Bachelor’s thesis

Foreign Fighters – aspiring and returning Prevent, protect, pursue and respond

Author: Julia Johansson Email: jj222qj@student.lnu.se Supervisor: Anders Persson Examiner: Daniel Silander Date: 2016-05-25 University: Linneaus University Department: European Studies Level: G3-level Word count: 11 225 Course code: 2SK300

i

Abstract This research resulted in a foreign fighters analytical framework aiming to identify the

reasons for an increase of foreign fighters travelling from the European Union to

jihadist organisations in Syria and Iraq. The theoretical framework is built on EU’s

Counterterrorism strategy (ECTS) on prevention, protection, pursuing and responding

towards terrorism. The theoretical framework has in this essay been applied on ECTS in

order to search explanation to the phenomenon of foreign fighters in the EU. The

analytical framework is built on the concepts operationalized in the theoretical

framework in order to obtain further clarifications on foreign fighters in relation to the

EU. The results and analysis of this essay show that ECTS somewhat approaches the

phenomenon of foreign fighters. However, further analysis shows that the strategy does

not completely explain the phenomenon of foreign fighters nor entirely contemplate

preventing, protecting, pursuing or responding towards foreign fighters. The

contributions that could be drawn from the essay are mainly interpretive that should be

kept in mind when discussing the ECTS in relation to foreign fighters.

Key words: EU’s Counterterrorism strategy, foreign fighters, ECTS, the European Union, EU, terrorism, prevent, protect, pursue, respond

ii

Abbreviations ECTS – EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy ENER – European Network of Experts on Radicalisation EU – European Union Frontex – The European Borders Agency PNR – Passenger Name Records PWGT – Police Working Group on Terrorism

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT I

ABBREVIATIONS II

1 INTRODUCTION 5

1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM .............................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ..................................................................................................... 6 1.3 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS ....................................................................................................... 6 1.4 MATERIAL ............................................................................................................................................... 7 1.5 DISPOSITION ........................................................................................................................................... 8

2 RELEVANCE AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 9

2.1 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION .................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH – FOREIGN FIGHTERS ......................................................................................... 9

3 METHOD 12

3.1 METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDINGS ....................................................... 12 3.2 METHOD FOR BUILDING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................... 13 3.3 VALIDITY, RELIABILITY & GENERALISATION ..................................................................................... 13 3.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................................. 14

4 DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGIES – A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15

4.1.1 PREVENT .............................................................................................................................................. 15 4.1.2 PROTECT .............................................................................................................................................. 16 4.1.3 PURSUE ............................................................................................................................................... 17 4.1.4 RESPOND ............................................................................................................................................. 19 4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 21

5 ECTS APPROACHES ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE EU 24

5.1 RESULTS – FOREIGN FIGHTERS TRAVELLING FROM THE EU ............................................................. 24 5.2 RESULTS – FOREIGN FIGHTERS APPROACH IN THE ECTS ................................................................. 25 5.2.1 PREVENTION ........................................................................................................................................ 25 5.2.2 PROTECTION ........................................................................................................................................ 27 5.2.3 PURSUING ............................................................................................................................................ 28 5.2.4 RESPONDING ........................................................................................................................................ 29

6 FOREIGN FIGHTERS - ASPIRING AND RETURNING 32

6.1 PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT OF EU CITIZENS ............................................... 32 6.1.1 UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM ............................................................................................................... 32 6.1.2 EQUALITY IMPROVEMENTS .................................................................................................................... 33 6.1.3 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 34 6.2 PROTECTING EU CITIZENS FROM TERRORISM ................................................................................... 35 6.2.1 CIVIL PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................... 35 6.2.2 MODERN TECHNOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 35 6.2.3 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 36 6.2.4 PURSUING OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF FINANCING TERRORISM ...................................................... 37 6.2.5 MODERN TECHNOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 37 6.2.6 HORIZONTAL EXCHANGE ...................................................................................................................... 38 6.2.7 GLOBAL COOPERATION ......................................................................................................................... 39 6.3 RESPONDING JUDICIALLY AGAINST TERRORIST ................................................................................. 39 6.3.1 MILITARY INVOLVEMENT/SANCTIONS ..................................................................................................... 39 6.3.2 STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL COOPERATION ............................................................................... 40

iv

7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 42

7.1 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 42 7.2 FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................... 43

8 BIBLIOGRAPHY 44

8.1 BOOKS AND ARTICLES .......................................................................................................................... 44 8.2 INTERNET SOURCES .............................................................................................................................. 48

5

1 Introduction This chapter will present the research problem, followed by the purpose and research

question, limitations and delimitations, material and disposition of the essay.

1.1 Research problem

“The phenomenon of foreign fighters – i.e. individuals who join insurgencies abroad and

whose primary motivation is ideological or religious rather than financial – is anything but

new”1.

The European Union (EU) has had the issue of citizens travelling to other countries to fight

for an ideological or religious cause. The recruitment and radicalisation of such citizens as

well as the return to Europe have however not existed in the dimension that it does today2. In

addition, EU’s Counterterrorism strategy (ECTS) that the Council of the European Union

published concerns the different aspects and measures against terrorism for Europe and for

the international arena3. The strategy, which contains of four branches – prevent, protect,

pursue and respond – considers international terrorism and travelling and returning foreign

fighters as an approach towards fighting terrorism4.

Furthermore, since hostilities in Syria and Iraq continue and terrorist attacks and activities

seem to increase, the EU member states are more than ever concerned about the problem

regarding aspiring and returning foreign fighters5. Therefore it is fundamental to address the

mistakes that the EU strategy against terrorism contains, concerning both the document

published in 20056 and the document published in 20117.

1 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). ‘Foreign fighters’ – Member States’ responses and EU action in an international context. Published by the European Parliamentary Research Service, The European Union. p. 2 2 Ibid. 3 Council of the European Union. (2005). EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Published by the Council of the European Union, Brussels. 4 Council of the European Union. (2005). 5 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 1 6 Council of the European Union (2005). 7 Council of the European Union (2011) EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy. Published by the Europan Union, Brussels.

6

Although it has become almost impossible to adequately insure the broad ECTS policy in a

single paper, such overviews8 remain a necessary complement to more specialized articles on

issues such as the fight against radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens9, unsafe border

controls and infrastructure10, financing of terrorism and judicial cooperation11. In particular,

by providing a critical reading of the ECTS, this essay seeks to provide a counterpoint to the

official summary of EU’s achievements. Therefore, by adding other theoretical measures, this

essay will address the functionality of ECTS by stressing the increase of foreign fighters from

Europe.

Consequently, due to terrorism and foreign fighters’ increased influence in Europe, the issue

is traditionally associated with the sovereignty of the state whereas policing against terrorism

and control of crime and safety and investigation against foreign fighters increases12.

1.2 Purpose and Research question

On the basis of the preamble above, the purpose of this essay is to examine why ECTS has

not been able to avert the increased rate of foreign fighters in the EU to decrease rather than

increase. The research questions that will be answered to fulfill the purpose read as follows:

• What are the approaches towards aspiring and returning foreign fighters in the ECTS?

o Why have the amount of foreign fighters increased from the EU despite ECTS,

according to the theoretical framework?

1.3 Limitations and delimitations The first delimitation is that the essay considers foreign fighters only from and to the borders

of the EU. This delimitation was considered being necessary in order to concretize the amount

of information on counterterrorism strategies as well as the amount of foreign fighters

8 Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. In Government and Opposition. 9 Nesser, P. (2010) Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. 108 10 Flynn, S.E. (2000). Beyond Border Control. In Foreign Affairs. Vol.79. No 6. Published by The Council on Foreign Relations. p. 57 11 Nilsson, H. (2007). Judicial cooperation in Europe against Terrorism. In The European Union and Terrorism. Edited by D. Spence. London, John Harper Publishing. p. 71-87 12 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). Legitimacy under pressure: The European web of Counter-terrorism networks. In Journal compilation. Published by Blackwell Publishing. p. 101

7

aspiring and returning. The second delimitation of this essay will therefore involve the foreign

fighters from the EU to jihadi organisations. Moreover, the reason for this delimitation is due

to the current situation for the EU, and the most common destination for foreign fighters to

aspire to and return from is jihadist terrorist organisations13.

Another delimitation of this essay was the amount of strategy documents within the EU that

was considered. Since the EU and its member states have individual strategies as well as a

joint strategy for all member states, the delimitation concludes the documents provided by the

EU. The main focus will be on the two counterterrorist strategies from 2005 and 2011

collected among the EU member states14.

Since this essay is a policy study and analysis of ECTS, the very limitation lies in the

theoretical and methodological reasoning15. In the Method-chapter of this essay it is explained

how the theories will be used and why. Thus, the theories that build the theoretical framework

are far from all theories that exist on the subject and are chosen to fill the gaps that may be

missing in ECTS.

1.4 Material

The material used in this essay is limited to certain topics, like ECTS, aspiring and returning

foreign fighters in the EU and different theories around foreign fighters and counterterrorist

strategies. The main material consists of academic books and articles as well as some

statistics from the well recognized and respected EU. The material will be presented

thoroughly in the Theoretical framework as well as in the Result in this essay. The sources of

books and articles chosen for the build-up of the theoretical framework is consistent to the

phenomenon of counterterrorist strategies alongside foreign fighters enables to interpret the

concepts and to also control the conceptual level in the latter analysis16. Also, the results of

13 Hegghammer, T. (2013) Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. Published by American Political Science Review, USA. p. 4 14 Ibid. 15 Giolia, D. (1999) Response: Practicability Paradigms and Problems in Stakeholder Theorizing. Academy of Management Review. p. 228

16 Orlikowski, W.J. (1993). CASE Tools as Organizational Change: Investigating Incremental and Radical Changes in Systems Development. Published by MIS Quarterly (17:3). p. 310

8

the essay are limited to the perspectives of ECTS and its different branching of policies

implemented by member states of the EU.

1.5 Disposition In its configuration this essay is presented with the research problem to address the issue that

will be considered and analysed for, and the purpose and research question follows in the lead

of the research problem. Under the subheading of the introduction will also include the

material used for this essay as well as the structure. Furthermore is the previous research

presented in order to provide earlier approaches and angles of the case of European foreign

fighters as well as the issue on ECTS. The theoretical framework will be presented and

operationalized in order to be able to explain the case on foreign fighters. The results of ECTS

will be thereafter presented as well as results on foreign fighters development the last few

years. The analysis on the case of foreign fighters in the EU will be as a continuous inquiry,

using ECTS, and the developed theoretical framework. Thereafter can a conclusion be made

of what approaches ECTS has on foreign fighters and why foreign fighters from EU have

increased despite the ECTS17.

17 Esaiasson, P. Giljam, M, Oscarsson, H. Wängnerud, L. (2012) Metodpraktikan. Published by Nordstedts Juridik AB. Stockholm. p. 41

9

2 Relevance and previous research This chapter provides academic contribution and previous research on the topic regarding

both analyses on ECTS and the aspiring and returning of foreign fighters in EU.

2.1 Academic contribution

The academic contribution of this essay is to apply a theoretic framework concerning foreign

fighters on the policy ECTS. The specific subject of foreign fighters and built theoretical

framework will be applied and analysed for in order to create and enlighten the issues of

ECTS, and to find answers to why aspiring and returning foreign fighters increases in Europe

rather than decreasing because of the strategy. The strategy, with the four branches – prevent,

protect, pursue and respond – will be used in order to create a theoretical framework

considering foreign fighters as an approach towards fighting terrorism18.

2.2 Previous research – Foreign fighters Previous research concerning foreign fighters is a common subject for Thomas Hegghammer,

whereas he attempts to pinpoint the differences between a domestic and a foreign fighter, and

the reasons for choosing one or the other19. He focuses first and foremost on the difference

between the two by investigate why Western Jihadists choose to go abroad, but also why

some choose to return and the legislation of returnees20.

In addition, Magnus Ranstorp who is a research director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat

Studies at the Swedish National Defence College and a Member of EU Expert Groups on

Radicalisation has a twenty-year experience on the research concerning counterterrorism

issues.21 Understanding Violent Radicalisation edited by Ranstorp concerns radicalisation as

a broad-based phenomenon and also radicalisations in the Untied Kingdom, France, Spain,

Italy and the Netherlands.22

18 Council of the European Union. (2005). 19 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 2 20 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 4 21 Ranstorp, M. (2010). Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. i 22 Ranstorp, M. (2010). p. 7

10

Moreover, Hegghammer recognises the issue of understanding foreign fighters in the global

context. First and foremost he mentions the reasons for the foreign fighters upbringing in the

1980s, in which he seeks to explain23. He continues by stressing the lack of foreign fighters as

a phenomenon in the current social science literature. The main reason for the deficiency of

such a term is that foreign fighters comprise a transitional actor absent between local rebels

and international terrorists24. Further, Hegghammer explains the foreign fighters from the

West towards jihadist organisations as being a threat to the security of nation states where

foreign fighters return. Moreover, the risks of foreign fighters than return to the originated

country, there is not necessarily higher risk of a terrorist attack to occur than otherwise,

however if an attack would take place, as he claims, will entail grander damage than

otherwise25. The issue at hand uphold a dilemma for the EU, where ECTS has to include

foreign fighters from the EU in a larger dimension than ever before.

Also, The EU as a counter-terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, overcoming

constraints, written by Peter Wennerholm, Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard resembles most

of the research within the field of EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The issue paper provides

a consolidated version, considering EU’s assistance in countries outside the union during a

crisis of terrorism. The assistance made, according to the issue paper consider five countries

in which EU has alongside the strategy prevented, protected, pursued and responded against

terrorism.26

Furthermore, Scott Pynting and Davis White on Counter-terrorism and the terrorist state

examines the war on terror and the significant social impact than the terrorism of the

mentioned ‘sub-state’ or ‘non-state’ groups27. The approach concerns and demonstrate

counter-terrorism strategies as a connection and cause to a range of forms of state terror;

genocide and cultural genocide, mass killings of civilians by state-sponsored militants and

23 Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalisation of Jihad. In International Security, Vol.35, No. 3. Published by The Harvard Coolage and the Massachusetts Insitute of Technology. p. 54 24 Hegghammer, T. (2010). p. 55 25 Hegghammer, T. (2013). p. 9 26 Wennerholm, P. & Brattberg E. & Rhinard, M. (September 2010) The EU as a counter-terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, overcoming constraints. Published by The Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 27 Pynting, S. and White, D. (2012). Introduction: counter-terrorism and the terrorist state. In Pynting, S. Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence – The ’war on terror’ as terror. Published by Routledge. England. p. 1

11

paramilitaries, military raids on and carpet bombing of civilians, mass rape as a weapon of

terror, politically motivated destruction of civilian infrastructure etc.28

28 Pynting, S. and White, D. (2012). p. 2

12

3 Method In this chapter the essays selected case, approach and material will be presented and

motivated for. 3.1 Methodological and epistemological understandings

The methodological approach for this essay is abductive, which in this process refers to a

method often used in case studies due to the combination of both induction and deduction.

Abduction as a method proposes a single case and interprets it from a hypothetic overall

pattern, which, if it were true, explains the case in question29. A pure theoretical branch as a

method is most often referred to as deductive, while empirical material in various forms is

most often referred to as inductive30. Abduction compared to induction and deduction,

according to Alvesson and Sköldberg, provides a method where the empirical area is

developed gradually during the process, and the theory is regulated and advanced31.

Moreover, this is a case study method, a method that has been much discussed both in terms

of its strengths and weaknesses. This especially when it comes to sustainability for theory

development, and in terms of its limitations when it comes to theoretical conclusions32. The

reasons for analysing a single case is to in detail examine the issue of aspiring and returning

foreign fighters33. As according to the deductive part of the method, the theoretical framework

will provide logical prediction of the case and the issue behind the solutions on solving the

problem34.

29 Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2009). Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research. Published by SAGE, England. p. 4 30 Tohmé, F., Caterina, G., Gangle, R. (2014). Abduction: A categorical characterization. In Journal of Applied Logic 13. Published by Elsevier, online. p. 78 31 Alvesson, M. & Sköldberg, K. (1994). p. 31 32 Örnberg, J.C. (2009). The Europeanization of Swedish Alcohol Policy. Published by Stockholm University, Stockholm. p. 34 33 Esaiasson, P. Giljam, M, Oscarsson, H. Wängnerud, L. (2012). p. 211 34 Örnberg, J.C. (2009). p. 34

13

3.2 Method for building a theoretical framework

This essay considers a theoretical framework, which further is developed and constructed

through a process of qualitative analysis35. First and foremost, the framework was built on

theories using the key concepts of ECTS – prevent, protect, pursue and respond.

According to Mishler are “qualitative studies ultimately aimed to describe and explain

relationships, which can only be done with a set of conceptually specified categories”36. The

theories collectively, in a framework, seek to generate new interpretations of the original

characteristics in ECTS and further include the concept of foreign fighters37. The conceptual

framework is therefore built by the categories prevent, protect, pursue and respond in order to

add an interpretive approach to the social reality of counterterrorism and foreign fighters. This

seeks to provide as Levering would express it soft interpretations rather than hard facts about

the case selected38.

3.3 Validity, reliability & generalisation Since this study is considering foreign fighters, the issues of validity and reliability are a few.

First and foremost, the generalisations of this essay lay in the concept of foreign fighters,

whereas different backgrounds, up bringing, gender, age or specific citizenships are not

considered. The generalisation mainly specifies the very statistics of foreign fighters as well

as the citizenships from EU member states. However, according to Yin, case study methods

lack objectivity, which contributes to the further criticism of a lack that postulates

generalisations. This gives further issues around case studies where the study may not give

representation enough to seem reliable or valid39. In order to avoid lack of objectivity, this

essay will consider each material source as equally valuable and useful. The theoretical

framework, that will provide analysis to the empirical material, will carefully be chosen in

order to contribute further objectivity. Also it should be clarified that, concerning previous

35 Jensen, L. A., & Allen, M. N. (1996). Metasynthesis of qualitative findings. Qualitative Health Research. Published by SAGE Journals. 6(4). p. 554.

36 Mishler, E.G. (1990). Validation in inquiry-guided research: The role of exemplars in narrative studies. In Harvard Education Review, 60. Published by Yale University, New York. p. 431. 37 Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Published by Cambridge University, UK. p. 224 38 Levering, B. (2002). Concept analysis as empirical method. In International Journ al of Qualitative Methods, 1. Published by Univeristy of Alberta, Canada. p. 38 39 Yin, R.K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Published by SAGE Publications, England. p. 10

14

delimitations, does not this essay seek to generalize foreign fighters in the EU as a concept.

More likely will this essay provide EU’s approach towards foreign fighters, whereas new

hypotheses may evolve to further improve the strategies against terrorism.

3.4 Analytical framework

The analytical framework of this essay will structurally follow the concepts created and

developed in the theoretical framework, and thereafter be applied to the result and information

provided by ECTS and its for sub-headings prevent, protect, pursue and respond.

Below a figure shows the connections between foreign fighters and the counterterrorism

strategy that will be addressed in the analysis of this essay. The link between the four sub-

headings will be the theoretical framework.

Figure 1.

Foreign Fighters

Prevent Protect Pursue Respond

EU’s Counterterrorism strategy

15

4 Different aspects of counterterrorist strategies

– A Theoretical Framework Due to the increased amount of foreign fighters that the EU now faces40, the strategic plan

may be considered incomplete or unsuccessful. The theories that are presented below fill gaps

in the strategic plan, or give another approach to the strategy against terrorism.

4.1.1 Prevent

Primarily, the prevention against terrorism is a common area of issue to investigate, whereas

Tore Bjørgo also has investigated. Bjørgo uses key analytical terms such as, terrorism,

prevention, strategy, and measures41. Lara Fakih describes the measures of prevention against

terrorism as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. According to Fakih, the soft measures are more of

preventing kinds whereas initiatives are motivated for in part of understanding terrorism, so

that the strategies prevent terrorist attacks42. The understanding on how to prevent in soft

measures is, as Bjørgo would portray prevention, non-observable. Bjørgo claims that

measures at different levels of society can systematically contribute to larger understanding of

terrorism, and the reasons for why individuals choose to join terrorist groups43. The

community, Bjørgo argues, have to make essential improvements within economic and social

measures such as poor environments for children to grow up in, high unemployment, social

divisions or economic inequality44.

Furthermore, Rogelio Alonso claims environments such as prisons to be a level in society

where terrorism can be prevented by diminishing radicalisation and recruitment45. In regards

to for instance prisons, Tal Becker sort the prevention of terrorism as an obligation towards

the State in its entirely. Becker claims that the motivation and determination against terrorist

attacks and organisations is the States mission to complete. This is in order to deploy the

40 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 2 41 Bjørgo, T. (2013). Strategies for preventing terrorism. Published by Palgrave Macmillan, London. p. 5 42 Fakih, L. (2013). Soft measures, realm: Somalia and the US ”War on terror”. In Satterthwaite, M.L. & Huckerby, J.C. Gender, National Security and Counter-terrorism: Human Rights. Published by Routledge, England. p. 183 43 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 15 44 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 10 45 Alonso, R. (2010). Radicalisation and recruitment among jihadist terrorists in Spain: Main patterns and subsequent counter-terrorist measures. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge, England. p. 226

16

message internationally and domestically46. Becker also adds that, as international law does

not impose an absolute duty on the State to guarantee that no act of terrorism will emanate

form its territory. Instead, a standard of due thoroughness is required, demanding the State to

use all means at its clearance to prevent and conquer terrorist activity. If the State meets the

due thoroughness standard but the private terrorist activity nevertheless occurs, no State

responsibility is engaged47.

On the other hand, Anna Bella Korbatov, Erika Suzuki and Bethany L. Goldblum claims the

need for a stabilising force in an increased destabilised world. Unlike Becker, argues

Korbatov et.al. that mainly global cooperation can ensure nuclear security and also prevent

nuclear terrorism48. Graham Allison agrees that in order to prevent terrorism globally, is to

deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons or materials49. Terrorist groups and organisations

that attain increasingly lethal weapons and other capabilities creates, according to Korbatov

et.al., an increase towards global responsibility to fight nuclear terrorism50.

4.1.2 Protect

As previously mentioned, Tal Becker stresses the importance of increased State responsibility

in the matter of counterterrorism. Continuously, Becker claims that terrorists count on

governmental inaction, toleration or support. On the other hand the citizens look to the State

in order to be protected from danger that for instance terrorists pose51. Dieter Mahncke writes

about the difficulties of protecting the State and its citizens in a modern society. Due to the

activity of terrorists across borders, that not necessarily is arranged by a hierarchal structure

and instead cells act independently of each other. In addition the media and modern

technology from cell phones to the Internet are effective enough. Therefore it is most difficult

to predict an attack or protect States citizens to not get harmed52.

46 Becker, T. (2006). The standard of care and the burden of proof. In Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the rules of State Responsibility. Bloomsbury Publishing, England. p. 139 47 Ibid. 48 Korbatov, A.B, Suzuki, E. and Goldblum, B. (2015). The fight against nuclear terrorism needs global cooperation – and the IAEA. In Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Published by SAGE, England. p. 67 49 Allison, G. (2004). Nuclear Terrorism: The ultimate preventable catastrophe. Published by Macmillan, England. p. 141 50 Korbatov, A.B, Suzuki, E. and Goldblum, B. (2015). p. 68 51 Becker, T. (2006). p. 2 52 Mahncke, D. (2006). Introduction. In Mahncke, D. & Monar, J. International Terrorism: A European response ro a global threat?. Published by Peter Lang, Belgium. p. 17

17

For instance, the protection against terrorism is an essential fragment for the citizens living

within the borders of the terrorist target. By protecting a state from such threats are usually

considered through controlling terrorists to not cross the borders. Stephen E. Flynn explains

the current system of boarder controls in a critical matter, where he argues that the economic

aspects of border controls internationally is damaged.53 Further Flynn points out that the

current border controls globally are inefficient, and instead he suggests that countries

involved in international transportation systems, must tighten security from beginning to end,

and not only the final destination of transportation goods54.

Moreover Flynn argues that by implementing such a system, criminals and terrorists will be

less likely to exploit the liberalised global market of today. Thereafter, Flynn claims, that

countries need to encourage international companies to implement and develop transparent

systems for tracking flows and transportations. Such a system, accordingly, will also help

conduct inbound traffic and its contents long before arrival. Finally Flynn argues that border

control services need more efficient capabilities to gather information of exports and imports.

Flynn continues by claiming that if customs are well informed on how to target high-risk

goods or persons, the inspections of those of less harm will work quickly and confidently.55

However, Carsten Stahn comments on the International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty and the report published on State responsibility56. In relation to

counterterrorism, the commission in question, comprehend a trend whereas whenever States

are unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from catastrophes conforming terrorist attacks,

there is a growing acceptance if the wider international community engaged responsibility57.

4.1.3 Pursue

Thirdly, the discussions on how to pursue counterterrorism have brought several aspects of

the issue. For instance, Jörg Monar claims that in order to counteract against terrorism some

claim that one have to consider operational aspects. By operational measures within strategies

53 Flynn, S.E. (2000). Beyond Border Control. In Foreign Affairs. Vol.79. No 6. Published by The Council on Foreign Relations. p. 57 54 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 55 Ibid. 56 Stahn, C. (2007). Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?. In The American Journal of International law, Vol. 101, No. 1. Published by American society of International law, USA. p. 99 57 United Nations. (2004). A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, report of the High-Level Panel on threats, challanges and change. Published by United Nations Foundation, USA. p. 65-66. par. 201.

18

in pursuing counterterrorism, are of more repressive kinds, as Monar calls it58. Simon Hix

continues on the same trail and comments on the pursuing of counterterrorism as a strategy of

common objectives. That is, not only one nation, but also several have to participate in a

process where compromises are necessary in order to come to terms with how these

objectives will be achieved59. Christoph Meyer argues that this may force some states to

reshape their own initial interests and ambitions as their interaction with other state actors

may make them aware of other dominant norms and beliefs within the group and may

accordingly change their own perception of security to better reflect the prevailing world

view60. Monar claims that by pursuing counterterrorism, financing of terrorism has to be

considered in order to fight terrorism in its entirely61.

Continuously Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava and Eric C. Martin explains pursue against

terrorism through controlling terrorist networks and thereby the funding of terrorism. They

frame terrorism as a network of two branches, that is, informal and formal relationships. The

networks over all, they claim, access and deploy critical resources, such as people, finances or

information.62 Comas et al. explain the informal relationships as a common strategy within

terrorist organisations, mainly to maintain secrecy towards those against them. Information,

coordination and propaganda are often of bidirectional flows, where these can be flown out

from terrorist groups while at the same time resources flow in. They also reason costs for

terrorist organisations to minimise due to the usage of networked technologies such as

computer networks and mobile telephones. These technologies, Comas et al. explains,

strengthen and quicken the extent, flexibility, and value of networks around the

organisations63.

Furthermore, Comas et al. clarify that terrorism also can be organised as networks of formal

organisations, institutions and other organised foundations that helps achieve numerous

opposing goals. They address two types of functions in the formal organisation of terrorism.

58 Monar, J. (2007). The EU’s approach post-September 11: global terrorism as a multidimensional law enforcement challenge. Published by Cambridge Review of International Affairs, England. p. 274 59 Hix, S. (2005). The political system of the European Union. Published by Palgrave Macmillan. England. p. 400 60 Meyer, C. (2005). Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms. In European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no.4. Published by Sage Publications. p. 536 61 Monar, J. (2007). p. 274 62 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). Terrorism as formal organisation, network, and social movement. Published by Sage, Journal of Management Inquiry. p. 49 63 Ibid.

19

One is where association groups bind networks where ideological and cultural similarities are

considered. The other concerns transnational support groups that are organised in favour of

the terrorist organisation. Both functions are, however, characterised by horizontal

communication and exchange, which is voluntary and reciprocal. Comas et al. claims that

these types of organisations are most often not led by a hierarchy system, but for getting the

job done for a greater cause64.

4.1.4 Respond

Finally, as a response towards terrorism and terrorists has Jenny Hocking concluded a strategy

that generally occur in western liberal-democratic countries, which contains of the five

elements – legislation, intelligence, police special squads, military involvement in civil

disturbances, and media management65.

Hocking explains the legislation as ‘exceptional’, which is further clarified by actions that lie

in its functional amendments to the procedures of criminal justice organisation and the

capability for legal systems to uphold common law values66. On the other hand, according to

Paul Wilkinson the limitations lay in, according to him, that first nations have to assess the

individual components of emergency powers adopted to combat terrorism before coming to

hasty conclusions about the role and value of special anti-terrorist legislation in democratic

states67. Also, Wilkinson claims, that some legislation appears to have primarily symbolic or

psychological functions of expressing public revulsion at particular outrages and reassuring

the public that something is being done68.

In contrast to Wilkinson’s opinion, Hocking means that the ‘exceptionality’ of the nature of

this type of counterterrorism strategy is a temporary solution that can have an effective

outcome. The dimension behind this temporary solution, although the issue occurs within

immediate and limited state borders, has extended the normality for integrating criminal

justice administrative measures69.

64 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 50 65 Hocking, J. (1986). Terrorism and counter-terrorism: institutionalising political order. In The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3. Published by Australian Institute of Policy and Science. p. 299. 66 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 300. 67 Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Published by Taylor & Francis, England. p. 96. 68 Wilkinson, P. (2011). p. 93. 69 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 301

20

On the other hand, Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter agrees with the argument that

Wilkinson argues for, namely that nations act to respond against terrorism rather than

preventing or understanding the issue in before hand70. Jakana Thomas continues on the same

track and evolves the argument by considering violent and nonviolent tactics when

responding against terrorism. Thomas argues that nonviolent response such as legislation

against terrorists; terrorism can be affected in a positive way, as governments have not fully

developed a secure strategy on exact punishment for different acts of terrorism71. However,

Hocking also criticise the nonviolent responses in the dimension of general counterterrorism

strategies in the form of sanctions. The argument lies in the measurement where the terrorist

act has already occurred. The previous work, which is the ‘exceptional’ legislative settlement,

is the most efficient response against terrorism72.

Moreover, terrorist violence is according to Thomas Schelling irrational. This is further

argued for that the response by governments against terrorism in the form of violence is also

irrational. Schelling claims that the impact of governments towards terrorism has to show

good behaviour. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behaviour, if the

power to hurt can get it at all73. Continuously Richard J. Thomas argues that indiscriminate

government responses to terrorism radicalize latent rebel supporters and rival groups alike.

Thereafter she claims that excessive government responses to terrorism may also cause

individuals who would otherwise support the government to offer support to rebels instead74.

70 Kydd, A.H. and Walter, B.F. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. In International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1. Published by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. p. 50. 71 Thomas, J. P. 806 72 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 302 73 Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and Influence. Published by Yale University Press, New Haven Conneticut. p. 3 74 Thomas, R.J. Profiles of people in power: The world’s governemnt leaders. Published by Routledge, England. p. 80

21

4.2 Operationalization of the theoretical framework This sub-chapter will provide a summary and operationalization of all theories in order to be

able to use this as a theoretical framework.

4.2.1 Prevent

According to the theoretical framework, first a strategy must be providing the understanding

of terrorism and foreign fighters. The understanding includes systematically understanding

each level of society and the different aspects of equality measures. In order to manage these

non-observable measures through social and economic inequalities, the understanding of

terrorism is more observable.

Also, different levels of society whereas radicalization and recruitment is made, such as

prison environments, are accordingly to be managed by the sovereignty of the nation-state.

The responsibility of the state is ultimately to be able to shield the citizens from terrorist

attacks and foreign fighters, and then to provide the results to other nations.

Finally, the international responsibility is to fight together to prevent terrorism also, but on the

level whereas the same framework of definitions of terrorism, as well as securing the use of

nuclear weapons and other war materials.

4.2.2 Protect

Furthermore, to protect is defined by managing border controls even further by the border of

the state. The protecting lay in state responsibility in order to keep the borders safe. The state

is responsible to have a safe system, but also to preserve the pace of modern technologies in

order to ultimately protect the country from terrorist attacks. The modern technologies of

computers and cell phones are important to understand and to supervise and protect.

Furthermore is the ultimate protection to keep terrorists from crossing borders, and what

enables a state to do so is through global cooperation when it comes to all international

transport. There is a necessity to control transport on all levels to be able to protect all

countries from terrorism and foreign fighters.

22

4.2.3 Pursue

In order to pursue counterterrorism there has to be a common objective and a common

operationalized strategy to manage the financial flows of terrorism according to the

theoretical framework. The necessity for some states to reshape initial interests is crucial in

order to create a more superior counterterrorism strategy. For instance, networks concerning

the internet, social groups and financial networks are greater than within the borders of a

state, and therefore can global cooperation develop flexibility, efficiency and quicker

responses towards terrorism rather than the opposite.

Institutions and organisations that have an expertise on the subjects have the ability to reach

and understand the networks of for instance foreign fighters, and can therefore provide the

formal information of terrorism and foreign fighters. The horizontal cooperation and

exchange between states, institutions and organisations is therefore essential in order to reach

a operative counterterrorism strategy.

4.2.4 Respond

Lastly, according to the theory, there are both positives and negatives concerning the response

to counterterrorist strategies. The positives lay in the prosecutions efficiency and the potential

that the legislative strategy contains. Between states it is essential to have common law

values in order to fairly prosecute, but the state is also responsible to have the ability to

respond on its own.

Continuously, the military interventions as a response towards terrorism and foreign fighters

is considered being symbolic and ultimately have a psychological function, and does not

prohibit foreign fighters to commit terrorist acts in the future. Therefore, responses in the

sense of sanctions or other soft measures can both make countries show what good behaviour

looks like, but also to peacefully negotiate and understand the issues of terrorism and foreign

fighters. However, if a state is attacked by terrorism in the form of warfare, the state has the

responsibility to act upon terrorism in the form of military involvement to protect citizens.

23

Figure 2. Table of concepts from the theoretical framework describing what and how to build a Counterterrorism strategy Prevent Protect Pursue Respond

What

Radicalization Citizens Operational aspects Acts of terrorism

Recruitment Transportations Financing of

terrorism

Recruitment

Acts of terrorism Infrastructure Radicalization

How

Understanding

terrorism

State responsibility Modern technology Military involvement

Equality

improvements

Border controlling Horizontal exchange Sanctions

State responsibility Modern technology Global cooperation State responsibility

Global cooperation Global cooperation Global cooperation

The concepts on how to prevent, protect, pursue and respond terrorism and foreign fighters

will be the main concepts used to describe and analyse ECTS, and why the strategy’s scarcity

affects the deterrence towards foreign fighters.

24

5 ECTS approaches on foreign fighters in the EU This chapter will provide the different approaches of foreign fighters in the ECTS, and its

appliances under the four branches prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Before that, the

chapter will present results of foreign fighters travelling to jihadist organisations in Syria and

Iraq.

5.1 Results – Foreign fighters travelling from the EU Statistics from the European Parliament, still quite unclear whether these statistics show the

true numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, show that almost 5000 out of

27 000-30 000 foreign fighters originate from the EU75. This development compared to

previous statistics of foreign fighters during the 1990s and 2003-2008 is exceeding and more

combatants come from other countries than where the conflict76. Consequently, due to

terrorism and foreign fighters’ increased influence in the EU, the issue is traditionally

associated with the sovereignty of the state whereas policing against terrorism and control of

crime and safety and investigation against foreign fighters increases77.

According to Europol, the European Law Enforcement Agency, in the European Union

terrorism situation and trend report 2015 that the main cause for terrorist attacks and arrests

occurring in Europe currently are religiously inspired78. Compared to the report written by

Europol in 2008, terrorist attacks and arrests in Europe does not occur as often as currently. In

more detail, in 2006-2007 about 26 % of terrorist attacks and arrests occurred under religious

inspiration79, while in 2014 the report shows that terrorist attacks and arrests under the

influence of religion occur about 51 % out of all acts80.

75 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. The European Parliament. (2016). Foreign Fighters – Member state responses and EU action. Published by the European Parliament. p. 2 76 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. The European Parliament. (2015). p. 2 77 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). p. 101 78 Europol. (2015). European Union terrorism situation and trend report 2015. Published by European Police Office, Hague p. 41 79 Europol. (2008). EU Terrorism situation and trend report. Published by Corporate Communications Europol, Hague. p. 51 80 Europol. (2015). p. 41

25

5.2 Results – Foreign fighters approach in the ECTS 5.2.1 Prevention

First and foremost, the prevention against terrorism according to the EU concerns the

radicalisation and recruitment of individuals internationally towards terrorist organisations.

The first document from 2005 structures the prevention of terrorism in the way to prevent

people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to

radicalisation and recruitment, in the EU and internationally81. The argument for the

prevention of recruitment and radicalisation is that terrorism is a threat to the entire Union,

and therefore an extensive preventive strategy on the practical reasons for why individuals

choose to radicalise and join terrorist groups82. Examinations include internet monitoring and

the understanding of the clash between the West and Islam. The examination on why the

worldviews of individuals, and that makes them consider and justify violence83.

To understand this development of terrorism and to understand terrorism and its levels, the

EU has put up divisions between member states in order to prevent radicalization and

recruitments. For instance, the UK is leading communication with countries having Muslim

majorities as well as with Muslim communities within the EU in order to understand

important challenges as well as having a pro-active communication84. Further, the

communication networks are directed to help and support Muslim communities, as well as

having direct dialogue about radicalisation and recruitments. This strategy is also shared with

other countries in order to help in the challenge against terrorism and foreign fighters85.

In Spain there is a programme on imam-training at university-level, where the ultimate goal is

to aspire pastors, rabbis and imams to work together in accordance to the constitutional

values86. For instance, in an interview made by Marco Nilsson it is well defined that the first

step that generally made these people go to Syria or Iraq to fight for terrorism was to help

their fellow brothers to protect the Muslim lands87. One for example explains his decision to

leave Sweden for Syria because he heard an imam saying that it is a duty to help other

81 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3. 82 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 7. 83 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 8. 84 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 85 Great Britain: Home Office. (2011). Prevent Strategy. Published by The Stationery Office. p. 48 86 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 87 Nilsson, M. (2015). Foreign fighters and the radicalization of local Jihad: Interview evidence from Swedish Jihadists In Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Published online by Routledge. pp. 343-358.

26

Muslims in need. In before hand, what the previous reasons are leading up to these people

travelling to a foreign country is left with different answers and conclusions. However, in

general, according to the people interviewed there are extensive evolving goals in Syria and

Iraq. In today’s society of radicalization its practical goals is to create a Khalifat, and this can

be achieved by fighting and terrorizing those who want democracy, or to fight for those who

do not want democracy, which is enabled by the ‘Rule of God’. Moreover, the interviews

generated information about the socialization towards global jihad had to do with the fact that

America is behind all the corruption. As long as the Islamic State is not accepted, they will

fight those against them88.

Also, the understanding of radicalization amongst young people has been a main focus in

Denmark since 2009 with a project on deradicalisation89. Furthermore, the Danish Prison and

Probation Service were given approval to another project on deradicalisation in prisons

starting from 201190. One part of the project is to have continuous conversations with young

people who are already part of extremist groups. Another part of the project aims to develop a

concept of mentoring young people who for instance socialize with extremists or are inspired

and express extremist behaviours. This project’s primary goal is therefore to develop

measures of intervention and prevention of radicalisation91.

Continuously the European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER) is composed of

experts whose job is to gather and critically assess knowledge and expertise on the subject92.

Seminars are held in order to create policy papers and practices focusing on the paths into

violent radicalisation and recruitment, meaning the influence of extremist propaganda and the

role of the internet93. However, not until 2014 were foreign fighters travelling to Syria and

Iraq seen as a major threat to European security in 201494.

88 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 349 89 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 90 The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. (2011). Denmark’s deradicalisation efforts. Published by The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. p. 2 91 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 4 92 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 7 93 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 8 94 Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. (2015). p. 4

27

5.2.2 Protection

Moreover, in accordance to the EU framework for counterterrorism is to protect the people

living within the EU increased security concerning border controls, transport and critical

infrastructure95.

One part of the civil protection, including internally and eternally for a EU perspective, are

disasters that carry substantial threats to provide development and poverty reduction. In order

to reduce the impacts of disasters and to save lives it is essential to reduce and prevent

terrorism. The management policies include prospects such as to protect the environment and

health, and to ensure sustainable development, poverty eradication and economic growth

worldwide96.

In order to fulfil the demands, the member states will be guided by EU institutions, for

example to improve the technological measurements for both capture and exchange of data

between states. The European Borders Agency (Frontex) has a role in providing risk

assessment as part of the effort to strengthen controls and surveillance at the EU’s external

border97. In 2014 the Council adopted conclusions on Terrorism and Border Security, which

encourage member states to exchange best practices and lessons learned regarding border

management capabilities, especially for returning foreign fighters98.

Additionally, both nationally and cooperative research is to be shared in order to develop a

stable technical expertise, practical experiences, which also includes explosives99. The

policies in which the protection against foreign fighters involves controlling the borders,

amongst those include the Visa Code100. This involves digital facial image and fingerprints in

order to have concrete data to protect external borders101. Also, since the EU noticed a

development of technologies within terrorist organisations102, it was decided in 2011 under

95 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3. 96 Council of the European Union. (2014). Press release, 3319th Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs. Published by The European Union. p. 30 97 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10. 98 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 99 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 14. 100 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on Visas. In the Official Journal of the European Union. Published by the European Union. Article 56, paragraph 2(g). p. 26. 101 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). p. 2. 102 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 9

28

the Spanish Presidency to implement a concerted strategy to combat cyber crime. This was

also including initiatives aimed at better understanding the phenomenon of foreign fighters103.

Continuously, transport remains a target for aspiring and returning foreign fighters from the

EU104. Accordingly is passenger transport, including urban transport systems and railways the

main focus of threat105. The EU cooperates within the member states, but also externally with

for example the USA in order to develop security measures at airports. Further the European

Commission and the Government of the United States have agreed to enhance cooperation in

technology research and exchange of terrorist information106.

5.2.3 Pursuing

Continuously, the EU demonstrates the pursuing against terrorism and foreign fighters, both

internationally and regionally. It presents a development of border controls by adding a

strategic surveillance of communications through networks. These strategies are set in order

to bargain and cut funding of attack materials, travel and planning107. In 2005 it is

demonstrated that the pursuit of terrorism involves the European Arrest Warrant, which

according to ECTS is important in pursuing and investigating foreign fighters108.

Another strategy plan is to create a hostile operating environment for foreign fighters also

means tackling terrorist financing. The EU has already put in place provisions for freezing

terrorist assets. The next stage of the strategy involves the implementation of the EU-wide

legislation concerning money laundering and cash transfers, and to agree steps to impede

money transfers by terrorists. The goal is to approach the global dimension of foreign

fighters109. One of the key elements in the fighting against international terrorism includes

Passenger Name Records (PNR) and is the most valuable tool to detect terrorist networks and

103 Eurojust. (October 2012). Cybercrime. In Eurojust News, Issue No.7. Published by Eurojust. Brussels, Belgium. p. 5 104 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 26 105 Council of the European Unio. (2011). p. 11-13 106 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 20 107 Council of the European Unio (2005). p. 3. 108 Council of the European Union. (2002). Council framework decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. In the Official Journal of the European Communities (2002/584/JHA). Published by the European Union. Brussels, Belgium. Article 2, Paragraph 2. p. 3 109 Council of the European Union, EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005). p. 14

29

movements. This is an element that is shared and cooperated with the US, Canada, and

Australia110.

Additionally, the plan of 2010 was to summarize different terrorist structures in nations and

then developing, cooperating and sharing information between member states within the EU.

The so far cooperation has been involving Spain, Belgium and France. To further joint and

more efficiently pursue counterterrorism the EU transformed Europol into a EU agency that

also covers terrorism and its trends111. This includes target groups such as foreign fighters and

other phenomena of terrorism112.

Further, financing of terrorism was in 2010 mentioned as part of the Stockholm Programme,

indicating that the detection of instruments for financing terrorism can be solved by increased

transparency and responsibility for charitable organisations113. Further, the EU mentions in

2014 that the goal is to develop guidelines to support implementations towards

counterterrorism as well as sharing conclusions of different aspects of financing of foreign

fighters114.

In addition to that, the EU strives to deliver technical assistance to enhance the capability of

priority third world countries115. In 2014, the Council and the Representatives of the

Governments of the Member States adopted conclusions on the integration of third-country

nationals legally living in the European Union. The conclusions included the reaffirming of

their commitment to the common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the

EU116.

5.2.4 Responding

Lastly in the consideration of ECTS and protection from terrorism and foreign fighters, the

first approach is the civil protection. In such action whereas member states act in response

together cross borders against terrorism, it is stressed that civilians in that foreign country

110 The European Parliament. (April 2015). The proposed EU passenger name records (PNR) directive – Revived in the new security context. Published the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. p. 2 111 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 23 112 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 24 113 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 114 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 31 115 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 15. 116 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27

30

need protection117. The consequences in which response against terrorism causes damages on

innocent victims, is somewhat the main focus in the strategy documents118.

A full protection of citizens within the EU borders and outside cannot be guaranteed

according to the document, and the most urgent strategy is for now to develop a crisis plan

against terrorism. The Council adopted decisions in 2014, which request on member states to

consider contributions of multinational units under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and

in which could improve the European disaster response capacity119. EU’s disaster response

capability all involves the response towards citizens such as water supplies and medical

assistance120. Externally the response capability involves military interventions, in order to

fight terrorism from where it originates. However, the crisis management against terrorist

actions at national level is not yet developed, in which the idea is to have a common policy on

how to respond towards terrorism121.

Other responses towards terrorist actions involve the EU return policy, the conclusions in

which the response against returning foreign fighters is included. The already existing rules

are still on going, meaning the member states decide the rule and response against returnees

respectively. The one implementation in 2014 was to underline that a key challenge for a

more effective and successful EU return policy should be to strengthen cooperation between

the EU and third countries, in particular as regards to identification and documentation of

returnees122.

For instance, the UK Government has drafted Counterterrorism and Security Act in 2015,

which seeks to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and

then return to the UK123. The Act follows by explaining that passports and travel documents

can be seized for 14 days from twofold citizens at the borders when terrorist activities are

117 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27. 118 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 28. 119 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 26 120 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27 121 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 29 122 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27 123 The U.K. Home Office. (2015). Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015. In U.K. Home Office Introduction. Published by the U.K. Home Office. p. 3

31

suspected. If there are further suspicions the UK can cancel passports and immediately report

the suspected terrorists to international no-fly lists124.

Also, Monica den Boer, Claudia Hillebrand and Andreas Nölke inform that the Police

Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT) provides cooperation between member of anti-

terrorism units of the EU member states, including Norway and Switzerland. In order to

respond towards foreign fighters, the group exchanges information, criminal intelligence and

operational cooperation125. The conclusion reached in the analysis of cooperating within

networks in the EU, den Boer et al. further explains that the EU itself acknowledge the need

for a sound balance between effectiveness and good governance in order to further prevent

terrorism. However, the struggle lays in the still existing sovereign secret services that exist in

each member states in the union126.

124 The U.K. Home Office. (2014). Factsheet – Temporary Passport Seizure. In Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill. Published by the U.K. Home Office. p. 4 125 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 116 126 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120

32

6 Foreign fighters - aspiring and returning This chapter provides analysis of the results that previously were presented. The concepts

used below to analyse ECTS are extracted from the theoretical framework, and this in order to

concretize what may be missing in the counterterrorism strategy. 6.1 Preventing radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens In order to analyse how this exceeding development of foreign fighters originating from the

EU-countries can be prevented, the theoretical framework show that understanding terrorism

is crucial, equality improvements that has to be made, state responsibility alongside global

cooperation have to be defined and involved in the process.

6.1.1 Understanding terrorism

The ECTS tries to tackle the case of foreign fighters by understanding and building a

preventive strategy on the practical reasons for why individuals radicalise and join terrorist

groups127. First and foremost the soft measures, the non-observable ones, could contribute to

larger understandings of terrorism and why individuals choose to join terrorist organizations

can help prevent terrorism128,129. One understanding is the terrorist acts, where according to

Europol is fought for a religious cause most of the times130. Another aspect of understanding

terrorism was noticed in Marco Nilsson’s interview with Swedish Jihadists, meaning that one

of the callings was to help fellow Muslims in the war against the ones not accepting an

Islamic State or the creation of a Khalifat131. Also, the EU includes examinations such as

internet monitoring in order to understand the clash between the West and Islam132. The

understandings of religion and the impact it conveys towards individuals can be understood

through different levels of society according to the theoretical framework133.

Moreover, examples from Nilsson’s interview shows that foreign fighters from the EU see the

USA as the enemy. The clash between Islam and the West is therefore complicated to

127 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 7 128 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 5 129 Fakih, L. (2013). p. 183 130 Europol. (2015). p. 41 131 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 348-349 132 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 8 133 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p.

33

prevent, much due to the strong belief that the West are against Muslims134. These types of

arguments can according to the theoretical framework be promoted for in environments such

as prisons135. However, the only member state working towards the prison environment

presented in ECTS is the Danish Government’s conversations with foreign fighters in prisons,

as well as young citizens close to radicalisation or recruitments136. Also, the meanings of

practical reasons for why individuals choose to radicalise or to be recruited that the EU wants

to prevent, are not in accordance to the theoretical framework. Even though the non-

observable perspectives can be difficult to explore, could these be the key to understanding

foreign fighters and terrorism.

6.1.2 Equality improvements

Also, the theoretical framework continuously claims being a preventive measure is to make

essential improvements within economic and social measures at all levels of society137. In

connection to the understanding of terrorism, the EU put in programmes in different levels of

society to understand terrorism, but also to make improvements between different groups of

society. For instance, the UK leads frequent communication with the Muslim communities in

order to integrate more into society. Since the UK through communication tries to help and

support Muslim communities, the equality measures in the social aspect should be improved

and the Muslim communities should feel more involved in the EU138. The same applies to

Spain, where imams works together with pastors and rabbis in order to learn and share

experiences with other religious cultures139. The acceptance of different religions applies in

this aspect both ways, in order to prevent the thought that was expressed in the interview by

Nilsson on fighting anyone against them140. The ECTS shows an attempt to examine different

levels of society, however, the theoretical framework considers different levels of society on a

more narrow level. Equality improvements, both socially and economically, are not part of the

strategy in the sense as the theoretical framework points out being an important aspect in the

work towards preventing terrorism and foreign fighters. In order for the strategy to function

and to implement policy changes, the member states of the EU all have to consider different

134 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 349 135 Alonso, R. (2010). p. 226 136 The Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. (2011). p. 2 137 Bjørgo, T. (2013). p. 10 138 Great Britain: Home Office. (2011). p. 48 139 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 3 140 Nilsson, M. (2015). p. 348-349

34

aspects of equality improvements. State responsibility in this aspect is essential to create a

stronger strategy document on counterterrorism141.

Economic or social inequality is not an aspect in which foreign fighters in the EU necessarily

express being one of the reasons to go fight in Syria and Iraq. However, these can be

contributions for why many choose to leave the EU.

6.1.3 State responsibility and global cooperation

As already mentioned, many member states of the EU had different programmes to

investigate and to share results from with the other member states. The ENER helped

stressing the spreading of information between the member states, but maybe not efficiently

enough142. For instance, the recruitment and radicalization in prisons has been mentioned in

other countries as an issue, but nothing has been done except for Denmark’s efforts for policy

changes143. The state responsibility when it comes to new policies and contributions to the

prevention plan against terrorism, each state according to the theoretical framework has to

take their responsibility144.

On the other hand, in the EU there also has to be cooperation alongside state responsibility.

Like the theoretical framework explains, that terrorism can never be prevented unless global

cooperation against weapons and nuclear material is prevented145. Therefore the responsibility

of the state alongside the EU and internationally has the responsibility to prevent terrorism

together. The fact that the recognition of Daesh being seen as a major threat not until 2014 by

the European security, and that new preventive measures came in 2013 against radicalizations

and recruitments shows that the EU does not work as efficiently together as it should during

such times146.

141 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 3 142 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 7 143 Hellmuth, D. (2015). Countering Jihadi terrorists and radicals the French way. In Studies in conflict & terrorism. Published by Routledge. England. p. 986 144 Becker, T. (2006). P. 139 145 Allison, G. (2004). p. 141 146 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 16

35

6.2 Protecting EU citizens from terrorism

From the results of the counterterrorism strategy and the theoretical framework, the border

controls, the modern technology and state responsibility and global cooperation will be

assessed below.

6.2.1 Civil protection

According to the theoretical framework, the most important for a nation is to be able to

protect its citizens from dangers and threats147. The civil protection in the ECTS involves the

member states and third world countries that need to be aided in a crisis of terrorist act. The

protection of citizens according to the EU was to be able to reduce risks and save lives from

disasters. For the disasters that can be protected from are mostly directed at the civilians that

are in danger of terrorist attacks or similar, and the protection of citizens being lose to

radicalization or recruitments148.

The activity across borders and in today’s modern society is an issue, accordingly, in order to

protect its citizens from such disasters. The framework finds the inefficient border controls

and how it can be changed to a global dimension where the same policies are applied in order

to create a safe environment for all149. The EU tries to extend security all over Europe through

the Visa Code by airports and more150. However, foreign fighters are still able to travel

through and return into the EU, which is a sign that the protection by the borders is not as safe

as the EU strives to achieve. The global cooperation and the sharing of information is today

not as efficient as it should be within the border of the EU, most due to the fact that many of

the still existing security police forces are not sharing information amongst each other

between member states151.

6.2.2 Modern technology

Since the terrorist acts are no longer connected to one single stem within terrorist

organisations, it is today difficult to connect a foreign fighter to a certain terrorist

147 Becker, T. (2006). p. 2 148 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 27 149 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 150 The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). p. 26. 151 Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. & Nölke, A. (2008). p. 101

36

organisation152. Therefore it is essential according to the theoretical framework to protect the

internet flows and to protect people being recruited and radicalized153.

The EU does not yet consider the protection of modern technology in pretence of a terrorist

act or of a foreign fighter trying to travel through the EU border risk free. The modern

technology that the EU considers concerns the Visa Code of facial recognition or the

fingerprints recognition. This is still in the development phase, as well as building a group of

expertise on the technology levels in terrorist organisations. Since the pace of modern

technology keep evolving in terrorist organisations it is essential to preserve the same pace,

however, it seems that the EU has not yet been able to fully develop since the beginning of

such a strategy in 2011154.

6.2.3 State responsibility and global cooperation

Continuously, the border controls and its cooperation between member states was handed

over to Frontex, in order to develop surveillance and border control risk assessments155. These

assessments have however so far only been of encouragement for all member states to

consider in their own border control systems. This difficulty does, even though by good

intentions, not create a cooperative border control system for the entire Union as the

theoretical framework considers156. Both concerns of state responsibility and global

cooperation are not fulfilled due to the fact that the member states have choice whether to

implement the system Frontex suggests. The member states’ interests are still considered in

ECTS157. The international cooperation with the USA is extended, and has been developed

well. However, even though the global cooperation, there are still necessities to enhance the

exchange of information and expertise on border controls and modern technology.

Although there are no completed cooperation between member states of the EU or

internationally, there are cooperation developing between member states and USA. The

enhanced cooperation seeks to evolve the security measures first and foremost at airports, but

152 Mahncke, D. (2006). p. 17 153 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 154 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 14. 155 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10. 156 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 157 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 10.

37

since the cooperation has worked so far the exchange of information will continue to develop

in the future158.

6.2.4 Pursuing operational aspects of financing terrorism

Continuously, below will ECTS and the theoretical framework be the pillars for analysing

modern technology, horizontal exchange and global cooperation.

6.2.5 Modern technology

Continuing on the aspect of modern technology, the theoretical framework determines the

importance of finding the networks in which foreign fighters are radicalized and recruited.

Since, as previously mentioned, the modern technology preserves communications between

foreign fighters and terrorist organisations and it happens across borders without

limitations159. ECTS also considers the importance of surveillance of communications

through networks, especially to find planning of finances of terrorism and travel of materials.

By finding the financing of terrorism, the EU means can provide information about explosives

and other warfare materials160. The pursuing of modern technology in counterterrorist

strategies are important according to the theoretical framework in the sense where informal

relationships through the internet, computers and telephones keep the secrecy from those

against them161.

However, even though the Stockholm Programme was implemented, it mainly, again,

encouraged member states of the EU to solve increased transparency of finances for and of

foreign fighters162. There are no clear organisations in which every member states cooperates

with in order to increase transparency of financing, which creates issues in the strive to freeze

funds of terrorist actions and foreign fighters163. In accordance to the theoretical framework

the transparency is essential in order to control both border controls, but also all networks

used in terrorist organisations. In order to pursue foreign fighters through networks it is more

difficult to hide information and thereby being recruited and radicalised164.

158 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 20 159 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 160 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 14 161 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120 162 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 163 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 164 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58

38

6.2.6 Horizontal exchange

Furthermore, according to the theoretical framework, there has to exist a developed horizontal

exchange of information in order to fully supervise the financing and communication

networks between foreign fighters165. This formal exchange of information is accordingly

between organisations and institutions. For one, the EU implemented a EU-wide legislation

concerning money laundering and cash transfers, which is accordingly to the theoretical

framework166. Also, the exchange of information concerning PNR has been seen as the most

shared and important tool to pinpoint financing of terrorism167.

In addition it is according to the theoretical framework a necessity to exchange horizontally,

most due to the fact that terrorist organisations work the same way. Therefore, in order to

pursue such organisations in the same structure, ideological and cultural similarities between

organisations can be found, much for the reason that communication and exchange in terrorist

organisations also work horizontally168. As previously mentioned, The EU has not yet

implemented technology that is developed enough to pursue terrorist organisations. However,

a surveillance system through the European Arrest Warrant works as a network of

communication horizontally between member states169.

However, concerning the informal flows of information and propaganda there is a difficulty

of finding and pursuing counterterrorist strategies. There are mainly plans for the future in

order to implement a support programme for organisations in exchange of transparency of

information170. The theoretical framework also suggest that companies and organisations

should have a developed transparency system in order to easier find targets of foreign

fighters171. Unfortunately, as mentioned under Modern technology, these systems are not yet

fully developed in the EU for a working horizontal cooperative network to catch foreign

fighters.

165 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 49 166 Council of the European Union. (2005). p. 14 167 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 168 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 47 169 Council of the European Union. (2002). p.3. 170 Flynn, S.E. (2000). p. 58 171 Ibid.

39

6.2.7 Global cooperation

As an extension of horizontal exchange is the global cooperation in order to spread

information and to evolve strategies on transparency of finances. For instance, between

member states of the EU only Spain, Belgium and France have been involved in cooperating

for sharing information and experiences of terrorism and foreign fighters172. Even though

Europol is supposed to work for efficiency, as a collector of information and then sharing

with other member states173, it has not yet achieved to distribute the same common values and

strategies to member states in order to pursue counterterrorism and foreign fighters174.

Also, global cooperation in the sense of other countries outside of EU being involved is the

USA, Canada and Australia in order to share information under PNR175. Also, the EU have

tried to encourage member states as well as other well developed states to try and reach third-

world countries in order to extend the information through transparency of finance in

organisations and institutions there as well176. However, for this to work it is a necessity, as

mentioned earlier in this essay, that member states are not only encouraged to implement such

values or strategies177.

6.3 Responding judicially against terrorist

Lastly will the ECTS and the theoretical framework be used to analyse the military

involvements and sanctions alongside State responsibility and global cooperation in order to

respond tot terrorism and foreign fighters.

6.3.1 Military involvement/sanctions

The legislation in counterterrorism strategies is according to the theoretical framework an

essential part to respond towards foreign fighters and terrorism178. This means that there is a

necessity of other responses than military involvements. As mentioned, the EU implemented

in 2014 a disaster response document that is directed towards civilians in a foreign country

that have been exposed to a terrorist attack. This involves medical assistance alongside water

172 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 23 173 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 24 174 Hix, S. (2005). p. 400 175 The European Parliament. (April 2015). p. 2 176 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 26 177 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 28 178 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 299

40

supplies179. Legislative measures such as non-violent strategy plans are however not fully

considered in ECTS. The only thing mentioned is the documentation of returnees of foreign

fighters, such as passports and travel documents. Also, as mentioned is that information and

exchange of such documents can provide proof in order to be able to prosecute a returning

foreign fighter180. However, the still existing sovereign secret services makes this strategy

inefficient in the sense where these services do exchange the information amongst them181.

The soft form of response against terrorism and foreign fighters, that is sanctions in this case,

was somewhat criticised in the theoretical framework. The argument lays in the fact that the

violent terrorist act has already occurred182. The ECTS does not consider sanctions as a form

of response against terrorism and foreign fighters; instead the focus in the strategy is the

military interventions abroad in order to fight terrorism183. The opposite argument is thus that

governments or the EU has to show good behaviour in order to not legitimize the violence

that is performed by foreign fighters184.

6.3.2 State responsibility and global cooperation

Continuing on the same topic, the return policies and response against terrorism and foreign

fighters has been put on each member state separately, since each member state still has

separate military connections as well as legislation185. The EU has however considered the

civil protection of any military intervention in cross border warfare. The EU has also put out a

request to help in the multinational civil protection, but this is also a choice in which each

member state186. For instance, the legislation of returnees in the UK is only active in the UK,

which can create confusion as of where there is supposed to be the states responsibility to act

on responses versus the aspect of global cooperation187. According to the theoretical

framework, this can create issues in the sense where common law values can both efficiently

affect the ECTS, but also in the long-term prevent terrorist acts in the EU from for instance

foreign fighters. And the global cooperation that the EU want to develop is not yet

179 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 30 180 Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). p. 50 181 Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008). p. 120 182 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 302 183 Hocking, J. (1986). p. 299. 184 Schelling, T. (1966) p. 3 185 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27 186 Council of the European Union. (2011). p. 29 187 The U.K. Home Office. (2015). p. 3-4

41

implemented due to the different policies already exists in each member state separately on

how to respond towards terrorism and foreign fighters188.

188 Council of the European Union. (2014). p. 27

42

7 Conclusions and Future Research This ending chapter will offer the conclusions that can be drawn from this essay and present

some overall guidelines for future research. The conclusion will review the findings in the

Result and Analysis chapters and the future research will advocate further explorations of this

study and essay.

7.1 Conclusions The European Union (EU) has had the issue of citizens travelling to other countries to fight

for an ideological or religious cause. The recruitment and radicalisation of such citizens as

well as the return to Europe have however not existed in the dimension that it does today189.

The ECTS uses different approaches towards foreign fighters, whereas preventive measures

focus on radicalisation and recruitment of EU citizens. The strategy seeks to understand

foreign fighters through practical reasons, and through dividing different programmes

amongst member states. The state responsibility is an important factor to prevent foreign

fighters being recruited or radicalised. Continuous approaches towards foreign fighters

include developments of expertise on the phenomenon in order to evolve the strategy of

preventing foreign fighters. Moreover, in order to protect EU and pursuing foreign fighters

ECTS approaches networks through terrorist organisations and modern technology to

investigate recruitment and radicalisation sites as well as finding foreign fighters that aspires

from the EU. Finally the strategy considers responding of returning foreign fighters by

assigning member states and its state responsibility to judicially respond towards these

actions. Responding from the account of EU is mainly military intervention abroad.

Moreover, the reasons for foreign fighters’ rate to increase despite ECTS in accordance to the

theoretical framework are extensive measures on many aspects. For instance, understanding

terrorism is a difficult concept to comprehend, however, the ECTS lack understanding of

different levels of society concerning individuals, organisations, religion and socio-economic

inequalities. Improvements on each level can through a counterterrorism strategy be made in

cooperation between member states, the EU and internationally to fully understand the acts of

terrorism. Also, border controls between all member states in which the same principles are

shared can create safer borders as well as improved efficiency. Modern technology in the 189 Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). p. 2

43

form of networks and communication is and approach where the ECTS succeeds to evolve

programmes that find foreign fighters networks as well as other terrorist activity. However,

the strategy can be improved in the sense of transparency and sharing of information

horizontally and vertically, as well as nationally, regionally and internationally. Lastly, in

responding towards foreign fighters the ECTS mainly considers terrorism as a whole and not

specifically foreign fighters. The strategy according to the theoretical framework lack

response strategies towards returning foreign fighters, and also this is left to state

responsibility of all member states. The theoretical framework shows that ECTS include

short-term solutions rather than long-term solutions.

7.2 Future research The claims made in this essay are initiating theoretical claims in need of further presentation

and study. This could be made in several ways: for instance by going deeper in the theoretical

framework, using more theories or creating further concepts to analyse. In addition, these

concepts can further explain why the ECTS has not been successful in the case of foreign

fighters.

Thus future research can be provided with concrete strategies towards foreign fighters, since

this is a relatively new phenomenon for EU. Different strategies can be provided and be

analysed for in order to research a common pattern between counterterrorism strategies to

seek common issues between member states of the EU. The development of foreign fighters

and how to avert the merge of them aspiring and returning. Whereas this essay may have only

touched the tip of an iceberg of facts and theories around foreign fighters, it perhaps have

found some answers to why foreign fighters continue to increase in the EU.

44

8 Bibliography 8.1 Books and articles Alvesson, M. and Sköldberg, K. (2009). Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research. Published by SAGE, England. p. 4

Bakowski, P. and Puccio, L. (February 2015). ‘Foreign fighters’ – Member States’ responses

and EU action in an international context. Published by the European Parliamentary Research

Service, The European Union.

Bakowski, p. and Puccio, L. The European Parliament. (March 2016). Foreign Fighters –

Member state responses and EU action. Published by the European Parliament, Brussels.

Bjørgo, T. (2013). Strategies for preventing terrorism. Published by Palgrave Macmillan,

London.

Brück, T. (2007). The economic analysis of terrorism. Published by Routledge, England.

Comas, J. Shrivastava, P. Martin, E.C. (2015). Terrorism as formal organisation, network,

and social movement. Published by Sage, Journal of Management Inquiry.

Council of the European Union. (2005). EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Published by the

Council of the European Union, Brussels

Council of the European Union (2011). EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Published by the

Council of the European Union, Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2014). Press release, 3319th Council meeting, Justice and

Home Affairs. Published by The European Union.

Den Boer, M. Hillebrand, C, and Nölke, A. (2008) Legitimacy under Pressure: The European

Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks. In JCMS 2008 Volume 46. Number 1. pp. 101-124.

Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Oxford, England.

45

Flynn, S.E. (2000). Beyond Border Control. In Foreign Affairs. Vol.79. No 6. Published by

The Council on Foreign Relations.

Geltzer, J.A. (2009). US Counter-terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda: Signalling and the

Terrorist World view. Published by Routledge, England.

Giolia, D. (1999) Response: Practicability Paradigms and Problems in Stakeholder Theorizing. Academy of Management Review. 24 (2). p.228–32.

Hellmuth, D. (2015). Countering Jihadi terrorists and radicals the French way. In Studies in conflict & terrorism. Published by Routledge. England.

Hegghammer, T. (2013) Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western

Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. Published by American Political

Science Review, USA.

Hegghammer, T. and Wagemakers, J. (2013). The Palestine Effect: The role of Palestinians in

the transnational Jihad movement. In Welt des Islam, 53-3-4. Published by Brill Acemdemic

Publishers. The Netherlands. pp. 281-314.

Jensen, L. A., & Allen, M. N. (1996). Metasynthesis of qualitative findings. Qualitative Health Research. Published by SAGE Journals. 6(4). pp. 553–560.

Levering, B. (2002). Concept analysis as empirical method. In International Journ al of

Qualitative Methods, 1. Published by Univeristy of Alberta, Canada.

Mishler, E.G. (1990). Validation in inquiry-guided research: The role of exemplars in

narrative studies. In Harvard Education Review, 60. Published by Yale University, New

York. pp. 415-441

Monar, J. (2007). Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-

Terrorism Strategy and its Problems. In Government and Opposition.

46

Nesser, P. (2010) Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding

violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge,

England.

Nilsson, H. (2007). Judicial cooperation in Europe against Terrorism. In The European

Union and Terrorism. Edited by D. Spence. London, John Harper Publishing. p. 71-87

Ranstorp, M. (2010). Understanding violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements

in Europe. Published by Routledge, England.

Nilsson, M. Foreign fighters and the radicalization of local Jihad: Interview evidence from

Swedish Jihadists (2015).

Nesser, P. (2010) Joining jihadi terrorist cells in Europe. In Ranstorp, M. Understanding

violent radicalisation: Terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe. Published by Routledge,

England.

Orlikowski, W.J. (1993). CASE Tools as Organizational Change: Investigating Incremental

and Radical Changes in Systems Development. Published by MIS Quarterly (17:3). pp. 309-

340.

Pynting, S. and White, D. (2012). Introduction: counter-terrorism and the terrorist state. In

Pynting, S. Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence – The ’war on terror’ as terror.

Published by Routledge. England.

Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and Influence. Published by Yale University Press, New Haven

Conneticut.

Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Published by Cambridge

University, UK.

Strenz, T. (2007). A terrorist operational profile: A psycho-social paradigm and plan for their

destruction. In Hancerli, S. & Nikbay, O. Understanding and responding to the terrorism

47

phenomenon: A multi- dimensional perspective. Published by IOS Press. The Netherlands,

Amsterdam.

The European Parliament & the Council of the European Union. (2009). Regulation (EC) No

810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on

Visas. In the Official Journal of the European Union. Published by the European Union.

Article 56, paragraph 2(g).

The European Parliament. (2015). The proposed EU passenger name records (PNR) directive

– Revived in the new security context. Published the European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.

The U.K. Home Office. (2015). Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015. In U.K. Home

Office Introduction. Published by the U.K. Home Office.

The U.K. Home Office. (2014). Factsheet – Temporary Passport Seizure. In Counter-

Terrorism and Security Bill. Published by the U.K. Home Office.

The White House. (2010). National Security of the United States. Published by The White

House, USA.

Thomas, R.J. Profiles of people in power: The world’s governemnt leaders. Published by

Routledge, England

Tohmé, F., Caterina, G., Gangle, R. (2014). Abduction: A categorical characterization. In,

Journal of Applied Logic 13. p. 78-90. Published by Elsevier, online. p. 78

Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response. Published by

Taylor & Francis, England.

Wennerholm, P. & Brattberg E. & Rhinard, M. (September 2010) The EU as a counter-

terrorism actor abroad: finding opportunities, overcoming constraints. Published by The

Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

48

8.2 Internet sources

Obama, B. (September 10, 2014). Statement of the President on ISIL. Published by The White

House, Washington. Retrieved 2016-04-26 on: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1