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![Page 1: Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011 Detailed Analysis of the Impact of Distributed Generation and Active Network Management on Network Protection Systems.](https://reader036.fdocuments.in/reader036/viewer/2022062804/5697bf9e1a28abf838c940eb/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Detailed Analysis of the Impact of
Distributed Generation and Active
Network Management on Network
Protection Systems
Federico Coffele
University of Strathclyde (UK)[email protected]
RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 2
Overview
Test Case Network
Protection System
Simulated Scenarios
Analysis Methodology
Findings
Conclusions
Future Work
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Test Case Network
United Kingdom Generic Distribution Network (UKGDS) HV Overhead Type A Network.
The high-level characteristics of this model are as follows:
rural arealong circuit lengthlow customer densityoverhead constructionradial topologylarge overall size
CBT1-11
CBT1-33
CBT2-11
CBT2-33B33kV
B11kV
SpurA1
SpurA2
SpurA3
SpurA4
SpurA5
SpurA6
SpurA7
SpurA8
SpurA9
SpurA10
SpurB1
SpurB2
SpurB3
SpurB4
SpurB5
SpurC3
SpurC4
SpurC1
SpurC2
R-A R-B R-C
PMAR-A
PMAR-B PMAR-C
Feed
er A
Feed
er B
Feed
er C
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 3
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Protection System
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 4
0.10
1.00
10.00
10 100 1000 10000
CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 (1stage): SI, 300 A, TMS 0.2CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 (2stage): SI, 300 A, TMS 0.25CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 DOC: SI, 60 A, TMS 0.1R-A: 400 A, 0.25s DTLPMAR-A: 200 A, 0.1s DTL
sec
A
0,10
1,00
10,00
10 100 1000 10000
CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 (1PH EF 1 stage): SI, 145 A, TMS 0.35
CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 (1PH EF 2 stage): SI, 145 A, TMS 0.4
CBT1-11 & CBT2-11 (SEF): 21 A, 7s DTL
CB-A: 30 A, 0.25s DTL
CB-A (SEF): 21 A, 5s DTL
PMAR-A: 30 A, 0.1s DTL
PMAR-A (SEF)
A
sec
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Simulated Scenarios
Types of DG:Inverter interfaced generators (e.g. photovoltaic generation, electric vehicle to grid, etc.)Synchronous and induction (e.g. combined heat and power (CHP), biomass, landfill, wind generators, etc.)
The overall level of DG penetration has been simulated from zero up to a combined total capacity equal to 100% of the network load capacity in steps of 5%.
Network automation:
Further scenarios have been added to reflect changes in the topology of the network, i.e. closing and shifting the positions of normally open points (NOP).
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 5
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Methodology
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 6
Scenarios
Faults
Fault currentscalculation
Protection system response calculation
Protectionsystem data
Performance analysis
Protectionrequirements
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Findings
The following protection problems have been investigated by the protection
performance analysis:
Sympathetic tripping
Overload tripping
Blinding
Grading degradation
Beside to the investigation of the problems, possible solutions have been analysed and there advantages/disadvantages have been evaluated.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 7
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Sympathetic tripping Sympathetic tripping may occur when the contribution of DG lead to a situation where
non-directional overcurrent relays mal-operate at the same time as, or before, protection on the faulted zone.
Considering the test case network with DLT protection, the incidence of sympathetic tripping due to synchronous DG is:
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 8
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Inci
denc
e of
Sym
path
etic
Trip
ping
(%)
Synchronous DG penetration (%)
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Solution Directional overcurrent protection?
It works but it is an expensive solution!
IDMT protection instead of DTL protection:It works and it is a cheap solution.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Inci
denc
e of
Sym
path
etic
Trip
ping
(%)
Synchronous DG penetration (%)
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Overload tripping
Overload tripping may occur if DG interface protection operates (either correctly or incorrectly) and results in the addition of previously “hidden” load.
This was observed in the scenarios where DG penetration exceeded 55% and network automation was available to reconfigure the network after a permanent fault.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 10
SpurA1
SpurA2
SpurA3
SpurA4
SpurA5
SpurA6
SpurA7
SpurA8
SpurA9 SpurA10
SpurB1
SpurB2
SpurB3
SpurB4
SpurB5
R-A R-B
PMAR-A
PMAR-B
S2
S3
S4
S5
B11kV
SpurC3
SpurC4
SpurC1
SpurC2
R-C
PMAR-C
Feed
er C
NOP
NOP
Permanent fault
S3
NOP
Fault
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Protection grading degradation
When the network topology is changed, the protection grading between OCRs might not be valid anymore.
Considering this specific case, PMAR-B tripping is unnecessary and could cause disconnection of several customers and 2 DG units.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 11
SpurA1
SpurA2
SpurA3
SpurA4
SpurA5
SpurA6
SpurA7
SpurA8
SpurA9 SpurA10
SpurB1
SpurB2
SpurB3
SpurB4
SpurB5
R-A R-B
PMAR-A
PMAR-B
S2
S3
S4
S5
B11kV
SpurC3
SpurC4
SpurC1
SpurC2
R-C
PMAR-C
Feed
er C
NOP
NOP
Permanent fault
S3
NOP
Fault
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Solution One very attractive solution is to implement an adaptive overcurrent protection
system.
The protection system is composed of:
New overcurrent relays
Adaptive protection controller
The adaptive protection controller monitors the distribution network and amend the protection settings to optimize the performance of the protection system.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 12
CBT1-11
CBT1-33
CBT2-11
CBT2-33B33kV
B11kV
SpurA1
SpurA2
SpurA3
SpurA4
SpurA5
SpurA6
SpurA7
SpurA8
SpurA9 SpurA10
SpurB1
SpurB2
SpurB3
SpurB4
SpurB5
SpurC3
SpurC4
SpurC1
SpurC2
R-A R-B R-C
PMAR-A
PMAR-B PMAR-C
Feed
er A
Feed
er B
Feed
er C
NOP
NOP
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Conclusions Considering a typical UK distribution network the simulation
outcomes show that the protection systems can mal-operate.
Solutions to the discussed problems are:
Sympathetic tripping can be avoided with correct protection settings.
Overload tripping due to false tripping of generator interface protections can be avoided improving the generator interface protection
Protection grading degradation can be solved implementing an adaptive overcurrent protection system.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 13
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Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011
Future work
Simulation of the UKGDS model and network automation within RTDS.
Implementation of the protection system with commercial IED.
Demonstration of the protection problems and further analysis.
Development and testing of the proposed solutions.
Federico Coffele – UK– RIF Session 3 – Paper 0428 Slide N. 14
Protection IEDs
Substation Gateway
HMI
LAN Interface
D&A Interface
RTDS