Fragile States Country Report No. 13 Afghanistan · economy, an agricultural sector dominated by...

September 2007 Fragile States Country Report No. 13

Afghanistan is a country in transition; the question is whether it is shifting to a stable, more controlled governance pattern, or whether the ongoing conflict will spiral further out of the Karzai government’s control. Afghanistan scores moderately in terms of Legitimacy on the strength of the civil processes and institutions that have supported Hamid Karzai since he was confirmed as President in late 2004. Authority and Capacity exhibit much higher risk; Afghanistan is among the ten highest risk countries globally in both areas. With over 30,000 international troops in Afghanistan and high numbers of casualties, kidnappings and violence, solid state Authority and Capacity are clearly not yet attainable by the current regime. CIFP ranks Afghanistan as the fourth-most fragile country in the world, and the prospects of reaching UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are in peril. In particular, Afghanistan is struggling to attain the goal of better gender balance in access to economic opportunity, justice and education. Afghanistan is also unlikely to achieve its goals regarding primary education under present conditions.

Analyst: Adam Fysh Principal Investigator: David Carment © CIFP Assessments expressed in this report are those of CIFP, and do not represent the views of the Canadian Government. Not to be cited, duplicated or circulated without permission of the authors and CIFP Feedback is welcome, and may be sent to [email protected]

Afghanistan

Events Coverage: September 2006 to

February 2007

INSIDE THIS REPORT: Structural Summary 2

Governance 3

Human Development 3

Economics 4

Environment 5

Demography 5

Canada & Afghanistan 5

6-12 month scenarios 6

Structural Data 12

Stakeholders 14

Primary Drivers

Secondary Drivers

Security and Crime 4

Methodology 10

Appendices

Events Monitoring Charts 8

Maps 7

Possible Entry points 6

Resources 16

More positively, Afghanistan experienced a number of promising developments in recent months, including the initiation of bilateral trade agreements, foreign debt forgiveness and the arrest of key militant leaders. International sponsors of Afghanistan’s reconstruction suggest that there are other reasons to be hopeful for the future as well. At the time of writing, the government enjoys a more reliable infrastructure than any time in recent history. Supporters believe that if the government implements the governance institutional reform supported by international actors, it will be able to withstand the Taliban’s aggression in the coming months and avoid the loss of public support. Challenges persist however, including a sprawling informal economy, an agricultural sector dominated by drug production, powerful regional warlords and a porous border providing sanctuary to the country’s most dangerous actors.

Afghanistan Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle

Extreme Poverty and Hunger Education Gender Equality Child Mortality

Maternal Mortality

HIV/AIDS & Malaria Environmental Sustainability

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT (UNICEF, 2007)

NA Low Low NA NA Medium Medium

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY

+3

0

-3

Governance

Medium-risk

+3

0

-3

Human Development

High-risk

Avg Score: -3.79 Trend Score: —

+3

0

-3

Environment

Medium-risk

+3

0

-3

Demography

Medium-risk

Economics

Average Events Score and Tendency

+3

0

-3

Avg Score: -0.88 Trend Score: 1.24

High-risk Overall

Security & Crime

High-risk Average Events Score

and Tendency +3

0

-3


Medium-risk

+3

0

-3 Avg Score: 0.84 Trend Score: -0.54

Avg Score: 3.00 Trend Score: —





Avg Score: 0.85 Trend Score: -0.63



© CIFP Fragile States Country Report No. 13 - Afghanistan Sept 06 - Feb 07

“Afghanistan is

heavily influenced by

its security situation“

SUMMARY

The overall high risk assessment is a result of the extremely fragile status of Afghanistan’s governance, security and human development. This is unsurprising due to the long-running military confrontation between various international forces and militant members of the Taliban. These effects are moderated by better scores in the areas of economics, demography and the environment. The latter may appear to be promising, they represent an artificial situation in which the economic trajectory of Afghanistan is directly dependent upon donor governments and their domestic interests. Further, demographic and economic activities have taken secondary importance in light of pressing humanitarian and security imperatives. Afghanistan’s structural situation is reflective of the ongoing military, development and security activities; its structural profile will change as Afghan institutions grow and indicators begin to reflect that transition. Heavy foreign aid suggests that foreign donors will be keen to protect their investments in the long term by continuing to actively support Afghanistan’s growth and development.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Afghanistan is heavily influenced by its security situation. More than two-thirds of total events belonged to this cluster. Ongoing instability in all provinces — particularly in the south and east of the country — provide a constant reminder of the country’s fragility. The violence has created immense and ongoing socio-political disruptions for civilians. An improving trend toward state stability during the period of observation results both from a reduction in the number of destabilizing events, primarily related to security, and an increase in the number of stabilizing events, particularly related to the human development and economic spheres. The latter phenomena are fuelled by the actions of international donors and NGOs, who are either funding or directly providing education, health care, and projects in support of economic independence and alternative livelihoods.

EVENTS

High-risk


+3

0

-3

Governance: • Intermittent collaboration between

Pakistan and Afghanistan to limit the influence and freedom of Taliban

• Karzai government struggling to bring rural regions under control - Afghan military or police in varyingly successful operations

Human Development: • Large number internally displaced

people lacking access to services • Foreign aid for Human Development • Development issues related to conflict

and natural disasters Environment: • Susceptibility to frequent floods,

droughts, earthquakes, avalanches • Prevention of avian influenza

achieved thus far Demography: • Refugee returns • Incidents of racism

Overall: • Economy and human development

weakened by security problems • Government lacks full territorial

authority • Afghanistan is very heterogeneous (in

terms of geography, demography, politics, resources, etc.)

Security and Crime: • Violence in every province • Kidnappings, murders, extrajudicial

assassinations • Widespread existence of

antipersonnel mines, weapons caches • Smuggling, corruption and

exploitation in all provinces Economics: • Foreign aid to develop private sector • Illicit agricultural production and its

effects on the Afghan economy/livelihoods of farmers

• Debt forgiveness and privatization of state businesses

KEY ISSUES AND FACTS



PRIMARY DRIVERS GOVERNANCE

Governance in Afghanistan is not particularly stable, but as institutions develop, this area will likely begin to reflect

strengthened capacity. Outside of Kabul, government authority is severely hampered, and restrictions on political and civil rights present problems. The state’s reliance on international actors for regional security and disaster relief is itself a source of instability, though one potentially offset by the increased security they bring. On average, 820 Afghans are killed per year in earthquakes and floods, with thousands of others displaced. The ability of the state to alleviate the effects of these natural disasters must improve if Afghanistan is to overcome its weakness in this critical cluster. Canadian support for elections and democratic development has helped establish a pattern of expectation for the performance of the Karzai government.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT With nearly as high a risk score as the security sector, Afghanistan’s human development presents an area of significant

and ongoing concern. Afghanistan requires strong institutions to deal with the myriad and complex problems related to human development. Thus, longer-term development outcomes will remain out of reach until state Capacity manifests more robustly. The deleterious effects of conflict and a paucity of legitimate legal authority combine to allow an exploitive element into Afghanistan’s rural areas. Warlords and profiteers exacerbate an already weakened development sector through looting, illegal tariffs, robbery, kidnappings and extortion.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Medium-risk Average Events Score

and Tendency

+3

0

-3

+3

0

-3


High-risk

Events relating to human development display a mixed pattern of humanitarian disaster and international peacebuilding activity. As the winter season ended, the

destabilizing effects of flooding and freezing decreased while education, health and shelter-building activities continued. Coalition donor states pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to reconstruction, social programs and development. Dozens of state-based aid agencies and international NGOs have been working in Afghanistan, and many have suffered casualties. It is unlikely that the combined efforts of the international community will affect the structural scores in the short term. However, international support for nascent institutions and humanitarian spaces is hoped to foster a domestic capacity that could address the grim outlook for most Afghans.

EVENTS

Governance events have been stabilizing in Afghanistan, partly due to numerous reports regarding international relations. President Karzai and several of his

cabinet ministers both visited and played host to other leaders. A novice Afghan military and police force, under the guidance of international peacekeepers, demonstrated their increased professionalism, though they suffered many targeted attacks. On the destabilizing side, poppy cultivation appears to be beyond the power of the government to control with estimates of annual growth ranging from 59% to 500%. The Taliban opened schools, and international troops confirmed that several regions were seized by Taliban forces. President Karzai variously castigated and congratulated neighbouring leaders for their support in the war on terror.

EVENTS

• Taliban claim capturing Charkh district 30 September 2006, Pahjwok Afghan News

• Pakistan Announces Plans to Fence and

Mine Border with Afghanistan 26 December, VOA

• Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO to set up joint intelligence center 17 January 2006, Xinhua

• Pakistan, Afghanistan sign bus service

agreement 23 February 2007, Xinhua

KEY EVENTS

• Poverty, anger with government fuelling Taliban support in southern Afghanistan, 5 November 2006, Associated Press

• 300 schools closed down in S.

Afghanistan due to Taliban's pressure 4 October 2006, Xinhua

• Pakistan, Afghanistan agree to convene tribal jirgas 29 September 2006, Pahjwok Afghan News

KEY EVENTS




PRIMARY DRIVERS SECURITY AND CRIME

Afghanistan faces a high risk and unstable security situation, with all indicators reflecting the depth of security-related problems.

Poor human rights and a high number of terrorism-related fatalities have the strongest effect on Afghanistan’s weak security profile. The ongoing conflict has also resulted in a high dependence on external military support, soaring numbers of refugees produced and increased numbers of terrorism incidents. Regional governors struggle to maintain control in rural areas where there is almost no distinction between government representatives and unaccountable warlords. International militaries work to provide physical security in the interim but lack both the mandate and the resources to do more than suppress violence.

This cluster is intimately related to the robustness of the government and the associated security sector. As institutions take root and the security forces — including the Afghan National Police — become better able to handle front-line duties in contested areas of the country, Afghanistan will begin to demonstrate progress that is more in line with other developing states.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

SECONDARY DRIVERS ECONOMICS

Afghanistan presented a mixed economic situation of encouraging success and infrastructural weakness. Positive growth moderates an otherwise volatile

economic situation, whereas high risks scores for dependence on foreign aid and level of regulatory standards are symptoms of Afghanistan’s continuing vulnerability and limited economic development. Afghanistan will improve its poor economic standing (152nd out of 229 countries) as the infrastructure becomes better able to support the policies of the leadership. The events reflected the driving role played by both infrastructure and regulatory drivers in this small economy. The government built roads and sought to control the underground economy, while leaders negotiated debt forgiveness and the privatization of most state corporations. Efforts by the international community to combat opium cultivation remain hampered by high profit margins and tacit complicity by regional administrators.

SUMMARY

Medium-risk


+3

0

-3

High-risk


+3

0

-3

As a result of the international and domestic security threats and operations across Afghanistan, the events profile reflects the structural pattern of the country: an

extremely tenuous situation in which the stabilizing influences are tested every day. Though volatile, events in Afghanistan stabilized slightly. The events in this cluster largely deal with kidnappings, political assassinations and roadside bombings. Of these, the death of a provincial governor in his office at the hands of a suicide bomber was among the most influential due to its brazenness and the political message it sent to Karzai’s provincial allies.

Hundreds of civilians were killed accidentally and intentionally in the reporting period. Spoilers who seek to hinder the freedom and control of both government and international forces exhibit no compunction in taking lives to accomplish their aims. Roadside bombs, suicide attacks and traps are symptomatic of their disregard for civilian life.

EVENTS

• NATO Commander Says Sept Offensive Inflicts Biggest Defeat on Taliban since 2001 19 September 2006, Agence France-Presse

• Bin Laden's "Close Associate" Killed in

Southern Afghanistan 23 December 2006, Agence France-Presse

• Member of provincial parliament killed in S. Afghanistan 15 October 2007, Xinhua

• Afghan Troops Seize Five Pakistani

Soldiers Inside Pakistan 20 December, Agence France-Presse

KEY EVENTS




It is unlikely that Afghanistan will see any significant political emphasis on supporting environmental causes while security operations remain the focus of both government and international actors. So long as the security situation remains unclear, environmental issues will likely continue to attract little attention in Afghanistan. Most NGO activities that do focus on the environment tend to involve human development or humanitarian relief (such as caring for earthquake victims, opening schools or rebuilding communities) as opposed to longer-term environmental protection. In most cases, environmental problems highlighted state inability to support victims of environmental stress. Afghanistan suffers, on average, from 1.5 significant natural disasters per year. These confirm state fragility and are destabilizing; responses tend to fall into the human development cluster and effects take longer to measure.

SUMMARY ENVIRONMENT

SECONDARY DRIVERS

Afghanistan’s high risk for rapid urbanization is offset by more stable patterns of population diversity. Life expectancy and population growth are naturally less than optimal while military activity continues and human development languishes.

The majority of events in this cluster represented stabilizing developments in Afghanistan. Refugee repatriation and expressions of population diversity such as open celebration of Ramadan and other religious festivals outstripped destabilizing events, which included isolated incidences of intolerance. It is important to note that Afghanistan is host to an immense variance of cultures, religions and languages. Although those differences have not become sources of antagonism or strife, the situation may change in the future.

SUMMARY

DEMOGRAPHY

CANADA AND AFGHANISTAN

LINKS

• Canadian Exports to Afghanistan: $19 million (Plastics, vehicles, chemical products, machinery, mineral products, metals)

• Canadian Imports from Afghanistan: $461,148 (textiles, machinery, transportation equipment, animal products)

• Afghani Diaspora in Canada: more than 25,230 (2001 est.)

• Development Engagement: Under the Bonn Agreement: $33 million for democratic reform processes

• Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has committed $616 million to humanitarian relief and development until 2009 (Afghanistan is the largest recipient of Canadian bilateral assistance)

• $60 million contribution to the National Solidarity Program, Alternative Livelihoods projects, and Mine Action program

(Data from CIDA, 2007, and DFAIT, 2006)

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

CIDA

• 62,000 disarmed under the New Beginnings Program

• Micro-credit project for women

• Rural support for 140,000 families

• Support for Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights through Afghanistan Compact

• Contributor to Microfinance Investment Support program.

• By 2007 CIDA had contributed Cdn$40 million to this program.

DFAIT • Lobbying on behalf of Afghanistan at NATO,

G8, OSCE.

DND

• 14,000 troops since 2001

• Will have spent $9B by 2009

• Police training and engineering projects as a part of PRT

Medium-risk


+3

0

-3

Medium-risk


+3

0

-3

Avg Score: -3.79 Trend Score: —

Avg Score: 3.00 Trend Score: —


6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS

Security & Crime:

• Disjointed command structures within ISAF would benefit from more integrated international and interagency coordination.

• Focus on reintegration aspects of DDR will help keep urbanization and the youth bulge from radicalising

Economics:

• Continuation of micro credit projects in conjunction with support for national regulatory systems to encourage meaningful international and national investment.

• Support for regulation of nationalised agencies and industries.

Governance:

• Continued support to expand Karzai’s control beyond the capital.

• Unbiased support and long-term vision in mentoring of democratically elected leaders and the legitimate processes of good government.

• Faster and more meaningful support of the professionalization of the security and judicial sectors in such a way that acknowledges Afghan history and context.

Human Development:

• Reinforce state structures to harmonize education and health-care beyond the patchwork of aid-funded projects to create systems and bureaucracies on which to scaffold long-term growth.

Demographic:

• Rural education and livelihood projects outside of cities will help staunch the flight of unemployed young men.

Karzai’s government maintains its control over parts of Afghanistan, largely due to support from international security forces and donors. State control remains limited to urban centres. Security operations continue to both capture militants and suffer attacks, while international actors face pressure to do more to protect international troops in Afghanistan. Karzai’s government struggles to focus on environmental and drug issues in light of pressing humanitarian needs and the imperative to demonstrate leadership. International donors shift support to emergency response, democratic development, with economic development receiving less attention. Refugee repatriation slows; conditions remain difficult for poor Afghans and returning refugees have fewer resources and weakened social networks. Ethnic and religious differences manifest themselves through occasional racist incidents and factionalism but remain out of the international spotlight in deference to the global war on terror.

BASELINE LIKELY CASE BASED ON MOST LIKELY ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

Potential spoiler groups, such as those formerly of the Northern Alliance, are less conciliatory and patient than they have been, and Afghanistan faces a series of Authority and Capacity challenges that are outside the international forces’ abilities to manage. The country will fracture along ethnic or clan lines and individual regions come under the control of warlords while international observers wonder if Afghanistan’s future lies down the same path that Iraq has followed. Additionally, the security situation will degenerate if a sufficient number of regional governors find that supporting the present government becomes inconvenient or hazardous.

ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAK-EST ASSUMPTION — ACTIVITIES BY THE SPOILER GROUPS

International forces succeed in maintaining control during the Taliban’s spring offensive. They contain the conflict in isolated pockets, though they do not succeed in quelling the insurgency outright. Measured optimism sustains growth and entrepreneurial economic activity. Refugee returns and other humanitarian initiatives experience a temporary boom in the expanded safety zones. Drug control remains a challenge for the government, particularly in light of other economic successes.

BEST CASE BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT SECURITY SITUATION STABILIZES

International troops and aid workers suffer large or grievous series of attacks. Leaders and headquarters face and begin to succumb to domestic pressure to remove most military and civilian staff from Afghanistan. Symbolic efforts continue though Karzai’s government continues to lose both political and geographical ground to a range of spoilers and warlords. Human development and economic growth are effectively suspended and environmental protection shifts from being an afterthought to being entirely irrelevant. A dry summer leads to a series of deadly floods and avalanches by winter, which only serves to intensify the poor humanitarian situation.

WORST CASE BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT VIOLENCE AGAINST IN-TERNATIONAL FORCES ESCALATES


MAPS

MAP 2: AFGHANISTAN DISTRICT VULNERABILITY MAPPING (AIMS)

MAP 1: AFGHANISTAN—REGIONAL MAP (BBC)


EVENTS MONITORING CHARTS

READING THE EVENTS CHART Red line (solid): Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values. Blue line (dotted): The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values

A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report

TABLE 1: OVERALL EVENTS CHART



TABLE 2: SECURITY AND CRIME EVENTS CHART




TABLE 3: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART



TABLE 4: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EVENTS CHART


STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)

Cluster avg.

Fragility index score

Fragility index rank

Raw Data -- Five

year avg

Last Year of

Data

Trend Score

1. Governance 6.24 Freedom of the Press (FH, index, 0-100) 7.3 40 71.0 2006 pos Gov’t Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, index, Deviation from mean) 8.3 17 -1.2 2005 * Level of Corruption (TI, index, 0-10) 7.3 45 2.5 2005 * Level of Democracy (Polity IV, index, (-10 - 10)) .. .. .. .. .. Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP) 2.1 154 4.3 2005 * Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, index, (WB WDI) 2.0 164 27.3 2005 * Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change) 8.6 8 0.8 2004 neg Refugees hosted (UNHCR, total) 1.3 145 18.6 2005 s.q. Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, index, 1-7) 7.8 21 6.0 2005 pos Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, index, 1-7) 6.9 42 5.8 2005 pos Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean) 8.9 3 -1.7 2005 * Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean) 8.1 21 -1.3 2005 * 2. Economics 6.30 Economic growth — Percentage of GDP (WB WDI) 1.4 180 12.5 2005 * Economic Size — Relative (WB WDI, GDP per capita, constant 2000 US$) .. .. .. .. .. Economic Size — Total (WB WD, GDP, constant 2000 US$) .. .. .. .. .. External Debt — percentage of GNI (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. FDI — percentage of GDP (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. Foreign Aid — percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI) 9.0 1 304.0 2004 * Foreign Aid — Total per capita (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. Inequality — GINI Coefficient (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. Inflation (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. Informal Economy — Black Market (Heritage Fdn, Index, 1-5) .. .. .. .. .. Informal Economy — Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI) .. .. .. .. .. Infrastructure — Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost) .. .. .. .. .. Infrastructure — Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB) 8.9 2 1.4 2004 s.q. Infrastructure — Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB) 9.0 1 0.5 2004 * Investment Climate — Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5) .. .. .. .. .. Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP) 4.8 100 5.0 2005 * Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank) 2.3 143 30.5 2006 * Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean) 8.7 6 -1.7 2005 * Remittances Received — percentage of GDP (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Reserve Holdings — Total (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Trade Balance — percentage of GDP (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Trade Openness — percentage of GDP (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Unemployment — Total (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Percentage of Women in the Labour Force (WB) .. .. .. .. .. 3. Security & Crime 8.48 Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths) 6.8 15 557.8 2005 * Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, Index, 1-10) 8.4 2 10.0 2006 * Human Rights — Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10) 8.2 26 1.5 2004 * Human Rights — Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-8) 8.8 9 0.6 2002 pos Military Expenditure — percentage of GDP (WDI) 8.9 3 11.7 2005 * Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) 8.8 4 -2.2 2005 *

Refugees Produced (WB, total) 9.0 1 2825792.

4 2004 pos Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset) 8.4 10 8.4 2005 * Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities) 8.8 4 479.0 2005 * Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents) 8.7 6 318.0 2005 *


STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT’D)

4. Human Development 7.39 Access to Improved Water (WB, percent of the population) 8.9 3 39.0 2004 * Access to Sanitation (WB, percent of the population) 7.8 26 34.0 2004 * Education — Primary Completion — female (WB, percent) .. .. .. .. .. Education — Primary Completion — total (WB, percent) .. .. .. .. .. Education — Primary Enrolment — total (WB. percent) .. .. .. .. .. Education — Primary Enrolment — Ratio Female to Male (WB) 9.0 1 29.4 2004 pos Food Security — Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT) .. .. .. .. .. Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP, index, 0-1 ) .. .. .. .. .. Gender-related Development Index (UNDP, index, 0-1) .. .. .. .. .. Health Infrastructure — Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB) 6.7 53 4.5 2003 pos HIV/AIDS — New AIDS Cases Reported (UN, total) .. .. .. .. .. HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult Females Infected (WB) .. .. .. .. ..

HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult population infected (WB) 1.6 118 0.1 2005 *

Human Development Index (UNDP, index 0-1) .. .. .. .. .. Infant Mortality (WB, per 1000 live births) .. .. .. .. ..

Literacy (WB, percent of population age 15 and above) 8.8 4 28.1 2004 *

Literacy — female (WB, percent of female population age 15 and above) 8.9 2 12.6 2004 * 5. Demography 4.86 Life Expectancy — Female (WB) .. .. .. .. .. Life Expectancy — Total (WB) .. .. .. .. ..

Migration — Estimated Net Rate (UN) 1.2 178 16.0 2005 * Population Density (WB, population per square km) .. .. .. .. .. Population Diversity — Ethnic (CIFP) .. .. .. .. .. Population Diversity — Religious (CIFP) 4.6 88 0.3 2005 * Population Growth (WB, annual percent) .. .. .. .. .. Slum Population — proportion of population (WDI, UN) .. .. .. .. .. Urban Growth Rate — Annual percent (WB) 8.8 5 6.0 2005 neg Youth Bulge — Percent aged 0-14 of total population (WB) .. .. .. .. .. 6. Environment 5.48 Arable/fertile land availability (WB, hectares per person) 2.9 148 0.3 2002 neg Consumption — Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN, kg of oil equivalent) 1.1 181 14.1 2003 s.q. Consumption — Use of solid fuels (UN, percent of population using) 7.9 1 95.0 2003 * Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million) 8.6 10 49.1 2001 * Ecological Footprint — Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network) 1.0 150 0.1 2003 * Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, percent of total renewable) 7.6 28 35.8 2002 * Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m3/inhabitants/year) 6.2 63 2668.8 2006 * Forest — Annual percent change in area (FAO) 8.7 6 -3.1 2005 * Pollution — CO2 emissions per capita (WB, metric tons per capita) .. .. .. .. .. Pollution — CO2 emissions per dollar PPP (WB, kg per 2000 US$ PPP) .. .. .. .. ..

TOTAL

6.69 For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo, (pos) indicates a positive trend to-ward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (*) indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.


STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

Interests • Seeking local or national administration of

the Afghan State (or parts of it) • Some of these groups are militarised and

some are of dubious legality • In some cases, these groups work in

cooperation with Karzai’s government or with each other

• Afghan National Un-derstanding Front (ANUF)

• Northern Alliance

• Hezb-i-Wahdat • Jamiat-e Islami • Junbish-I Milli-yi • Harkat-i-Islami-yi

GOVERNMENT

• President Hamid Karzai (Pashtun), elected president in 2002 by a collection of tribal leaders and then in national elections in 2004

• With 55% support, Karzai won this controversial election. The next most successful candidate had less than one third the votes of Karzai

Interests

• Demonstrating control over entire country, and defeating rebel groups

• Maintaining close ties with the USA in order to ensure economic, military, and counter-narcotic support

• Maintaining popular support in an ethnically diverse country

• Maintaining stable relations with neighbouring countries and supporting the US War of Terror

Recent Actions and Attitude

• The centralized government in Kabul is continually supporting the growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA), but continues to struggle gaining/maintaining control over outlying provinces, largely controlled by warlords and militias

WARLORDS

• No fixed leadership, motives or aspirations Background

• Regional warlords throughout the country hold significant power and resist government and NATO influence

• Warlords are often involved in maintaining certain levels of security (or control/power) in a region and regulate the opium trade in the area.

• As Afghanistan’s most significant economic resource, involvement in the opium trade results in significant regional power and little incentives significant enough to give up such control

TALIBAN

• Mullah Mohammed Omar, a radical Pashtun cleric. His location is unknown as he fled in the days leading up to the US-led liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban government in 2001.

• Taliban activities are ongoing, although it is unclear if there is a leadership structure and to what extent Mullah Omar is involved

Interests

• The removal of international troops and actors from Afghan soil

• Reestablishment of political control over the state of Afghanistan

• Reimplementation of the strictest interpretation of Sharia Law in the world

• Termination of opium cultivation and export


• Suspected to be in hiding in Pakistan with the tacit support of the Pakistani state security apparatus

OPPOSITION

• Yunus Qanuni (Tajik); received 16% of votes in 2005 election


• Because candidates for office in Afghanistan ran almost entirely as independents and there is a direct-vote system in place, there is no official party of opposition nor leadership of opposition as it is understood in other political systems. Mr. Qanuni’s only status is as the second highest vote recipient in the presidential election

OUTLYING RURAL POPULATION

• 80% Sunni / 20% Shia • Multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, clan-based Background

• Rural populations have suffered extreme poverty and underdevelopment being more susceptible to illegal work for income and taking short-term opportunities promised to have positive results


STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Interests

• Reduction/elimination of violence • Stabilization of Kabul and all provinces • Removal of Afghanistan as a place for

international terrorists to arm and train • Supportive of international forces in

Afghanistan including NATO and UN • Accused of planning to use Afghanistan as

a base for future activities with motives ranging from oil speculation to monitoring of Russia to serving as a forward base for a future attack on Iran. These accusations are rejected

UNAMA – NATO

• While United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assisted in brokering a peace deal and the interim government, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and has been actively involved since 2001 in fighting upsurges of the Taliban and reconstruction. The EU is a heavy supporter, and its countries are troop contributors

• Removal of Afghanistan as a place for international terrorists to arm and train

NEIGHBOURING STATES

Interests • Prevention of narcotic industry spill-over • Border security with regards to rebel and

criminal groups • Trade

• Pakistan • Iran • Turkmenistan • Uzbekistan

• Tajikistan • China • India (not contiguous) • Russia (not contiguous)

DEVELOPMENT NGOS

• There are a significant number of both international and local NGOs working in Afghanistan, though the lack of security has resulted in many of them being centred in the cities, especially Kabul.

• Programming is focused especially on education and women’s empowerment.

• UN agencies are heavily involved with reconstruction and human development


Afghanistan Compact (2006): http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/UploadFolder/The%20Afghnistan%20Compact%20-%20Final%20English.pdf (Accessed 27 March, 2007) Afghanistan Information Management Services: http://www.aims.org.af/ (Accessed 20 April, 2007) - map http://www.aims.org.af/maps/district_vulnerability/combined_indicators.pdf (Accessed May 16, 2007) Afghanistan National Development Strategy: http://www.ands.gov.af/ (Accessed 20 March, 2007) - Afghanistan Community Development Councils: http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/andsconts/consultation/Civil_Society_Organizations/src/CDC%202.pdf (Accessed 20, 2007) BBC, Country Profile: Afghanistan: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm (Accessed 26 March, 2007) CIA – Afghanistan: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Canada in Afghanistan: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/menu-en.asp (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Canadian International Development Agency - Afghanistan: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-129153625-S6T?OpenDocument (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Canada-Afghanistan Relations: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/relations-en.asp (Accessed May 1, 2007) Department of National Defence – CF Operations in Afghanistan: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703 (Accessed April 12, 2007) RCMP – Canadian Civilian Policing Efforts in Afghanistan: http://www.rcmp.ca/peacekeeping/fghanistan_e.htm (Accessed 22 April, 2007) Statistics Canada: http://www.statcan.ca/menu-en.htm (Accessed 22 March, 2007)

Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, David Carment and El Achkar, S., Prest, S., Samy, “The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada” (Vol. 13, No. 1, (2006), 1-35 Economist Intelligence Unit “Country Profile Afghanistan, 2006”: http://eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=1600922545&mode=pdf (Accessed 26 April, 2007) Global Security - “Afghanistan”: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/karzai.htm (Accessed 22 April, 2007)

Human Rights Watch

- “Afghanistan: Civilians Bear Cost of Escalating Insurgent Attacks”: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/afghan15688.htm (Accessed 19 April, 2007)

- “The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan”: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/ (Accessed 19 April, 2007)

- “Afghanistan: Slow Progress on Security and Rights”: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/29/afghan15223.htm (Accessed 19 April, 2007)

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Responsibility to Protect): http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp (Accessed 2 May, 2007)

International Crisis Group: Afghanistan: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1266&l=1 (Accessed 22 April, 2007)

“Not Too Late for Afghanistan”: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4349&l=1 (Accessed 22 April, 2007)

“What Ails Afghanistan”: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4102&l=1 (Accessed 22, 2007)

“World Must Help Afghanistan Through Its Risky Pause”: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3919&l=1 (Accessed 22 April, 2007)

IRIN – Afghanistan: http://www.irinnews.org/Asia-Country.aspx?Country=AFG (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Reliefweb Afghanistan: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=3&cc=afg (Accessed 23 March, 2007)

UNAMA: http://www.unama-afg.org/about/SRSG.htm (Accessed 1 April, 2007)

UNDP, Human Development Report 2006 “Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis”: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/ (Accessed March 20, 2007)

RESOURCES


UNDP, Millennium Development Goals Report, 2006: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf (Accessed 26 April, 2007) UNDP, Reducing Disaster Risk – A Challenge for Development: http://www.undp.org/bcpr/disred/english/publications/rdr.htm (Accessed 25 April, 2007) UNDP, Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report, 2005: http://www.ands.gov.af/src/src/MDGs_Reps/MDGR%202005.pdf (Accessed May 1, 2007) UNDP, Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2005: http://www.undp.org.af/nhdr_04/NHDR04.htm (Accessed 26 April, 2007) UNDP, Afghanistan: A Country on the Move: http://www.undp.org.af/home/afg_on_the_move.pdf (Accessed 20 March, 2007) UNEP – “Afghanistan – Post Conflict Environmental Assessment (2003)”: http://www.unep.org/Evaluation/PDF/afghanistanpcajanuary2003.pdf (Accessed 12 April, 2007) UNHCR, Global Report for Afghanistan (2005): http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/449267540.pdf (Accessed 12 April, 2007) UNHCR, Country Operations Plan 2007: http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/4505323f2.pdf (Accessed 21 April, 2007) UNPFA – Assistance Programme for Afghanistan: http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/afghanistan/background.htm (Accessed 22 April, 2007)

United States Department of Commerce – Exports Afghanistan: http://www.export.gov/afghanistan/ (Accessed 1 May, 2007) United States Department of State

Afghanistan Country Page: http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/ (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Background Note: Afghanistan: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (Accessed 1 May, 2007)

USAID

Afghanistan: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/ (Accessed 2 April, 2007 Afghanistan Country Profile: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/country_profiles/afghanistan_profile_0106.pdf (Accessed 2 April, 2007)

United States Library of Congress – A Country Study: Afghanistan: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/aftoc.html (Accessed 24 April, 2007) Washington Post – “Afghanistan Opium Crop Sets Record” (2006): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/01/AR2006120101654.html (Accessed 18 April, 2007)

World Bank, Afghanistan Data, Projects & Research: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,menuPK:305990~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:305985,00.html (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Access to Health Services in Rural Areas: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21247989~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html (Accessed 2 April, 2007) Afghanistan Challenges and Progress: http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21313688~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:305985,00.html (Accessed 2 April, 2007)

Afghan Islamic Press Japan economic newswire Agence France-Presse Observer Associated Press Pahjwok Afghan News BBC Press Association Newsfile Belfast Telegraph RIA Novosti Deutsche Presse-Agentur TASS Economist The Independent Euronews Times Financial Times Toronto Star Glasgow Herald UPI Guardian VOA International Herald Tribune Xinhua Independent

RESOURCES

EVENT MONITORING SOURCES

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Afghanistan, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

CIFP is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa ON, K1S 5B6

Phone: 520-2600 ext. 6662 Fax: 613-520-2889 [email protected]

www.carleton.ca/cifp

ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP employs fragility as the most effective lens through which to view state risk, broadly understood. Though the use of the concept of the concept remains controversial, when properly understood as a technical term of country analysis, it enables analysts to conduct a more thorough assessment of country risk than more specific concepts such as conflict or human development, both of which are effectively components of overall state fragility. Further, the concept allows the incorporation of environmental, demographic, political, and economic considerations, providing a more complete portrait of a state’s overall risk than narrow examination of any one of those factors. In effect, the concept incorporates all such areas of study into a complete analysis of the risks present in a given state or region.

When understood in this sense, all states exhibit some elements of fragility, whether in the form of demographic stress, politicized ethnic divisions, high levels of pollution, the presence of internal conflict, or low levels of human development. Through the use of transparent and quantifiable data, CIFP strives to bring together all such phenomena into a coherent country narrative, thereby rendering the concept of fragility an objective aid to country analysis, rather than a divisive element of subjective political discourse.

ABOUT FRAGILITY

Fragile States Country Report No. 13 Afghanistan · economy, an agricultural sector dominated by...

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