'For Diplomacy: Representation and Study of International Relations', International Studies Review,...

8/14/2019 'For Diplomacy: Representation and Study of International Relations', International Studies Review, 1(1), Spring 1

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For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International RelationsAuthor(s): Paul SharpReviewed work(s):Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 33-57Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186365.

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o r Diplomacy epresentationn d t ht u d y o International elat ions

PaulSharpwant to make an argumentfor why more internationalrelations scholars

should be studyingdiplomacymore often. It is odd thatwe do notfor,in Ray-mond Cohen'sphrase,diplomacyremains he engineroom of internationalrelations,' as both the site of most of the actualrelationswe study and as theimmediate motive force of theirbeing undertaken.We see this in the world ofinternationalrelations practice; witness the diplomatic inflation that hasoccurredsince the end of the Cold War.2 More states and new actors haverequiredmorerepresentation nd even the residentembassyhas prospered.3Wealso see it in the world of international elations heoryfor,as I arguehere,diplo-macy is a discrete human practice constitutedby the explicit construction,representation,negotiation,and manipulationof necessarilyambiguousidenti-ties. As such, it provides powerfulmetaphorsnot only for understandingwhatthe professionaldiplomatsdo, butalso for understandingnternational elationsin general.4 In sparseor thin social contexts,where even thebasic terms of what

1Raymond Cohen, Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map, Diplomatic StudiesProgramme Newsletter, May 4, 1998.2See Luc Reychler, Beyond Traditional Diplomacy, Discussion Paper No. 17, Dip-lomatic Studies Program (DPDSP), (Leicester, U.K.: University of Leicester, 1996), forthis phrase. For my contribution to the discussion on this theme, see Paul Sharp, WhoNeeds Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation, International Journal52, No. 4 (1997): pp. 609-634. For responses, see Brian Hocking, The Ends(s) of

Diplomacy, and Andrew F. Cooper, Beyond Representation, International Journal53, No. 1 (1997-1998).3RobertWolfe, Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador,DPDSP 33 (Leicester, U.K.: University of Leicester, 1997).4Fora development of this theme, see Costas Constantinou, On the Wayto Diplomacy

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Indeed, he suggests that diplomacyoffers powerful metaphors for understanding social life in general.? 1999 International tudies AssociationPublishedby BlackwellPublishers,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road,OxfordOX4 1JF,UK.


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34 Paul Sharpis going on may be contested,people behavediplomatically,at least as long asthey wish to continueconductingrelationswith one another.Thereforewe mightthinkthat studentsof international elationswouldpayagreatdeal of attentionto diplomacy,but they do not. The study of diplomacyremainsmarginal o and almostdisconnected romthe rest of the field.Itmaybe objectedthat this is unfair.Bargainingandnegotiation,as a glanceat recent ssues of InternationalStudiesQuarterly ISQ)and theReviewof Inter-nationalStudies(RIS)reveals,remainhot topics andappear o offer promisingmeetingpointsbetween international elations and internationalpolitical econ-omy. One article in ISQ, for example, demonstrates how a small, open,postcommunist tatehas been able to exploitchangesin its internationalnviron-ment to strengthen ts bargainingposition with the multinationalcorporationswith which it must work if it is to develop its car industry.Anothermodels thedialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States over intermediatenuclearforces in the 1980s. It concludes thatagreementwas eventually possiblebecause of changesin the way the Soviet Unionreconceptionalizedts strategicenvironment, ather han as the result of the Americandeploymentof cruise andPershingmissiles. A similarconclusion is drawn n anarticle n a recent issueofRIS that arguedfrom a graduated eciprocation n tension reduction(GRIT)perspective and credited Gorbachevwith taking the first and decisive steptowardendingthe Cold War.5Certainly,we learn a greatdeal from these articles aboutthe impactof struc-turalcontextsand technicaldevelopmentsuponbargaining.We also learnaboutways to conceptualizestrategic nteraction,behavior,and discoursewithinnego-tiations.Yet, in all of them,unproblematic ndunproblematizedntitiesplayouttheirgames in ways that admit little attention o diplomatsanddiplomacy.6Thesameis true of the currentbig books on international elations, ndexes of whichomit the term diplomacy. The better textbooks contain dutiful chaptersthattakethe reader rom the Renaissanceto Rio, butthey areusuallyself-containedaffairs, not partof the main argument.Diplomacy is presentedas one of thelesser tools of foreignpolicy, '7 medium for communicating he use of othertools. It is also presentedas an instrumentn its own right.

5David Bartlett and Anna Seleny, The Political Enforcement of Liberalism: Bar-gaining, Institutions, and Auto Multinationals in Hungary, and Gavan Duffey, Brian K.Frederking, and Seth A. Tucker, Language Games: Dialogical Analysis of INF Negoti-ations, International Studies Quarterly 42, No. 2 (1998): pp. 319-338 and pp.271-294, respectively; and Alan R. Collins, GRIT, Gorbachev, and the End of the ColdWar, Review of International Studies 24, No. 2 (1998): pp. 201-220.

6I am grateful o my reviewers for insistingthat this pointbe mademoreexplicit.7Alan James, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, Review of International Studies 19,No. 1 (1993): pp. 91-100.


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For Diplomacy: Representationand the Studyof InternationalRelations 35

We tell our first-yearstudents that most internationalrelations consist ofdiplomacy n this sense. As the courseproceeds,most of them areinvariably eftwonderingwherediplomacybelongs in the framework oranalysis.If it is a pol-icy tool in its own right,then what could pure diplomacybe, apartfrom thecommunicationof threats,promises,and rewards? f it is merelya way of com-municatingthe use of other tools, then how can it be so central to the wholeensembleof international elations?

This confusionoverdiplomacy s unfortunate,or it constitutesa barrier o theconceptualcoherencethat ourinternational elations/internationaltudies(IR/IS)field requires f it is to improve ts understandingsf internationalelationsprac-tice. It is now more than a decade since Kal Holsti madehis observationson the

dividingdiscipline, and MichaelBanks,in whatnow seems like a fit of unwar-rantedoptimism,attemptedo identifysuccessive waves of progressor,atleast,developmentin international elationstheory.8What has happenedsince is anironic,as well as a perversevalidationof ourenterprise.nterdependenceheoristshave continued to clusterin small groupusculescapableof conductingintenseinternaldebates,buthavinglittle to say to one another.The great transboundary iscussions, insofar as there are any, seem to bebetween those who prefera thousandschools of thoughtto contend in a demo-cratic andemancipatingproject,and those who emphasize studying nternationalrelationsa certainway, orgiving it up for somethingelse like IPE,criticalsocialpsychology, or even diplomatichistory.It has become hard to imagine what acenteredIR/ISwouldlook like amidthe fragmentation.Those who still hope fora betterdialogueare like hosts atfailingsalons tryingto revivethe conversation.Often they resort to proceduraldevices at academic conferences. They offerincentives for thejoint sponsorshipof panelsby subfield sections or call formoreplenarysessions, and some even wonderout loud if things would go betteriffewer people were invited. Although they are separate rom one another, hesegroupssharethreethings:theirmembersare all unsure hatthere s anythingdis-tinctive about international elations-virtually everythingin it is treatedas aninstanceof somethingelse; they find the members of othergroups uninterest-ing ;and, sadly, the restof the world finds them all uninteresting,as anyoneofus who has attempted o give anhonest answerto the question, So whatexactlyis it thatyou do? has foundout.9

8Kalevi Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in InternationalRelations Theory (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); and Michael Banks, TheInter-Paradigm Debate, Margot Light and John Groom, eds., International Relations.A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Francis Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-26.

9For a lively, if narrow, exploration of related themes of disciplinary insecurity/neu-rosis, see James Kurth, Inside the Cave: The Banality of IR Studies, National Interest,53, 1998, pp. 29-40.


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36 Paul SharpA revival of interestin the study of diplomacywould do much to addresseachof theseproblems.First, t wouldprovidea site from whichpractitioners f

international elationscould respondto academics and remindthem of what isdistinctive aboutthediscipline.Italso wouldprovidea perspectiveon whathap-pens and why nearly everyone in the field can engage international elations,although t is not acceptable o everyone.Andfinally, the discourse aboutdiplo-macycouldengagethe interestandexpectationsof thepublicat large,andmakea considerablecontribution o revivinga generalinterest n the academicstudyof international elations.

This is long overdue, for internationalrelations are widely seen to havebecome interesting again, and for numerous reasons. Most obvious, we maypoint to the end of the Cold War. More important,we may pointto the broaderattitudinal hangesthat robbed that greatcontest of its ideological life force,even thoughmost of the concrete manifestationsor symptomsof the conflictremained n place. Rightor wrong,the impressionexists thateverything,as faras makingsense of internationalelations s concerned, s upforgrabs.Yet noneof the scripts-new or old, radical or conservative-seems to capturean appar-entnew world of uncertain dentitiesperformingbothin andout of character, etthat still resonates with the characters,plots, and arguments hat MartinWightcalled thesameold melodrama. '1

The studyof diplomacyoffers a way out of this fix, but not by claimingtoprovidethe definitive factual or prescriptivecaptureof the current nterplayofsocial forces in world affairs,nor even by offering a freeze-frame n which toanalyze the claims of othercandidates n contention for capturingclass, state,nation,gender, organization,or civilization.It does so by focusing on how rela-tions are maintainedbetween identitiesthat arecontinuouslyunderconstructionin conditionsthat,if not anarchic,arecharacterized y very thinsocial contexts.Ideologicalabsolutes,GarrettMattinglyargued,drivediplomacyfrom the field.Intheirabsence,diplomacy s returning.11ndeed,as the ColdWarand oursenseof living in modernityrecede,the extent to whichhegemonyis a departureroma normin which living with differencewas the highest aspiration s becomingincreasinglyclear.It is time,I argue,forIR/ISto catchupwith international ela-tions andto beginto focus againon how life in a worldof differences s sustainedby diplomacy.I do so by examiningsuccessively attempts o define diplomacy-public, professional,and academicconceptionsof diplomacyand its signifi-cance;and the presentstateof diplomaticstudies-before offeringthemesfor aresearchagendabasedon seeingdiplomacyprimarilyn termsof representation.

'0MartinWightanded. HedleyBull,Systems f States(Leicester,U.K.:LeicesterUniversity ress,1977),p.9.GarrettMattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: JonathanCape, 1955), p. 196.


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For Diplomacy:Representationand the Studyof InternationalRelations 37

THE IDEAS OF DIPLOMACY:FROM HEGEMONY TO ISOLATIONDiplomacyis one of those terms that is best approachedhrougha considerationof its usages, rather hanby an attemptto assertor capturea precise, fixed, orauthoritativemeaning.The word is derivedfromthe Greekdiploma,meaningafolded document,and is linked to the studyof official handwritingand the ideaof credentials confirming the claims of the bearer.12 A preoccupationwithauthenticityand, hence, authorityappears o have beenpresentattheetymologi-cal creationof the term,andit would seem interesting hat the studyof a sort ofofficial handwriting,archives,also constitutesthe greaterpartof the methodofthe diplomatichistorian. We may even have fun with the notion of the foldeddiplomathat both reveals andhides, therebyunderscoring he ambiguityat theheart of the practice. Upon reflection, these links become obvious andunrevealing,and it is morehelpfulandinteresting o passon to recentusagesandattempts o captureor define the term.It is customaryto distinguishbetween broad and narrowconceptions ofdiplomacy.In the United States, especially, diplomacyis often used as a syn-onym for statecraft, oreignpolicy, andinternational elations n general.JamesBaker'smemoirs,The Politics of Diplomacy,andHenry Kissinger'sDiplomacyprovideexamplesof this broadconception.13 Kissingerand his publishers paytribute o the earlierandfamous book by Harold Nicolson with the same title,buthastento assurethereader hat t wasquitedifferent n scope, intentionsandideas (p. 8). Kissinger s interested n providinghis view of thebroad hemesofstatecraftandinternational istory,whereasNicolson was interested n theprac-tices of professional diplomacy. The distinction between broad and narrowconceptionsof diplomacy s problematic.AlthoughNicolson's bookwas writtenwith the young man considering a career at the Foreign Office in mind, heregards he Oxford EnglishDictionary'sdefinition of diplomacy,which he usesas implying a broadconceptionof the practice.14 He does so because his bookhas little to say aboutthenarrowconcernsof diplomaticpracticeand a greatdealto say about the conduct of international elations n general,albeitas seen from

12 For the studies of the origins and uses of the term on which this section is based, seeConstantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy, p. 69; Harold Nicolson, The Evolution ofthe Diplomatic Method (New York: Macmillan, 1953); and Harold Nicolson, Diplo-macy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).13JamesA. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995); andHenry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).14InNicolson, Diplomacy, pp. 4-5, the Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacyas the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which theserelations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art ofthe diplomatist.


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38 Paul Sharpa distinctiveperspective.We might even arguethatif IR/IS is about the broadpatternsof what typically happens in internationalrelations, then Nicolson'sDiplomacyhas a strongerclaim thanKissinger'sto belongingin its pantheonofclassics, for it deals with how people engaged in international elationsbehaveand how they oughtto behave.The problemswith the conventional distinctionbetween broad and narrowconceptionsof diplomacy are illustratedby a controversythat arose over thepublicationof the second volume in Gordon Craig's work on diplomacy in1994.15The firstvolume covers theperiod n primarilyEuropeandiplomatichis-torybetween 1919 and 1939, whereasthe second takes us up to the 1970s. In areview of the second volume, the scholar-diplomatSmith Simpsonmaintainedthat,unlike the first, it is not properlyaboutdiplomacy.16 Rather hanfocusingon the foreign services, foreign ministers,and ambassadorsof the period, itoffered a series of essays on political leadershipand the big questionsof WorldWarII and Cold Warforeignpolicy. For Simpson,it was a matter or regretastherewas no scarcityof suchanalyses,whereastherole andimportanceof diplo-macy proper n such mattersremainunderinvestigated nd poorly understood.Diplomats, Simpson argued,makeinternationalife possible in much the sameway as free-floating nfinitesimalaquaticplantsknownas phytoplankton reresponsible or a quarter f theoxygen we breath. t is the activitiesof diplomatsand consularofficers around he worldthat dayin andday out, indeedhourinandhourout, get much of the world's affairsrationallyattended o. 17Itmaybe seenthatSmith'sresponsewas notjust acall formore attention o aneglected subfield in internationalrelations. It also involved a conception ofwhat is importantto understandinghow the world of internationalrelationsworks. As such,it enjoyedlittle success in eitherSmith's own attempts o defendhis conceptionof what aspiring diplomats ought to be learningor in the IR/ISacademiccommunityat large.Manyof the reasonsfor this lay beyondthe con-trol of the diplomats and their advocates. As Costas Constantinounotes,Nicolson's writingson diplomacyand otherexamplesof thegenreof whichit isapartarestriking n theirattempt o defineauthoritativelywhat truediplomacy sandwhat it is not. It is not,forexample,foreign policy, nor is it usuallypracticedby anyoneotherthantheofficially accreditedrepresentatives f sovereignstatesand internationalorganizations.Within the narrowconception of diplomacy,politicalleadersmaydetermine he goal of policy andthe broadmeansby which

15G.A. CraigandF. Gilbert,TheDiplomats: 919-1939(Princeton, .J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1953);andG. A. CraigandF. L. Loewenheim,ds.,TheDiplomats1939-1979(Princeton, .J.:PrincetonUniversity ress,1994).'6SmithSimpson, Of Diplomatsand Their Chroniclers reviewof CraigandLoewenheim),VirginiaQuarterlyReview71, No. 4 (1995): pp. 755-758.

17Ibid., . 758.


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it mightbe achieved,butthey should do so on the advice of the professionaldip-lomats to whom they should also leave most of the execution of policy bynegotiation.The contentof formulationssuch as these is not nearlyso definitive as thetone in whichthey aredelivered. The division of labor betweenpoliticalleadersanddiplomatsofferedabove, forexample,canbe interpretedo suggestthat theleaders' role is restrictedto nodding their heads or signing at the appropriatemoment,or thatdiplomatshave nothingto do with policy choices; they merelyadvise and execute. Neither is usually the case. This being so, it is the tone thatis of interest.Why did writerslike Nicolson need to sound as if they were cap-turing authoritativelywhat diplomacywas, and with what consequences?Thesimple answers are that this was the predominant hetoricalstyle formakinganargument,or thatpeople like Nicolson believed that the trueidentityoressenceof a practicecould be establishedby linguisticprecision.The latter s plausible,for accompanyingthe authoritative one in Nicolson's work is a confidence intheprogressivecharacterof theevolution of the statesystemand its institutions.In all but his laterwritings,we areconstantlyinvited to witness the emergenceand evolution of the diplomatic system and method into what they have now

become.18It is also possible to ascribethe authoritativeone to the defense of profes-sional turfby a formerpractitionerusing his old skills. In conditions of uneasyambiguity,act confidentlyand with certaintyand you may succeed. After all,Nicolson was writing in the aftermathof one great catastrophe,World War I,which, rightlyor wrongly,had been attributedo a failureof diplomacy,andinthe face of anotherwhere,once again, diplomacyand the discredited,appease-ment with which it was associated were both underpressure.At more or less thesame time, Jules Cambon,a formercolleague, was speculatingon the future ofdiplomacy.Fifty yearsaheadof his time,Cambonsuspected hatwhatmightsur-vive would be a kind of diplomacywithoutdiplomats. '19

There s some meritto the claim thatdiplomacyhasalwaysbeenpresentedasa profession n peril, 20by its protagonistsas well as by its enemies. I suspectthatNicolson and otherslike him adoptedthe tone they did because they hadconfidence in what they were saying, ratherthan doubts about the profession.Nevertheless,unforeseenand unfortunate onsequencesfollowed as diplomacy18Foran assessment f theColdWar'smpact n theevolution fdiplomacy,ee,forexample,Nicolson, Diplomacy henandNow, ForeignAffairs 0, No. 1 (1961):pp.39-49.19Quoted n George. F. Kennan, Diplomacy without Diplomats, Foreign Affairs 76,No. 5 (1997).20 Diplomacy: Profession in Peril? was the title of a conference sponsored by theBritish Foreign Office at its center at Wilton Park in July 1997.


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40 Paul Sharpcame underpressurefrom subsequentpolitical, social, and technicaldevelop-ments. Although it may have prosperedin quantitativeterms, the need fordiplomacywas assailedin the mass media andby studentsandpractitionersofdiplomacyalike.21Who neededdiplomacyin the narrowsense when there weretelephones,televisions,andnow the WorldWideWeb? Andwhat diddiplomacyin the broad sense mean beyond international elationsin general,with someechoes of politeobscurantism ndcalculatingself-interest?To questionssuch asthese, the maintenanceof the authoritative ndexclusionaryapproachof assert-ing whatis andis notdiplomacyby manyof its supporters amperedan effectiveresponse.As a consequence,not only did diplomacyas a professionin the nar-row sense suffer, but, so too did the ideas of diplomacy as a broader socialpractice.In the way they assertedmoderndiplomacy's hegemonyover the con-duct of internationalrelations and the determinationof what is importanttothem, diplomatsand their advocates contributed o its apparent solation. Andtheydid so without mprovingon the notionthatdiplomacywas both a small anda big matter n the generalscheme of thingsin international elations.

ATTITUDES TOWARD DIPLOMACY:PUBLICS, PRACTITIONERS, AND ACADEMICSThis ambiguity regardingthe significance of diplomacy is presentin the atti-tudes of publics, practitioners,andacademics.Nearlyeveryonewill agreewiththe propositionsthatdiplomacyis, in some sense, in decline andnot as impor-tant as it used to be, and yet most of them will agree that it remains veryimportant.Among general publics, a well-developed image exists of a privi-leged elite pursuingexciting and prestigious careers,without paying parkingtickets, and with varyingdegreesof effectiveness. This image is fed by legisla-tive inquiries into government waste, which, in turn are fed by mediaexpos6s of the cost of diplomaticestablishmentsand the activities they entail.Among the attentivepublic, the whole is completed by a series of charactertypes from literature: greedy and incompetent political appointees likeLucky Lou Seers;poorCharlie Fortnumclinging to his honoraryconsulshipso he can continue to importduty-freecars and sell them;the cold andarrogantprofessionalsof his service who will barelyraise a fingerto save him from hiscaptors; and lightweights like Antrobus and his bizarre colleagues floating

21Foran outsider's doubts about the profession expressed from the inside, see, forexample, John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of theKennedy Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). In fairness to Galbraith, he regardedhis ambassadorship to India as very much a consolation prize, and it is possible to chart asoftening of his hard position on even the value of representation in the narrow sense inhis account of his career.


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down the Sava.22It takes a bomb, assassination,or kidnappingto disruptthisimage, althoughthe effects of such episodes areonly temporary.Diplomacy isgenerally regardedas nice workif you canget it by most people, butit is alsoassumedto be importantwork. Insofar as they think about internationalrela-tions, mostpeople assumethat it is still the professional diplomatswho do mostof it, even if they differ on whether or not they do a good job.Most professional diplomats would seem to agree with this assessment,although,like professorsof international elations,they have their moments ofexistentialdespair.23This sense of the importanceof whatthey do is manifestedin attitudesthatrangebetween the unreflective and what may best be termed,defensive self-confidence. To interestedacademicsandlegislativecommitteeson foreignaffairs,they professto accepttheneed tojustify continuallytheir rai-son d'etre,andtheytend to do so in termsfromwhich the auraof a professionalmystique, as one officer expressedit at a recentconference,has been stripped.Theyaremerelycivil servantswhose workhappens o cross international ound-aries. In discussing their work, diplomats make a seamless transition(someunconsciously)from a defense in termsof its ordinarycharacter o a defense interms of its special characterand the special qualitiesthatit demandsof them.This is done almost entirelyin terms of theirbeing repositoriesof scarce andvaluableskills,24 rather han on the basis of who or whatthey represent n termsof whatthey do rather han who they are.Facilitywith languagesandfamiliaritywith culturesare the assets most fre-quentlycited, although t is freely concededthatthe former s too often honoredin the breach than in the observance. Their social skills and contacts are alsostressed,andsome diplomatsareclearlycomfortablewith the conceptsand ter-minology of managementand administrative ciences, talkingof their roles asagendasetters, ssue raisers,coalitionbuilders,regimeor orderbuilders,and cat-alysts of collective action generallywithin the capitalsand countries to which

22Characters aken, respectively, from William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, TheUgly American (New York: Norton 1958); Graham Greene, TheHonorary Consul (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1973); and Lawrence Durrell, Esprit de Corps (London:Faber and Faber, 1957).230ne of my sources, an academic who trains diplomats, maintains that the sense ofexistential despair is far more pronounced than I am suggesting. Mid-career diplomatsin particular, he maintains, experience a great deal of difficulty in coming to grips with

not only contemporary international relations but also the terms in which they are dis-cussed by politicians, attentive publics, experts, and academics.24See, for example, Alan K. Henrikson, Diplomacy for the Twenty-first Century:'Re-crafting' the Old Guild, Wilton Park Paper, Wilton Park, U.K., 1998.


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42 Paul Sharp

they are accredited.25n short,diplomatslike to see themselves as generalists,althoughthis term is presentlyout of fashion among them, and they prefertopresentthemselves as expertsin several areas. For example, the basic sciencethat nforms a concernfortheenvironment,according o one formerseniorBrit-ish diplomat,is simply not that difficult for an intelligent and well-educatedpersonto master.This claim to multipleexpertisesmaybe given someplausibilityby loweringour expectationsabout what it means to possess a good generaleducation,buttherealdifficultywith therepository-of-skills ationale or theirexistenceis thatdiplomatsseem to exercise a monopoly over none of the ones that are usuallymentioned. As a senior budget officer of a great power said at the aforemen-tioned conference on diplomacy, all of them could be outsourced to privateorganizationsat greatsaving to the public purse. Diplomats seem to have fewanswersto this line of attack.Indeed, n a strangereaffirmation f theirallegedlyformerpreoccupationwithhighpolitics,somediplomatsgreettheoutsourcingofcertainkinds of commercial work to privateagents, and even nationalsof thereceivingstate or a thirdparty,with considerableequanimity,placinga reserveonly on what they continueto term politicalwork. In so doing, they wouldseem to fly in the face of several of the received academic wisdoms of the lasthalf centuryregarding he erosion of the distinctionbetweenthepoliticalandtheeconomic,the elevation of what was once low politics intohigh politics, andtherelegationof what was once high politics to a last instance that borderson theoperationallyrrelevant.Theydo so withgreatconfidence,for if diplomatsare on the defensive,theyare so in a context characterized y theubiquitousneed formorediplomats,oratleast more diplomacy.26The diplomatic system has continued to expand inrecentyears.The republicsof the formerSoviet Union andthe formerrepublicsof Yugoslavia all establishedtheir own foreign services and diplomaticnet-works. All the postcommuniststates soughtto transform,rather hantruncate,theirs.Nationalistmovements, ike the PalestinianAuthority,continueto believethatsecuring diplomaticrecognition n many ways precedes achieving politicalindependenceandgoes a long way to constituting t, while neweraspirants, ikehumanitarian nd environmentalorganizations,play partsthat transcendtheirfunctional rigins.Diplomatsare confidentbecausethe demandfor whateverit is they do seems inexhaustible.

25See,for example, BrianHocking, BeyondDiplomatic 'Newness' and 'Decline':The Developmentof CatalyticDiplomacy, DPDSP 10 (Leicester,U.K.: UniversityofLeicester,1995).26As one of them expressedit to me, Ifdiplomacyis in decline, thenwhy am I sobusy?


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The continuing demand for diplomats stumps the academics. A recentexchangein InternationalSecuritybetweenproponentsof diplomatichistoryand international elationstheory containedsome of the best and worst hitsthathistoriansandsocial scientistsarecapableof landingon one another,nicelybundledwith phrasesaboutmutualrespectandcomplementarity.Significantly,no authoractuallydiscusseddiplomacy.27tsplace as a theoreticalandmethod-ological firingline was merely implied by the silence on both sides. In contrast,there is nothingimplied about the statusof diplomacyin the second exchangethat I wish to cite here. This excerptis from a paperpresentedat a conferenceheld in honor of the seventy-fifthanniversaryof the Departmentof InternationalPolitics at the Universityof Wales, the first suchdepartmento be established ntheworld.Init, the authormaintained hat studentswouldlearnmoreabout nter-national relations from studying thebones of the earliest humans in the RiftValley of Africa thanfromstudying he sanitizedentrailsof governments npub-lic recordoffices. It is unlikely, he continued,that we would learn througharchivalmininganymoreaboutthecharacter f intergovernmentalelations hanwe knowalready. Accordingto theauthor,unless IRadopteda moreglobalper-spective, it was doomedto become adiplomatichistorybackwater. 28The InternationalSecurityexchangerecalls an old and datedbifurcation nthe way IR used to be authoritativelypresented.On the one side are a declininggroupthattenaciouslyclings to storiesaboutstates and thosewho actfor themasa badgeof its grounding n common sense.29 On the other side arethe swellingranks who regard his position as heresy by those who refuse to face facts. Nei-thercampfinds it easy to take the otherseriously.They prefer o leave each otheralone,for contactsusuallytake the form of the occasional shell lobbedacrossthecease-fireline, andoccasional shells can alwayslead to barragesorworse.The comments from the conference in Wales suggestmore,for they arefedby two differentandpossibly conflictingsentiments:one thatdiplomacyis oldhat andthe other that it is also badhat. Diplomacyis said to be bad hat in thesense that it serves a system of powerrelations,while those who studyit on itsown termshelpto obscuretheoppressivecharacter f theserelations.Diplomacy

27ColinElmanand MiriamFendiusElman, DiplomaticHistoryandInternationalRelations:RespectingDifference ndCrossingBoundaries, nternationalecurity 2,No. 1 (1997).28KenBooth, Seventy-five Years On: Rewritingthe Subject's Past-Reinventingthe Future, n Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International

Theory:Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996), pp.328-339.29StephenH. Haber,DavidM. Kennedy,andStephenD. Krasner, Brothers nder heSkin:DiplomaticHistoryandInternationalRelations, nternationalSecurity22, No. 1(1997): pp. 34-44.


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44 Paul Sharpis said to be oldhat, not in the sense that t is morallybankrupt, nd eithercan-not or will not solve importanthumanproblems,but in the sense thateither thepractice of internationalrelations or the theory of IR/IS has developed farbeyondit. We may still identifythe formaldiplomaticsystemas aninstitutionofinternationalsociety, but it is no longer possible to regard it as the mas-ter-institution 30or internationalrelations now flow above, below, around,through,andin spiteof diplomacy.This is presentedas a temporalargument.Diplomacy may once have beenvery important,but it is on the road to becomingunimportant.Unclearis wherewe presentlyareon the continuum.This is importantor the badhat approachin that,if marginalizedpracticesdeserve less scholarship, henwe mightexpectmarginalizedwickednessto attract ess judgmentand condemnation. t is impor-tantfor the oldhat approachn thatwe have little ideahow much attentionweshouldbe payingto the newerformsof interactionbetweenold and new actors.To whatextent is attention o track wo and field diplomacyin the formerrepublicsof Yugoslaviafueledby ajudgmentaboutthe alleged shortcomingsoftraditional iplomacy,as opposedto an assessmentof the capacityof newerformsto shapewhatactuallyhappensthere?By refusingto reflecton where weare on the continuum,it is possible to maintain a generaldisposition againstdiplomacy.Until recently,we have been able to acknowledgethe paradoxesofpresenting t as a minor nstrument f foreign policy while acknowledging hat tis everywhere,andanticipatingts decline while witnessingits expansion,with-out feeling anycompellingneed to explain,let aloneresolve, them.

Very little on diplomacy appears in International Studies Quarterlyandnothing is considered by Diplomatic History that is not based on archivalresearch.Of the major ournals,only in Reviewof InternationalStudiesdo wefindarticleson diplomacy,theirpositionbeing somewhatanalogousto thepolit-ical theoryarticlesthat the AmericanPolitical ScienceReviewfeels obligatedtopublish.DIPLOMATIC STUDIESConsequently,individuals interestedin the study of diplomacy have resided,untilrecently,on theperipheryof whatmightbe termed mainstream R/IS.Tobe fair,it mustbe addedthatthismarginalization as suitedmanyof them. Somestudentsof diplomacyhave continued o adhere o thenotion thattheirs s an eso-teric business, even if those whom they study profess to have relinquished heidea. Nevertheless,a rich body of work has emergedon the margins.In recent

30MartinWight, Power Politics (Leicester, U.K.: Leicester University Press, 1995),p. 113.


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46 Paul Sharpdinner?The latest reflections on the representations f otherness n frontierjournalsandfiction of the AmericanWestor the most recent ncarnations f StarTrek?Of course,this is a caricatureof the debatethat uses the worstimages theprotagonistshave of one another,yet it reflectsa sense on bothsides thatdiplo-macy and IR/IS are differentand that one of them is not very important.34npractice,most programsseem to have settled the debate with a compromise,offeringa combinationof basic diplomatic theoryand case studypredicamentsfrom the field, with the tamer,saner(lamer?)bits of contemporary R/IS. Ifanything, he compromise endsto be skewed toward he latter.Therelationshipbetween the two remainsproblematic.Does the aspiringdiplomat,for example,learnwhat SusanStrange,StephenKrasner,andJohnRuggiehave to say aboutthe centralityof international olitical economybecause it will informtheirpro-fessional practice,or because it is a partof their professionalmakeupto beinformed n these areas n much the sameway as theyneed to know aboutwine,opera,and art?Theansweroughtto be theformer,butI suspectit is often the lat-ter,partlybecause, as in most professionsandfor most people, theoryremainsremoteuntilit acquires ife throughsubsequentpracticalexperience.Inaddition,a realgapexistsbetweenthestudyof diplomacyandthestudyof mostof the restof international elations.

An effort s underwayto bridge hisgap,oftenfromwithindiplomaticstudiesprogramsor at theirprompting.Much of this is focused on academic service. Inrecentyears,forexample, diplomaticstudies sectionsof the BritishInternationalStudiesAssociation andInternational tudiesAssociationhavebeen established.They organizepanelson diplomacyfor their annualconferences,either alone orin collaborationwith other sections.Partyworksuch as this has been accompa-niedby explicit attempts o recruitnewcomersto diplomaticstudiesby stressingthecentrality,breadth,andinterdisciplinaryharacter f theirscope.35More important,research is emergingthat seeks to close the gap betweendiplomaticstudies andIR/ISfrom bothdirections.Buildingon the middlepowerand principalpower literatureof the 1980s, for example, AndrewCooperandRichardHiggot apply nsightsfromboth the constructivistand theorganizational

34Forthose interested,detailsof seatingarrangements, un salutes,and otheraspectsof protocolmaybe foundin JohnR. Wood and JeanSerres,DiplomaticCeremonialandProtocol: Principles, Procedures, and Practices (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1970). The aspects of otherness eferredto were the subjectsof paperspre-sented at recent conferencesof the British InternationalStudies Association and theInternational tudiesAssociation.Althoughpresentedas worst-caseoppositesto makearhetoricalpoint,one purposeof this article s to show thattherespectiveauthorswouldhave a greatdeal to say to one anotheraboutthepresentation nd maintenanceof identi-ties in sparseor ambiguoussocial contexts.35See, for example, Cohen, PuttingDiplomatic Studies on the Map ;and Sharp,WhoNeeds Diplomats?


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science literature o the behavior of both individualdiplomatsand diplomaticservices.36Cooper and Brian Hocking have writtenon residentambassadors.Hockinginvites us to see them as catalystsof collective action on a widerangeofinternalandexternal policy questionsin the statesto which they are accredited.Cooperexaminesattemptsby two ambassadors o use the World Wide Web topublicizetheir countries'respectivepositionsand advancetheir interestson par-ticular ssues that hadaroused,orpotentiallycould arouse,publicinterest.37Thethrustof their work is twofold: to emphasizethe transformedenvironmentofactors, issues, and modes of communicationwithin which diplomatsfunction;and yet, to demonstrate he continuingcentralityof conventionaldiplomatstomostof whathappens n contemporarynternationalelations.This kind of workbuilds back to diplomacy from IR/IS. The dynamics of niche diplomacy, forexample,will be familiar o anyoneconversantwith RobertKeohane andJosephNye's accountsof international elationsundercomplex interdependence ondi-tions, the main differencebeing thatagency is no longer implied.Now we areinvitedto look athow agendasare set and issues are linked.Conversely, other research in diplomatic studies attemptsto build fromdiplomacyto IR/IS. It does so by takingadvantageof our increasingability tostepbackfromandcontextualizethe modemrntatesystemrather han-whetherwe think t is permanent, hanging,ordeclining-theorizing only fromwithin itsframeof reference.For example, RaymondCohen and othershave broughtthework of historiansand archeologistson the Amarnasystem before studentsofdiplomacy and internationalrelations.38To be sure, this initially sparkedadebateon whetherAmarnacouldbe, in the Nicolsoniansense,properlyregardedas a fully fledged diplomaticsystemrather hananinternationalystemexhib-iting some diplomaticfeatures.39The emergingconsensus is that we get intomore trouble discountingAmarnathan accepting it, despite argumentsaboutwhatis properlydiplomacyand whatis not.Once beyondthis controversy,we begin to see notjust the same old melo-drama of internationalpolitics andforeignpolicy, butalso the predicamentsof

36See, for example, Andrew F. Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Over-view, and Richard Higgot, Issues, Institutions and Middle-Power Diplomacy: Actionand Agendas in the Post-Cold War Era, in Cooper, ed., Niche Diplomacy(Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 1-24, 25-45.

37Hocking, The Ends(s) of Diplomacy ; and Andrew F. Cooper, Snapshots ofCyber Diplomacy: Greenpeace against French Nuclear Testing and the Spain-Canada'Fish War,' DPDSP 36 (1997).

38Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook, eds., Amarna Diplomacy: The Begin-nings of International Relations (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,forthcoming).

39G. R. Berridge, Amarna Diplomacy: A Fully-Fledged Diplomatic System in theNear East? DPDSP 22 (1996).


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48 Paul Sharp

those who serve as diplomats.How do we representa kingof kingsto a kingwhowill be a god uponhis demise, or to one who claims to be a god already?Andhow do we convince our host that a delay in the deliveryof gifts or theirdisap-pointing quality upon arrival is neither a sign of disrespectnor a reason forregisteringdispleasureat ourexpense?Chargedwithconductingrelationsacrossthe great divides between political communities,those who represented heirleadershad a personaland a professional nterest n seekingto stabilize the iden-tities theyrepresented,he terms on whichtheywererepresentedo one another,and the modalitiesby which this was undertaken.The ideaof diplomatsas stabilizersof problematicandproblematizeddenti-ties that have to be represented o one another s not new. What is new is thefluidityof conceptslike sovereigntyandimmunityon which modem diplomacyis based. Froma professionalpointof view, this is both bad andgood news. It isbad becausethework of stabilization hatestablishesthe firstprinciplesof inter-actionis neverreally completed, although t may appearso for periodsof time.This is also the good news, for it is hard to conceive of how we may interactwithoutdiplomats nthe absence of a single,undifferentiated umancommunity.Thisis bornoutin a second kindof research hat, ike Cohenet al., seeksto buildfromdiplomacyto IR/IS.UnlikeCohen,peoplelike RichardLanghorneandLucReychlerseek to advancein very differentways beyond some of the contempo-rary and commonplace observations about how international relations arechanging.40 They are interested n the role of newactors n circumstancesofstate breakdownand sub- or trans-state thnic conflict. Arguablythese featuresconstitute he highpolitics andcertainly he powerpolitics of contemporaryinternational elations.Reychler speaks for what is becoming a large armyofresearchers ttractedo track wo and field diplomacyby events in the Balkansand elsewhere. The researchers rgue hatthesenew diplomatsbringcertaincon-ceptual and practical advantagesover their conventional counterparts o theprocessof resolvingconflictandseeking peace. Although t does Reychlersomeinjusticeto summarize t so, his arguments that such new diplomatsoffermore,preciselybecausethey do not represent tates.

Langhome,by contrast,hasgone beyondnotingthenewness andpotentialofthe nonstatediplomatsto observinghow humanitarian gencies, in particular,actually performvis-t-vis statestoday. Langhorne'smainpoint is thatgovern-ments and associationsof themwill fundagencies to pursueobjectivesthat thegovernments n questionfind difficultto pursuedirectly. Agencies need money

40Reychler, Beyond Traditional Diplomacy, and Richard Langhorne, CurrentDevelopments in Diplomacy: Who Are the Diplomats Now? Diplomacy and Statecraft8, No. 2 (1997): pp. 1-15. Also Richard Langhorne, History and the Evolution ofDiplomacy, in Jovan Kurbalija, ed., Modern Diplomacy (Valetta, Mediterranean Acad-emy of Diplomatic Studies, 1998), pp. 147-162.


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to functionand,as both the presenceof agencies fundedprimarilyby the Euro-pean Commission in Afghanistanand their subsequentwithdrawal when themoneywas cutoff suggest,therelationshipbetween thetwo has a markedpoliti-cal dimension.Second, Langhorneand others have begun to chart the response of suchagencies to these kind of predicaments.Theiremergenceis conventionallypre-sented in narrativesof the decline, transformation,or disintegrationof thecontemporarynternational ystem, a presentation hat has often been aidedbythe oppositionalpostureof the agencies themselvestowardconventionaldiplo-macyas partof theproblem. Nevertheless,as Langhorneargues, hesuccess ofsuch agencies has broughtwith it the need and the appetiteto becomediplo-matic. It is no longer sufficient to have the logo-side of t-shirtsworn by fieldworkersturnedtoward the television cameras.Agencies want to stabilize andsecurerecognitionof theiridentities within the frameworkof the presentdiplo-matic system to gain access to andparticipaten the policy processes by whichtheirfundingand theiroperatingconditionsare secured.To be sure,this involvesmakingdemandsupona systemwith no clearlydefinedplace for such actors(atleast the sortthey would want). Still, the needs of the moment,in termsof per-forming their missions more effectively and the dynamics of organizationalself-interest hatdevelopwithsuccess, strengthenheincorporativedimensiontothese demandsat theexpenseof thetransformative imension.To be a player,anactorneeds to be recognizedas such.Presentin all the work in diplomaticstudies surveyedabove is a sense ofdiplomacy's transcendentqualityas a discretehumanpractice.Cohen and hiscolleagues identifyit inrecordsof the internationalelationsof some 1,500yearsBCE.CooperandHocking present t as inherenteven in an international ystemgreatlychangedfrom the one with which diplomacyis conventionallyassoci-ated.Langhornedetects its influenceuponthe operationsof some of the neweractors n international olitics,widely expectedto become moreimportantn thefuture.Paradoxically,t is outsiderswho haveprovided hetheoreticalgroundingfor this transcendentor even essentialistconception.It is a doubleparadox,forthe two principalcontributors, ames Der Derianand CostasConstantinou,bothrejectessentialistformulationsof ideas andconcepts in social theoryandprac-tice. They arebest regardedas visitors to diplomacywho departedbefore theygot bored,but left some veryuseful andinterestingpresents.41We need not acceptthe generaltheoryof social realitythatmay informthework of Der Derian, Constantinou,or others, or the critical perspective thatanchors their accountsin claims about alienationand oppression,to find theirarguments nsightfulwhen they are appliedto the practiceof diplomacy.They

41james Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford:Blackwell, 1987); and Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy.


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50 Paul Sharpare insightfulbecause they draw our attentionaway frompositivist interpreta-tions of diplomacythatfocus on how the substantive nterests,ends, and meansof actors whose identities aretreatedas unproblematic reset, and then increas-ingly struggleto find a place for diplomacyin thatprocess.Instead,Der Derianandothersdirectour attention o how muchof diplomacy s aboutrepresentation,theproductionandreproduction f identities,and the contextwithin which theyconducttheir relations.The great puzzle from orthodoxand criticalpositivistperspectives s why diplomacyhas lingeredand even expandedwith apparentlyso little to do. Fromthe perspectivesoutlinedhere, in very differentways it ispossibleto see that f the modemdiplomaticsystemno longeris the master nsti-tutionof international ociety, diplomacystill remains its centralpractice,as itwould of any thin society of collectives that value theirunity, autonomy,andidentity.By diplomacy,the actors and their relationsare constituted.DIPLOMACY AS REPRESENTATION:SOME THEMES FOR A RESEARCH AGENDARecent researchsuggeststhatdiplomacy s much more aboutrepresentationhaneitherdiplomatsor those who study them have yet realized. I have sought toarguethatit follows thatinternational elationsaremuchmoreaboutdiplomacythan we have realized. The less obvious or natural he identities of the agentsappearand the thinner he social context in which they operate,the morediplo-macy is needed. Conversely, we would expect to see less diplomacy in therelations within a family, where identitiesappearself-evident,or within a reli-gious or legal setting,where roles andrulesareclearlymarkedandaccepted.Ifthis is so, then there are at least two consequencesfor IR/ISresearch.First, studentsof diplomacyin the narrow sense must continueto executetheir own conceptual ailbreak.Their solation is in partself-imposedandresultsfrom the state-centric haracter f the genrein whichtheywrite. There s nothingwrong with being state-centricper se, but only certainkinds of positivistswhoare interested n sparsehypothesesabouta verynarrow pectrumof behaviorcanafford to ignore the practicaland theoreticalchallenges to the primacyof thestate thathave been madeinrecentyears.If we acceptthatstates and othershave,in what Iver Neumanncalls armsand legs, 42 as well as consciousnesses,thenwe cannot rest contentwith the essentiallylegal argument hat states are sover-eign and thepositionandsignificanceof everythingelse derives from that status.To persistin doing so exposes us to the chargeof being engaged in perfectingand embellishingfamiliarbricks in a long-establishedwall whose foundations

42Neumann'shrase omesfromaprivate onversation. isattemptocapturewhatthediplomatsee asbelonging ndnotbelongingo themmaybe seen n his TheFor-eignMinistry f Norway, DPDSP35 (1997).


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may be crumbling.I suspectthey are not and thinkthey oughtnot. Yet neitherhunch norprejudicecan be taken for granted f we wantto join in the fitful andfragmentedconversations hatpresentlyconstituteIR/IS.Gettinginto debates aboutwho are the actorsmaybe difficult for manystu-dents of diplomacy, but it will be made easier if they realize that the fate ofdiplomacy does not ride upon the fate of the modern state system, and espe-cially the effectiveness of the latter'scapacityto go on saying who is and is nota player.Once diplomacyis seen againin termsof representation ather hanasan instrumentof more substantiveforeignpolicies, then it becomes possible tosee how it expresses a humanconditionthatprecedesand transcends he expe-rience of living in the sovereign,territorial tates of thepastfew hundredyears.Rather hanseeing diplomacyas an institutionof the modern statesystem,boththe practice and context should be seen as responses to a common problemof living separatelyand wanting to do so, while having to conduct relationswith others.Second, studentsof diplomacyneed to be broughtback into the mainstreamnot only to benefit from the broadeningof theirhorizons,but also becausetheyandthosethey studyhave something mportanto say. As alreadysuggested,thestrengthof diplomaticstudies is that it remainstheplace where thepractitionersspeakback. How then,do they make sense of whatis going on? The writingsand utterancesof diplomatsareobvious, but not necessarilythe point of depar-ture. The written and spoken record reveals that diplomats, like otherprofessionals,make a distinctionbetween andoperatewithintwo universes:theprofessionaluniverseof how thingsaresupposed o be, andthepoliticaluniverseof how they veryoftenactuallyare.Theyalso reveal thatdiplomatsattachagreatdeal of importance o the abilityto shift smoothlybetweenthese two universesandto recognizewhen such movementis or is not called for. Togetherwith thecapacityto pursueuseful personal relationshipseffectively and maintainthem,the smoothshift is regardedas one of thosetalents with which thegood diplomat

is born,rather han one thatis acquired.Not surprisingly, within the professional universe we find anunproblematized ccountof international ffairs.As thepreamble o the ViennaConventionon DiplomaticRelationsstates,people have lived in nations fromancient times. 43 nternationalelationsarepresentedas now havingevolved tothe point where states are authenticexpressions of popular sovereignty andnations areauthenticexpressionsof popularculturaldentity.This is the realmofdiplomacyas representationn thenarrow,professionalsenseby which theinter-national society of states and others is most directly constituted,be it theday-to-day socializing or the state ceremonies by which countries are recog-nized, territoriesaretransferred, r commitments o collaborationor acceptance

43TheVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols (1961).


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52 Paul Sharpof rules and norms are affirmed. The sources of problemsin the professionalworld are the passions, conceits, and ambitions of foolish or wicked men andwomen who lead people astray.The taskof the diplomats s to curb these emo-tions in theirown leadersand to managetheirconsequences n others.Theextentto which the rhetoricof diplomacy's professionaluniverse is centered on themanagementof common affairs,rather than advancing particular nterests, isremarkable.Peace is the objective,while the prince,oftentheirown, is the con-straining actor.The politicaluniverse,in contrast, s full of ambiguities.The real world,asmost diplomatsarereadyto admitin all but the most official of circumstances,does not always operatethe way it is supposedto. Even the most fundamentalorganizing principlesof the international ystem are vulnerable. Some entitiesclearly do not satisfy the preconditionsof statehood,yet obtain recognition,while some who do are denied it. The claims of Kurdsareignored,for example,while the status of Panama,whateverthe original sin of its conception,goesunchallenged.These are the easy ones, for to do otherwise would create moreproblems.Diplomatsalso have to perform he smooth shiftin more difficultcir-cumstances where situations are uncertainand policy has not been settled, aswhen the formerYugoslav republicsdeclaredtheirindependenceandthe greatpowerswere still arguingabouthow to respond.

Nor are these ambiguitiesof the political worldrestricted o crisis momentsin diplomaticwork. They permeateits daily operationsand the accounts thatdiplomats give of them. Thus the dominantmetaphorsof contemporarydiplo-matic discourse recall ideas of cooperation, managing problems, andconstructingorders.Diplomatscanspeakandwriteforhoursin these termsandyet still say, when pressed,thattheir fundamentalobligationis to advance anddefend the national nterest. It is not thatthese two discoursesare irreconcil-able. National interest may be presented as a constraining parameterfrompolitical realityon whatmightotherwise be desirable,orthetepidbromidethatinternational ooperation s (in) the national interestmaybe offered. We rarelyget explicit evidence of how diplomatsjuggle the demands of the two sets ofrhetoric n theirdaily work,or learnby what motives and criteriathisjugglingis informed.

The temptinganswer is thatdiplomatsaredrivenby the desire forpowerorthe desire to be close to it. In times of crisis, they will wait on the lead ofpolicymakersandfollow this wherever t takes them.While in the usualcourseof events, they may talk cooperationand order-building, hey are pursuinganarrow conception of their own country's self-interest. There is a distin-guished, if sparse, paper trail of corroborationfor this from Barbaro (thefifteenth-centuryVenetianambassador o Rome), who suggestedthatthe firstduty of an ambassador s to do, say, advise, and think whatever may bestserve the preservation and aggrandizementof his own state, to Charles


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Hardinge'sobservation that his theory n the service was that 'power' is thefirst aim. 44Even if this is the case, it does not tell us muchabout how diplomatsresolve

the dilemmas of their political universe. Barbaromade his claim preciselybecause some of theambassadors f the Renaissanceperiodpersisted n tryingtoserve theirGod and theirconsciences,whereasotherssoughtproximity o powerby committing grandandpettytreasons.It is not clear how muchbeing close tohis king was an end or a means of Hardinge'sefforts.Arguably,even if diplo-mats are drivenby this sortof self-interest,the relationshipbetween it andthefortunesof the statestheyrepresenthasnever been straightforwardnd is less sotoday. For example, how might the ambitiousdiplomatsof poor countries oreven European great powers best advance their own interests,by seeking tobecome the permanentundersecretaries f theirrespectiveforeignoffices, or bypursuingan equivalentpositionin the United Nations or the EuropeanUnion?Narrow self-interest is a poor predictorof whatdiplomatswill actuallydo,given the complexity of circumstances hey may confront.Evidence also sug-gests that self-interestdoes not guide them as often as the popular maginationexpects.Rather,andperhapssurprisingly,hatguidance s providedby anaspectof their professionalrole conception. Diplomacy, like other professions, pro-vides its memberswith a privilegingsense of distancefrombothits operationalworlds, thereby enablingthem to ignore theirrules and cheat on theirpoliticalmasters,even theirown politicalmasters,when the need arises. It is politiciansandcitizenswho, whentheythinkaboutthematall, maytakesovereignty, nter-national aw, andstateprestige seriouslyto the pointof precipitatingnationalorinternationaldisaster,unless they are properlyadvised, managed,or circum-ventedby diplomatswho know the whole thingis built on sand.Diplomatswith the consciousness of citizens could not managethe world,but citizenswith theconsciousness of diplomatswould be unmanageable.Hencethe desire to maintaina distinctionbetween citizens and politicians who taketheirstatesand the internationalpoliticalworldat face value, andprofessionalswho know better,the betterto managethe imperativesof the notional worldandthe consequencesof the disjuncturesandgapsbetweenhow thingsactuallyhap-pen and its account of them. Thus representationappearsin the political andprofessionaluniverseof diplomacy,and is central o the smoothshiftingbetweenthe two. Diplomatsnot only seek to represent heirstates to the world,but alsoseek to represent hat worldback to theirrespectivestates,with the objectiveofkeepingthe whole ensembletogether.

44Quoted n GarrettMattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London:JonathanCape,1955), p. 109; and Charles Hardinge, Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of LordHardinge of Penshurst (London: John Murray, 1947), p. 98.


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54 Paul SharpWithin the field of diplomaticstudies narrowlyconceived, viewing diplo-macy as representation pens up several new lines of inquiry.On the principlethatone only lives twice, it would be instructiveto examine the activities and

utterancesof diplomatsat the momentof statecreationandstatecollapse.Duringthe truncationof Yugoslavia,new foreignservices were established n unstableanddifficultconditionsby a combinationof internaleffortsandassistance fromotherservices,as well as thediplomaticstudiesprogramsdiscussedearlier.Theformationof these servicesprovidesan opportunity or examiningthe inculca-tion of the professionaland political values of diplomacy.What,for example,were recruits o the new Croatian ervice told about theirrespectiveobligationsto peace andtheirprinceand about the idea of being a restrainingnfluence onthe latter,and what did the successfulones amongthemlearn?Withregard o statecollapse,some work hasalreadybeen doneonthe SovietUnion (USSR) that confirms how detacheddiplomatsare from the process ofdynamic political change.45As expected, most Soviet diplomatscontinued torepresent he USSR to the bitterend, partlyfor self-servingreasons,but also tokeep stabletheexternalaspectof the state,depsitewhatwas going on within.Bythe final yearof internationalperestroika,t was clear that the principal nterestof the diplomats n executingGorbachev's nitiativeswas existentialrather haninstrumental.They soughtto keep the USSR as an internationalactoruntil, asthey hoped, internalaffairshad been clarified.They also attempted o use thatidentityto preventdomesticupheavalfromspillingout over Soviet bordersandbecominganinternational roblem.Whenthe statefinally collapsed, manySoviet diplomatssimplyshifted theirallegiance to the new sovereignrepublics.This can be interpretedn terms ofHardingeannarrow elf-interest although henone mighthaveexpectedmoreofthem to have deserted he Soviet state earlier hantheydid),but it is also consis-tentwith the sense of professionalismdescribedabove.Diplomatswill representwhatever is thereand in need of representation.As the final Soviet experiencesuggests, much of their work is concernedwith representationper se, beingthere,rather handoing something,on behalf of their client.If this is so, then a new light is cast on what diplomatsaredoing when thepaceof international egotiationshasbecomeparticularly lacialandthe contentof theircommuniqu6sparticularly acuous. Rather hananalyzedor ignoredasexamplesof stalled instrumentalbehavior andbargaining, hese situationsmaybe examinedas instancesin which diplomatsare engaged in the construction,maintenance,andrepresentation f different dentitiesto one another.To give aspecific example, when the existence of the activities of the Oslo channelbetween Israelis and Palestiniansbecame generallyknown in 1993, attention

45PaulSharp, The Death of Soviet Diplomacy, Diplomacyand Statecraft6, No. 3(1995), pp. 809-834.


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shifted to it from the high-profile,but deadlocked,negotiationsin Washingtonwith their associatedpress conferences and releases. Suddenly, Norway waswhere the real action was to be found. I am suggestingthat the existentialanddeclaratory epresentationn Washingtondeserves far moreconsiderationhan treceived,and the currentlydisappointingconsequencesof the Oslo channel andthe subsequentOslo accords addweight to this claim.BEYOND MODERN DIPLOMACYViewing diplomacyin representationalermsprovidesa richerunderstanding fwhatdiplomatsdo thandoes the conventionalaccountof it as oneof the lessertools of foreign policy. The diplomatsof the modem statesystemclaimed thatno one else occupiedthepositionof detachment romtheinternational ociety ofstates, or performedthe role of representing ts membersto the world and theworld back to them. Now, it is becoming increasingly plausible to claim thatmorepeople are so employedand more are diplomats. An obvious extensionof the approachof viewing diplomacy as representations to apply it to thenew diplomaticactorsof contemporarynternational elations.To what extent does their becoming diplomatic involve these actorsacceptingandinternalizingheprofessionalandpoliticalworldsas thesearepre-sented by diplomacy in the narrow sense? To what extent do they bringsomethingnew to it? Couldhumanitariangenciesparlaya local andtemporaryacceptance,based upon expertise,knowledge, and control of resources,into amorelastingand extensive legitimacy-one recognizedby statesbut notderivedfrom states?An obvious expectationof the approachoutlinedabove is that thenew diplomats, ike the diplomatsof revolutionary egimesbeforethem,will domuchadjusting.Theirabilityto bringaboutchangein theprofessionalandpoliti-cal universes of diplomacywill be limited. This is not anargumentn anysimplesense of that term. New actorsdo nothave to conformto the rules of the gameasit is played by old actors (readrich and powerful)because thatis what the oldones want.Rather, t is the representatives f actors for whom unity, autonomy,and identity remain important.They face similar predicaments,whethertheyrepresent he old or new, the richor poor,the strongor weak. All face the prob-lem of contributingto the productionand reproductionof the identities theyrepresent n, andby, theirrelations with one another.Othergames-economic,military,political,andsocial-are going on too, but theirsignificancevariesbyactor,policy, andcontext.Representation, s alreadydiscussed,is common to allactorsin international elationsand is particularo it.

This is not as big a claim as it may sound.The questionof whethernew dip-lomatic actors accept the political and professional worlds of diplomacyacknowledgesthatthey also functionin a wider world of internationalhoughtand actionin which these otheractorstry to functionwith theirown universes


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56 Paul Sharpand associated operationalcodes. Consider two established concepts, sover-eigntyandnation.Both appearas prominentbricks n the edifice of diplomacy'sprofessionalandpoliticalworlds,yet both also belongto other worldswhere thesystemic andmoderatingpreoccupationsof diplomacyseem to have very littleplace. In additionto how diplomacytames, manages,anduses these two ideasfor itself, it is worthexamininghow diplomacycopes when othershavedifferentconceptionsandpriorities.As JamesMayallnotes, diplomacywas one of the few internationalnstitu-tions to survive the onslaughtof popularsovereignty and nineteenth-centurynationalism.46Mayall'sdiplomacy,andnearly everyoneelse's, is thediplomacyof the modern erritorial tate,with a practicalandclearlyidentifiablesovereignsite. We take this so much for granted hatwe may askwhetherdiplomacy n theabsenceof sovereigns may be properly ermed diplomacy. nstead,we mightask,How did diplomacysurvivemodernity?Clearlythe answer s adaptation.How will diplomacysurvive encounterswith concepts beyond which it hastraditionallynotclaimed,suchas race,class, gender,andcivilizations(notCivi-lization)?It is beyond my competenceto speakabout these ideas, otherthan tonote that even at conventionalconferenceson diplomacy,paperson issues likethe problem of spouses and partners are often presented.47Discomfortingthoughtheseapproachesareto some of theparticipants, either hese themes northe universesof argumentsand assumptionsabout social life from which theystem will go away. Establishingan effective diplomaticmission todayinvolvesaddressingpatriarchy ndidentity ssues, as well as theproblemsposedfor secu-rityandinstitutionalmemory by electronicmailingsystems.

Havingsaidthis, andhavingmade a case fordiplomacyas a discrete humanpractice capableof providinga focal point for most people engagedin interna-tional studies, I conclude by noting that it is not for everyone. The study ofdiplomacy and what diplomats have to say about it will appeal neither tostructuralistsnor to constructivists n theirrespectivestrongforms.Diplomacypresumesthat structuresdo not explain all outcomes, nor even just the impor-tant ones, but it also takes existing structuresseriously. Structuresmay beconstituted by the practice of agents. In acknowledging this, diplomats areunlikelyto concede thatwe have learned much about the likelihood of particu-larstructures ohering,evolving, or collapsing-even if their own instinctis tobet on cohering.

46JamesMayall,Nationalismand InternationalSociety(Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress,1990),p. 35. I am not suggestinghatMayall s a hostileoutsiderodiplomacy, merely that in his work there is an account of the onset of hostile interpreta-tions of the ideas in question.47AnnabelHendry, From Parallel to Dual Careers: Diplomatic Spouses in the Euro-pean Context, in Kurbalija, Modern Diplomacy pp. 127-145.


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The studyof diplomacy,although t may be highly criticalof particularndi-viduals or styles, tends to be sympatheticto diplomacy per se and to thoseresponsible orhandling ts predicaments. talso hastendedto accepttheidentityclaims of principalactorsuncritically.Countrieshave been assumedto be moreor less whatthose who act for them claimthem to be, rather hansomethingelse,suchas an instrumentof oppression.There s no logical reasonwhy this must beso, andwhy a criticaldiplomaticstudies couldnotemerge,but its uncriticalpedi-gree may prove aninsuperablebarrieror some.Why? Because the studyof diplomacyappears o offer one well-establishedway of acceptingthe constructedcharacterof social reality,withouthaving toregard t as in some way fraudulent. t directsthe observers'attention o theprac-tices and processes of negotiation that help form and maintainidentities ininternational elations. What each observeractuallydoes with the insights pro-vided by the newer approachto diplomacy outlined above is anothermatter.Suffice it to saythat f a renewedemphasison diplomacymakes it easier forpeo-ple who do international tudies to recoverwhat it is they have in common andtalk to one anotherabout t, then it is well worthundertaking.

'For Diplomacy: Representation and Study of International Relations', International Studies Review,...

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