PROVIDED TO MARl0N C.I. ON

FOR MA!UNG. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

MICAH LAMB,Petitioner,

Case No.: SC17-1397vs. L.T. No.: 16-2002-CF-00115-AXXX-MA

STATE OF FLORIDA,Respondents.

.. . "DOUBLE MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT"AND

"WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS"AND/OR

"MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT TIMELY FILED 3.850"POSTCONVICTION MOTION OF OCTOBER 4, 2004, WITH

d * NEW SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OF LAW AND FACTS'SHOWING TRIAL COUNSEL DAVID MAKOKFA WASINEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS

FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR POLICEAND STATE ATTORNEYS' MISCONDUCT OF COERCING,

THREATENING, CALLING ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ALYING MOTHERFUCKING BITCH, FOR IST APPEARANCE

COURT FOR PROBABLE CAUSE.AND IDENTIFICATIONAND ETC. UNDERMINED ALL GOVERNMENTS EVIDENCE

AS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINEREQUIRING DISCHARGE OF PETITIONER MICAH LAMB.

ANDMOTION TO ENFORCE TRANSFER ORDER FOR NEW

INTERVENING CHANGE OF LAW

COME NOW, the Petitioner Micah Lamb pro se, hereby files' this Writ of

Habeas Corpus, and/or Motion to Supplement Petitioner's timely filed 3.850

1, Plus, Appendix 1A-169A

Postconviction Motion of October 4, 2004, with new case law and facts' see, as

follows:

. "BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION"

This Honorable Court does have jurisdiction under Florida Statutes 79.01

(2017); Article V, §3(b)(4) and pursuant to Vetree v. Wainwright, 184 So. 2d 420

(Fla. 1966) ("Change of law can be filed in a 3.850 Postconviction Motion.");

Saucer v. State, 779 So. 2d 261 (FN1) (Fla. 2001) (Citing Rozier v. State, 603 So.

2d 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Ayers v. State, 708 So. 2d 318, N. [2, 3] (Fla. 5th

DCA 1992); Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991, N. [6-10] (9th Cir. 2016) ("en

banc")

"FACTS' AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE"

1.) Petitioner timely filed a Postconviction 3.850 on October 4, 2004 after the

denial of Petitioner's direct appeal mandate, Lamb v. State, 871 So. 2d 211 (Fla.

1st DCA 2004).

2.) Petitioner also filed a "Writ ofHabeas Corpus" on or about 2007, which was

denied, that trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to charge Petitioner,

3.) On or about 2013 Petitioner filed a motion on (2) two black ski masks not

matching victim/employee bank teller Mrs. Sharon Seagrooves identification as

having "floppy loose ends" when trial counsel David Makokfa "lied" and said

Bank surveillance videotapes' did not exits, was contradicted by pending (FOIA)

2

Freedom of Information Act in State Attorney's Office from 2004-2013, see,

Appendix 165A, Marrah v. State, 773 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000);

4.) On or about August 2, 2013 and August 14, 2014 State Trial Judge Adrian

G. Soud abused his discretion by barring Petitioner from filing anypro se

motions' which has manifested itself as contradictory and conflicting, when

State Trial Judge barred Petitioner from making futurepro se Motions' has

been waived by the Court when it allowed Petitioner to file a "Amended

Motion for Sheriffs to return seized $2,041.00" pursuant to Court order see,

Appendix 82A-91A, of February 14, 2014; see, Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538,

1545 (11th Cir. 1994); Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515-1528 (11th Cir. 1995);

Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 165 (8th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352,

359 (2d Cir. 1997) Cert. Denied 118 S.Ct. 1092 (1998); Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d

649, 653(7th Cir. 2000); Bramlett v. Champion, 28 Fed. Appx. 868 (10th Cir.

2001) Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2005); Marshall v. Jerrico,

100 S.Ct. 1610 (1980); Berger v. U.S., 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935); violates the 14th

Amendment of due process, that prevents' Petitioner from presenting writs' and

motions' ofmerit in the future, such as these proceedings' should not be applied

because ofbeing a catch-22 situation or tantamount to "obstruction of justice," see,

D.L. v. State, 138 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ("Motion for Judgment of

Dismissal due to Officers conflicting (Trial Judge Adrian G. Soud)testimony);

3

Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S.Ct. 1610 (1980) Should be granted by reviewing court,

then proceed further with filed instant initial petition; because State and Trial Court

have no records; files; or motions' to refute Petitioner's relief that no "forfeiture

notice, "or" forfeiture hearing was given to petitioner, see, U.S. v. Toshiba Color

TV, 213 F.3d 147, N. [8].(3d Cir. 2000)("Remanded forfeiture hearing void");

William v. State, 35 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)("Motion to recover property

seeking return ofproperty including $100.64 at time ofhis arrest, and reversed.for

Defendant"); In Re Forfeiture of $6,003.00, 505 So. 2d 668, N. [4, 5] (Fla. 2003)

("State must give a forfeiture notice 45-days' after initial seizure") cannot be

refuted, see, Dupart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597, N. [1, 3] (6th Cir. 1973); Zappulla v.

New York, 391 F.3d 462, 474 (2nd Cir. 2004) Cert. Denied 126 S.Ct. 472 (2005)

("To the contrary notwithstanding the States retrospective assurances', this was not

a slam dunk, prosecutors where the evidence weighed toward conviction. Quite the

opposite, the prosecutors theory was marred with discrepancies, inconsistencies,

unreliable, and conflicting testimony, shady forensic evidence, and logical gaps

("e.g. the lack of a motive, and inconsistent time line"); Bennett v. State, 904 So.

2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Thomas v. State, 707 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA

1997); when Petitioner has not received a denial order, from the 4th Judicial

Circuit Court, see, Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001)

Cert. Denied 122 S.Ct. 1442 (2000) ("Vacating dismissal remand where equitable

4

tolling was require prisoner acted diligently when he received notice of State

Courts final disposition in his case"); Knight v. Schofield,.292 F.3d 709-10 (11th

Cir. 2002) ("Prisoner who was assured by Georgiä Supreme Court Clerk...that he

would be notified as soon as a decision was made but in fact was not informed of

ruling until prisoner made further inquires because Clerk inadvertently entered and

sent notice of the decision to the wrong person is entitled to equitable tolling

until...the day he received notice of the fmal denial of the Georgia Supreme

-Court"); Gölden v. Oliver, 264 F.Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("4 Month delay

equitable tolling required"); and/ or Gupton v. Village and Saw, 656 So. 2d 475, N.

[4] (Flac1995)("Under this rule, a party cannot successfully complain about an

error for which he or she is responsible or of ruling that he or she has invited the

trial court to make. See, e.g., Held v. Held, 617 So. 2d 358, 359-60 (Fla. 4th DCA

1993) Behar v. Southwest Banks Trust Co., 374 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 3d DCA

1979) Cert. Denied 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1980) Public Heath Trust Of Dade County

v. O'Neal, 348 So. 2d 37.7, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), there for injunction does not

apply to Petitiöner, see, Mem'l Health Sys. v. Halifax Hospice, 689 So. 2d 373,

375-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Trams Health MGMT. v. Nunzilata, 159 So. 3d 850

(Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

5.) Petitioner was illegally sentence in Duval, County, Florida in the Fourth

Judicial Circuit Cöurt in Jacksonville, Florida, on Armed Robbery of Educational

5

Community Credit Union ofDecember.7, 2001, Attempted Murder First-degree

Murder, and Shooting and throwing deadly missiles' using an.AK-47 assault rifle

. I itiä eiñ ö jiii liiál on 3d mendell iminal lúformation see

Appendix 17418A 108A, 109A, with no Florida Statute jury instruction 777.011

(2003) or §2, aiding and abetting, see, Appendix 2A, 6A, but Warrant of

Commitment to State ofFlorida prison falsely states second amended

information/indictment, see Appendix 19A

7.) Petitioner filed upon being convicted (April 2003) in a tiinely Postconviction

3.850 on October 4; 2004, with a total of (15) fifteen trail counseP ineffective

assistance of counsel grounds,' upon hearing motion trial Judge Lance Day issued

a show cause order on the State ofFlorida. Trial Judge ordered Petitioner to have

an evidentiary hearing, which.a final decision was made on, or about March 14,

2007, see, 3.850 Postconviction Record/Exhibits, filed see, Appendix 55A-58A.

8.) Petitioner asserts that he is factually innocent due to not being able to be at .

"crime scene" with his (4) four door Lumina, contrary to Affidavit/Lead of

Detective R. P. Crews probable cause affidavit see, Appendix 81H, ("Tire tracks

made by Lumina were also located and preserved'') but see, (FDLE) Florida

Department of Law Enforcement exonerates Defendant, by saying tires' are not the

same as suspects' at crime scene, Defendants Lumina should be returned with

additional suspect tires,") see, Appendix 12A, see, Zappúlla v. New York, 391

6

F.3d 462, 474 (2d Cir. 2004) Cert. Denied 126 S.Ct. 472 (2005) ("...this was not a

slam dunk, Prosecutors' where the evidence weighed toward conviction. Quite the

opposite, the Prosecutors' theory was marred with<liscrepancies, inconsistencies,

unreliable, and conflicting evidence, and logical gap's ("e.g. the lack of a motive,

and incotisistent time line") see, also, Terranova v. State, 764 So. 2d 612, (FN3)

(Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("...none of the finger prints recovered matched Terranova

hor did the tire tracks matched Terranova rental car, judgment of acquittal

granted");

9.) Even trial counsel David Makokfa in his letter to Petitioner at pre-trial

detention of January 29, 2003, see, Appendix 99A-104A, that Petitioner had no

motive to commit any crimes' was also said in Jury Trial, see, Appendix 110A-

114A. Creates,' Judicial estoppel, and stops' all parties' from changing their

positions to Petitioners' injury, see, Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 99 F.2d 9, 13

(5th Cir. 1938) Cert. Denied 59 S.Ct. 362 (1939) ("the general rule is that one may

not to the prejudice of the other deny any position taken in a prior judicial

proceeding between the same parties or their privies involving the same subject

matter if successfully maintained"); Scarano v. Central R. Co. ofN.J., 203 F.2d

510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953) ("There we stated that a plaintiffwho had obtained relief

from an adversary by asserting and offering proof to support one position, may not

be heard later in the same court to contradict himself in an effort to establish

7

against the same adversary a second claim inconsistent with his earlier

contention") see, also, New Hampshire v. Maine, 121 S.Ct. 1808 (2001) puts this

Court in the position to discharge Petitioner, under Florida Statutes 79.01.(2017).

10.) The totality of the circumstances' requires this untimely or successive writ

of habes corpus, 79.01 (2017) merits to be adjudicated on by either the First DCA,

or 4th Judicial Circuit Court, Duval County; anything less by the "Motion to

enforce the transfer order" will result in a "miscarriage of injustice," see, Trapp

v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976, 981 (8th Cir. 1981) Cert. Denied 55

S.Ct. 112 (1934); Pettway v. State, 776 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 2000); Havard v.

Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999); Washington v. State, 134.So. 3d 452 (Fla.

2014); Rogers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 390 So. 2d 138

(Fla. 1981); Smith v. Moore, Lexis 2804 (Fla. 2002); Clark v. McNeil, Lexis

141652 (11th Cir. 2010)("Citing Barragan v. State, 957 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2007); U.S. v. Brunner, 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952)("Remand to consider

entire transcript").

11.) Petitioner made a complaint to the Judicial Qualifications Commission of

the State ofFlorida, Case No.: 17-291; Dearing, on State Trail Judge Peter Dearing

for convicting Petitioner of a non-existent crime of Petitioner aiding and abetting

himself, filed on or about June 6, 2017, see Appendix 98A, see as follow:

8

GROUND #7

Writ Of Habeas Corpus,.And/Or

Motion To Supplement Timely.Filed 3.850 Postconviction Motion OfOctölfer 4, 2004, With New Change Of Law And Facts' Showing .Trial Counsel David Makokfa Was Ineffective Assistance Of CounselFor His Failure To File A "Motion To Dismiss" For Police And StateAttorneys' Misconduct Of Coercing, Threatening, Calling AllegedEyewitness A Lying Mother-Fucking Bitch, For 1st AppearanceCourt For Probable Cause, And Identification And Etc., UnderminedAll Governments Evidence As Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree DoctrineRequiring Discharge Of Petitioner Micah Lamb.

Prejudice and cause to Petitioner preseñts extraordinary circumstances,'

beyond control ofPetitioner Micah Lamb, who is factually innoceñt, ofArmed

Robbery of Educational Community Credit Union on December 7, 2001,

Attempted murder, shooting and throwing deadly missiles' using a AK-47 assault

rifle, Bank of America armed robbery of September 17, 2001, (State failed to

prosecute); carrying a concealed firearm ofDecember 21, 2001, (State failed to

prosecute) has made it ineffective/impossible to obtain collateral review, justifies

this courts intervention, due to the futility ofPetitioner having no viable avenues'

for redress of the instant violations' of the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 14th U.S.

Constitutional violations, and Florida Constitution, to a procedure of fairness.

No State or Federal Court has not conclusively refuted with records', files',

or Motions that petitioner is not entitle to relief, see Dupart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597,

N. [3] (6th Cir. 1973); Thomas v. State, 707 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);

9

Corp v. State, 698 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Bennet v. State 904 So. 2d

. 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Clisby v. Jones 960 F.2d 925,.938, N. 17 (11th Cir.

1993); Fox V. Maloney 515 F.3d 1, 3 N. 1 (1st Cir. 2008), have not been followed

in the State ofFlorida Courts on the following ground:

That trial counsel David Makokfa was ineffective assistance of counsel for

his failure to file a "Motion to Dismiss" where alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey

was coerced, threatened, and.subjected to abusive language of being called a

"Lying Motherfucking Bitch" by the Jacksonville Florida Police and State

Attorney's Office, is a bad faith egregious misconduct that was knowingly used as

false manufactured identification and probable cause utilizéd as the primary

establishment of the Tainted Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree doctrine exploited by the

instant illegality, substantiated by newly discovered fact and.law, and change of

law requiring discharge ofPetitioner, see Santos v. Thomas 830 F.3d 987, 991, N.

[6, 7, 8, 9, 10] (9th Cir. July 28, 2016). ("Evidence that witness confessions which

implicated accused in (Petitioner Micah Lamb) kidnapping were obtained through

torture and coercion constituted explanatory evidence that was generally

admissible, discharged Petitioner") Id. 991 ("The Supreme Court has described the

extradition hearing to determine probable cause as Akin to a grand jury

investigation or a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

5.1, see, Charlton v. Kelly, 33 S.Ct. 945 (1913); Benson v. McMahon, 8 S.Ct. 1240

10

(1888); ("FJC Manual at 10 as the First Circuit described the process:") See, also,

Rozier v. State, 693, So. 2d 120 N. [2] (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ("Tonjia swore she was

terrórized¹ into lying that Rozier killed Mary Baker. At the time, she made

statement, the man who was terrorizing her had admitted to her, he killed Baker;

further. Rozier, Defendant filed a motion to supplement a motion for

postconviction reliefwith the affidavit of a witness who alleged that she falsely

incriminated petitioner before his murder trial and that sheha£offered without

success to testify at Petitioner's trial that he was innocent. The trial court

denied the motion; Rozier N. [2] for the question of timeliness out Supreme Court

has recently start referring to amended rule 3.850 motions that the (2) two year

limitation does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely filed

1st motion for post conviction relief, Brown v. State, 596 So. 2d 1026 (Fla.

1992); Lemus v. State, 585 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

The above violations' made trial counsel David Makokfa ineffective/inept

assistance of counsel for his failure to file a "Motion to Dismiss" when concrete

evidence before County Court Judge Eleni Elia Derke, and State Attorney John G.

Kalinowski, existed see, Appendix 158A. Police and State utilized their illegal

pecuniary gain to false imprison and illegally detained petitioner. Resorts' from the

' "Oxford pocket American Thesaurus of current English of 2002 by Christine aLinderg, page 752, Terrorize = Terrorize the hostages strike terror in/into, terrify,frighten to death, scare stiff, petrify, horrify, 2. Terrorize them into leaving theirhomes coerce, browbeat, bully, intimidate, menace, threaten, inf. Bull doze."

11

face of the record, see, Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d 976 (8th Cir.

1934) Cert. Denied 55 S.Ct. 112 (1934) ("Miscarriage ofJustice occurred");

Figueroa v. State, 84 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Sun Oil Co. v.

Burford, 1.30 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1942) ("Motion to Recall mandate to prevent

injustices'"); see, also, Kosak v. U.S., 54 F.2d 72, (3d Cir. 1931) ("Recall mandate

granted"); Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998); Ayers v. State, 708 So.

2d 318 N. [2, 3] (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("A motion for postconviction relief based

on a significant change in the law must be filed within (2) two years' of the date

the facts' became known or the change was announced, Adams v. State, 543 So.

2d 1244, 1246-1247 (Fla. 1989); Massey v. State, 660 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA

1995); U.S. v. Tarricone, 21 F.3d 424, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1993)("Remandihg a

prosecutorial misconduct claim for an evidentiary hearing to address questions' of

the government intent and knowledge; IAC, Claim"); Tannehill v. Fitzharris 451

F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Jannott, 501 F.Supp. 1182 (P.A. 1980); U.S. v.

Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, N. [1, 4] (2d Cir. 1976) ("The requirement of due

process in obtaining a conviction extends to the pre-trial conduct of law

enforcement authories'") see, also, U.S. v. Jannott, 501 F.Supp. 1182 (P.A. 1980)

("Dismissing indictment on ground that government overreaching violates due

process"); which would shock the conscience of the Court, and make trial counsel

David Makokfa ineffective assistance of counsel, see, U.S. v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663

12

(8th Cir. 1976); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); Tejeda v.

Dubois, 143 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1998)-("Police fabricate evidence"); Jones v.

Kentucky, 97 F.2d.335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938); Berger v. U.S., 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935);

Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2001) Cert. Denied 122 S.Ct. 1358

(2002); Delprete v. Thompson, 10 F.Supp. 2d 907, N. [1, 2] (Ill. 2014); when he .

failed to file a "Motion to Dismiss, all charges, see, U.S. v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585

(3d Cir. 1980); Lambert v. State, 84 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Cunningham

v. State, 799 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Rogers v. State, 788 So. 2d 331 (Fla.

1st DCA 2001); Byrd v. State, 754 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

It's evident and clear that the l ith Circuit Court of Appeal has departed

from the essential principles' of the United States Supreme Court laws', that a

State Judge Peter Dearing must hold a voluntariness hearing, which is absent

from the State and Federal, records' or files' that above and below alleged

witnesses' Betty McDuffey Lead Robbery Detective/Affiant R. P. Crews and

robbery Sgt. John Rutherford have not testified at any "voluntariness hearing"

before any State or Federal Judge, to weigh all factors' and circumstances', when

all witnesses sworn depositions' point to coercion and threats' being administered

under oath, see, Appendix 39A-51A, 42A, 43A, 42A Lines 30-34;

The exculpatory/exonerating aspects would prove government lacked 4th

Amendment probable cause to execute any arrests', warrants', and search

13

warrants' for Petitioner's 5617 Tempest Street House, see Appendix 39A, 54A,

which Police seized expensive firearms: One AK-47 Assault Rifle, cost's $900.00;

AR-15 Assault Rifle with a scope, cost's $1,700.00; AR-10 Assault Rifle, cost's

$2,700.00; Bolt-action 30-06 with scope, cost's $700.00; and $22,000.00 from

Petitioner's, "Star Floor professional grade safe," see, Appendix 46A, 51A, 52A.

The breakdown of the evidence to the jury will result from being derived

from tainted inflamed evidence, and also being planted or doctored evidence

placed on Petitioner, in violation of all these Federal law cases' see, Smith v.

Oakland, 538 F.Supp. 2d 1217, 1233-40 (Cal. 2009) Aff'd 379 Fed. Appx. 647

(9th Cir. 2010); Nichlos v. Kleintools, 949 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1991); Vargas

v. Pelty, 901 F.Supp. 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Quantum Communications Corp. v.

Star Board Casting Inc., 473 F.Suup. 2d 1249 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Quela v. Pay Co-

General American Credit Inc. and Osl, Inc., Lexis 6932 (7th Cir. 2000); Rochirr v.

California, 72 S.Ct. 2052 (1952); U.S. v. Karake, 443 F.Supp. 2d 8, 86-94 (D.C.

Cir. 2009); Collzallelo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1991) Cert. Denied

112 S.Ct. 870 (1992); Bell v. City of Milwaukie, 536 F.Supp. 462 (Wis. 1982)

Aff'd 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1983) will shock the conscience of this Court,

which resolve lies' with the Supreme Court justices' or Florida Judges' to

personally review the face of this complaint, that will show the chronological

steps' ofhow the State of Florida used the instant illegality to build a (Criminal

14

case with the sentences' of 2 natural life) against Petitioner contrary to Federal

Law and with help ofPetitioner's trial Counsel David Makokfa who did all the

sworn depositions' of the witnesses' and failed to recognize the instant defense that

State of Florida fabricated this whole case against Petitioner, see, Heard v.

Addison, 728 F.3d 470, N. [10] (10th Cir. 2013) ("Counsel was ineffective for

failure to recognize defense"); Link v. U.S., 352 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1965)

Cert. Denied 86 S.Ct. 906 (1966)("A conviction that is tainted by knowing use of

false evidence to persuade of guilt is one as to which there has been a violation of

due process. Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959). The (same)

is true as to a situation of false evidence which, though not solicited, has been

knowingly allowed to go uncorrected after it appears and the taint has been held to

extend also to situations of [use of] or failure to correct false testimony by a

witness in elements having relation only to his credibility but appearing to be of

capacity to affect the reliability ofhis substantive testimony"); Burwell v. Teets,

245 F.2d 154, 163 (9th Cir. 1957)("No due process violations in appellants

interrogation or in the pre-trail and trial process, citing Mooney v. Holohan, 55

S.Ct. 340 (1935); Urban v. New Jersey, 225 F.Supp. 798, 805 (3d Cir. 1964)("The

test of whether the hearing constituted a denial of due process is whether it caused

a denial of that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept ofjustice

Crooker v. California, 78 S.Ct. 1287 (1958); Lisenda v. People of the State of

15

California, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1942); Moore v. South Carolina, 347 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.

1965); Chaney v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1960) Cert. Denied 81 S.Ct.

379 (1961)("Mere errors or mistake of law in conduct of a trial or hearing may not

be reviewed by a Federal Court on a State prisoners petition for Habeas Corpus

unless they constitute such a denial of fundamental fairness").

The l ith Circuit Court Appeals has erred in there factual findings' by stating

Petitioner did not have standing to contest alleged witness Betty McDuffey's

exculpatory statements' to Police for probable cause and identification, see, James

v. Harrington, 829 F.3d 1128, N. [7] (9th Cir. 2016)("But we can conclude the

decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and

convictions evidence Maxwell v. ROE, 628 F.3d 486, 503 (9th Cir. 2010) and

where the State Court makes factual findings under misapphension as to the correct

legal standard the resulting factual determination will be unreasonable and no

presumption of correctness can attach to it Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001, see, also

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003); Flower v. Butt, 829 F.3d 788 (7th

Cir. 2016); Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, N. [7] (9th Cir. 2016)(en banc)("But

the Supreme Court has made clear that the aim of the requirement of due process is

not to exclude presumptively false evidence[but to prevent fundamental

unfairness in the use] of evidence whether true or false, Lisneda v. California,

314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1942) requires' the State and Federal Judges' to

16

extensively review attached Postconviction 3.850, and §2254 records' which the

merits' will be wrote out too brief this court on word-for-word verbatim, see, as

follows:

(A). It is argued, and noted that the above violations' of the law were unknown

and could not have been litigated earlier in any motions' or pleadings'. The.

problem expands thru the whole entire State of Florida, and started at the being of

Petitioner's incarceration in (April 2003) at Petitioner's first prison Calhoun

Correctional Institution which the law library was the size of (3) three prison cells

at (8 x 10). The institution had only paper copies of State Cases' (So. 2d's) no

copies ofLegal U.S. Supreme Court cases', F.2d's, F.3d's, F.Supp. 2d's, F.Supp.,

So. Fla., 3d's, F.R.D.'s, and Lexis cases' did not exist, because the institution had

(2) two antique law computers' which screens' would only light up half the way,

and you couldn't view any legal opinions', caused Petitioner in many ways' to

involuntarily forfeit his U.S. Constitutional legal arguments' in State and Federal

Courts'. Calhoun Institution Law Librarian Mr. Dan Nolan would always e-mail

DOC Headquarters and tell them that a problem existed and Law computers' did

not work for inmates to do legal research from (2003-2008) Petitioner's Direct

Appeal mandate was (2004) and State postconviction 3.850 evidentiary hearing

was denied on (February 2007) would show how Petitioner was lulled into

inaction of not gaining legal knowledge of the Federal Jurisprudence Rules', and

17

procedures' laws'. When Petitioner got to his second prison institution at Marion

Correctional prison/institution law librarian Miss Stephanie Stover, see, Appendix

128A: ("Florida statewide prison/institutions' receives' (5) five new Dell law

computer with (Westlaw firm, for publishing law cases' in April 2008")) shows

how Petitioner got in this mess which seriously injured Petitioner so badly by late

filings', and from unavailability of Federal Law Books', and search engine.

Moreover, it is further noted Dell Computers' legal book inventory reach's

only from 544 F.2d-734 F.3d, 461 F.Supp.-942 F.Supp. 2d tliat's contrary to

Bound v. Smith, 97 S.Ct. 1491 N. [1] (1971)("we held this violated the principle

that State and it's Officers' may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to

a Federal Court for a Writ ofHabeas Corpus, Cochran v. Kansas, 62 S.Ct. 1068

N.8 (1942)("if a lawyer must perform such preliminary research it is 430 U.S.

826 vital for a pro se (Petitioner Micah Lamb) prisoner (FN 4) indeed despite the

less stringent standards by which a pro se pleading is judged, Haines v. Kerner, 92

S.Ct. 594 (1972); Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 2008); Hooks v.

Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163, N. [1, 10] (Jax. Fla. 1972) is a breach of fiduciary

duties' ofprison officials' and Attorney General Office over operations' ofprison

law libraries' see, Argurs Research v. Argurs Media, 562 F.Supp. 2d 260, 281

(Conn. 2006); Creative Montessori Jearmy Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC., 662 F.3d

913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011)("when class Counsel have demonstrated a lack of

18

integrity, a Court can have no confidence that they will act as conscientious

fiduciaries of the class, Wagner v. Lehaman Bros. Kukn, 642 F.Supp. 643, 661-662

(Ill. 1986); Stavrides v. Mellon Bank and Trust, 60 F.R.D. 643, 637 (W.D. LA.

1973); Kirkpatrich v. J.A. Bradford, 822 F.2d 718, 726 (11th Cir. 1987)");

Marshall v. Jerrico, 100 S.Ct. 1610 (1980); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th

Cir. 1985)("State interfered with Petitioner's case"); U.S. v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381,

388 (5th Cir. 1981) Cert. Denied 102 S.Ct. 2908 (1982)("false assumptions'

prohibited in sentencing process").

But, on March 29, 2016, new law librarian Mr. J. Barton, see, Appendix

130A: ("Florida DOC got new publishing company Lexis Nexus plus new and

approved windows/search engine for §2254/2244 Federal Habeas Corpus") shows'

the respondents' took over (14) fourteen years' to fix the problem of giving all

Federal law books' F., F.2d, F.3d, Fed., F.Supp., F.Supp. 2d, F.Supp. 3d, S.Ct., So.

Fla., F.R.D., B.R., on Lexis Nexus, which when the reviewing court's assess the

instant Subsection (A) and (B) of this motion/writ of habeas corpus, the Court

would separately conclude that Petitioner has been denied again due process of the

law, a 14th U.S. guaranteed Constitutional Amendment, which has been abridged,

and undermined the proceedings' and tainted the alleged evidence used to create

the alleged commitment order, see, Appendix 19A, see, Ambrose v. Booker, 684

F.3d 638, 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2012) Cert. Denied 133 S.Ct. 993 (2013)("computer

19

glitch unintentional caused the systematic-underrepresentation ofAfrican-

American in-Jury pool was not reasonable known or available to counsel and

Petitioner could not have known the minorities were underrepresented in jury pool

looking at the venire pool"); Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504, 508 (7th Cir.

2007)("remanding for evidentiary hearing regarding whether inadequate law

library provided basis for statutory or equitable tolling"); Stephen v. U.S., 519 Fed.

Appx. 682 (11th Cir. 2013)("that is a prisoner may demonstrate actual injury

establishing that prison officials actions actually deterred his pursuit of a non-

frivolous postconviction claim or civil rights action Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d

1317, 1323-33 (11th Cir. 2008); Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2000)("remanding with instructions for district court to develop facts

concerning whether (AEDPA) material were unavailable in prison law library and

determine illegal significance of such a finding"); Sosa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225,

1235 (9th Cir. 2013); Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009); Fahy v.

Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244, 245 (3d Cir. 2000) Cert. Denied 122 S.Ct. 323 (2001);

Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000)("equitable tolling

appropriate for example in the case of actual innocence or a timely but defective

filing"); Chlorine ofDel. v. Sinibald, 821 F.Supp. 231, N. [25] (Del. 1992) resulted

in DOC Officials' and Respondents fraudulently concealing all Federal law

books', requires the Courts' to entertain another motion, on the merits', due to the

20

State ofFlorida has acted with, Discriminatory intentional purposes', when the

above facts' and totality of circumstances' shows' that the facts' and legal

opinions' from the Federal courts' upon which the claims' are based could not

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, therefore any Court that

rules/adjudicates' this instant motion/writ of habeas corpus is reminded, Petitioner

has meet the Successive, Procedural Default, law of the case doctrine exceptions'

that corrects a "Manifest Injustice," from occurring, see, Footman v. Sigletary,

978 F 2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1992); Tower v. Phillps, 979 F.2d 807 (11th Cir. 1992);

Minnich v. State, 36 Florida L.Weekly D 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Haager v.

State, 36 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); ("3.800"); Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640

(Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Stephen v. State, 974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008);

Brumit v. State, 971 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Zeno v. State, 910 So. 2d

394 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Slappey v. State, 584 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991);

Stang v. State, 24.So. 3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Foster v. State, 518 So. 2d 901

(Fla. 1987) Cert. Denied 108 S.Ct. 2914 (1988) which would achieve substantial

justice, see, In The Interest OfM.S., 455 So. 2d 557, 559 (FN 5) (Fla. 4th DCA

1984); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 2000); Herndon v. State, 796 So.

2d 534 (Fla. 2001); Frizzell v. State, 238 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1970); Exparte Bosso, 41

So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949); Sullivan v. State Ex. Rel. McCoy, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.

1951): Raines v. State, 14 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) gives' this Court

21

authority and jurisdiction to use the face of the record enclosed, to discharge

Petitioner, under Florida Statute 79.01(2017), see, State Ex. Rel. Scaldeferri v.

Sandstorm, 285 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1973)("holding that Circuit.Court may entertain

Habeas Corpus proceeding and discharge.Petitioner held under an illegal or void2

order issued by a court over which there is not appellate jurisdiction but may not

review the legal sufficiency of the order"); Alachua Reg'l Juvenile Det. Ctr. v.

T.O., 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996).

(B). Petitioner was arrested at 1645 or 4:45 P.M. for "carrying a concealed

firearm," and being a suspect in a Bank Robbery see, Appendix 81A-82A when the

seizure of the 380 Tarsus handgun found under the rear-department of the

passenger seat is not a violation of Florida Statutes 790.01 see, Alexander v. State,

477 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1985)("Petitioner's pouch a zipped gun case, and therefore his

carrying of it in his automobile was not a violation of the statute") Petitioner had

his firearm in (2) plastic gags' under the seat.

Petitioner was not taken to the County Jail, but was taken to the Police

Headquarters; were at 4:00 P.M. Police had snatched the alleged eyewitness out of

Petitioner's truck earlier, but she Betty McDuffey inclupatory statements' were

made at 8:30 and 10:45 P.M. see, Appendix 64A-67A which State County Judge

2 "Petitioner filed informal and formal grievances' showing Department ofCorrections Florida, Respondents', that Petitioner has not been duly charged,convicted and sentenced, using same Exhibits, they relied they could not correctcommitment order, only thru a Court Order."

22

Eleni Elia Derke, see, Appendix 158A at 1st Fist Appearance Court without a

"Voluntariness Hearing," Davis v. North Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962),

did not ask the%itness (in the presence ofMicah Lamb) was she not coerced or

threatened for her statements'.

3.) The inculpatory statement's of alleged eyewitness started on December 21,

2001, at 8:30 see, Appendix 64A ("Betty McDuffey requested that indicate my

statements' to Det. Wright. It was my decision to do this I was not pressured in

any way for the statement"); Fischer v. U.S., 382 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1967);

Williams v. U.S., 382 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1967).

See, Appendix 70A ("Alleged witness Betty McDuffey sworn deposition

testimony)("so they Detectives' were talking to me and they went showirig me

pictures'. The threatened me and told me that it I did not work with them they were

going to make them checks' stick. It was going to be just like I did do it"), see,

Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S.Ct. 8, 9, (2009).

4.) Lead Detective R. P. Crews Jacksonville Sheriff Detective utilize the above

coerced testimony in a search warrant and affidavit to go inside Petitioner's 5,500

square foot (2) story house and seize all and any expensive assault rifles' he

wanted, see Appendix 39A-54A; 42A-43A 5617 Tempest Street, and then utilized

the coerced information to arrest alleged Co-Defendant Aaron Lamb in his arrest

affidavit see, Appendix 81A, 27A, and omitted from Lead Detective R. P. Crews

23

search warrant affidavit information that (2) alleged suspects fired (18) eighteenth

AK-47 Assault shell casings' and (4) 9mm Luger shell casings', were left at the

crime-scene see, U.S. v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir. 1976) Cert. Denied

97 S.Ct. 360 (1976)("that affiant has observed the following items of evidence

taken from the scene of the murder:

a.) One VPT 44 finish remanufactured nine-millimeter shell casing: b.) One

Yugoslavian shell casing having 11, 52, as well as two asterisks thereon: c.) One

Winchester western 9-millimeter shell casing: d.) of two bullets removed from the

body ofKenneth C. Patrick which the FBI Laboratory Washington D.C. has

identified as being the same type bullet as the bullets which are normally encased

in the Yugoslavian type casing as opposed to the above finish and Winchester type

casing"). Allowed Police and prosecuting Attorneys' unlimited authority, to seize

and plant evidence befittingly to the State ofFlorida, see, U.S. v. Cortina, 630 F.2d

1207 (7th Cir. 1980)("intentional and reckless misrepresentation of the search had

to be voided and fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable

cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit seized to only defraud the court");

U.S. v. Simmons, 771 F.Supp. 908 (Ill. 2011)("Officer omitted material

information, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply"); Franks

v. Delaware, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978); U.S. v. Scully, Lexis 9576 (7th Cir.

1992)("granted motion to quash warrant and process"); warrant was defective and

24

over-broad for seizure of any and all firearms', see, U.S. v. Garner, 537 F.2d 861

(6th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Townsend, 394 F.Supp. 736, N. [24, 36] (Mich. 1975);

U.S. v. Fuccilo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1973); U.S. v. One Parcel of Property, 774

F.Supp. 699 N. [1-6] (Conn. 1991)("return currency3 because warrant was over-

broad and Police could not match serial numbers") allowed Police and

prosecuting Attorneys' a illegal opportunity to double-back and now say the

planted evidence was used in the crimes; is Police fabrication, see, Smith v.

Oakland, 538 F.Supp. 2d 1217, 1233-40 (Cal. 2008) Aff'd 379 Fed. Appx. 647

(9th Cir. 2010) the AK-47 Assault rifle seized gave Petitioner (2) two natural life

sentences', illegally.

Moreover, Lead Detective R. P. Crews/Affiant corroborates' that the

execution of threats and coercion did in fact happen, see, Appendix 76A: ("Lead

Detective/Affiant R. P. Crews', A. the only thing she made a mistake of it was

Dale Carson that told her that if she did not answer our questions truthfully, then

t_hhey were going to make the check charges-they were going to charge her with

the check charges' and everything and [make] her part of the principle");

Moreover after Police coerced Betty McDuffey they created another alleged

Co-Defendant Aaron Lamb, see, Appendix 81A-82A, which Affiant/Lead

3 "Police seized form Petitioner's "star floor safe," was $22,000.00 that was notconnected to any armed robberies' see, Appendix 79A, but was from a previousjob Petitioner held at Winn Dixie Grocery Store chain driving Semi-tractors for 17-years' under their T. Rowe Price 401-K Plan."

25

Detective R. P. Crews uses' his affidavit for arrest ad etc., compare also, Appendix

79C: ("do you know whether or not if any conversation that took place in that

room between Aaron Lamb and Betty MgDuffey was recorded?)

A. Yes Sir. Q. Okay Mr. Mantel (Prosecuting Attorney) I do have that tape.

I've got all (5) five of them, was a violation of clearly established.Federal Law,

see, Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972)("Court found intimidating

setting statement inadmissible where he was in gustody with no Miranda

Warnings"); see, also, Carbo v. Lavallee, 270 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1959); Santos v.

Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 1003-1005 (9th Cir. 2016) (En Banc) was breached see,

Appendix 81E ("...Lying Mother-Fucking Bitch in Jail. The reason I did that was

to try put may be Aaron on the side of (Detective) Wright to see if he would talk

some more!), see Appendix 81E.

Aaron Lamb refused to and invoked his rights' to a authority and Police got

made, and started walking Aaron to the county jail, and half way there after

Detective Wrights' conjunctions' of intimidations' and repeated questioning of

Aaron, they return back to Jacksonville Police Headquarters to the robbery office,

were Aaron made involuntary inclupatory statements', see, Moss v. State, 60 So.

3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)("suspects' re-initiation was involuntary"); U.S. v.

Rosario-Cintron, Lexis 90363 (1st Cir. 2016).

26

Then R. P. Crews again uses' a search warrant affidavit for Petitioner's

5617 Tempest Street Home, see, Appendix 31A-54A, 43A, with alleged Co-

Defendants' involuntary/coerced/intimidated extended the Fruit of Poisonous

Tree Doctrine to other evidence, see, Appendix 43A, Line 24-25: ("Micah Lamb

was arrested and found to be wearing shoes' virtually identical to those worn by

one of the robbery suspects' depicted in surveillance video photographs").

R. P. Crews sworn depositions' see, Appendix 78A, Page 45, Lines' 16-18:

("this is the photograph that you reference in you (affidavit) when you discuss Mr.

Lamb-Micah Lamb shoes? A. yes, sir; see, Appendix 78A: ("Q. what marking?

A. what I take being low cut-low top black tennis shoes"); inventory

report see, Appendix 90A: ("black high-top shoes (Charles Barkley NBA Tennis

shoes")) in Petitioners' home star floor safe Police found $19,000.00 see, R. P.

Crews sworn deposition see, Appendix 79A: ("A. Tempest Street Address. Q.

Okay. And you indicated that you had found I think $19,000.00 inside of a safe at a

later time?

A. yes sir. Q. Was there anything about the cash you connected to either of

the robberies? A. no. sir") the money was from T. Rowe Price investment thru

Winn Dixie Warehouse Grocery Store see, Appendix 52A-54A.

27

See, also, Appendix 76A, Page 20 Lines 20-22 ("A. no sir, we did not

threaten her. M told her that if she did not cooperate with the agreement made by

her Attorney, she would be prosecuted on everything");

See, also, Appendix 81E Sgt. Rutherford ("So I went in the room and when

Detective Wright went back in there, and I said Detective, when you get through

here go out and put that lying, "I think that I said lying motherfucking bitch in

jail") see, U.S. v. Alston, 311 F.Supp. 296 (D.C. Cir. 1970), has not been

addressed by any Court, see, Cusby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 938, N. 17 (11th Cir.

1993): Fox v. Maloney, 515 F.3d 1, 3, N. 1 (1st Cir. 2008); Stachulak v. Cougallin,

520 R2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975) Cert. 424 U.S. 947 (1976).

5.) However in October 25, 2016, Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991 N. [6,

7-10] (9th Cir. July 28, 2016)(en banc) came inside Marion Correctional Institution

see, Appendix H:

("But the Supreme Court has made clear the aim of the requirement of due

process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence but to prevent fundamental

unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false Lisenda v. California, 314

U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941). The court offered an extended explanation in

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484-85, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972) there may be a

relationship between the involuntariness of a confession and its un-reliability. But

our decision in Jackson v. Dennon, 378 U.S. 368, 377, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964)(a

28

defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right at some stage in the

proceedings' to object to the use of an allegedly involuntary confession and have a

fair hearing and a reliable determination of the issue of "voluntariness"

uninfluenced by truth or falsity of the confession").

Moreover Id. 991 ("The Supreme Court has described the extradition

hearing to determine probable cause as akin to a grand jury investigation or a

preliminary hearing under federal rule of criminal procedure 5.1 see, e.g. Charlton

v. Kelly, 33 S.Ct. 945 (1943); Benson v. McMalon, 8 S.Ct. 1240 (1888) FTC

manual at as the first circuit describe the process:

("In probable cause hearings' under American law, the evidence taken need

not meet standards for admissibility at trail. In deed at a preliminary hearing in

federal court a finding, a probable cause may be based upon hearsay in whole or

part. Fed.R.Crim.P. 5.1(a). This is because a preliminary hearing is not a mini-trial

of the issue of guilt; rather its function is the more limited one of determining

whether probable cause exists to hold4 the accused for trial. An extradition hearing

similarity involves a preliminary examination of the evidence and is not a trial,

4 "The (2) two armed bank robberies' of bank of America September 17, 2001, andeducation community credit union ofDecember 7, 2001, had no eyewitnesses' ateither crime scene, or at Jury trial to say Petitioner Micah Lamb was involved or aparticipant to the crimes', is why Police used alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey,is because she has been to prison for murder, see, Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d462 (2d Cir. 2004) (Another witness credibility was significantly eroded by hisextensive criminal record"); see also, Duhart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597 N. [1, 3] (6thCir. 1973)("Illegal Arrest").

29

U.S. v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997); resulted also into a illegal

seizure and search[s] violations' of the 4th and 14th Amendments'.

Santos v. Thomas, supra. N. [7] ("Id. 1004....in these cases' once the

evidence of coercion is admitted, court's weigh whether the allegations of coercion

are credible, and if so, whether probable cause still exists once the [tainted]

evidence is excluded from the analysis see, Cornejo-Barreto v. Selfert, 218 F.sd

1004, 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000)("To isolate any possible taint the allege tortue

could have on the evidence supporting probable cause determination, the Judge

considered the sufficiency of the evidence without the challenged confessions")

see, also Belcke v. Boone, 527 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)("The steps a Judge

must take in finding probable cause"); Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 421 (9th

Cir. 1991) Cert. Denied 112 S.Ct. 870 (1992)("....come at by exploitation of that

illegality"); U.S. v. Jannott, 501 F.Supp. 1182 (P.A. 1980)("Dismissing indictment

on ground that government overreaching violates due process").

Santos v. Thomas, supra. N. [8] ("Id. 1006....the portion of our decision in

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) that appears to have presented

a stumbling block for both the extradition court and the district court here involved

different charge based on the exculpatory affidavit ofMakham Ram. Barapind

offered [a second affidavit from Ram in which Ram claimed that Police had forced

him to sign blank pieces' of paper, on which statements incriminating Barapind

30

was a falsification] Id at 1024 see, also Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50. The

extradition court analyzed this statement and factors going to its reliability, and

ultimately concluded that under the circumstances, the Court could not determine

Ram's credibility. Accordingly, the extradition Court concluded that Ram's

statement did not undermine probable cause. Extradition of sign, 170 F.Supp. 2d at

1024-25. We affirmed finding that Ram's statement constituted "conflicting

evidence," because it's credibility [could not be determined without a trial, and that

it would have been improper for the extradition court to engage n the kind of

review that would have been necessary to determine the statements' credibility.

Barapind, 400 F.3d at 749-50.

The extradition court and district court here relied on this section here relied

on this section ofBarapind in concluding that Rosa's and Hurtado's statements

alleging coercion were inadmissible evidence. But what the extradition court did

here is different from what the extradition court did in Barapind. In Barapind the

extradition court first considered the allegations of coercion, before concluding that

it could not determine their reliability without exceeding the scope of review. Here

however, the extradition court refused to consider Rosa's and Hurtado's statements

in the first instance. This was error. A Petitioner in an extradition proceeding has

the right to introduce evidence that a statement was obtained under coercion does

just by undermining the competénce of the governments evidence]. The 9th Circuit.

31

Court Appeals has retreated, the 11th Court ofAppeals refuses' to retreat/change

course, see, Appendix 123A.

6.) Petition asserts the start ofjudicial travesty, allows the fruit ofpoisonous

tree doctrine to permeate all Governments evidence that followed, which this

instant Ground #7 proves' egregious Police and State prosecutors' misconduct

allowed them, too exploit illegally, alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffeyss evidence,

too help them manufacture a criminal case Petitioner, see, D. L. v State, 128 So. 3d

499 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ("motion for judgment of dismissal due to

officers'(Detective R. P. Crews) conflicting testimony").

Moreover, and very important, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals' has also,

utilized Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) this overruled law I

previous legal opinion's showing that Petitioner's federal habeas corpus §2254

. certificate of appealability merits were sabotaged, which has denied Petitioner a

fair shake, when the court ofAppeal relies' on erroneous principles' of law, see,

Saldana v. U.S.A.G., 431 Fed. Appx. 801 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Barapind v.

Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005) that's tainted their denial order of July 27,

5 "Alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey made a 2d Sworn Deposition, see Appendix69A, 70A, 72A, explains' how the behind-the-scenes of the activities' ofJacksonville Police Department, and State prosecutors' in Florida, have a practicethat on or about in (1998-2002) HBO TV came to Jacksonville, Florida and made amovie of victim/suspect/prisoner Brian Butler being coerced and threaten by HeadSheriff Nat Glovers' son Detective Glover and another Detective, shows thru[record evidence] a line conspiracy is afoot."

32

2012, case #12-11771-F and this, courts case numbers' Lamb v. Crews, 133 S.Ct.

1859 (2013); Lamb v. Jones, 137 S.Ct. 19 (2016) has caused the Supreme Court

Justices' and their law clerks' to be duped, that superseded Petitioner's due

diligence of timely fillings', from State and Federal Courts; to further have

Petitioners' guaranteed United States Constitutional Rights; trampled, resulting in

a unreasonable seizure of Petitioner.

The Catch-22 to a successful "Motion to recall mandate and amend .

judgments," is to show Petitioner has no viable assets' to obtain Judicial review in

State and Federal Courts' without the help of all the United States Supreme

Courts' justices, to look at just the face of records', without extensive paper

turning; and the merits' will justify redress and resolve by remanding for a "M

evidentiary hearing/voluntariness hearing", to weigh whether a due process

violations' has occurred, see Mesarosh v. U.S., 77 S.Ct. 1, N. [8] (1956) ("Mazzel

by his testimony has poisoned the water in the reservoir"); U.S. v. Williams,

382 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S. v. Zerbst, 111 F.Supp. 807 (4th Cir. 1953)

("Motion to Dismiss Granted")· U.S. v. King, 482 F.2d 768 (DC. Cir. 1973); U.S.

v. Shober, 489¥.supp. 393 (PA. 1973); Washington v. Ziemmer, 339 F.2d 715

(DC. Cir. 1964) ("Habeas Corpus replaced 5 (2) with 5 (1)"), requires uniformity

of the law, which shows' 9th Circuit Court ofAppeal retreated back, to old

establish law, lith Circuit refuses'.

33

7.) Jurisdiction by the Florida Supreme Court and its Courts' Supreme Court

law justifies this court's intervention, see, Gondeck v. Pan American World

Airways, 86 S.Ct. 153 (1965) ("In that case the Supreme Court faced a Petition for

rehearing. Two men had been killed in an automobile accident outside a defense

base where they were employed. For one Frank Gondeck, the District Court set

aside an award made by the Department ofLabor to his supervisors, and the 5th

Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and denied rehearing. The

4th Circuit reaches the opposite result for the other employee. Over 3-years after

the original certiorari petition was denied, Gondeck Petition the Supreme Court for

rehearing again, this time successfully. The Supreme Court noted that Gondeck

supervisors were the only ones who were eligible for compensation from the

accident who did not receive it. This according to the Court justifies application of

the established doctrine that the interest in finality of litigation must yield where

the interest would make uniform the stringent application of the court rules. The

Court vacated its order denying certiorari and reversed the decision of the 5th

Circuit"); U.S. v. Ohio Power Co., 77 S.Ct. 652 (1957) ("Finding that judgment

below in instant case could not stand if there were to be uniformity in application

ofprinciples announced in the other (2) two cases, the Supreme Court granted the

Petition for rehearing, vacated the order denying certiorari granted the petition for

certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of claims"); see, also Ashmus v.

34

Calderon, Lexis 7104 (9th Cir. 1998); Walker v. Supreme Court of California,

Lexis 63689 (9th Cir. 2016); Cahill v. New York N.H.R. Co., 76 S.Ct. 758 (1956);

Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 741 F.3d 353, 357-58 (2d Cir. 2013);

Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1942) ("Motion to Recall granted

to prevent injustice"); International Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Neder Amerik,

89 S.Ct. 482 (1968) ("Motion to Recall Granted"); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 87

S.Ct. 1300 (1967); Williams v. Glimer, 91 S.Ct. 2167 (1971); Stewart v. Wilson,

80 S.Ct. 874 (1960); Wallings v. Reuter, 321 U.S. 671-678 (1944); Zap v. U.S., 67

S.Ct. 857 (1947); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo Marcus, 238 U.S. 647 (1955)

precludes' all parties "from changing their positions' at any phase of this

proceedings known as Judicial Estoppel see, Scarano v. Central, 203 F.2d 510,

513 (3d Cir. 1953); Sinclar v. Jenkins, 99 F.2d 9, 13 (5th Cir. 1983) Cert. Denied

59 S.Ct. 362 (1939).

8.) Ground #7 is the nucleus ground that establishes the primary taint and other

timely filed grounds' like Ground #15 and 4 relies' on alleged eyewitness Betty

McDuffey false testimony to taint the initial probable cause determination, i.e. trial

Counsel David Makokfa was ineffective assistance of counsel for his failure to file

a motion to dismiss were Bolo was lacking in probable cause as being too general,

(A). FDLE, Florida Department of Law Enforcement was served a warrant and

affidavit thru Lead Robbery Detective R. P. Crews, which in the affidavit he uses'

35

alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey involuntary exculpatory statements, (B). even

FDLE, directed the Jacksonville, Fla. SheriffDept' to return Petitioners' Lumina

back to Petitioner, because, from the crime scene of the shooting at the Police the

suspects' Luminal left at the crime scene tire prints' and Police made tire cast

prints' see, Appendix 125A-127A which did not match Petitioners Lumina,

shows' Petitioner was not at any armed robbery, see, D.L. v. State, 138 So. 3d

499 (Fla. 3 DCA 2014) ("Motion for Judgment of Dismissal due to Officers'

(Detective R. P. Crews) conflicting testimony)....

9.) Ground #6 during jury trial at opening statements' trial Counsel David

Makokfa alerted the jury to the existence of alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffey,

see, Appendix 110A, 114A ("Now we (Anticipate) there is one witness that you

will hear from who may or may have something to say about all this. Her name is

Betty McDuffey. We ask you to make a mental note of that now. We (Anticipate)

you hearing from this lady. We (Anticipate) you hearing a lot from this lady").

Detective R. P. Crews (Detective Crews, Q. I'm going to show you what's marked

for identification as State's Exhibit 4-B. do you recognize 4-B for identification?

Yes, sir, I do. Q. what is that a picture of? A. Micah Lamb. Q. and 4-C who is that

a picture of? Trial page 382 A. Aaron Lamb. Q. and were these photographs taken

back in December 2001 when they were arrested? Yes sir. They were"), see, Jones

v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1054(7th Cir. 2011) ("Improper admission "Police"

36

testimony about (Betty McDuffey) double-hearsay statements accusing Jones of

being the leader of the robberies"); Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 474 (2d

Cir. 2011) Cert. Denied 126 S.Ct. 472 (2005) ("To the contrary notwithstanding

the States retrospective assurances, this was not a slam dunk, prosecutör where the

evidence weighed toward conviction. Quite the opposite, the prosecutors theory

was marked with discrepancies, non-consistencies', unreliable and conflicting

testimony, shady forensic evidence, and logical gaps (e.g. the lack of a motive,

and inconsistent time line"); U.S. v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, N. [8] (4th Cir. 2011)

(Robbery suspect left ball-cap in subway sandwich shop (3) Federal Judges held

DNA evidence insufficient in placing suspect at crime scene") see, Trial Page 371

(2) black ski-mask found with Petitioners DNA on masks', shows' government

attorneys' knowingly used false evidence throughout jury trial, failure of this court

to hear instant, "Motion to Recall-Mandate and Amend Judgment," of bad faith

and egregious misconduct by Police and Prosecuting Attorneys' of knowingly

coercing and threatening alleged witness Betty McDuffey for involuntary

statements' for probable cause and identification, contrary to the 4th and 14th U.S.

Constitutional Amendments' and Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991, N. [7-10]

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) when no records, files' or pleadings' conclusively

refutes' the totality of circumstances', see, Duhart v. U.S., 476 F.2d 597, N. [3]

(6th Cir. 1973); Mcquggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013); House v. Bell, 126

37

S.Ct. 2064 (2006); Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F.Supp. 3d 907 N. [1, 2] (Ill. 2014)

proves' that trial counsel David Makokfa testimony that he (Anticipate) means

(Derivative Evidence) would come from alleged eyewitness Betty McDuffeys

inculpatory statements for probable cause and identification, which made Makokfa

ineffective assistance of Counsel for his failure to file a, "Motion to Dismiss," see,

U.S. v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct.

2052 (1984); Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372 (6th Cir 2001) Cert. Denied 122

S.Ct. 1358 (2002); Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938); Tejeda v.

Dubios, 143 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1998); Berger v. U.S., 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935) shocks

the conscience of the court, which the outcome of the proceedings' would have

been different, a reviewing judge would grant motion to dismiss and deem trial

counsel Makofa ineffective and when it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror hearing.[all] of the evidence would not vote to convict

petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt, see which the end of justice would be

served by discharge of petitioner Sander v. U.S., 83 S.Ct. 1968 (1963); U.S. v.

Miller, 455 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1972); Calder v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998);

Harris v. Nelson, 89 S.Ct. 1082, N. [2, 3] (1969); Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F.Supp.

2d 802 (FN2) (6th Cir. 2001) requires Discharge of Petitioner under Santos v.

Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 246 (9th Cir. 2016) because no legal collateral-review

exist for previous grounds', and no collateral-legal opinion exist which the 11th

38

Circuit Court of Appeal will accept, unless by the United States Supreme Court's

approval, of this case, or Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. July 28, 2016)

(en banc), is made, to protect all Americans', or all "Miscarriage of Justice," will

further occur if the merits' are not considered and evidentiary hearing not ordered,

see, Edward v. Carpenter, 120 S.Ct. 1587 (2000); Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382,

292 (2d Cir. 2008); Peterkin v. Horn, 176 F.Supp. 2d 342, 353-356 (P.A. 2001);

Rump v. Metro, Lexis 743 88 (3d Cir. 2010); Brown v. Crosby, 249 F.Supp. 2d

1285, 1289, 1309-1310, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2003) cited in In Re Holladay, 331 F.3d

1169, 1175 (FN 3) (11th Cir. 2003); Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 F.2d

976, 981 (8th Cir. 1934) Cert. Denied 55 S.Ct. 112 (1934); U.S. v. Garcia-Ortiz,

528 F.3d 74, 85, N. [22-24] (1st Cir. 2008); James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 980 N. [33-

35] (9th Cir. 2012); Evans v. Tripce R. Welding and Oil Field Maintenance Corp.,

472 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1973); Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp, 468 330,

334 (5th Cir. 1972); Youngstown Sheet Co. v. Cuckey Products Co., 403 F.2d 135,

140 (5th Cir. 1968); Teleguz v. Pearson, 689 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2012); Finley v.

Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 2001); Munchinski v. Wilson, 642 F.3d 308,

338 (3d Cir. 2012); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 589-90 (6th Cir. 2005); T.J. v

State, Lexis 14843 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)("Rule 8.140 Extraordinary relief"); U.S. v.

Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274, N. [1, 4] (2d Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Ross, 196 F.2d

25 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Moncrief v. Anderson, 342 F.2d 902 (D.C. 1964); Brown v.

39

Crosby, 249 F.Supp. 2d 1285, 1289, 1309-1310 (11th Cir. 2003); State v. Brannic,

164 So. 3d 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)("Brannic was the alleged getaway driver

during her boyfriend gnd his friends tobbery with a firearm of a 7-Eleven, which

trial court erred in not granting motion to dismiss"); see, also, Stills v. State, 154

So. 3d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

CONCLUSION

(1) Discharge Petitioner;

(2) Evidentiary Hearing on voluntariness hearing; transfer to the first DCA or

4th Judicial Circuit Court Duval County, to be heard on the merits;

(3) Any other relief the Court deems just.

Respectfully submitted,

FNfC

Micah Lamb, J23663Petitioner, Pro Se

40

OATH

Under the penalties ofperjury, I do swear that the facts and circumstance are

true and correct executed on 2017 see, Kafo v. U.S.,

467 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006).

Micah Lamb, J236 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this is "Frit ofHabeas Corpus," and/or "Motion

to Supplement 3.850," has been given to DOC Officials' to be U.S. mail to the

Florida Supreme Court, 500 South Duval Street, Tallahassee, Florida 3299/1927;

Attorney General's Office, the Capitol PL-01, Tallahassee, Florida 32399/1927,

filed on this date of , 2017, see Ray v. Clements, 700

F.3d 993, N. [1] (7th Cir. 2012) ("Mailbox rule").

Micah Lamb, J23663Marion Correctional InstitutionP.O. Box 158Lowell, Florida 32663/0158

41