FO B2 Commission Meeting 11-6-03 Fdr- 11-3-03 Memo From Kean-Hamilton Re 11-6-03 Meeting Agenda and...

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Lee H. H a m i l to nI C E C H A I R

ichard Ben-Veniste

M ax Cleland

Fred F. Fielding

S . Gore l ick

Slade Gorton

F. Lehman

Timothy J . Roemer

ames R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow

E X E C U T I V E D I RE CT O R

November 3, 2003

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

Subj:

Commissioners

Tom and Lee

Our M eeting on November 6 th and 7 th

W e will meet at 6:00 p.m . at 2100 K Street for a working dinner on November

6 th and then resume again from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on November 7 th .

1. Approv al of the Minutes

M inutes for the September 23 rd and October 14th meetings were circulated to

all Comm issioners last Friday . They are included at Tab 1.

2. TripReport

Philip will provide the Com mission a brief report on the just-concluded trip.

The staff met with the full range of local, international, an d American officials

or soldiers in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh), Yemen (Sana'a),Qatar (Doha),

Afghanistan (Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar), Pakistan (Islamabad, Karachi,

Peshawar), the United Arab E mirates (Abu Dhabi), and the United

Kingdom (London). Most meetings were in Saudi Arabia, Yemen,

Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The time in London included a pair of substantial

interviews with Prince Turki al-Faisal, who led the Saud i intelligence service

from 1977 to Augu st 2001.

Zelikow and Scheid went to all stops. Byman left the delegation in Sana'a.

Hurley joined the delegation in Doha. Snell went to Riyadh and remained

there, after the rest of the delegation left, to conduct further interviews of

individuals of interest, working with FBI agents who flew out to Riyadh tojoin in these interviews that the Commission had helped arrange. The

Comm ission was also accompanied by an NSC lawyer, who sat in on most

discussions with serving U .S. officials. Commission staff refused to let him

attend their meetings with foreign officials.

The staff has already prepared m ost of the memoranda for the record for their

301 7th Street SW, Suite 5125

Washington, DC 20407

T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545

www.9-11commission.gov

FOR OFF ICIAL USE ONLY

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26 Federal Plaza

Suite 13-100

New York, NY 10278

T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595



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scores of interviews, meetings, and briefings. Organized by country, these

memoranda have been assembled for your benefit in binders available this week at K

Street for any of you to review. If you have time, you might find it helpful to review

this material before the meeting.

3. Document Production

A. PDBs. We will report on the status of the discussions since our teleconference

on October 29, if you have not already heard from us in the meantime.

B. Document Production. Dan will summarize the status of document

production, highlighting areas of concern. The staff expects to recommend the

issuance of another subpoena, to the Department of Defense, for documents

from the Air Force's North American Air Defense Command and for DOD

reports from the interrogations of detainees.

4. Plans for Publication of the Commission Report

Working with Philip, we have developed plans for preparation an d production of the

Commission Report, and options for publication and distribution. These plans are

outlined at Tab 2.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7

5. MI-5 Briefing

At 9:00 a.m., Eliza Manningham-Buller, the Director of the British Security Service

(MI-5), will respond to questions about the MI-5. At Tab 3, we have provided her

biography, background materials, and suggested questions.

6. Hearings

Attached are draft agendas for the November 19 th hearing in New Jersey and the

November 20th meeting in New York City. Emily Walker an d Tracy Shycoff will be

available to answer questions about the hearing and logistics, respectively (See Tab 4).

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N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O N

T E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S U P O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T ES

Minutes of the September 23, 2003 Meeting

The Chair called the meeting to order at 9:05 AM. The Chair, Vice Chair, and Commissioners

Gorton, Gorelick, Ben-Veniste, Lehman, Fielding, Roemer and Cleland were in attendance.

Minutes. The Chair asked for approval of the minutes. Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked for

Commissioners to receive briefing materials earlier, on a Friday prior to a mid-week meeting.

He also asked for the minutes to be prepared right away after meetings. The Chair agreed. The

minutes were subsequently approved.

Second interim report. Discussion turned to the draft second interim report. The Vice Chair

noted that the draft 's key paragraph on the White House and NSC does not speak about

conditions on access. Commissioner Gorelick also noted that it did not speak about notes, and

Commissioner Ben-Veniste observed that the note-taking regulations were very hard on him.

The Executive Director noted that note-taking requests had been granted, though no requests had

been made for PDD-63 and NSPD-26. Whether this was sufficient to raise the matter of note-

taking to a level of principle was for the Commission to decide. The General Counsel suggested

an edit, to speak to some of the conditions noted by Commissioners.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste commented that the procedure set forth on PDBs was dilatory. He

did not accept going along with it, observing that it would harm the Commission's credibility.

H e observed that if the White House chose to rely on its prerogatives, the White House should

make the case, hi support of this point, Commissioner Gorton suggested striking language

concerning the White House. Edits by Commissioner Gorton and the Vice Chair were accepted.

Commissioner Gorelick asked whether the negotiations were just on conditions. Commissioner

Ben-Veniste stated no, that in the case of the PDBs the question also concerned access to the

documents. Commissioner Roemer stated his firm view that the Commission must have access

to PDBs. Discussion then suspended upon the arrival of Gen. Scowcroft.

Gen. Scowcroft's Presentation. Gen. Scowcroft noted that he was appearing solely in a

personal capacity. He thought the heart of the problem was not malfeasance, non-feasance or

ineptness, but the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community pursuant to the 1947

Act, dividing foreign collection (CIA) from domestic collection (FBI). For most of the time

since 1947, this was not much of an issue, except for some turf wars on counter-intelligence.Today, with terrorists crossing borders, th e problem is far more acute, with significant friction

between the two very different bureaucracies, hi the law enforcement approach, a forcing event

leads to an investigation. For the CIA, the approach is very different, seeking to assemble a

puzzle or make patterns out of all sources of information.

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How to fix it? General Scowcroft observed, that no matter w hat your management philosophy,

no one would build the Intelligence Comm unity the way it is built today. An MI-5 would not

work in America. The 1947 Act tried to deal in part with this problem, through the prevention

of a secret police force. This is not a serious or real problem in the United States, but it w ould be

a significant psychological problem and political problem to mo ve in this direction.

Another approach is to separate the National Security Division from the FBI, to change it from a

law enforcem ent to an intelligence m ission. Director Mueller is starting to mak e this change, as

he has created a D eputy Director for Intelligence.

Another approach is to make the agencies wo rk together. You can physically locate FBI

collectors with analysts from the FBI and CIA. This can help, but it is only a start. The

Terrorism Threat Integration Center, mentioned in the President's State of the Union address, and

created afterw ard, is still a baby in the crib. The CIA for sure, and to a lesser extent the FB I as

well, hope the baby never leaves the crib. The CIA sees the TTIC as an infringemen t on itsmission.

DNI. Com missioner Roemer asked a question ab out the Joint Inquiry's reco mm endation for thecreation o f a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Gen. Sc ow croft noted that the organization

of the 1C bears no relationship to management theory. In 1947 the Secretary of Defense wasweak, but since then he has accreted power. Today, if you bring in each member of the Defense

agencies (NSA , NIMA, NRO), and ask them for whom they work, they would say the Secretary

of Defense. We don't allocate resources in an organized way in the 1C. We just fund, and fill in,

each post hole. Would a DNI solve 9-11? Gen. Scowcroft answered his own question: no, not

immediately, but it wo uld help. He observed further that until now the 800 poun d gorilla in the

1C has been the Department of Defense. But once Homeland Security is stood up, it will be the

second 800pound gorilla. At that point, you really will need a DNI to allocate resources among

these huge, demand ing customers. The creation of a DN I will allow the Director to rationalizecollection, analysis, and presentation of intelligence in a way that makes sense. If you separate

the DN I from the CIA Director, then the DNI would have to have budge t authority over the CIAas well as other agencies.

Com missioner Fielding asked if we could glean anything from the practice of other countries.

Gen. Scow croft was doubtful. Other countries have a much m ore centralized approach, and w e

should not try to steamroll our own culture and impose something that is foreign to it.

Americans will not accept a national police force.

The Vice Chair asked about the feasibility of the DN I concept. Gen. Sco wcroft observed that the

Secretary of Defense says that he doesn't control these elements anyway. He pays for them, butthey respond to the DCPs policy priorities.

Commissioner Gorton asked abo ut the difference of intelligence collection inside the FBI, or

outside the FBI. Gen. Scow croft responded that it was fundamentally a political problem, and

that Sen. Pat Leahy, for example, had very strong views.

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Commissioner Lehman worried about what happens when you create a strong agency, so that it

becomes a Ministry of Truth. Don't you create pressure for group think and pressure to adhere to

the party line? If you put a DNI in the Cabinet, don't you also then take up his time with issues

irrelevant to his mission, such as school vouchers or pet political projects? Gen. Scowcroft said

that he did not mention making a DNI a Cabinet member, and he would not particularly advocate

it. He also thought that freeing up the DNI from managing an agency (CIA) would then enablehim to work on the central problem of the budget. Scowcroft further observed that one of his

biggest jobs during his time asNational Security Adviser was negotiating between the Secretary

of Defense and the DCI on budget issues.

Scowcroft added that he would take the DNI out of Langley, but wasn't certain he would put him

in the White House. The White House is already getting complicated enough with an NSC,

NEC, and HSC. Soon we'll need a coordinator to coordinate between the Councils. The White

House structure is just getting too complicated; he would not want to make it worse by folding

the DNI into the White House operation.

FBI. Commissioner Ben-Veniste observed that he did not think that Director Mueller would getto the finish line in the creation of an analytic core at the FBI. He observed that Mueller is an

impressive person, but the analysts are not an impressive lot. How does the FBI get the

intelligence cadre up and running? Gen. Scowcroft observed that the Commissioner had put his

finger on the problem. The FBI is close-knit, dogmatic, and one of the most ruthless

bureaucracies in Washington. Mueller is trying. Can he do it? Gen. Scowcroft has his doubts.

Each agency out waits its Director—it is just the way of life in Washington, where senior civil

servants stay in place and the next Director comes along. Gen. Scowcroft stated that he believed

it was very important to pull the National Security Directorate away from law enforcement, and

merge it with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

Commissioner Gorelick asked a series of questions: (1) Should the Homeland Security Council

be folded into the National Security Council; (2) Is TTIC being led or strangled? What does it

need to succeed; (3) Is the new requirements process spelled out in NSPD-26 working; (4) There

is a new undersecretary for Intelligence at the Department of Defense—does it work; (5) A new

Northern Command has been created; how do we get that right?

Homeland Security. Gen. Scowcroft observed that we are getting overburdened with Councils.

The practical impact is that Secretaries stop coming to meetings. Homeland Security grew like

topsy. First, it was just inside the White House. Then, a Cabinet Department was added, and

now it is both. Homeland Security just doesn't work very well. Gen. Scowcroft noted that he

wants to protect the National Security Adviser; he or she cannot be a Deputy President and ride

herd over the others; he doesn't have the authority to carry out that job. Scowcroft added that

Homeland Security doesn't have a very good reporting chain either: from Ridge, to Gordon, to

Townsend, to Rice, to the President.

TTIC. On the question of TTIC, Scowcroft thought TTIC can work, and it is working in a very

halting fashion now. The CIA sees TTIC as a zero sum game: TTIC is stealing our analysts,

analysts are a scarce resource. CIA sees TTIC as a raid on its Counter Terrorism Center; it







doesn't understand that the function is moving. Analysts on CT should go to the TTIC. For the

FBI right now, collection is geared to casework. The collection of foreign intelligence is

regarded as a bonus. The TTIC needs analysts to help guide collection, including collection by

the FBI. That is only beginning to happen. Only the DCI can make the TTIC work. But the

DCI is taking so much heat from his people, he's backed away from the TTIC.

Collection. On collection, Scowcroft observed that we organize ourselves on collection entirely

in the wrong way. We divide collection requirements by the different INTs. Instead, we need to

state requirements first, and then bring the collectors to the problem afterward. If you ask

Cabinet secretaries what they want, they don't know until the bell rings, and then they know

exactly what they want. Therefore, a DNI is needed to propose a collection requirements plan.

Defense Department. Commissioner Gorelick asked how we address the problems of the

Secretary of Defense, who says he needs assets dedicated to his purposes. Scowcroft observed

that we need to refine the definitions of national intelligence versus tactical intelligence. Defense

places many, many demands on intelligence. But so does 9/11, and that is why a DNI is needed

to allocate the scarce resources. Scowcroft said that when he and Rumsfeld met, they agreed

that Athe Community is a mess. Rumsfeld said that he will straighten things up by appointing an

Undersecretary for Intelligence. But it just makes things worse, in his judgment. On the

question of Northern Command, Scowcroft said that it is a black hole, and that he doesn't know

what it does.

Warning. The Executive Director asked the question: Who does warning on terrorism?

Scowcroft answered that the function resides somewhere between TTIC and DHS. Because

warning is closely associated with intelligence, it should be done at TTIC. The job of DHS

should be to match warning against vulnerabilities. The Executive Director asked whether John

Brennan (the head of TTIC) thought the buck stops with him. Scowcroft doubted whether he

did.

Strategy. The Vice Chair asked how do we develop a unified counter-terrorism strategy.

Scowcroft answered that it had to be through the NSC system—but that we hadn't done much on

this, because we are so busy in Iraq. Right now, we are focused on tactics, and we are pulling

petals off the flower; we are not focused on the whole plant.

Scowcroft observed that the cockpit of terrorism the Middle East. Now, the United States has

disrupted a lot of patterns in the region, and knocked over two Sunni regimes, and we don't

really understand the consequences of what we have done. One of the things we did at the end

of the Cold War was to put together an "ungroup" to think about the consequences of thecollapse of the Soviet Union. We have an enormous amount of talent in the USG, but we have

difficulty harnessing it, especially across Department lines.

NSC Structure. Commissioner Roemer asked how do we organize the NSC so that it can push

through changes, and coordinate and create a strategy. Scowcroft replied that at this level, the

question comes down to questions of personalities. Presidents operate in different ways;

different Presidents set up things the way they want it. Also the President is dealing with







personalities: Cabinet secretaries are all different.

Commissioner Roemer asked further whether the NSC is too big and unwieldy, and whether it

needs to be reformed. Scowcroft answered that he would bring the Department of Homeland

Security into the National Security Council system. You are not going to win the war on

terrorism with DHS, but it will mitigate the consequences; its resources are part of the nationalsecurity system. The system requires a National Security Adviser, otherwise the President

becomes the sole integrating officer in the USG for national security; he can't do that. The job

of the NSC is not to re-do what the Cabinet agencies do. Its job is to integrate the work of others,

not do it for them. You don't want the NSC doing what the Departments do. It is useful to trim

the tree of the NSC staff vigorously every once in a while.

Data Collection. Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked whether there is a legitimate purpose in the

Department of Defense for data collection. Scowcroft answered yes, that unfortunately

Poindexter's name is associated with it. The concept may not be the right way to do it, but the

idea truly is to find a way to "connect the dots." Every time terrorists move, they spend money

and leave a trace. How do you get actual people to look at the data? The only way you get to that

point is through an enormous amount of data sifting.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked further why this function is at defense. Scowcroft responded

that DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) has great flexibility. Commissioner

Ben-Veniste asked further whether this should be a domestic function. Scowcroft answered yes,

but that domestic agencies do not have this kind of research and development capability. He

added further that this capability could give us a real leg up in the war on terrorism.

Appreciation expressed. The Chair thanked Gen. Scowcroft for his generous time, and stated

that as the Commission gets closer to its recommendations it hopes to hear from him again. The

Vice Chair observed that the Commission learned a great deal faster from Gen. Scowcroft that it

learns in any other way. He recommended that the Commission should hear from such senior

persons on a regular basis. Commissioner Gorelick added that the Commission also needs to

hear regularly from team leaders, and the Chair replied that this had been agreed to at the

previous meeting. Commissioner Gorelick asked whether the Commission could get a copy of

the Scowcroft External Panel report on NSPD-5. The Chair asked staff to get a copy.

PDBs again. Discussion returned to the question of the PDBs. Commission Ben-Veniste noted

that instead of zeroing in on the documents we need, the Commission is being herded into a

briefing, date not set, where the Commissioners' questions may or may not be answered. He

stated that the Commission should focus on a smaller number of documents, identify them, andseek them.

The Chair observed that Gonzales has said that the Commission will get what it needs. The

Vice Chair recounted the series of proposals. The White House initially offered a briefing, with

no questions, combined with an offer that the Chair and Vice Chair could see a few PDBs later.

He and the Chair went back and stated that Commissioners must be able to ask questions. What

the Commission and White House have not been able to resolve after a briefing is what happens


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next if the process gets hung up. The Vice Chair stated that we will just have to see how it goes.

Commissioner Gorton proposed an additional edit to the draft interim report, to cut the sentence:

"We have again been assured that we will get the access we need."(Agreed.)

Commissioner Gorelick observed that the Commission absolutely need to have the EOP#3

documents in two weeks. On the question of the PDBs, she said that the Commission does nothave an infinitive time line. She observed that the Commission had blown past its own

deadlines, and that we need a clear two week timetable.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste proposed that the Commission ask for a certain, discrete number of

PDBs, so that it can look at those PDBs now. The Executive Director replied that this was the

purpose of the briefing, so that we could learn precisely what was in which PDBs, and therefore

ask for those specific documents.

Commissioner Roemer referred to the Joint Inquiry and its approach to seeking the PDBs, which

proved unsuccessful. Commissioner Gorton thought it appropriate to tell the White House

privately "you've got two weeks," and then to issue a press release at that point.

Overall recommendations. Commission Roemer stated that he thought the Commission's first

statement in July had been balanced, fair, and effective. Cooperation since that date has not been

"impressive," as the current draft states. Commissioner Roemer had three specific criticisms of

the draft statement. First, it did not provide agency by agency evaluations. Second, there was no

inclusion of a matrix comparing agency performance. Third, there was no evaluation of the

production of specific categories of documents, such as NORAD documents, policy documents,

or PDBs. He believes that the Commission loses its leverage if it gives the Administration such

high marks. Commissioner Roemer dissented from the report.

Commissioner Cleland stated that the draft interim report was all process, and didn't say much of

anything. He asked whether the report can't say something about what the Commission has

actually learned. He expressed his impatience, stating that it was time for the Commission to

"put up or shut up." He asked whether we knew anymore than when we had started: the

Commission is creating high expectations, and not getting anywhere.

The Vice Chair agreed with Commissioner Cleland's first observation: the draft interim report

indeed speaks to process. But you cannot judge surgery in the middle of the operation. He added

further that he did not know of a Congressional inquiry, or any entity, that had the access the

Commission now had. He observed that if the Commission closes off talks with the White

House, and criticizes them up and down, the White House will shut the Commission's access

down. The Vice Chair said that he did not want to suggest that he is satisfied with where we are,

but that the Commission will be better off pursuing the course of negotiation with the White

House than giving up on that course.

NORAD hearing. Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked briefly about the NORAD/FAA hearing.

The Chair and Vice Chair agreed that the hearing should be held in January, and committed to

arrange schedules to accommodate Commissioner Ben-Veniste's participation.

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Final approval. Discussion turned to final approval of the second draft interim report.

Commissioners Gorelick and Gorton appealed for unity. Commissioners Roemer and Cleland

dissented from the report. Commissioner Gorelick noted further that when the Supreme Court

is going to issue a major ruling, it tries very hard to be unanimous. Legally, a unanimous ruling

makes no difference, but it makes a big difference in terms of impact. The Chair appealed for

unity as well. The dissenting votes were unswayed.

At 12:15, the Chair adjourned the meeting.


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N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O N

T E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S U P O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S

Minutes of the October 14, 2003Meeting

The Commission met informally at 12:15 for discussions prior to the resumption of a

Commission hearing. The Chair, Vice Chair and Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Fielding,

Gorelick, Gorton, Lehman, Roemer, and Thompson were in attendance.

The Chair began by noting that a topic of media interest was an allegation of the

Executive Director's conflict of interest. Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked about the

role of the Executive Director on the PFIAB; his resignation from the PFIAB at the outset

of the Commission (February 2003) was noted. Commissioner Gorelick observed that

the General Counsel needs to take the lead in recording the recusals of Commissioners

and staff.

PDBs. Discussion ensued on the upcoming New Executive Office Building briefing on

the question of Presidential Daily Briefs. The Chair explained what had been proposed

originally by the White House, and why this fell fa r short of what the Commission

believed it required in terms of access. He explained that he and the Vice-Chair would

present a proposal on access to Judge Gonzales as soon as the Commission had

formulated one, and the Judge had agreed to a prompt response. Commissioner Roemer

noted that he believed it was critical to have direct access to the PDBs. The Commission

needs to know what the President knew and when he knew it, and that access to the PDBs

was important to know the best of what the intelligence community was producing. He

noted that access to PDBs is a key area where the Commission can add value.

Because of the press of time, Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked once again that the

Commission meet more frequently. Commissioner Gorton concurred, and stated his

belief that the Commission will soon need to be meeting each week.

FAA problems. Team Leader John Farmer briefed the Commission about the FAA's

failure to produce documents. He and Team 8 members discovered during the course of

field investigations several types of documents present at regional offices that were not

produced in response to document requests. This discovery became a source of acute

embarrassment to the FAA. Under the threat of subpoena, and pressure from Dan Levin,

the FAA produced approximately 20 boxes of documents late on October 10th. Farmer

did not know whether the documents fulfilled the document request; it would takeconsiderable time to review the documents, and in any event the delay in production

would result in a significant delay of Team 8'swork.

Subpoenas. Team Leader Farmer's presentation led directly to a discussion about

subpoenas. Commissioner Gorelick said that she intended no disrespect to any Agency—

many if not most of which had taken document requests seriously and made substantial

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efforts to comply with them. Nonetheless, she believed strongly that subpoenas should be

issued across the board to all Executive branch agencies. She stated her belief that the

Commission should have known before this would be the case, and the Commission

should certainly know now, that confirming subpoenas are necessary. Commissioner

Ben-Veniste and Gorton agreed. Gorton called the FAA's behavior an absolutely

shocking instance of failure to respond. Commissioners Gorton and Gorelick both statedthat they are increasingly concerned that the Commission cannot meet a May 27 th

deadline.

Discussion ensued. Commissioners Gorelick and Ben-Veniste stated their belief that the

issuance of subpoenas was not, and would not be viewed as, a hostile act and that the

Commission would get more compliance with a subpoena than without it. Commissioner

Thompson stated his belief that a subpoena would be seen as a political act.

Next Steps. The Commission decided that the Chair and Vice Chair should meet with

Judge Gonzales as soon as possible. The Chair and Vice Chair decided to cut short their

press availability at the close of the day's hearing, and postpone any statement until thefollowing day. Staff were instructed to draw up alternative press statements and options

for the issuance of subpoenas for discussion later in the evening after the conclusion of a

Commission briefing at the New Executive Office Building. The Commission resumed

its hearing at 1:45 PM.

The Commission resumed its meeting at 6:30 PM, with all Commissioners present.

Whom to Subpoena. Commissioner Gorton began by stating that he believed it to be

very important that the Commission proceed with unanimity. He spoke in favor of

alternative #1, issuing a subpoena to the FAA, combined with a warning to other agencies

and a requirement that they provide certification promptly as to the completeness of their

own document compliance efforts.

Commissioner Ben-Veniste disagreed. He spoke in favor of alternative #2, an issuance of

subpoenas to all agencies. He stated he saw no reason why the Commission shouldn't use

every tool in its toolbox, and use the tools the Congress saw fit to provide it.

Commissioner Gorelick strongly concurred.

The Vice Chair stated that he leaned toward the first option. Additional subpoenas are

based on a prediction, and the Commission does not now know whether other agencies'

behavior merits a subpoena. The course of cooperation has gotten the Commission a

mountain of material, and has worked reasonably well. Commissioner Gorelick

disagreed, that the provision of mountains of material was not dispositive as to whether

the Commission had received the material it needs. She added further that if the

Commission had to wait for evidence of failure, it would be too late for a subpoena to

work, and too late for the Commission to do its job.

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Commissioner Ben-Veniste expressed his view that the issuance of a sole subpoena

would only defer an inevitable decision on broader issuance. He reiterated his strong

sense that, given the provocation, the Commission needed to use all the tools it has.

Comm issioner Roem er spoke in favor of the issuance of subpoenas to the FAA and other

agencies. He stated that for the purpose of unity, he would agree to a subpoena of just theFA A for now, reserving the right to return to the question of additional subpoenas later.

Comm issioner Lehman stated his interest in a subpoena of NORAD in addition to FAA .

The Chair spoke in favor of a subpoena of FAA alone.

Decisions. After additional discussion, the Commission decided, without dissent, to issue

a subpoena to the FAA, w ith a warning that additional subpoenas would be issued if

necessary. Further, it called upon staff teams to use the next two w eeks to test the level

of compliance by Executive branch agencies and report back to the General Counsel w ith

recommendations, where appropriate, for the additional issuance of subpoenas.

Commissioner Roemer stated his belief that too much time was being spent on accessissues and that there should be a very short period of time to conclude negotiations on

PDB s. The Chair and Vice Chair agreed.

The Chair and Vice Chair discussed with the Comm ission informing Judge Gonzales of

the Comm ission's decision on an FAA subpoena the next morning before releasing a

public statement. The Commission further decided that the Chair and Vice Chair shouldask the White House for Comm ission access to all PDBs responsive to its request.



FO B2 Commission Meeting 11-6-03 Fdr- 11-3-03 Memo From Kean-Hamilton Re 11-6-03 Meeting Agenda and...

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