Problems in Desert Warfare

U.Se Marine Corps

FMFRP 0-58

PCN 11o 000580 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380—0001

19 October 1990

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

FNFRP 0-58, Problems in Desert Warfare, provides an overview ofthe problems encountered in desert warfare and some of theirsolutions.

2 • BACKGROUND

a. Desert operations have much in common with operations inthe other parts of the world. The unique aspects of desertoperations stein primarily from deserts' heat and lack ofmoisture. While these two factors have significant consequences,most of the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures used inoperations in other parts of the world apply to desertoperations. The challenge of desert operations is to adapt to anew environment.

b. FMFRP 0—58 was originally published by the Air Commandand Staff College in 1982 as a student report. Major Allan R.Becker wrote the report. FMFRP 0-58 was published in August 1990as Operational Handbook 0—58.

3. SUPERBESSION

Operational Handbook 0—58, Problems in Desert Warfare; however,the texts of FMFRP 0-58 and OH 0-58 are identical and OH 0-58will continue to be used until the stock is exhausted.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Users' comments are valuable to improving this manual. Submitcomments to ——

Commanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development Command (WF12)Quantico, VA. 22134—5001

5. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

N. P. CAUL1'ELDMajor General, U.S. Marine CorpsDeputy Commander for Warfighting

Marine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

D1ST 14000058000

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REPORT NUMBERTITLE

82—0205

PROBLEMS IN DESERT WARFARE

AUTHOR(S) Major Allan R. Becker, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR Major Richard C. Radawicz, AC SC/EDO WC

SPONSOR Lt Col Gary B. MclntireDefense Nuclear Agency / Forces Division

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND. STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

PREFACE

The author's purpose in studying desert warfare was toidentify the basic, continuing problems the desert poses formilitary operations and make the results readily availableto other military readers. The .study.was preparedfrom un-classified material to permit greater distribution and en-courage its use at the unit level. In researching the study,the author found that most classified information on desertproblems was classified due to the information source, notbecause of the actual problem itself, and that virtually allidentified desert problems could be found in unclassifiedmaterial. The problems discussed in the study should providea basic level of knowledge for anyone who will be involved indesert operations and should present a point of departure forfurther study of particular3 specific problem areas.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PrefaceExecutive Summary

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTIONSignificance 1Study Objective 2

CHAPTER TWO - BIOMSDICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DESERTBackground 3Water Requirements 3Acclimatization 5Disease 6Food Problems 7Treatment of Wounded 8Clothing 8Chemical Warfare 9

CHAPTER THREE - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICSPROBLEMS IN THE DESERTBackground 11Ducting Problems i_iMultipath Propagation 12Attenuation 12Static 13Impact on Military Operations 13

CHAPTER FOUR - OPTICAL PROBLEMS IN THF DESERTBackground 15The rjndisturbed Desert 15The Disturbed Desert 16Visual References 17

CHAPTER FIVE - MOBILITYBackground 19Mobility Problems 19

CHAPTER SIX - AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE ANDOPERATIONS IN THE DESERTAircraft Maintenance 21Aircraft Operations - 23Helicopter Operations 25Aircraft Ground Protection 25

• Summary 26

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CONTINUED

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CHAPTER SEVEN - DESERT SURVIVAL FOR AIRCREWSBackground 27Ditching and BailoutSurvival Environment 28Ivlirages and Illusions 29Water 30Travel 30Signaling 31

CHAPTER EIGHT - FINDINGSConclusions 33Recommendations 34

BIBLIOGRAPHY 35

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A

Part of our College mission is distribution of theAstudents' problem solving products to DoD

sponsors and other interested agencies toenhance insight into contemporary, defense. related issues. While the College has accepted thisproduct as meeting academic requirements forgraduation, the views and opinions expressed orimplied are solely those of the author and shouldnot be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 82-0205

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ALLAN R. BECKER, USAF

TITLE PROBLEMS IN DESERT WARFARE

I. Purpose: To identify the operational and logistical problemsencountered by military forces operating in equatorial desertsand derive lessons learned that are applicable to today's forces.

II. Problem: Though desert warfare occurs frequently, UnitedStates military forces have not conducted large scale combatoperations in the desert since World War II. The experiencesof World War. II and those of Arab-Israeli forces in 1967 and1973 need to be studied, updated, and distributed so the basiclessons learned in these conflicts can be used to prepare UnitedStates forces for future desert operations.

III. Data: By the end of World War II the United States haddeveloped a desert training program based on experience gainedduring the early years of the war. Much of the informationtaught in •that program, such as basic desert survival, medicalproblems, and vehicle and, aircraft maintenance procedures, re-mains valid today and provides a good starting point for thisstudy of desert warfare problems. A second source of informationon desert warfare is the recent Arab-Israel.i wars which providevaluable information on the effectiveness of modern weapon sys-tems. The final category of sources of information is the num-erous government sponsored studies of the Arab-Israeli wars thatfocus on lessons learned in the conflicts. When these threemajor sources of information are studied together they providea comprehensive overview of the. problems encountered in the desert.

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"insights into tomorrow"

CONTINUED

IV. Concluslons The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars provedbeyond doubt that high-intensity, sophisticated air and groundcombat can be conducted in the desert with existing United Statesand Soviet equipment. The study concludes that the problems ofdesert warfare are merely inconveniences that hamper operationsand can be overcome. This is the same conclusion that the UnitedStates Army reached in World War II. United States forces canlearn the basics of desert living and fighting if properly trainedand exercised in the actual desert environment.

V. Recommendations: The conclusions of this study indicate thatvirtually all problems encountered in desert warfare can be re-.solved by thorough training and the basing of units in the desert.Desert training should first be conducted in the classroom andthen extensively exercised in an actual desert for long periodsof time. In addition, United States forces should be based atlocations where they operate daily under desert conditions, eitherin the southwest United States or overseas. It is only throughactually living and training in the desert that United Statesforces can fully develop their desert warfighting potential.

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Chaptar Ora

INTRODUCTION

SIGNIFICANCE

Desert warfare is unique because of the hostile environmentin which it is fought. Military operations in the desert arecharacterized by fluid, highly mobile, shifting battles amongwidely dispersed units. Engagements of ground forces are frequent.,rapid, and often occur during darkness so opposing forces canavoid detection and the extreme daytime temperatures o± the desert.Deserts are generally sparsely populated, relatively empty andundeveloped. Desert terrain lacks vertical development, as wellas natural cover, and the hostile desert climate can severelyimpair the effectiveness of both men and equipment. Deserts ofpolitical and military importance exist throughout the world.They range from the Death Valley (below sea level) to the Saharaand Atacania (elevations over 10,000 feet). Desert surfacesvary throughout the world and. include alluvial plains, bare rock,eroded rock-strewn areas, dry lake beds, salt flats, dry marshes,dry riverbeds, and shifting sand dunes. All deserts, however,are characterized by a lack of rainfall and many, the Saharafor example, experience the highest temperatures registered onearth.

This study of desert warfare problems concentrates on theSahara Desert sinceit is a typical equatorial desert and exten—sive military operations have been conducted there in recentyears. The Sahara is of' particular interest to the United Statesbecause of the continuing instability in the region and thepossibility of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force deploying to thearea. U.S. military experience in the Sahara goes back to WorldWar II when air and ground operations were conducted across NorthAfrica. Since then additional experience in desert warfare hasbeen gained from the recent Arab-Israeli wars and US, trainingexercises.

A thorough understanding of the problems encountered indesert warfare is important to military leaders since the UnitedStates has not conducted large scale military operations in adesert environment since World War II. U.S. forces are traine.dand equipped primarily for a central European war and their onlyrecent combat experience occurred in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

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The terrain, climatology, and development of the desert istotally different from Europe or Southeast Asia and it causesthe conduct of desert warfare to differ fundamentally. Thedifferences result from ambient temperature extremes, lack ofwater, sand and dust, optical phenomena and illusions, terrain,and electromagnetic effects. These desert characteristicsshould be of prime interest to U.S. military commanders pre—paring forces for desert combat since they influence day to dayoperations, battlefield tactics, and regional strategy.

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this study is to identify operational andlogistical problems, unique to the desert, that U.S. forcesare likely to encounter when deployed to a desert region. Thestudy deals primarily with experiences of U.S. forces fightingin North Africa during World War II and with observations ofthe recent Arab-Israeli wars. The study begins with the bio-medical problems the desert poses, followed by the electromag-netic, optical, and mobility problems. The final chapters con—cern aircraft maintenance and operation, desert survival, andconclude with the author's conclusions and recommendations. Itis the author's hope that the historical experiences presentedand discussed herein will provide other military readers addi—tional insight into the nature of desert warfare and allow themto avoid the same problems and pitfalls experienced in the past.

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Chapter Two

BIOMEDICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DESERT

BACKGROUND

The severe desert environment causes unique biomedicalproblems for military personnel. The extreme heat and low hu-midity of the desert affect human water requirements, acclimati—zation, physiological processes, and treatment of the sick andwounded. Other problems not directly associated with heat aridhumidity that also cause medical problems are diseases, insects,and chemical agents. Meteorlogical conditions, such as glaringsunlight, windstorms, and drastic daily temperature changesalso cause medical prolems. While the average temperature inthe Sahara is about 52 F in the winter0and 90 F in the summer,the extremes vary between200F and 130 F, with temperature dropsof 25-50°F occurring at sunset. These temperature variationsare greatest on the plains and tend to decrease at higher alti-tudes. (8:B—1)

To appreciate the seriousness of medical problems that mayconfront a deployed military force one need only look at theUS, operation in Lebanon in 1958. In the first week of theoperation, 1,100 of the 5,000 man force became ill with diarrhea.(8:B.-2) In World War II whenever U.S. troops first entered adesert region, both in the United States and overseas1 they en-countered many heat casualties, By the end of the war,.however,the U.S. Army concluded that environmental heat was just an-additional handicap that could be tolerated and would not pre—vent effective military operations, provided preventative inea-sures were taken. (8:B-2) The following discussion will addressthe most significant medical problems experienced to date indesert regions. It is extremely important for commanders at alllevels to be knowlegeabie of these medical problems and to con-duct training and preventative measures to minimize their affects.

WATER REQUIREMENTS

Inhabitants of temperate zones do not appreciate the im-portance of water to everyday life as do the inhabitants ofequatorial deserts. For example, there is no one word in theEnglish language that means "to die of thirst", yet in Arabic

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there are eight degrees of thirst expressed in the language.Arabs express Ghirst in terms of simple thirst,.burning thirst.vehement thirst, burning thirst with dizziness, and lastly ex-cessive thirst —— the thirst that kills. (8:B—15)

In desert combat all movement is driven by the availabil-ity of water. A military. column may run, out of fuel and faceno immediate danger, however, when the same column exhausts itswater supply, the entire force becomes vulnerable. Troops incombat must be assured a plentiful supply of water i± they 'areto conduct effective operations. Locating water in the desertis a major problem, siñce.most subsurface desert water is highlymineralized and rapid, large scale. purification facilities arenormally, not available. (8:B-15) The problem of locating water'in the desert is so serious that Soviet desert combat units areassigned special detachments for drilling wells. (11:Ch 14)

Thermal regulation is the main physiological problem thehuman body encounters, in the desert when water is in shortsupply.. The body's primary physiological cooling mechanismsare sweating, panting, and salivation. Another, less importantmechanism, is the distribution of heat through the blood systemwhere it is dissipated by radiation, conduction, and convection.These mechanisms are. reduced in effectiveness when ambient airtemperature is higher than body temperature. When temperaturesare high, however, evaporation increases and partially compen-sates for the inability of the other mechanisms to adequatelyfunction. (8:B-11)

The thermodynamics of sweating are simple. Water evapo-rates at any temperature and the evaporation process uses.energyin the form of body heat. As sweat evaporates from the bodysurface the body is cooled. The body rotates sweating amongthe groups of sweat glands and the prevention of sweating onone part of the body normally increases sweating over anotherpart of the body. The ability to sweat increases with acclima-tization and sweating can. occur at rates from 0.5 to 3.0 quartsper hour. (8:B-13) The sweating process is essential for bodycooling and it can consume large quantities of' water duringstrenuous activity in hot eather. For example, a man walkingat 3 miles per hour in 100 F, heat requires about one quart ofwater per hour to continue the evaporative process and maintainbody fluids. In general, desert troops need up to 12 quarts ofdrinking water each day (Soviet planners allocate 8.5 litersper man per day) when engaged in hard physical activity. (11Ch1Ll)The water should be consumed in small amounts so water lossthrough excessive urination is kept to a minimum. Tinder normalclimatic conditions, thirst is an adequate indicator of' thebody's need for.water. In the desert, however, thirst is notan adequate means of determining the body's true water needsand dependence on thirst can lead to involuntary dehydration.

(8:B-16) The sheer bulk and weight of water required to sup-port a military force constitutes a significant logistics prob—lem. In addition, the water must be of sufficient quality toencourage drinking by the troops. (8:B-5)

The loss of body salt is a common side effect of sweating.The salt deficiency develops a salt is lost from the bodythrough sweating and it is not possible to build up the body'ssalt supply in advance. To try to do so is not a good physio-logical practice. Standard military rations provide sufficientsalt for normal desert activity. The Israeli Army did not usesalt tablets during the Sinai campaign in 1973arid they experi-enced no cases of heat exhaustion. It is necessary to givespecial attention to men who manifest anorexia to ensure theyintake sufficient amounts of salt. (8:B-16)

ACCLIMATIZATION

Unfortunately, an individual arriving in the desert froma temperate zone is initally unable to perform hard physicalwork until he acclimates to the desert. The acclimatizationprocess can take from two to four weeks and in some cases itmay not be possible. Acclimatization remains with an individ-ual for about two weeks after leaving the desert, however, itwill continually decrease during the period and should be con-sidered when rotating troops into and out of the theater orgranting leave. (8:B-6)

Acclimatization is necessary for the human body to grad-ually adapt to the desert's high ambient temperature and lowhumidity. The process also conditions the body to solar radi-ation, biting insects, blowing sand and dust, limited water,the sun's glare, optical illusions, and mirages that affecttroops in the desert. In extreme instances the body mast adaptitself for exposure to temperatures as high as 150-160 F. Theacclimatization process eventually conditions the individualto tolerate the temperature, humidity, and solar exposure ofthe desert environment. (8:B-6) Rapid, successful acclimati—zation requires planned, disciplined periods of progressivelylonger physical activity in the desert climate. Exposure toheat alone will not promote acclimatization. The individualmust engage in physical activity for acclimatization to occur.(8:B-23) The last, and perhaps most important aid to effectingacclimatization is to keep the troops in top physical condition.This allows them to better withstand the stresses of exposureto the desert environment and to engage in a more rigorousprogram of activity during the acclimatization period.

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DISEASE

In preparing for World War II, U.S. medical officers weregreatly concerned about the appalling list of diseases commonto African and Middle Eastern deserts. (8:B-26) These diseasesinclude malaria, yellow fever, typhus, small pox, dysentery,sandfly fever, arid all forms of venereal disease. The diseasesare transmitted by biting insects, prostitutes, arid unsanitarymessing conditions. (8:B-6) The lack of water in the desert isthe major cause of the poor sanitary conditions found among thenative population. Most water supplies are heavily contaminatedand must be purified prior to consumption. The use of humanfeces for fertilizing is common and local fruits arid vegetablesmust be thoroughly cooked before eating.

The most frequently encountered diseases among troops inthe desert are malaria, gastro-in-tes-tinal diseases, and venerealdiseases. Malarial control of the troops prior to deploymentinto the desert is extremely important. Once in the desert,malaria must be kept under control, since recurrent malarialattacks are extremely dangerous where water is in short supply.Malarial control in the desert will be difficult unless a newinsecticide is developed that will replace the no longer used,but highly effective, DDT. (8:B-27) Gastro—intestinal diseasescan be expected to cause the greatest manpower loss. For example,during the first week of U.S. operations in Lebanon, over 20 per-cent of the 5,000 man force contracted diarrhea. Gastro-intestinaldiseases are usually transmitted through the food and water supply,which in turn are often contaminated by the lack of effectivesewage disposal. Venereal diseases are the third major groupof diseases common to the desert. In addition to the seriousaffects of the venereal diseases themselves, they make the patientmore susceptable to heat injury. Venereal diseases can be ex-pected to create a serious loss of manpower if effective indoc-trination and control programs are riot instituted and strictlyenforced. (8:B-26-27)

Fever and dehydration also seriously compound the e.ffectof heat stress on the body. Hormonal and catabolic responsesto disease increase the body's requirement for water and changethe physiology of the cardiovascular system. The body's ré-sponse to thermal stress creates cardiovascular side effectsdeterimental to the body's overall efficiency, particularlyduring illness. The superficial blood vessels in the body dilatecausing an increase in the overall capacity of' the circulatorysystem. This forces the body to draw fluids from other partsof the body into, the circulatory system in order to prevent hy-draulic inefficiency. The effect of this fluid transfer appearsas orthostatic insufficiency and decreased cardiac efficiency.The transfer of plasma water also causes an increase in the redblood cell and protein concentrations in the body. The sumeffect of these body responses is increased viscosity of the

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vascular fluids which in turn creates an added burden on theheart. This additional strain on the heart can be fatal if theeffects of heat stress are Pot relieved by the body's normalevaporative dissipation of heat. (8:B-'14)

U.S. troops stationed in desert areas during World WarII found insects such as flies, sand flies, mosquitoes, ticks,lice, and fleas very irritating and annoying. (7:17-18) Theyreported swarms of flies that appeared from nowhere arid de-scended upon them causing constant irritation and scratching.The sand fly poses an even greater problem since it transmitssand fly fever. Concentrations of mosquitoes, potential malariacarriers, were also found along coastal areas with the insectsmaking their appearance at dusk and then disappearing around8 o'clock in the evening. (726) To protect deployed troopsfrom disease carrying insects the troops must be issue,d amplesupplies of insect repellent. The repellent should be gener-ously applied around the neck, wrist, and ankles so that clothingopenings may remain open and permit circulation of cooling air.(8:B—9)

FOOD PROBLEMS

The nutritional requirements of troops in the desert donot differ from those in other parts o± the world, with theexception of the increased water requirement. The messing systemincludes all aspects of food processing, preparation, serviceand storage. It faces unique sanitation and spoilage problems,due to the desert climate, that make it a potential source ofgastro-intestinal diseases. (8:B-27) The everpresent shortageo± water compounds the problem of' sanitation throughout themessing system, since large quantities of' water are needed toclean and sanitize utensils.

At first it would appear that dehydrated rations are idealfor use in the desert, however, in reality they offer few advan-tages. The food processing procedure used to dehydrate andfreeze dry foods leaves a residual bacteria population that iscapable of rapidly multiplying when exposed to high temperatures.Rehydrated food that is allowed to stand, such as in large messhalls, can quickly spoil and become a source of dysentery. Afurther disadvantage is that dehydrated foods require water forreconstitution, and as a result increase the water transpor-tation and distribution requirement. Lastly, troops do notaccept rehydrated rations as readily as canned rations and therefusal to eat can become a critical problem since it sharplylimits the body's salt intake. (8:B—28) As a result, individualmeal service rations are advantageous at operating locationswhere sanitation problems may be encountered. The individuallypacked rations also eliminate the need for water and fuel usedto clean the mess kits and eating utensils.

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TREATMENT OF WOUNDED

The desert environment, combined with the mobile natureof desert warfare, creates problems in first aid treatment 2ndevacuation of wounded. Since desert operations are frequentlyconducted by small, mobile, dispersed units, norma]. battlefieldfirst aid may not be available. In addition, the dispersal ofthe units increases the problem of evacuating casualties fromthe battle area. In World War II it was learned that the stan-dard military ambulance was not suitable for use in the desert.It had poor traction, was too hot inside, and it had too higha silhouette. The Jeep was quickly modified to carry littersand it provided an effective substitute for the ambulance.(8:B-17) In modern operations, troops will be heavily dependenton helicopters for evacuation of wounded from dispersed fightingpositions. As a result of the dispersal of units and problemsproviding forward medical care, it will be necessary for combattroops to be highly trained in first aid.

In the desert, low humidity combined with unfiltered solarultraviolet rays keeps the surface bacterial count lower thanthat of other areas, such as farms or urban centers. As a result,it is expected that a decrease in the frequency of secondarywound infection will occur in the desert, as compared to otherregions. (8B-18) The heat arid low humidity, however, alsohave negative medical effects, such as accentuating shock andincreasing the need for intravenous fluids.

Troops exposed to the desert environment for any lengthof time can expect a variety of ailments that effect their per-formance and comfort. During a recent British operation inKuwait, the troops found that the sand laden wind caused manycases of conjunctivitis (inflamed eyes), epistaxis (nose bleeds),cracked and bleeding lips, and a few cases of sore throat. TheBritish also found that skin creams, and lotions were in greatdemand among the troops. (8:B—18)

CLOTHING

Clothing in desert regions serves different functions thanit does in cold climates. In the desert, clothing providesprotection from radiant and convective heat gain and also actsas a partial vapor barrier around the body. In deserts, looseclothing that permits extensive ventilation and, is vapor perme-able is best. Impermeable garments and equipment, such as bullet—proof vest and some chemical warfare outfits, create seriousbarriersto the body's normal evaporative cooling process. Theeffects are compounded when boots, helmets, masks, and gloves

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are worn. As a result, troops should not be expected to engagein prolonged heavy activity when clothed in impermeable garments.(8:28)

In World. War II,. desert troops tightly closed all the open-ings arid ventilation ports of their uniforms in an effort toprevent insect bites. This hai -the effect of eliminating thecirculation of cooling air and increasing the body's heat load.Today, troops should be issued adequate amounts of insect repel-lent so all exposed skin around clothing openings can be heavilytreated with insect repellent. This permits the clothing open-ings to remain open and thereby increases the circulation ofair and evaporation of sweat. The net result is that the troopsare able to function more effectively in high temperatures. In-the British Kuwait operation, the troops found the need for ahead covering which provided proteà-tion from the sun, would notbe blown away by thewind, and could accomodate earphones andgoggles. They also preferred loose -trousers to -tight ones fordesert operations and found that sweat rags they used needed tobe highly absorbent and, most important, nonabrasive. (8:B—18)

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Chemical warfare in the desert should be considered aneverpresent possibility and troops must be trained and equippedto function in a chemical environment. The high temperature,low humidity, and meteorological phenomena of the desert combineto influence the employment and effectiveness of chemical weapons.The desert's high temperature increases the volatility of mustardand V agents (nerve gas) arid the low humidity slows down theprocess of degradation hydrolysis. These effects cause an in-crease in the persistency of many agents when employed in thedesert. The lack of vegetation on the desert's surface generallypermits higher surface winds which will dissipate gas clouds.more quickly than in other areas. At nighttime the usual temper-ature inversion will tend -to trap chemical agents near the sur-face and make them more persistent between dusk and dawn. Dur-ing daytime the reverse occurs and the use of chemical agents isprohibitive. Asa result, the time of day chemical agents areemployed is critical, to their effectiveness and persistency.

During the daytime, both ultraviolet and infrared radiationaffect the way chemical agents penetrate the body. Ultravioletradiation produces hyperemia (redness) of the skin which allowseasier penetration of V agents, while infrared radiation bringsmore blood to the skin causing increased penetration of bothmustard and V agents. Sweating increases the blistering effectof mustard gases, while in the case of V agents it retards pene-tration through the skin because the V agents are soluble insweat, (8:B-3o-31) The need to wear chemical warfare equipment

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can be expected -to significantly degrade morale since troopswearing impermeable outfits must function in a high humiditymicro-environment that creates extreme heat loads which in turncause fatigue, exhaustion, and inefficient performance.

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Chapter Three

COM1TUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS PROBLEMSIN THE DESERT

BACKGROUND

The desert produces several unusual phenomena that affectthe performance of communications-electronics equipment. Themost significant is ducting, a phenomenon that causes radiowaves to bend either toward, or away, from the earth's surface.A second phenomenon is multipath propagation. It reduces elec-tromagnetic signal strength and affects radar performance. Athird phenomenon is signal attenuation caused by dust clouds andthe fourth is the static discharges that occur around radio an-tennas. The effects produced by these phenomena are well under-stood and occur in specific frequency bands. These phenomenaare important to both commanders and equipment operators. Theymust understand the performance limitations the desert imposeson their equipment and exercise preventative measures wheneverpossible to minimize the degradation these phenomena cause. Abrief discussion of each phenomena follows.

DUCTING PROBLEMS

The temperature extremes which occur between day and nightin the desert frequently create severe temperature inversions.These inversions cause the index of refraction to be non-linearin the vertical plane. This inhomogeneity in the lower atmo-sphere causes an upward deflection, or ducting, of electromag-netic signal during the day arid a downward ducting during thenight. Ducting occurs almost daily in the desert, whereas ina temperate climate, such as Washington D.C., it occurs onlyL.6 percent of the time. The effects of ducting are significantin the UHF, SHF, and microwave frequency spectrums. (8:17)

During the day, radio waves from ground stations are sub-refracted upward and a vertical duct is created. Stations out-side the direction and range of the duct receive either a faded,weaker signal, or no signal at all. This upward ducting is theprimary cause of signal fading in the desert. Due to thisfading, the radio horizon distance for an antenna in the Saharais 1.8 to 5.5 percent less than for the same antenna operatedin the United States. The variation in percent of reduction

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is due to the use of maximum and minimum monthly averages ofthe index of refraction in both the Sahara and the lJnjted States.Experience indicates that communication equipment operated inthe Sahara Desert requires LI. to 8 db more than in the UnitedStates for equal coverage. (8:A-15)

Night ducting results in the opposite effect and can con—siderably increase radio and radar range. At first the rangeincrease appears desirable,. however, some tactical considerationstend to negate the advantages of the increased range. For ex-ample, increased radio range may transmit friendly c3mxnunicationswell beyond normal radio range and make them subject to exploi-tation by the enemy. The increased range may also cause friend-ly radio coverage to overlap creating frequency congestion.Further, it is also possible that civilian communications fromwell outside the battle area may be received and mistaken forenemy jamming or intrusion. Any civilian signals received willalso compound the frequency congestion problem. The extendedrange of radar signals produces undesirable clutter on radarscopes and makes target acquisition arid trackingmore difficult.A final problem is that radar operators may attribute the in-creased range to good radar performance and then be deceivedwhen atmospheric conditions change and the effect of groundducting is reduced. The experience of the equipment operator,on that particular system at that particular location, is thecritical factor in determining whether ducting or equipment mal-function is occurring. (8:A—15)

MULTIPATH PROPAGATION

The non-linear index of refraction, caused by desert tem-perature inversions, also creates multipath signal propagationproblems. The multipath propagation problems are centered inthe C and S frequency bands and cause the loss of a large per-centage of targets on early warning and GCI radars.. In a UnitedStates government test conducted over a western desert, 83tarets flew controlled profiles 25 miles from the radar ataltitudes between 1,000 and LI.,000 feet above the desert. Testresults showed that radar tracking loss occurred on 50 percentof the aircraft targets involved in the test. (8:17-18)

ATTENUATION

A third major communications problem encountered in thedesert is attenuation of electromagnetic signals due to absorp-tion by dust clouds. Electromagnetic attenuation becomes appre-ciable (0.2db per kilometer) in the X band and higher frequenciesand is more pronounced when larger dust particles arid denserdust clouds are present. In extremely dense dust clouds,

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attenuation also occurs in the lower frequency bands. (8:18)The most common source of dust clouds that affect militarycommunications are moving vehicles arid helicopters. Generally,the effects of electromagnetic attenuation are minimal for thefrequency bands and ranges used for communication within vehi-cle convoys.

STATIC

A fourth phenomenon common to the desert is radio staticcaused by the electrification of dust clouds. The static resultsmainly from corona discharges from atennas and other metallicobjects. The amount of static increases as dust cloud densityand wind velocity increase. (8:A—7)

IMPACT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

The phenomenon described in the previous paragraphs causevarious degrees of degradation, including unpredictable per-formance, for many electronic systems. Understanding and antic-ipating these problems allows the military force to train foroperations in a degraded electronic environment and also avoidtactical errors caused by misinterpretation of radar and radioperformance. Of the four phenomenon described, ducting andmultipath propagation are potentially the most serious problems.The remaining problems, attenuation and static discharges, haveless impact on military operations since they are recognizableandcan be accommodated.

The problems caused by signal ducting arid multipath prop-agation are insidious; there is no way to detect when, or towhat extent, they are affecting equipment performance. Changingatmospheric conditions determine the severity of the ductingand, consequently, the maximum range of a radar, or radio, signalwill vary considerably through the course of a 2.4 hour day.Although the ducting effect is unpredictable, an experiencedradar operator, familiar with. the local radar scope picture,should be able to compensate for the increased clutter throughfrequent tuning and careful scope interpretation.

The effects of multipath•propagation on radar performanceare also insidious. This phenomenon appears in the C and Sfrequency bands and poses a serious limitation on the effective-ness of radars in those frequency spectrums. Radars in thesebands should not be relied upon for early warning and GCI controlin the desert.

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Chapter Four

OPTICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DESERT

BACKGROUND

The desert is envisioned as an ideal optical environment.The openness of the terrain and lack of clouds often permitunlimited visibility. The excellent visibility of the desert,however, also creates disadvantages such as the inability toavoid detection by the enemy. The desert optical environmentshould be addressed in two basic conditions; the undisturbeddesert and the disturbed desert. In the undisturbed desert,optical phenomena are natural effects caused by solar heating,whereas in the disturbed desert they are primarily meteorologicalor man-made. The major optical advantage of the desert is visi-bility and it is primarily due to the lack of trees, vegetation,and clouds. The major disadvantage is dust and in most desertbattles the problem is usually too little visibility rather thantoo much. (8:E-5)

THE UNDISTURBED DESERT

In the undisturbed desert, optical problems result fromheating of the desert surface and convection in the atmosphereimmediately above the surface. This solar flux and the lowthermal conductivity o± desert soil results in high surfacetemperatures which in turn cause a strong convective motion ofthe air over the surface. This air motion causes heat shimmering.and the appearance of a haze along thedesert surface. The hazeseverely restricts vision in the horizontal arid its effects varywith wind and the surface dust content. During World War II,visibilities as low as OO yards were common in the haze andaircraft could not be detected from the ground unless they passednearly directly overhead. (7:29) Because of the haze, theIsraelis found early morning the ideal time for photo recoririais-sance missions. Interestingly, however, they flew most of theirreconnaissance missionS at noon when the Arabs were relaxing andtaking a mi4day rest.. (8:E-6)

Solar radiation heats the desert surface and causes shim-inering. This shimmering reduces the resolution and stabilityof small images and makes it difficult to focus or preciselyalign optical instruments on them. Surface glare is another

15

problem of the desert. It produces an effect similiar to "snowblindness" and nampers the effective use of optical instruments.The combined effect of glare, haze, and shimmering is to blurthe edges and fine detail of images making detection, identifica-..tion, ranging, and tracking almost impossible. These effectsalso cause problems in such basic functions as aiming a rifle ata small target in the desert. (7:13)

THE DISTURBED DESERT

By far the most serious impediment to optical functions inthe desert is dust. In battle the dust problem becomes veryserious because of heavy vehicle movements, shell bursts, muzzleblasts, and smoke generated by the battle. The Israelis founddust and smoke to be the major cause of optical problems. Prob-lems occurred when troop attempted to acquire targets, aim,fire, and follow tracers. (8:E—8) Visibility in battle was sopoor that Israeli tanic commanders fought with their heads out ofthe hatches to overcome the limited visibility. The fact thatthey continued to operate with open hatches after heavy casualtiesamong tank commanders indicates the seriousness of the visibilityproblem in the battle area. (8:E-8) Dust also causes considerablephysical damage to optical equipment by deterioriating lens coat-ings and filtering into all orifices and openings causing substan-tial damage to bearing surfaces. The Israelis state that thevery fine, highly abrasive dust of the Negev and Sinai Desertsdeteriorates optical equipment so rapidly that they must be ré-coated and polished every 18 months. (8:E-1O) The combinedeffects of dust and heat also accelerate the deterioration ofrubber componets, such as eye pieces and lens covers. Combattroops must be trained to operate their weapons in a. heavy smokeand dust laden environment if they are to obtain maximum perform-ance from their weapons in the dusty desert environment.

Desert sandatorms and dust storms are another source ofoptical problems. Sandstorms, sometimes misidentified as duststorms, consist of large particles and extend only a few feetabove the desert surface. The smaller particles of dust stormssometimes reach several thousand feet into the air. Dust stormscan produce zero-visibility and last for several days at a time,severely limiting combat operatiors and reconnaissance. InWorld War II, Rommel frequently used dust storms to conceal hismovements and preparations for attack. Blowing sand and dustalso create a "sandblasting" effect that deteriorates opticalequipment and damages lenses, Optical lenses should, therefore,be covered at all times when the equipment is not in use. (8:E-8)

Thermal infrared imaging systems have been tested for usein the desert's haze and dust environment, but have not performedwell due to attenuation and scattering by silicate compounds

16

uniqueto desert dust particles. Tests conducted from aircrafthave been significantly more successful than ground tests, dueto the much smaller amount of dust that must be penetrated whenviewed from directly above. The tests suggest that hazeariddust effects may not be as serious as previously thought. (8:

E—11—12)

VISUAL REFERENCES

The final optical problem is the lack of visual references,such as hills, trees, vegetation, that can be used to help pin-point a location. This poses a potential problem for artillery,forward air controllers, pilots, arid gunners since it will bedifficult to visually reference, or acquire, a target that ismomentarily sighted against the barren desert background. Groundtroops would be wise to use this to their advantage and intent-ionally establih their positions away from visible featuresthat could be used as fire control reference points by the enemy.

17

Chapter Five

MOBILITY

BACKGROUND

The vast expanse of maneuvering terrain causes desert war-fare to be very fluid and makes mobility a prerequisite foreffective combat operations arid logistical support. In thedesert, as in any other war zone, the ability to concentratesuperior firepower at the decisive time and place normallydetermines the victor. Because of the openness of the desertand wide dispersal of units, vehicular mobility determines theability to mass and engage forces. Desert terrain varies fromsalt flats to impassable mountains and vehicles designed forone terrain or purpoe may be significantly less effective whenused on different terrain. For example, wheeled vehicles operatewell on paved roads and salt flats, but are severely restrictedon soft sand or bedrock fields. Tracked vehicles, on the otherhand, operate on virtually all surfaces, but cannot achievehigh rates of speed on any. In general, tracked vehicles arebest for desert combat operations and wheeled vehicles are bestfor rear area support functions where they can operate on theexisting road network. (8:C-i,6)

MOBILITY PROBLEMS

The major mobility problem in the desert is controllingthe contarination of engines caused by airborne dust particles.Dust is gcnerated by the wheels and tracks of moving vehiclesand is diEtributed by the air currents surrounding the movingvehicles and natural desert winds. In the desert's low humidity,dust particles lack cohesiveness and once disturbedthesrnallerparticles remain airborne for extended periods. The airborneparticles are ingested into engine air filters arid cause thefilters to clog, restricting air flow in to the engine. Whenfilters are not properly maintained poor engine operation (re-duced power, excessive fuel consumption, overheating and pre-mature engine failure) results. U.S. military specificationsstipulate a service life of at least 20 hours for air filters,however, most U.S. vehicles do not meet this specification. Forexample, the Army's 2--ton truck (MLiLA2) will require air filterservicing every 2-5 hours when operated in zero-visibility condi-tions in the desert. (8:C-4) Another problem is higher engine

19

operating temperatures caused by dust accumulations on radiatorfins arid other cornponets. The dust acts as insulation whichdrastically reduces cooling efficiency and causes overheatingor 'engine failure. Besides degrading the. efficiency of heatexchangers, the dust particles cause abrasion of fan blades andsuspension componets, and reduce the visibility of vehicledrivers. (8:C—17)

Another series of vehicle probems are caused by the desert'shigh ambient temperatures (over 110 F). The cooling and lubri-cating systems of most U.S. vehicles are marginal, to inadequate,at the 125 F temperature stipulated in the military specifica-tions. Performance of these systems is further reduced whendust and oil are allowed to build-up' on vehicle heat exchangersand other componets. The combination of high ambient temper-atures, inadequate cooling systems, and rough terrain oftennecessitate that vehicles be operated in lower gears. As aresult, maintaining engine operating temperature within limits,not actual engine power, is often the limiting factor in operatingvehicles in the desert. High ambient temperatures also cause aloss of rated engine power that can be significant, when combinedwith high pr8ssure altitude.- A one percent loss of power occurswith each 10 F temperature rise (most engines are rated at in-duction-air temperature of 60 F) and an additional three percentis lost for each 1,000 fee.t above sea level. In the desert, atan altitude of 2,000 feet above sea level with the engine intakeair (under the hood) temperature ranging from 200-250 F, a typicalvehicle experiences a 20 percent loss of-rated power. (8:C-23)

Standard military vehicle maintenance procedures are adequatefor use in the desert, provided the maintenance depot is air con-ditioned, or as a xnininum it is supplied with filtered air. Fieldmaintenance is more difficult, but it can be performed if certainprecautions are observed. Vehicles should be allowed to coolfor a minimum of four hours and it may be necessary for mechanicsto wear heavy gloves when handling componets in order to-avoidburns.' When conducting field maintenance extreme care must beexercised, to avoid introducing dust or sand particles into criticalcomp'onets.

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Chapter Six

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONSIN THE DESERT

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Aircraft maintenance in the desert is an endless struggleagainst sand and its effects. In 194Li, U.S. aircraft mechanicsenroute to North Africa were taught:

Sand is the foremost foe of your equipment. Not onlythe sand on the terrain, but the dust found in sus-pension in the air.. Whenever the hard crust of thedesert has been broken, there is dirty work afoot.There is the deadly scratching, gouging action ofquartz-hard grains and pebbles, and the terrificabrasive qualities of dust with the fine consis-tency of talcum powder.... The life of an airplaneand its parts is unbelievably short once you letsand and dust get the upper hand. (5:1)

The problems sand and dust cause aircraft are similiar to thosethey cause vehicles. •The particles cause abrasion, cloggingof filters, contamination of fluids, and deterioration of seals.Each of these effects are potentially disastrous, not only forthe obvious flight safety reasons, but also because they reducethe combat effectiveness of the force.

When preparing a particular model and series of aircraft.for desert operations, applicable maintenance technical ordersshould Le consulted to determine any unique problems the air-craft may encounter. The technical data provides the approvedhot weather and desert maintenance procedures. In addition,the following general maintenance rules should be observed whenmaintaining aircraft in the desert.

1. Locate maintenance sites on hard stands whenever possi—ble, or on terrain where fine sand grains of high quartzcontent are at a minimum.

2. If possible, locate maintenance sites to the windwardof abrasive, loose sand areas. Consider carefully the direc-tion of prevailing winds and avoid locating maintenance sitesin the path of blowing sand that results from disturbances

21

of the deserts surface.

3. When conditions permit, improvise some sort of shelterwhich will minimize sand interference with servicing. Acanvas lean-to, a half-tent, afl improvised nose hanger,or a sand-break around the airplane, placed to windwardare effective.

4. Keep the maintenance site free of sand and dust.

5. During violent sand si-id dust storms, postpone repairsarid service (if possible) until the storm abates. Do onlysuch work as cannot be injured by dust or sand.

6. These general rules cover conditions peculiar to desertmaintenance. Rigidly follow the detailed aircraft technicalmanual for normal servicing. (52-3)

The following general rules provide guidelines for the preventionof damage caused by sand and dust abrasion.

1. The most injurious action of sand arid dust resultsfrom its adherence to oil-bearing surfaces. When mixedwith oil, desert dust becomes an efficient grinding agent.Guard against it constantly, especially around close fittingparts or parts that work against friction. Clean, inspect,and lubricate regularly, frequently, continuously. Thisis a must.

2. Surfaces tha-t must be lubricated should be cleaned ofsand and dust, inspected, and re—lubricated (lightly) muchmore often than during non-desert operations. Many surfaces(normally lubricated in non-desert areas) can be best oper-ated dry in the desert. They must, however, be cleaned ofsand and dust and inspected as frequently as possible.

3. Lubricate sparingly and only where absolutely necessary.Sacrifice lubrication rather than risk the grinding, abra-sive action of sand and dust.

4. On landing, immediately seal all openings on the air-craft with dust-proof covers arid after engine shut-downimmediately install the intake and exhaust covers. Keepall covers on the aircraft while on the ground, After ser-vicing, replace seals immediately.

5. Do not lay tools on the, desert ground, Every article,large or small, is either lost, stolen, or damaged whenplaced on the ground in the desert. If you must lay partsor tools on the ground, place them on a clean ground clothor put them in a suitable clean receptacle.

22

6. i'1éta1 parts removed brom aircraft should be carefullycleaned, sealed :fl containers, and stored in lockers andbins away from sand and dust. (5:2-3)

In addition to the aove rules, certain precautions shouldbe observed when performing maintenance in high daytime tern—peratures. While the heat is uncomfortable, it poses no prob-lems that cannot be overcome if some basic "heat facts" arekept in mind. First, surface temperatures are determined bythe heating effect of the sun minus whatever cooling effectmay occur due to the wind. When there is no wind, or the veloc-ity is low, aircraft skin temperature will run between 1.4 arid1.5 times higher than the free air temperature. During R8d Flag80-4 in Nevada,.ramp temperatures frequently exceeded 125 F.It was so hot that several men wearing steel toed boots blisteredtheir feet and had to replace their boots with tennis shoes.(9:Ch 4) Whenever possible, aircraft should be parked under atleast a partial cover to shade and cool the section of the air-craft under maintenance. In the shade the aircraft skin tem-perature will be somewhere between the free air temperature and1.4 times free air temperature. In the daytime, metal surfacesof the aircraft will often be too hot to touch and maintenancepersonnel should be issued gloves or mitts that will permit themto handle, metal tools or surfaces. Mats and pads should also beused to protect knees and elbows and it is also advisable towrap tool handles with cord or tape to avoid burned hands. Asa final precaution, whenever possible, maintenance on exposedaircraft should be scheduled. for early morning, late afternoon,evening, or night, when the desert heat is less intense. (5:4)

AIRCRAFT 0PERATI0S

Experience of the US. and its allies indicates there areno significant problems that inhibit aircraft from operatingin the desert. High performance aircraft will, however, needto operate from sites with hard surface runways and, suitablemaintenance facilities in order to conduct sustained operations.Virtually all aircraft experience degraded performance when oper—ated in the desert at high ambient temperature and high pressurealtitude. For example, during Red Flag 80-4 the U.S. Air Forcefound the performance of the A-b severely degraded when the air-craft was operated in the desert. The high temperatures andpressure altitudes reduces "G" available, increased turn radii,caused excessive airspeed bleed-off, and decreased the aircraft'soverall effective and survivability. (9:Ch 2) The effectsare well understood and are addressed in detail in each aircraftperformance manual. (8:D-5) There are, however, unuSual desertconditions involving sun, sand, wind, and visibility which callfor pilot awareness and modification of techniques.

23

During preflight pilots and crewchiefS must keep in mindthat aircraft st4rfaces exposed to the sun will be very hot.Both should wear gloves. Because running engines generate dustclouds, ground operating time should be kept to an absoluteminimum and as many preflight, checks as possible should be pre-formed prior to engine start. Once engines are running, pilotsshould minimize the use of power and avoid blowing dust and sandat other aircraft, personnel, or ground equipment. This holdstrue for all taxiing and in. extreme instances it may be desir-able to tow aircraft to the end of the runway for engine start.

After engine start, pilots must carefully monitor the tem-perature and pressure of the various lubricants, hydraulics andcoolants on the aircraft. Avionics cooling will probably be in-adequate during ground operations and it will be necessary tooperate the avionics systems only after becoming airborne. Themost logical approach to this problem is to briefly turn on theequipment for a ground check, then turn it off as soon as possibleand not operate it again until airborne. Pnother ground problemoccurs at the end of the runway where quick-check and armingdelays create the potential for overheating and blowing dustand sand. The marshalling crew.chief and the pilot must be awareof the locat ion of each aircraft in order to avoid blowing sandor hot jet wash on other running aircraft. The effects of blow-ing sand on running aircraft are obvious. High temperature jetwash blowing on an aircraft will often activate aircraft temper-ature sensors, such as engine inlet duct temperature or radarcooling, and cause mission essential systems to fall off the line.The jet wash temperature problem will be significant during theheat of the day. Whenever possible, aircraft start, taxi, andtakeoff should be staggered to avoid these problems.

Once airborne, the desert presents unique problems, for thepilot. Visibility is extremely good, and as a result distancesare very deceptive. Generally, an inexperienced pilot will under-estimate range and should multiply his range estimate by a factorof three to compemsate for the good visibility. The intense,glaring sunlight of the desert is another problem and, tactically,it makes undetected enemy attacks a constant possibility. Whenon the offense, pilots should attack with the sun at, or neartheir back whenever possible. Attacking from the sun also elim-inates most shadows that degrade optical weapon guidance and makevisual target acquisition difficult for pilots. Though attackfor the sun is generally a good rule, it should not. be followedto the point of making tactics predictable. (5:9—10)

Dust storms also cause visibility problems over the desert.They rise as high as 8,000 feet above the surface and often re-duce visibility to less than 100 yards. Dust storms are a factorin tactics, since maneuvering and suprise attacks often occurunder their cover. They., also provide concealment for withdrawing

2L

forces and evasive maneuvers. Intelligent use of moving dustcan be a factor in tactics and may make a suprise attack ortactical withdrawal successful. Other visibility problems arecaused by heat distortion, Heat distortion, the result or heatwaves at the surface, causes images to shimmer arid makes posi-tive identification difficult. Heat distortion also affectsdepth perception during landing and causes pilots to flare toohigh. The depth perception problem can be minimized by usingobjects and references j the pilots periphereal vision to helpjudge height over the runway. (5:10)

HELICOPTER OPERATI ONS

U.S. helicopters and V/STOL aircraft have only limited ex—perience flying in the Middle East and North African deserts.The combination of high elevation and extremely high temper-atures frequently requires heavy lift helicopters to use theirabsolute maximum performance to overcome the degradation of theirlift capability. Operations with little, or no, excess power inthe hot, elevated, arid areas, calls for steep, dangerous, land-ing approaches. Airborne sand and dust also create hazards dur-ing landing approaches and hovering. Sand and dust are pickedup and circulated by the helicopter rotors and create local sand-storms that envelop the hovering helicopter. The pilot requiresvisual references to continue the hover, or land, and when theyare lost in the dust cloud he must immediately transition to aninstrument takeoff or risk loss of aircraft control. (5:32-33,37)

Helicopters and V/STOL aircraft experience excessive corro-sion of engines, propellers, rotors, and other componets whenexposed to sand and dust particles during takeoff, hovering, andlanding. Sustained operations increases maintenance and sparepart requirements J'or these aircraft because of the corrosioncaused by this "sandblasting effect's. Dust build-up on intakesand aerodynamic surfaces also affects engine and aerodynamicefficiency and must, therefore, be carefully monitored. (8:D-5)

AIRCRAFT GROUND PROTECTION

One of the most important lessons learned in the Arab-Israeli wars is the vulnerability of unsheltered, runway de-pendent aircraft. (6:L46_47) In 1967, a full 98 percent of theArab aircraft destroyed were destroyed on the ground, eitherparked on open ramps, in open bunkers, or taxiing toward the run-way. (iO;1l9; 3199? Following the war, the Egyptians construc-ted twenty new airfields, each with multiple runways and hardenedaircraft shelters. They erected bombproof hangers, dispersedtheir aircraft, and when the 1973 war occurred the Israeli AirForce was unable to destroy Egyptian aircraft on the ground.

25

(2:21; 12Ch 5) The Egyptians also used decoy aircraft on theirramps in an effort to confuse the Israeli pilots; however, theIsraelis attacked from such close range that they were usuallyable to discern which were decoys and not expend ordnance onthem. (LI.:258) One Israeli officer credited their successinidentifying decoys to both the poor quality of the decoys andgood intelligence. He stated that on attacks near Ismailiasome decoys were hit, but on the Sinai airfields, where intelli-gence was better, there were no mistakes. (1:85) The lessonslearned by the Egyptians in 1967, and their total success inresolving the identified problems prior to the 1973 war, clearlyhighlights the importance and effectiveness o± passive protectionmeasures for aircraft on the ground.

SUIVIMARY

In summary, the problems caused by the desert environmentvary from the normal only insofar as the natural characteristicsof the desert emphasize the sun and suprise during flight. Onthe ground sand and dust are the major problems, however, theycan be controlled through a well managed .maintenane program.Pilots and maintainers who understand the desert can minimizeit's negative effects and at the same tine maximize the advan-tages the desert offers.

26

Chapter Seven

DESERT SURVIVAL FOR AIRCREWS

BACKGROUND

At the start of World War II U.S. airmen were poorly pre-

pared for desert combat or survival. The Desert Training Center

in the southwest United States proved of little value in train-

ing aircrews for the war in North Africa primarily because the

program was based on limited survival experiences that occurred

in United States deserts. The problem of survival in the North

African desert during World War II was further compounded by the

fact that no organized search and rescue force existed. Searches

that did occur for downed airmen were planned and executed by

their squadron mates when the battle situation permitted.

Following the war, the consensus among rescued airmen was

that the survival training and briefings they received were woe-

fully inadequate. The men were simply not trained or briefed on

what to do when forced down in the desert. (7:1,28,32) The re-

mainder of this chapter will discuss several specific aspects ofdesert survival experienced by airmen during World War II in

North Africa, and include ditching and bailout, the survivalenvironment, mirages and illusions, water, and signaling.

DITCHING AND BAILOUT

Desert surfaces vary greatly from eroded rock-strewn areasto dry lake beds. When faced with the decision to ditch or bail-

out, the pilot must carefully consider the terrain he is over.

Although ditching is often possible because of the flat, barren

desert terrain, ditching should be made prior to fuel starvation

so that aircraft power is available when executing the forcedlanding. In World War II many pilots attempted to stretch their

range prior to ditching and flew the aircraft until it ran out of

fuel. After rescue, they all agreed that a power—on ditching was

much safer than a dead—stick landing in the desert. (7:5) With

todayTs high performance jet aircraft, ejection would be prefer-able to ditching in virtually all situations.

Sandstorms. and high desert winds also cause problems for

airmen forced to bailout. They found that parachute descents

27

were particularjy hazardous during sandstorms and they were oftenbuffeted about and tossed in all directions by the winds. In oneinstance an airman was so badly peppered with flying sand and pel-lets -that he could hardly stand when he reached the ground. An-other airman's face and hands were raw and bleeding when he landeddue to the abrasive effect of flying sand. Parachute landingswere usu.lly uneventful, although some serious sprains, bruises,and, abrasions occurred when airmen descended into rough terrain.The desert of southern Libya and the Sinai caused the greatestnumber of minor injuries due -to the numerous large rocks andboulders found in those areas. (7:4)

Once on 'the ground, airmen found it extremely difficult toloca'te other crew members or the aircraft crash site. In oneinstance a British bomber crew bailed out of their aircraft asclose together as possible, however, in -the four days that followedtill they were rescued, none of them saw any of the other crewmembers. Another crew bailed out of their light bomber in apoorly planned manner and spread themselves over twelve miles ofdesert. Numerous other instances demonstrate the value of care-fully planning for emergency bailout and in one instance a wellplanned bailout resulted in a crew of six men all landing withinfour hundred yards of each other. (7:4-5)

SURVIVAL ENVIRONIVIENT

The effects of sun and heat, combined with the lack of water,proved the most dangerous environmental factor that confronteddowned airmen. The bright sun was hard on eyes, extremities,skin, and sunburned hands were reported as particularly painful.The daily temperature extremes of the -desert were terribly bother-some. The daytime heat caused exhaustion and severely limitedphysical activity, whereas the bitter cold night limited sleepand caused exposure problems. (7:12,20,34) Dust and blowingsand were frequently mentioned as problems and the medical reportson many rescued airmen indicated mild to serious sinusitis, prob-ably due to irritation caused by the dust particles. The menalso complained of continuous sore eyes caused by the sun'sglare and abrasions of the eyelids and eyeballs caused by blow-ing sand and dust particles. These airborne particles also gotinto ears, nostrils, and mouths and sometimes caused severe irri-tation. One survivor reported the abrasions on his eyes, causedby dust particles, reached the poin.t where his eyes watered sobadly he could not see, arid when the watering stopped his eyelidswere like emery cloth. (7:12,20) Many survivors talked of theneed for sunglasses or goggles to protect their eyes from thesand and sun. Sunglasses intended for survival must be carriedin a safe location, either in the airman's personal equipmentor the survival kit, so they will remain with the airman throughthe bailout and landing.

28

Most desert survivors reported the presence off'ljes andother insects, even in remote areas. In one instance, flieswere so bothersome in the middle of the day that rest or sleepwas impossible. Another survivor reported he was not botheredby flies until be fell and scratched his arm; almost immediatelyflies appeared and he was unable to keep them away from the minorwound. Sand flies are even more troublesome due to their smallsize, painful bite, and the fact -that they an crawl throughtthe finest nets. Sand flies otten carry sandfly fever, however,their worst eect appears to be -the constant scratching thatresults from their bites. Insect repellent is the best way tokeep sand flies away since they are small enough to penetratemost rnosquitoe nets. Mosquitoes should also be expected in thedesert. The are reported to be particularly abundant near thecoast and inland marshes. Desert survivors found little in theway of desert wildlife to bother -them. Instead, the irritationarid annoyance caused by flies, sand flies, ticks, mosquitoes,lice, and fleas proved to be the most significant problem andit was limited primarily to the daylight hours. (7:17,21,26)

MIRAGES AND ILLUSIONS

Mirages are common -to the desert and pose a potential prob—lem for survivors. They are caused by the uneven density of theair near the surface and appear as a sheet of water on the desert.Mirages cause problems primarily in travel since they make itdifficult to judge distance and obscure the intermediate terrainthat is hidden by the mirage. Mirages can be expected to hampervision, navigation, and in some instances to magnify or concealobjects. Under these conditions visual acquisition of aircraftor vehicles is difficult as is trying to signal them. Thoughreports of mirages are very common, in most cases they wereeasily recognized as mirages and caused only minor difficulties.(7:13)

Another desert optical illusion is caused by atmosphericrefraction and results in distant, objects appearing closer thanthey actually are. The conditions and effects are similiar tothose that cause electromagnetic ducting and when the condi-tions occur distant objects appear closer and objects belowthe horizon are visible. Under slightlydifferent conditionsatmospheric refraction causes light waves to reach the observerby two or more different paths, causing distorted or multipleimages of the object. Illusions also occur at dawn and dusk.The most interesting of these is the false-dawn illusion thatoccurs when the sun's spectral light appears on the westernhorizon. The fact that the sun initially appearedin what wasthought to be the west has caused many anxious moments for desertsurvivors. (7:13)

29

WATER

Few airmen can expect to land in the desert with an ade-qute water supply. In nearly all desert survival reports, air-men attempted to obtain water by searching for wells, cisterns,or oases. Some sought relief from thirst by sucking on smallpebbles, chewing grass or leaves, arid sucking the juices fromsnails Without water the lips usually became the first partof the mouth to dry out, crack, and become painful. The useof a chap-stick, or some type of grease will help prevent dry-ing of the lips. After about five days without water, survivorsreported the skin began to peel from their tongues and mucousmembranes, In World War II, many survivors found relief fromthirst by locating water in the radiators and supplies of abari-doned and derelict vehicles that were abundant in the NorthAfrican desert. Other, less imaginative survivors, overlookedthis potential source of water. During World War II airmenwere specifically warned that alcohol, in any form, shou1 beavoided in a survival situation, Alcohol should be considereda food, not a source of water, since alcohol requires water fordigestion and excretion from the body. (7:15,17,34-35)

TRAVEL

Experience fro'm World War indicates an uninjured man iscapable of traveling 12 to 18 miles a day on average terrainat the beginning of the survival experience. As heat and thelack of water take effect, the daily distance decreases. Gen-erally, this becomes noticeable about the fifth day, and by thefourteenth day many men were able to travel only 1 to 2 milesa day. Theaverage time spent walking by World War II survivorswas 5 days, however, 20 days or more were not uncommon and onegroup traveled for 29 days. The greatest distance traveled bya group of survivors was 350 miles and the average distance was50 miles. (7:8)

It appears nighttime travel and daytime rest would be bestin the desert, however, the survivor must consider that hischances of contacting passing vehicles or aircraft will be lessat night than during the daytime. In World War II, men whotraveled at night sought daytime shelter in caves, in the shadeof trees or rock piles, arid many found that burying themselvesma shallow depression tended to reduce water loss, aid relax-ation, and allow some sleep. Those who traveled during daylighthours found the physical effects of' the sun and heat severelyhandicapped their ability to travel. The most satisfactory timeto travel is the early morning or late evening. (7:34-35)

Standard issue flightsuits proved quite satisfactory fordesert travel. Whenever possible gloves arid headgear shouldbe retained for protection from the sun, however, substitutes

30

can easily be made from parachute cloth if necessary. Govern.ment issue boots are also very satisfactory for.desertuse.Several survivors, however, experienced difficulty replacingtheir shoes due to the swelling of their feet that Occurredwhen the shoes were removed during rest stops. One group ofsix survivors was forced to continue their travel barefoot be—cause they could not get their swollen feet back into theirshoes. Other men who walked barefootc.d across alkaline swampsor salt flats reported they suffered alkali burns on their feet.(7:19,35)

S IGNALING

Most signaling problems encountered in World War II havebeen resolved over the years. The creation of dedicated rescueforces and development of modern survival equipment will nodoubt make desert rescues more rapid and successful. Opticalproblems in the desert, however, continue t affect signalingand rescue operations. The desert haze, coupled with the effectsof inirages,complicate signaling. The haze often limits visibil-ity to LOO yards,.. or less, and makes it impossible to see air-craft or survivors unless looking directly up or down throughthe haze. The haze also makes it very difficult to positivelyidentify ground parties as friend or foe; consequently, survivorsoften hesitate to establish contact with ground parties or air-craft until they are relatively sure of identification or aredesperate enough to surrender if necessary. (7:28-29)

Though modern survival radios and signaling devices willusually lead to quick rescues in the future, airmen must beprepared to communicate with less sophisticated signaling andcommunications techniques in the event the modern equipment isis lost or fails. The experiences of World War II airmen dis-cussed above provide a valuable source of information on basicdesert survival.

31.

Chapter Eight

FINDINGS

CONCLUSIONS

The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars proved beyond doubtthat high-intensity, sophisticated air and ground combat canbe conducted in the desert with existing United States andSoviet equipment. Throughout the world native populationslive in deserts and indigenious military forces operate dailyin them. It logically follows that United States forces canlearn the basics of desert living and fighting i1 properlytrained and exercised in the desert environment. The documentsresearched for this study support this observation and lead tothe following conclusions concerning desert warfare.

1. Medical problems can be controlled through education,training, careful sanitation arid messing procedures, andample supplies of insecticides arid insect repellents.Acclimatization problems can be minimized by maintainingtroops in. top physical condition while in garrison and bya comprehensive acclimatization program when deployed.

2. Electromagnetic problems are not significant and theycan be overcome with training, except in the case of multi-path propagation in the C and S radar frequency bands.Radars in these bands should not be relied upon for earlywarning or GCI control.

3. Mobility in combat is best provided by trackedvehicles;however, wheeled vehicles perform well in rear support areaswhere they can operate on the existing road network. Ex-treme care must be taken to keep engine cooling systemsand air filters free of sand and dust. Vehicle performancewill often be limited by engine operating temperature, notby available.power, Careful operator maintenance is re-quired to keep military vehicle in operation.

Li. Optical illusions and mirages do not present major prob-lems if they are understood by the troops. The shimmeringof images caused by surface heat can significantly degradevisibilityand make optical tracking systems ineffective.Blowing sand and dust cause wear on optical len.ea an

33

equipment and, consequently., optical equipment must beprotected at all times.

5. Aircraft maintenance can be effectively performed inthe desert if precautions are taken against sand, dust,and the daytime high temperatures.

6. Aircraft operations are degraded by the high daytimetemperatures. The high temperatures result in longer take-off rolls, reduced thrust, and smallerpayloads. Temper-ature affects virtually all aircraft. Blowing sand anddust also deteriorate aircraft componets and are a factorin helicopter and V/STOL operations.

7. Modern survival equipment should permit rapid recoveryof downed .aircrews in most cases. When evading, or withoutsurvival equipment, it is possible to survive in the desertfor several weeks and travel substantial distances if pro-perly trained in desert survival techniques.

RECOM1VNDATIONS

The conclusions listed in the preceeding section indicatethat virtually all problems encountered in desert warfare canbe resolved by familiarizing the troops with the desert environ-ment and then conducting extensive training exercises in thedesert. To achieve this realistic training, the following recoin—mendations are suggested.

1. Training and Indoctrination. Desert problems occurbecause troops are unfamiliar with the environment. Theseproblems, which include most medical, optical, electroniag-netic, and mobility problems identified in the study, canbe resolved by thorough training and indoctrination. Thetraining should first be conducted in the classroom andthen extensively exercised in the, field in actual desertsfor long periods of time.

2. Operational Training. Both air and ground forces musttrain as they intend to fight in the desert. Current train-ing exercises are of too short a duration to identify longrange problems and provide the forces the desert experiencethey need to develop and refine maintenance and employmentprocedures. The United States should base combat and sup-port units at locations where they operate daily underdesert conditions, either in the southwest United Statesor overseas. It is only through actual operations in thedesert that United States forces can fully achieve theirdesert warfighting potential.

31.j

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Books

1. Churchill., Randolph S. and. Churchill, Winston S. The SixDay War. Boston: 1-loughton Mifflin Company, 1967.

Articles and Periodicals

2. Coleman, Herbert J.. "Israeli Air Force Decisive in War,'Aviation Week and Space Technology, (3 December 1973):pp. 21.

3. Dinwiddie, James F., Col, USAF Ret. International Symposiumon The 1973 October War, (28-31 October 1975): pp. 199.

4. Reagan, J.F. "Air Power Over Sinai," Ordnance, Vol. 52,No. 285 (November-December 1967): pp.258.

Official Documents

5. Arctic, Desert and Tropic Information Center. The Desert(Lecture II - Maintenance, Operations, and Camouflage).Eglin Field, Florida: Arctic, Desert and Tropic Informa-tion Center, undated (about 192.14).

6. Gunnerson, Stanley ., Maj, USAF. A Study of AirpowerEmployment in The Six-Day War. Maxwell AFB, Alabama:Air University, May 1971.

7. Howard, Richard A. Sun-Sand And Survival, An Analysis ofSurvival Experiences In Desert Areas. ADTIC PublicationNo. D-102. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, Jan-uary 1953.

8. Institute. For Defense Analyses. Review of Selected DesertWarfare Problems. Arlington, Virginia: Institute ForDefense Analyses, Systems Evaluation Division, April1972. SECRET. Classified by ARPA-TIO, Institute ForDefense Analyses, downgraded at 12 year intervals, notautomatically declassified.

35

CONTINUED

9. Mac D.ow.ell,. Paul. fl.., Maj.,. USAY. Final Reort RDF Red Flag8bLi 3 June 1980 - 3 July 1980. Nellis AFB, Nevada:i4.44.Oth Tactical Fighter Training Group (Red Flag),12 September 1980. SECRET. Classified by Red. FlagSecurity Classification Guide, declassify on 1 June 1992.

10. Stromberg., Ronald.D.,. Maj,. USAF. The Israeli Answer: AClassic Employment of Airpower. Maxwell AFB, Alabama:Air University, June 1968.

11. U.S. Army Command. and General Staff College. ContingencyOperations (Middle East Setting), in Selected ReadingsIn Tactics No. 100-2, Vol. 3. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,August:.. 1976

12. U.S. Army ommand arid General Staff College. The 1973Middle East War, in Selected Readings In Tactics No.100-?, Vol. 1. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1980.

B. RELATED SOURCES

Books

Herzog, Chiazn, Maj Gen. The War of Atonement. Boston: Little,Brown, and Company, 1975.

Jackson, Robert. The Israeli Air Force Story. London: North-urnberland Press Ltd., 1970.

Palit, D. K., Maj Gen. R.eturn To Sinai. New Delhi: Palit andPalit Publishers, 19714..

Schiff, Zeev. October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973. Tel Aviv:University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974.

Stevenson, William. Zanek! A Chronicle of the Israeli AirForce. New York: The Viking Press, 1971.

Weizman, Ezer. On Eagles' Wings. New York: MacMillian Pub-lishing Company, Inc., 1977.

36

_-

CONTINUED

__________

Articles and Periodicals

Handel, Michael I. "The. YomKippur War and the Inevitabilityof Surprise,1' International Studies Quarterly, (Sep-tember 1977): pp. 474_475.

Rodwell, Robert R. "Concrete fibber Conceived in France,"Flight International, Vol. 92, No. 3066 (14 December1967): p. 1013.

"Warning: No Easy Victories," Newsweek, (22 October 1973):

pp. 64 and 79.

Young, Peter. "The Arab—Israeli War," Royal Unitedtion Journal, Vol. 112, No. 648 (November 1967): P. 331.

Official Documents

Byrd, William B., Jr.,.Maj, USAF. USAF Heavy Lift Helicopters'Employment in a Hostile Middle East Desert Type Environment.Maxwell AFBI Alabama: Air University, May1974.

Defense Intelligence Agency. A Summar of Lessons Learned InThe Arab-Israeli War of October 1 U • DIA DirectorateFor Intelligence, August 197 . SECRET NOFORN Classifiedby DIA—Di, exempt from general declassification schedule,declassification date indefinite.

Department of Defense. Lessons of the October War: The Viewsof the Israeli Generals in January 1975. Washington D.C.:Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), 1975,SECRET/NOFORN. Classified by DASD (R&N),exempt. fromgeneral declassification, declassification date indefinite

Digby,JaITleS. pern Weapons For Non-NATO Contingencies Reportp-6521. Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,December 1980.

Olschfler, Clarence .E.. m Air Superiority Battle In The Middle1967_-_1973.. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army

Command and General staff College, 1978.

37