For Printing- Civil Cases

7/27/2019 For Printing- Civil Cases

1/54


2/54

ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall

entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of

the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one

who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may

have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.

The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,

866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover

money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the

Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the

Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the

Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also

in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal.

Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of

marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphl.nt

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I

thereof:

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.

Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male

between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without

such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in

case of breach of the promise.

Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though

approved by the parent or guardian.

Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not

be affected.

Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.

Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without the

assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.

Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also

compensation for mental and moral suffering.


3/54

Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a

marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is

rejected.

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he or

she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the

corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:

The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely

decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in

England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is

this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American

States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344

Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762

Nevada 1943 p. 75

Maine 1941 pp. 140 141

New Hampshire1941 p. 223

California 1939 p. 1245

Massachusetts 1938 p. 326

Indiana 1936 p. 1009

Michigan 1935 p. 201

New York 1935Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for

breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States,

in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction.

(Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of

our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by thelower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by

her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we

hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under

the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those

following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the

"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised

Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally

guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around

thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are

supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of


4/54

first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she

"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support

of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and

shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00,

as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for

hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses

incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.

With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in

all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.

Article 32CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I. Cojuangco vs CA

[G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999]EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs . COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES

OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents .D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J . :

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts done in theperformance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad

faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for

nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision [1] of the Court

of Appeals [2] in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner

in the following manner: [3]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them, jointly andseverally the following:

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment thereof;

2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment thereof;

3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof;

11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn1


5/54

Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:

1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);

3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);

4. To pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In a Resolution [4] dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The following is the Court of Appeals undisputed narration of the facts:

Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the

sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the

races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for

trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows:

Date Place Stake Horse Racewinning 30% Due Net Amount

Winner Prize Claims Training Withheld by

Grooms PCSO

03/25/86 1st Hansuyen 200,000.00 57,000.00 143,000.00

06/08/86 2nd Stronghold 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

07/10/86 1st Kahala 200,000.00 57,300.00 142,700.00

02/01/87 1st Devil's Brew 100,000.00 30,000.00 70,000.00

03/22/87 1st Time to Explode 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

04/26/87 3rd Stormy Petril 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

05/17/87 1st Starring Role 20,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00

08/09/87 1st Star Studded 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

12/13/87 2nd Charade 250,000.00 75,000.00 174,000.00

09/18/88 1st Hair Trigger 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

TOTAL 1,450,000.00 429,300.00 1,020,700.00[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits A, dated July 3, 1986; B dated August 18, 1986; and C, dated

September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. And [herein

private respondents] consistently replied (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of

Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30, 1991, this case

was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on February 7, 1991, Presidential

Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize

winnings (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private

Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.]. [5]

As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioners counsel, refused to accept the prizesat this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent

Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of

sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was

Carrascosos unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate of

petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that petitioners winning horses were

not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the

persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. [6] It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in

solidum petitioners claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages,

attorneys fees and costs of suit.

While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of

the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no

objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn6


6/54

February 14, 1992, an Order [7] for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700. Accordingly, on May 20,

1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors: [8]

I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-

APPELLEE[S] PRIZE[S];

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OFPLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.

In reversing the trial courts finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former

PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted

that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies

was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained: [9]

xxx Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG,

the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to

obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso

had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position

and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for

neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.

The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied

to petitioners demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGGs instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGGs

subsequent advice to release petitioners winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no

objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally disposed as follows: [10]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new oneentered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.

On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence,

this petition. [11]Issues

Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:

a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes

Office (PCSO);

b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief;

c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which

was not appealed from by the respondents;

d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law. [12]

Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly. The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.First and Second Issues: Effect of PCSOs Appeal Brief

Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been

dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO and

Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against

Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs. The PCSO, through the Office of

the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: the impropriety of the award of damages

xxx. This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO

could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only, and not against the

government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have been

dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no

longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn12


7/54


8/54

Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the

appeal, as it stated at the outset that this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other

than the claims for race winning prizes. [23] The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the

aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Courts review. Consequently, what the

assailed Decision reversed and set aside was only that part of the appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of

herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial courts order

for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had never been assigned as

an error sought to be corrected.

On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so manifestedbefore the trial court [24] in answer to Petitioner Cojuangcos Motion [25] for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on

May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount ofP1,020,700 in accordance with the writ

of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992. [26] Obviously and plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it

related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to appeal.

In any event, the Court of Appeals discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a party-litigant to the

instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of

the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very ground, or at least

one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have legally done so anyway,

because the PCGGs role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial court. Well-settled is the

doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo. [27]

The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to

Respondent Carrascosos good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGGs

statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other

words, Respondent Courts view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a mere

aside that did not prejudice petitioner.Fourth Issue: Damages

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial courts finding that Respondent Carrascoso

acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moralobliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes

of the nature of fraud. [28]

We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of

Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent

Courts conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval: [29]

A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of the

Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the

extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit 1) the first prize for the March

16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld to avoid anypossible violation of your sequestration order on the matter because while he is aware of the sequestration order issued

against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof. It was for that

reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether the prizes are covered by the

order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the

shares of the trainer and the groom.

Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the payment

to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of

evidence should be understood and appreciated in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a

newly born legal creation and sequestration was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were not sure as to the

actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the said newly created office should be

exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without violating due process of law. To the mind of

their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand

E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that plaintiff is a very close political

and business associate of the former President. Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn29


9/54


10/54

prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of

petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a

sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. [38] The

withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of

his property rights without due process of law.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or

invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any

loss suffered. [39] The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. [40] The

amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken intoaccount. [41]

WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED withthe MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in

the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.Doctrine : To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts donein the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident

bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable

for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Facts :Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking to set aside CAs decision,

after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary

damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in sweepstakes races. Several of

his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of

demand for the collection of the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso

Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this

case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised private respondents that it poses no more

objection to its remittance of the prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to petitioners counsel EstelitoMendoza by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already

been brought to court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings since no writ

of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial

court further held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and

harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the CA, the petitioner moved for partial

execution pending appeal to which the private respondents posed no objection to.

CA reversed the trial courts finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the

instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascosos acts of promptly replying to demands and not objecting topartial execution negated bad faith.

Issue :W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law

Held :YES AND NO . Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral

obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest of ill will that partakes

of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that Carrascoso did

not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the

properties of the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former

President Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in

asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/119398.htm#_edn41


11/54

just been issued by President Aquino, freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos

and/or his wifetheir close friends, subordinates, business associates

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the

performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorneys fees and

expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor

under the Civil Code. The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under

Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or inany manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for

damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is

enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or

good faith in the performance of ones duties.

We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have

relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of

prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of

petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration

order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of

the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property

rights without due process of law.

Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or

invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any

loss suffered.

II. Alcuaz vs PSBA

G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA, REMEDIOS BALTAZAR,CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners,vs.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in hiscapacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents.Rosalinda L. Santos for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.Merly Basco-Olano for Intervenor Union.

Camilo Flores for Intervenor

PARAS, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with motion for preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to nullify

the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch, in violation of

petitioners' constitutional rights.

The factual background of this case is as follows:

Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City, while respondents,

are the Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon City Branch, a 'non-stock

institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman

of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice President for Admission and Registration of PSBA, Q.C.; Ruben Estrella,

Officer-in-Charge; and Ramon Agapay, Director of the Office of Student Affairs of PSBA, Q.C. and Romeo Rafer, Chief

Security of PSBA, Q.C.


12/54

As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on

certain matters which would govern their activities within the school (Rollo, p. 75). Among the agreements reached at that

time were:

On The exercise of student's democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be conducted any day as long

as they meet the following requirements:

a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. only;

b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit;

c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 p.m.

d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days before, or if onthe same day, it still be under the "first-come-first-serve served" basis in the use of facilities, volume of sound system shall

be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.

It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in the policy-

making body of the school, as this is provided by law. However, the administration will be open to suggestions and

questions, especially those regarding tuition fee increases and other policies that directly affect us.

In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the

negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and

barricades of school entrances (Rollo. p. 20; 347-348). "Subsequently dialogues proved futile." Finally, petitioners received

uniform letters from respondents dated October 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 23) giving them 3 days to explain why the school should

not take / mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the

commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on Thursday (Oct. 2), Friday (Oct. 3) and Tuesday (Oct. 7). The aforestated letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter dated October 22, 1982

Annex "E" (Rollo, P. 26).

During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and

denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. On October 28,1986 the President of the Student

Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council

Officers and student leaders. (Annex "F" Rollo, p. 30). Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the

President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school's decision regarding their enrollment (Rollo,

p. 31). Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within forty-eight (48) hours (Rollo. p. 33). All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be

forthcoming, hence this petition.

In the resolution of November 7,1986, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required

respondents to comment thereon and set the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction on November 10, 1986 (Rollo,

p. 35). In compliance therewith on November 9, 1986, respondents filed their comment and opposition to the application

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the petition for the issuance of a writ be denied

not only for lack of merit but also for being barred by res judicata (Rollo, p. 67).

Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on November 10, 1986, by the Philippine School of Business Administration,

Quezon City Faculty Union, (PSBA, QC-FU for brevity) representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to asintervenors, on the ground of commonality of issues and cause of action with that of the petitioners (Rollo, p. 36).

At the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, where counsel for all the parties appeared and argued

their causes, the Court Resolved to grant the motion for intervention and to require the intervenors to comment on the

petition and the petitioners to file a reply thereto (Rollo, p. 66, copy corrected, p. 167). On the same day respondents filed

their comment and opposition to the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp.

67-74).

On November 12, 1986, this Court resolved to issue a temporary mandatory order directing the respondents herein (a) to

re-enroll the petitioners herein and (b) to re-admit the intervenors to their former positions without prejudice to the

investigation to be conducted by the school authorities (Rollo, p. 141). Said Order was issued on November 14, 1986

(Rollo, pp. 142-143).

A supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 11,

1986 was filed by herein respondents (Rollo, p. 150), while an urgent motion to reiterate prayer for issuance of preliminary

mandatory injunction dated November 13, 1986 was filed by herein petitioners (Rollo, pp. 162-163).


13/54

Instead of complying with tile resolution of November 12, 1986 an urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by herein

respondents on November 15, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194) praying that this Court reconsider the aforesaid resolution.

On November 18, 1986 petitioners and intervenors filed a joint urgent motin to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p.

199), while respondents filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, also on the same date (Rollo, p. 205).

In the resolution of November 19,1986, respondents' motion for reconsideration and sumplemental motion for

reconsideration were denied for lack of merit, and the denial was dedlared FINAL. The urgent motion of counsel for

petitioners and intervanorts to cite respondents in contempt of court was NOTED (Rollo, p. 225).

An urgent motion for intervention and answer in intervention was filed by Nelia M. Lat, Annalisa T. Geronimo, Leonora Q.

Bueniraje, Maria L. Araas, Eduerijes Llanto, Charita, R. Chong, Marilou Garcia, Amelita R. Sia, Loida O. Ladines, Dominic P.Santos, Noly R. Chong, and Arthur R. Cacdac for themselves and on behalf of other students of the PSBA, Quezon City, who

are similarly situated, to allolw them to intervene as respondents dated November 11, 1986 (Rollo, p. 227) which was

granted by this Court in a resoulution dated December 3, 1986 (Rollo, p. 240)

On November 20, 1986, the respondents filed their compliance with the temporary mandatory order; Issued by this Court

pursuant to its resolution dated November 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 237).

On November 29, 1986, respondents filed their comment on the motion for intervention of the PSBA Quezon City Faculty

Union (Rollo, p. 252).

A consolidated reply to respondents' supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction, urgent motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by herein

in intervenors on December 2,1986 (Rollo. p. 242).

In the resolution of January 21, 1987, the petition was given due course and parties parties were required to file their

respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 266). Accordingly, respondents filed their memorandum on February 23, 1987, (Rollo, p.

269) while the intervenor Union filed its memorandum on March 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 296). Respondents filed their reply

memorandum on April 13, 1987 praying that the intervention of the intervening teachers be dismissed (Rollo, p. 328).

Respondents filed their manifestation and motion dated April 27, 1987 stating that pursuant to this court's order dated

November 12, 1986, the school authorities created a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, which

submitted a report with recommendations (Rollo, p. 335), the report reading as follows:

After due deliberation, the Committee hereby submits the following recommendation:

STUDENT-RESPONDENTSA. RENATO PALMA, BERNADETTE ANG, ROGELIO TAGANAS are hereby recommended to be EXONERATED of all charges.

B. SOPHIA ALCUAZ (up to No. 19) are hereby recommended to be HONORABLY DISMISSED from PSBA Q.C. roll of students

without prejudice to reenrollment on a case to case basis if found suitable and justified.

FACULTY-RESPONDENTS

A. To be EXONERATED of all charges JOSE C. ANTONIO, DONALLY BRINGAS, DANTE CAJUCOM, LEO LOQUELLANO SOLITA A.

CRUZ, and N TOLENTINO.

B. To be reprimanded with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely

FLORANTE BAGSIC and ATENOGENES BONDOC.

C. MR. SEVERINO CORTES, JR. is hereby recommended for non-renewal of his semester to semester appointment.D. MESSRS. ASSER (BONG) TAMAYO and RENE Q. ENCARNACION are hereby recommended for termination of their services

as faculty members.

Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for

having become moot (Rollo, p. 341). On April 30, a second urgent manifestation and motion was filed by respondent

praying that the recommendation of special Committee as implemented by its President be made effective by the

discontinuance of the summer enrollment of petitioners Anna Shiela A. Dinoso, Zeny Gudito and Ma. Shalina Pitoy upon the

refund to them of all the fees they have paid to the school (Rollo, p. 397).

An urgent motion to cite for contempt herein respondents was filed on May 5, 1987 for violating this court's temporary

mandatory order on November 12, 1986, by discharging and striking off from the roll of students petitioners Dinoso, Gudito

and Pitoy (Rollo, p. 400) while an opposition to urgent motion to cite for contempt was filed by herein respoddents on May

20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 413).

On May 20, 1987, Intervenor Union filed their Intervenor's Comment on Respondents' reply memorandum and

manifestation and motion with motion to cite respondent in contempt (Rollo, p. 417).


14/54

On June 8, 1987, petitioners filed their very urgent motion for an order to re-enroll (Rollo, p. 620) followed by an urgent

supplemental motion and Reply to opposition dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. 623).

Later on, an Opposition to "very urgent motion for order to re-enroll was filed by herein respondents on June 11, 1987

(Rollo, p. 625) while on June 15,1987, herein intervenor Union filed its manifestation and motion with urgent motion

reiterating intervenor's motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 629).

On June 16,1987 respondents filed their opposition to urgent motion to oppose petitioners' urgent motion dated June 9,

1987 (Rollo, p. 795)'. Petitioners filed their memorandum on June 17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 799).

On June 18, 1987, respondents filed their counter-comment and opposition to motion to cite respondents in contempt

(Rollo, p. 815). Subsequently, on June 25,1987, respondents filed their Reply Memorandum on the petitioners'memorandum (Rollo, p. 820.).

In the resolution of June 29, 1 987 the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll herein

petitioners was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the investigating committee and who

had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. This court further stated that the reason for the non-enrollment of

the others is that the results of the investigation conducted indicate prima facie the violation by the majority of the

petitioners of the rules and regulations of respondent school (Rollo, p. 793). The Court further resolved to require

respondent school to show cause why it should not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-

faculty members in the interim .

Respondents filed the manifestation on July 3, 1987 informing this Court that they did not refuse to reinstate the

intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in compliance with the Court's temporary

mandatory order (Rollo, p. 829). Hence, the motion for contempt should be dismissed.

The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who

have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty

members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies,

and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due notice and

hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be

competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. They claim that barring them from enrollment for the second

semester is equivalent to expulsion which cannot be valid and effective without the required MEC's approval (Rollo, pp. 12-13).

Furthermore, petitioners point out that the acts of respondents constitute a wanton and deliberate disregard of petitioners'

freedom of expression ( ibid ).

In the same manner, intervenors-teachers claim that their constitutional right to due process has been violated when they

were summarily dismissed without affording them the opportunity to be heard (Rollo, p. 301).

It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in

Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood

that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for

college teachers are for 'one semester." It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longerhas any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of

denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the

contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs.

Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 1 00 SCRA 197). The contract having been

terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said

students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts

for the parties." (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra ).

Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of

contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not

entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such

proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum

standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed

in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges

against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they


15/54

shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the

investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case (Guzman vs. National

University, 142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]).

Tested under said standards, the records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions

No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with.

It is not disputed that printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. are distributed at the beginning of each school year

to the students including petitioners. The Rules, among other things, provide:

Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed

to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by t he Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, heagrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the

School Administration.

As previously stated, in violation of aforesaid Rules and Regulations, sore students staged noisy demonstrations in the

premises of the school. For the settlement thereof, an agreement was reached providing among otliers the regulations for

the conduct of protest actions. Despite said agreement, it was alleged that petitioners, acting as the core group of a noisy

minoritv, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the

intervening teachers, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority of the students including the

intervening ones; which acts now constitute the subject of this controversy (Rollo, p. 217 ).

Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in writing why the

school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of their participation in the commission of

tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.

Respondents alleged that none of the students ever filed a reply thereto. The records show however that a letter was sent

by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students to the President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said

students are not guilty of the charges filed against them (Rollo, pp- 26-28). Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as

answer in a letter to the same President of the school, where he denied the charges against him (Rollo, p. 52). It therefore

becomes readily apparent that while the students and the teachers have been informed in writing of the charges filed

against them and they in turn filed their answers thereto, no investigating committee or official was designated by the

school authorities to hear and decide the case upon the presentation of evidence of both parties. Presumably, the schools

banking on the theory that the contracts have already expired, said procedural steps are no longer necessary.At any rate, this Court obviously to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and

the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November

12, 1986.

The investigating committee found among others that: there were concerted mass assemblies conducted on October 2, 3,

7 and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said students and teachers, and which disrupted classes. The

disruption of classes and the barricades in the school entrances constitute violations of existing MECS and PSBA rules and

regulations (Rollo, pp. 348-349). It is ironic that many of those who claim that their human rights have been violated are

the very ones who emasculate the human rights of the innocent majority.

Moreover, petitioners named in the report were found to be academically deficient (Rollo, p. 273) while the interveningteachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the school were found to have committed various acts of

misconduct (Rollo. p. 275). Accordingly, three students were recommended for exoneration from all charges, and some to

be honorably dismissed. Of the faculty members eight were recommended to be exonerated of all charges, two to be

reprimanded, one for non-renewal of his semester to semester appointment and two to be terminated (Rollo, pp. 359-360).

The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary

regulations has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. Paflo, 137 SCRA 246 [1985]; Ateneo de Manila

University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107

of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations

vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom

enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution. More specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court

as follows:

This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,

publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of

rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the


16/54


17/54

Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al . v . Philippine School of

Business Administration, et al ., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once

admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the

semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by

the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the

preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court

dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs . PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in this

case but the authority of the school regarding admission of students, save as a matter of compassionate equity when

any of the petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-enrollment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [ Rollo , p. 12-A.]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989 in this wise:

Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas S.J., and that really there must be a better way of

treating students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme Court, the Termination of Contract

at the end of the semester, that is.

But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al . vs . Philippine

School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the termination

at the end of the semester, reason for the critical comments of Joaquin G. Bernas and Doods Santos, who both do not

agree with the ruling.

Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative

defenses that "they were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on

February 22, 1988 during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the date of

the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal

permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a

great majority of students of their right to be present in their classes.

Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment withrespondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89.

Said form specifically states that:

The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory

and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or

interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini

College code of conduct and discipline.

In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which among others uniformly reads:

In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of my privileges as student of this institution, I hereby pledge/

promise under oath to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in theCollege Department or School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:

xxx xxx xxx

3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College, which I represent and see to it that I conduct myself in such a manner

that the college wig not be put to a bad light;

xxx xxx xxx

9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which tend to cause confusion or disrupt the normal appreciation

of the college.

Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65). It being a

mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or

not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the

Supreme Court rulings in the cases of Garcia vs . Faculty [Admission Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975)

and Tangonon vs . Pano, et al . (L-45157, June 27, 1985).

WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the order of

this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.


18/54


19/54

are students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-

enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by

students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them.

Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988; Rollo , pp.

1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students' rights and the school's power to discipline them, to

wit:

Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there is such denial when students

are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and peaceable assembly and/or

subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable for studentleaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.

But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . [Order of February 24, 1989; Rollo , p. 13.]

1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate .

Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights of free speech and

assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]

This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973 Constitution, as amended

[Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 81, the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para.

13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court in People v . Apurado , 7 Phil. 422,

upheld the right to speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It said:

Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:

All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal methods any of the following

objects are guilty of sedition:

xxx xxx xxx

2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public official, from freely

exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or administrative order.

But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of speech" or "the right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances" guaranteed by the express provisions of section 5 of "thePhilippine Bill."

xxx xxx xxx

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against

grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,

and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of

the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such

disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and

tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would

become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceablemanner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes

which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct

occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must

be exercise in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly

and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]

That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to

students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case of Malabanan v . Ramento , G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984,

129 SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en banc decision, declared:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the

rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in

gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v . Des Moines

Community School District , "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."


20/54

While therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so

far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]

The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass actions:

. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University. They sought and

were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982.

Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal

Science (VMAS) the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the respond floor

lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of

the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the LifeScience building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their

demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the

process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing

distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should

not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a memorandum

that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life

Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a

petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and

Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of

the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal

assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral

defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.]

The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-week suspension.

The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of the Court.

In Villar v . Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the Court reiterated

that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the school

and its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-

enrollment of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency, with the following caveat :

xxx xxx xxx4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to

determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however,

that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise

their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the

students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. [At p. 711.]

In Arreza v . Gregorio Araneta University Foundation , G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case arising from

almost the same facts as those in Malabanan , the Court rejected "the infliction of the highly- disproportionate penalty of

denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of

free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them. [At p. 98].In Guzman v . National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow

the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any

disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests that led to the

stoppage of classes.

2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School .

While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken

to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students. This was made clear by the Court

in Malabanan , when it echoed Tinker v . Des Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 514: "But conduct by the

student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially

disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the

constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."

Thus, in Malabanan , the Court said:

xxx xxx xxx


21/54

8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was

a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby,

rather than the basketball court, of the (VMAS) building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the

period allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly went

on until 5:30 p.m." Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At pp. 370-371].

But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Thus:

. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these

are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they

shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall beinformed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the

evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear

and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].

Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated in Malabanan , "[i]f the concept

of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness

intrudes." [At p. 371].

3. Circumventing Established Doctrine .

Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated not only because of

political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversy over increases in tuition fees. But the

over-eager hands of some school authorities were not effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan . Instead of

suspending or expelling student leaders who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same

stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, their

alleged misconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass actions directed against the school.

Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."

4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student .

The Court, in Alcuaz , anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized

that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,

considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and

regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,

which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester

for collegiate courses," which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on

the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.

The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a

college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on

an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before

examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for

more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentialsfor transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its

totality provides:

137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and

secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in

writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school

fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the

term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of

whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws

anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student

shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of attendance.

Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and

that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the

contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to

complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:


22/54

Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and

reasonable regulation: Provided , that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation,

the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course without

prejudice to his right to transfer.

This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982." Section 9 of

this act provides:

Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School . In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and

regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to

graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights .

Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not

admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school" [ Rollo , p. 16]. To support

this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v . The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology , G.R. No. L-

40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v . Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where

the Court emphasized the institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the

academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.

These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia , the issue was whether a female lay student has a clear legal right

to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological studies leading to a degree. In Tangonan , the issue

was whether a nursing student, who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel

her school to readmit her for enrollment.

Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that the right of an institution of

higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their

constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win be a violation of their right to equal protection [At p.

711]

6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup .In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent cases of Capitol Medical Center,

Inc . v . Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989, and Licup v . University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October

19, 1989, both decided by the First Division of the Court.

We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in the present case.

In Capitol Medical Center , the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down the school because of

problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty. The Court ruled that the students had no

clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school.

On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded procedural due process

before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated:The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they were deprived of due process of law and that

the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the contrary, what appear from the record is that the

charges against petitioners were adequately established in an appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and

partiality is not supported by the record. . . .

Moreover, Licup , far from adopting the "termination of contract" theory in Alcuaz , impliedly rejected it, to wit:

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is

also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is

not jeopardized.

True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course

they seek to pursue . However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required

academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university

authorities. (Emphasis supplied.)

7. The Instant Case .


23/54

To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting from their answer filed in

the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have incurred failing grades, to wit:

a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause the submission of Form 137 which is a pre-

requisite to his re- enrollment and to his continuing as a student of Mabini;

b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete grades in four (4) subjects as well as no

grades in two (2) subjects;

c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete grades;

d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT 1 1 to 22. He is already enrolled at Ago

Foundation;e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;

f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;

g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the incomplete grade in one (1) subject;

h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades in five

For Printing- Civil Cases

Documents

Transcript of For Printing- Civil Cases