The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 51 | Number 1 | Article ID 4411 | Dec 21, 2015

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Forgotten voices from the Great War: the Chinese LabourCorps

Alex Calvo, Bao Qiaoni

Cap badge of the Chinese Labour CorpsCLC personnel moving sacks of corn at Boulogne, on12 August 1917

Abstract

The one hundredth anniversary of the GreatWar is prompting a renewed effort at both thepopular and academic levels to ensure that thedifferent units and countries involved are not

forgotten. While not supplying combat troops,China entered the First World War on the sideof the Allies, furnishing much-neededlabourers, 140,000 by conservative estimatesand possibly more, who played an essential roleon the Western Front and other theatres,taking responsibility for a wide range of tasks.Among others, unloading military supplies andhandling ammunitions, building barracks andother military facilities, digging trenches, andeven agriculture and forest management. Whiletheir essential contribution was recognized inBritish documents, both Paris and London sawthem as a temporary expedient, to be ended assoon as the war was over. Furthermore, theirdeployment gave rise to all sorts of culture andlanguage clashes, in addition to the dangers oftravelling to Europe and surviving in closeproximity to the battle field. However, beyondthese travails, the Chinese Labour Corps left asignificant legacy, with members seeing theworld, experiencing other nations, and oftenbecoming literate. More widely, despite beingon the winning side, China's failure to secureany gains at Versailles prompted the May 4th

Movement and can be seen as a key juncture inthe long and winding road from empire tonation-state. It is an important reminder of theglobal nature of the Great War, whose impactextended far from the battle field to all cornersof the world.

Keywords

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Tombstone of a CLC member, a physical reminder oftheir legacy

WWI, Great War, CLC, Chinese Labour Corps,Nation-Building, Versailles

Introduction: Asia and the Great War

The one hundredth anniversary of the GreatWar has prompted renewed interest in theconf l ict and a major dr ive by myriadinstitutions and individuals to inform the publicand assure that the sacrifices made one centuryago are never forgotten. While the maintheatres of the war were in Europe, there arereasons why it is called the First World War,since its nature and scope were truly global.This includes Asia, which may have seenlimited combat operations (other than in South-Western Asia, part of the Middle East) butwhere a number of countries made keycontributions to the Allied cause. They includeJapan, whose navy helped secure the Pacific,

while her troops took over German territories,and took part in the conquest of Tsingtao;China, which contributed much-neededworkers; and India, whose soldiers helpedstabilize the Western Front in late 1914 andlater played a key role in a wide range oftheaters, including Gallipoli, East Africa, andMesopotamia.

While such contributions were recognized bycontemporary media and are well documented,with the passage of time there is little publicawareness of them. The first centenary of thewar is, however, prompting many public andprivate organizations in countries like Japan,1

India, and China2, and among communitiesfrom those nations, to make renewed efforts tomake sure that their contribution is dulyrecognized, both at home and abroad, and inparticular among their war-time Allies. This isan aspect of the renewed geopoliticalcompetition in the Asia-Pacific region, whichalso features countries vying to stress theirpast roles in world conflicts.

China at the outset of the War: NationBuilding, Limited Sovereignty, andCollective Security

The outbreak of the Great War caught China inthe mids t o f a g iant ye t incomple tetransformation from Empire to Republic, anexercise in nation building that would takedecades to complete and see myriad wars andturmoil amid fragmentation and widespreadhuman suffering.3 The Revolutionary Party（中华革命党), renamed Guomindang (国民党) in1919, had been forced in 1916 to cede thepresidency to Yuan Shikai, and warlords ruledmuch of the country, with significant foreigninfluence. In 1916 Duan Qirui, a graduate ofthe Beiyang Military Academy who hadfurthered his studies in Germany, becameprime minister following Yuan's death. One ofthe dossiers on his table was whether to jointhe Great War. One of the factors at play wasthe possibility of recovering the German

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concessions in Shandong Province, and moregenerally of improving China's internationalstanding, something which, among others,leading intellectual Liang Qichao hoped for.4

Pressure also came from the United States, atthat time moving towards joining the war, andfrom the Japanese, who had decided on a policyof loans to China and other financial incentivesin exchange for recognition of their position innorthern regions which Tokyo considered asphere of influence necessary to protect itsKorean colony and shield it from Russianambitions, following its failed bid to impose the“twenty one demands” on China in 1915.5

These wide-ranging demands were tantamountto turning China into a Japanese protectorate.Among others, Tokyo demanded freedom ofmovement and the right to purchase land andcarry out business for Japanese nationals inSouth Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,a promise “not to cede or lease to any otherPower any harbour or bay on or any islandalong the coast of China”, and the appointmentof Japanese advisors.6 In March 1917 Duanconvinced Parliament to break diplomaticrelations with Germany, and, after a struggleover who had the constitutional power to issueit, a declaration of war by the cabinet followedin August.7

Thus, although her own nation-building processwas far from complete, Chinese leadersdecided to join a conflict which, while global innature, had its origin and main focus thousandsof miles away. Ideally, being on the winningside would help China consolidate and increaseher national stature, but as we shall see later,things would turn out quite differently. Whatwas clear in 1916 was that whereas China hadlittle, if any, expeditionary military capability tooffer to the Allies, it had something theydesperately needed: manpower. The conceptwas simple: import Chinese labour, thus freeingBritish and French young men for combatduties. Although the Chinese and Japanesegovernments concluded a military agreementwhereby Tokyo would provide “aid, advisers

and instructors to develop the Chinese WarParticipation Army to support the Allied cause,”no troops were deployed to Europe, andJapanese aid simply served the purpose ofreinforcing Duan’s troops concentrated inNorth China.8 Germany, on the other hand,provided financial support to Sun Yat-sen'salternative government in Guangzhou, in thehope of pushing China back into neutrality.9 Aswas the rule in those years, factional interestsfrequently took precedence over the exercise ofnational power.

The Chinese Labour Corps: China's majorcontribution to the war effort

Logistics is often forgotten, or at least rarelygranted a degree of attention commensuratewith its true importance, in many militaryhistories. In the case of the Western Front inthe Great War the distances involved were nothuge, in particular if compared to sometheatres in the Second World War, but theindustrial nature of the fighting, the dualdemands of artillery and fortification, and thesheer number of troops involved, meant astrong and growing demand for labour behindthe trenches. Although some machinery andvehicles were available, building and repairingrailways and roads, moving supplies, mail,troops, and the injured, laying down andmaintaining telephone lines, plus constructingall sorts of military facilities, were tasks mainlyundertaken with a mixture of human andanimal labour. Many labour units were created.The Royal Engineers, for example, set upeleven labour battalions, and in January 1917the British Labour Corps was born. By the timeof the armistice, it had grown to almost400,000. Staffed by officers not medically fit forfront-line duties (often returned wounded), itregularly operated within range of enemy fire,and some of its units were employed asemergency infantry during the spring 1918German offensives.

The Allies quickly realized that their manpower

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pool was simply not large enough to feed thisever-growing need for construction andlogistics labour. At first arrangements wereoften ad hoc, but the scale of the fighting, theinadequacy of some earlier approaches, and therealization that this would be no short conflict,soon gave way to a more systematic approach.France was the first to tap into China's hugelabour force. Great Britain followed, with bothcountries already in negotiations with China inthe summer of 1916.10 According to the OfficialHistory: '…although some labour units wereraised and eventually labourers from variousparts of the Empire and China were brought toFrance, the numbers were never at any periodsufficient for the demands of a great armyoperating in a friendly country'. Despite this, itis clear that Chinese workers played a crucialrole in sustaining the Allied armies in the field.Precise numbers are not available, with somesources mentioning that in August 1918,96,000 were enrolled in the British LabourCorps, with a further thirty thousand workingfor France,11 but Chinese sources stress thatthe specific number is disputable and that140,000 in total for both France and Britain is aconservative estimate.12 Guoqi Xu notes the“sizable discrepancy among the figuresprovided by different sources” and provides arange from several authors.13 Among others, hementions the Dictionary of the First World Warby Stephen Pope and Elizabeth-Anne Wheale,eds. (320,000)14, Arthur Philip Jones (150,000Chinese workers in France, Mesopotamia, andRussia)15, Chen Sanjing (between 175,000 and200,000 adding those recruited by France andGreat Britain)16, and CLC interpreter GuXinqqing (175,000 again as a joint figure)17. Healso quotes a US War Department telegram(97,000 recruited by London, 40,000 plus 1,500specialists by Paris)18. We could add that,although Paris was first to tap China's vastlabour pool, there were precedents in GreatBritain for the employment of Chinese at timesof war to free military and naval personnelfrom other duties. This includes the NapoleonicWars, during which 'Chinese men who worked

in merchant ships were then used by the RoyalNavy in support roles to provide cover for theBritish men who were away fighting, such asships’ porters'.19 London also used colonialworkers in the Indian, Egyptian, and SouthAfrican Native Labour Corps.

The Individual Experience of ChineseW o r k e r s : T a s k s , D a n g e r s , a n dOpportunities

Even before China had formally declared war, aprocessing plan was set up in ShandongProvince, with the purpose of screening andhiring labourers. Located near the Royal Navy'sbase at Weihaiwei, it was followed by a secondfacility in the port of Qingdao. Recruitment wasnot difficult, given the region's poverty andinstability and the high wages offered. Theseconsisted of twenty Chinese dollars as astarting bonus, food and clothing, and tendollars per month partly payable to theirfamilies. The medical examination was focusedon tuberculosis, trachoma (a viral disease ofthe eye, then prevalent in Shandong), andvenereal diseases.20 Some 100,000 wereselected, issued a serial number in a dog tagaround their wrists,21 and sprayed prior toembarkation. Many still donned a queue andwere urged to cut it.

Travel to Europe was not without its dangers.Already in 1916 a ship carrying Chineseworkers to France22 had been sunk by aGerman submarine in the Mediterranean, withthe loss of 543,23 prompting the use of analternative trans-Pacific route across Canadaby train.24 Once in the Old Continent, althoughtheir contracts said they would not be deployedin or near the front, they often foundthemselves under enemy fire or dealing withother dangers , such as unexp lodedammunitions.25 Illness was an additional hazard(including the Spanish Flu from 1918), togetherwith the harsh climate and unfamiliar food,despite which in December 2018 “ColonelWetherall said that the Chinese suffered very

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little from ill-health; out of a total strength ofsome 93,000 Chinese in France, there wereonly about 1,500 in hospital.” 26 In addition tothose lost at sea, more than 2,000 died. Theirtombs can be found in France, Flanders, andEngland, some in special cemeteries.

Members of the Chinese Labour Corps weredistributed in 500-strong companies, underBritish officers and Chinese foremen. Thelanguage barrier was a significant problem, forexample when an American soldier said “let’sgo,” which sounds like “GOU” in Chinese(meaning “dog”) it nearly caused a rebellionamong Chinese labourers.27 Many translatorswere hired, while efforts were conducted torecruit Chinese-speaking British officers. Thelatter's number was small, not only becausethere were not that many Britons resident inChina who had mastered the language butbecause most of those able and willing to servesought to join a combat unit. British officersnever saw their Chinese Labour Corpscounterparts as true equals.28

A typical schedule was ten working hours perday, seven days per week.29 Although undermilitary discipline and severe restrictions ontheir movement, to a certain extent resulting insegregation, authorities made efforts toaccommodate some of their customs. Anexample was the free days they got duringChinese festivals.30 An effort was made tofacilitate postal communication with theirfamilies, despite censorship and the fact thatmany were illiterate. The resulting letters (upto fifty thousand per month) are a very usefulsource to learn about their roles, thoughts, andliving conditions. The YMCA played a key rolein their welfare, organizing recreationalactivities and literacy classes. Hong Kong- andUS-educated James Yen created a 1,000-character vocabulary and the Chinese Workers'Weekly, also writing many letters for illiteratelabourers.31 As a result of various literacydrives, it is estimated that some two thirds ofthe members of the Chinese Labour Corps

returned being able to read and write, albeit toa limited extent, whereas originally more thaneighty percent were illiterate.32 Classes were sopopular that they ran out of materials.33

Their work was varied and ranged fromunloading military supplies and handlingammunition to building barracks, diggingtrenches, and constructing fortifications. Iteven extended to agriculture and forestmanagement.34 The minutes of a meeting on“Chinese Labour in France,” held on January18, 1918 at 10 Downing Street with the primeminister in the chair (and following a WarCabinet meeting on the same subject the daybefore), reveal that at first labour tended to beallocated to the different services from acentral pool, but this gave way to the view thatit was better to second at least a minimum toeach department, so that, among others, themembers of the Corps could specialize andachieve greater proficiency at a given kind ofwork, and their supervisors become morefamiliar with them. That was the positiondefended by Sir Eric Geddes, who explainedthat it was the system employed with the firstseven thousand Chinese workers brought toFrance by the Brit ish Department ofTransportation. General Travers Clarkesupported the “desirability of keeping the samemen at the same job,” adding that “it was donenow at a considerable extent.” He spoke infavour of retaining a central pool, which, whilecompatible with the described specialization,allowed a measure of flexibility. Eric Geddessaid that labour was “nobody's child” anddefended the permanent allocation of “aminimum number of men” to departments, sothat “they could put in their interpreters andN.C.O.s and control would increase rather thandiminish.” Sir Joseph MacLay and Sir GuyGranet concurred in these views of EricGeddes.35

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Handling ammunition was one of the many tasks theCLC performedBuilding roads was a very important task for the CLC,given the need to sustain industrial warfare on agrand scale in the Western Front

While labouring long hours in uncomfortableand often hazardous jobs, their stay in Europewas for many their first opportunity toexperience life not only outside China butbeyond their village or province. As oftenhappens, contact with a different realityprompted more than a few to question theircountry's place in the world and to wonder howit could be changed. Contact with fellowcitizens and with nationals from other Alliednations may have helped the members of theChinese Labour Corps to develop a sense ofnational identity and of their country's place inthe world.36 It should also be emphasized that,while originally intended to carry out unskilledtasks, members of the Chinese Labour Corpsoften ended up being responsible for muchmore complex tasks, even tank maintenance,overcoming the extensive prejudice that sawthem as hard working but incapable ofperforming technologically-demanding jobs.37

The Br i t i sh Government V iew: ACommodity? Yet a Valuable One

A look at British official documents reveals adual view of the Chinese Labour Corps. On theone hand, its members often appear as littlemore than objects. They are referred to in terseterms, as if one was talking about a piece ofequipment. On the other, the vital nature oftheir contribution to the war effort oftenappears openly, without any attempt todisguise it. This is clear even in the immediatepost-war period, once the hostilities were overbut the need for labour remained high. Forexample, the minutes of the December 4, 1918meeting of the War Cabinet included an itemdevoted to the “Repatriation of Chinesecoolies.” Faced with a proposal from theMinistry of Shipping to repatriate a number ofworkers, taking advantage of available space intwo passenger ships, “the Adjutant-Generalsaid that he had taken this matter up withG.H.Q. in France, who were averse from theidea of repatriating Chinese coolies at thepresent time. There was a great deal of work tobe done, e.g., handling cargo at the ports,upkeep of roads, filling up the shell-holes, androlling up the barbed wire, for which civilianlabour would have to be engaged if the Chinesewere withdrawn.”38 At the meeting, the Britishprime minister pointed out that while there wasa shortage of labour in France, “the amount ofwork requiring this class of labour must havegreatly diminished since the cessation ofhostilities,” and it was decided to arrange therepatriation of five thousand Chinese workers,with a further five thousand to follow.39 Thus,while essential, and openly recognized as suchin official documents, the decision was madethat Chinese workers, viewed as a temporaryasset, were to be returned to their nativecountry as soon as possible.

Direct Hir ing and the End of theComprador System: a Precedent forGeneral Stilwell's Training Drive?

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At the same January 18, 1918 meeting referredto earlier, Colonel MacLaren Brown said thatduring the construction of the Canadian PacificRailway, with which he was familiar, “therecruiting and control of the Chinese was keptin the hands of the Compradors. The RailwayCompany dealt only with and through theCompradors.” While conceding that in that case“the Chinese understood the system and itworked well”, Colonel Brown explained that “inthe case of the Chinese in Northern Francethey have been recruited on a different basisand under special conditions,” a reference tothe system of individual contracts outlinedearlier.40

We can thus see how the Great War led to achange in the way Chinese labour wasemployed, dispensing with middlemen. Duringthe Second World War, a similar change wouldtake place to some extent in the militarysphere. When training Chinese soldiers atRamgarh (British India) from 1942, in anattempt to develop a number of modern,capable divisions, US General Joseph Stilwellaccepted the recruits sent by the governmentof the Republic of China but insisted that theybe paid individually, in a bid to preventcorruption by officers pocketing their men'spay.41

Considering, and Rejecting, the Use ofChinese Troops

France did not just initiate the recruitment ofChinese workers. It also endeavoured to securethe deployment in the Western Front ofChinese troops,42 although the move wasultimately rejected by London and never tookplace. Even before the Chinese declaration ofwar, General Ferdinand Foch had argued forthe need to get China to raise “pioneerbattalions,” between 1,200 and 1,500 strong. Inan August 11, 1917 secret report, he pointedout that, “given the population of China, thenumber of battalions which can be raised istheoretically limitless.” Foch asked Paris to

press China to dispatch between seventy andeighty battalions. Such units, mostly officeredby the Chinese themselves, would haveundertaken construction and logistical worknear and at the front, making it unnecessary toindividually hire further Chinese workers.43

France did not manage to persuade the UnitedKingdom, with the War Cabinet noting at itsFebruary 4, 1918 that “the Supreme WarCouncil do not accept Joint Note No. 11 of thePermanent Military Representatives on thesubject of Chinese battalions.”44 Logistics didnot seem to be the reason behind Britishopposition despite the shortage of Alliedshipping and the unsuitability of Chinesevessels for oceanic voyages described in thesame missive.45

While not the focus of the paper, it should alsobe mentioned that a small number of Canadiancitizens of Chinese origin volunteered andmanaged to be accepted for service, despite therefusal to enrol them in, for example, BritishColumbia. While sources estimate them at, atmost, three hundred, 'Those of Chinese originwho are known to have volunteered includedFrederick Lee and Wee Hong Louie (enlisted inKamloops), William Thomas Louie (Calgary),Tung On Hong (Sudbury), and Victor Fong(Quebec).'46

CLC recruits in Weihaiwei doing physical trainingbefore leaving for Europe

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The U l t imate Impact o f Ch ina ' sContribution to the War Effort: Logistics,Frustration and Revolution

As explained, life was not easy for the membersof the Chinese Labour Corps, and a numbermade the ultimate sacrifice. On the positiveside, however, they could acquire somesavings, widen their horizons, and some gaineda measure of literacy. Many went back homewith the desire and ability to play a moremeaningful role in the future of their country.The presence of Chinese in France did not endwith the Great War, and included some keyfigures in Chinese communism who took part inthe Work-Study Program, including DengXiaoping and Zhou Enlai. Deng lived in Francefrom 1920 to 1925, where he became active inpolitics for the first time and joined the ChineseCommunist Party.47 Zhou was in the countryfrom 1920 to 1924, playing a leading roleamong Chinese work-study students.48

At the international level, the outcome of theFirst World War was frustrating for China.Despite being on the winning side and aparticipant in the Versailles Peace negotiations,China was unable to secure any significantgains. Japan, a more powerful and cohesivestate which had entered the war earlier, pre-empted Chinese moves and succeededGermany in securing rights in China and anumber of Pacific Ocean islands. The 62-strongChinese delegation was attacked followingrevelations of Japan's confidential agreementswith France, Great Britain and Italy, on the onehand, and Duan Qirui on the other. USPresident Wilson, originally sympathetic toChina, agreed on April 30, 1919 with FrenchPM Georges Clemenceau and British PM DavidLloyd George to the transfer of all Germanrights in Shandong Province to Japan. This“flagrant denial of the new Wilsonian principlesof open diplomacy and self-determination,”inflamed Chinese public opinion and promptedmany protests.49 Enraged, Chinese students inParis surrounded the hotel where the Chinese

delegation was staying in order to prevent itfrom signing the Peace Treaty as decided bythe government in Beijing, which sent atelegram to that effect.50 Mass demonstrationsin Beijing on 4 May would give a name to amovement which sought to renew China andraise her to the position of equal amonginternational powers. One of its immediateconsequences was the emergence of a newstandard for the written language, based on themodern Beijing dialect, which would replaceclassical Chinese..51 It would also lead to thecreation of the Chinese Communist Party.

China's intervention in the First World War,while contributing to the Allied victory, failedto secure for Beijing any significant geopoliticalgains. Indeed, by boosting Japan andweakening the British Empire, it could even beargued that the war facilitated the later clashbetween the two Asian giants. In its wake,London put an end to the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance, sided with the United States, andstarted work on a new naval base in Singapore,designed to provide a measure of deterrence.The Great War, however, transformed the livesof many Chinese, both members of the LabourCorps and students and intellectuals at home,and helped reinforce the conviction that thecountry needed to become stronger and renewitself in order to be treated as an equal in theinternational sphere.52 It was yet anotherreminder, following less than a generation afterthe First Sino-Japanese War, that unlike Japan,China had not yet transformed itself into amodern nation state and gained a measure ofrecognition as an equal by the leading Westernpowers of the time.

Geopolitics, Public Diplomacy, and SoftPower: Competing Narratives.

The importance of commemorating the FirstWorld War and of highlighting their nationalcontribution to the allied victory has not goneunnoticed in Beijing, New Delhi, or Tokyo. Thefact that these three major Asian powers,

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competitors and often party to border disputeson land or at sea, fought on the same side inthe Great War is a two-edged sword. It couldhave led to coordinated efforts and even haveprovided, in the case of China and Japan, acounter to other historical episodes, very muchalive in popular memory, which act as majorobstacles to a lasting peace. However, this doesnot seem to have been the case. China tends tosee the Great War mainly in terms of havingcapped Japan's successful move fromcolonialism target to colonial power, withTokyo not just replacing Berlin in China and thePacific, but decisively moving towards aparamount position in much of China.

The lack of public recognition of the CLC in the UKprompted the birth of the “Ensuring We Remember”,a “National Campaign for a Permanent Memorial tothe Chinese Labour Corps of the First World War”

Efforts at remembrance are also being made inthe United Kingdom, where “The NationalCampaign for a Permanent Memorial to theChinese Labour Corps of the First World War”was launched in August 201453, while initiativesin China include a documentary series byCCTV, introduced with a reminder that “Anestimated 145,000 Chinese workers stoodshoulder to shoulder with British and Frenchsoldiers during the conflict from 1914 to 1918.More than 20,000 of them were killed.”54 Achallenge as we commemorate the centenary ofthe Great War is to ensure it includes greaterawareness of the contributions of the ChineseLabour Corps.

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at NagoyaUniversity (Japan) and the author of ‘TheSecond World War in Central Asia: Events,Identity, and Memory’, in S. Akyildiz and R.Carlson eds., Social and cultural Change inCentral Asia: The Soviet Legacy (London:Routledge, 2013).

Bao Qiaoni is an ECUPL (East China Universityof Political Science & Law) law undergraduateand exchange student (NUPACE Program) atNagoya University (Japan) School of Law.

Recommended citation: Alex Calvo and BaoQiaoni, "Forgotten voices from the Great War:the Chinese Labor Corps", The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 13, Issue 51, No. 1, December 21,2015.

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Notes

1 A. Calvo, "Japan and the Century Since WorldWar I", Shingetsu News Agency, 20 June 2014,available here.

2 International academic conference of Chineselaborers during World War I, 2008. CCTV,2009; CCTV, 2014. Deng Xiaojun 邓小军.February 15, 2009.

3 Yao Na 姚娜. September, 2011.

4 Sheridan 1983, 308.

5 These demands alarmed Western powers benton keeping the balance of power in China. Theyalso prompted a rift between the Kuomintang,radically opposed to the Yuan Shikai regime,and those organizations stressing unity in theface of Japanese expansionism. For the lattersee Yong 1987, 100. Yao Na姚娜. September,2011.

6 Text of the demands, 7 May 1915 ultimatum,and Chinese reply, reproduced in MichaelDuffy, “Primary Documents - '21 Demands'Made by Japan to China, 18 January 1915”,FirstWorldWar.Com, 22 August 2009, availablehere.

7 Spence 1990, 289-290. Li Zhancai 李占才.October 3, 2011.

8 Sheridan 1983, 304.

9 Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: TheWestern Armaments Trade in Warlord China,1920-28, (Vancouver-Toronto: UBCPress,2010), p. 18.

10 Huang Yinghu 黄英湖. December, 2011.

11 The Long, Long Trail. Undated.

12 Xu Guoqi 徐国琦. 2007, 56--60.

13 Xu Guoqi 徐国琦. 2007, 56.

14 Pope et al. 1995.

15 Jones 1986, 108-09.

16 Chen Sanjing 陈三井.1986, 34---35.

17 Gu Xingqin 顾杏卿. 1937, 50.

18 RG165M1444 Roll 2, documents 2055-12,USNA.

19 Ermito and Liu 2013.

20 Huang Yinghu 黄英湖. December, 2011.

21 Yangjichen 杨机臣. September 8, 2007.Domonique Maillard.2009.

22 They had been hired by the French and thusdid not belong to the Chinese Labour Corps,which was a British organization.

23 Deng Xiaojun 邓小军. February 15,2009.

24 Li Zhancai 李占才. October 3, 2011.

25 Peng Zhiguo 彭志国.April 1, 2014.

26 CAB 23/8, NA.

27 Song Enrong 宋恩荣. 1989, 528.

28 Ermito and Liu 2013. Li Zhancai 李占才.October 3, 2011.

29 Huiminhetongzhaogonghetong 惠民合同招工合同 , A r t i c l e 9 .　Yingguozhaogonghetong(Renjihetong) 英国招工合同（仁记合同）[The contract of BritishRecruitment], Article 12.

30 Xu Guoqi 徐国琦. 2007.

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13

31 Spence 1990, 291-292.

32 Wang Jiading 王家鼎. December15, 1997.

33 Xu 2011 A, 191-192.

34 CAB 24/39, NA.

35 CAB 24/39, NA.

36 Xu 2011 A, 3.

37 Xu Guoqi 徐国琦. 2007.

38 CAB 23/8, NA.

39 CAB 23/8, NA.

40 CAB 24/39, NA.

41 “The U.S. Army insisted that the soldiers atRamgarh be paid individually and by public rollcall. The Chinese constantly agitated that thesoldiers' pay be turned over in a lump sum tothe commanding officer of the units involved.This was the traditional channel of theft in theChinese Army, and the U.S. Army refused.”Stilwell 1948, 213.

42 Xu 2011 B, 185.

43 16N2450, GQG, 6498, SHAT.

44 CAB/23/5, NA.

45 CAB/24/31, NA.

46 Vancouver Public Library 2012. Walker 1989.

47 Nora Wang, “Deng Xiaoping: The Years inFrance”, The China Quarterly, Volume 92,1982, pp. 698-705.

48 Paul Bailey, “The Chinese Work—StudyMovement in France”, The China Quarterly,Volume 115, 1988, pp. 441-461, p. 442.

49 Schwartz 1983, 407.50 A copy of the telegram from the delegationreporting on the failure to secure Germanrights in Shandong is available in NationalPalace Museum 2011, 134-135. On the otherhand, China signed the Treaty of Peacebetween the Allied and Associated Powers andAustria (Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Layle) andthe Treaty of Peace between the Allied andAssociated Powers and Hungary (Treaty ofTrianon) National Palace Museum 2011,136-139.

51 De Francis 1984, 243-245.

52 Deng Xiaojun 邓小军. February 15,2009；　Wang Jian 王建. 2014, 33-36.

53 The National Campaign, undated.

54 CCTV 2009.