Frazer (2007) Depoliticising Citizenship

This article was downloaded by: [Corporacion CINCEL]On: 21 November 2012, At: 13:03Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

British Journal of EducationalStudiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbje20

DEPOLITICISING CITIZENSHIPElizabeth Frazer aa New College, OxfordVersion of record first published: 05 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Elizabeth Frazer (2007): DEPOLITICISING CITIZENSHIP, BritishJournal of Educational Studies, 55:3, 249-263

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8527.2007.00378.x

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make anyrepresentation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up todate. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should beindependently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liablefor any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damageswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbje20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8527.2007.00378.x

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

British Journal of Educational Studies, ISSN

0007-1005

DOI

number: 10.1111/j.1467-8527.2007.00378.x

Vol.

55

, No.

3

, September

2007

, pp

249–263

249

© 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation © 2007 SES. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKBJESBritish Journal of Educational Studies0007-1005© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and SES 2007XXX

ORIGINAL ARTICLES

DEPOLITICISING CITIZENSHIPDEPOLITICISING CITIZENSHIP

DEPOLITICISING CITIZENSHIP

by

Elizabeth

Frazer

,

New College, Oxford

ABSTRACT: One problem faced by teachers of citizenship is that ‘politics’is negatively valued. The concept is actually ambiguous in value. Thepaper sets out a neutral, a negative, and a positive meaning of the term.It then goes on to explore the way that even on the positive constructionthere can seem to be ethical problems with politics. This explains bothaspects of numerous projects to ‘depoliticise’ society and government,and to depoliticise citizenship education. But, the alternatives meanthat we lose important political values.

Keywords: citizenship, politics, education

The project of citizenship education in schools raises a fundamentaland very difficult question: How can educators teach young peopleabout politics? For most of us ‘politics’, whatever country, whateverinstitution, whatever setting it is in, is an overwhelmingly dispiritingspectacle.

1

Public debates about policy and laws too often seem hardly worthyof the name ‘debate’. The party system – whether it is two parties ora multiplicity, whether governments are formed by some form of re-presentation of parties proportional to the votes cast for them, or bya winner takes all system – polarises deliberations and enquiries.Discussion seems to have little to do with the merits of the case, and agood deal to do with rival party members attacking one another.Partisan control means governments whose overwhelming preoccupa-tion is staying in power rather than developing wise public policy oradministering public resources prudentially.

This kind of negative perception of politics is pervasive, and isreflected in expressed scepticism, at best, and cynicism, at worst,about the motives and performance of elected representatives andministers. The problem of scepticism and cynicism is sometimes seenas a problem of attitudes and understanding, to which citizenshipeducation, among other measures, is one possible response. Forexample, the proposal for statutory provision of citizenship education

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


250

© 2007 The AuthorJournal compilation © 2007 SES

in schools in England and Wales made reference to ‘worrying levelsof apathy, ignorance and cynicism about public life’ (Advisory Groupon Citizenship, 1998). New forms of consultation and public deci-sion making are also proposed as public policy responses to apathyand cynicism. James Fishkin, for example, makes an argument for aconstitutionalised role for citizens’ juries (Fishkin, 1991). Tony Blair,as Prime Minister of the UK, recently argued about a ‘citizens’ policyreview seminar’ held at 10 Downing Street: ‘as for the general cyni-cism about policy, the important thing about a dialogue with people,and getting them to sit in the decision-maker’s chair, is that peoplethen understand that politics isn’t about a whole lot of very bad peo-ple who somehow have found their way to positions of public respon-sibility, doing their own thing, saying no to people for completelyperverse reasons, just trying to make a hash of things for the sake ofit’ (http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11148.asp; 3.iii.07).

It seems to me, however, that the pervasive negative perception ofpolitics is underlain by some deep problems and paradoxes in thevery idea of politics itself. I believe, as I go on to argue, that thesecould be addressed in public policy including education. But unlesswe explicitly address them, there is a danger that citizenship educa-tion, and public consultation exercises, will fail to get to the heart ofthe problem of democratic participation.

To begin with, let us note an equivocation in the concept ‘poli-tics’. It can be used quite value neutrally, to signify all those processespertaining to the power to govern – getting it, keeping it, opposingit, subverting it, squandering it and so on. This is how it tends to beused by social scientists and historians. For example, in his study of

Politics in the Ancient World

, Moses Finley characterises politics in thisrestricted sense: ‘the ways, informal as much as formal, in whichgovernment is conducted and governmental decisions are arrived at,and of accompanying ideology’ (Finley, 1983, p. vii).

However, more often than not in ordinary discourse, ‘politics’ hasnegative associations and connotations. Political conduct is associ-ated with strategic manouevring, cunning, a certain kind of ruthless-ness, mendacity, in connection with the pursuit of power; and to actpolitically is to act disreputably. Machiavelli is often referred to inconnection with this meaning. ‘Machiavellian’ is often used as amodifier, but equally often it is used as a synonym, for politics. Thisassociation between Machiavelli and disreputable political conduct isboth very old and unfair. Machiavelli’s views scandalised RenaissanceEngland, and ‘machiavellian’ is a commonplace for cultural com-mentators such as Shakespeare. Iago in

Othello

is a ‘machiavellian’operator; Machiavelli is invoked in

Henry VI part III

by the future

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12

http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11148.asp


251


Richard III, and in the

Jew of Malta

by Christopher Marlowe. Thisinterpretation of

The Prince

is contentious, it must be said. The bookcan, for instance, be read as satire. There is good reason to takeseriously Machiavelli’s republicanism as articulated in

The Discourses

(Bock

et al.

, 1990). One plausible reading is that the Prince is whatpeople will get if republican politics fails, and is itself a justificationof republicanism by way of warning of the alternatives. Be that as itmay, there is no doubt that for many people politics is ‘machiavelli-anism’ in the disreputable sense.

To these neutral and negatively valued meanings we can add acontrasting third. Politics is a particular kind of process of ‘govern-ment’, one which is based on conciliation. The resulting stability andorder are reasonable (Crick, 1992, p. 21). It is ‘the art of reachingdecisions by public discussion and then of obeying those decisions asa necessary condition of civilised social existence’ (Finley, 1985,pp. 13–14).

Political cultures vary, of course, but the negative connotations ofpolitics strikingly seem to outweigh the positive in the anglophoneand the European settings that I am familiar with; and in these andothers ‘politics’ as such is often associated with opportunities forand patterns of financial and other kinds of corruption. And yet,the positive view is never completely expunged. It recurs in politicalthinking and philosophy (Arendt, 1958; Crick, 1992; Stoker, 2006;Williams, 2005). ‘The political way’ is an alternative, articulated assuch, to the way of war, or uses of other kind of violence. We knowthat politics is the only real solution to the problems of Iraqi stateand society, or to the Palestine–Israel conflict.

Now, obviously, this suggests a project. We should point out howmuch we depend on politics in its good sense. We should expoundpolitics’ virtues and its advantages over alternatives like violence. Inthis paper I am going to do just that. But I first want to point outsome deeper paradoxes in politics. Let’s take it in its good sense,meaning roughly a public process of the conciliation of all relevantand rival interests and views about an issue so that an authoritativeand legitimate decision can be reached with relevant officialsempowered to dispose of the necessary resources in order to executethe decision. Note, in passing, that on this characterisation of a politicalprocess the decision can be that regarding who should be authorisedto govern; or it can be one regarding the passing of a law makingsomething illegal or legal; or it can be one regarding the propulsionof some issue, like the sexual division of labour, or the social stand-ing of a minority group, onto the public agenda, with the aim ofa cultural or social change. Even when we take politics in its good

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


252


sense, though, we are going to see reasons why people might stillview it with suspicion or distaste, or find it morally dubious.

First, if you want your point to be persuasive it’s often best not tosay what you really think or feel. Rhetorical care will be effectivewhere blunt truth is not. Political action always involves coalitions –making alliances with people with whom you disagree in some mattersor to some degree. In order to make these alliances, it is necessary toact strategically, perhaps suppressing some immediate goals or prin-ciples in favour of longer term or more important ones. Strategicaction smacks horribly of game playing, and moral persons believethat games should not be played around peace and war and povertyand education and health. That is, politics seems to be necessarilyassociated with dissimulation. It can seem to involve a compromisewith truth (Arendt, 1968; Bok, 1999; Nagel, 1998; Williams, 2005).

Second, politics is associated with ‘talk talk talk’. Reasonable,practical people can often see straightforward ways to tackle pro-blems like poverty and injustice. What we need is ‘action, action,action’. The political process strikes many practical people as awaste of energy. Politicians look like an effete and vacillating lot,with their procrastination and endless deliberation, and executivedeficits. Ethically, it can look criminally immoral to sit around talk-ing and negotiating and trying to agree on a form of words forsome useless document or other, when we could just go straight outand feed hungry people, or build roads, or get nurses to work inhospitals.

Third, politics stands in a difficult relationship with violence.Governments wield sovereign power, and political effort is, in part,the effort to win the offices that control sovereign power. Sovereignpower is the power of life and death – the power to make war, todirect police forces, to punish criminals. For this reason, pacificallyminded individuals can seriously argue that ethical persons shouldnot have anything to do with state power (Tolstoy, 1987). But youdon’t have to be a thoroughgoing pacifist to be troubled by thedisciplinary and punitive power of legislation and administration.Politics is associated with violence other than the violence of thestate, too. Many individuals are repelled by the hints of violence andaggression in political events such as demonstrations and even theexercise of free speech. Partisan debate about policy decisions canstrike many as uncomfortably antagonistic. The political processinvolves competition for office; it involves disagreement and argu-ment. Obviously, these antagonisms can be conducted within theconstraints of different cultural norms of politeness and face-saving.But practices of civility do not wholly disguise the competition that

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


253


underlies political life. And from the point of view of many criticsthis antagonism is uncomfortably close to hostility.

We have a problem. Politics poses a problem for education because,it seems, to educate people politically is to educate them out of ethics.Politics is uncomfortably close to lying, to procrastination and evasion,and to antagonism and aggression. In response we find a series of ideasof how to do government and organisation without politics. These projectsparallel a series of ways in which citizenship, in education, is depolit-icised. What could human social life be like, if it were depoliticised?

An obvious alternative is some kind of reversion to nature. Fromtime to time ‘sociobiology’ becomes quite influential. The idea isthat we can’t buck nature; we have to recognise our group and bio-logically competitive nature. From the point of view of organisationthis would mean leaving the dominant to decide and to lead. Whoactually is dominant could be determined in the time honoured wayby success in reproduction and by fighting; by male bonding and theexclusion of the female and the weak (Tiger, 1969; Tiger and Fox,1971). Although sociobiology of this form is now very dated andaspects of the theory have been displaced, as I understand it, byrecent breakthroughs in the understanding of human genetics, it isworth including it here both because the idea of ‘natural’ non-politicalalternatives recur in popular thinking, and also because the ideathat structures of political power are underpinned by competitionbetween men for dominance and for the control of females is impor-tant in the history of political thought (Pateman, 1989).

More peaceably, markets can be the mechanism that determineswho gets what and how. Again, proponents of market solutions oftenargue that market exchange is, in some sense, natural, and trying tocontrol exchange or evade market outcomes is impossible in anycase. This view is associated most notably with the work of F.A.Hayek, a reading of whose liberalism was influential with ‘new right’governments and projects to substitute market mechanisms forauthoritative governmental decisions and distributions. Hayekargued that market formations are an example of ‘spontaneousorder’ to be compared favourably with distorting and in the endunsustainable state coercion. However, it must be said that manylibertarian readings of Hayek dwell on this aspect of the theory andoverlook his distinctive theory of law (Hayek, 1960, 1982). The ideathat as much of people’s lives as possible should be depoliticised,and should be free from law and regulation, allowed to be orderedby market mechanisms, is notably proposed by Nozick (1974).

A third alternative is to suggest that people have the capacityfor cooperative self-organisation in communities. Providing the scale is

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


254


right, people who share values and ways of life could organise andgovern themselves. Communitarianism recurs again and again in thehistory of ethics and social theory. The idea of the self-governingcommunity of course is implicit in Marx’s vision of depoliticised lifewhen economic exploitation has ended (‘Individuals, class and com-munity’ in Marx and Engels, 1970). Recent political communitarian-ism attempts to spell out a way that rejects both the state with itscoercion and its bureaucracy, and the market with its commodific-ation and its inequitable distributive outcomes, giving distributivepower to communities, relying on shared norms (Etzioni, 1993).

These three solutions to rule all focus on the idea that there arenatural, spontaneous, or truly human modes of organisation and order.A problem with politics is that it is artificial and non-natural. Theethical problems associated with it, by implication, are to do with thisforced quality. A similar motivation and rationale can lie behind theidea that society, state and government are structured like a kinshipgroup or household. Schools and other similar institutions often,of course, proclaim themselves as families. At least head teachersfrequently aspire to have their school members conduct themselveslike family members, with themselves as respected parents.

We can also look at alternatives to the political way by focusing onthe kind of power that is deemed to be effective and legitimate.There are numerous claims for uses of spiritual or religious power.As a matter of fact, of course, we often find that those who have the powerto offer salvation or its equivalent actually can take hold of thepower to govern. Theocrats also find this quite proper – religiouspower gives a rightful claim to rule. Furthermore, it is argued, a societyorganised according to religious prescription will be a harmoniousone. Significant, and successful, claims are also made by those whocontrol military power. Compared to politicians, who are an effete,vacillating lot, the military claim uprightness and the right kind ofmasculinity; military power can keep order where political power,allegedly, brings disorder and corruption.

There are other claims. In connection with market policies it isoften thought that officers of the state should be managers andentrepreneurs, or other experts whose decisions and actions wouldbe authoritative by virtue of their efficiency and special knowledge,not by virtue of their capacity to conciliate rival views. It is sometimesthought that in a society governed by the rule of law, judges are andshould be the real rulers. Politics is thought by critics to be ineffi-cient and unprincipled. These projects set out to displace it, correctit with something else – something more rational, or less artificial,or more efficient, less frictional. It’s actually very useful to dwell on

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


255


what the world would be like if any of these alternatives whollydisplaced political processes. Of course, they never could really.Actually existing societies we know about consist of combinations indifferent quantities of all these mechanisms and forms of power. Butnevertheless, it’s the shortcomings of the political way that promptthese and other such projects. And they invite us to think, as manyof us have over the last thirty years, what lives would be like if allgoods were allocated by market mechanisms; or if all life were sub-ject to military order or managerial capability; if religious authoritycould order society. What would happen really if traditional commu-nity power structured authority and made critical decisions? Con-ducting these thought experiments can bring sharply into view whatwe would lose if we eliminated politics from life.

Let’s turn to some answers to these questions. Politics is a public(visible and audible) process and onlookers are entitled to askparticipants, in whatever role, to account publicly for what they do.When I’m out shopping there is no norm that demands that I answera passer-by or fellow shopper who asks me what I’m up to; when I’mon a demonstration, there is; as a representative, or a civil servant Iexpect to be held formally to account for my actions in that role. Agood deal of military action takes place publicly, as a spectacle; butthe norms of accountability are by no means the same. One of thepoints of expertise is that it is justified independently of any publicprocess of accounting. This takes us to another feature of politics. Ifa group with power is going to decide on a course of action which isopposed by another group, the opposition and its grounds must betaken into account. That is, deliberation must be conciliatory. Thisdoes not mean the opposition gets its way, or that it is satisfied; butnevertheless political process itself fully acknowledges opposition,and a number of features of political decision making (deliberationitself, decisiveness) embody this acknowledgement. By contrast, if Ilose out in a market transaction nobody need acknowledge my loss.One meaning of ‘politicisation’ is the process of drawing attentionto, and taking full account of, the consequences of mechanisms suchas markets, or the exertion of power by people over others.

Office is another key characteristic of politics. A political processworks through agreed upon or established procedures, and thoseprocedures are conducted, overseen and administered by officers,who by virtue of their office, have duties. This is partly a matter ofthe accountability mentioned earlier. But most importantly officesare agreed – perhaps the most important aspect of political power ispower to decide how we are going to decide. (Contrast this with thenatural order of prides of lions and packs of monkeys and uses of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


256


physical domination; or with the single simple market mechanism ofprice.) The reasoning political actors engage in must be prudential.This is because a political process is decisive, and binding on all, sothe consequences of it are grave. (Compare this with market mech-anisms, where there is no collective prudence; or religious law aspresented by Moses.)

All of these principles add up to something very distinct aboutpolitics – it is inevitably an open-ended process. Notwithstandingwhat I said about the bindingness and finality of political decisions,they are always revisitable and always will be revisited. This is anothersource of frustration for politics’ critics. Whereas some critics dislikepolitics because it involves decisive use of power, and therefore impliesauthority and closure, other critics dislike it because it is never-ending. Decisions aren’t quite made, forms of words are agreed so thatdisagreement can be glossed over – and we have to come back, timeand again, to the original dispute which is never, really, finally, settled.

This open-endedness would be a loss, indeed, from those designsfor society that seek to minimise or eliminate it. Think about thealternatives. The disadvantages of leaving social organisation to ‘natural’power, or to local or small scale community life, or to the market, ormilitary violence, or the authority of religious salvation are numerous.In each case we are likely to worry about exclusion – to turn to thepolitical value of conciliation in order to at the very least acknowl-edge loss or disadvantage. We can’t be silent about loss and disadvan-tage – to acknowledge them publicly is to politicise them. In politics,account has to be made. Situations of loss or disadvantage are neverclosed, never finalised. Even if an authoritative institution manageseffectively to conceal or disguise loss the fact of politics means thatit is not immune from notice, not immune from agitation, notimmune from publicity.

I want now to return to the pedagogical problem. I began by ask-ing how we can teach young people about politics. First, there is theproblem of ethics. It seems difficult to hold political processes up asmodels for the young. Second, politics is competitive. It is about rivalclaims in public policy, or rival claims to govern. Understanding itand discussion of it involves getting to grips with controversial issues.These can be to do with profound moral disagreements that meanthat public policy cannot please everyone, or with rival claims togoods, or with disputes about what kinds of action and strategy arepermissible in political pursuit of a group’s claims. Third, the open-ness of politics poses its own pedagogical problem. Openness, whichI present as a virtue of politics, can from another value viewpoint beseen as a weakness of political way. Politics doesn’t settle things. It is

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


257


associated with havering and wavering. What do we say about this?Do we tell young people that adults can’t solve pressing problems?

In many curriculum areas we take it for granted that truth has tobe compromised for pedagogical reasons. For instance, when teachersteach physical sciences, or history, they take it for granted that everyyear you have to tell young people that what they learned last yearwasn’t right – that it was a simplification, or it was partial. But itseems worse – even unacceptable – to go in for this kind of pedagog-ical misrepresentation when it comes to talking and teaching aboutpolitical issues. Thoughtful people have difficulty with the idea ofvarnishing the political truth – pretending, for instance, that issuesare settled politically when they’re not. The openness and never-endingness of political process gives the political story the oppositeof the structure of the fairy tale. Rather than lying, it seems preferableto leave politics for the grown ups.

It has become something of a standard complaint by educational-ists and political theorists that citizenship education is consistentlydepoliticised. When we take into account this analysis of politics – nowonder. In response, partly, to this, so-called multidimensionalmodels of citizenship have been embraced by educators. Such modelsemphasise that citizenship has a cultural dimension – it is about lifeand participation in a given society. It has an economic dimension –preparing young people to participate in the processes by whichgoods are produced and consumed, and households support them-selves. It has a legal aspect – which will vary from state to state. Its eth-ical aspect puts constraints on character and conduct. And so on.The problem with the way such multidimensional models have cometo dominate the citizenship education scene is that the politicalaspect of citizenship is relatively downgraded, if not eclipsed altogether.Most often, it is eclipsed.

‘Citizenship’ is, properly speaking, a political relationship. Origi-nally the term designates membership of a state, nowadays of a fed-eral or nation state usually; but it also designates the political aspectsof our local relationships in town, county or commune, and otherorganisations. Now, I am aware that there are many analyses anddefinitions of citizenship that elide this. Citizenship is defined as‘membership of a community’. Marshall (1950, p. xx) gives thisdefinition and it is rather often repeated by later theorists who, arguably,then contribute to a tradition of depoliticising citizenship. Marshallcannot, surely, have meant that any member of any communitywhatsoever – for instance, a religious community, or a community ofinterest – is a citizen. But this looseness in definition has, indeed,contributed to a discursive context in which ‘citizen’ has a very vague

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


258


reference. To be sure with this kind of very general definition we canspeak of ‘a good citizen’ as any one who, in any community whatso-ever, pulls their weight with regards to the common good, upholdsthe organisation and its values, takes responsibility and so on. Andwe do talk this way. But if we consistently think of citizenship withoutany reference to political power, we are omitting something crucial.

To speak of ourselves as ‘citizens’ is to claim a particular kind ofdignity, to proclaim a particular kind of relationship with our fellows,a particular set of responsibilities and privileges, and a particularkind of relationship with those who hold office, and rule, whetherlocally or at the national state level. In particular, as citizens of ademocracy we might be those rulers – we might run for office. Andas citizens in any kind of polity we have an interest in decisions thatare made – whether these are about very local matters like play-grounds or very big matters like invasions and immigration policy. Asadult consumers we might say that playground provision is of nointerest to us; as citizens, if we are acting as citizens, we must be inter-ested in public and merit goods that are provided by the politicalauthority. This interest we have in such matters, though, has as aninevitable corollary conflict – we will find ourselves in conflict withothers who take a different view, or have a different style of argument.Citizenship in this sense is inescapably competitive. It is conflictualas politics is conflictual. But, given what I’ve said about politics, thisaspect of citizenship can be unwelcome and unattractive.

Is it any wonder, then, that in the implementation of the citizen-ship curriculum in England and Wales schools have overwhelminglyconcentrated on life skills instead of political literacy, on communityinstead of civic skills? Of course citizenship involves skills and com-petences; but it also involves relationships in the polity. Of course, itinvolves membership of a community – but it is also premissed onmembership of a state or its equivalent. Of course, to be a citizenrequires civility; but it also involves friction and rivalry.

I want to draw attention to two things. First, politics can’t be elim-inated. It can certainly go badly which is to say that its negative mean-ing can dominate. It can be scorned and treated with contempt.Actors can attempt to evade it or displace it with community orviolence or religion or something else. In human societies there isconflict, oppression and exploitation. Where these are, people will –probably – act politically. They will get together, and cooperate, anddecide, and act up publicly, and attempt to hold the powerful toaccount for power and injustice. Second, we need politics, becausein human societies as such there is conflict. Conflict is why magic, orreligious power, or markets, won’t do. Such forms of rule will be, and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


259


should be, resisted by those who are disadvantaged by them. Conflict,both in the form of disagreement, and in the form of oppression,exploitation and exclusion, is a necessary condition for politics. Andpolitical process, with its procedural values of publicity, deliberation,office, and prudence is the best way to conduct conflict.

Now, here I have not talked of democracy, or justice. This analysissays nothing specific about theories of sovereignty. It is consistentwith a certain kind of monarchy, and a certain kind of democracy. Itis neutral in itself between ideologies and constitutional approachessuch as liberalism or conservatism. However, I hasten to say, this doesnot mean it is neutral as between all possible ideologies. Some arequite inconsistent with political values and conduct.

My argument is that liberal democratic political cultures have lostsight of the foundational political power that underpins them. Theconcepts laid out here are relatively unfamiliar to most citizens.I connect this to the conduct of political theory and philosophy inrecent decades. An emphasis there has tended to be on the policygoals and ethical ends on which we should fix. Less attention hasbeen paid to the political process by which those ends must bereached, and the virtues or characteristics of actors that are neededfor that process to go well. The point is that where politics is rela-tively disvalued or positively disliked, then there is a temptation toconclude that if a magician could magic us into a just state, or a phi-losopher king could somehow impose on us a constitution for jus-tice, then that should be our choice. John Rawl’s theory, for instance,certainly was read this way, as fixed on the desirable end state withthe implication that the philosopher king both should pronounceon what that end state is, even if that is counterintuitive for somemembers of the society, and should govern so as to bring about thatendstate regardless of the motivations of citizens (Rawls, 1971).

There are two problems with this idea of a just society. First, it isa model of a just society without just citizens. That is to say, withoutcitizens who themselves engage in the pursuit of justice. Second,then, the justice that resulted would either be held in place by mas-sive authoritarian power; or it would be very fragile. Philosophicaltruth may be a necessary but it is not a sufficient foundation. Thatis, justice must be built on the foundations of true political power.(Rawls’ later work is much more focused on processes of publicdeliberation, although some critics argue that it is still insufficientlyresponsive to the real conflicts of pluralistic societies (Rawls, 1993).)

By political power, let us remind ourselves, we mean the cooper-ative power to get together publicly and decide how to decide, todecide, to have methods of making the decision stick, and methods

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


260


of implementation. Politics as a process connected with the power togovern must rest on this more fundamental political power. Just asthe power to govern can be lost, subverted or squandered, so wecollectively can lose, or lose consciousness of, the underlying politicalpower. Political power truly is a property of people; although it is nota property that all people everywhere can effectively deploy.

There are strands in the field of political theory which take thisconstitutive political power, and the virtues of politics, much moreseriously. Some work directly addresses the issue of political virtue inthe sense I have set it out here, inspired by the work of HannahArendt (Arendt 1958, 1968). More familiar is the work of delibera-tive democrats with their explicit focus on processes of deliberation(Dryzek 1990, 2000).

Schools, colleges and universities are great places in whichpeople – teachers, staff and students – can familiarise themselveswith the political way. The analogy between school and polity is ofcourse not perfect. But it’s as close as we get – compare the schoolwith the workplaces most of us enter later, or the commercial spacesof the leisure economy. In education institutions people (this canbe from their earliest days) have responsibilities for tasks. They canbe introduced to the principle of accountability and the constraintsof office.

Sadly, though, participation in decision making in school is oftenpatchy and ineffective. Children and students are frequently frus-trated by consultative committees and the like, and oppressed byhead teachers and other authorities’ decisiveness. So school, withits playground and its classroom representatives and its citizenshipdays, can be an object lesson in how awful and petty and uselesspolitics is.

Schools in many settings also model religious hierarchy; or theymodel productive firms for which the young people are inputs tobe turned into outputs of young people with educational creden-tials. Understandably perhaps, given the pressure that schoolsface in containing the social stresses that result from deprivation,not really good enough parenting, and the pressures of the market,as well as the pressure to produce results, headteachers produceauthoritarian styles of leadership or management, and teachersdemand this, at least where maintaining social order among thestudents is concerned.

In these kinds of contexts the demands for citizenship educationare most easily deflected, even in schools that take the projectseriously, into fundraising for charity, or, to a lesser extent becauseit’s harder to organise, into volunteering in the local area, and into

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


261


some developments of the programmes of social, personal andhealth education that are very common in UK schools.

What is missing? What’s missing is systematic discourse of politicalpower of the sort I have been outlining and recommending in thispaper. I mean a self-conscious understanding of political virtues byteachers, self-conscious and developed standards of proceduraljustice so that decision making and conflict resolution in school,classroom and playground can be systematically related to the beststandards of politics in the state and between states. In formal class-room work I think this should mean sustained attention to states,inter- and supra-state institutions and organisations, their constitu-tions, the values that are articulated in their constitutions, and theway these values have or have not been, are or are not, realised inpolitical events.

But this of course presents us with a problem. It means thatteachers need a developed sense of specifically political power,political procedures, and political virtue. As I have said, our liberaldemocratic societies have to a large extent suppressed this sense.There are clear historical reasons why liberals have emphasisedthe foundational status of market relations; why in many places thecultural or religious underpinnings of the national culture have tra-ditionally been central to common understandings. And there areclear historical reasons why progressive, radical and liberal personscommunicate to the young a pervasive disenchantment with, orcynicism about, political institutions, political procedures and,especially, politicians. But these historical reasons have too often, intoo many places, driven out any positive appreciation of the valuesof politics.

If teachers are to develop a sense of the special nature of politicalpower (as opposed to its rivals), a sense of the particular legitimacyof political decision making (as opposed to the other ways that humansocieties also use), then they and the rest of us need to practise facingup to the difficulty of political conflict, and facing in a non-fatalisticfashion the dissatisfactions of the political way. This means thatwe must develop, for ourselves and for young people, a clear andarticulated commitment, which we attempt to make part of our polit-ical cultures, of the virtues and the wonders of the political way.

Note

1

This paper is an amended version of a speech given at the International Con-ference on Citizenship and Teacher Education, Oriel College, Oxford, July2006.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


262


References

ADVISORY GROUP ON CITIZENSHIP (1998)

Education for Citizenship and the Teach-ing of Democracy in Schools

(London, Qualifications and Curriculum Authority).ARENDT, H. (1958)

The Human Condition

(Chicago, University of Chicago Press).ARENDT, H. (1968, 1st edn. 1954) Truth and politics. In H. ARENDT (Ed.)

BetweenPast and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought

(New York, Viking Press), 227–264.BOCK, G., SKINNER, Q. and VIROLI, M. (Eds) (1990)

Machiavelli and Republicanism

(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).BOK, S. (1999, 1st edn. 1978)

Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life

(New York,Vintage Books).

CRICK, B. (1992, 1st edn. 1962)

In Defence of Politics

. 4th edn. (Harmondsworth,Penguin), 21.

DRYZEK, J.S. (1990)

Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science

(Cam-bridge, Cambridge University Press).

DRYZEK, J.S. (2000)

Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations

(Oxford, Oxford University Press).ETZIONI, A. (1993)

The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communi-tarian Agenda

(London, Fontana).FINLEY, M.I. (1983)

Politics in the Ancient World

(Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress).

FINLEY, M.I. (1985, 1st edn. 1973)

Democracy Ancient and Modern

, revised edn. (NewBrunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press).

FISHKIN, J. (1991)

Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform

(New Haven CT, Yale University Press).HAYEK, F.A. (1960)

The Constitution of Liberty

(London, Routledge).HAYEK, F.A. (1982, 1st edn. 1973–1979)

Law, Legislation and Liberty: a New Statementof the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy

(London, Routledge andKegan Paul).

MACHIAVELLI, N. (1961, 1st edn. 1532)

The Prince

. Trans. G. BULL (Harmonds-worth, Penguin).

MACHIAVELLI, N. (1970, 1st edn. 1531)

The Discourses

. Transl. L.J. WALKER SJ, Ed.B. CRICK (Harmondsworth, Penguin).

MARSHALL, T.H. (1950)

Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays

(Cambridge,Cambridge University Press).

MARX, K. and ENGELS, F. (1970, drafted 1845–46)

The German Ideology

. Ed. andIntro C.J. ARTHUR. Part One with selections from Parts Two and Three (Lon-don, Lawrence and Wishart).

NAGEL, T. (1998) Concealment and Exposure,

Philosophy and Public Affairs

, 27, 1,3–30.

NOZICK, R. (1974)

Anarchy, State and Utopia

(Oxford, Basil Blackwell).PATEMAN, C. (1989) The fraternal social contract. In C. PATEMAN

The Disorder ofWomen

(Cambridge, Polity Press).RAWLS, J. (1971)

A Theory of Justice

(Oxford, Clarendon Press).RAWLS, J. (1993)

Political Liberalism

,

John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, No. 4

(New York,Columbia University Press).

STOKER, G. (2006)

Why Politics Matter

(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan).TIGER, L. (1969)

Men in Groups

(London, Thomas Nelson and Sons).TIGER, L. and FOX. R. (1971)

The Imperial Animal

(London, Secker and Warburg).TOLSTOY, L. (1987, 1st edn. Russian 1908) The law of love and the law of violence.

In J. KENTISH (Ed.)

Leo Tolstoy: a Confession and Other Religious Writings

(Har-mondsworth, Penguin).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12


263


WILLIAMS, B. (2005)

In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in PoliticalArgument

. Selected, edited and with an introduction by G. HAWTHORN (Princ-eton NJ, Princeton University Press).

Correspondence

Dr Elizabeth Frazer New College Oxford OX1 3BN E-mail: [email protected]

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cor

pora

cion

CIN

CE

L]

at 1

3:03

21

Nov

embe

r 20

12

Frazer (2007) Depoliticising Citizenship

Documents

Transcript of Frazer (2007) Depoliticising Citizenship