Fowler, 1987 - Uses of the Past

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Society for merican rchaeology

Uses of the past: Archaeology in the Service of the StateAuthor(s): Don D. FowlerSource: American Antiquity, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), pp. 229-248Published by: Society for American ArchaeologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/281778 .

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2/21

USES OF THE

PAST: ARCHAEOLOGY

IN

THE

SERVICE OF

THE

STATE

Don D. Fowler

Nation

states, or partisans

hereof,

controland allocate

symbolic

resources s one means

of

legitimizingpower

and

authority,

and

in

pursuitof

their

perceived

nationalistic

goals

and

ideologies.

A

majorsymbolic

resource

s

the

past.

In

this

paper

I review

hreecases in which he

past

and,

in

particular,

elevant

archaeological

esources

were used forsuch

purposes,and

I

refer o severalother well-known nstances. The three cases

discussedare

Mexico

rom

ca.

A.D.

900 to the

present,

Britain

rom

ca. A.D. 1500

to the

present,

and the

People'sRepublic

of China

since 1949. The

implicationsof

such uses in

relation

to

archaeological

heoriesand

interpretations

re

discussed.

In The Uses of the Past, Herbert Muller (1952) sought for certainty of meaning in an analysis

of the

development

of

Western

civilization.

The

only

certainty

he found was that the

past

has

many

uses. This

paper

is concerned

with

some

specific

uses of

the

past:

1)

how nation-state

rulers and

bureaucrats have manipulated the

past

for nationalistic

purposes,

both

ideological

and

chauvinistic,

and

to

legitimize

their

authority

and

power; 2)

how nation-states have used

archaeological sites,

artifacts, and theories for such

purposes;

and

3)

how these uses of the

past

relate

to more

general

questions

about the

intellectual

and

sociopolitical

contexts in which

archaeology

is

conducted.

The

importance

to the state of

using

or

manipulating

its

past

is

neatly

delineated

in

two

great

dystopian novels, George

Orwell's

(1949)

Nineteen

Eighty-Four,

and Aldous

Huxley's

(1932)

Brave

New World. In the

former, the Ministry of Truth

totally revamps the past as

needed to justify and

lend truth

to

the immediate

requirements, actions,

and

policies of

the

state.

In

the

latter, the past

is blotted out. As the Resident World Controller

for Western

Europe, Mustafa Mond tells the

Savage,

We

haven't any use for

old things

here

(Huxley

1932:200).

In

both cases, control and

manipulation

of the

past

or its

complete

denial is critical to state

ideology

and

purposes. Here,

and

in

virtually

all

nation-states

past

and

present,

the aim

of the

manipulators

is to

convince

themselves, their

citizens/subjects,

and

the

relevant

rest of

the

world,

that their

right

to

rule,

their

dominion of other

states or

peoples,

or their

cause or mission is

just.

In

a

number of

instances, and specifically in

cases discussed

here,

these

manipulations

have

exploited

archaeological

remains or data.

Three

key concepts

require

definition.

Archaeology

is used in

its original and

broadest sense:

Ancient

history generally; systematic

description or study of

antiquities (Oxford English Diction-

ary 1:431).

Nationalism,

following

Berlin

(1980:338),

is

defined

as,

the

elevation of the

interests

of self

determination of

the

nation to the status

of the

supreme

value

before which

all other

considerations

must,

if

need

be, yield

at all

times. Third

is the

concept

of

legitimation, cogently

laid out by Kurtz (1984:302):

A

fundamental

goal

of

statepolicies is

acquisitionof support; .e. either

the active or passive compliance

of

citizens

with

state

policies

and

goals

....

Support

s the

underpinning f

legitimacyand providesthe most

fruitful

concept

for

understanding

egitimation ...

Legitimationof political authority s in

large measurea

consequence

of the

ability

of

authorities o

generate,control,and allocate,

economic andsymbolicresources

in

pursuit

of

public

and

privategoals

[emphasisadded].

Don D.

Fowler,Department

ofAnthropology,University f

Nevada,Reno,

NV

89557

American

Antiquity, 52(2),

1987, pp.

229-248.

Copyright? 1987 by the SocietyforAmericanArchaeology

229


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3/21

230 AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY [Vol.

52, No. 2, 1987

The focus

herein is on the generation,

control, and allocation

of one symbolic resource, the

Past,

ancient

history generally,

particularly antiquities, physical

remains of past peoples and

their

cultures. Three

case studies are presented.

Each has been chosen to illustrate

specific ways

that

various pasts

and associated antiquities have

been used for official state

purposes by rulers

and

bureaucrats, or unofficially

by citizen partisans/patriots. The

case studies are: Mexico from

ca.

A.D. 900 to the present;

Great Britain from the sixteenth

century to the present; and the

People's

Republic of

China since 1949.

There are

many other examples. Best known is

the official creation and

manipulation of a

Nordic,

or

Indo-Germanic past

(Frick 1933; Rosenberg 1930; see also

Cecil 1972 and

Chandler 1945) by

the Nazi

regime

in

Germany,

a

past

verified

principally by

the works

of Gustaf Kossinna and his

colleagues

and students

(Gunther

1926;

Kossinna

1911,

1914, 1926-1927).

In

fact, throughout

Central

Europe, manipulations

for nationalistic

purposes

of both Slavic and Germanic

racial,

his-

torical,

ethnolinguistic,

and

archaeological pasts

began

as

early

as the sixteenth

century (Bierhahn

1964; Erickson 1973; Mallory

1973, 1976;

Poliakov

1974;

Silfen

1973; Sklenar 1983).

Nazi

Germany

was simply

the most

recent and most

tragic

instance

(Mosse

1961, 1964).

A second example lies in the struggles between Sweden and Denmark-Norway from ca. A.D.

1500-1800 for

political domination of the

Baltic Sea region. There, Goths,

Atlanteans, the Teutonic

god-king

Odin and his

sometime

enemies,

the

gigantic Aesirs, together with

archaeological sites

attributed to

them,

were

invoked by one side or the

other

in

attempts to establish

claims of nationalist

supremacy

and

precedence

(Klindt-Jensen 1975; Michell

1982:40-43).

A

third example is the

diverse uses of archaeological,

ethnographic, and

historical data and theories

in

African studies written

in

pre- and post-Colonial times

(Collins 1968; Heniger, ed. 1974 et

seq.;

Temu and

Swai 1981; Zwernemann 1983).

Specific archaeological examples

include the variant

interpretations of Zimbabwe (Garlake

1973:51-110, 1982) and of Iron Age

sites in South Africa

(Hall 1984).

A

fourth example is the United

States

in

the nineteenth

century. The Myth of the Mound

Builders

(Silverberg

1968),

which

often served

to

denigrate

American

Indians,

was never

official

government

policy

but it did

bolster

arguments

for

moving

the

savage Indians out

of the way of White

civilization

(see

also

Carpenter 1950;

Fowler

1986;

Meltzer

1985;

Pearce

1965; Trigger 1980a,

1981, 1986).

A

fifth

example is Palestine. Silberman (1982)

describes how European powers

used archaeological

expeditions

ostensibly

to seek verification of the Bible and Near Eastern

history generally,

but

also

as

a

cover for

seeking

control of that

strategic

area. The

modern state of Israel uses

archaeology

(Glock 1985; Trigger

1984:358-359)

as

a

means of

glorifying

the Hebraic

past,

and

of

validating

its right to exist as

a

nation,

as

frequent

news releases attest

(Friedman

1985;

Pear

1983;

Reif

1985).

There are

many

similar

examples (Trigger

1984),

but the three

presented

below illustrate

in

particularlystriking ways

how nation-states

and

their

partisans

have

used

archaeology, archaeological

remains,

and the

past generally

for

purposes

of national or

chauvinistic

ideology,

or

the

legitimation

of power, or all three.

MEXICO

One of the

primary symbolic

resources controlled

by

nation-states is

religious ideology

and its

supporting myths.

A

principal

means of

legitimizing

a

ruler's

authority

is to

establish,

or

validate,

the ruler's

genealogical

links back

through

time to

the

founding

deities: the ultimate

symbolic

sources

of

power

and

authority.

Whether

the

genealogical

links are actual

or

putative

is irrelevant. As

long

as the

populace

and the

loyal opposition (if

any)

act as

if

they

are

actual, they

are. The

process

is

as old as nation-states.

Certainly

it was

well

understood

by

the

god-kings

of

ancient

Egypt

and

by

rulers of later states

and

empires

in

Mesopotamia

as

well

as

in

Egypt, India,

and China

(Balazs

1964;

Clark

1959;

Fairservis

1971:217-310;

Frankfort

1948;

Kramer

1963),

and

was

equally

familiar

to the governing class in New World Mesoamerican civilizations.

Several

recent studies

(Calnek

1982;

Carrasco

1982;

Conrad

and Demerest

1984:11-83;

Kurtz

1984;

Rounds

1982; Zantwijk 1985)

have shown how the Aztecs of

pre-Hispanic

Mexico

manip-




4/21

Fowler]

USES

OF THE

PAST

231

ulated economic

and

symbolic

resources

in

their

rise

to

power

between

A.D. 1375

and the

Spanish

Conquest of 1519-1521. But the Aztecs were

neither the

first nor

the

last

in

Mexico to undertake

such

manipulations,

and to use the

past

as

well

as

archaeological

ruins for

ideological purposes.

The studies by

Calnek and others

should be

considered

in

conjunction with

Davies's (1980) and

Diehl's (1983)

works on the

Toltecs,

and

Lafaye's

(1976) and Phelan's

(1960) studies of

post-

Conquest Mexican

nationalism.

Le6n-Portilla's

(1963)

classic

study

of Aztec

thought,

Bernal's

(1980)

and

Lorenzo's (1981,

1984) histories of Mexican

archaeology,

and

Keen's

(1971)

study

of Aztec

imagery

in

Western thought

provide additional useful

insights into

Mexican

uses of the

past.

Highland

Mexico,

like

Mesopotamia,

witnessed the

rise and fall of

successive nation-states and

empires through the centuries

(Adams

1966).

The

highlands

and

adjacent

areas

were

dominated

for

nearly

a millennium

by

the

great city

state

of

Teotihuacan (ca.

200 B.C.-A.D.

750).

Its

great

truncated-pyramid

temple

platforms,

now called the

Pyramids

of the

Sun

and the

Moon,

rank

high

among

the

engineering

feats of the

ancient

world.

Many

deities were

worshipped

at

Teotihuacan,

including

Tlaloc,

the

god

of rain

and

fertility,

and

Quetzalc6atl,

the Plumed

Serpent;

both

are

represented on the

facade

of the so-called Citadel

(Le6n-Portilla

1963:51).

Teotihuacan declined after A.D. 750 and was largely abandoned by A.D. 800. But the decaying

city was still

the

place

of

the

gods,

as

the name

translates from the

Nahuatl. After

the

fall

of

Teotihuacdn,

there was

a

period

of

confusion,

followed

by

the rise of the Toltecs

(ca.

A.D.

900-

1150)

centered

on their

capital,

Tollan

Xicoctlan,

now called Tula

(Diehl

1983:43-67).

The Toltecs inherited

the elaborate

cosmology

of

Teotihuacan

and reformulated it for their

own

purposes. Quetzalc6atl

became a

major deity

of

Tollan, through

whom

the Toltecs laid claim

to

genealogical

descent from the rulers

and

deity-rulers

of

Teotihuacan

and those of earlier

civilizations.

The

Toltec claim was

personified

in

their last

major

priest-king,

the

legendary Topiltzin Quetzalc6atl

(Conrad and

Demerest

1984:17-19;

Davies

1980:3-41;

Zantwijk

1985:94-97,

180-18

1).

The

Toltec hegemony

began

to

disintegrate ca. 1150.

Groups of

Chichimeca pushed their

way

into the Valley of

Mexico and

became variously entangled

in

the

struggles

for resources and

power

that

characterized

the remainder

of

pre-Conquest

Mexican

history (Calnek 1982;

Zantwijk

1985:

57-124). Toltec

groups remained in

the Valley of

Mexico and environs,

however, and several

city-

states, including

Culhuacan,

claimed

direct descent from them.

Culhuacan,

in

fact,

had

succeeded

Tollan as

a major center of

religion and

culture

in

Highland Mexico

(Davies

1980:338-339). Toltec

came to

symbolize civilization

and

legitimation

of

power.

The

many city-states

and the

various

Chichimec

interlopers

each

worked to

legitimize

its claims

to

power

through

Toltec

ancestry.

Such

an

ancestry

could be obtained either

through creative

mythography

or

through marriage

alliances

with rulers

having better

established claims

to Toltec descent

(Conrad and

Demerest 1984:20).

One of the

interloper

groups,

the

Mexica

(hereinafter Aztecs

in

the

sense

established

in

the

nineteenth

century by Alexander von

Humboldt and W.

H.

Prescott), took

both routes to

power.

In

the mid-i

300s, the Aztecs

established a marital alliance with

Culhuacan. Legend

indicates that

the alliance

got

off

to a

poor

start

because the

Aztecs,

rather than

marrying

her

to one of their

young

men, sacrificed the Culhua princess and paraded her flayed skin before her father during a religious

festival

(Carrasco

1982:154). Nevertheless,

in

1376

Culhuacan

granted

an

Aztec

petition to

give

them a ruler

from its

reigning

house.

Acamapichtli,

a

half-Culhua

prince,

became ruler of

Tenoch-

titlan.

At the

same

time,

Atzcapotzalco granted a

ruler to

Tlaltelolco, the Mexica

town adjacent to

Tenochtitlain

(Carrasco

1982:156-157). The granting

of rulers to the

Mexica may reflect a

later

Aztec

view of history.

Conrad and Demerest

(1984:25)

point out that in the

1370s both

Tenochtitlan

and

Tlatelolco

were

tributaries of the powerful

Tepanec

alliance, centered at

Azcapotzalco.

The

Tepanec may well

have imposed

the rulers on their

Mexica

vassals. In any case, the

granting of

rulers

gave the Aztecs

legitimacy.

Acamapichtli's

genealogy of authority

and power became

the

Aztecs'

genealogy. They

could, and did, claim

legitimation of

authority back through

Culhuacan

to

Tollan

Xicoctlan,

thence

back to Teotihuacan

and beyond

(Rounds 1982:83-84).

After

1376, the

Aztecs expanded

their quest for power

in the Valley of

Mexico. The

crisis came

in the great turmoil of

1426-1428.

The

Triple

Alliance -Tenochtitlan,

Texcoco, and

Tacuba-

defeated the

Tepanec

alliance and

took over their

realm

(Conrad and

Demerest

1984:31; Zantwijk

1985:113-124).

Ultimately, Tenochtitlan

emerged as the

dominant city-state of the

Triple Alliance.




5/21

232

AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY

[Vol. 52, No. 2, 1987

After

1428, the Aztecs embarked on

a calculated course of imperialistic

expansion that led to

the

hegemony

(fragile though it was) encountered

and shattered by the

Spanish in 1519-1521 (Conrad

and Demerest

1984:44-70).

The

Aztecs also embarked on a basic

restructuring of social and

symbolic institutions. A

new

system

of land tenure and wealth distribution

was instituted,

concentrated in the hands

of the warrior

elite rather than the calpulli.

A new ideology was formulated

to justify and support

a program

of

continual imperialist expansion

and warfare, an ideology

centering on the elevation

of Huitzilo-

pochtli to the role

of

principal

Aztec

deity (Conrad and Demerest

1984:32-33). Historical

and

religious texts

were burned,

and the Aztecs rewrote

history to make their ascension

to power seem

supernaturally

foreordained (Le6n-Portilla

1963:155-163). Their journey

from the north became

an

epic

trek toward their place of destiny

in the Valley of Mexico, and

they continued

to syncretize

their past with the Toltec

past (Carrasco 1982:148-204;

Kurtz 1984:306-312; Fagan

1984:60-73).

In Aztec mythology the

Toltecs, inspired by Quetzalc6atl,

became Promethean figures,

the bearers

of culture. The

Aztecs'

great capital,

Tenochtitlan, itself

became mythologized, a sacred city

laid

out

on the

plans

of Tollan and Teotihuacdn.

The symbolic importance of geographical Tollan, the site of Tula (there was also an idealized,

conceptual

Tollan that

was sometimes

merged

with Teotihuacdn

and

Tenochtitlan [Davies

1977:

25-75]),

is

succinctly

stated

by

Diehl:

They [the Aztecs] thought

of it as the birth place of civilized

life and much of their cultural

heritage. They

tried

to

identify

with their

putative

Toltec ancestors by expropriating Toltec

art and religious objects for their

own use and

intermarrying

with the local ruling families

in the Tula area who claimed

legitimate Toltec

descent

[Diehl

1983:166].

It

was also at Tula,

or

nearby,

that the idol of Huitzilopochtli

from the

great

temple

in

Te-

nochtitlan

was

apparently

hidden after

the

Conquest

(Padden

1967:270-274),

an

important

indi-

cation

that

Tula both

symbolized

and

embodied

power. Tula,

Cholula,

and

Teotihuacan

were

all

places closely

associated

with

Quetzalc6atl,

and hence

places

of

reverence.

Teotihuacan

was said to

be

the

place

where

the

gods

created the

Fifth

Sun

(i.e.,

the

present

universe),

the

sun

that shone on

the Aztec world

(Davies 1974:144;

Le6n-Portilla

1963:43).

As sacred

places, Tula,

Teotihuacan,

and Cholula

were

pilgrimage

centers

(Brundage

1982:151),

ancient ruins that were

symbolic

focal

points attesting

to

the

power

and

continuity

of

the ancient deities whom

the

Aztecs

had

incorporated

into their pantheon (Nicholson

1971:408-430 and

Table

3). They

were

places

associated

with the

ultimate

sources of

power

and

authority

in

the

Mesoamerican

world

(Lorenzo

1984:89).

The sites

became

integral parts

of the

Aztecs'

self-legitimization

process.

Faced with the

overwhelming

evidence of

their

predecessors'

monumental

achievements,

sacred

genealogies,

and

complex

social

structures,

the Aztecs

..

.

strove to construct

a

city, mythology

and

destiny

in

order to

impress

and

intimidate

others and legitimate

themselves

(Carrasco

1982:160). They

succeeded

admirably

in

part by incorporating

and

sacralizing

ruins

(and deities)

from others'

pasts

into their own. Once

they achieved political dominance, the Aztecs rewrote the past; i.e., they gained control of a major

symbolic

resource

and used it

for nationalistic

purposes.

In

1519,

Hernmndo

Cort6s

and

his

soldiers

landed on the

east coast of Mexico.

Prevailing legends

led

the Aztecs

to believe

that

Quetzalc6atl,

the

fair-skinned,

bearded

god-king

of Tollan and

the

more

ancient

past,

had returned

in

the

person

of Cort6s

(Fagan

1984:261-277).

Aided

in

part

by

the

Quetzalc6atl

legend and,

more

importantly, by

the fact that the Aztec

empire

was

teetering

on

the

brink

of internal

collapse (Conrad

and Demerest

1984:44-70),

Cort6s

and

his

handful of followers

conquered

the

great

Aztec

empire

and established

New

Spain

in

its

stead

(Anderson

and

Dibble

1978).

The

Spanish

were,

of

course,

heirs to

European

traditions

of

legitimation

of

authority:

Apostolic Succession,

Petrine

Supremacy,

and

rule

by

Divine

Right.

They

ruled

New

Spain

in

the

name of those

authorities

for three

centuries.

But

during

that time

there

slowly

came to be

a Mexican

national consciousness,

centered

on the idea that

Mexico

was more than

a

colony,

that it

ought

to

be a nation-state in its own right. The development of such a consciousness is, of course, common

as colonies

metamorphose

into

nation-states;

the United

States is one well-known

example.

What

bears

noting

in

the Mexican case

is the

syncretization

process.




6/21

Fowler]

USES OF THE PAST

233

Keen

(1971:217-508), Lafaye

(1976), and Phelan (1960),

among others, have

reviewed various

aspects of

post-Conquest

Spanish

and

Mexican uses

of the

past

for both

religious

and

nationalistic

purposes,

and the

present

discussion follows their

analyses.

In

pre-Spanish

times there was

an

important female deity,

Cihuacoatl,

or

Tonantzin,

Our

Mother,

who was sometimes

regarded as

a consort of

Quetzalc6atl.

The hill

of

Tepeyac,

in

the

Valley

of

Mexico,

was

closely

associated

with

Tonantzin.

In

1557,

the

Spanish

built a church at

Tepeyac

dedicated to Our

Lady

of

Guadalupe.

The

intent was to supplant Our

[Mexica] Mother with Our

[Catholic]

Mother,

but

the result

was the syncretism of the

two deities. Visitors to

Tepeyac

Hill

who watch

the thousands of

pilgrims

crossing

the

plaza on

their

knees to

worship

at

(now)

the third

of the churches dedicated to

Guadalupe,

become

aware

of

her

great significance

to the Mexican

people.

She is not

only

a healer but a

symbol

of

faith,

and

of the nation

(Lafaye

1976:256-257, 274-300).

Quetzalc6atl,

at

least

the

priest-king, Quetzalc6atl of

Tollan,

came to be

identified,

and

finally

syncretized

with,

the

apostle

St. Thomas

(Lafaye

1976:157-208).

The belief

grew up

in

Mexico that

St. Thomas

not

only

had travelled to Persia and

India,

as Christian

legend

had held

for

centuries,

but

also

that he had come

to the New World

bringing

the

word of Christ and civilization

(recall

the Promethean aspects of Quetzalc6atl). St. Thomas-Quetzalc6atl became the Apostle of Mexico

and,

like

Tonantzin-Guadalupe,

a

major

religious

and nationalistic

symbol.

This sort of

religious syncretism

was,

of

course,

a

common

practice

in

Europe

for

centuries. As

Christianity spread

across

Europe

after A.D.

400,

local

pagan

deities

and

cult

figures

were

often

syncretized

or converted into Christian

saints,

or sometimes devils

(Smith

1952:166-296;

Murray

1970). Nor was the

process

new to the Mexicans for

pre-Conquest city-states

and

empires

had

syncretized

deities for centuries.

The syncretism of

Tonantzin-Guadalupe

and St.

Thomas-Quetzalc6atl

took

place

within the

context of a

larger

intellectual movement

in

Mexico that

Phelan

(1960)

calls

Neo-Aztecism. The

movement

developed primarily

among

Mexican

Creoles-people wholly

or

partially

of

European

descent born

in

the New World.

Phelan

(1960:760-762)

sees

the roots of

the movement

in

the

writings of

various historians, e.g., Spanish-born

Juan

de

Torquemada's Monarqufa

indiana, pub-

lished

in

1615 (Franch

1973) and the

works of

later

Creole

historians. These writers

viewed pre-

Conquest

Aztec times as the

period

of

Mexican

classical

antiquity, similar to classical

Greek and

Roman

times

in

the Old

World. That

is,

classical Aztec

and classical

Greco-Roman

cultures

were seen as

idealized, antecedent, Golden

Age cultures.

The theme of a classical

Aztec Golden

Age was taken up by various

Mexican Creole

writers, particularly Bemardo

de Valbuena (Van

Home

1930;

Pierce

1968),

Carlos de

Sigiuenzay G6ngora

(1954)

and

Mariano

Veytia (1836).

These

writers

focussed

at

first

on

an

idealized,

conceptual past

rather than

on

specific places

associated with

that

past.

The

theme reached its

culmination

in

Francisco

Javier

Clavigero's (1979), Historia

antiqua

de

Mexico,

first

published

in

1780-1781.

Clavigero updated

and

expanded

Torquemada's exposition of

parallels between

classical

Aztec

and classical

Greco-Roman cultures.

He also drew a

picture of the

Aztecs

in

anti-Spanish terms,

and was the first to relate the cult of Aztec antiquity to the social problems of contemporary

Indians

(Phelan

1960:763). Clavigero's glorification

of the Aztecs had

other purposes as well.

He

felt

compelled

to answer the

charges

of

European

savants, particularly

Cornelius de Pauw

(1806,

first

published 1770) that all forms

of New World

plants,

animals, and people were

degenerate as

compared

to those of

the Old World. This

dispute

of the

New

World, as Gerbi

(1973) calls

it,

raged from at least

1750 to 1900

among Old and New World

scholars.

The dispute was a

principal

impetus for

Thomas Jefferson's Notes

on Virginia, among

many other works by

various authors.

In

refuting

Pauw and

others, Clavigero

not only glorified the

Aztecs, but

argued that

contemporary

(eighteenth-century)

Mexican

Indians had

been

rendered brutish

by Spanish

oppression, and not

through

innate

degeneracy.

And

he held

that

Mexico would

reach its true potential

only through

biological integration

of

its ethnic

groups, i.e., as a

nation of mestizos

(Clavigero

1979:11:225-226).

Indianism

became a major theme in

the early

nineteenth-century drive for

Mexican indepen-

dence. Both Carlos Maria de Bustamente and Jos6 Maria Morelos sought Mexican

independence

through

a

repudiation

of the

Spanish

heritage and the

restoration of an idealized

Aztec empire

(Phelan

1960:767-768). Such

ideas were

sidetracked after Mexican

independence in 1821. But

they




7/21

234

AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY

[Vol.

52, No. 2,

1987

re-emerged very strongly

in the Revolution of 1910. As part of this

re-emergence, the Mexican

archaeological past began to be studied systematically,

initially through

the efforts of Manuel Gamio

after

1907. The

places

associated with an ideology derived

from

the

past again became important.

Over the years, Gamio,

Alfonso Caso, Ignacio Bemal, and their many

distinguished colleagues and

co-workers clearly demonstrated the brilliance

and achievements of pre-Conquest Mexican

civili-

zations

through

their work

at

Teotihuacdn,

Monte

Alban, Tula,

Chichen Itza,

and

other

major

sites.

Archaeology became an integral part of the

emerging and on-going indigenismo movement, a

core

feature of Mexican nationalism (Keen 1971:463-508;

Lorenzo 1984:90-91).

The contemporary

importance of the syncretized past in Mexican ideology

is reflected in various

ways. One is the great National Museum of

Anthropology in Mexico

City. The physical layout of

the building stresses the continuity of past

with present Mexican peoples: the halls of regional

prehistory on the

first level are superimposed by the co-ordinate historic

and ethnographic halls for

each

region directly

above. The focal point of the entire museum is

the great calendar stone on

which the Aztec cosmos

is depicted, the complex

face of the stone being widely used throughout

Mexico as both an official and unofficial symbol

of the nation.

A second example is the use made by the Mexican government, since 1978, of the excavations

of

the Templo Mayor

in

the center of Mexico

City. The temple was the liturgical center of the

Aztec

state,

its

twin sacrificial sanctuaries

dedicated to the

gods Huitzilopochtli

and

Tlaloc.

The

Templo

Mayor

is

adjacent

to the

National Cathedral

because,

as

at

Guadalupe

and

elsewhere,

the

Spanish

built their sacred

shrines atop the ruins of

Aztec sacred shrines. Given the syncretism characteristic

of the Mexican

past,

the

juxtaposition

of the Templo Mayor (now that it is visible) and the National

Cathedral takes on

added nationalistic symbolic weight. The Mexican

government has given the

temple excavations

great publicity (e.g., McDowell et al. 1980), has

issued coins with Aztec deities

on

them, and

in

other

ways

has used the Templo Mayor finds to continue to bolster the syncretized

past,

and hence national

ideology.

A final

illustration

of how this continuity and syncretism is expressed

is found in the wording of

a

plaque

dedicated

in 1964

by

then-President

Lopez Mateos,

at

the Plaza of

the

Three Cultures

in

Mexico

City.

The Plaza

has

on

it the ruins

of the

temple

of

Tlatelolco, adjacent

to

a

Spanish

cathedral, and

is flanked

by

modern

high-rise

buildings. The Aztecs made their last concerted

stand

against

the

Spaniards

on the steps

of

the temple.

The

plaque reads:

On

13

August,

1521, Tlatelolco, heroically

defended

by Cuaht&moc,

ell

into the

power

of Heman

Cortes.

It was neithera triumph

nor a

defeat, but the painful

birth of the mestizo

people that is Mexico today.

Clavigero

would

surely

be

pleased by

the

plaza

and

the

plaque.

The Mexican case is a cogent example

of successive nation-states

in

one region manipulating

the

past

for various reasons.

The

Aztecs,

and

presumably

their

predecessors,

did

so

to

legitimize

lines

of

power

and

authority.

The

post-Conquest

Mexican nationalists linked themselves

to

the

pre-

Conquest

Aztec

past

to

justify attempts

to

rid

themselves

of

Spanish rulers,

and

subsequently

to

solidify the Mexican nation under the banner of Indigenismo. Yet they also retained the Spanish-

stimulated

syncretism

of Aztec

and

Catholic

deities and saints.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great

Britain

provides

an instance

in which

archaeology

and the

past

were

rarely officially

used

for

nationalistic

purposes,

but

unofficially

have often been

manipulated

and

interpreted

for

such

purposes.

The

history

of

antiquarianism

and

archaeology

in

Britain

from the

early

1500s

until

well into the

nineteenth century

is

primarily

a

history

of the

elaboration

of

archaeological myths

to

glorify

Britain's

past.

Stimulus

for the

study

of British

antiquities

was

provided by Henry VIII,

who

appointed

John

Leland as

King's

Antiquary

in 1533. Leland's

method of

study-extensive

tours

through

counties

or regions recording buildings, ruins, and inscriptions, and collecting manuscripts and data on

heraldry

and

folklore-set the

pattern

for British

antiquarian

studies

over the next

two centuries

(Daniel 1967:22-45;

Dorson

1968:1-90;

Evans

1956;

Hunter

1971; Piggott 1976:1-24,

101-132).




8/21

Fowler]

USES OF

THE

PAST

235

Although the

position of

King's

Antiquary was

not

continued beyond

Leland's

death, chauvinism

toward Britain's

past and its

antiquities

continued to

develop.

For

example,

one

John

Collinson

(1779,

cited by

Jessup

1961:186)

bragged that

Italy, whose

ruins are so

much

glorified

by

the

legendary

traveller,

had only

the

remains

of its

own ancient

people ;

Britain on the

contrary

can

boast not

only the works of

its

Aborigines,

but those of

its

conquerors and invaders

.... We

join to

the massive

rudeness of

the

Briton,

the

elegance

of

the

Roman,

and

the

clumsy ornament

of

the Saxon.

(The

well-established idea

that Britain drew

its

uniqueness

and

strength

from

its

mixed

ethnic origins

became a

popular

rallying point

in

the

1930s for British

arguments

against the

Nazi

Nordic

monomania

although scientific

analyses

of

ethnic

mixtures were much

more

carefully

couched

[Huxley

et al.

1935:193-196].)

British

archaeological

myth-building is best

exemplified

in

the

elaboration over

four

centuries of

interpretations of late Neolithic

and

Bronze

Age

megalithic

sites. The

interpretations

began

in

the

1500s with

the

invention of the

Druids and continue at

present

with

Druidic,

or

other, designers

of

astronomical

computers

in

the form of

megalithic

mainframes.

There is a

plethora of

historical,

ethnographic,

and

legendary

information on the

Druids.

The

clearest attempts to separate fact from fiction are by Chadwick (1966), Kendrick (1927), Owen

(1962), and Piggott

(1968).

The

account of the

Druids

on

which

most of the later

myths

and

speculations are based is

Julius

Caesar's

(1980:121-123)

description

of

them

in

the

Gallic

Wars.

Caesar

describes

the

Druids

in

Gaul as

in

charge

of

religion,

instructing young

men

in

Druidic

lore,

acting

as

judges

in

criminal

and

civil

disputes,

and being

greatly

honored

by

the

people

....

It is

thought

that the

doctrine

of the

Druids

was invented

in

Britain and was

brought

from

there

into

Gaul; even

today

those

who want to

study

the

doctrine

in

greater

detail

usually go

to Britain

to learn there

(Caesar

1980:121).

The

Druids

in

Gaul were

suppressed

after A.D.

14.

Large

numbers

of

them were

massacred

by

the Roman

general

Seutonius Paulinus

in

A.D. 60. After

that

time, they

are

generally spoken

of

in

the

past

tense;

they

are

last

mentioned

in

Classical

literature ca. A.D.

300

(Owen

1962:15-26),

then

forgotten

for a

millennium.

Druids were

rediscovered

by

French

literati

toward the end of

the

fifteenth

century.

In

1526,

the

Scottish historian Hector

Boece

(1526)

revived

knowledge

of

them

in

Great

Britain. He

claimed

that

in

ancient times

the

Druids'

headquarters

was

the Isle of

Man.

They

were rich

experts

both

in

natural and moral

philosophy

..

. advisers of

kings

and

nobles

and

instructors of

nobles'

sons

in

'virtue and

science. ' He also

associated

them with

megalithic

stone

circles (Owen

1962:28-31).

John

Leland studied

in

Paris

in

the

1530s and

became a

Britannic

Druidophile. Leland's

enthu-

siasm was shared

by

William

Camden.

In

his

influential and

oft-reprinted

Britannia,

Camden

(1587)

became the

champion

of British

Druids: our

Druids,

great

scholar-priests who

imparted

much

knowledge

to the rest of

Europe.

Although Boece

(1526)

had

suggested

a

relation

between

Druids

and

megalithic

stone circles,

the

identification

was not

systematically made until

the

seventeenth

century. The

Druidic:

Stone

Circle

linkage

grew,

especially

in

the

hands of

John

Aubrey,

who

made

careful studies

of

Stonehenge and

other sites. In his Monumenta Britannica (written by 1693, but not published until 1980), Aubrey

called

Stonehenge

Templa

Druidium.

Though

not

published,

the

Monumenta was

well known

to later

antiquarians,

and others

soon

found

that

various

megalithic stone

circles

were

Druidic

temples (Hunter

1975;

Owen

1962:109-117;

Stover

and

Kraig 1978:6-9).

But it was

William

Stukeley, law

student,

physician,

Anglican

minister,

and fervent

antiquarian

(Piggott

1950)

who

Restor'd

(as

he

put

it)

Stonehenge,

Avebury, and most

other

British

megalithic

monuments to

the Druids

(Stukeley

1740, 1743).

Late in his

career,

Stukeley came to

suffer from

what

Christopher

Chippindale

(personal

communication

1985) calls

Druid

dottiness.

Stukeley

concluded

that,

in

addition to

building

the

circles, the

Druids knew

in

principle

of the

divine

emanation,

i.e.,

the

Christian

nativity,

and

believed

in

the Trinity

long

before the

birth of

Christ

(Owen

1962:125,

128; Piggott

1935,

1950:129,

1968:152-154). Thus, the

Druids

were

transformed

from

Caesar's

Gaulish

diviners

and

judges

to

Stukeley's

British

scholars, teachers,

priests,

and

anticipators of true (i.e., Anglican) Christianity.

In

the

hands

of

later

eighteenth-century

Romantic

antiquarians,

writers, and

poets, our

holy

Druids

became British

patriots and the

fonts of

philosophical and

scientific

knowledge.

According




9/21

236

AMERICAN

ANTIQUITY

[Vol.

52,

No.

2,

1987

to

some, British Druidic learning was carried eastward, first to Greece, there stimulating the early

Greek philosopher/scientists, thence to India, there giving rise to

a caste of scholar-priests, the

Hylobii (Brahmins?), and finally to China where it became the basis for Confucianism (Wood

1747:9-12, cited by Owen 1962:11). And scattered across the

British Isles were the stone circles

and the megalithic tombs, evidence of the long reign of the Druids and their abilities as engineers

and scholars. Druidic archaeology was a major factor in British Romanticism' in the latter half

of the

eighteenth

and

throughout the nineteenth centuries (Piggott

1937), despite vehement protests

from critics (Herbert 1838; Higgins 1829; Ledwick 1790; Lubbock

1865; Pinkerton 1789, cited by

Owen

1962:238). By 1900, Druid had become a word not to be uttered in respectable archaeo-

logical company;2 but Druidism, especially in relation to

Stonehenge, was well established in the

mainstream of British popular history, culture, and folklore (Kendrick 1927; Owen 1962:239; see

also

Bonwick

1894; Piggott 1949:193; Rutherford

1978).3

Although the Templa Druidium theory of British megalithic

sites had lost favor among ar-

chaeologists by 1900,

the sites

themselves soon found new interpreters (few of them archaeologists)

who saw (and see) them as astronomical observatories and, latterly, astronomical computers. The

new wave of interest, part of the continuing fascination aptly called megalithomania (Michell

1982), has historic antecedents. From at least Stukeley's time, various authors (e.g., Smith 1771)

had hinted that Stonehenge and other megalithic circles had some relation to astronomy, whether

the

astronomers were, or were not, identified with the Druids

(Michell 1977).

Modem astronomical megalithomania began with Lockyer (1906). It continued in the first

issue of Antiquity (Trotter 1927). Thereafter, astronomical interest abated somewhat until the pub-

lication of Hawkins's (1965) Stonehenge Decoded. Interest in

astroarchaeology, or archaeological

astronomy,

was rekindled not

only

in

Britain

(Michell 1977), but

elsewhere (Bailey 1973; Collea

and

Aveni

1978).4

Whether Stonehenge

or other

megalithic

sites

in

Great Britain

were,

in

fact,

used

for astronomical

purposes

is

not

the

issue here.

What

is

of

interest

is the

popular

interpretation

of

Stonehenge and

other

sites as

computers,

or astronomical observatories. Given

their

great age,

now

well-

established

by

14C

determinations,

the

implication

drawn is that their

builders,

be

they Druids,

Neolithic farmers,

or

Bronze

Age pastoralists,

were

scientifically very advanced folk. By further

implication, they

were

more

advanced than other

contemporary European folk,

hence somehow

better.

In

short,

a chauvinistic

popular interpretation

of the

past

is

operative.

With the

exception

of MacKie

(1977),

few

contemporary

British

archaeologists accept

the

idea

of an association of

astronomer-priests

with

megalithic

monuments

(Atkinson 1966; Chippindale 1983:216-236, 1986).

But, since

at least

1771,

the

popular image

has

existed,

and

makes Hawkes's

(1967:174)

observation

even more

telling: Every age

has

the

Stonehenge

it

deserves-or desires.

One

apparent

line

of

support

for the

argument

that

Stonehenge

and other

megalithic

sites

in

Britain

were built under

the

supervision

of

indigenous astronomer-priests

or

engineers

derives

from

the recalibration

of 14C

determinations

(Renfrew 1973).

The

consequent

redating

of

European

late

Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures drastically altered accepted chronological relations both within

Europe

and between

Europe

and

the

Near East.

It was no

longer necessary

to

posit

the arrival of

Mycenaean

or

other

engineer-astronomers

from the civilized East to

supervise

the

barbarian

Britons

in

the construction

of

megalithic

sites. Recalibration

made it

equally possible

that the

engineer-astronomers

were

home-grown.

On a broader

scale,

the

recalibration of

the

'4C

chronology

also

forced

a

general rethinking

of the

archaeological implications

of

Orientalism,

the Eastern

Other,

in

European scholarly

and

po-

litical

thought.

As

Edward

Said

(1978:12) puts it,

. . .

Orientalism is-and does

not

simply rep-

resent-a

considerable

dimension

of modem

political-intellectual culture,

and as such

has

less

to

do

with the Orient

than it does with

'our' world.

Said

demonstrates

how Orientalism

grew

out

of

European

colonialism

and

colonial

ideology.

Full

justice

cannot be done to

his

complex

and

per-

suasive

arguments

here.

For

present purposes,

the

important point

is that the East

has

figured

prominently in colonialist thinking as well as in historical and archaeological interpretation in

Europe;

for

archaeological interpretation

see Clark

(1966),

Poliakov

(1974:255-325),

Renfrew

(1974:

14),

and

Trigger (1978:74-114, 1980b:82-123, 1981).




10/21

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USES OF THE PAST 237

The theory that most elements of civilization diffused to Europe from the East was tenaciously

held by most archaeologists during

the second

quarter

of this

century (Daniel

1982:63).

The

work

of V. Gordon Childe, especially

the third

edition

of

The

Dawn

of European

Civilization (Childe

1939; see also Green 1981 and Trigger 1980b), is an obvious example.

Christopher Chippindale (personal communication 1985) casts an interesting light on the influence

of Orientalism

in British

archaeology

and British colonial and nationalist

ideologies.

He

notes that

in lieu of absolute dating methods, diffusionism was a necessity

if

some semblance

of chronological

order

was

to be imposed

on

European prehistory.

That

is,

an

apparent

relative

chronology

could

be

(and was)

derived

by establishing

links

across

Europe

to the

Near

Eastern

high

cultures

dated

by

calendric

means, a

la Childe.

But a further

implication

was that the

good

phenomena

of

civilization-writing, monumental architecture, metallurgy, farming, states,

etc.

-began

in

the East

and diffused to

the West.

Certainly

Britain had received much

of

the

benefit from

the East

by

diffusion

in

historic times, e.g.,

the Roman

and

Saxon

invasions,

and

presumably

also

in

pre-

historic times, e.g, the postulated Mycenaean engineer-astronomers.

In

short,

in

prehistoric

and

early

historic times

the source of culture

and civilization was the

East.

But,

at the

height

of the

British Empire (ca. 1850-1950), it was Britain's turn to be the source of culture and civilization.

Her self-defined mission was the transfer of

material

culture,

technical

expertise,

and

advanced

forms of government to

the now-backward East

(an argument congruent

with that of Said

[1978]).

The key assumption, of course,

is

the central tenet of diffusionism

and

its derivative

concepts,

the

age-area hypothesis and

Kulturkreislehre:

cultural elements

originate

at a center of

high

culture

and diffuse toward

the

peripheries. Chippindale concludes,

That

is

why

it

was unthinkable

that

Stonehenge

was

British,

and

why

as late

as

the

early

1950's a

Mycenaean

architect was

sought

for

Stonehenge:

the diffusionist

imperative

was

to search elsewhere rather than to conceive of native

British ingenuity. With the demise of the empire, British archaeology could

take on board more

happily autonomous ideas,

such

as

a British

Stonehenge (Christopher Chippindale,

personal com-

munication 1985). The recalibration

of '4C

chronology seemed to clinch the

case.

Bringing together Chippindale's analysis with earlier British ideas as outlined

above creates an

interesting picture

of national chauvinism and sense of national

destiny

in

British uses of the past.

The monuments of the past are interpreted as evidence of early British cultural

superiority. The

builders of

those monuments,

the ancient

Britons,

also created and diffused the

seeds of higher

knowledge to the Continent and Asia. That knowledge flowered and ultimately returned to Britain

via the successive invasions

of

the Saxons, Danes, Romans,

and others. The resulting physical and

cultural

hybrid vigor

enabled the British

to

carry

culture

and

civilization,

higher knowledge,

via the Empire back out

to the world for a second

time.

CHINA

Archaeology

in

the service of

the state

is

currently

well

exemplified by

the

policies

and

practices

of the People's Republic of China. Prior to the establishment of the current government in 1949,

archaeology

was

a

well-developed discipline

in

China

(Triestman 1972),

aided

in

part by scholars

from Japan and the West (Chang 1977:623). Since 1949, Chinese archaeology

has occupied a

privileged political position (Cheng 1965:73), stimulated by a governmental policy to make a con-

scious and conscientious effort

to

include

archaeology

as an

important part of the political education

of the

people (Chang 1980:497).

The organization of archaeological

research

in

China

reflects this nationalistic

policy. All ar-

chaeologists

in

the

country

work

directly

for the central

government.

In

Beijing, the National Bureau

of Cultural Relics is

directly

under

the State

Council.

Archaeologists work

for the

hundreds of

provincial or subprovincial museums administered by the Bureau; through

the Institute of Ar-

chaeology

or the Institute

of

Paleontology

and

Paleoanthropology of

the

Academy Sinica; or

in

and

through

one of

eight

universities

teaching

and

conducting archaeological research at the doctoral

level (Chang 1977:624, 1980:499; Cheng 1965:68-73).

Under this

organizational

structure

archaeological

work has

proceeded apace since the early 19

5Os.

During the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s to 1970s, archaeology went through

a period of internal




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1987

criticism and slowdown

(Cheng 1965:76-77), but apparently

was not as severely damaged as were

history and ethnology

(Braybrooke

1979:593-594). Major discoveries, excavations,

and re-exca-

vations throughout the country have

provided a plethora of new data from

early Paleolithic times

to the late historic period (Chang 1977:626-634). The amazing terracotta army from the tomb

complex of Emperor Zheng, founder

of the Qin dynasty, the jade burial suits

from the Han dynasty

tombs

in

Hebei Province (Qian et al.

1981:65-86, 127-138), and numerous

other spectacular finds

have rightfully

received world attention

and admiration in recent years.

Traditionally for the Chinese, the

past has always been in part a morality tale

providing precepts

for

proper behavior

and thought

in

the present. But in

China, as elsewhere, which precepts

are

provided is a

matter of ideological

interpretation and the current needs

of the state. Boorstin

(1983:562) points out that an official

history office was established during the

Tang dynasty, and

thereafter controlled

all the accessible past. In succeeding

dynasties official historians wrote and

reinterpreted the

histories of previous dynasties according

to their own presuppositions.

Often the

histories held that previous dynasties

fell because the Mandate of Heaven

had been withdrawn

but was reinstituted at the onset of

the then-current dynasty (Plumb 1970:27-28).

Such histories

were written by bureaucrats for bureaucrats to justify the present dynasty's power and authority.

Thus, Chairman Mao's dictum,

The

past

should

serve the

present (cited

by Chang 1980:505),

is

not new. What is new since 1949 is,

first, that the past is now the People's

past and not just that

of rulers and bureaucrats and, second,

the interpretation of the past is framed

within a variation

of

the Marxist

perspective

(Chang 1977:625, 1980:501).

Between 1949

and 1959, Chinese archaeological interpretations

were couched in Marxist-Leninist

terms

derived

from Russian archaeological theory (Cheng

1965:68). But after the Sino-Soviet rift

began

in

1959, Chinese archaeological

interpretation began to change. Archaeologists

and historians

faced the problem

of

having

to balance the traditional Marxist schemata of

world history with

an

attempt

to do justice to

the

scope and weight

of a

cultural

tradition as magnificent as any that

human

genius

has created (Kahn and Feurwerker 1965:2).

Chinese archaeologists, at least, seem

to have

succeeded.

In

1960-1961,

they adopted

a

standard framework of

Chinese cultural devel-

opment.

Chinese

prehistory

and

history

are

periodized

into

three

stages

or states, derived

ultimately

from Morgan (1877)

and

Engels's (1884)

interpretation

of

Morgan,

in

relation

to Marxist

theory: 1)

Primitive

society

in

prehistoric times; 2)

Slave

society

in

Shang

and

early

Zhou

dynasties;

and

3)

Feudal societies

in

late Zhou and

subsequent

dynasties (Cheng 1965:76).

Marx's Asiatic

mode of production

seems

to have

proved

an embarrassment

(Cheng 1965:76;

Kahn and Feurwerker

1965:5)

and is quietly ignored.

Within the overall

paradigm

of

history

as

class

struggle,

and

the

three-stage

framework of

cultural

development,

there is

apparently

room for

quibbling

over details-

such as the

timing

of

stage

transitions-but

no

possibility

of

questioning

the

conceptual

framework

or the

stages per

se

(Chang

1980:501;

Pearson

1976).

In

their

technical reports,

Chinese

archaeologists,

as

do

those

in

other

countries, usually separate

data, analysis,

and

interpretation (Chang 1981:167).

But

it is

the

interpretation

of

archaeological

data for national and international consumption that is relevant here. In a recent, large-format

volume (filled

with brilliant color

plates

and

published simultaneously

in

Beijing

and

New

York),

Qian

et al.

(1981) present

to the non-Chinese

world several

of the recent

spectacular

finds and

excavations.

These include

Shang bronzes, Zheng's

terracotta

army,

and

silks,

bronze

statuary,

and

other sublime

art

works from Han

and later

dynasties.

In

the

accompanying

text we see

how

Chinese

archaeologists

have achieved

a balance between the

Marxist historical schematic

and an

appreciation

for their

own

magnificent

cultural tradition.

The

interpretations

presented are,

in

fact, part

of a

morality

tale.

The

evil, pre-

1949

past

is contrasted

with

the

glory

of the

present

and the future.

The

past

was

evil,

not

in

itself,

but

because

those who ruled China

in

the

past

were evil.

There is

a

concomitant

celebration

of the

slaves, peasants,

and

crafts-people-the People-as

the true loci

of

Chinese

wealth, culture,

and art.

And

there

is

great pride

in

the cultural

heritage

the

people produced

despite

the

oppressive

rulers:

By

the late

Shang period

the

rulers

had amassed

huge

wealth

through

the

exploitation

of

slaves,

and led

lives

of

luxury

and

extravagance

....

Shang

was a slave

society

and

agriculture,

animal

husbandry,

and the

hand-

icraft

industries

were

mostly accomplished

by

slaves. The

slaves,

therefore,

created these admirable

bronze




12/21

Fowler]

USES OF THE PAST

239

and

jade

treasures,

he wealth of

the society, and ultimately

the culture

of Shang....

The

sculpture

of

the

Qin [dynasty] erracotta igures

s wholly

based

on

reality

and draws

ts material

rom actual ife. It

reflects

the spirit of

the times of the First

Emperorof Qin as

he unifiedChina with

his

powerfularmy,

and it brings

out

a national style

of

lucidity

and grandeur Qian

et

al.

1981:26-27,

82].

We see

in

these quotes,

and

in

other official

interpretations

of

Chinese history,

a

very

different

use of the past

from

that revealed

in

the other

examples.

The

purpose

is not to

legitimize

authority

by genealogical

linkage,

not

to justify imperial

hegemony

of a

superior people

over

inferior

ones, or

to

claim

intellectual or

philosophical priority

over

other nations.

Rather,

the

past

is

seen

as

a testimonial to the Chinese masses,

the People, who created

and

carried forward

a magnificent

civilization despite

their

overlords,

but whose

full

potential

was unleashed only

in 1949.5

IMPLICATIONS

Three instances

are examined

in

which

the past, particularly

those portions

in

which archaeological

phenomena or theories figured prominently, was used for nationalistic purposes. Voltaire once wrote,

History

is after

all only

a

pack

of tricks

we

play

on

the dead

(cited by

Becker

1932:44). Manip-

ulations

of

the

past by

nationalistically

motivated

ideologues

and chauvinists are also, however,

a

matter

of

playing

tricks on the

living. They

serve to convince the

governed

that

those in power

rule

legitimately:

that

they

have

genealogical

links,

or other

lines of

authority, connecting

them

directly

to

the ultimate

sources

of

power

and

legitimacy,

however

conceived. Mexico

is offered as an

example

of

this

type.

A second method

of manipulating

the

past

is

more diffuse

and propagandistic.

Nationalist partisans

use

and interpret

the

past

to

advance claims

of their nation's

peoples' indigenous

physical

or mental

superiority.

For

example,

there are the

British claims

that

Druids are

the true source of

Western

(and

even

Eastern, i.e.,

Brahmanic

and

Confucian) religious

and

scientific

knowledge,

and that the

Druids or other indigenous

Britons

were

the

designers

and builders of

megalithic

mainframes,

or

Stone-

and

Bronze-Age

astronomical observatories.

The

implication

is that

early

Britons

were

mentally and organizationally

more advanced than

their Continental

peers, and that

somehow this

superiority

carries down to

the contemporary

British. This purported

natural

superiority

sup-

ported

Britain's

right,

or

duty,

to

carry

the White Man's Burden: to bring culture

and civilization

to the

less

fortunate

rest

of

the world.

A

similar,

if

more

sinister, example

was Nazi Germany's

officially-sponsored

attempts to

ma-

nipulate

the past by

marshalling anatomical,

linguistic, and

archaeological

data to

prove Aryan

superiority

and

with

it,

the

right to conquer

and rule the world.

Although Nazi

Germany is

the

most

blatant

recent

example,

history

is

replete

with

others (Plumb

1970:62-101):

all would-be

and

all

successful

conquerors

are

always

superior and the

deities are always

on their sides. It

was

so when

Sargon

came to

power

ca. 2370

B.C.;

when Ur established

hegemony over other

Sumerian

city-states around 2050 B.C.; when Hammurabi and the Babylonians conquered Sumer-Akkad in

1750

B.C.; when the

Hebrews besieged

Jericho; when the

Aztec Triple Alliance

dominated

Me-

soamerica

in

1500;

and

when

the Spanish conquered

the Aztecs and

the Incas soon thereafter.

Finally,

there are uses of the

past for internal

legitimation of a

nation-state's policies,

actions,

and

ideologies.

Both Huxley and Orwell

recognized the

importance of the state's

need and ability

to control

the

past,

and

made them

focal

points

of their

dystopian

novels.

The

example

used

here

is

contemporary

China.

Like

Orwell's

state,

China

uses

and

manipulates

the

past.

Its

purposes

are

to

glorify,

and

hence,

justify

the

present

and

the future

by

denigrating

the

evil

past.

Huxley's

World

Controllers

obliterated

the

past

because

its

perceived

heresies threatened

the

present

stability

and

happiness

of

a

populace

tranquilized by

soma and

feely

movies.

There was no room for Shake-

speare

or other old

things

in

such

a

world,

as the

Savage

found out

to his sorrow.

In

China,

at

least

since the

end

of

the

Cultural

Revolution,

there is room once

again

for Confucius and

Mencius,

although they

are

officially interpreted,

and there

is

clearly

room

for the

Qin

terracotta

army

and

the

other

great

treasures

from

the

past.

The

latter have become visible

symbols

of

the

strength

and

genius

of the

People

throughout

three millennia of

oppression

that ended

in

1949.




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The uses of the past

for nationalistic and chauvinistic

purposes

discussed here raise

a set of issues

within emerging critical

discussions about the

purposes of archaeology,

and the sociopolitical and

epistemological contexts

within which it is conducted.

Worldwide in the

1980s, there is

a great deal

more to

archaeological inquiry than

is posited in the original

OED

definition given at

the outset of

this article:

Ancient history generally;

systematic

description of study of antiquities.

The scientism

of the now-aging

New Archaeology (Binford

1962, 1986), the exigencies

of rescue archaeology

and cultural resource management

(Cleere 1984;

Fowler 1982; Knudson

1986; Wilson and Loyola

1982), and the attempted

integration

of post-processual symbolic,

structural, and Marxist

concepts

into archaeological

analyses and theorizing

(Hodder 1982;

Leone 1986; Spriggs 1984;

Tilley 1984)

have all

conspired to push archaeology

far beyond the simplicities

of culture history implied

by the

OED definition.

That archaeological study of

the past does not take place

in an intellectual or

sociopolitical

vacuum

is

obvious.

That the contexts in which

archaeology is practiced

may structure

or influence how

the

past

is

interpreted

is becoming a matter

of critical

concern.

A

host

of complex questions is

raised. On a general level,

there are questions about

philosophies

of history.

Historians

and social

philosophers

have

long

wrestled

with the

question,

what is

history?,

and a series of related questions about historical process (Becker 1932; Plumb 1970; Toulmin

and Goodfield 1966). Archaeologists

generally have focused

on middle-range

theory in seeking to

answer

questions

of historical process

(Grayson 1986) and

less on grandiose what

is history?

issues. The emerging

critical discussions

require that attention

be given to the grandiose

questions,

to

the intellectual

and sociopolitical contexts that

overtly and covertly give

form and substance to

those

questions,

and to

middle-range theory.

Clearly, the past

and archaeology, as

a provider of

various

interpretations of the past,

have often been used for

nationalist, colonialist, and

imperialist

purposes,

to use

Trigger's

(1984)

terms. As

I

indicate here, the past

and monuments of the past

have long been used to

legitimize authority and

to assert, or

symbolize, nationalist ideologies.

Such

usage

may

well be coterminous

with the state as an

entity

in

human

history. Since

the sixteenth

century,

scholars

styling

themselves as

antiquarians,

and

latterly

as

archaeologists,

have, wittingly

or

otherwise, participated

in

these

uses for overt nationalistic

purposes.

But

knowledge

of such

participation

raises

the other

side

of

the issue.

That

is, how, and

to what

degree,

do

nationalist,

colonialist, imperialist

aims and the

ethnic,

social-class,

and

political-party

ideologies

and values

in

which archaeologists

are

immersed covertly

influence archaeological theory

and

interpretation?

Fowler

(1986),

Gero

(1985),

Meltzer

(1985),

Patterson

(1986), Trigger (1984,

1986), and

others

have

recently

begun discussions

of

various covert influences

on

archaeological

interpretations

of

New

World

pasts.

Hall

(1984)

and Garlake

(1982)

raise similar issues

for

Africa.

Wilk

(1985)

raises

fascinating questions

with

his

correlations

between

contemporary

political

and

environmental

issues

in the United States and

archaeological

interpretations

of the ancient

Maya.

If

the ideologies

and values

of

their

sociopolitical

milieus

influence or

structure

how

archaeologists

interpret

the

past,

then to what

degree

are

they pursuing,

or

delineating,

what Watson

(1986)

calls

the real

past?

Watson

critically

summarizes

various

contemporary approaches

to

archaeological

interpretation, as those interpretations derive from theoretical and methodological assumptions

within archaeology.

She

notes

that the

majority

of

archaeologists

think that the real

past

is

accessible,

and

what

archaeologists

do is

to

(more

or

less

successfully)

delineate

that

reality (Watson

1986:442-443).

The

cases

discussed herein,

blatant

manipulations

of

the

past

for

political

ends,

and the

covert

influences of

ideology

and values

on

archaeological interpretations,

raise

complex epistemological

issues

in relation

to Watson's concerns.

Real

in Watson's sense

implies

that

objective

and

perhaps

value neutral

interpretations

of the

past

are

possible.

Philosophers

of

history

and

phi-

losophers

of

historical

sciences, e.g., geology,

paleontology,

and

astronomy,

have

for a

long

time

explored

the

epistemological implications

of historical

reality.

The

general

conclusion

appears

to

be

that

true

objectivity

and

value-free

interpretations

are worthwhile

ideals,

but ideals not

likely

to

be

fully

Fowler, 1987 - Uses of the Past

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