Forensics analysis of hacking cases

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Doctor A Security Forensics Analysis of Hacking Cases Norman PAN cisa, pdcf Doctor A Security Systems (HK) Ltd. 2003-09-22 [email protected] (Professional correspondence only)

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Transcript of Forensics analysis of hacking cases

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Forensics Analysis of Hacking Cases

Norman PAN cisa, pdcf

Doctor A Security Systems (HK) Ltd.

2003-09-22 [email protected]

(Professional correspondence only)

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§ Is for– Need to know – Should/should

not

§ Is NOT for– How to do– Legal advice

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Case for discussion .. 1

§ Investigator arrived the crime scene and § used his

notebook and created a new partition in the existing USB Hard disk…

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Case for discussion … 2

§ Used a Forensic tools installed yesterday in his notebook using colleague’s CD

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Case for discussion … 3

§ Unplugged the power supply of the target computer

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Case for discussion … 4

§ Copied the files of the target computer to the Investigation newly created partition

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Case for discussion … 5

§ Investigator returned to office, his colleague borrowed his notebook for another case, and returned 2 days later.

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The Cost of an Incident

§ Intruder: 2 Hours§ the time spent to

clean up after them: 80 Hours– not inlcudev Intrusion Detection

(human element)v Forensic acquisition of

disk imagesv Restoration of

compromised systemv Hardening of

compromised systemv Network scanning for

other vulnerable systems

v Communications with stakeholders

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Forensic, for the sake of Forensic?

§ Incident Respond Procedure… .– .. Snapshot of the

victim machine… (?)

§ Decide– RecoveryvVirus vFailed Harddisk…

– Forensic (if evidence if important)vSubstantial

financial lossvComputer crime

– Intrusion– Theft of

proprietary information…

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Why Forensics is, a little bit, difficult?

1. Too many variables– Operating systems– Software

application– Cryptography– Hardware platform– Law– International

boundaries– Publicity

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Elements of Forensic Readiness

§ How Logging is Done§ What is Logged§ Forensic

Acquisition§ Evidence

Handling

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How Logging is Done

§ “needle in the haystack”– Data from an IDS– Centralized logging

§ Time– time

synchronization becomes an issue.

§ Permissions§ Reporting

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Usefulness of Incident Data

§ The victim system(s) RAM, registers and raw disk

§ The attacking system(s) RAM, registers and raw disk

§ Logs (from the victim and attacking systems as well as intermediary systems)

§ Physical security at the attacking system (e.g. camera monitoring, etc)

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Solid Analysis and Case Building

§ You have to defend– How you work– Why you work this

way

§ To Juror (non tech)– If you tell them you

have no defined methodology

– Acquit for Reasonable doubt

§ Methodology become a Discipline– Think about car

driving

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Document Everything

§ REFUTE because of mishandling??

§ Chain of evidence– 1 x Conduction the

investigation– 1 x Document

§ What– Time– Date– Steps were taken– Name involved– Whose authority’s

for step.

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Crime Scene … . 1

§ Snapshort– Photograph the scene– Note the scene

v Personal items

– Photograph the actual evidencev E.g. What’s on the

screen

– Open the case carefully

– Photograph the internal

– Document the internals (e.g. Serial#, cable config – IDE, SCSI… )

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Crime Scene … 2

§ Label the evidence– Consistently

§ Photograph the evidence with label

§ Document who did what at when.

§ Custodian double checked your list, initials next to yours while at the scene

§ Videotape the team entrance and evidence transport, if possible

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Evidence transportation

§ Legal authority?§ Guard

against electrostatic discharge

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Preparing the Evidence

§ Unpack the evidence – Document date, … .

§ Visually examine§ Duplicate IMAGE of

hard drive– Turn off virus

scanning software– Record the time/date

of the CMOSv Time zonev Accurate

§ Make a second copy§ Seal the original

evidence– Electrostatic safe– Catalog it– Initial by everyone

touched.

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Forensic Acquisition

§ to preserve the entire digital crime scene with minimal or no modification of data.

§ Order Of Volatility (OOV) which implies that collecting some data impacts other data.– CDROM based tool kit

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§ Backup– MAC?– Deleted files?

§ Live system?§ Open source tools§ Cryptographic

hashes§ Shutdown vs

Poweroff§ Copy of the copy

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Evidence Handling … 1

§ Chain of Custody– track who had

access

§ start when the data is first considered as potential evidence and should continue through presentation of the item as evidence in court.

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Evidence Handling … 2

§ Physical Transport– FBI

§ Storage– Paper char at

460F– Data start

disappearing at 120F

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Examination of Evidence

§ disk image(s) should be mounted read-only

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Now, you have the evidence…

§ Where do we start?

§ Think like an Intruder

§ And Let’s start …

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Some useful links

General§ http://www.cybercrime.gov/§ http://www.e-evidence.info/§ http://www.forensix.org/

Tools§ http://www.sleuthkit.org/§ http://fire.dmzs.com/