Foundations of System-Wide Stress Testing · 1. System-wide stress tests are necessary complements...
Transcript of Foundations of System-Wide Stress Testing · 1. System-wide stress tests are necessary complements...
Foundations of System-Wide Stress Testing
J.DoyneFarmer,AlissaM.Kleinnijenhuis,PaulNahai-Williamson&
ThomWetzer
AnyviewsexpressedaresolelythoseoftheauthorsandsocannotbetakentorepresentthoseoftheBankofEnglandortostateBankofEnglandpolicy.
Introduction
Stresstests:• Evaluateresilienceagainstfinancialshocks• Keypost-crisisregulatoryinnovation
Introduction
Stresstests:• Evaluateresilienceagainstfinancialshocks• Keypost-crisisregulatoryinnovation
Single-Institution“Microprudential”
System-Wide“Macroprudential”
✅ Initialshock❌ Endogenousshockamplification
“Needarobustand[easily]implementableframework”
A “robust and implementable framework” for system-wide stress tests
• Existingframeworksandmodelsfailtomeetthechallenge:
Frameworkshortcomings
HighlytailoredtospecificsettingsNotflexibletonewimplementations‘Reinventingthewheel’
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Modellingissues
Multiple,simultaneouslyoperatingamplificationmechanismsHeterogeneityininstitutions,contracts,(regulatory)constraints,behaviours…
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Objectives & Contributions
Frameworkforsystem-widefinancialstability
analysis
• Agenericmethodtomodel:• Interactingcontagionmechanisms• Banksandnon-banks• Multipleinteractingconstraints
• Aflexible,modular,scalableframework
EUimplementationofasystem-widestresstestandpolicyexperiments
• System-wideanalysisandcalibration• Centralityof“usablecapital”
Generic System-Wide Stress Testing• Python-basedsystem-widesimulationengine• SimulationenginealsoavailableinC++• Open-sourcelibraryavailableonline
• Flexible‘ontology’(‘buildingblocks’)
Implementation: EU Financial System
Initialadverseshock
• EuropeanBankingAuthority2018StressTestScenario• Usedasamicroprudentialbenchmark
Fivebuildingblocks
• Financialinstitutions:banks(42),hedgefunds,assetmanagers
• Contracts:tradableassets,interbankcontracts,repo,other• Markets:priceformationviapriceimpactfunction• Constraints:risk-weightedcapitalratio,leverageratio,liquiditycoverageratio,margincall,repaymentobligations
• Behaviours:contractualandregulatoryobligations
Cash
External Assets
Interbank Loans
Reverse Repo
Tradable Assets
Other
Deposits
LT Funding
Interbank Deposits
Repo
Other
Equity
Bank
Ot
Cash
Tradable Assets
Hedge Fund
Tradable Assets
Shares
Asset Manager
Cash
Repo
Equity
Implementation: Institutions and Interconnections
• Key finding: The financial system may be stable or unstable given a microprudential stress test outcome, depending on its shock-amplifying tendency. Therefore, microprudential stress tests are poor predictors of stability and system-wide stress test are necessary.
Policy experiment 1: From Micro to Macro: A Macroprudential Overlay to the EBA 2018 Stress Test
Policy Experiment 2:`Usability’ of Buffers and Contagion
• Key finding: Systemic risk decreases in an increasing `usability’ of regulatory capital buffers.
Policy Experiment 3: Calibration of Buffers with System-Wide Stress Tests
Key finding: The size of regulatory buffers needed to confine systemic risk may be underestimated if calibrated with microprudential stress tests, which do not capture system-wide amplifications, rather than with system-wide stress tests.
Policy Implications and Discussion
1. System-widestresstestsarenecessarycomplementstomicroprudentialstressteststoassesssystemicrisk–andfurtherresearchinthisareacontinuestobecritical.
2. Theusabilityofcapitaliskeytosystemicresilience.
3. Thecalibrationofcapitalbuffersshouldexplicitlytakeintoaccountsystem-widedynamics.
• Key finding: Contagion mechanisms may mutually amplify systemic risk. The degree of amplification is heterogeneous in the market liquidity and differs among contagion mechanisms.
More in the paper… Amplification of Contagion Mechanisms
Thank you for your attention. Any questions?