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1 Somalia in Transition: Winning Back Mogadishuwww.force-analysis.com

ContentsExecutive Summary

Security Developments in Mogadishu

Crosshairs on Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Al Shabaab Methods in Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Force for Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Strategy of Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Eliminating the Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Enemy at the Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conflict Outside of Mogadishu

Al Shabaab Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spillover into Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dependence on Foreign Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States Operations in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Race Against the Clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Security Threats Beyond al Shabaab

The Islamic State in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An End to Piracy Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2Somalia in Transition: Winning Back Mogadishuwww.force-analysis.com

The conflict in Somalia is currently going through an important evolution. As the African Union peacekeeping forces (AMISOM) initiate their withdrawal, and plan to complete this over the next several years, the strategic context of the conflict now revolves around the transition of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces themselves, or possibly a new constellation of external actors that can capitalize on existing gains.

Incident level data shows that Somali security forces have made clear headway in the fight to secure Mogadishu. Al Shabaab attacks in the city have showed a sustained drop over the past six months, and locations of attacks have started shifting towards the outer perimeter of the city. Despite harsh criticism resulting from individual dramatic attacks by the al Shabaab militants, the government of Somalia is demonstrating it has built a foundation for further accomplishments.

The limited level of training and equipment available to most of the Somali National Armed Forces continues to be a risk, however, and Somalia continues to depend on external actors for advanced military capabilities. The transition towards a post-AMISOM era in Somalia brings opportunities to capitalize on the existing foundations, but most of all presents great risks in removing key capabilities that would leave the government unable to retain the current limited level of security both within Mogadishu and throughout Somalia.

Al Shabaab has not spent its strength, and remains a powerful actor within Somalia. As its attacks in the capital have steadily dropped, the group has shown great determination to continue its operations in the immediate vicinity of Mogadishu. In other parts of the country, the already overstretched Somali forces and African Union peacekeepers have been unable to make significant gains over the past year, and even failed to maintain their presence in specific remote areas of the country.

An increased focus on Somalia in United States military operations is putting an obvious pressure on al Shabaab, and the intense training support from the United Arab Emirates and Turkey provide a necessary boost to Somali capabilities. Somalia continues to depend on these acts of foreign support, however, and a successful transition into the next phase of the Somali conflict will only be possible through sustained or increased external involvement in Somalia.

Executive Summary


Crosshairs on Mogadishu

Though al Shabaab militants withdrew from their positions within Mogadishu over six years ago, the group continues to wage an unrelenting campaign of terrorist attacks in the city. A decade of efforts by African Union peacekeepers, as well as local security forces, has not been able to stem the almost daily occurrence of al Shabaab attacks. Over the course of the last year to date, the militants were responsible for over 330 attacks within the city limits of Mogadishu.

Despite their ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu, al Shabaab has not demonstrated a capability to once again establish a conventional foothold in the city, though the persistence of its activity casts a shadow over Mogadishu’s potential future. On a strategic level, al Shabaab is mainly focused on its own survival and the continuous attrition of Somali and foreign security forces. Just

like during the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia from 2006 until 2009, al Shabaab is realistic in its ambitions, yet maintains a position from which it could easily expand should those forces that oppose them withdraw or collapse.

The al Shabaab activity within the capital Mogadishu is best considered in the context of a campaign aimed at undermining support for the Somali political system, as well as negating success of security services in the city of Mogadishu. This motivation behind al Shabaab’s activities is also one of the

On October 14, the Somali capital of Mogadishu was struck by a devastating terrorist attack. A large truck bomb was detonated in the center of the city, killing over 500. Not only was this bombing the single most lethal attack in Somalia’s decades of civil war, but it has also shaped the narrative on security achievements in the country. The devastating effects of the attack have led to criticism of the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts in Mogadishu. Despite the fact that the attack did highlight a certain level of tactical failure, however, it does not negate the meaningful achievements that Somali security forces have accomplished over the past year. Furthermore, the misinterpretation of these achievements could itself present a risk by negating opportunities to appropriately capitalize on these initial gains.

Recent trends in the fight against al Shabaab, and particularly within Mogadishu, show clear positive signs of improvement. This improvement can be traced back to notable adjustments in security strategies both within and beyond the city of Mogadishu. The February 2017 election of President Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo has brought a renewed focus on security within the capital, even long before the October 14 bombing. Adjustments to the force structure of the Somali National Army, as well as its presence and conduct within Mogadishu, have contributed for a great part to a sustained decline of al Shabaab activity in the capital.

The achievements within Mogadishu, and especially the potential created for further achievements, are critical to the further development of security within the Somali theater. As the capital, seat of government and largest population center in the country, Mogadishu represents perhaps the most critical front in the fight against al Shabaab. The ability for the Somali government and its partners to further develop security capabilities in the capital is a necessary step towards enhancing security throughout the country. This task is, however, neither easy nor guaranteed of success.

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Chart 1Al Shabaab activity within the Mogadishu city limits

Security Developments in Mogadishu


main factors behind the surge in al Shabaab attacks within Mogadishu in the wake of the February 2017 elections in Somalia. While al Shabaab did not conduct a notable campaign to prevent or disrupt the electoral process itself, the militant organization has distinctly targeted those involved in the process following the election.

A significant portion of attacks in Mogadishu during this surge has consisted of assassinations against electoral delegates that took part in the election process. In addition to electoral delegates, al

Shabaab militants also frequently target employees of government ministries and members of the security services. While a crude and unsophisticated form of attacks, these assassinations have succeeded in generating a climate of insecurity associated with taking part in the nascent political processes of Somalia. The inability by the Somali government to guarantee the security of those that play a part in its existence severely undermines the attempts to develop a stable political instrument.

Beyond the targeting of individuals engaged in the Somali political processes, al Shabaab is perhaps better known for its more dramatic attacks. These attacks, consisting of bombings, complex attacks within the center of Mogadishu, and at times indiscriminate shelling

with mortar rounds, present a clear threat to the perception of effectiveness of the government and its security services. The October 14 bombing, due to its unprecedented scale of death and destruction, is a key example of this effect. Following the attack security services have largely been perceived as having failed at their core mission, despite the fact

that intelligence shows the attack did not strike its intended target and the fact that similar attacks have in fact occurred less frequently since significant adjustments of the security posture within Mogadishu were put in place.

These different types of attacks aimed at undermining the confidence and active support of the government institutions and security forces may not

necessarily play out in a zero-sum game where they garner support for al Shabaab itself. However, they do succeed at shaping a climate of political instability that is not supportive of driving the required persistent pragmatic developments in security procedures.

Al Shabaab Methods in Mogadishu

On a tactical level, al Shabaab attacks within Mogadishu have largely consisted of a limited set of types of attack. There have been signs that al Shabaab has at times experimented with new methods within Mogadishu, though these have not led to a significant shift in the types of operations that al Shabaab undertakes there. Al Shabaab has, for example, on several occasions over the past year employed suicide belts in its bombings, a technique it

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Chart 2Assassinations by suspected al Shabaab militants within Mogadishu

Chart 3Bombing attacks in Mogadishu over the past year

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On a strategic level, al Shabaab is mainly focused on its own survival and the continuous attrition of Somali and foreign security forces.


typically never deploys, and has conducted multiple driveby assassinations.

While assassinations make up a significant portion of al Shabaab attacks, they are not typically very complex. These attacks are mostly executed by small teams of gunmen armed with pistols, or through the deployment of UVIED (Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices). These techniques have shown

to be effective, though al Shabaab continues to test new methods to stay abreast of developments in security operations against them. The use of vehicles in driveby shootings as a form of assassinations is one example of this, and despite mixed results such attacks continue to occur occasionally. One potential reason this particular tactic has not developed into a more prominent tool is likely the emphasis by security forces on restricting the movement of motor

vehicles in their attempts to curb the use of VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices).

VBIED present one of the most powerful tools used by al Shabaab in Mogadishu, and are frequently deployed either on their own or as an element of complex attacks that involve multiple explosive devices and suicide gunmen. Al Shabaab frequently uses explosives to

Map 1Concentration of al Shabaab activity in Mogadishu from December 2016 until November 2017

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Chart 4Use of UVIED (Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices) within Mogadishu


target checkpoints or locations where politicians and security forces converge. The tempo of such attacks, as well as their success rate, has been heavily affected by the growing capabilities of Mogadishu’s security forces, however.

In addition to its focus on a set of proven methods, al Shabaab attacks also show an important geographic concentration with the city of Mogadishu. While attacks do occur throughout the city, there are several hotspots in the city that show priority in al Shabaab activity, or that have forced a concentration of attacks by design. The prominent ex-control checkpoints on the main roads leading from Mogadishu towards

Afgooye and Balcad, for example, are frequent locations of attacks. This is not only a consequence of al Shabaab’s intent to target such checkpoints, but also a marker of success by security forces as these checkpoints are intended exactly to limit penetration of the city by al Shabaab militants. Other areas within the city such as restaurants and hotels along Maka al Mukarama road, the political center of the city around the Presidential Palace known as Villa Somalia, and Bakara Market are still frequently reached by al Shabaab militants despite the effect of the ex-control checkpoints, however.

A Force for Stability

The effectiveness of security forces in the city of Mogadishu, and its checkpoints, has changed dramatically since a series of decisions by the new government that were put into action in May 2017. These changes have been the most significant adjustments in the government’s security strategy for

Map 2Change in number of attacks in Mogadishu districts between December 2016 until May 2017 and June 2017 until November 2017

The prominent checkpoints on the main roads leading from Mogadishu towards Afgooye and Balcad are frequent locations of attacks, this is a marker of success as these checkpoints are intended exactly to limit penetration of the city.


Mogadishu since the withdrawal of al Shabaab from the city in 2011. The most significant element of this adjustment has been the erection of a Mogadishu Stabilization Force, responsible specifically for securing the capital.

This initiative was pushed through at a time of elevated al Shabaab activity in the city of Mogadishu, though built heavily on already established successes in the professionalization of Somalia’s armed forces. Mogadishu itself had already benefited from the success of operations by the Gaashaan special operations forces, particularly their Alpha Group unit that raised the bar in close protection and counterterrorism operations in Somalia.

Just like the Gaashaan units, the Mogadishu Stabilization Force depends heavily on foreign assistance for the training of its members. The success of the United Arab Emirates training mission within Mogadishu, through its permanent military facility, has provided the basis for a more effective force to take over responsibility for security in Mogadishu. Less reliable or professionalized units of the Somali National Army have been removed from the capital Mogadishu, and so far the Mogadishu Stabilization Force appears to be showing great results in forcing a downward trend on al Shabaab activity within Mogadishu.

For its training, this force of course still depends for a great deal on foreign actors, though the existence of individual isolated units within the Somali National Army that demonstrate an ability to operate effectively generates further opportunities for the development of Somali capabilities. The ability to train forces to this level may receive a boost through the Turkish training program at a separate facility in Mogadishu, which has only recently become operational. In addition to the dependence on foreign training, these forces still lack advanced equipment

and certain technical capabilities. This means there is still a greater potential for added effectiveness through increased support to the mission of these particular units within the Somali National Army. Further training programs provided by foreign actors, or even providing advanced equipment to support their survivability, mobility and ability to perform checkpoint operations could further capitalize on these initial improvements in Mogadishu.

A Strategy of Disruption

Security operations against al Shabaab have not been limited to the use of static security measures such as checkpoints. Government forces have also increased the tempo of active operations against al Shabaab militants in the city. While al Shabaab attacks are physically disrupted by the checkpoints that interdict the transportation of explosive devices and VBIED’s, an increasing number of security sweeps and raids have disrupted the ability of al Shabaab militants to reside or operate within the city limits.

Following the surge of al Shabaab activity prior to the adjustment of Mogadishu’s security posture in May, security forces started conducting regular localized security operations rounding up al Shabaab suspects in particular areas of the city. Through these operations, security services not only disrupt ongoing operations by al Shabaab, but also increase their potential for intelligence collection against the militant organization.

In addition to such security sweeps within the city of Mogadishu, several operations outside of the capital have also specifically targeted al Shabaab personnel responsible for operations within the city limits. These operations have been heavily supported

Chart 5Operations against al Shabaab throughout Somalia

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Mogadishu


The effectiveness of security forces in the city of Mogadishu, and its checkpoints, has changed dramatically since a series of decisions by the new government that were put into action in May 2017.


by foreign actors through the AMISOM peacekeeping operation, as well as through air operations conducted by the United States. The combination of these operations has had a notable effect on al Shabaab’s ability to operate in Mogadishu, though it has not altogether prevented successful attacks.

Eliminating the Noise

In addition to establishing a force geared directly towards security in the capital, the Somali government also executed several important changes in May 2017 that limited the negative impact of untrained security forces. Since the al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu in 2011, Somali National Army units garrisoned within the capital have frequently engaged in infighting.

Infighting between Somali army units has typically been a consequence of a widespread lack of professionalism, but also of political allegiances within the armed forces. New training programs set up with the help of foreign actors have aimed to negate these effects, though have been limited to only a small portion of the Somali National Army. In May 2017 however, in conjunction with the transfer of responsibility for Mogadishu security to the Mogadishu Stabilization Force, the government redeployed these substandard units outside of the capital.

While initially, this decision led to a number of incidents of fighting between the Mogadishu Stabilization Force and other units of the Somali National Army that refused to give up their arms within the Mogadishu city limits, the move has eventually led to a notable decrease in infighting within the capital. Due to the effectiveness of the better trained units within the capital, the lack of disruption from unprofessional units has demonstrated that less troops do not necessarily equal less security.

In addition to the relocation of elements of the Somali National Army, the government also placed limitations on the use of private security details by its politicians. Such private security details often function as a way to maintain private militia, and their lack of training has made them prone to errant behavior. Several high level politicians and their own private security guards have been injured or killed in shootings initiated by such security details. While the governments limitation on the number of vehicles and armed security guards has not completely remedied the occurrence of errant shooting incidents, it has helped generate a space within the capital for a general improvement of the security situation.

Enemy at the Gates

While initial successes are showing within the city of Mogadishu, al Shabaab is proving particularly resilient in the areas immediately surrounding the capital. In the region stretching from the town of Balcad, through Afgooye and towards Buulo Mareer, government forces and their foreign partners have attempted to negate al Shabaab the opportunity to hold terrain. Even some of the most persistent attempts by the Somali National Army, AMISOM troops and United States special operations forces in some of these areas have not been able to permanently recover territory from al Shabaab.

The presence of al Shabaab forces in this area, and particularly their ability to exercise territorial control over population centers, contributes to the threat of al Shabaab operations within the city of Mogadishu. Security forces are, however, limited in their capabilities and have demonstrated great difficulties in interdicting the movement of al Shabaab forces

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Chart 6Force Analysis “Con�ict Intensity Indicator” for the Somali Civil War


While initial successes are showing within the city of Mogadishu, al Shabaab is proving particularly resilient in the areas immediately surrounding the capital.


outside of the main population centers of the country.

Al Shabaab fighters regularly attack even the larger garrisons of Somali National Army and AMISOM peacekeeping forces located at population centers in this area. Towns such as Afgooye and Balcad, located along the main routes leading towards Mogadishu, are typical targets for such attacks. Even though al Shabaab has been able to temporarily gain control over such locations, government forces and their allies have always been able to recover control rapidly after. Al Shabaab militants continue to be active in the surroundings of these towns, however, and retain their ability to strike against them.

The roads between these locations, and towards

Mogadishu, are also frequent locations of roadside bombings and ambushes against security forces. The Afgooye corridor, situated between the town of Afgooye and the city of Mogadishu, is one of the most active areas in Somalia when it comes to attacks on military convoys. Beyond this immediate vicinity of the capital, towards the coastal town of Merka and the town of Buulo Mareer, the capabilities of al Shabaab elements grows even further. The inability of armed forces to secure the roads in this part of Somalia not only poses a direct risk to forces traveling on those roads, but also imposes great risks on forces occupying extended positions within this area. Al Shabaab has in the past used their freedom to operate in this area to isolate contingents of Somali or African Union forces, or to strike at reinforcements during attacks against population centers.

Map 3Concentration of al Shabaab activity in the outskirts of Mogadishu from December 2016 until November 2017


The conflict in Somalia as a whole is currently going through an important transition. The key element in this transition is the expected end to the African Union Mission in Somalia known as AMISOM. While the mission as a whole is not coming to an end right away, the anticipation of this has become the dominant factor in defining the security strategy in Somalia.

The Somali civil war, since its inception in the 1980’s, has gone through many different transformative phases. Since the formation of al Shabaab as the main militant group in 2006, the conflict has already gone through two distinct phases when initially Ethiopia conducted a unilateral intervention in Somalia from 2006 until 2009 and afterwards when AMISOM became the main foreign military actor in the country.

While neither of these previous phases have managed to destroy al Shabaab, significant gains have been made in recovering territorial control and establishing governance in Somalia. Over the past several years, however, these gains have been limited as the capabilities of AMISOM and the Somali forces are already severely stretched across the country. The evolution towards a new phase in the conflict thus poses both significant risks and opportunities as a withdrawal of AMISOM forces could leave the already stretched security forces even weaker, or the introduction of new actors operating against al Shabaab and improved capabilities within the Somali National Armed Forces could provide further gains beyond what has already been achieved.

Even though al Shabaab continues to show itself resilient against the efforts of the overstretched military actors in Somalia, recent developments in light of a potential end to the AMISOM mission have brought an increased presence by external actors such as the United States and Turkey. It remains unclear how exactly the involvement of these actors will evolve, and what effect they could have towards sustainable achievements in the field of security for Somalia, but these actors may well bring capabilities to the Somali theater that negate the risks withheld in this transition.

Conflict Outside of Mogadishu

Al Shabaab Resilience

Over the past year in Somalia, al Shabaab has been able to largely retain its area of operations and territorial control. Due to the overstretched nature of the forces combating them, the militants have been able to deny any significant deterioration of their capabilities. From that position, al Shabaab has directed its attention across Somalia at eroding the staying power of foreign forces by means of inflicting sustained attrition on them.

Outside of Mogadishu, al Shabaab has focused its operations against Somali government forces and their partners on interdicting their movements and presence outside of Somalia’s major population centers. Rather than

spending its resources on major territorial offensives, the militants have mostly conducted ambushes and raids against military convoys and extended positions of security forces in rural areas of Somalia.

In certain areas, such as the immediate surroundings of the cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, al Shabaab has engaged in more aggressive operations aimed

Chart 7Al Shabaab activity across Somalia

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at controlling terrain or preventing the loss thereof, though militants have consistently surrendered terrain in the face of superior forces only to return to the areas when those forces are no longer present. This denial of combat against superior opponents is a significant aspect of al Shabaab’s strategy to retain its capabilities, and instead the group aims to outlast the commitment of foreign actors operating in Somalia.Al Shabaab’s efforts to interdict mobility and presence of military elements operating against them has successfully affected the posture of these forces, and is one of the contributing factors to recurrent discussions by regional troop contributing states on their presence in Somalia. So far, however, al Shabaab’s attacks against the Somali National Army or the AMISOM peacekeeping forces have not managed to militarily or politically collapse the

combined force operating against them.

Due to the limitations on the capabilities of the Somali National Army and AMISOM, these forces have also not been able to truly capitalize on the weaknesses of al Shabaab. As a result, the overextended security forces are unable to threaten the survival of al Shabaab, though al Shabaab itself is also in no position to force a military victory and is thus limited to weakening the resolve of its opponents as it bides

Map 4Concentration of al Shabaab activity throughout Somalia from December 2016 until November 2017

Overextended security forces are unable to threaten the survival of al Shabaab, though al Shabaab itself is also in no position to force a military victory and is thus limited to weakening the resolve of its opponents as it bides its time.


its time. This balance could be upset, however, depending on how the conflict transitions into its next phase. A weakening, or strengthening, of capabilities against al Shabaab could alter this strategic stalemate.

Spillover into Kenya

In addition to al Shabaab’s activities within Somalia itself, the group also continues to be active in the region of Kenya that borders with Somalia. During 2017, this activity has continued, though did not demonstrate any notable escalation beyond established seasonal trends. Al Shabaab was

expected to escalate its operations within Kenya to disrupt or exploit the general elections in the country, but such a dynamic did not actually materialize.Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya continue to be made

Map 5Concentration of al Shabaab activity in Kenya from December 2016 until November 2017

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Chart 8Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya compared to local average monthly rainfall


up mostly of attacks directed against security forces moving in remote areas of the Kenyan border region, and remote villages in this same area. During 2017,

attacks by al Shabaab did occur more frequently in the Lamu region of Kenya near the coast, while in the past activity has been concentrated more in the northern border regions. The reason behind this increased activity is related to the use of the Boni forest in Kenya as a base of operation for al Shabaab militants, though the activity conducted in the area has not been sustained at any notable level beyond the typical seasonal dynamics.

Attacks in Kenya typically surge during the wet season, as mobility of Kenyan security forces decreases and disruptions of soil facilitate the concealment of roadside bombs. Due to regional drought conditions this year, the main rainy season arrived late and this was visible in the general timing of the surge in attacks across the border in Kenya. Al Shabaab activity in Kenya remains limited to rural border areas, however, and even the displacement of fighters to Kenya’s Boni forest has not resulted in a significant development of a wider threat.

Dependence on Foreign Forces

The Somali National Armed Forces are unable to carry the burden of security operations in Somalia on their own. It is only through the intervention of foreign forces that al Shabaab has been pushed from the major population centers in the country, and that security operations extend as far as they do. This is not to say that there is no merit in the activities of the Somali National Army, but as a force with extremely limited capabilities it is not in a position to carry the burden of securing Somalia on its own.

The size of the Somali armed forces is estimated to be around 20.000 troops, although this number is likely inflated, and it is

currently backed by a more or less equal number of African Union peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Considering the fact that these AMISOM troops are generally better trained and equipped than the Somali military, it is unrealistic to expect the Somali military to be capable of maintaining the current level of security operations against al Shabaab without that foreign support. Even separate from the AMISOM troops deployments, the Somali military depends on foreign forces such as the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, the United States, Great Britain, and the European Union to train its own forces.

In the fields of mobility and close air support, both the Somali National Army and the African Union mission are severely lacking. Operations by the United States in Somalia bring sophisticated capabilities to the Somali conflict, though the limited scale of this activity still leaves most of the Somali and African Union forces without access to those capabilities. In the past, Uganda had announced the deployment of combat helicopters to Somalia, and a training program for Somali pilots in Turkey is meant to help establish a Somali air force, but neither of these initiatives has actually materialized. The lack of air support, and a shortage of protected military vehicles to allow mobility of forces over land, has largely reduced the forces fighting al Shabaab to a relatively static and vulnerable force, particularly in remote areas of Somalia.

As such, the capacity provided by foreign forces in Somalia is to be considered a minimal commitment required to sustain current levels of security. In order to build upon those gains already achieved, additional capabilities will be required either through additional foreign commitment or through the development of the Somali National Armed Forces.

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Chart 9Airstrikes conducted by the United States in Somalia over the past year

In order to build upon those gains already achieved, additional capabilities will be required either through additional foreign commitment or through the development of the Somali National Armed Forces.


United States Operations in Somalia

In addition to the AMISOM peacekeeping missions and a variety of training operations, the United States has also been actively involved on the ground in Somalia. This involvement in Somalia has grown over the past year, and has seen a significant uptick in activity during November 2017. The United States not only conducts airstrikes against al Shabaab, as well as the Islamic State fighters in northern Somalia to a lesser degree, but also has special operations forces in country that operate alongside African Union and Somali forces.

While the timeline of the Somali conflict is now dominated by the anticipated withdrawal of AMISOM, the United States have emerged over the past year

as a significant and capable actor within the Somali conflict theater. The United States role is perhaps more limited in scope than that of AMISOM, but its advanced capabilities have had a notable effect on the ability of al Shabaab to conduct its operations.

Throughout 2017, United States special operations forces have worked closely with Somali National Army units, and AMISOM forces, and the United States have conducted numerous airstrikes targeting key al Shabaab infrastructure and personnel throughout Somalia. Especially during November 2017, the tempo of United States operations in Somalia has soared.

Following the initial series of airstrikes during this escalation over the past month, activity by al

Map 6Concentration of United States military operations in Somalia from December 2016 until November 2017


Shabaab temporarily dropped significantly. For such operations to provide persistent results, however, a persistent pressure by means of an elevated tempo of airstrikes and raids against al Shabaab would be required. These operations of course provide a compounded effect in combination with other operations that continue to be conducted against al Shabaab by other actors.

A Race Against the Clock

The directionality of the conflict in Somalia may suggest security operations are developing in the desired manner, albeit at a relatively slow tempo, but the evolution towards a withdrawal of AMISOM has introduced a sense of urgency to security operations in Somalia. Initially, troop contributing nations had discussed a potential withdrawal of the mission at some point in 2017 or 2018, and while this timetable now seems to be off the table, the United Nations have already initiated a modest drawdown in the mandate for military forces in the AMISOM deployment. Current plans by the United Nations suggest a timetable leading towards a full withdrawal of the mission by 2020.

This timetable extends the originally discussed deadline by another two years at least, but the ambitions for what needs to be accomplished between now and then are steep. Disregarding any potential deployments of foreign forces outside of AMISOM, this would require the Somali National Army to take over the duties of approximately 22,000 African Union peacekeepers in addition to their current duties within three years. This is an ambition that appears unrealistic by these standards, though a separate train of thought leads to the ambition that by 2020, al Shabaab should be damaged to the point where the expected capacity of the Somali military at that point is able to further capitalize on those gains.

Accomplishing either of these objectives, or partially achieving either of them to the point where residual al Shabaab capabilities can be balanced by increased security capabilities of the Somali state, remains a daunting task. At the current capacity, both in terms of improving Somali capabilities and in terms of weakening al Shabaab, it is unlikely that a dramatic shift can be achieved over the following three years without additional external commitments.


Map 7Concentration of Islamic State attacks from December 2016 until November 2017

Security Threats Beyond al Shabaab

The Islamic State in Somalia

Al Shabaab is not the only extremist organization active within the borders of Somalia. A portion of al Shabaab militants have split off from the group and have been operating under the banner of the Islamic State for the past two years in the northern region of Puntland. While reference to the Islamic State, in comparison with other conflict theaters, typically suggests a significant threat to security, the Islamic State affiliate in Somalia has not proven itself particularly capable or active.

The main element of Islamic State militants in Somalia consists of several hundred fighters located in a remote area of the Bari region in Puntland. Smaller cells of Islamic State followers have operated in major cities of southern Somalia, such as Mogadishu and Belet Weyne, though these cells have been unable to sustain their activity and displayed limited capabilities on their own. The main element of Islamic State fighters in Puntland has occasionally mounted attacks in the coastal city of Bosaso, and during a limited time attempted to gain control over the remote coastal town of Qandala, but the group is incapable of presenting a strategic threat at this point.

The exact size of the main element of Islamic State fighters in Puntland is unknown at this point. Most estimates available in the open source date back at least a year and put the size of the group at around 200 fighters. Since then, however, through attrition by fighting, airstrikes, arrests, surrenders, and suicide attacks, the group has lost at least 50 of its members though likely more. There is no reliable information on recruitment by the Islamic State in Somalia over this period, but its isolation in the remote mountainous region east of Bosaso may suggest the group does not have access to meaningful recruiting grounds.

This does not mean the Islamic State in Somalia could not develop into a more significant threat over time if left unchecked, but at this point in time, the group struggles to be relevant and likely suffers from a lack of resources and capabilities. Migration of Islamic State fighters abandoning the core Islamic State battlegrounds in Syria and Iraq has at times been quoted as a potential source of growth for Islamic State contingents such as the one in Somalia, and while this is a risk that could alter the capabilities of the Islamic State in Somalia, it is unlikely to have significant appeal to foreign fighters due to its limited achievements and resources.


An End to Piracy Concerns

During 2017, fears of Somali piracy spiked again as several vessels were attacked by Somali pirates. A small oil tanker and several smaller fishing vessels were targeted by the pirates, but in the context of a more significant piracy threat these incidents were relatively insignificant. Somali pirates continue to be incapable of hijacking vessels that adhere to the best practices established in the industry, and are only able to pose a threat to vessels taking unwarranted risks.

The larger criminal networks that were behind piracy activity between 2005 and 2009 are no longer active and this has severely limited resources available to pirates. The adoption of best practices, as well as the use of armed guards, in combination with the presence of foreign naval assets and anti-piracy operations on land in Somalia have effectively dried up the financial backing for piracy activity in Somalia.

What made piracy such a significant threat between the years of 2005 and 2009, was the vast criminal industry that existed behind it. A network of financiers and providers of specific services such as information on vessels and insurance, physical spotters of vessels on shores, negotiators, and pirates themselves created a layered industry that sustained piracy as an entrepreneurial activity in Somalia. More than the introduction of best practices in the maritime industry and the presence of foreign naval forces, which caused hijackings of large vessels to be much more difficult, it was the depletion of financial resources that truly defeated piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

In order to sustain operations at sea to guarantee successful hijackings, these networks had to make investments to pay for crews, supplies and information. Over time, the duration of negotiations for individual vessels became longer, which caused piracy networks to spend more resources on maintaining crews holding those vessels and these crews were made unavailable to conduct additional hijackings. The ransoms obtained also dropped in value, causing a significant decrease in return on investment for the piracy financiers. Eventually, loss of equipment and personnel at sea, and the destruction of pirate staging areas on land, delivered a final strike to the piracy networks. Under current conditions, the potential for success and the return on investment associated with it are so low that large criminal networks no longer operate in the Gulf of Aden.

Individual groups of pirates continue occasional attempts to hijack vessels, and at times even succeed in hijacking local fishing vessel or other vessels that place themselves in risk, but even then these hijackings are barely profitable to the pirates and thus unlikely to fuel a resurgence of organized and widespread piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden. This lower level activity is unable to sustain operations at sea in the same way the larger criminal networks were, and their ability to target larger vessels is extremely limited. Piracy continues to be a concern in Somalia, but the response to the past crisis has effectively removed the required elements for sustained and sophisticated piracy activity in the area at this point in time.

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