Frank C

owell:

Frank C

owell: E

conomics

Econom

ics Public E

conomics

Public E

conomics

MSc Public Economics 2010/11

http://darp.lse.ac.uk/ec426

Wealth TaxationWealth Taxation

31 January 2010

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Overview...Wealth taxation

Wealth distribution

Wealth trends

Long-run models

Wealth Distribution and Taxation

Why wealth taxation? Types of tax

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Why wealth taxation?

Revenue raising?Revenue raising? Estate, inheritance and gift taxes as percent of total tax revenueEstate, inheritance and gift taxes as percent of total tax revenue Cremer and Pestieau (2003) from OECD Revenue Statistics (2000)Cremer and Pestieau (2003) from OECD Revenue Statistics (2000)

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Efficiency and equity considerations

Efficiency case for or against wealth taxes is unclearEfficiency case for or against wealth taxes is unclear ((Cremer and Cremer and PestieauPestieau 2003 2003))

Equity case for wealth taxes is more promisingEquity case for wealth taxes is more promising But needs careful empirical analysisBut needs careful empirical analysis Who owns what?Who owns what?

Direct impact of wealth taxes on redistribution likely to be smallDirect impact of wealth taxes on redistribution likely to be small small revenue raised…small revenue raised… ……less than 1% of receipts?less than 1% of receipts? not much taken from rich to give to poornot much taken from rich to give to poor

But what of long run? But what of long run? taxes may influence savings behaviour and bequest behaviourtaxes may influence savings behaviour and bequest behaviour these influence wealth accumulation and inequalitythese influence wealth accumulation and inequality

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Forms of wealth taxation

Annual wealth tax:Annual wealth tax: mostly on an overall measure of net worthmostly on an overall measure of net worth some specific wealth taxes (property taxes)some specific wealth taxes (property taxes)

Inheritance tax: Inheritance tax: taxes taxes transfertransfer of wealth at death of wealth at death taxes the beneficiaries of the estatetaxes the beneficiaries of the estate

Estate tax:Estate tax: taxes taxes transfertransfer of wealth at death of wealth at death taxes the personal representatives of the deceasedtaxes the personal representatives of the deceased also known as estate duty / death dutyalso known as estate duty / death duty

Transfer taxTransfer tax taxes taxes transfertransfer of wealth not necessarily at death of wealth not necessarily at death

Some jurisdictions without wealth taxation Some jurisdictions without wealth taxation

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Overview...Wealth taxation

Wealth distribution

Wealth trends

Long-run models

Wealth Distribution and Taxation

Definitions, composition and inequality

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Wealth concepts in the UK

British Household Panel SurveyBritish Household Panel Survey fairly comprehensivefairly comprehensive suffers from standard participation / attrition problemssuffers from standard participation / attrition problems

Wealth and assets surveyWealth and assets survey uses survey and administrative data – comprehensiveuses survey and administrative data – comprehensive newly emerged, so no time-series analysisnewly emerged, so no time-series analysis

HMRC Identified personal wealthHMRC Identified personal wealth emerges directly from the estate multiplier methodemerges directly from the estate multiplier method it is clearly biased (missing wealth, missing persons)it is clearly biased (missing wealth, missing persons) differs from balance-sheet concept of wealthdiffers from balance-sheet concept of wealth

HMRC Series C: marketable wealth onlyHMRC Series C: marketable wealth only valuation issues addressedvaluation issues addressed excluded population correctedexcluded population corrected

HMRC Series D: includes a valuation of pension rightsHMRC Series D: includes a valuation of pension rights HMRC Series E: includes a valuation of state pension rightsHMRC Series E: includes a valuation of state pension rights

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HMRC “Identified wealth” 2003

Residential buildings about 50% of net worth, except for £500,000+

Debts concentrated amongst those with less than £100,000

Securities concentrated amongst the rich

net

capi

tal v

alue

of

esta

te

Secu

riti

es

Cas

h

Loa

ns, m

ortg

ages

et

c

Pol

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s of

in

sura

nce

Res

iden

tial

bu

ildin

gs

Oth

er B

uild

ings

an

d L

and

Oth

er a

sset

s

Net

as

% g

ross

Mor

tgag

es

Oth

er d

ebts

0 - £50,000 4.6% 22.7% 5.6% 8.9% 47.6% 0.1% 10.5% 61.0% 5.7% 33.4%

£50000 - £100,000 4.5% 16.2% 3.0% 14.6% 55.0% 0.0% 6.8% 83.3% 4.1% 12.6%

£100000 - £150,000 3.9% 14.0% 2.4% 18.6% 55.2% 0.1% 5.8% 84.4% 4.3% 11.3%

£150000 - £200,000 4.5% 14.4% 0.7% 12.1% 59.4% 1.6% 7.5% 89.0% 4.9% 6.1%

£200000 - £500,000 8.5% 12.8% 0.9% 12.6% 54.7% 1.5% 9.0% 89.7% 6.5% 3.8%

£500000 - £1000,000 17.6% 11.2% 1.6% 7.6% 42.5% 5.3% 14.1% 93.8% 3.9% 2.3%

£1,000,000 and over 23.8% 10.8% 1.9% 5.0% 28.1% 8.1% 22.4% 94.2% 2.9% 3.0%

Source: HMRC statistics table 13.2Source: HMRC statistics table 13.2

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Proportion of wealth in securities. UK 2003

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%age 18-44

age 45-64

aged 65 and over

All ages

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Proportion of wealth in residential buildings. UK 1999

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%age 18-44

age 45-64

aged 65 and over

All ages

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Proportion of wealth in residential buildings. UK 2003

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

0 - £50,000 £50,000 - £100,000 - £150,000 - £200,000 - £500,000 - £1,000,000 -

age 18-44

age 45-64

aged 65 and over

All ages

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Wealth distribution by age

1999. Quantile points of top...

£0

£200,000

£400,000

£600,000

£800,000

£1,000,000

£1,200,000

age 18-44

age 45-64

aged 65 and over

40%

30%

20%

10%

5%

1%

2003. Quantile points of top...

£0

£200,000

£400,000

£600,000

£800,000

£1,000,000

£1,200,000

age 18-44

age 45-64

aged 65 and over

40%

30%

20%

10%

5%

1%

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Identified Wealth UK 1999

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0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Proportion of population

Pro

por

tion

of

wea

lth

Identified Wealth Gini=0.58

Series C Gini=0.67

Series D Gini=0.59

Series E Gini=0.49

UK wealth, 1994: Lorenz

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UK: BHPS (LWS) and HMRC

-0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00

UK BHPS 2000 NW1

UK HMRC 2000 Series C

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UK: WAS 2009

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Total Wealth Percentiles

Financial Physical WealthPercentiles

Financial Physical PropertyWealth Percentiles

Equality

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Household portfolio composition – LWS

Wealth components Canada Finland Germany Italy Sweden

United

Kingdom

US

PSID

US

SCF

1999 1998 2002 2002 2002 2000 2001 2001

Non-financial assets 78 84 87 85 72 83 67 62

Principal residence 64 64 64 68 61 74 52 45

Real estates 13 20 23 17 11 9 14 17

Financial assets 22 16 13 15 28 17 33 38

Deposit accounts 9 10 n.a. 8 11 9 10 10

Bonds 1 0 n.a. 3 2 n.a. n.a. 4

Stocks 7 6 n.a. 1 6 n.a. 23 15

Mutual funds 5 1 n.a. 3 9 n.a. n.a. 9

Total assets 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Total debt 26 16 18 4 35 21 22 21

Home secured 22 11 15 2 n.a. 18 n.a. 18

Total net worth 74 84 82 96 65 79 78 79

Source: Sierminska et al (2006); see also Source: Sierminska et al (2006); see also Davies et al (2010) Davies et al (2010)

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LWS series ordered by Ginic of v Gini

ITALY 2004 NW1 1.387 0.565

ITALY 2002 NW1 1.477 0.573

FINLAND 1998 NW1 1.453 0.588

CYPRUS 2002 NW1 3.993 0.635

FINLAND 1994 NW1 1.419 0.648

UK BHPS 2000 NW1 1.705 0.689

CANADA 1999 NW1 2.396 0.755

GERMANY 2002 NW1 2.550 0.758

SWEDEN 2002 NW1 5.969 0.849

US SCF 2001 NW1 5.062 0.911

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LWS: Net worth

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Canada 1999 NW1

US SCF 2000 NW1

UK 2000 NW1

Sweden 2002 NW1

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LWS: Net worth (top 10%)

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Canada 1999 NW1

US SCF 2000 NW1

UK 2000 NW1

Sweden 2002 NW1

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Measurement tool for wealth distributions Choose an arbitrary base level wealth Choose an arbitrary base level wealth bb Calculate a conditional mean and normalise:Calculate a conditional mean and normalise:

““average” average” E E ((x | xx | x bb)) “ “base”base” b b

Advantages:Advantages: easy interpretationeasy interpretation focuses on upper tailfocuses on upper tail

Disadvantage: Disadvantage: depends not only on distribution but also on the arbitrary depends not only on distribution but also on the arbitrary bb

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Functional form for wealth distribution

0 1 2 3 4 5

f(x)

= 1.5

= 2.0

The Pareto Distribution

FF((xx) = 1 ) = 1 −− [ [ xx / / xx ] ]

ff((xx))xxxx captures “weight” of the tailcaptures “weight” of the tail xx “locates” the distribution “locates” the distribution average average = = base base −− 1 1

11GiniGini = = 22 −− 1 1

Higher (less inequality)

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-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

08 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

log Wealth

log(

1−F

)

Pareto diagram: application

UK: Identified Personal Wealth 2003Inland Revenue Statistics 2006 Table 13.1

log (1−F) = −1.7618 log W + 19.761

Plot log wealth against log( 1 – F)

Data points

Top 7 points

Fit straight line

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Overview...Wealth taxation

Wealth distribution

Wealth trends

Long-run models

Wealth Distribution and Taxation

Rising inequality or stability?

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Trends in wealth inequality Useful to look at Useful to look at trendstrends in distribution in distribution

what effect of wealth taxation in the past?what effect of wealth taxation in the past? equalisation?equalisation? is there a trend toward stability…?is there a trend toward stability…? …….or divergence?.or divergence?

For historical and recent wealth trends in USFor historical and recent wealth trends in US KopczukKopczuk and and SaezSaez, (2004), (2004) Substantial time coverage: Substantial time coverage: From early 20From early 20thth century century

For historical wealth trends in UKFor historical wealth trends in UK Atkinson et al. (1989)Atkinson et al. (1989) Similar time coverage…Similar time coverage… But incomplete seriesBut incomplete series

Recent picture from Inland Revenue dataRecent picture from Inland Revenue data

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Distribution of wealth US 1916-2000

Wealth owned by various groups

05

1015202530354045

1915

1925

1935

1945

1955

1965

1975

1985

1995

2005

perc

ent

top 2%

top 1%

top 0.5%

top 0.25%

top 0.1%

top 0.05%

top 0.01%

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Distribution of marketable wealth UK 1976-2002 (Series C)

Wealth owned by various groups

0102030405060708090

100

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

perc

ent

top 50%

top 25%

top 10%

top 5%

top 2%

top 1%

Gini Coefficient

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Pareto’s : USA and UK

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

US income

UK income

US wealth

England & Wales wealth

UK wealth (1)

UK wealth (2)

• Sources: see Cowell (2010) Chapter 4 Sources: see Cowell (2010) Chapter 4

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Wealth trends

US and UK: Substantial wealth inequalityUS and UK: Substantial wealth inequality UK Inequality falls in early 20UK Inequality falls in early 20thth century century

roughly from first world warroughly from first world war substantive rises in income tax and estate dutysubstantive rises in income tax and estate duty

Reductions in inequality continue through mid-centuryReductions in inequality continue through mid-century US inequality falls from time of great depressionUS inequality falls from time of great depression

Largely attributable to stock pricesLargely attributable to stock prices Large concentration of corporate stock in wealth of very richLarge concentration of corporate stock in wealth of very rich

But US inequality also carried on falling through to 70sBut US inequality also carried on falling through to 70s This despite recovery in stock pricesThis despite recovery in stock prices Antitrust legislation?Antitrust legislation? Development of estate taxDevelopment of estate tax

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Overview...Wealth taxation

Wealth distribution

Wealth trends

Long-run models

Wealth Distribution and Taxation

Fairy tales?

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A way forward Direct impact of wealth taxes on redistribution will be smallDirect impact of wealth taxes on redistribution will be small But wealth taxes may work by influencing long-run distributionBut wealth taxes may work by influencing long-run distribution

requires careful modellingrequires careful modelling small taxes can have powerful effects on the equilibrium (Kaplow 2000)small taxes can have powerful effects on the equilibrium (Kaplow 2000)

Develop a story of wealth distribution in the long run (Develop a story of wealth distribution in the long run (Piketty 2000Piketty 2000):): Characterise each generation as a fixed time unitCharacterise each generation as a fixed time unit Specify financial constraintsSpecify financial constraints Model preferences / tastes / habitsModel preferences / tastes / habits Model exogenous resource flowModel exogenous resource flow Specify family formation mechanismSpecify family formation mechanism

Preferences: what motivates bequests? (Preferences: what motivates bequests? (Kopczuk 2010Kopczuk 2010)) AltruismAltruism ExchangeExchange Warm-glowWarm-glow Accident and inertiaAccident and inertia

Examine three illustrative modelsExamine three illustrative models

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Outline of model (1)

Common practice to combine in a neoclassical modelCommon practice to combine in a neoclassical model ((Becker and Tomes 1979))

Preferences and behaviourPreferences and behaviour Cobb-Douglas preferences (simplified savings behaviour)Cobb-Douglas preferences (simplified savings behaviour) utility maximisation by parental generationutility maximisation by parental generation look one generation aheadlook one generation ahead

Simplified family characteristicsSimplified family characteristics exogenous attributesexogenous attributes no “marriage story”no “marriage story” no “fertility story”no “fertility story”

Resources and marketsResources and markets ““perfect” marketsperfect” markets exogenous (labour) earnings and initial endowmentsexogenous (labour) earnings and initial endowments

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CCn n + + BBnn /[1+ /[1+rrnn] ] WWnn

½½k Wk Wnn+1+1 = = ss[1+[1+rrnn] ] WWnn ++ s E s Enn+1+1

WWnn ++ E Enn+1+1 /[1+ /[1+rrnn] ]

WWnn+1+1 = = [1+[1+rrnn] ] WWnn ++ E Enn+1+1

½½k Wk Wnn+1+1 = = BBnn

Illustrative model (1) Generational budget constraint Wealth accumulation equation Prospective resources Proportionate savings rate s Equation for wealth accumulation

Stochastic “earnings” will give a simple Markov chain.Stochastic “earnings” will give a simple Markov chain. given sensible parameter values will get convergence (regression to mean)given sensible parameter values will get convergence (regression to mean) Initial wealth inequalities will be damped awayInitial wealth inequalities will be damped away

In the long run wealth inequality is going to be determined just by In the long run wealth inequality is going to be determined just by EE..

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Simulation approach

It is common to put some variant of is this into a It is common to put some variant of is this into a simulation modelsimulation model

But is it based on optimisation – and of what sortBut is it based on optimisation – and of what sort?? Type of utility function s crucialType of utility function s crucial GokhaleGokhale et al. (2001) et al. (2001): strong conclusions based on “accidental : strong conclusions based on “accidental

bequests”bequests”

What characteristics of the simulation model?What characteristics of the simulation model? representative agentrepresentative agent size and length of the runsize and length of the run criteria for evaluationcriteria for evaluation

Type of solution?Type of solution? convergence to equilibrium?convergence to equilibrium? an equilibrium distribution?an equilibrium distribution?

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Illustrative model (2)

Focus on the role of consumptionFocus on the role of consumption naïve savings behaviournaïve savings behaviour family features absentfamily features absent (Champernowne-Cowell 1998) (Champernowne-Cowell 1998)

A model of single person-dynastiesA model of single person-dynasties person inherits person inherits TT years after attaining adulthood years after attaining adulthood dies dies TT years after inheritance years after inheritance leaves all his terminal wealth to one descendantleaves all his terminal wealth to one descendant

Wealth left in excess of Wealth left in excess of WW* * taxed at rate taxed at rate During the earnings all get the same earnings, During the earnings all get the same earnings, EE**

Individuals consume:Individuals consume: CC** if they have positive wealth if they have positive wealth otherwise otherwise EE**

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Link between generations

0-T Tn =0

0-T Tn =1

0-T Tn =2

0-T Tn =3

B0 − tax

B1

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Wealth over the lifetime and bequests Given savings rule and inherited wealth Given savings rule and inherited wealth WW(0) we get(0) we get ^ ^ ^ ^ WW((tt) = max { ) = max { WW(0) e(0) ertrt BB [e [ertrt 1], 0}, 1], 0}, B B := [:= [CC* * EE*]/*]/rr ^̂ Wealth rises/declines according as Wealth rises/declines according as WW(0) (0) BB At end of life bequest is At end of life bequest is BBnn = = WW((TT))

But initial wealth for next generation is But initial wealth for next generation is

WW(0) =min {(0) =min {BBn n , [1, [1BBn n + + WW* }* }

Evaluating at end of next generation:Evaluating at end of next generation: ^ ^ BBnn+1+1 = max {min {= max {min {BBn n , [1, [1BBn n + + WW** } e } erTrT BB [e [erTrT 1], 0}1], 0}

Change in bequest Change in bequest BBnn+1+1 = = BBnn+1+1 − − BBnn as a function of as a function of BBnn Get three possible regimesGet three possible regimes

1.1. where where WW((tt) = 0) = 02.2. where where WW((tt) > but ) > but BBn n < < WW**

3.3. where where BBn n > > WW**

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Bequest Dynamics

Bn falling Bn fallingBn rising

Bn10050 150 200 250 300

Bn

StableStableStableStable

UnstableUnstable

oW*B̂

-40

-30

-20

-10

10

20

30

40

0

The phase diagram Paths to riches Paths to ruin Find equilibria (B = 0) Now cut tax…

Plot B against B

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Wealth distribution overall

0

0.0025

0.005

0.0075

0.01

0.0125

0.015

0.0175

0.02

0.0225

0 50 100 150 200 250

f(W)

W

Distribution of W amongst wealthy

Take into account lower equilibrium

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Illustrative model (3) Focus on family formation (Focus on family formation (ChampernowneChampernowne-Cowell 1998-Cowell 1998) )

each generation is a discrete uniteach generation is a discrete unit pairs always consist of people with equal wealthpairs always consist of people with equal wealth no-one benefits from more than one bequestno-one benefits from more than one bequest bequest is divided equally amongst the bequest is divided equally amongst the kk kids ( kids (kk given) given)

Model applies to upper wealth levels Model applies to upper wealth levels above some specified wealth above some specified wealth level level WW**

For any For any W>WW>W**, the proportion of testators with , the proportion of testators with kk kids is kids is ppkk, , independent of independent of WW ppkk ≥ 0 ≥ 0 k k ppkk = 1 = 1 k k kpkpkk = 2 = 2 two examples:two examples:

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Equilibrium distribution LetLet F Fn n ,, FFnn+1+1 be the wealth distribution in generations be the wealth distribution in generations n n , , nn+1+1

FFnn((WW) is the proportion of the population in generation ) is the proportion of the population in generation nn with wealth with wealth WW We have equilibrium if We have equilibrium if FFnn = = FFnn+1+1 = F = F

Take a person with wealth W in a family where the parents had k kids if parental wealth was W' per head bequest must have been 2[1−]W' so each kid would get 2[1−]W'/k therefore W' = kW/ 2[1−] given that there are pk such families: Fn+1(W) = k ½k pk Fn(kW/ 2[1−])

Equilibrium requiresF(W) = k ½k pk F(kW/ 2[1−])

Only functional form that permits a solution for all W is ParetianF(W) = 1−AW

So the equilibrium condition is:

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Tax and Equilibrium Wealth Distribution

(i) Narrow (ii) Wide(%) Gini Gini 2 1.22 0.410 - - 5 1.55 0.323 1.42 0.35210 2.11 0.237 1.90 0.26315 2.73 0.183 2.44 0.20520 3.43 0.146 3.07 0.16325 4.28 0.117 3.86 0.130

Higher tax produces lower long-run inequalityHigher tax produces lower long-run inequality If tax is too low – no long-run equilibrium If tax is too low – no long-run equilibrium Quite low tax rates produce values similar to actual economies.Quite low tax rates produce values similar to actual economies.

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Equilibrium Distribution = 10%

0

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.005

0.006

0.007

0.008

0.009

200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800

Wealth

freq

uenc

y

=2.113 (Narrow family spread)

=1.9002 (Wide family spread)

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Summary

Dynastic model produces a bifurcationDynastic model produces a bifurcation Convergence to equilibrium distributionConvergence to equilibrium distribution Inequality within and between groups Inequality within and between groups Source of inequality lies in savings behaviourSource of inequality lies in savings behaviour

Role of uncertainty captured in savings behaviourRole of uncertainty captured in savings behaviour Family structure affects long-run equilibriumFamily structure affects long-run equilibrium

spread out families reduce effectiveness of taxation spread out families reduce effectiveness of taxation

Tweaking the models would modify this a littleTweaking the models would modify this a little Variation in income Variation in income Out-of-class marriageOut-of-class marriage ((ChampernowneChampernowne-Cowell 1998-Cowell 1998))

Potentially major role for taxationPotentially major role for taxation

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the shares of top wealth-holders in Britain 1923-1981,” the shares of top wealth-holders in Britain 1923-1981,” Oxford Bulletin Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statisticsof Economics and Statistics, , 5151, 315-332., 315-332.

Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N. (1979)Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N. (1979) “An equilibrium theory of the “An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenerational mobilitydistribution of income and intergenerational mobility,” ,” Journal of Journal of Political EconomyPolitical Economy, , 8787, 1153-1189. , 1153-1189.

Champernowne, D. G. and Cowell, F. A. (1998) Champernowne, D. G. and Cowell, F. A. (1998) Economic Inequality Economic Inequality and Income Distributionand Income Distribution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 10.Chapter 10.

Cowell, F.A. (2010) Cowell, F.A. (2010) Measuring InequalityMeasuring Inequality, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press **Cremer, H. and Cremer, H. and PestieauPestieau, P. (2003), P. (2003) “ “Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Wealth Transfer Taxation: A

Survey,” CESifo Working Paper No. 106Survey,” CESifo Working Paper No. 106 Davies, J.B., Sandstrom, S., Shorrocks, A.F. and Wolff, E.N. (2010) Davies, J.B., Sandstrom, S., Shorrocks, A.F. and Wolff, E.N. (2010)

“The Level And Distribution Of Global Household Wealth” “The Level And Distribution Of Global Household Wealth” The The Economic JournalEconomic Journal, , 120120,,

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References (2) GokhaleGokhale, J. and , J. and KotlikoffKotlikoff, L. J. and , L. J. and SeftonSefton, J. and , J. and WealeWeale, M. (2001), M. (2001) “Simulating the “Simulating the

Transmission of Wealth Inequality Via BequestsTransmission of Wealth Inequality Via Bequests,” ,” Journal of Public EconomicsJournal of Public Economics, , 7979, , 93-12893-128

KaplowKaplow, L. (2000), L. (2000) “A framework for assessing estate and gift taxation,” NBER “A framework for assessing estate and gift taxation,” NBER Working Paper 7775Working Paper 7775

*Kopczuk, W. (2010) “Economics Of Estate Taxation: A Brief Review of Theory *Kopczuk, W. (2010) “Economics Of Estate Taxation: A Brief Review of Theory And Evidence,” National Bureau Of Economic Research,” Working Paper 15741 And Evidence,” National Bureau Of Economic Research,” Working Paper 15741

Kopczuk, W. and Saez, E. (2004) “Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-Kopczuk, W. and Saez, E. (2004) “Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns,” 2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns,” National Tax JournalNational Tax Journal, , 5757, 445-487, 445-487

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**PikettyPiketty, T. (2000), T. (2000) “Theories of persistent inequalities,” in Atkinson, A. B. and “Theories of persistent inequalities,” in Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F. (eds) Bourguignon, F. (eds) Handbook of Income DistributionHandbook of Income Distribution, North Holland, , North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 429-476Amsterdam, pp 429-476

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