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Forms, Paradigms and the Form of the GoodAuthor(s): Richard J. KetchumSource: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 1-21Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744607.

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History of Philosophy QuarterlyVolume 11, Number 1, January 1994

FORMS, PARADIGMS ANDTHE FORM OF THE GOODRichard J. Ketchum

THEpurpose here is to present, clarify and defend a particular interpreta

tion of the sun analogy ofRepublic VI. The idea ofR. M. Hare1 that theForm, F-ness, is in some sense a good F and thus is somehow related to theForm of the good is first presented and criticized. From Hare's interpretation,two interpretations of the sun analogy are developed, neither ofwhich requiresself-predication as Hare's interpretation does. Though one of these interpretations is ultimately rejected, it is discussed in some detail here both because itdeserves more attention than it has been given and also because the discussionwill clarify the correct interpretation by contrast at specific points. The theorythat the good is the cause of the being and the knowability of the Forms,correctly interpreted, expresses a philosophically interesting thesis which isstill debated and discussed today.

The Form of the good, Plato tells us in theRepublic, "supplies (7iape'x?iv)what is known with truth and gives (ano?i?ovai) the power toknow to whatknows." It is "the cause (aui a) ofknowledge and of truth (r| ? Xr\eia) insofaras it is known" (508E1-4). Furthermore, "not only is being known presentin (napexvea) what is known fromCurco') he good, but even 'tobe'(to ??vou) andbeing (r\ovaia) attach to those things from it" (509B6-8).

The context in which this passage occurs makes it clear that the things whichare known and are true are Forms. Since Forms are unchanging, Forms cannotliterally receive anything from the good and the good cannot literally giveanything to Forms. These verbs and the suggestion of agency must be intendedmetaphorically. The occurrence of the word "ama" and Plato's theory of amain thePhaedo 99D-105C suggest that themetaphor is tobe parsed in terms of"explanation."2 The definition of the Form of the good, Plato must be telling us,either provides a complete explanation as to why, or plays a role in an explanation as to why, Forms are known or are true or simply are.3 It is entirely orin part because the good is_that, e.g., justice is known or is true or is.

There are very close connections between knowledge, truth and being withwhich Plato was quite familiar. Truth can be defined in terms of being.4 A truesentence (Xoyoc) is a sentence "which says of the things that are that they are."(Cratylus 385B7; see also Euthydemus 284A, Theaetetus 188D, Sophist240D-E). Furthermore, what is known must be true (Gorgias 454D, Meno

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2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY97E-98A and, perhaps, Republic 477E). Moreover, for Plato if not for us,knowledge is of that which purely (eiXiKpivco;)and completely (navTzXcuc) is(Republic 477A). Perhaps, then, particularly since being seems to be thecentral notion here, ifwe could understand how the good accounts for the beingof the Forms we could use these connections to extend that understanding totruth and knowledge. If, for example, we could understand how the goodexplains why justice is, then we might be able to appeal to the fact that onlywhat-is is knowable to make sense of the claim that the good explains whyjustice is knowable.5 This is the approach taken here. The question is then,"Why does Plato think that the Form of the good explains or helps to explainwhy the Forms have being and are?"

There are three possibilities as to what Plato intends by saying that "to be"and being belong to Forms. First, he might merely mean that they exist. Thus,the good would explain, e.g., why justice exists or why the just itself is something (Cratylus 439C8, Phaedo 74A9-12), or inmore idiomatic English, whythere is such a thing as justice. Second, at the end of Republic V Platodistinguished Forms as things which completely and purely are (477A) fromthe many sensible objects which roll around between what is not and whatpurely is (479D). The second alternative is, then, that the good will explainwhy Forms have the particular kind of being they do have. That is to say, itexplains why they purely and completely are as opposed to having the inferiortype of being possessed by sensible objects. Finally, there is a sense of "being"Cn cvuGia) whereby the being of a Form is simply what that Form is.6 Thus, toexplain why the Forms have their being would be to explain why each Form iswhat it is, why, e.g., the triangle is the plane, three-sided figure, why shape isthe limit of a solid, etc. The fact that both to rivai and r\ ovaxa are said toattach to the Forms from the good at Republic 509B6-8 leaves open thepossibility that some pair of these alternatives is intended as well.

In the above paragraph the English verb "to be" is used without an anticipated predicate complement. Plato frequently does the same with the Greekcopula "eivca." It is argued elsewhere, and will be assumed here, that especiallyin contexts in which Plato is contrasting Forms with their sensible instances"to be" is "to be something or other."7 "X is" means "x is something or other"and "x is not" means "x is not anything at all." The idea is that the Greek copulabehaves grammatically in ways similar to some transitive verbs. Some transitive verbs can occur without a direct object without changing their meaning."Eat," "see," "sing," and "give" are examples of such transitive verbs.8 If I gaveto the United Fund, I gave something or other and if I did not give, I gavenothing at all. While much more can be said about the parallels between suchtransitive verbs and Plato's use of the verb "rivai," let this suffice for presentpurposes. Such uses of the copula will be called "incomplete uses of the copula,"and in what follows they will be underlined.

The first of the three alternatives mentioned in the next to last paragraphis entailed by either of the other two. That is to say, ifwe explain why justice



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 3completely or purely is something or other we have ipso facto explained whythe kind, justice, exists. In the sense of "there is such a thing as" F-ness whichdoes not entail that specific Fs exist, we have explained why there is such athing as justice. Also, ifwe can explain why shape is the limit of a solid we haveexplained why there is such a thing as shape. For shape would not be what itis if there were no such things as shape. Nor would shape really be anythingat all if there were no such thing as shape. It will be assumed here that if thefirst alternative is intended at all, it is to be understood as a consequence ofone or both of the other two.9

There are at least two things to be said in favor of the second alternative.First, it is suggested by the analogy with the sun. The sun is responsible forthe generation, growth and nourishment of visible things. Though it is not clear

what sort of physical theory Plato has inmind here, it is almost certainly notone which would make the sun responsible for each thing's becoming the very(kind of) thing that itcomes tobe. Plato is almost certainly not thinking of thesun as what not only makes saplings grow but also makes them to grow intotrees instead of grass or fish or flowers. On the analogy then, the good should

make the Forms be, but not be what they in fact are.10 The second alternativeis also more likely than the third simply because it is, on the face of it,moreplausible. The claim that one principle can explain why all Forms have acommon feature, pure or complete being, is far more plausible than the claimthat one principle can explain, even in part, why each Form has its particularnature, e.g., why shape is the limit of a solid, why justice is the giving to eachhis due, etc.

Though the second alternative will come up again, the third alternative isin all probability the correct one. For, as implausible as it is, it does seem to bewhat Plato had inmind.11 On the usual interpretation of the divided linepassage which immediately follows the sun analogy, that which is the principleof all (Forms) and is itselfwithout assumptions (to avimo?eiov, 511B6-7) isthe Form of the good. It isknowledge of this which enables the dialectician toknow the Forms (511D2). If, however, knowledge of the good merely enabledus to explain why Forms have the kind ofbeing theyhave but notwhy they arewhat they in factare, it is difficultto see how the good could hold the prominentposition Plato gives to it in the allegory of the cave and the divided line. It isafter all the dialectician's job to know the natures of things, their being.

R. M. Hare has given some content to the claim that knowledge of the goodis necessary for knowledge of the being of Forms assuming the third alternative. Let us assume that Plato thinks of Forms as self-predicable in the moststraightforward sense, in the sense intended by Vlastos'use of the term.12 Thus,the Form, largeness, is too big to fit into my room; Justice is constantly doingthe right thing or is at least disposed to do the right thing and the equal itselfis a pair of objects exactly equal in every respect. Furthermore, Forms areparadigms (TiapaOeiyuaxa), standards, models or patterns, Plato tells us in anumber of places.13 Paradigms are typical examples or good examples, so that



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4 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYa paradigm F is a good example of an F. Since Forms are paradigms, the F itselfwill be a paradigm F. Plato thenmay have thought that the question "What isthe F itself?" and "What is a good F, i.e., a good example of an F?" as much thesame question. As Hare himself puts it,

Ifwe try to draw a circle, somebody may say 'that isn't a very good circle.' By thishe might mean that it is not very exactly circular?that it is not the sort of circleone would point to ifone wished to give someone the idea ofwhat a circle was. Here'good' seems to be being used in such a way that the criteria for being a good circleare identical with those for being (really) a circle... So Plato may have argued asfollows. Ifwe wish to know what it is to be a circle (to know the Idea of circularityor to know what the Circle is), we have to find out what it is to be a good or perfectcircle. And this involves knowing the Idea of the Good or what the Good is.

The idea expressed in the last two sentences of this quotation from Hare is thebasis from which the present interpretation is developed. To put the pointsomewhat differently,the answer to the question "What is the F itself?" is thesame as the answer to the question, "What is a good F?" (or in more Platonicterms, "What is the good F itself?") and thus, knowing what the F is involvesknowing the Form of the good. Plato should not be burdened with the reasoningwhich Hare gives to him, however. That argument is not very good and forreasons far less sophisticated than Hare's own criticism of it. There is no reasonto attribute it to Plato. There are better reasons for believing that the circleitself and the good circle are one and the same thing, though those reasons willnot be presented until what Plato means by the identification is stated anddefended by an appeal to the texts. The argument for the present interpretationdevelops as follows. First, the reasoning Hare attributes to Plato is criticized.Next an interpretation of the sun analogy which explains in what way Platothought of the F itself and the good F as one and the same Form is stated anddefended. The defence at this point assumes that there is some initial plausibility to the claim that to be an F is to be a good F. Finally, a reason Plato mayhave had for identifying the F itselfand the good F is presented.

The argument which Hare attributes to Plato is fallacious because it assumesthat the criteria for being a circle are the same as the criteria for being a goodcircle. Someone who claims that a particular poorly drawn circle is not a verygood (example of a) circlemay none the less believe that in spite of this it is(really) a circle.15 The point that the poorly drawn circle is not a good exampleof a circle and thus should not be used in teaching what a circle is would bejust as well taken ifwe assume that the criteria for being a circle are differentfrom those for being a good one. Of course, it is arguable that a poorly drawncircle is no circle at all. But this is plausibly argued only for geometric termsand perhaps a few others. Human beings who are paralyzed or are albinos orhave downs syndrome or have had a limb amputated are not good examples ofa human being. But they really are human beings. A very dull, poorly balanced,brittle knife with a blister producing handle is not a good example ofa knife,but is one none the less. In a word, the point is that the predicate, "is aborderline (or questionable) F," is the opposite of, not the negation of, "is aparadigm (or good example of a) F." There is no reason to believe that Plato



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 5thought otherwise. The idea that the knife itselfand the good knife are one andthe same thing can be explained in such a way that this thesis does not have theconsequence that a less than paradigm case of a knife is no knife at all.

In the passage quoted above, Hare is trying to give sense to the claim thatknowledge of the good is required forknowledge ofany other Form. What weare looking for, however, is an explanation as to how the good can explain whyForms are what they are. We want to understand how the being of the goodexplains the being of the other Forms.16 Hare's idea can be fairly easily moldedto do the job, however. It is because the good is_that, e.g., the circle itselfis a figure every point onwhich is equidistant froma given point. Why is thisso? Because the circle itself is a good (circle). The logic is the same as thefollowing. It is because the bald is the hairless that George is a hairless man.

Why is this so? Because George is bald. Of course I do not know how tofill inthe blank in "The good is_" in such a way that it, in conjunction with "TheF is a good F," entails the answer to the question "What is the F?" All we aretrying to do is see how someone might think that the good plays a role inexplaining, e.g., why the circle is a plane figure every point on which isequidistant from a given point. At the very least, Hare has enabled us to makeitplausible that a statement to the effectthat the good is thus and so (or thatthe good example itself is thus and so) is involved in (is a premise in) anexplanation as to why a correct answer to a "What is the F?" question is in factcorrect, e.g., why the circle is a plane figure every point on which is equidistantfrom a point on the plane.

This interpretation points to a conceptual connection between "good" and"being." Since such a connection is required by the text, the interpretation hasgiven meaning to a doctrine which would otherwise be so implausible as toapproach unintelligibility. There are, however, two objections to it. First, asHare himself points out, it assumes self-predication in the most straightforward, many would say the most detrimental, sense.17 A Form cannot be a good(example or instance of an) F without being an F18 There are those who do notthink that Plato was committed to self-predication, early or late, and mightprefer to leave his comments on the good a mystery to accepting Hare'sexplanation which requires self-predication. A second, related problem is thatwe need some evidence that the interesting idea Hare has suggested to us isPlato's idea and not Hare's alone. While there is no doubt that Plato thoughtof Forms as paradigms at the time of writing the Republic, some justificationis needed for the claim that he thought of them as paradigms in a sense neededby Hare's interpretation, a sense which is paraphrasable in terms of "good."The opposite of "paradigm F" or "good example of an F" is "poor example of anF" or "borderline case of an F." Evidence is needed that Plato thought of Formsas paradigms in a sense the opposite of which is borderline or questionablecase.

The point of the second problem is that there are passages in the dialoguesin which Forms (or what were later to be called Forms) are called paradigms



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6 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYbut which need not and perhaps should not be understood as claiming that theForm in question is a good example. Consider, for example, Euthyphro 6E.

Teach me what this form itself is so that, looking at it and using it as a standard(7iocpoc eryucx), I can say that what is such as it is holy whether it is something youor anyone else may do and what is not such as it I can deny [is holy].

Assuming that looking at the Form is a metaphor, how is the metaphor to beparsed? How do we determine if n act is such as the holy? Indeed, what is itfor an act to be such as the holy? One perfectly adequate way to understandthe passage is by understanding an act to be such as the holy just in case itsatisfies the definition of theholy. If the holy is service to the gods then an actisholy if nd only if t is an act ofservice to thegods. Nothing very sophisticatedis required and surely not the idea that standards are perfect examples, e.g.,that holiness is a good example ofa holy thing.19A thing is such as the F itselfjust in case the answer to the question, "What is the F?" describes it.

A natural place to look in the middle dialogues to see whether or not Platoheld that Forms are paradigms in the required sense is to those passages whicheither argue that, or explain how, Forms are more perfect than their defectiveinstances. In this regard we have the argument from opposites in the RepublicySocrates' praise of beauty itself in the Symposium, especially 210E-212A, andthe argument that learning is recollection in the Phaedo. In the Republic,478E-479D, Forms are contrasted with sensible objects in that Forms purely(ei^iKpiv?ic) and completely (navxEXi?z) re while sensible objects a) partake ofboth being and not being (478E2), b) are between being and not being (479C7),c) cannot be firmly conceived either to be or not to be or both or neither(479C3-5). These contrasts hold because it is true of sensible objects but not ofForms that they are no more than they are not what anyone might say theyare (479A9-10).

Equality is contrasted with its defective instances in thePhaedo 74A-75E.Equal sticks are said to be "in need of something with respect to being such asthe equal itself (74D6-7). The grounds for this claim are presumably that anystick which is equal is equal to one thing and not to another (74B2-4) while theequal itself is never unequal (74C1-2). It is expressly stated that this argumentas well as the argument inwhich it is embedded is intended to apply not onlyto the equal itselfbut also to "the beautiful itself,the good itself,the just andthe holy and all those thingswe designate as that which is" (75C11-D2).

Finally, beauty itself is contrasted with beautiful things in theSymposium(211A1-5) in that beauty itself always is, neither comes to be nor passes away,neither waxes nor wanes since it is not beautiful in one respect and ugly inanother, nor is it beautiful at one time and not at another, nor is it beautifulwith respect to one thing, ugly with respect to another, nor is it beautiful herebut ugly there, beautiful to one but not to another. It is not controversial thathere beautiful sensibles are distinguished from beauty on the grounds that thebeautiful sensibles are both beautiful (in some respects, at some times, etc.)



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 7and not beautiful (in other respects, at other times, etc.). What ismore controversial is whether this difference obtains between beauty and beautiful thingsbecause (A) beauty is always, in all respects, by comparison with all things,everywhere, etc., beautiful and thus at no time, in no respect, etc., ugly20 or (B)beauty is not at a time or in a respect or in comparison to anything eitherbeautiful or ugly but is simply and unqualifiedly beautiful.

In fact, the distinction between the two alternatives, (A) and (B), exists aswell in the Phaedo and Republic passages. Is the equal itself never unequalbecause (A) it is always perfectly equal to whatever it is equal to, and in allrespects and by comparison with any other pair of equals? Or is the equal itselfnever unequal because (B) it is equal without being to something equal, or ina respect equal, or in comparison with something equal. The examples cited atRepublic 479A-C are susceptible of both alternatives but by themselves suggest neither.

To the extent that we think alternative (A) to be entailed or supported byany of these passages, to that extent we have found exactly what we have beenlooking for. We have found evidence to justify Hare's analysis of the good as thecause of the being of Forms. Alternative (A) seems best understood as assumingself-predication. Furthermore, a beauty which is in every respect, always,everywhere, in comparison with everything beautiful is paradigmatically beautiful and a good example of a beautiful thing.

There is good reason to doubt, however, that Plato thought of Forms asparadigms in this sense. The contrast drawn in the Symposium betweenbeautiful things and beauty itself is not presented as an instance of a contrastthat exists between Forms and their instances generally. So, even if theSymposium does claim that the beautiful itself is in all reports beautiful,further argument would be needed to conclude that all Forms are self-predicable in the same way. The contrasts drawn in the Phaedo and Republic,however, are explicitly stated to apply to all Forms (Phaedo 75C11-D2, Republic 476A, 479E). It has furthermore been argued that the language Plato usesin these passages to generalize the contrast, among other considerations,strongly suggests alternative (B).21 A simple statement of the conclusion ofthese discussions will suffice for present purposes.

The difference between sensibles and forms consists not so much in a difference between what they are but rather in a difference in the way they are whatthey are. Sensible objects are at a time, in a respect, in relation to something,in a word, qualifiedly, what they are. Forms, on the other hand, are simply andunqualifiedly what they are. The adverbial phrases in the above sentences, "ata time," "in a respect," "qualifiedly," "unqualifiedly," etc., are to be understoodas modifying the verb "to be," not the predicated adjective or noun. Perhaps ananalogy will help to explain the idea. The sentence, "The number three isnecessarily odd," does not tell us that there is a particular kind of oddness,necessary oddness, which is possessed by the number three while perhaps



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8 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYother things have contingent oddness. So too, on the interpretation attributedto Plato here, "Helen is (today, in face and figure, by comparison with mortals)beautiful," does not attribute to Helen a particular sort of beauty, e.g., temporal, bodily, mortal beauty.22 Rather, it tells us just how Helen is beautiful,namely, now, in comparison with mortals, in face and figure, in a word, qualifiedly. "The beautiful purely is (beautiful)," does not tell us that there is aparticular kind of beauty, pure beauty, possessed by the beautiful itself butperhaps not by sensible beauties. What this sentence does tell us is that theway that the beautiful itself isbeautiful is such that it is not also not beautiful.Equal sticks fall short ofbeing such as the equal itself is not because the equalhas a kind of equality not possessed by the sticks but because the equal itselfis equal without being to something equal while any equal stick is to somethingequal, as itwere, (and thus is not equal to something else). As A. Nehamas hasput the point, "when we say that particulars are only imperfectly F in comparison to the Form of F-ness, the imperfection belongs to the "being" rather thanto the "F" in "being F."23 Today, by semantic assent, we might put the point bysaying that sentences of the form, "the F itself (or F-ness) is G," is a differenttype of predication from sentence of the form, "a is G" where "a" is a propername of a sensible object. Plato, on the interpretation here suggested, puts thepoint by saying that Forms really purely, completely and by nature are24 whilesensible objects a) stand in need of something to be such as the Forms are andb) roll about between being and not being.

It is immediately clear that on this interpretation we can no longer appealto the passages from the Phaedo and Republic mentioned above to support theclaim that Forms are, in the requisite sense, paradigm cases. If a Form'sperfection and superiority over sensible objects lies in the fact that Forms areunqualifiedly this and thatwhile sensibles are only qualifiedly this and that,then a Form, the F, will no more be a paradigm case of an F than a sensibleobject which is F. The fact that a stick must be equal to something to be equalat all does not make the stick a borderline case of an equal thing. The fact thatthe equal itself is equal without being equal to something or at a time does not

make the equal itself a paradigm case of an equal thing.In a way it is a good thing that we failed to find in the above mentioned

passages fromthePhaedo and theRepublic evidence that Plato thought of theF itselfas being paradigmatically F For itwould have been amistake onPlato'spart to infer that sensibles are not paradigmatically F, good examples of an F,from the fact that they partake of opposites. For consider. Suppose Helen ofTroy is, in one minor respect, not beautiful. Suppose, for example, that she hasan ingrown toe nail. Would that be a good reason to deny that she is a goodexample of a beautiful woman? Or, suppose we grant that as she ages she willlose a small part of her beauty. Again this seems to be a poor reason for denyingthat she is a good example of a beautiful woman.25 The inference is even lessplausible when other so called incomplete predicates are in question. For astick to be equal it must be at a time, in a respect and to something equal. It



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 9is just because a stick must be equal to something that it is also not equal (tosomething else). But the fact that any stickwhich is equal in length to one stick

will also be unequal in weight to some other stick seems totally irrelevant tothe question as to whether or not the stick in question is a good example of anequal thing. If there were something that is equal always to everything in everyrespect, we might be able to say that this is a better example of an equal thingthan any stick. But there is of course no such thing. The point, in a word, isthis. The argument from opposites can be used to show that an object is not agood (not a paradigm case of an) F only if it contains a premise to the effectthat there are examples of Fs which do not partake of opposites (and the Form,F-ness, is an example of an F which does not partake of opposites only ifweassume self-predication.)

The argument from opposites can be used to show, however, that Forms areand sensible objects are not paradigm cases of beings, paradigm cases of thingsthat are. The fact that Helen is only at times, in certain respects, etc., beautiful,and thus qualifiedly isbeautiful, while beauty itselfunqualifiedly iswhat it issupports the conclusion that Helen's being beautiful is not a paradigm case ofsomething's being something. It does so, and this is crucial, because there arebetter examples of something's being something than Helen's being beautiful.Beauty's being a delight to behold (or, perhaps, beauty's being what is pleasingto the eye) is an example of something's being something which requires noqualifications and thus does seem to be a good example of something's beingsomething. It is not the case that beauty in a way or sometimes or in somerespects is not a delight to behold. The point seems just as easy tomake using"equal." A stick's being equal is a bad example of something's being somethingsince the stick is only now, in length, to another stick equal. That is to say,sticks qualifiedly are equal. The fact that thieves are only qualifiedly honorable(i.e., only among themselves) is a good reason for denying that thieves are goodexamples of honorable people. So too, the fact that sticks only qualifiedly areequal makes a stick's being equal a bad example of something's being something. This is true in the case of the thieves only because there are betterexamples than they of honorable people. It is true in the case of the sticks beingequal precisely because there are much better examples of something's beingsomething at hand, e.g., the equal's being what is (? ? crciv) neither greater norless. Were there no examples of a thing's being unqualifiedly something orother, a stick's being equal (in length, to another, now) would be as good anexample of something's being something as we could expect. It would be aparadigm case of something's being something. After all, ifwe were all (bynature) thieves, an honorable thief would be a paradigm case of an honorableperson. As things stand, however, since there are good examples of something'sbeing something or other, a stick's being equal is not a good example ofsomething's being something.

So far we have drawn a contrast between what we might call types ofpredication or, in more Platonic terms, ways of being. But this does not yet



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10 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYamount to a distinction between objects and a distinction between objects isclearly intended, e.g., in distinguishing Forms as things that completely arefrom their instances as things that are and are not. We get a distinctionbetween Forms and their sensible instances ifwe assume that sensible objectsare qualifiedly whatever they are while there is at least one thing (what it is)that each Form unqualifiedly is. Plato may have thought when writing the

middle dialogues that Forms are unqualifiedly whatever they are but we neednot assume this here. The theory that Forms are distinct from sensible objectsin that Forms are unqualifiedly something or other while sensible objects arequalifiedly whatever they are may be called, "the grades of being theory."

It would be wrong, as argued above, to infer simply from the fact that Helenis in one or two minor respects not beautiful, or on a few occasions not beautiful,that she is not a good example of a beauty. It would be equally wrong to infersimply from the fact that sensible objects are not, in a way, whatever they arethat sensible objects are not good examples of beings. It is not only becausesensible objects are qualifiedly what they are but also because there are things,Forms, that are unqualifiedly something or other that sensible objects are notgood examples of beings. If everything were what it is qualifiedly and thus wasalso not, in a way, what it is then everything would be an equally good exampleof a being. As things stand, however, only Forms are good examples of beings.

We looked at those passages in the middle dialogues which in one way oranother find sensible objects wanting by comparison with Forms to discoverevidence for the view that Forms are paradigm cases in the requisite sense of"paradigm," i.e., the sense in which a paradigm F is a good example of an F. Wewere looking for evidence for Hare's analysis (more accurately an extension ofHare's analysis) of the claim that the Form of the good is the cause of the beingof the other Forms. We now find, however, that Forms are in another wayparadigm cases. Each Form is a paradigm case of a being. The form of F-nessmay not be a good example of an F but it is a good example of something thatis. It is a good example, that is to say, of a being. Now, since Forms are paradigmcases of being and thus are good beings (good examples of beings), we havearrived at an interesting explanatory connection between the good and thebeing of Forms. If there were no such thing as the good, and thus no such thingas the good example or paradigm, then Forms could not be the good beings theyare. Any explanation as to what it is to be a Form would, it seems, have tomakereference to the good.26

Since an objection we considered to Hare's analysis was that it seemed torequire self-predication, itwould do well to consider how the present interpretation fares in this regard. The thesis that all sentences of the form, "The Fitself is F," or "F-ness is F," are true may be called the thesis that "Forms areself-inscribable." The thesis that Forms are self-inscribable leaves open thequestion as to what ismeant by sentences of this form, which sentences implythem and which sentences they imply.Now Plato held the thesis that Formsare self-inscribable in the early and middle dialogues.27 Furthermore, the view



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 11that Forms are self-predicable is, strictly speaking, consistent with the interpretation presented here of the passages from the Phaedo and Republic. Thepoint to be stressed is that those passages as interpreted here do not requireself-predication. The Form, being (to ov), must be and, as all Forms, must beunqualifiedly. But this is a far cry from the full blown self-predication thesiswhich requires that all Forms have the characteristic they are. The grades ofbeing theory does not entail self-predication. Indeed, on the interpretationoffered here the whole point of the grades of being doctrine seems to be thatthe F itself is not another among many Fs though the F itself is F. The F itselfis simply and unqualifiedly F. It is F in a way that no sensible object can be F,since sensible Fs are at a time, in a respect, etc. F.28 If sentences of the form,"x is F," where x refers to a sensible object are predications and if no Form "isF" in the same way (sense?), then perhaps we will want to say that the truesentences of the form, "x is F," are not predications when x refers to a Form.

One explanation as to how the good may be held to be responsible for thebeing of Forms, which explanation does not assume self-predication, has beenfound. While this may well be what Plato had inmind in the sun analogy, it isnone the less rejected and for the same reason itwas rejected when it appearedabove. For, it does not give to the Form of the good the prominent positiondemanded of it by the divided line and the allegory of the cave. These passagesmake it clear that Plato thinks of the good not as explaining why the Formshave real or unqualified being, which we would now be in a position to explain,but rather why the Forms have the particular being that theydo in facthave,which we are still at a loss to explain. To explain why Plato thought of the Formof the good as explaining why each Form has its particular being we must lookelsewhere.

One Form, justice, is called a paradigm in a passage which immediatelyprecedes the argument from opposites in the Republic. This passage seems tohave little todowith type distinctions between grades ofbeing or a distinctionbetween types of entity. Glaucon has asked Socrates to show him that and howthe state they have been describing is possible. Socrates points out that thepossibility of the state was not in question.

Ifwe do discover what sort of thing justice is, shall we demand that the just manmust differ from it in no respect but be in all respects such as justice is? Or shallwe be content ifhe is as close as possible to it and partakes of itmore than others...It was in order to have paradigms (7iapa?eiY(iaxa) that we were investigating whatjustice is and the completely just man, who he would be ifhe comes to be, and againinjustice and the most unjust man, so that when looking at them, however theyappeared with respect to happiness and its opposite we would be constrained to besimilar to them; whoever was most similar to them would have a lotmost similarto theirs... {Republic 472B7-D1).

What Plato is telling us here is fairly clear. The questions, "Who is the justman?" and "What is justice?" at least in the context of the Republic, are notrequests for necessary and sufficient conditions for being a just man and forbeing a just something or other respectively. Rather, they are requests for



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12 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYdescriptions of a paradigm just man and a paradigm just thing. They arerequests for necessary and sufficient conditions for being a paradigm just manor thing. While the grammar of this passage does, strictly speaking, imply thatthe Form, justice, is self-inscribable, there is simply no inclination to believethat Plato here is involving himself in a metaphysical paradox or neglectingtype distinctions.29 Assuming that justice is the giving to each his due, no just

man is completely such as justice is since no man always, everywhere, in allrespects, etc., gives to all others he comes in contact with their due. If justiceis doing one's own, then no state is completely such as justice is simply becausein no state does every last person always, in all respects do his own. There isno difference between the questions, "What is justice?" and "What is a paradigm just thing?"That this is all that is intended by denying that justmen arecompletely such as justice is becomes clear in the context. The point is decidedlynot that just men are born and die while justice does not or that just men maybe just in a respect (or by comparison with something) while justice can't be inthis way just.

It must be granted that the language here is similar to that used in thePhaedo. In the Phaedo we are told that equal sticks do not "appear to us to beequal in the way that that itself which is [equal is equal]." Rather they "arein need of something with respect to being such as the equal"(?v??i xi ?K?ivol) t?o toiowov rivai o?ov to ?gov) 74D5-7. Here we are toldthat we should not demand of a just man that he be "completely such asjustice is" (7cavTaxT| toiodtov rivai oiov ?iKaioo"uvr) ?ori'v) but we should becontent if "he is very close to it and partake of it more than the others"(oti eyyuTaTa awr?c r? Kai nk?\


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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 13as that [the equal itself]" 74E1) while in theRepublic the possibility is expressly leftopen that a man might be completely such as justice.30 eCnrojiEV...av?paxov xete'c?c Simiov ei yevoto, kcci o?o? av e?r| yevo'uevo?, 472C4-6.This is not only consistent with but encourages the view that the distinction

between sticks and the equal itself in the Phaedo is an unbridgeable, as wewould say, type distinction while no type distinction, no unbridgeable gapbetween men and the justman is intended here in theRepublic by calling thejust man a paradigm. The grades of being theory claims that all Forms, but nosensible object, is a paradigm case of a being. This in turn means that eachForm, but no sensible object, unqualifiedly is (something or other). The pointat Republic 472, if generalized, is that all Forms and perhaps even somesensible objects are paradigm Fs. If the answer to the question, "What is theF itself?" is "The F itself is G," then "G" states necessary and sufficientconditions, not for something's being F, but rather for something's being aparadigm F. A sensible object is a paradigm F if it satisfies the description "G."We can state theRepublic 472 point while also making the type distinction ofthe Phaedo as follows. It is not the case that the just man himself is (unqualifiedly) what all sensible justmen are (albeit qualifiedly); rather the just manhimself is (unqualifiedly) what a good example ofa sensible justman would be(albeit qualifiedly) iftherewere one.

In the early dialogues the "What is F-ness?" question was put forth as arequest for necessary and sufficient conditions for being F. If there were thingswhich were F butwhich did not satisfy the definition presented ofF-ness, thedefinition was rejected as incorrect (e.g., Euthyphro 6D). If something satisfiedthe definition but was not F then the definition was incorrect (e.g., Meno78C-D). The above passage quoted from the Republic drops the requirementthat the conditions stated in the answer be necessary. Socrates may be justeven though once, when he was tired and distracted, he blamed one of hischildren fordoing something forwhich another childwas infact toblame. Thismay be true in spite of the fact that justice is the giving to each his due. To givea paradigm of the difference between the two types of answers to "What isF-ness?" questions consider the question "Who is the bald man himself?" Ifweare looking for necessary and sufficient conditions then "the bald man is theman with relatively few hairs on his head," is about as well as we can do. Ifweare seeking a paradigm, "The bald man is the man with no hairs on his head,"would presumably be correct. On the second definition, an individual would bemore or less bald depending on the extent to which he approached having nohair.

No other passage makes it as clear as Republic 472B-D thatanswers to

"What is the F itself?" questions are not to state necessary and sufficientconditions but rather describe a paradigm case. Plato's practice does, however,frequently conform to this understanding of what a correct answer would be.Definitions of practitioners of arts are apparently of this nature. The physicianis the one who knows health and disease (Charmides 170E), the dialectician



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14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYis one who knows how to ask and answer questions (Cratylus 390C, Gorgias460B) or one who is able to give an exact amount of the being of each thing(Republic 534B). If the definition of the physician given here stated necessaryand sufficient conditions for being a physician or for the correct application ofthe term, "physician," there would be no physicians.31 The definitions of thevirtues in the Republic 428-434 are of this nature. Courage, for example, isdefined as "unfailing preservation of right and lawful belief concerning whatis to be feared and what not" (430B2-4). Thrasymachus' claim that speakingprecisely no craftsman errs (340D-E), as well as the argument that follows,obeys the rule that nothing is true of the F which would not be true of aparadigm F were one to exist. Indeed except for a few definitions given asheuristic examples of answers to "What is F-ness?" questions (e.g., Shape isthe limit of a solid) one is hard pressed to find plausible answers to "What isF-ness?" questions in dialogues which are not best viewed as descriptions ofparadigms instead of statements of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Ifwe assume that Plato would say about all Forms what he says at Republic472B-D about justice and the just man, and this is an assumption,32 then wehave found a way of understanding how the Form of the good is the cause ofthe being of the Forms which has support in the text and does not assumeself-predication. If all Forms are paradigms in this sense then itmakes somesense to claim that the nature of the good explains the natures of all otherForms.33 The idea is that what explains why one feature does and anotherfeature does not belong to the F itself is the fact that theF itself iswhat a goodF would be if one existed and good F's have this but not that feature. Of course,it is assumed here that to know what it is to be a good F we must know whatthe good is.

At the beginning of this paper itwas stated that the correct interpretationof the sun analogy expresses a philosophically interesting thesis which is stilldebated. The debated issue is just what is to count as an answer to a "What isit?" question, i.e., a question concerning the natures of things. Some contemporary philosophers would claim that in asking such questions we are askingwhat a word means or for the content of a concept. "What is justice?" is a requestfor a definition of the word "just" and such definitions state and clarify ourconcept of justice. On this view theoretical definitions or explications found inthe special sciences are seen as doing something quite different from this."Water is a swarm of H2O molecules," does not state the nature of the sort,

water (at least not in the ordinary sense of this term), but rather it is a partiallystipulative introduction of a technical term which looks and sounds just likean ordinary English word.

Philosophers of a more naturalistic bent will claim that it is in the specialsciences, if anywhere, that the natures of things are discovered. If chemistryclaims that water is a swarm of H2O molecules then this is what we shouldbelieve water to be until chemistry corrects itself. Neither the chemist nor thephilosopher of a naturalistic bent is bothered by the fact that few if any



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 15isolatable volumes of liquid consist of nothing but H2O molecules. The fewerforeign particles and/or molecules a given volume of liquid contains, the closerit is to (pure) water. Needless to say, it is fully possible on this view that therebe some three dimensional pure water. Does the term, "water" have the samemeaning in ordinary language as it does in theoretical definitions? Naturalistsare usually either uninterested in this question or follow W V. Quine inregarding the question as somehow bogus.

It is clear that the present interpretation places Plato close to the naturalist.Plato distinguishes ontologically between Forms and the meanings of words.34The meaning of the word, "just," is one Form. Justice is another. Thus, Platois free tomaintain, though he need not, that the answer to the question, "Whatis justice?" is different from the answer to the question, "What does the word'just' mean?" The passage in the Republic upon which so much weight is put

here implies that in answering the question, "What is justice?" we should notgive necessary and sufficient conditions for being just, i.e., we should not tryto define the word in its ordinary use.

No reason has yet been attributed to Plato for holding that Forms are, in therequisite sense, paradigms. He is vague on the question in the Republic.Though the following idea is somewhat speculative, itmay turn out that oneof Plato's reasons for thinking that Forms are paradigms is similar to aconsideration which justifies in some minds theoretical definitions and explications. Physical laws are easier to discover given that the terms they containare clarified by explications than they would be using ordinary dictionarydefinitions of their terms. Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit given thetheoretical definition of water. It would have no freezing point defined as acolorless, odorless, tasteless liquid. Impurities would prevent it from havingone. Does the shepherd know how to tend sheep? The answer is either, "Ofcourse," or "Most of them do," depending on who the shepherd is. If he is aparadigm, "The shepherd knows how to tend sheep," is a true law (of nature).If we answer the question, "Who is the shepherd?" by stating necessary andsufficient conditions for the correct application of the term, we have only thevague accidental generalization, "Most shepherds know how to tend sheep."Now, in the Republic Plato tells us that we are seeking a paradigm so that wecan discover whether or not the just man is happy If he is, you and I will behappy to the extent that we are just. The idea seems to be that ifwe do notdiscuss paradigms, we will not be able to discover whether or not there is aconnection between justice and happiness. Most of us are more or less just and

more or less happy. Define justice in such a way that you and I are included asjust and the definition will be too vague to enable us to establish any connection, one way or the other, between justice and happiness. To see if there is aconnection between our being just and our being happy, we need to look atparadigms. No claim ismade here that this is true, but only that it does seemto be Plato's idea.

Even those who are convinced that in asking what justice is Plato is involved



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16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYin concept clarification can see the sun analogy as expressing an insight on thepresent interpretation. Consider the following quotation from Howard

Wettstein.Perhaps you will think: But how could someone ever learn to apply a general term,if not by somehow picking up, even ifnot totally consciously, which features countas the, so to speak, essential ones? This question, however, presupposes a "definition-based" picture of concept acquisition, as opposed to what we might call a"paradigm-based" picture... The topic of definition-based, as opposed to paradigmbased, pictures of concept acquisition deserves more attention than it has receivedin the philosophic literature.Let us summarize the conclusions we have reached along the way. On Hare's

interpretation the Form of the good is the cause of each (other) Form's beingwhat it is. This is so because each Form is a paradigm case or good example.Self-predication is required. The F itself is not only an F but an F in every way,always, in comparison with every other thing, etc. Symposium 211Ais the bestthough not unequivocal evidence for the position. We found another interpretation whereby the Form of the good caused each Form to be something or otherbut not to be what it is. Since each Form really is and thus is a good exampleof a thing that is, a being, the good is (partially) responsible for the kind ofbeing each Form has. Self-predication is not required. The grades of beingtheory is inconsistent in spirit ifnot logically with self-predication. Ifbeautyis in a way very different from theway Helen ofTroy is then it ismisleadingto say that they both are. Evidence that Forms were believed by Plato to haveunqualified, real being as opposed to a lesser form of being, or perhaps becoming, is found in the argument from opposites in the Republic, the argumentthat learning is recollection in the Phaedo, and the language Plato uses tospeak ofForms in thePhaedrus, Republic andPhaedo. Although this evidenceis not presented here, studies which do present it have been cited. The ideathat this is what Plato had in mind in the sun analogy, however, we rejectedon the grounds that the divided line and the allegory of the cave make it clearthat knowledge of the good is required for knowing specifically what each Formis. Finally, we found Plato speaking of Forms as paradigms in a somewhatdifferent sense, a sense which did not require self-predication but claimed thateach Form was a good example. The F itself is a good F in that the question"What is the F itself?" requires an answer which would describe a good F ifthere were any. What we want to know when we want to know the natures ofthings, Forms, is the way things would be if all things were paradigm cases.That is to say, what we seek to know in wanting to know what, e.g., water is,is what water would be if all (volumes of) water were paradigm cases.

Nothing very original is said here about how the good is responsible for theForm's being known. A thing cannot be known without being something orother and so, in accounting for Forms being what they are, the Form of the goodalso accounts for Form's being knowable. Furthermore, if the good is the causeof the being of theForms and ifknowledge involves (knowing) the cause (Meno97E-98A, Gorgias 465) thenknowledge of theForms requires knowledge of the



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 17good. Not only does the Form of the good explain why the Forms are what theyare but since knowledge of what a specific Form is requires knowing why it is asit iswe could not know the Forms without knowing thegood.How theForm of thegood explains the truth of the Forms may be clarified by simply appealing tothe definitions of truth in terms of being mentioned above. A Form is true ifthere is a true sentence (Xoyo?) or thought concerning it.A true sentence says ofthings that are that they are and of the things that are not that they are not.

Let me conclude by responding to an objection. It is here claimed that thegood explains the content, as it were, of each of the Forms but not theirontological status, the type of entity or being they are. But surely the dividedline and the allegory of the cave are both all about ontological distinctionsbetween mirror images, physical objects, mathematical objects and Forms. Allof this is granted. If Plato claimed or implied that the Form of the goodexplained why the Forms held the position theydo in this great chain ofbeing,the present interpretation would be wrong. If he implied that itwas becauseof the good that images are less real or knowable or clear than the things ofwhich images are images, this interpretation would be wrong. But though Platodoes attribute an enormous amount of dignity and power to the Form of thegood in the sun analogy, this much power he does not assign to it. The Form ofthe good in all three comparisons, the sun, the line and the cave, is supremeamong Forms but does not account for their ontological status as Forms.

New Mexico State UniversityReceived July 1, 1993

NOTES1. R. M. Hare, "Plato and the Mathematicians," in R. Bambrough, ed., New Essayson Plato and Aristotle (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 21-38.2. See Gregory Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo" inPlatonic Studies

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 76-110.3. The fact that the good is unchanging also prevents our understanding the claimthat the good gives to what knows the power to know as efficient causation. Plato mayhave had inmind such claims as, "The doctor knows health and disease" (Charmides

170E). This is an eternal truth and the idea would be that the good plays an explanatoryrole in explaining why health and disease are known and why the doctor has the powerof knowing, knows and is a knower.4. It is assumed here that the truth that the good gives to Forms is semantic truthand that an object has semantic truth just in case something true can be said of it (or,

perhaps, there is a true answer to the question "What is it?") It is, after all, semantictruth which is necessary for knowledge and it is the truth that is known for which Platotells us the Form of the good is responsible. Nothing important hangs on this assumption. If "r\ ?Xr\"dzm" has the sense of genuineness or reality here, then the explanationas to how the Form of the good is responsible for the being of Forms will, with slightalterations, also explain how the Form of the good is responsible for their reality.

5. There is a danger in this approach depending on how seriously one takes the



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18 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYanalogy between the Form of the good and the sun. There is a sense of "visible" in whicha physical object (as opposed, for example, to a number) is visible whether or not lightis falling on it. The sun makes things visible, in this sense of "visible," simply byproviding them with generation and growth {Republic 509B). But this is not the senseof "visible" used in claiming that the sun is the cause of the visibility of visible things.The sense of "visible" required in this context is one which would classify things in thedark as invisible. On the analogy then, the good should account for the knowability ofthe Forms in a sense of "knowable" in which it does not follow that a thing is knowablefrom the fact that it is.

6. See Euthyphro HA. Euthephro did not reveal the being (r\ oixna) of piety andthus failed to say what piety is. See also Meno 72B, Cratylus 423E, Republic 534B3,Phaedo 101C3. The ambiguity in Greek parallels the ambiguity of "meaning" inEnglish.As any word which means something has meaning, so any thing that is something hasbeing. As what a word means is itsmeaning, the meaning ofthat word, so what a thingis is its being, the being of that thing.

7. R. Ketchum, "Plato on Real Being," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 17(1980), pp. 213-14 and "Plato on the Unknowability of the Sensible World," History of

Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 4 (1987), pp. 295-302; G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on theSnares ofOntology," in Bambrough, ed., op. cit., p. 71; L. Brown, "Being in the Sophist:A Syntactical Inquiry," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 4 (1986), pp. 49-57.8. Other transitive verbs, e.g., "fly" and "sink," do not behave this way.9. The view that the good explains the existence of Forms directly, i.e., without

explaining why they are what they are, is defended at length by Richard Patterson,Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,1985), pp. 117-45. His explanation as to how the good is responsible for the existence ofForms is ultimately circular. "Now while it is true that some Forms may have aconnection to the Good that does not apply to other Forms, all Forms have one commonconnection to the Good, even a common dependence on the Good for their very being,for each Form is one place or position in the natural (good) order of things."

10. D. Hitchcock, "The Good in Plato's Republic," Apeiron, vol. 19 (1985), pp. 69-70.11. This is the interpretation of the majority of commentators, R. L. Nettleship,

Lectures on theRepublic ofPlato (London: Macmillan, 1901), pp. 225, 230; A. E. Taylor,Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 294; R. M.Hare, op. cit., p. 36; C. C. W. Taylor, "Plato and the Mathematicians: An Examinationof Professor Hare's Views," The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 199-200;N. P. White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,1976), p. 101; T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 225,336, n. 47; G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic," PhilosophicalInquiry, vol. 2 (1980), p. 393, n. 27; J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 246.

12. G. Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras," in op. cit., p. 258, n. 97,and pp. 350-51.13. Euthyphro 6E; Timaeus 39E, 38B. The English word, "paradigm," particularlyas used by philosophers often means "perfect example" as opposed to merely "typical

example" or "good example." Thus, a person with a few minor flaws might be a goodexample of a beautiful person without being a paradigm case of a beautiful person. Itis assumed here, however, that an F need not be a perfect F to be a paradigm F.

14. R. M. Hare, op. cit., pp. 35-36. N. White, who has adopted this position {op. cit.,p. 179), puts the point, "the knowledge of every other Form involves the knowledge ofthe Good because in general the Form ofF is unqualifiedly F and in that sense is F fullyand without defect. From this Plato concludes that the Form of F is in a certain sensea good F." G. Santas, who offers an interpretation similar to that ofHare, claims that



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 19the theory of goodness is "the theory that the Form of the Good is the formal cause ofthe ideal attributes of the Forms and that it is by virtue of these that the Forms are thebest objects of their kind" (op. cit., p. 393).

15. Of course, Hare may intend the phrase "being (really) a circle" in such a way thatonly good circles are really circles. If so, the claim that there is such a sense of "really"needs defence.

16. Since Hare's own explanation of this relies on the disputed claim that the criteriafor being (really) an F are the same as those for being a good F, it cannot be used here."Since to be (really) a circle, a figure has to be a good circle, the Good can be said to bethe source of the being and the reality of the circle?and of everything else likewise..."op. cit., p. 36.

17. Op. cit., p. 36.18. "The notions of Forms as ideal exemplars, self-predication, and the Form of theGood as the formal cause of the being and essence of the Forms?all these go hand inhand." G. Santas, op. cit., p. 393, n. 27.19. R. E. Allen, Plato's "Euthyphro" and the Earlier Theory of Forms (New York:Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 70-74.20. This is the interpretation of G. Santas (op. cit.) who claims that the Symposiumpassage quoted here implies that "Beauty itself is beautiful in all respects, always, nomatter compared to what, or apprehended from what point of view" (p. 380, n. 11). G.Vlastos ("The unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras," in op. cit., p. 262) cites the passageto support the interpretation that the Form, beauty, is "eternally, absolutely, universallyand flawlessly beautiful." Neither A) nor B) is without its difficulties. The fact that

beauty always is suggests that it is not the case that beauty is beautiful at one timeand not at another precisely because it is always beautiful, i.e., alternative A). On theother hand, Forms are nowhere and thus cannot be everywhere beautiful, which wouldsuggest B). Note that Santas either ignores the reference to place or transforms it tothe place of the observer when he interprets the Symposium passage as saying thatbeauty is beautiful "no matter...from what point of view."

21. For the Republic, R. Ketchum, "Plato on Real Being," op. cit. and "Plato on theUnknowability of the Sensible World," op. cit. In essential agreement are R. E. Allen,"The Argument from Opposites in the Republic," Review ofMetaphysics, vol. 15 (1961),pp. 325-35; N. P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Co., 1979), pp. 159-62; perhaps also G. Vlastos ("AMetaphysical Paradox,"in op. cit., p. 49) when he writes "By the same token the Form is said to be 'really real'not to assert, but to categorize, its existence?to tell us what kind of existence it has."For the Phaedo, R. Ketchum, "Knowledge and Recollection in the Phaedo: An Interpretation of 74a-75b," Journal of theHistory of Philosophy, vol. 17 (1979), pp. 243-47; G.E. L. Owen "A Proof in the Peri Ideon," Journal ofHellenic Studies, vol. 77 (1957), pt.1, pp. 110-11; N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford: TheClarendon Press, 1951), p. Ill n. 1; K. W Mills "Plato's Phaedo, 75b7-c6," Phronesis,vol. 2 (1957), pp. 128-47, and (1958), pp. 40-58.

22. Note that to claim that sensible objects do have a different sort of beauty fromthe sort possessed by the beautiful itself would immediately lead to third man difficulties. For something would be needed to explain why both sorts were sorts of beauty.23. A. Nehamas, op. cit., p. 109.24. No suggestion that all of these adverbs mean, in this context, the same thing isintended. Each points to a way Forms are which is different from any way sensible

objects are.25. N. White (A Companion toPlato's Republic, op. cit., 179) writes "the knowledgeof every other Form involves knowledge of the Good, because in general the Form of Fis unqualifiedly F..., and in that sense is F fully and without defect. From this Plato



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20 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLYconcludes that the Form of F is in a certain sense a good F." The point is that theconclusion would be fallaciously drawn, had Plato drawn it, even understanding by"good F," "good example of an F." There is no reason to think that Plato in fact drew theconclusion attributed to him byWhite.

26. It is argued in R. Ketchum "Plato on the Unknowability of the Sensible World,"op. cit., that it is because Forms have unqualified being that they are both knowableand true. Thus, on this interpretation we could also explain why the good is the causeof the truth and knowability of the Forms as is required by the sun analogy.

27. Lysis 217D; Protagoras 330C-D; Phaedo 100C, 102E; Republic 597 A-B.28. The sense of "paradigm" inwhich it is here argued that Forms are paradigms andwhich serves to explain how the Form of the good is a cause of the being of the otherForms does not require any specific interpretation of sentences of the form, "The F itself

is F." For an interpretation of this sentence form which is consistent with both the gradesof being theory and the present interpretation of Forms as paradigms see R. E. Allen,"Participation and Predication inPlato's Middle Dialogues," Philosophical Review, vol.69 (1960), pp. 147 ff. and R. Ketchum, "Knowledge and Recollection in the Phaedo" op.cit., pp. 245-47.

29. Vlastos ("The Unity of the Virtues in the Protogoras," in op. cit., pp. 259-60) citesthis passage as one which clearly does not imply that justice is just apparently on thegrounds that to have this implication "is such as justice is" [toiouov e?vai o?ov?iKcaocruvri ecmv] would have to be read as "is such as justice has." But ifx is such asy is in some respect then x and y share some characteristic and ifx is completely suchas y is then (F) [Fy 3 Fx]. Vlastos is right, however, in claiming that the reasoning, asopposed to the grammatical construction, does not "require that the Form should havethe quality which it is. Hence reading it into the text is gratuitous; it should be rejectedon grounds ofmethodological economy."

30. The possibility that the just state be in fact brought into existence is asserted orimplied in a number of places in the Republic, e.g., 473A, E, D-E, 540D. However, thepoint is also made that to show that the state is possible is tantamount to showing thata state could be very close to the description though not necessarily an exact fit (473A).

31. The idea that correct answers to "What is F-ness?" questions describe paradigmsmay hold the solution to one of the more puzzling aspects of the Meno. The conclusionthat virtue is acquired as a divine dispensation from the gods is one which neither Platonor Socrates held. Still it is not clear where the mistake in the argument is or whatPlato wanted us to learn from puzzling over the unexpected conclusion. Perhaps theproblem can be solved as follows. Virtue is indeed knowledge (of the good). However,present day virtuous people do not know the good well enough to be able to teach itthough they are dimly aware of it {Republic 505B). Flesh and blood doctors more or lessknow health as flesh and blood virtuous people more or less know the good. Thedifference is that doctors have enough knowledge to have a modicum of success at

making copies of themselves while virtuous people do not.32. Some interpretations of the sun analogy (see N. White, Plato on Knowledge and

Reality, 112-13 and A Companion to Plato's Republic, pp. 42 and 180) are spoiled bythe fact that in theRepublic (475E-476) "bad" Forms such as injustice, evil and uglinessare mentioned. Note, however, that Plato does not hesitate to call Forms paradigms inthe same sentence in which he mentions the Form, injustice. Nor should he. The viewthat the good accounts for the being of Forms on the ground that Forms are paradigmsis not called into question by the existence of "bad" Forms. There are just as goodexamples of ugliness as of beauty. On the other hand, those who think that Plato wouldappeal to the Form of the good to limit the world of Forms might also reasonably appealto this interpretation. Perhaps there is no Form of the barbarian himself preciselybecause the idea of a paradigm non-Greek simply does not make much sense. Any oldEgyptian is as good an example of a barbarian as any old Persian. One is reminded of



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THE FORM OF THE GOOD 21the opening lines of Tolstoy's, Anna Karenin, "All happy families are alike but anunhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion." On the view presented here, thiswould show that there is no such thing as the unhappy family itself. If all unhappyfamilies are unhappy after their own fashion, they are not more or less unhappydepending upon their closeness to the paradigm unhappy family.

33. If it be thought that too much emphasis is placed here on this sense of "paradigm"note that in the Statesman 277D Plato claims that "it is difficult to prove adequatelyanything of worth without the use of paradigms." While the meaning of this claim isnot beyond controversy, it is fairly clear in the context that a paradigm is a good example.

34. R. Ketchum, "Names, Forms and Conventionalism: Cratylus, pp. 383-95,"Phronesis, vol. 24 (1979), pp. 140-44.

35. Howard Wettstein, "Cognitive Significance Without Cognitive Content," in J.Almog, J. Perry, H. Wettstein, eds., Themes From Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1989), p. 435, n. 28.

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