FM 100-2-2 July 1984

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Headquarters

Oepartment of the Army

. "--+---",--- \\-

SPECIALIZED WAR FARE

AND REAR AREA SUPPORT

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication contains technical or operational information that

is for official Government use only. Distribution i s limited to US Government aaencier. Rsauesta- - 7 - -from outside the US Government for release of this publication under he Freedom of Information

Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to H Q TRADOC. Ft Monroe. VA 23651.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Field Manua l

No. 100-2-2

"FM 100-2-2

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Wash~ngton,DC, 16 July 1984

THE SOVIET ARMY:

Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support

PREFACE

This field manual is part of FM series 100-2,TheSot r i e tAmy . The other volumes are

FM 100-2-1,m e Sozriet A r m y : O p a t i o r z s a n d T ac tic s, and FM 100-2-3,The SorMet

A m y : Troops,Organization atzd Equipnzent.These manuals cannot stand alone but

should be used interchangeably.

These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassified information on

Soviet ground forces and their interaction with o ther services in combined arnls

warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they

will be updated periodically. More information would become a.railable in the event o f

war o r national emergency.

Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submitcomments for its improvement. Key comments to the specific page and paragraph in

which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure

understanding and complete evaluation. To send changes or comments, prepare DA

Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and fomard it

to Deputy Commander,USA CACDA, ATTN: ATZL-CAT, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

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The cover design is an adaptation of this patch which

is worn bySoviet motorized rifle troops, whose organiza-

tion is representativeof the Soviet combined arms theme.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Quick Reference

CHAPTER TITLES NUM BER

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NTRODUCTION 1

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

HELIBORNE OPERAT IONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PERATIONS 5

RIVER CROSSINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OUNTAIN WARFARE 7

PAGE

1 I N T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 1

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -1AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 1 -1SPECIAL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -1

. . . . . . . . . .A I R B O R N E O P E R A T I O N S 2 - 1DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 -1MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2

Strategic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2Operat iona l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2Tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2

Specia l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 3ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT . . . . 2 - 3

A i rbo rne U n i ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 3Air Del ivery Capabi l i t ies . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 3

TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 4CONDUCT OF AIRBORNEOPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 5

Plann ing and Preparat ion . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i r M o ve m e n t 2 - 6

Ai rdrops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 - 6Drop Zone Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 7Movem ent to the Ob ject ive . . . . . . . . . 2 - 7The At tack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 8The Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 9L inkup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 10

3 H F L I B O R N E O P E R A T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . 3 -1DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1

ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -1TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2

Plann ing Considerat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2Command and Con t rol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2

CHAPTER TITLES NUM BER

DESERT WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8COMBAT I N EXTREME COLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9COMBAT I N CITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

NIGHT COMBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

REAR AREA COM MAN D AN D

CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OGISTICS 13

REAR AREA PROTECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

PAGE

Commun ica t i ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 - 3

Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3Landing Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3The O bject ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 4

. . . . . . . .A M P H I B I O U S O P E R A T I O N S 4-1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OCTRINE 4-1MISSIONS AND OPERATING FORCES . 4 - 1

Amph ib ious Land ings . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 -1Sovie t Nava l In fan try . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 -1

CONDUCT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS

ASSAULT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 - 5Phases o f th e Assaul t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 6Assaul t Format ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 - 7Weaknesses ....................... - 8

5 U N C O N V E N T I O N A L W A R F A R EO P E R A T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -1DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 1MISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .t ra teg ic 5-1Operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2Tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFAREFORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2

Agen ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ersonnel 5-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .QUIPMENT 5-3

TRAINING AND PREPARATION . . . . . . . . 5 - 3AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CENARIO 5-3

6 R I V ER C R O S S I N G S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 1EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION . . . . 6-1TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGS . . . . . . . . 6 - 3

iii

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PAGE

. . .ssau l t C rossing F rom the M arc h 6 - 3. . . . . . . . . . .repared R iver Cross ings 6- 8

. . . . . . . . . . . . .OUNTAIN WARFARE 7 - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .FFENSIVE ACTION 7- 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EFENSIVE ACTION 7 -2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RTILLERY 7-2

. . . . . . . . . .ELICOPTER EMPLO YMENT 7 -3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NGINEER SUPPORT 7 -3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OGISTICS 7-3

. . . . . . . . . .O MM A N D A N D C ON TR O L 7 - 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IR DEFENSE 7 -4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BC EFFECTS 7 -4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .O V E ME N T 7 - 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ONCLUSIONS 7-5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ESERT WARFARE 8 - 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE OFFENSE 8- 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE DEFENSE 8 -2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A MO U F L A G E 8 - 2

. . . . . . . . . .ELICOPTER EMP LOY MEN T 8 -2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OGISTICS 8-2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BC EFFECTS 8 -2

. . . . . . .COMBAT IN EXTREME COLD 9 - 1

. . . . . . .LANNING AN D PREPARATION 9- 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE OFFENSE 9- 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE DEFENSE 9 -1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OGISTICS 9-2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IRE SUPPORT 9 -2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NGINEER SUPPORT 9 -2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0 COMBAT I N CITIES 1 0 - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OCTRINE 10-1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE OFFENSE 10 -3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE DEFENSE 10 -5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 NIGHT COMBAT 1 1 1CONDITIONS AFFECTING NIGHT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .O MB A T 1 1 - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .QUIPMENT 11 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .H E MA R C H 1 1 - 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE OFFENSE 1 1 -4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE DEFENSE 11 5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RAIN ING 11-6

12 REAR AREAC OMMAN D AND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ONTROL 1 2 - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .HE REAR AREA 12 -1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .t r a teg i c 12-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pera t i ona l 12-1

PAGE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .act ica l 12-1CHIEF OF THE REAR A ND THEIR

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .O M M A N D S 1 2 - 1LEVELS OF COM MA ND AND

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ONTROL 12-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .t ra tegic 12-2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pera t i ona l 12-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

act ica l 12-3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OGISTICS 1 3 - 1. . . . . . . . .ONCEPT AN D PRINCIPLES 13 -1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .entra l ized Planning 13 -1. . . . . . . . . .a i l o ri ng o f Log is t ic Un i t s 13 -1

. . . . . . . . . . . . .i xed Supply Pr ior it ies 13 -1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .e l ive r y Forward 13-1

. . .ont i nuous Supp ly Base Suppor t 13-1. . . . . .t andard i za t i on o f Equ ipment 13-1

Supply Accountabi l i ty and Resource. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .onservat ion 13-1. . . .omplete Use of Transpor tat ion 13 -2

. . . . . . . . . .omple te Mo b i l e Suppor t 13 -2Forward Pos i t i on ing o f Suppor t

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .l e me n t s 1 3 - 2. . . . . .se of A l l Poss ib le Resources 1 3 - 2

. . . . . . . . .ENTRAL-LEVEL LOGISTICS 13 -2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r gan i za t i on 13-2

. . . . . . . . . . . .e s ou rc e Ma n a g e me n t 1 3 - 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ogis t ic Stockpi les 1 3- 4. . . . . . . . . .PERATIONAL LOGISTICS 13 -4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ACTICAL LOGISTICS 13 -4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .UPPLY 13-7

A m m u n i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .O L 1 3 - 10

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .at i ons 13-1 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .l o th i ng 13-1 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .eh i c l es 13-1 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ate r Supp l y 13 -12Engineer . S ignal . Chemical . an d

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .e d i c a l I t e ms 1 3 - 12. . . . . . .upp l y D i s t ri bu t ion Sys tem 13-1 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RANSPORTATION 13-13. . . . . . . . . . . . . .r a ff ic Ma n a g e me n t 1 3 - 1 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ai l Transpor t 13 -13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .oto r Transpor t 13 - 1 4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .eaknesses 13 - 14. . . .AINTENANCE AN D RECOVERY 13 -15

. . . . . . . . . . .a in tenance Fac il it ies 13 -1

6

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ehic le Repair 13 -16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .echn i ca l Serv ices 13 -16

Organ i za t iona l Ma in tenan ce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .apabi l i t ies 13-16

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PAGE

Maintenan ce Responsib i li t ies . . . . . 1 3 - 16Recovery and Repair Dur ingCombat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 1 7Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -17

MED ICAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 17Doctr ine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 -18Company and Bat ta l ion Medica l

Suppor t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 -18

R e g im e n ta l M e d ~ c a l u p p o rt . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 0Div is ion Medica l Suppor t . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 1Army-Leve l Medica l Suppor t . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 1

REAR AREA SERVICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 2Personnel Replacements . . . . . . . . .1 3 - 2 2Civi l Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 3Mi l i ta ry Po l ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 3 - 2 3

PAGE

Pr isoners o f War and Civ i lianDeta inees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 3

DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS . . . . . . . . . 1 3 - 2 3

14 REAR AREA PROTECTION . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NIT SECURITY 14 -1

KGB TROOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 1

MV D TROOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 1MILITARY DISTRICTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 1CIVIL DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 2RESERVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 2INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 2DOSAAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 - 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LOSSARY Glossary-1

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I CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This field manual is part of FM series 100.2. T i k

.W)zr'et 3nr!1~.t should be i lxd with the othe r manualsin this series, FM 100-2- , Thr.W)z$rtAn~(~*:pratiorz.q

and tactic.^, and FM 1 00-2-3,7he So r r'rt An?qt: troop.^,

Oq~lizjz~ltzorli t z f / ~izdiptric~t~t.

The term "specialized ~.a rf are ," I X ~ n the title of

this FM , is intended to be an abbreviated, collectivedescription of combat actions ~v hi ch , n ITS termi-nolog): may be descr ibed as "special operat ions" or"operations in special conditions." These a re arbitrar)categorizations used onljr o describe combat actionsothe r than those general forms of Soviet ground forcesoperations and tactics discussed in FM 100-2- . Ike of

the tern1 "special" does not imply that the combat;ictions discussed in this FM represent abnormal fonnsof operatio ns or tactics. They are all an integral part of

Soviet military doctrine. Special operations includeairborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations, andunconventional Lmrfilre in the enemy rear.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

During W'orlci War 11, the Soviets gained s omeexperience with airborne operations in combat.Because they lacked the transport aircraft required forlarge-scale operations. they employed the airborne

troops mainly as infiintr). Since the war, the Sovietshave completely reequipped their large airborne forceand built a large f ee t of transport aircraft to support it.Airborne units played key roles in Soviet intementionin Czechoslovakia ( 1968 ) and Afghanistan ( 19'9 ).

The airborne force currently consists of sevendivisions.

Heliborne operations are relatively new to theSoviets. They ha\,e built an impressive fleet of transportand gunship helicopters and have trained assault

troops. Ho~vever. ntil the Afghanistan intervention.they lacked actual cornki t experience \vith this hp e ofoperation. Motorized rifle o r airborne troops o r ;in airassault brigade assigned to a ,f?orzt, could conduct

~ heliborne opperations.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious operations are primarily the respon-sibilih of the Soviet naval infantq ( nlarines), a smallbut growing force. Di~rillgWorld War 11, the SovietArmy and Na\y conducted many amphibious opera-tions, mainly on river and inland seas within the SovietUnion. They have never conducted massive

amphibious assault opera tions like those co nducted bythe ITS n the Pacitic and the Allies in North Africa andEurope during W'orld K'ar 11. 111recent years, the Sovietnaval infantq has been revitalized and reequipped. Itcurrently has three independent regiments ;tnd one~lnclerstrength ivision and is supported by :I growing

fleet of amphibious ships and small aircraft carriers.This elite force trains in joint e ser cises with airborneilnits, and it undoubtedly has an intemention or poure rprojection mission.

The So~~ietsave a varieh of special purpose iulitschat are trained and eqiripped for unconventionalu.arfarc ( I AX')missions. Recause of their political sen-

sitivih. I'W' activities are managecl at the highest levelof govemmel-tt authority. They are directed by theCommittee for State Securih ( K G B ) and the General

Staffs &lain Intelligence Ilirectorate (CiRIr).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations certainly ~vill e conducted inwartime, atld some of thes e will play important roles inpeacetime inten tmio n and pow er projection beyondSoviet borclers.

Operations in special conditions include rivercrossings, mountain and desert \\w-kire, and combat in

extreme colcl, in cities, and at night.Soviet grou nd forces are well equipped and trained

for river crossings.The Soviets consider the capabilityto cross water barriers from the march on a broadfront with minimal delays an essential element inmaintaining a rapid rate of advance in an offensive.River crossings ar e a consistent feature of Soviet fieldexercises.

'VZhile no particular Soviet divisions are identified asbeing tailored or trained specificalljr for mountain ordesert ~mrf'are. ome di\.isions are suited for combat inthese envirolltnents as a result of their base locations.The Soviets undoubtedly a re gaining more experiencein mountain \\.arfare from their increased use ofmilitary force in po\ver projection, such as inAfghanistan.

Soviet ground forces also are well prepared forcombat in estremc cold. The majorit). of Sovietdiirisions are located in areas ~ vi th arsh lvinters.

Rased on their W'orld WarI 1

experience andrecognition of the ~lrb anizlt ion f Europe, the Sovietsrealize that combat in cities \vould be common to mostmilitar) operations. 'fheir training reflects thisrealization.

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One of the principles of Soviet operational art ancltactics is the prosecution of combat rel entl ess l~~,tndcrall conditions of ~~isibilih. ith this principle, theSoviets strive to be capable of continuous combat,during daylight, o r at night. The Soviets concluct mucho f their training during hours of darkness.

The last part of this FM dc-als with the organizationand fittlctions of the elenlents which constitute the

Soviet "rear." (;ollecti\.el~~,hese elements pro~ride\vhat, in ITS te rn~ in ol op , s called comh ;~tsenrice

support.Soviet logistics have been inacci~rate ly escribed as

;I major ~ veak ness n Solriet militar). pow'cr. Sovietforces d o receive effective logistic support, but i t is

different in concept and organization from I[S Amqrlogistic support .

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CHAPTER 2

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Since the 19(10s, the So\.iets h;tire given increasedattention to the devclopnient of their airborne cap;[-bilities. Extensive reequipment of the Soviet airborneforces has given them increased mobility and fire-po\\,er. i ; ro ~~ ndssault tactics also have changecl. Once

landed, airborne units can operate as motorizedrifle units. Soviet air transport capabilities have also

been greatly improved.This moclernization prograni is based on tlie Soviet

principles of tmmobilitj; surprise, and combat activeness .Tlmc So\ icts view their air1,orne forces as a means to

carry the into the depths of the enemy's position.'T1icjr believe that :tirhorne forces can and must be ~tscci\viclely on tlie moclern battletield.

The Soviets h;c\,e long recognized the value of an

airborne force. Sovict nmilitiuq, planners, such asGener;cl Tukhachevsh~~,oresa\v the value of troopslvho cou ld he deployed by air as e;~rly s the 1920s.On

August 2. 1950-the otficial "birthday" of the SovietAirborne-the first airborne exercise in ~o l\ ~i ng2men \ras conducteel. Within 0 years, tlie Soviets \\.erefielding indepenclent ;cirborne brigades \\hichincluded xtilleq. armor, antitimk, reconn:ciss;tnce.and air transport subunits. HI , the beginning of \YforlclWar 11, the Soviets had 1i independent airhorne

brigades.'l'he Soviets' use of their a ir l~orne roops during

Wforld Wr:cr 11 isas se\.erely restricted for lack ofaviation assets. Nevertheless, nlore than 50 Sovietairborne operations \yere conducted during the \%.ar.Most of tlmese operations wer e stmmall in scale. The large-scale oper;ctio& that \vere conclucted Lvere m;crkedhj.poo r planning and execution. Questions of theor) andexecution concerned Soviet militan' planners for tlienext LO years. Attention \vas centered o n tlie problenm

of linkup b et ~veen irborne units operating in rearareas and advancing ground force ~ttmits.

In an effort to find solutions to the problems ofemplo)ment, the?, s\\.itched control of the airborne

forces from one conimand organization to another andincreased the available tirepmver. In 19+6, conmmandof tlme airborne \%is s\vitclm& from tlme Air Forces to theMin is ty of I>efcnse, in 1956 to the Soviet (irounclForces, anti finally in 19 6i , Iwck to the Mitlistq. ofIlefense. Tlmc principal \veapons added t o the airborne

in\,entoq during the tirst LO post\\,ar years kvere theAS : - i 7 self-propelled assault gun ( 1955 )a nd thc ASIT-X i self-propelled ;issaitlt gun ( 1900 ).

Hou,ever, it is not until the 1900s that the Sovietmilitary bcg;un to x) l\ ,e the problenms o f force linkup.

Solutions resulted primarily from the Soviet decisionto deploy nonstrategic nuclear wrapons. Nuclearstrikes \vould pernmit I;~rge round force format ions to111o\.e rapidlj. into tlie enemy's depth. Today, theSoviets' huge buildup of conventional weapons hasalso made possible a massive conventional air, missile,and artillen. strike to make linkup easier in a non-ni~clear var.

l'lie resolution of the linkup problem resulted in a

niajor program to reequip airborne units. The 120-mmmortar, the 122-mrnhowitzer. modern antitank and airdefense \\,capons, rocket launchers, and the airborneamphibious iimhtmtr). combat vehicle (BMI ) ) \vereadded to equipment inventories. The BMD is of par-ticular importance. With its deployment in the 1970s.

airhorne units made significant gains in mobility andfirelx)\\~er. oday airborne units can conduct a broadrange of combat missions to include many nornmallyassociated with nmotorized rifle or light armor units.

The present Sn ie t airborne force is formidable. Itcan be delivered to great distances. It is highly mobile,and can assault a prepared position or a well-armedenemy force. It is also an excellent force to use forpower projection.

DOCTRINE

Soviet military doctrine calls for using airborneforces in both conventional and nuclear environments.Airborne units are an integral part o f many opera tionsat army and .fiu)jlt levels. Aerial en\relopment of theenemy has become an important maneuver in modernoffensive operations. The primary theater \varFxe roleof airhorne units is to support the rapid adl anc e of alarge conmhinecl arms force deep into the enemy's

ol,c~rntiotitil or o/,c.t-rrtiotz~I-strc~tc~~~icepth. Airborneunits may be uscd in coi~junc tionwith an operationalmaneuver group (Obi(; ) during offensive operations.Tlme OhlG is a combined arms formation employed in;irmy- and,@otrt-level offensive operations to raid deepinto the enemy's rear area. The Soviets conducted theirmilitary cxercise ZAPAIl-81 to test "new concepts ofmilitary science and art." I l~ lr ing hese exercises,airborne units \vere used extensively in support of anolxrational timaneuver group.

Tile Soviets also use airborne forces as a means of

projecting po\lrer. This \vas demonstrated by theirinmsions of i:zcchoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in1Y79. In both instances, a major portion o f the Sovietinvasion force consisted of airborne units. Airborne

2-1

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


trOOJ>b ire \\,ell s~ ~i te clor s11c11 oles. 'Ilie!~ train for

oper;itions in a \,ari et\ of geograpllicd en\,irotlments.

The) . are speciall!. trained t o estal,lisli, defend , and

expand an ;tirheael. 'Ilicir cqi~ip~nents all air trans-

portithle. Airborne troops ;~ ls o i;i\.c lligli political

reliabilit!..

'T o allo\v flexibility in emplo!mcnt, dur ing \\.artimc

Soviet airborne fo rces \\.ill be directly s~tborclinate o

the Su1>reme ligh (;o m~i iand.\.ith operiitional cont rol

exercised 1,). the % ) \ k t C;encral Stiiff. Sonic ;iirl>orne

units \ ~ . o L I I c I I>e I I I o c ~ ; I ~ c c I to Smriet tl)e;~tcrs f~liili t;in.

opera tions ( ' l l l > s for .str.rrtc:yir- oper ;ttions. Also, uni ts

u~ ou lr l e allocated tcmporaril! to So\,ict /i'o/l/.s :irid

combin ed ;w~ils md tank armies for specific o/)cl)rr-

tioruil depth nlissior~s.Oth er airhorne units \vould be

retained i~tid erlie co ~i tro l f t he Sor'iet Supreme tiigh

(;omtirand for contingencies.

The present locations of four % \ k t airborne

divisions generall). correspond to St)\.iet ~jrartirnc

Europea11 ancl Near Eastern 'Il ll) s. h fifth di\,ision is

sta tioned in tlie vicitlit!, of 3losco\v iund a sixt h clivision

serves ;LS a triiif-tit~g ivision. ~\dditio~l;iII!,, in ;iirborfie

division is oper ating in AfgI1;inistan.

Soviet militar). plan~~crsonsider ;iirborne units to

b e an extremely valuahle resoilrev t o he used

judiciously. (1st. of airborne forces in an operatio11

dep end s upon \\.tiether that \voulcl enh;ince the likeli-

hcxxi of surl>rise,de ep pcnetr;t tion, a11d rapid exploita-

tion. These criteria, together \vith the :tchie\.ement ofat least tcrnp oraqr local air superiori ! and tlie ;r\,aila-

bi li v of airborne and airlift assets, con sti ti~ telie main

elements in a Soviet planner's decision t o conduc t an

airborne operation.

MISSIONS

The Soviets categorize airborne missions based on

the depth an d importance of th e objective and t he size

of forces involved. There are four categories ofmissions:

Strategic.

Operational.

Tactical.

Special.

Strategic

Strategic 11iissions arc cstal,lislied in \\,artinre h! the

Soviet Srlprcmt. tligh (:on>mand I I I ~ ontrollecl h?. he

General Staft l'lie o utc ome of ;I strategic mission is

expected to ha1.c signiticant imp;~cto n a \\;ir or

campaign. The use of ;iirborne hrccs in a po\vcr

projection role is also a strategic mission.

2-2

Str;itc.gic. mi ss io n ;ire con di~ctccl against d ee p

t;lrgets I>! a n airl)orne elitision o r rqiri len t. Forces

from otlier arms ancl scn.ic.cs \\.ill most likely Ix-

in\,ol\'ecl. linkirp it11 ;icl\'aticing groc~ncl orces ma)

not h e achic\cc l for evcr; tl cl;t!,s. t3ec;urse of the wolx.

and clcptli of a str;itegic niission, sill,stantial air c o n ~ b ; ~ t

:und tr;inslx)rt is rccli~irecl. upplies maiy be air -droplwd

or ;iirliftecl to troops o n thc groilncl.

Ohjccti\.es of str;itegic ~l~issiotlsO L I I C I x 11ittio1lal

capit;ils or other ;tdn~inistr;~ti\,c-politicalenters,

inclc~stri;il or eco nom ic cente rs, port s o r maritime

stnits or air fields. Strategic missions also may IK.

irnclcrt;~ken o est;il>lisli I ncn. the;iter of operations o r

to nei~tr ; i l i~ene menlbcr of ;w cncni!. ctulition.

Operational

Ojxr ;t tiot~al nissiotis ;ire controllecl I>!~,f,*o)1t.sund

;trmics. An airborne t,att:~lion, reginlent, o r di\.ision

conclucts these missions in conjunction \\i th, /i~ ))l t r

arm). ojxr;itions. ,4irl>orneunits ancl aviation assets ilre

alloc;ited to tlie ,/ir)ilt or arm!. from th e T\1) or

S u ~ x e ~ i ~ eiigli (:o~nmancl. ,i~ik ~ip\'it11 acI\.a~icing

groi~ncl orces \\,oc~ld )e e xj >~ ct ed\.ithill sc\,eral days

or less. 0per;ltional mission ol>jccti\,ca nclude:

en en^! tactic;tl nircle;tr \\.c;q,ons and deliver).

means.

tl'aclcjuarters or conlmat-td posts .

1,ogistic kicilitics.(:oii1ln~rnic~;1tio1ih;~cilitics.

Airfields.

Ports.

Hridgca a n d otlicr \\.;ttt.r o r gap crossing sites.

X1olrnt;lin p;i.sscs.

0peration;il ~nias ions ilso III;~!. I>e ~111~1ertakeno

block o r to ncirtr;ilizt. enern!. rcs cnv s, o r to Idock a

\\,irhclra\\.ing cllenl),.

3

Tactical

'f'actical missions ;ire cont rolled ;it division Ie\,el.hnairclrop of ;tirl,or~it roops 111;1! be ~rsed n a tactical

mission, but ;I hclil>ortlc ;isx;ti~lt is prefe rred. A

helil>ornc force norm:rlly is cotiiprisccl of tro ops from a

n-totorizecl ritlc I,attalion of the di\.ison. !fo\vevcr,

;iirl>ornc troops alloc;tted fr om ,f ir )i ~t r ;trm), may b e

i~sccl n r;irc occ;isions. Ilithcr ;I rcinforc.ed company or

;I Ixittalion co~-tcliicts:ictic;il n~issiona.

7'., t'C ; l ol,jecti\es are:

Nucle;ir \\capons ;111c1cIeli\.eq. IIIC;IIIS.

(:orn~ll;~~~cl"ts.

I.ogistic b;lscs.

(:ornrn~rnic.atiorl res.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Airkields.

Kej. terrain such as high ground, bridges, gap

crossings. road junctions, or pasWs.

Tactical missions also may be ilndertaken to block or

neutralize enem!. reserves, to hlock ;1 withdrabving

enemy, or to attack enernj.forces from the rear o r flank.

Special

Special missions, or unconventional \varfare (lJW:)missions, are probably established by the Soviet

Supreme High Co~nmand nd controlled by,fio)lt and

army con~manders.Company or smaller size units

conduct S L I C ~missions. Special ( I N ) missions

include:

Reconnaissance.

Neutralization of nuclear \ireapons and delivery

means.

Sabotage.

Deception.

Creation of panic in enemy rear.

Not all airborne units are designated and trained to

carry out ITW missions. Furthermore, not all I . N

missions are carried out hy airborne units. The KGB,

the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRCI) of the Soviet

armed forces, the g r o ~ ~ n dorces, and the naval forces

all have "special purpose" troops trained to carry out

lJW missions. ( IM' is discussed in Chapter 5 . )

I ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The modernization program has transformed .%\kt

airborne divisions into mechanized infantry forces

capable of seizing defended objectives and of attacking

well-armed enemy forces deep in the enerny rear. All

combat equipment of an airborne division is air-

droppable. The BMI) is responsible for the greatest

improvement in airborne combat capability. The BMD

is an air-droppable, amphibious as,uult vehicle witharmament similar to that of the BMP found in

motorized rifle units. Ho~v ever , some olde r

equipment , such as the ASIT-5': assaillt gun and SD-44

antitank f ld gun, may still be found in some airborne

units.

Airborne Units

The Soviets perceive enemy tanks and aircraft to be

the tw.0 major threats to airborne units after landing.Accordinglj: all airborne units contain numerous anti-

tank and air defense \veapons. The exceptional

mobiliq and firepokver of Sioviet airborne units rnake

them a formidable threat to an enemy's rear.

The Airborne Division. Each airborne division has

three BMD-equipped airborne regiments. Division-

level support elements include an artillery regiment,

an air defense battalion, an assault gun battalion, an

engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a transportat ion

and maintenance battalion, a parachute rigging and

resupply battalion, a medical battalion, a chemical

defense company, and a reconnaissance company.

The Airborne Regiment. Each airborne regimentconsists of three BMD-equipped airborne battalions, a

mortar battery, an antiaircraft battery, and an antitank

battery. Regimental support elements include an

engineer company, a signal company, a transport and

maintenance company, a parachute rigging and

resupply company, a medical platoon, and a chemical

defense platoon, and a supply and service platoon.

The Airborne Battalion. Each airborne battalionhas

three airborne companies. Equipping airborne

companies with BMDs has eliminated the need for a

battalion-lwel antitank battery. Furthermore, the wide

distribution of man-portable, surface-to-air missiles

has eliminated the need for a battalion air defense

section. The airborne battalion is designed t o provide

command, control, and limited communication,

supply, and medical support.

The Airborne Com pany. The airborne companyconsists of three platoons of BMDs. There are three

BMDs in each platoon (on e pe r squad). Besides the

heavily-armed BMD, basic weapons of the airborne

company include modern assault rifles, light machine

guns, automatic grenade launchers, ATGMs, and

numerous RPGs and shoulder-fired surface-to-air

missiles. (For more information on organization and

equipment, see FM 100-2-3.)

Air Delivery Capabilities

The Soviet Air Forces Military Transport Aviation

(VTA) provides airlift service for Soviet airborne units

and air assault brigades. The VTA has a fleet of over600

medium- and long-range cargo transport planes

assigned full-time use. This fleet includes about 370

AN- 12/ClJBs (similar to the US C-130/Hercules), over

170 IL-76/CANDIDs (similar to the US C- 14 1 Star-

lifter), and over 50AN-22/COCKs (similar to the US C-

5A ) .The older, medium-rangeAN -12 is the mainstay of

the WA. This four-engine turbo-prop aircraft can airlift

90 troops or can drop GO paratroopers from two exits.

It can carry up to 20 metric tons of cargo, but some

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


large items such as engineer equipment uill not tit in

its cargo area. Each AN-12 can carry two BMDs.

Transporting a BMD-equipped airborne regiment

requires 90 to 1 15AN-12s. The AN-12 can operate on

unimproved runways. Its range with maxirnum

payload is 1400 kilometers.

The AN-12 aircraft are being rt ~ l a c e dy IL-76 ong-

range, four-engine jet transports. The IL-76 can carry

120 paratrtxlpers \vho can jump from four exits, one

exit on each side and hvo exits in the rear. The 1L.-76,\vith a cargo capacity of 1 0 metric tons, can carry all

combat equipment normally assigned to airborne

forces. Each IL-76 can carry three BMDs. Transporting

a BMLI equipped airborne regiment requires 50 to 65

IL-76s. The IL-76 can operate from unimproved

runways. Its range u~it1-lmaximum payload is 5300

kilometers.

The AN-22 is a long-range, turbo-prop. heavy

transport aircraft used mainly for airlandings, as

opposed to airdrops. The AN-22 can carry 175 troops

or SO metric tons of cargo, to a range of 4200

kilometers. Each AN-22 can carry four BMDs. This

aircraft is used mainly to transport large items such as

self-propelled artillery, medium tanks, surface-to-air

missile (SAM) launchers, or en gn ee r equipment. It is

well suited for strategic operations.

Most \TA aircraft are based in the western USSR

Some AN-12 units are based along the southern and far

eastern borders of the Soviet Union. The concentrationof aircraft in the western LJSSR places the main VTA

assets near the airborne divisions they would support,

as well as positions the force opposite NATO. Never-

theless, the VTA is capable of quickly concentrating ts

aircraft to support an operation anywhere along the

Soviet borders.

During times of military emergent-, aircraft of

Soviet civil aviation,Aerrjfi'ot can augment VTA capa-

bilities. The civil fleet is equipped with about 1 , 1 0 0

medium- and long-range passenger transports, about2(X) AN- 12s and IL-76s, and several thousand short-

range transports and helicopters. Am(?flr,t aircraft

could be used extensively for the airlanding of troops

once airheads are established.

TRAINING

Soviet airborne troops are among the best-trained

soldiers in the Soviet anned forces. The training that

they receive is physically rigorous and mentallydemanding. It is conducted under conditions

simulating actual combat. including extensive NBC

training. Airborne training integrates special airborne

techniques with basic motorized rifle tactics.

The personnel assigned to airborne units enhance

the quality of training in those units. Airborne

personnel are carefully selected. Most of them are two-

year conscripts who are put through a rigorous

screening process which emphasizes a high level of

physical conditioning, education and training, and

political reliability.

Because parachute jumping is a major sport in the

Soviet Union, many new conscripts are already

experienced parachutists at the time of induction. Pre-induction parachute training is atailable through

sports clubs and premilitary school programs

conducted throughout the Soviet Union by the Volun-

tary Society for Cooperation with the Arm): Aviation,

and Navy (DOSAAF). Most inductees selected for

senic e in the airborne forces are sent directly to the

regular airborne divisions. 1The majority of Soviet airborne officen: are

graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command

School near Moscow. Junior of icer s are also provided

by other higher command (four-year) schools, higher

senice career in the airborne forces. Active duty

senice begins in September or October following

their summer graduation and commissioning.

technical (three-year) schc~>ls,nd civilian univer-

sities with r exnre officer commissioning programs.

Commissioned graduates of the Ryazan Higher

Airborne Command School usually spend their entire

Like warrant officers throughout the Soviet armedforces, warrant officers in the airborne forces are

selected and sent to warrant officer training schools

f

after being trained and having senred as -noncom-

missioned officers. Warrant officers serve as platoon

leaders; company technicians, or company first

sergeants.

~ ir tu al ly ll airborne noncommissioned officers - 1began their senriceas two-year conscriptswho demon-

strated high motivation and political reliability. Many iare selected for noncommissioned officer training by - 1the district military registration office at the time of

induction. They are then assigned directly to the

airborne training division for at least 6 months of

speciali~edraining. Upon completion of this training,

they are awarded an NCO rank and are assigned to one

of the regular airborne divisions

All enlisted conscripts in airborne units ( like almost

all Soviets youths) have undergone at least 140 hours

of IIOSAAF-sponsored premilitary training either

during their last 2 years of formal schooling, or at theirjobs. Most have undergone DOSAAF premilitary

parachute training, thus reducing the training that

conscripts need. <:onscripts receive 4 weeks of basic

training after which they receim additional instruction

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


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Drop zones are as close t o objectives aspossible. TheSoviets prefer that DZs be within 30 kilometers of thefinal objective. If circurnstancespernlit, d ro p zones areon the objective itself.

The first element is a securit). element and is respon-sible for eliminating enemy resistance in the DZ. TheSoviets try to conlplete the operation in one flight.However, if more than one flight is used, the firstassault wave will contain forward command post s and

crew-served air defense and antitank weapons, as wellas maneuver units. The second wave will consistprimarily of support elements.

Airborne Assault

Assaults can be conducted up to 500 km from the

- . -FEBA ~n support of Army or front operations

DROP ZONEb

Preferred bo p zones are w~t hi n 0 km

of final objective

fT v ~ ~ c a lror, zones mea-

s&e 3 km b y 4 km.

Regiment is allocated

one or two drop zones-

If two drop zones are

used, battalion integrity

will be maintained.

Division uses 4 to 6 drop

zones.

Alternate zones designated for

emergency use.

If circums tances permit, drop zones are on me

objective itself

ALTERNATE ZONES

Flight routes are chosen to minimize flight time t othe d rop zone. They also are planned to minimize thethreat of aerial intercept and ground air defense.

Airborne unit marshaling areas are dispersed toprevent detection of an imminent operation and toreduce vulnerabilih to nuclear strikes. Conversely,marshaling areas must be close enough to departureairfields t o make loading on aircraft eas ier. Normally,no more than a company can be expe cted in any onearea.

Airborne troops scheduled for an operation arestrictly segregated from the surrounding population.Units receive their rnissions in the marshaling areas.Having received their missions, unit commandersorganize their units for loading on aircraft.

Loading is accomplished so that lead aircraft over adrop zone carry reconnaissance and se cur ih troops tosecure the I>%.The security force is armed to defendagainst enerny air and armor attack. Main assault forcesare loaded s o that platoons, companies, ;~ nd attalionsland with as much unit integrit j. as possible.

For securit) rcasons, airdrops are planned to takeplace at night, whenever possible. llnit s normally move

to departure areas after nightfall. Radio silence is

obsemed in marshaling areas and while en route t o andat departure airfields.

Normally, more than on e airfield will be used if morethan on e regiment is involved in an operation. Ft-orztcill

aviation and,porzt and army air defense weapons mayprovide air defense for both the marshaling anddeparture areas. In an emergency, close-in air defensecould b e provided by the airborn e unit's \ileapons.

Asa minimum, aviation, rockets and missiles, groundforces incursions, unconventional ~ var fare , r naval firesupport must gain local air superiority for theoperation. Recognizing that local air superiority maybe achitlred for only a short period of time, Sovietsprefer to accomplish the airdrop in on e flight.

Air Movement

During the flight to th e dro p zone (DZ ) o r landingzone (LZ) , aircraft fly in a formation that insurzs the

prope r jump sequence. Commanders and their chiefsof sta@ at batta lion level and above are in separateaircraft to insure that a unit's entire commandstructure would not be lost if one plane we re shot

down.The S oi~iets onsider the air movement phase of an

airborne operation to be its most \.ulnerable phase.They emphasize the necessity for creating a threat-freeflight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ.All a long the flight path, fire support assets ar e targeted iagainst enemy air defenses. Fighters and fighter- - 1bombers escort transport aircraft to protect them fromenemy fighters and ground fires. Protection of the airmovement phase will be carefully coordinated.

Passive defense measures taken during the airmovement phase include conducting movementduring hours of darkness, using more than o ne flightroute, maintaining radio silence. ar.d flying at lowaltitudes. The Soviets also may use elect ronic warfaremeasures during air movement.

Airdrops 9The Soviets attempt to complete their airdrops

before dawn. To sirnplifi the a irdrop, the Soviets

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


probably emplo!. only one t ?pe of riircr;tft for each 11Z.The Soviets normall! conduct con11,;1t airdrops at an

altit~ldeof 150 to $00 meters. 'lliey cniphasize the

necessity to drop at lo\\, ;~ltitutle o t-ninimize theamount of time indivicluals are in the air. I,o\v altitucledrops also increase the likelihood that ;I n nit's

personnel and equipment \ \ , i l l I;lnd close together.During some training exercises, the Soviets haveconducted personnel clrops as low as 100 meters. but

there is no indication that such lo\\ altitudes arestandarcl. I h e Soviets also h:lvc used stcerithleparachutes in an effort to increase tiit it integrit).cluringairdrops.

The tirst element to be dropped is a srn;lll reconnais-sance and security force. *She main assault force is

dropped at Ic-ast 15minutes filter. Ihe I1MI>sand crc.n,-sened \vc;ipons precede their respective personnelduring the ;tirdrop.

The Soviets li;~\,eeveral rnetliods for dropping c;irgo

by pa ra ch ~~ te . quipment ~vcigliing less than $0kilognmls ( 6 6 p o ~ ~ n d s )s clropped in paddeclcontainers. Equipment \\.cighing up to 1,000kilograms ( 2 ,2 0 0 poirncls ) is securecl to stanclard cargop1;ttforms. Rhll1s. motor vehicles, self-propelled guns.and other he;ny items rna!Ire s e c ~ ~ r c do speci:~I hock-ahsor1,ing pl;~tformstnci clroppecl niulti -par;~chutesystem. Tlie Soviets also use. notishock-;~bsorl,ingplatforms \vi th a retro-rocket britking p;tr;ichu te

I . .system. ' fi e retro- rocke t s?.stem, ~t se d xtensively todr op Bbll)s, is supposed to ;illon, its cargo to descendfive to six times ktster than the multi-parachute system.TLVO round probes, mounted o n diagonal corners ofthe cargo platform, elcctric;~lly ire the ret ro-rocketsystem's explosive charge. 7'he explosive chargedetonates \vlien the sensors toc1c.11 the ground andclose the electricill circuit

Drop Zone Procedures

The reconnaiw;lncc :mcl security force's imt-nedi;ttrmission is t o secure the 11%before the main body lands.'Iliis force, ~vhi ch ould be up to a company for eachd ro p zone ~ ~ s e dn a regimental :~irdrop ,akes itp defen-sive positions around the I)%'s perinieter . Of sr)eci;llconcern are the main enem!. ;ivenues of appro;ich int o,the I >% . The force also est:ihlisIies listening ancl obser-vation posts tw!vnd the 11% to provide e;lrly \\-arningofan appr(~~c11ingnctny. Antitank and air defenx

weapons itre integrated into the perinietcr clefense.If the main bod!. is airrlroppcci during da!,liglit

hours, personnel rrio\.e directly t o their predesignateclattack positions. Iwt if the drop zone is not o n tficobjective, personnel assemble in battalion assembly

areas. fio\\.ever, if the airdrop is con dt~c ted t night,personnel assemble before occupying predesignatedattack positions. If the drop zone is not o n the ohjec-tive, personnel dropped during the hours of darkness:~sscmhle s companies and tnove to battalion assembly3 eas.

If the 11% is unclcr strong enern! attack, personnelassemble and move immediately to the I)Z perimeterto establish ciefensi\.e positions. I'ersonnel i~ s e ny

a\xilahlc H,1.111 to reinforce defensive positions. and donot sort out the Bhll>suntil after the enemy attack has

been repelletl.If the I> % is not o n the objecti\,e an d battalions

assemble first, they tqp o avoid combat \vith enemyunits. They attempt to evade enemy groutid forces and

hide from an air thrcat. If required to actively defendagainst an air attack, at least one entire platoon percompany or one company per battalion is assigneti themission.

The Soviet5 consicicr ;in enemy air attack to he aserious threat to ;I landed ;tirlrorne force. Hesides theregiment's cre\~. -sc rved rid shoulder-fireel stir defense\\.eaipons, the So~iets .oitld use small arms fire. andeven KPCts, .YT(;IZts, anel the HMI)'s miin gun against airattack.

M'lien a n enemy threat against the I)% h;is been suc-cessfully neutralized or suppressed, units move tobattalion i~ssen11>1!' are;^^ Ioc;~ted either at tlic 11%boundaq. o r a k\v h~tndredmeters o~ttsicle he 11%.

If a follorv-on air laneling is planned, the regiment's

initial assault force leaves a rear detachment at the I>Zto provide sec~~rit!.nd to ;~ssist n the landing of thefollo~\.-onorce.

The airclrop and reorg;uiizatior~ph;ise ;it the I>% isconsiderecl t o I,e the second-most \vlnerable period inan airborne operation follo\ving the air movementphase. Al l actions taken at tlic I)% are to clear the I>Zbefore ;un enem\. fi)rce arrives.

Movement to the Objective

A regimental-sized :~irbortieoperation uses threepredesignatecl batt:~lionassetnhlj. areas o n or near theboun d;~ q f the I )% . hlovernent t o the final objectivemost often is niadc in h;~tt;ilionm:lrcli columns alongparallel routes. Battalions may he assigned separatefinal objectives. (:or-npanics and pl;ltoons are oftenassigned interniediate missions (r ai ds ) to he

accomplished during their niovement to the finalobjecti\,e.

Speed and security are the primal?, concerns duringrnovet-nent to the ol,jecti\-c. Hatt:tlions ~i io \, e n atactical marcll formation as long ;IS possible. Ttiis

2-7

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formation ;~ l lo \vshe ba t ta lion t o m ov e s\vikl!. :und stillmaintain securit). . A unit in tactical march formationestablishes fo w ar d , f lank. and rear secur i ty e le rncnts .A batt;l l ion adva nce guar d coulcl b e i tp to I re i~ l forcec lcompany in s t rength . In th e m;dn body of any marchformat ion. a t tached a r t i l le ry e lements a re Ioc ;~ ted tt he he a d o f t h e c o lum n to a l l o~ v im m ec li at edeployqnent . Ant i tank wea pons a r e I txa ted behind the;trtillery follo\ved by any attached ere\\.-seneel ant i -

aircraft \f reapons.The a i r bo r ne f o r c e t r i es t o m a in ta in m o\ . c m e n t t o

the ob jec t ive even if an enem y force is enco i ln tc reddur in g th e march. If poss ib le , they evade enem!forcesdur ing the m a r c h . If no t , t hey a t ta c k the e ne m j r o r c c\v ith th e f o n~ t r c l e c u r ity e l e m e n t o f t he a dva nc eguard, but not necessarily \ \ , i t11 the main body. Thede c i s ion to de p loy the m a in body de pe n ds on the s iz eo f the e ne m y f o r c e . If t l ie force is too la rge to he

I~anc lled uccessful ly b j , the ad\ance guard but smalle n o u g h t o be dest royed quickly by the main body, thenth e c om m a nde r p r ob ;~ b lp v ill u se the m a in body toattack the enemy. 13owe\,er , if the enemy force is sol a r ge tha t t he c om m a nde r be l i e ve s the m a in bodywou ld bec om e dec isive ly engaged in an a t tack. then h e\vould a t te tnpt t o avoid contac t a nd lead th e main bocl j,on a n a l t er na te r ou te to the objective. In this case, theadvance girard \vould be lef t i n contac t \v i th thee ne m y.

If th e a i rbo rne force is mo\ . ing a t n ight , es tabl ishedroad ne tnrorks a re used to reach t he objec t ive quickl?.before dakvn. If m ovem ent is during th e day, th e unitmoves c ross-country us ing te r ra in fea tures to providec onc e a lm e n t i ~ he n e v e r o s s ib l e . I li t ri ng m ove m e n t ,the a i rborne force keeps the radios in the " rece i \ . eonly" mo de unt i l contac t i s mad e wi th th e enem) . . Inthe " r e c e ive on ly" m ode , on ly the c om m a nde rtransmits messages.

Dur ing the rnarch, the uni t mainta ins $00-degree

acrid ssun.eil lance. BMI) anci antiaircraft ( ,M ) gut1cre \vs a re g iven ; in a i r sec t or to kee p und er constantsun.eil lance. Visit ;d sun.eil lance is required Ixcaitscthere is no a ir defense rad; ~rn Soviet airb orn e units. If ;I

un i t c o r nc s und e r a s t r ong a i r a tt a c k , t he c o m m a nde rde p loys the AA gun s. If th e air attack is not repillsedim m c di ;~ te ly . he n the AA ele me nt may b e left in p1;lc.eto p r ov ide c ove ra ge ~ v h i l che m a in body c on t i t l i~ e stsmovem ent to th e objec ti \ re .

R e c o n n a i s s a n c e m i s s i o n s d u r i n g t h e g r o u n d

movement phase a re ext remely impor tant , s i r ice theinformation rcce i \ . ed before dep ar tu re may h e l imi tedo r perishable. For in l iw n~at io n n t l ie routes of marchan d e nem y fi)rces in th e area, th e ; i irborne comnl:underscncls out his recon naissa nce teitlns. Ho\vevcr , the on ly

clcdicatcd rcc,orinaiss;~ticc l l l i [ lssigncd to I I ~ lirl,orncf o r c e is t he r c c onn ; l i s~ u ic c o r npan) . ;kt cli\.isior~ e\.el.'Ih erc fo rc. ;un :tirl>orne I,;itt;llion cl ep lo !~ ~ n c of itsorganic p l ;~ to ons ;ls a rcconn:tiss;tncc ~xltrol.7ll ispl at oo n tn;l!, I1a1.e cn gi nc er o r cltc mi cal clefenscelerncnts :tttachccl.

71'l~e econ naissa nce patrol in\ .estigatcs the traf i ca-bi li ty of routes , ; ~ n d oss ible ambush and r i \ ,e r c ross ingsi tes. In t he o bjec t i \v a rea , the reconna issa tlce p ;~ tr ol

t r i e s t o loc ;~ tegood battalion assembly arc-as. Ther e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l a l so ; ~ t t e n i p t s t o g a ininfortnation o n enetn y secu rity out pos ts, fortif ications.tank an d antit:uik \Yeapons dispositio n. ancl resem cs.

I t1 genera l , the reconna issance c le tncnt movesi ~ n d e r o v er o f clarkness using the NiZ.II)'s onboardnavigation equipment to assist i ts movement. I t mayo p e r a t e u p t o I 5 kilometers in f ront of the main body.Reconnaissance pa t rols seek t o avoid co mba t n it11 th ee ne m y. If ; t t t ;~cked y ;In enem y force, they attem pt tobreak cont ; ic t and t o con t inu e to mov e fon\, arc l.

C om pa n ie s o r p l a toon s tha t ha ve a c c om pl i shed'1 1011ntern1edi ;i te miss ions ( ra id s) , march to b a t t I'

itssembly areas near their hattalion's final ol>jective.Th ere they join the i r ba t ta l ions in the assa~t l t

The Attack

Tim e spent in h a t t ;~ l ion ssembly a reas is kept to a

minimum. Bat ta l ion commanders conf i rm the i r uni ts t rength :&er the road march and ra ids . and receiveene lny s i tua t ion repor ts f rom the i r reconna issancepa t r o ls . B e c ai ls e a i r bo r ne ope r a t ions a r e c on duc te d\vitl lin ene my te rr itory ;mci requi re spe ed and surpr ise ,Soviet commanclers p lan to con du c t opera t ion s\vithout f i t11 personal reconnaissance. After com-manders have been i tpda ted on the s i tua t ion, theyre l ine th e rn iss ions of the i r subord ina te and a t tachedunits. Plans of attack almost al~ vay snvolve ; ~ nnve lop -

me nt o r llanli ;rtt;lck.Offensi\ ,e tactics of ; t irhome forces are similar t o

tho se of Soviet mot orized r ifle forces. I :nlike raids, thea t tack a t th e t ina l objec t ive usual ly i s con duc ted toove nv l i elm the e ne m y a nd to ga in c on t r o l o f an c ne m y-hel d areit or fr~cilit), . inal objectives m o s t c o m m o n in% ) \ k t a i r bo r ne e se r c i se s a r e r iver c r os s ing s i t es , ai r-f ields, ;lnd mo un tain passes.

Before the a t t ;~ck. uppo r t ing uni ts a re deployed top n ) \~ i ci e n ; ~ x i r n i l n ~uppo r t . Attachec l ;~r t i l Ie r ) supp or ts

the airborne imit as i t c loses in on :In objective.Engineer e lemen ts a rc posi t ioned to n iove in quickly;~ n d \veep the a rea of obstac les . Air c lefense sec t ionsa r e ~ x ~ s i t i o n e d' lierc. they can engage a t tackin genem yairc raf t o r he l icopte rs .

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Hatt;~lionsnormall!. depart assembl!, areas in pre-battle formation. 71'l~is onsists of three compvnicsarrayed in a line, \+.eclge, or echelon. (:ompan)prebattle formation consists of three platoon columns1vitI-r 150 to LOO meters bet~ vee n olumns.

Attack formation norm;~lly s assumed within 1000meters of the objective, b ~ ~ t~lbullitsry t o get 21scloseas possible before dep1o)ing. A b o ~ ~ tOO fne ter s s tl-ren-rinimum distance for deployment into attack

formation.Platoons in a company attack formation deploy wit11

a 50 -meter in t en d between squad RMl)s, and a 50- toIo hn et er in te nd bet\veen platoons. The maximumattack frontage for at1 airborne company would be 500meters.

Before receiving the signal to attack, BMD radios arein the "recei\,e only" n-rode. Only the company com-mander and platoon leacler can transmit messages.On ce the attack begins. :ill radios can transmit and

receive messages.If the enemy is estimated to be weak-especially in

antitank \veapons-the airborne force may attack inone echelon \\it11 personnel nloi~ntecf n their RMIIs.Ho~vever.f the enemy is considered to be strong, theairborne force most likely \voi~ld attack in hvo

echelons Fvit1-r personnel dismounted. Ilismountedpersonnel adwnce between the HMIls and couldeither precede or follo\v them. The I3MDs fire fromshort halts.

In a night attack, the company commander gives theplatoon leaders an azimuth upon \vhicI-r to advance tothe objective. The. azirn~~thill be set on the direc-tional gyrocompass onboard the BMDs to guide eachplatoon o n its direction of attack.

kiz urc of a river crossing site hpicall). takesplace inthe same manner. Hokvever, the commander adjustshis plans to ;~c countor the peculiarities of the mission.'fie reconnaissance patrol's mission is modified to

include fincling s~l itable rossing sites so that units canbe deployed to seize key terrain o n both sides of theriver. <:omhat engineers also scout the riirer to de ter -mine its depth ancl u.icitl-r, speed of the current, riverbottom characteristics, existence of floating obstaclesand rnines, riverbank composition and slope, andapproaches o n the ri\,er's far hank. Subunits also ;iredesignated to prc\.cnt the enemy's destruction ofbridges or ferries during the attack.

An airfield protx~blywould be seized using two

directions of att;~ck. Iuring the attack, ~l ni ts emainmounted in HhII>s as long as possible. In the attackplm. commanders designate units to seize the controlto\ver. I>( I. storage are;ls, ancl any radio beacon to\+.ers.In addition, designated ~l ni ts ttack the enemy's main

:u-rcl re se nc securit). eletnents as well as any air defensecre\+,s situ;ited around the airfield. The engineer;~t tachment clears the airfield of enemy-emplacedmines. Iluring the attack, the main force takes thecontrol tower ;ind destroys the airfield security force.

In securing a mountain pass, the airborne unitdesignates as its objective the key terrain surroundingthe pass. Soviet commanders tailor their force size andcomposition to the size and availability of dro p zones,

as \%,ell as to the difficulty of movement onmountainous terrain. The Soviets plan to drop only abattalion or smaller-sized i~t-riton each DZ in themountains. They also expect more injuries due to theruggeclness of the terrain. In some areas, BMDs will nothe used in the a irborne operation. Also, the Soviets do

not plan on using attached :irtillery in every mountainoperation.

I)rop zones may be closer to the objective andlocated o n several sides of an objective to compensate

for the decreased speed of movement in then-rountains. If the IlZs are not Itxated near theobjective, the So ~i et s lan to move only on roads toreach the objective area. Finally, the Soviets rely more011 radio cornmu~c;~tionsn the mountains eventhough radios are less reliable in such regions.

The Defense

Once a Soviet airborne regiment or battalion hasseized an objective, its mission is to defend theol>jective ~l nt il he arrival of Soviet forces advancingfrom the front line. In almost all cases, they use a 360-

degree perimeter ctefense. Whether the defense isestablishecl in depth o r with all unitsfonvard, dependsupon the enemy threat and the terrain. If the com-mander puts maximum po\ver for nar d, he maintains asmall t-r-robile re se ne . For a regiment, this reservewould l x no more than a company. A ba t~ di onefense

\ v o ~ ~ l deep n o more than :I platoon-sized element inreseme.1)efensii.e positions are built on a series of subunit

strong points. A company is assigned a strongpoint\\+thin ;I hi~ttaliondefensive position. The companyma! establish a defense in depth o r a defense with allplatoons fo r\ ~i rd . he company commander designsthe cfefensive position so that g ro i~ nd ivenues of:~p~xo;~cl-rire hea\.il!. defended by antitank weapons.He places shoulder-fired air defense \veapons forward

of the perimeter. The air defense sections are locatedo n high ground so that an enemy air threat can bechallenged before it reaches the company's position,or in th e case of helicopter gi~nships.\.hilt. i t is firingfrorn a dist;~nce. The company commander places

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obstacles anci ;untit;rnk \\,e;ipons in inten.als het\\,eenplattx)ns as \vet1 as het\veen his comp;tny ;tnd ;ldj;tcentcompanies.

A coml>;~n)~'sciefenscs built ;tround a series ofpht txm strongpoints. These strongpoints are q7proxi-matcly - tOO meter:, across. H!kiI)s ;we placed LO O

meters apart kvitl~in e;tcIi platoon position. Forprotec tion, are p1;tccd in hi111 clcfilade o n th ereverse side of hill slopes. <;olnp:rn!~ commandersclesignate both priman. and alternate platoondefensive positions. In turn. platoon ci)ml-uandersdesignate both prim;tn and alternate positions fbr

their squads.The company commander prepares a company fire

plan that insures t he entir e company defensive arca is

covered by interlocking tires. Intenxls hct\\.een the

company and flanking companies arc also covered byfire. *lbeplan inclt~desrim;tr). ;uld alt erlute ;~zimuthsof fire for the platoon's prim;^ ;tnd alternate positions.In the fire plan, sqrlads are numlwred from 1 throi~ghso that the company commander can cont rol his ~lnit' sdefensive fires dojvn to squad level.

The c o n ~ ~ a n fommander may sp ec ie one platoonto provide air defense coverage for the company. If a

platoon receives such a mission, it concentrates all o f

its weapons onan

air threat ~v he n irected to do s o bythe company comman der. This platoon eflfort supple-ments t he air defense tires of the SAM section.

IJpon receiving t he prirnar).azimuths of fire from thecompany co~nm;tnder , latoon command ers lay eachBMD using the onboard directional g?rocompass. 'nleplatoon comtnander indicates terrain features to beused as the RhlD's lateral limits. The RMDs are placedin hull defi1;ide approximatel!, LOO meters apart and 50

to 100 meters to the rear of squad personnel. Squad

ln el nk rs prepare prone firing positions to raakc them-selves less \ulnerable t o enemy or friendl!, tire. 'f i eplatoon co~nrnancfer ocates MY; tntit;lnk gren;~delaunchers benveen the BX11)s. The Kl'Gs are alsoassigned sectors of fire.

1)uring th e dcfensi\.e bi~t tle, nem). tanks are gi\,entarget priority. The Soviets engage arrilor at ~n ; ~ s i r n i ~ mranges \vith all a\,~tilabletntitank \\~eapons. he SojFietsseek to awid having a BMI) engage a tiink one-on-one.

The individual Soviet soldier is trained to conduct"11:und-to-hand combat" against tanks. Firing from

prone positions, soldiers i~ s cutomatic \ve:pons fireto destroy an enetny tank's ohse nati on devices. Uh ena tank c omes within 8 to I 0 meters, a soldier jumps upand throws a grenade at the tank. If the tank is

damaged, he shoots the cr ew as they exit the vehicle.Ambush sites may be created o n primar). avenues of

approach approximately 5 kilome&rs from the main

clefensive perimeter. Platoon-sized rtmbushes may beem~>loyedn a role similar to that of a con~eringorce.

The location of an ; ~mb ush s chosen to facilitate

attacking an enemy as it crosses : naturitl defile. Theenemy ro ute into the ambush is mined s o that 1e;td andrear elements of the enemy march ti)rtnation aredestroyed so as to block exits from the dcfi e. Mineexplosions are the signal to open tire. Lead tanks arethe prin.~ar). argets in th e ambush.

The unit conducting it11 anibush a\,oids decisiveengagement wTith he enemy. Once the commanderhas made the decision to \\.ithdran., the unit moves to

its previously prqared defensive positionon

th eobjective.

Linkup

Airborne units either await a linkup \vith friendlyforces o r Aght their ~v ay ack to friendly lines. 7'0accomplish linkup, the airbo rne unit sends its recon-naissance element to meet advancing ground forceunits. The reconnaissance element provides

information o n the best ;tppro;tches into th e area, thesecurity situation on the objecti\,e, and th e enemysituation. Once linkup has been completed.oper;~tional ontrol o f tile airborne unit returns to thefi.otlt or n11.

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CHAPTER 3

HELIBORNE OPERATIONS

Helibome operations have been a part of Sovietm i l i t q doctrine since the 1900s. 711e I T Sairmobileexperience in Vietnam incre;aed Soviet interest in the

combat uses of the helicopter. Heliborne operations inSoviet ground force maneuvers increased during the1970s. Such operations now are standard in militaryexercises. Since early 1980, Soviet forces inAfghanistan have been conducting heliborneoperations in combat.

The Soviets appreciate the tactical advantage ofheliborne operations-rapid nuneuver of combattr(n)ps, ~lnconstrainedby obstacles o n the ground.When compared to parachute drops as a means of

inserting troops, heliborne operations require lesstraining and can penetrate enemy air space at a lowlevel. O n the o ther hand, availabiliqand capabilitiesof

helicopters limit the size, scope, and frequency ofheliborne operations.

DOCTR INE

Theoretically, by day or night, Soviet heliborne unitsare inserted in enemy territory, 50 kilometers or mor eforward of the line of contact. How7ever,Soviet descrip-tions of practice opera tions imply that the -assault forceis iauillly of battalion size or smaller, is assigned an

objecthrewithin range of Soviet divisional artillery ( i.e.,within about 15 kilometers of the line of contact ),

operates in daylight, and links up with an advancingfriendly force within hours.

Battalions of motorized rifle regiments are trainedfor helib ome operations employing helicopters from

arniy or fir>r?t elicopter regiments.

M ISS IONS

Typical rnissions for a heliborne operation areneutralization of enemy command, control, andconlmunications facilities; seizure of critical terrainsuch as an opposite shore of a river crossing site;pursuit of a withdrawing enemy; attack enernydefensepositions from the rear; neutralization or disruption oftnemy combat support or combat semice supportelements; or deception. The Soviets expect thehelibome force to be threatened by superior enemytirepower and mobility after landing in th e enemy rear.Therefore, the assault force generally requires externalfire support and early linkup if it is to Ix recovered.

A typical hel ihorne mission is the seizure of a bridge-h a d in support of a river crossing. Other possible

objecti\res are mountain passes, bench exits. desertoases, crossroads, or other featitres ~v ho se enial to theenemy will make the overall maneuver plan eilsier.ffeliborne units also can block enemy attempts tobreak out of an encirclement or to reinforce a meetingeng;tgement.

tfeliborne units also can he inserted into the enemyrear area for reconnaiss;lnce ~nissions. mall reconnais-sance units may he inserted with light arr-noredvehicles. In the Soviet rear area, heliborne units canperfornm rear area securih missions. lliey can screen,delay, or defend against ;in enemy approach to a\ .~~lnerablelank.

Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deceptionoperations are exarnples of other missions suited toheliborne op ent ion s. Ilel ibome units also can lay and

clear mines in t he enemy rear. In World War 11duringthe forcing of the enemy Dnieper river defenses, Sovietforces inserted company-sized units by parachute intoGerman division rear areas on the f;~r ide of the river.On th e I hie per , the enemy was hard-presseci from thefront and was iinable to provide adequate rear areasecurity. The result was that enemy combat supportactivities were disrupted at small cost to the St)\iets.On o ther occasions, a disproportionately large enemyforce was diverted from the front to deal with a rear

area threat. In comparable situations today,helicopters could be L I ~ W ~o insert combat units intothe enenly rear area rather than parachute drops. Insupport of deception operations, helibome units canbe ilsecl to r epresen t larger fi) rn~a tions n feints,demonstrations, and ruses.

ORGAN IZAT ION

Motorized rifle battalions are tailored for heliborne

operations and probably ~ ~ o ~ ~ l de selected from adivision's seco nd echelon o r combined arms reserve.The tailoring eliminates asscts not mission-essential.The battalion antitank platoon may be augmented. Asapper company, an anti;~ircraftbattery, and a batteryof tokved artillery may be attached. Rear servicepersonnel rnay be attached to the force to deal withsupply of an~n ~un it ion ,edical supplies and treatment.and any special problems for a giw n operation, s i ~ chssupply of drinking water.

Some light armored or ~vhee lcd sehicles can beincluded in the force for use as missile carriers andreconnaissance vehi cles A1 hli-(>/HOOK l~ ea \ytransport helicopter is required to lift most of these

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vehicles. 'l he number ofhl i-0 sorties ;t\ailal>le \ - i l l liriiit

the number of \,chicles. U'itll all aitgmentations ancl

deletions cotlsidered (particularl!. cleletion of AI'(:sand most other battalion t.chicles), the battalionheliborne force could contaiti o\rr 500 troops.

'Transport helicop ters from either the ;tssaulthelicopter regiment or the tr;tnsport helicopterregiment can be usecl for helibome operations. HINI)attack helicopters are capable of c: ~r ~) .i t~ gotile troopsbut are nornmlly not i~sedn that role.

TRAINING

Soviet motorized rifle troops require a minimum ofon e day's training in prepar;~ tion for helibornc

operations. Individual companies require 2 to -t hoursto practice loading and unloading procedures. Six orstTen hours a re required to re11e;trsc the actions in thedeparture area before embarkation ancl those :actiotls

required after landing. Training stresses antitanktactics and other pertinent aspects of dismountedcombat aswell as se t routines for troops in aticl aroundaircraft. Mockup helicop ter fuselages may be used andcerta in individuals may receive :tdditional specializedtraining in tlie tasks of loading ;itid secilring t)i~lkyitems in the helicopter.

A battalion or company helihorne ;wsault is astandard prac tice in field training exercises at di\isionlevel and above. In 1978,Exercise HEREZINA inclucied

a heliborne operation that employed :I mix of Mi-WHIPand Mi-(,/HOOK helicopters to land a motorized riflebattalion in the enemy's re;tr.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Planning Considerations

Helibome operations in the otfense exploit fleetingopportunities. In the defense, they counter t11re;its\vhich suddenly materialize. I-ieliborne pl;innitig has tob e rapid, thorough, a nd flexible. Planning begins withthe selection of the objective. The responsible com-mander designates the objectives, one or morehelicopter landing zones at o r near the objective, and adeparture area for the force.

1)uring the oper;ttions, helicopters shoitld spenclonly a minimum of time in any one place. They Ltre par-ticularly tv1ner;ible \+.hen stationar),, either o n the

ground or hovering in t he air. The pickitp ;111t11;tnclingof the assault force must he accomplished quickl!..withoitt cotlfusiot~.

The lift capabilih. of t-acli helicopter is a v;triahledepending on air density encottntrred during the

mission. 'l'he lift c;tp;tl>ility is degr;tcJecl seriously astemlwrature or ;tltitttdc ittcreases.

W'c;tlx)tis, supplies, ;tncl key personnel arc spreadthroitghoitt the l~~licopteri~ rceo that the oper;ltion\\.ill not bil hecause of;( fen. unlitck~.osses among the

helicopters.An ;ws;iitlt itnit onc e or1 the groiund in the enemy rear

area rn;i!. I>e att;tckecl from ;in!. tlirection by sitperiorenemy forces. I t is likel! t o require more external Aresitp1x)rt than a motorizccl rifle unit of similar size inst;tnclard configuration. 'llic groitt~cl force is in atet~i~oitsiti~;i tioti oncerning resuppl!,. 1)ilring heavycngagemcnt at close qit;trters. tl ~ ebasic load ofammunit ion can be csha usted \.eg. quickl!:

Command and Control

A division commander is the lokvest ranking groundforce oficer likely to order :1 helihonle operation.

I + - o t i t or army cotnrnanders may order ;I heliborneoperation dralving o n the assets of a motorized rifle or

airborne division. In 311). case, ;irnly and ,f ,r)tzt willknow of and appro\.e tile operation in advance.

'The comtnander of the Iielihorne force \vill Ix thecomm;~nder f the battalion. comp;tn!?, or other unitsforming the Ixtsis for the ass:lult force. The gn,undh r c e comm;lnder is responsible h)r preparation andpositioning the trtnlps ii)r lo;~ding.He shares with theaviation comnlander the decision to proceed with th e

landing, based o n their assessment of tlie situation atthe landing zone. After the landing is made, the groundforce commatlder is solely responsible for conductingthe operation.

W'hile the grouncl force commander may be able torefine the .scheme of tn;ttleitr,er, most of the decisionsrequired for the operation ;is ;I \vliole \+.ill have beenmade by higher authorit). The operations plan isfollowed as closely as possible.

>lost helibome operations require at least asquadron and possihly a regiment of transporthelicopters. Tl-tese units belong to either the army orfiurrt. The ;t\.iation conim;lnder's responsibilitiesinclitde p roper 1o;iding of troop s and c;irgo in the pickit17 zone and navigation and tactics in the air. The

ground and air cotnmander for the operation nornlallyride in the same helicopter. ~ vh il e heir respectivedeputies ride in another helicopter. Ground and airofficers work o ~ t t otlflicts in the mission planning

process by negotia tion. \vitli appeal to higher authorityin case of disputes . Air liaison officers in ground unitshelp the aviation commander to identify the bestapproach and departure routes, and coordinate thehelicopter activity with ground force air defenses.

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Communications

The gmuncl force radio net interlocks \vith theaviation net . An airborne command post may be usedto relay cornmunic;~tions rom the assault unit on theg r o ~ ~ n dack to its parent itnit. Minimal radio trans-missions :we ;I standard So\.iet procedure . Prearrangedco de v+.ords keep transmissions short and uninfor-mative to the enemy. Color coded signal flares andsmoke are ~ ~ s e d .

LoadingThe departure ;uea is located approximately 2 0

kilometers behind the line of contact to avoid enemyartillery fire. The departure area is large enough toallow troop dispersal. It contains subareas forhelicopter pickup, disposition of troops, and itnits

preparing to embark. The departure area is locatedwhere it can be ni;akecl from enemy observation byprotective features of the terrain, and by camouflageand dispersal. Units which cannot be completelyhidden from enemy reconnaissance should appear assnlall reserve or second eche lon units.

The pickup zone is located as close as possible to thedisposition area to minilnize delay and confusion enroute to the helicopters. A unit may move from itsdisposition area to a short- term waiting area closer toth e pickup zone. The waiting area also is canlouflagedand allows for troop dispersal. It can be used todistribute special equiplnent and t o receive specialist

personnel attached to the force for the operation.The force is prepared to load before the helicoptersarrive. While waiting for the helicopters, the com-mander briefs his subordinates and joins the politicaldeputy in exh orting the t roops. The commander's finalbriefing includes recognition signals to be usedhetween subunits and the plan for linking up withfriendly forces. Staff officers responsible for communi-cations and other services brief t he force chief of s t s .The chief of staff has prepared and coordinated a

detailed list, approved by higher authority, ofu~ li at illbe loaded into each helicopter.

The helicopter crew, having prepared the aircraft inadvance to receive its assigned load, supervises theloading process. For palletized cargo, the center ofgravity is chalk-marked on the cabin floor. For bulkyitems such as artillery pieces. unnecessary obstruc-tions are removed from the cabin of the helicopter.The helicopter crew provides the \\,inches, booms,ladders, ramps, chocks, lashing material, and any oth er

items required for loading.'The ground forces provide the labor for loading

cargo into the helicopters. Specialists of the rearservices attached for the mission may be used. The

cargo is placed 1 0 to 15 meters from the expectedposition of the he licopter receiving cioor. I'ersonnel to

be loaded form in a single colunln at a similar distance.The senior man present, normally ;I sqi~ ad eadersergeant, identifies hirnself;~nd he cargo to be loaded.He provides a ~vrittennanifest sho\ving the helicopternumber and the cargo \\.eight by item. ffelicoptersdesignated for th e most time-consuming loadingolxrations land first.

If the ca rgo consists of equipment o r supplies, the

helicopter commander checks the rnanifest andord ers, "Begin loading." \Y'hen he has inspected andapproved the positioning of the cargo inside theaircraft, he orders, "Begin lashing." Personnel to betransported are marchect into the aircraft and arechecked for proper seating by the senior ground forcerepre.wntative and th e helicopter cre\v. While in thehelicopter, the ground forces personnel follow theinstructions of the helicopter commander.

Landing Zones

The heliborne force lands on its objecti\re if l>ossible.If not o n the objective, the landing zone should be as

close and as advantageo~~slylaced ;LS possible, butoutside direct fire range of a clefended objective. Therewill be at least o ne alte rnate landing zone and possiblym~tl tipl e anding zones for subunits of the force.

The heliborne force commander is limited in his

ability to reconnoiter lanciing zones and routes to th eobjective. Ilsually he must depend o n maps, aerialreconnaissance. and human sources such as prisonersor line crossers. The terrain in question is likely to be

beyond reach of ground reconnaissance patrols. Tooo b v i o ~ ~ sin air reconnaissance jeopardizes the chanceof surprise. Minutes before the landing, an armed

helicopter or otlier aircraft perfornis a final reconnais-

sance of the landing site.In selecting the landing zone. there are hazards to

cons ider \vhich may not he reflected o n maps or aerialphotography. The greatest danger is that the enemy,either through acl~ lnc eino\\,ledge oftl lc mission or bychance, u7illbe in position to defeat the operation and\vill exploit his advantage hilly. Another hazard may beundetected changes in the NH<: situation in thelanding zone and the objective. Li ~~ s el yacked snow,sand, or dust driven by rotor \msh can obstruct pilotvision. Snow can hide hazards such as boulders andcre\.;lsses in the landing zone. The firmness of the

grounci, on \vhich th e force artil len. ciepioyrnent maydepend, can change rapidly \vith precipitation ortempcraturc cl~ilnges. n th c tun dr;~.having creates abog on to p of the penii;ifrost \+.here rock-hard soil

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existed ;i short time 1,efi)rc. If ;I sllortagc of suitable

terrain for I;unding exists, troops ciun I,e unlo;~dccl ,).

~ a i n gope ladders, 1)). rappelling, or I,).simpl!, jumping

from ;I Ino\.ering helicopter.

While the operation as a whole may rely heavily on

air and artillery support, the assault force primarilysuppresses the enemy forces in the landing area.

Helicopters at the landing zone c w e r the off-loading

operation with antitank guided missiles, free flight

rockets (both antipersonnel and antiarmor), and

machine gun and small arms fire.,.Iroops le;ive the helicopter on order of the

helicopter cre \s commancler. I'roccdi~res are tightly

regimentetl to get the troops ;inel cargo ;I\KI!. ti-om th e

aircraft and a\\.;~yrom th e 1;uncling zonc n. it li oi~t el;~). .

the I;~irncIiers ~uncl giricl:~ni.c ,c.hicles from ;uml>ilsh

\\i tIiout attacking the enel~ly's arrihon fitcilit!.. 'l'hc

schelne of nn;ineln,cr \ \ - i l l I x q>pro\,ecl,f not clict;~tcd.

I>! higher autliorit]\~. nc.e the oper;~tionbegins, the

heliborne ti)rce cotnm;~nclcr a!. retine t lie sclie ~iic f

m;incu\.er if necess;lr!., I>ilt m;~kes is feu . clialiges as~~ossil,le.n exercises, the mission ends \\,it11 th e :irri\.;~l

of ;I tiiendl!, groilncl forcc. t;s;~mpleh uggest tli;tt the

s ~ ~ n ~ i \ ~ a l1' the ;iss;~i~ltorce m;i!. not I,e rcclirirecl for

s~~cccssf'i~l~ccomplishnlc.nt f tlic tilission.

\Yrhile c;~cIi hase o f the ope r;~tion s b~ri lt n the

success o f the pre\.ious phase, the most critical

~ ~ ~ o m e n t secirr in the nlo\,ement from the 1;uncling

zonc to the ol,jective. It 1 man) sitil;itions, c\~er?-tliings

st;tked o n the success of the initial assaitlt o n the objcc-

ti\.c, made bcforc the enemy re;tcts to tlic p re c n cc ofthe Iteliborne force. 1

The Objective After seizing its ol)jc.cti\,e, t l ~ e ssault fi )rcc est;ih-

'The objective normally is cspressecl in term5 of lislles :I perimeter defense to i t \~ t i tinktlp.A motorized

terrain to 1,e secured o r ;ui enemy ~l ni to I,e neutm- rifle hattalion in helihorne ;~ssi~i~ltperations cannot

Iized. Ideally, it sho~rld e rel;itivcly sm;~ll nd lightl), he self-sustaining. Tlie plannecl time to linkup tlorm;ill!.

defended, and lni~\~casy access. For cx;umple, m enem), is 2 t o 3 ho~lrs.

tactical missile ~lnitma), be ncutralizccl by destroying

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! CHAPTER 4

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

DOCTRINE

Soviet military strategy currently recognizes the

importance and complexity of amphibious operations.

During the 1950s, the Sovietsdenied the militaryvalue

of amphibious assaults because of the potential effect

of nuclear weapons on an assault force. The Soviets re-

evaluated their position in the early 1960s and re-

activated the Soviet Naval Infantry in 1964,which now

consists of approximately 12,000 men. It has the crpa-

bility to conduct tactical landings with highly mobile

forces, air cushion vehicles, and landing ships.

inflicting loss or damage in enemy rear area facilities

Itxated near a coast, and for diversionary operations.

The mval infantry force employed normally would be a

battalion, company, or platoon.

Soviet Naval InfantryThe Soviet Naval Infantry can be expanded quickly in

wartime by mobilizing trained re~ervis ts nd reserve

equipment. The Naval Infantry is organized in to units

which are subordinate operationally to fleet com-

manders. The organization of naval infantry units isMISS IONS A ND OPERATING FORCES similar to that of motorized rifle units. There are cur-

Amphibious Landings rently three naval infantry regiments and one division.

The Soviets categorize amphibious landings

depending on the scale of the landing. The&Naval

categories are strategic, operational, tactical, and ,

reconnaissance and 'ahot& landings. Secondary

missions, such as coastal defense, may also be assigned. I FLEET

Strategic Landings. Strategic landings support

theater forces in opening up a new area of military

operations. This landing would call for the employ-

ment of a multidivision force, with appropriate naval

and air support. The Soviets have never conducted astrategic landing.

Operational Landings. Operational landings are

made to assist ground o r naval forces in a coastal region

to surround and destroy enemy ground or naval units

in that area. The Soviets call this a "maritime front."

Landings of this scale might entail the landing ofa naval

infantry regiment as the first echelon. Other missions

would include the seizure of major islands or a group

of islands, naval bases, and other important coastalobjectives. This is believed to be the primary role of the

Soviet Naval Infantry today.

Tactical Landings. Tactical landings are conducted

to strike at the rear area or flank of any enemy force

along a coastline, or for seizing islands, naval bases,

coastal airfields, ports, and other objectives on an

enemy-held coastline. The naval infantry force

employed could be a battalion or larger, operating

indenendentlv or with ground force units.L

Reconnaissance and Sabotage Landings. These

landings are conducted for reconnaissance, for

UNIT

Northern 1 regiment

Baltic 1 regiment

Black Sea 1 regiment

Pacific Ocean1

division

Naval lnfantry Regiment. The naval infantry

regiment consists of three naml infantry battalions, a

tank battalion, and several specialized support

companies. It has a strength of about 2,000 men. Its

organization is similar to the motorized ritle regiment

except that the tank battalion has a mix of medium

tanks and PT-76 amphibious light tanks. The naval

infantry regiment does not have an organic artillerybattalion, but does have a multiple rocket launcher

battery. It also receives artillery support from the naval

gunfire ships of the amphibious task force.

Naval Infantry Battalion. The basic unit of the

naval infantry regiment is the naval infantry battalion.

The battalion is made up of three naval infantry

companies, a mortar platoon, an antitank platoon, and

supporting supply and maintenance, medical, and

con~municationsunits. In all, the battalion numbersabout 1 00 men. This unit, reinforced, constitutes the

basic amphibious attack force in the assault landing-

the battalion assault force (BAF).

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Soviet Naval Infantry Regiment

NAVAL

INFANTRY

REGIMENT

I I iAIR CHEMICAL

DEFENSEENGINEER SIGNAL

COMPANYDEFENSE

BATTERYCOMPANY COMPANY

58 70 57 36

4 x ,2511-23-4 3 x K-61 2 x BTR-6OPA/B 3 x BRDM-2CBR Recon

4 x SA-SIGASKIN 63 x AK M 53 x AKM 3 x ARS-12U Decon

*Total Personnel (Approx~mate)

5 2 x AKM I 34 x AKMI I I

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-5 4/55 Medium Tank . 4 4 ARS-12U CBR Decontamination Vehicle .. . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .T-76 Amphibious Light Tank . 4 4 82/ 120 -m m Mortar . 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TR-6OPA/B Amphibious APC . I 1 1 RPG-7 Antita nk Grenade Launcher.. .9 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ROM Reconnaissance Vehicle . 9 SA-7/GRAIL SA M Launcher .2 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .T-3/SAGGER BROM ATGM Launcher. . 6 SPG-9 73- mm Recoilless Antita nk Gun . 9

. . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RDM-2 C8R Reconnaissance Vehicle . 3 AT-3/SAGGER Manpack ATGM Set.. . 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .M-21 122-mm Multipl e Rocket Launcher.. .6 RPK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun .90

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .811-23-4 SP Quad 23-rnm AA Gun . 4 AKM 7.62-mm Rifle . I 5 2 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A-9/GASKIN SAM Launcher . 4 SVD 7.62-mm Sniper Rifle .2 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-61 Tracked Amphibian . 3

NOTE: The AKM rifles and the RPK light n iach ~ne uns have now been replaced by the new AK-74 and

RPK-74 5 45-mm weapons

MEDICAL

COMPANY

27

60 x AKM 38 x AKM 34 x AKM 23 x AKM

MAINTENANCE

COMPANY

5 7

TRANSPORTATION

COMPANY

74

SUPPLY

COMPANY

39

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Soviet Naval lnfantrv Battalion

'Total Personnel (Approximate )

- -N A V A L

I N F A N T R Y

B A l l A L l O N409 *


Equ~pment Total Equipment Total

BTR 6OPA/B Amphibious APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 SPG-9 73-mm Recoilless Antitank Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

82/120-mm Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 SVD 7.62-m m Sniper Rifle ..................... 9

SA-7/GRAIL SAM Launcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 RPK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 AKM 7.62-mm Rifle ........................ 28 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . .T-3/SAGGER Manpack ATGM Se t. . . 3

t I

NOT E: The AKM ri fles and the RPK light machine guns have now been replaced by the new AK- 74 and

RPK-74 5.45-mm weapons.

B A l T A L I O N

HEADOUART ERS

1 2

1 x BTR 6OPA/B

3 x AKM

I 1

Soviet Naval Infantry Company

M E D I C A L

PL AT OON

5

5 x AKM

SIGNAL

P L A T O O N

16

16 x AKM

N A V A L

I N F A N T R Y

C O M P A N Y

S U P PL Y A N 0

M A I N T E N A N C E

P L A T O O N

2 726 x AKM

NAVAL

INF ANT RY

C O M P A N Y103

C O M P A N YN A V A L

H E A D Q U A R T E R SINF ANT RY

P L A T O O N

3 x SA-7/GRAIL3 x BTR 6OPA/B

5x

AKM

3 x RPG 7

1 x SVD3 x RPK

21 x AKM

%-

10 x BTR 6OPA/B 3 x 82/120-mm Mortar 2 x BTR 6OPA/B

3 x SA-7/GRAIL 1 x BTR 6OPA/B 3 x AT-3 SAGGER Manpack

9 x RPG 7 9 x AKM 3 x SPG 9

3 x SVO 19 x AKM

9x

RPK68 x AKM

M O R T A R

P L A T O O N

16

5


ANT IT ANK

PL AT OON

2 4

Equipment Total

BTR-6OPA/B Amphibious APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

....................A-7/GRAIL SAM Launcher . 3

RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. ............... 9

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VD 7.62-mm Sniper Rifle . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun . 9AKM 7.62-mm Rifle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

NOT E: The AKM rifle s and the RPK light machine guns have now been replaced

by the AK -74 and RPK-74 5 .45-mm weapons.

'Total Personnel (Approximate)

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Naval Infantry Company. The naval infantrycompany is made up of a small company headquar tersand three naval infantry platoons . The company head-quarter s consistsof the company commander, political

officer, technical officer, first sergeant, mes-senger/clerk, medic, three SA-7 gunners, and thedriver and gun ner of their BTR-60 armored per sonnelcarrier. Each platoon consists of three squads of tenmen each. Each squad consists of the squad leader, amachine gunner, an RPG gunner, an assistant RPG

gunner/rifleman, four riflemen, the APC machinegunner, and the APC driver.

Tank Battalion. The naval infantry tank battal ion hasa mix of PT-76 light amphibious tanks and mediumtanks. Each of the tank companies has three platoons of

four tanks each with t he company commander's tankbringing the total t o 13 anks. While the medium tanksare not amphibious, they can disembark in shallowwater as a follow-on landing force behind the PT-76and BTR-60 first o r second wave. In task organizing alanding force, on e platoon of tanks normally suppo rts anaval infantry company.

Reconnaissance Company. The reconnaissancecompany may be task organized to provide a platoon ofat least o ne PT-76 and three BRDMs to the battalionassault force for the amphibious landing. The Sovietsconsider this platoon to be one of their amphibious

assault advance teams. These teams also includecombat engineers and hydrographic personnel whoreport beach conditions. In certain instances, recon-naissance vehicles may swim to shore under thei r ownpower. Conditions permitting, they may be landed byair cushion vehicles. Some reconnaissance teams alsomay be airlanded by helicopter or dropped by para-chute behind de fended positions. The reconnaissanceplatoon has two objectives:

To provide information to t he main landing force

about enemy defensive positions and ene my reinforce-ments on the march toward the beach.

To screen forward and to the flank of the amphib-

ious landing teams.

Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery. With theexception of the three mortars organic to each navalinfantry battalion, the regiment's six BM-21 multiplerocket launchers constitute the sole organic artilleryassets of the naval infantry regiment. BM-21s provide

fire support for amphibious landings and also may beused by the naval infantry in a coastal defense role.Each launcher can deliver considerable firepower withits forty 122-mm high-explosive rockets.

Antitank Battery. The naval infantry regiment's sixBRDMs of its antitank battery are fornlidable antitank

weapon systems. These weapons augment the man-pack antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and SPG-9recoilless guns employed at battalion level andgenerally constitu te th e regimental antitank reserve.The ATGM/BRDMs normally are employed to protec tthe flanks of the landing force from counterattacking

tanks and against enemy weapons emplacements.

Air Defense Battery. Besides the three SA-7s atcompany level, air defense is provided to regimentalunits by the four ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraftguns and four amphibious SA-9 surface-to-air missiles(SAMs) of the air defense batter): Supporting navalships provide air defense throughout all phases of thelanding operation.

Engineer Company. The engineer companycontains th ree combat engineer platoons. Normally, acombat engineer platoon is provided to support eachbattalion assault force. It clea rs obstacles and mine-fields along the approaches to the shore, on thebeaches, and on routes leading inland from thebeaches.

Signal Company. The signal company of the navalinfantry regiment consists of a headquarters andse nl ce section, a radio platoon, and a wire/telephone

platoon. The headquarters and service sectionprovides courier senrice and limited signal and vehiclemaintenance support for the company. The radioplatoon provides vehicles, radios, and operato rs for theregimental commander and staff. The Pr.ire/telephoneplatoon installs and operates switchboards for com-mand posts and the message center, and lays wirewhen directed.

Chemical Defense Company. The regimental

chemical defense company consists of a companyheadquarters, a decontamination platoon, and achemical and radiologcal reconnaissance platoon.The decontamination pla toon is organized into threesquads with one ARS decontamination vehicle each.The chemical and radiological reconnaissance platoonconsists of three squads with one BRDM rkh in eachsquad.

The chemical defense company of the regimentnormally provides one reconnaissance squad to the

battalion assault force t o determine and report levelsand types of contamination in the landing area and tomark cleared lanes for advance of the main force. If theregiment i s not conducting similar landings elsewhere,

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the remaining t ~ . oeconnaissance .yu;tds also can Ixemploj,ed to check alternate ad nn ce routes. I>econ-tanination vehicles normally set up on the fir sicle ofthe contaminilted areas to spray the adrzncing navalinfantry \,chicles 011 the march. One o r more squads

can be employed, depending on regimentalrequirements.

Rear Service Units. Rrar senice units (trans-

portation, supply, maintenance, ancl rnedical ) are small

in keeping \vith the limited scope and clumtion ofmission assigncd to na n l infant?. Principal supply isfrom the ships offshore. Senice units may provideplatoon-sized units to suppor t battalion assault forces.Casuitlties are evacuated in ret~~rningmpty supplytrucks and othe r se ni ce vehicles.

With th e Soviet N a y playing the dominant role.units of all branches of the armed forces may providesupport for amphibious landings. The na1-y transportsthe naml infantn* o the enemy-held shore; providesgunfire; sweeps offshore minefields; protects thelanding with rnissile ships, gunboats, and anti-submarine warfare ships; and provides logisticsupport.

Naval aviation and the Soviet Air Force provide airsupport on the beach. They also attack enemy shipshindering th e advance of the amphibious assault force,and conduct aerial reconnaissance. Air defense unitsprotect the ;tmphibious force against air attack during

embarkation. sea passage, deb;trkation, and shorecombat operations. nlissile and artillery units strikebeach defense forces and wrapon systems.

Soviet Ground Forces. The Soviets considermotorized rifle troops of the ground forces to bepotential participants in amphibious operations.

Ground forces will probably conduct an amphibiousoperation with naval infantry troops. The navalinfantry's special skills are utilized to the maximum to

insure success of the assault landing.N;tval infantr). landing teams probably lead the

assault. 'lhey have responsibility for breitching anti-landing obstacles il l the urater and on the shore, forseizing a beachhead, and for securing the approach of

the main force to the landing area. The mitin hody,consisting largely of motorized rifle troops, follo\vs.Naval infa ntn personnel m;ly be attached to motorizedrifle subunits to assist in overcoming the specialproblems of an assault landing.

CONDUCT OF THE

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

The Soviets maintain that anlphibious assaults can beconducted both day and night, in inclement \.eather,and under radio silence until successful landing.Airborne, heliborne, air, ground. and naval forces haveparticipated jointly in such landings.

Soviet Amphibious Force Organization

AMPH I B I O U S

FORCE

COMMAND ER

I LANDING

FORCE IL I J

b 1NAVAL GROUND LANDING NAVAL

SHIPS GUNFIRE SHIPS

TRANSPORTSSECURITY

SHIPS

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Phases of the Assault

The five phases in a Soviet amphibious assault are:Preparing of equipment and amphibious units.Loading of personnel and equipment on ships and

transports.Moving by sea to the objective area and

debarkation.Battle for the beachhead by the amphibious units.Landing of ground forces and withdnwal of the

naval infantry.The naval infantry is trained to commence opera-

tions either while at sea or from an alert status at theirland bases. When alerted. an amphibious assault forcemans its equipment and moves out to its embarkationpoints for loading aboard landing ships. The landingships ideally arrive at the embarkation points shortlybefore or at th e same time as the arrival of the assault

forces. This precludes congestion of the anlphibiousforce at th e embarkation point awaiting transport.

The vehicles are loaded on in reverse order so thatthe assault vehicles can disembark first at the taxget

area. Vehicles are then tied down for th e movenlent bysea. After loading, the ships form a cow o). under theprotect ion of combat ships and aircraft.

The amphibious landing ma!. take place in conjunc-tion with a ground force battle under aay near the sea-coast. In this case, th e supported ground force usuallysends a reconnaissance party of up to a motorized riflecompany with engineers attached to reconnoiter thelanding area. The information from this reconnais-

sance party is passect to the amphibious force andsupporting air forces. The enemy defenses them nu).be fired upon by aircraft, naval gun ships, and groun dforce artiller)..

A h;~tt:tlionassault force ( BAF) ccinmmander usuallyis assigned an immediate mission, a direction of attack,and ;he overall landing objective. Normally theimmediate mission is to destroy personnel andFveapons in the enemfs tirst line of defense and tocapture shore terrain fi)r the landing and deploymentof follo\v-on grotlnd forces. 'l'he depth of the BAF'si~nnlediatemission depends upon the strength and

disposition of the enemy defenses.A company landing as part o fa RAF isgiven an imme-

diate mission. normally t o seize a strongpoint in theenemy's defenses and t o protect the landing and

deployment o f follow-on forces. The company also isgiven ;I direction for further advance. A plitoon isassigned an attack objcctivc and a direction for further

a&ance.The ba ttle for the beachhead begins with naval gun-

fire on coastal targets. Fires are con cent rat ed onenemy artillery, obstacles, and troo p concentrations.

AI I ;~irbornc r helibortle as.sault inland t o block

enemy re se nes heading to the beachhead may support-the amphibious assault forces. Naval infantry units mayconduct this type of airborne o r heliborne operation.

W'hile naval gi~r lfirc nd air strikes suppress enemytire, mines\veepers clear paths through offshore mine-fields for passage of the landing ships. Destroyers andother antisubmarine uarfar e (ASW') ships protect theamphibious force from attach by submarines andothe r warships. When approach lanes are cleared, thetirst \Give of amphibio~~sanks disembarks and swims

toward the shore. 'fie amphibious tanks commencefiring with their main guns at targets of opportunitywhile in the surf.

Soviet Naval Infantry Battalion Assault Force (BAF)

B A T F A L I O N

A S S A U L TFORCE (BAF)

"Can include any or all of the followrng elements med~urnan k reconnaissance, mult~plerocketauncher,antitank, arr defense, engrneer, signal, chemical defense, transportatran, supply, maintenance. medical

m

1 IOTHER

R E G I M E N T A LE L E M E N T S *

BA FHEADQUARTERS

N A V A LINFANTRY

BATTALION

A M P H I B I O U SLIGHT TANK

C O M P A N YJ

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The follo~vingwave is made up of RTR-60s. Recentamphibious exercises in the Raltic have employed aircushion whicl es t o c a r p aportion of the assault forcesto th e shore.

Troops do not dismount from their BTR-(10s afterreaching the shore irnless the bealch is defended.Normally, in the ;tbsence of defenses or in the face of

lightly defended positions, cornhat vehicles continuefo ma rd to seize the objectives. They the while on themove, maitltaining the momentum of the attack, and

pushing on to link up \vith a n airborne or heliborneforce or ground force ti) secure the beachhead for thefollon.-on forces.

In the Face of determined resistance, the natalinfantry troops dismount to seize their objectives, tosecure the beachhead, and to provide cover for themain force landing o n the beachhead behind them.

The follow-on groilnd force units disembark, moveto shore, and continue the battle inlmd ~v hil ehe natalinfantry unit is mit11dr:twn. Writhdra\val of the naval

infantry terminates th e :irnphibioils assault phase of th eoperations.T?Assault Formations

The formation of the b:tttalion assault force isvariable. A first xvave force may contain an amphibioustank lat to on as the lead clement xvith one or Gvo of thenaval infantry comp;mics, support ing engineers. and a

chemical defense platoon. A second Ivave ma), consistof the remaining tl&tal rdtntncortlpan),orcompanies.led by a platoon of amphibious tanks.

The ent ire nax;ll in fa ntn battalion could deploy inc o l u m ~ ,ine, \veilgr, or other \ariation in a singlewave. Ground force units such as a motorized riflebattalion deploy :is a second uave.

The diagram at the right shows the assault of a navalin fantq batt:ilion clepl&yed in line in a single uave.Amphibioits lalnding ships h3t.c launched th e APCs and

amphibious tanks. Tank fire is directed at antitankweapons. art ill en, tn)oq> strongpoints, bunkers andtroop concentrations. The Sot.iets train to f re theirweapons while afloat.

For a regimental operz~tion, naial i nfa ntn battalionattacking in line ti)nnation coirld constitute the firstwave. 'Ihe renraining b;lttalions ;ire held back for thesecond and possibl!: third lvaves o r echelons.

If offshore ohst;tcles are present, the combatengineer s clear thret. t o six lancs for the battalion. Onwide frontages xvith feu. or no obstacles, the battalion

/? may adopt ;I line h)r:rx~ti<)n.;~m)iv ront:~ges laycallfor cornpan!,-sized a\\at ilts either o n line or in coliirnnformation.

Amphibious Assault Landing

. lORED

PERSONNELCARRIER

a

A SOVIETNAVAL INFANTRY BATTALION, LINE FORMATION,

I N A SINGLE-WAVE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDING WITH

SUPPORTING AMPHIBIOUS TANKS.

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Weaknesses

Surprise. If t he ships of the amphibious force aredetected en route, the defenders have time toreinforce likely landing areas with troops, ar til len , andair support. The anlphibious force also may be attackedby enemy naval forces.

Air Cover. If the amphibious landing force does nothave tactical air superiorit)., the assault force woi~ ld evulnerable to air strikes at sea and on the beaches. SA-7s, ZSU-L3--is, and SA-9s can be fired from the decks ofth e landing ships and ashore. 'These weapons coni-plement naval antiaircraft fire, but might not be suf-

ficient to insure success of the rtssault.

Weather. Fog, hea\y rain, or other periods ofreduced visibiliq could cause disorientation of the

assault force. Such disorientation could cau.welements of the units to be dispersed beyond thecontrol of the unit conlmanders and even outside theobjective area altogether.

Sea Conditions. Hemy surf could capsize vehiclesand break u p the assault fornlation. Troops inside thevehicles would not have stable pla tfor n~srom whichto tire. Fire from amphibious tanks in the wa ter wouidbe useless in any but the calmest conditions. Sea-

sickness could become a problem and decrease theeffectiveness of assault troops.

Enemy Obstacles. A well-prepared s)stem ofobstacles and mines could slow or stop an :lss;~itltlanding. Air cushion \,chicles may skill1 successli~ll~~o v a submerged obstacles, but passage of amphibiousvehicles could be blocked.

Enemy Armor. Enemy tark s or guns could destroy

the assault force. Amphibious vehicles are lightlyarmored ;ind estrcmely. ~u ln er ab le o niost t!.pes of

enemy fire.

Rates of Advance. If the first m ;c\.es arc pre \rnte dfro111 moving inland from the Iwachhcad, massing oftroops, vehicles, and Lveapons can occur. The Sovietsplan for rapid advance inland of the naval intintry tofollow up \vith a large ground force with supportingartiller) and staying po\\.er. 1 psetting the t imetable byforcing th e naval inf;~ntq. nits to stop or slow downwould not only reduce the momentum of the attackbut u.ould subject tr oo l~ oncentrations to enemyrtire.

Marking of Lanes. The orderly procession of theassault columns depends on cleared lanes being

marked clearly ~ v i th uoys or panels. If these weredestroyed or moved, the columns might deviate fromthe c leared lanes to th e sho re anci could be destroyedby obstacles or mines.

Communications. 'I'he Soviets rely hca\~ily n pyro-technics. panels, and other forms o f n o n - r1d ' 0com-municat ions before the assai~lt. Rapidly changingtactical sit~mtionsma). make raclio communications

essential. Enemy janlnjing or inteticring ~v it h adiocomnlunications could seriousl!~degrade the assault'sSLIcceSS.

Airborne Landings. The Soviets often cotiduct

anlpliibious exercises in conjunction ~v i thirborne orheliborne landings. The airborne or heliborne forcesattelilpt to keep reinforcements from reaching theamphibious Iimding area. If these troops land in thewrong area or are o the mis e prevented from landingsuccessfillly, the na\,al illfantry could face stiffenedresistance.

Beach Conditions. Not all shorelines are suitablefor landing of amphibious vehicles or 1;lnding ships. If

Stwiet beach reconnais sance teams rue prevented fromaccurate1~- hcertaining l>e;ich gradien ts, soil con-ditions, and othe r landing sitc factors, the alnphibiousassault could fail.

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CHAPTER 5

UNCONVENTIONAL

WARFARE OPERATIONS

Soviet unconventional warfare (UW) consists of avariety of military and paramilitary operations. UWincludes partisan warfare, subversion, and sabotage,conducted during periods of peace and war. It alsoincludes other operations of a covert or clandestine- nature.

Past Examples of Unconventional Warfare-Bolsheviks employed partisan guerrilla unitsagainst the Czarists and other oppon ents duringthe Russian Civil War of 1917-20.

Soviet partisan forces were used extensivelyagah st the Germans during World War 11 .

Special purpose troops were used to crushresistance to Soviet domination over EasternEurope.

Soviet special purpose forces we re used in theSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 toarrest Czech leadership and secure key objec-tives in Prague.

Soviet special purpose forces played animportant role in the invasion of Afghanistanand the elimination of President Am in.

DOCTRINE

Unconventional warfare (UW) is a key element ofSoviet doctrine. SovietUW capabilities constitute a for-midable threat. UW forces conduct reconnaissance,espionage, sabotage, assassination, and interdiczion oflines of communications.

Soviet unconventional warfare is designed primarilyto support a surprise attack Before the start ofhostilities, clandestine operations in the target areaincrease the probability of destruction of key targetswell before enemy rear area security measures areheightened.

The Soviets also appreciate the important role thatUW can play in support of a main offensive. Even if

there is success in on@part of the planned UW opera-tions, it may be enough to disorganize the enemy and

to insure that Soviet forces can seize and maintain theinitiative.SovietUW activities are managed at the highest level

of government authority. The Committee for State-Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Division

(GRU) of the General Statfare the most Likely agenciesto screen, recruit, select, and train CJW personnel.These agencies also can be assumed to plan andexecute Soviet UW operations. liW activities are pro-tected by stringent security measures.

Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of UW

units and boast of their accomplishments in WorldWar 11:

During the war, the partisans killed, wounded,

or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of

German troops, collaborators, and officials of

the occupation administration. They derailed

more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or

damaged thousands of locomotives and tens o f

thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The

partisan war affected the morale of the GermanArmy, keeping the German troops in a constant

state of fear.

Pospelov

Great Patriotic W ar of th e

Soviet Union, 194 7 - 1945.

MISSIONSSoviet unconventional warfare missions are divided

into three basic categories: strategic, operational, andtactical. The principal differences in the missions arethe level of command and control used and the natureof the targets engaged. The overall objectives aresimilar:

Weaken military capabilities of target country.Support follow-on conventional military

operations.

Strategic

Strategic UW missions are controlled by the KGB.UW forces conduct strategic missions in the enemy'sheartland to reduce the enemy's ability to continue thewar. Strategic missions include efforts to:

Intimidate and demoralize the population.Create chaos and disrupt public services.

Undermine national resistance.Selected regular airborne forces also may performstrategic UW missions. These are not normal airbornemissions which generally require coordination withfront-line operations. Rather, small elite airborne

5-1

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groups operate at great depths behind enemy lines.

Their basic objectives are to nrakcn enemy opera-

tional readiness and combat effectiveness. Their

missions could include:

Neutralization of major enemy headquarters.

Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons.

Sabotage to support disruption of enemy com-

munications and key logistics.

OperationalOperational CW missions in support of thefmwtand

subordinate armies are carried out under the control

of the ront commander. Airborne forces, GRU special

purpose units, and army sabotage or reconnaissance

units may perform these missions. Theirprimary objec-

tive is to destroy or neutralize enemy nuclear means

within the frotzt's area of operation, to a depth of 350

to 1,000kilometers. Additional missions include:

Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons andassociated qs terns .

Preparation and security of landing sites for

regular airborne forces.

Intelligence on location and strength of enemy

forces.

Sabotage opera tions against airfields, railway lines,

road and rail bridges, and communications systems.

The use of terror to intimidate the population.

Organization of local guerrilla or partisan groups.

Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units try toprevent effective and timely employment of reserves.

They generally disrupt the enemy offensive and defen-

sive capabilities.

TacticalTactical UW' missions are conducted in support of

divisions and are similar to the operational missions

described. Tactical missions are carried out on a

smaller scale and directed at targets in the division's

area. The Soblet divisional reconnaissance battalion

has a limited capabilih to perform raids to a depth of

100 kilometers.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES

The Soviet leadership has a variety of elite forces for

conducting UW missions: special units of the KGB,

GRU, airborne, and ground and naval forces. The KGBis probably responsible for the overall planning and

coordination of sabotage actions in peace and war. The

KGB special purpose units have a sabotage mission and

are thought to be targeted primarily against the civilian

sector. Their tasks would he to create general panic

among the ckilian population, to dis rupt civil govern-

ment and public utilities, and to damage or destroy key

production facilities.

The regular Soviet Armed Forces maintain elite air-

borne units, special sabotage and reconnaissance

units, and special long-range reconnaissance units for

UW missions. The most powerful and numerous are

the airborne troops under the direct control of the

General Staff in Moscow. Some of these airborne units

are designated as "special purpose" troops. They

operate in small groups against key political, military,

command and control, and transportation and indus-

trial targets in the enemy rear area.

The Soviet potential for UW is not limited to special

KGB and elite airborne units. Within the USSR, the

General StafYs GRU maintains a number of small

special purpose units. These units are concerned pri-

marily with UW activities in direct support of combat

operations. Their main tasks include preparing for thelanding of airborne units behind enemy lines, recon-

naissance and intelligence reporting on nuclear

delivery means and other vital military targets,

sabotage, disruption, neutralization of key political and

military personnel, and possibly the use of nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons.

A Soviet special purpose brigade is assigned to and

controlled at fron t level. Soviet armies and divisions

also have groups vi th in their reconnaissance units that

are capable of conducting long-range LrW operations.

AgentsAgent networks in the target country support Soviet

unconventional warfare opera tions The KGB and GRU

recruit agents in vital areas of the enemy's social

structure-in political circles, in his intelligence

services, at all levels of the military, within key

industries, in a variety of academic institutions, and in

the media-press, radio, and telebision Some of these

agents actively engage in subversion, while others are

"sleepers," prepared to act on call Agents are trained ?to operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors,

and saboteurs The GRLT recnii ts agents in the vicinityI

of military targets-airports, missile bases, arsenals,

communication centers, tank dispersal centers, and

also on routes used for troop movements. Just before

the beginning of hostilities, Soviet special purpose air-

borne troops, GRU special purpose units. and speciallong-range reconnaissance units could deploy and

link-up with KGB or GRll agents already operating in

the target area Also. local communist and other leftist

groups may provide support

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Personnel

Soviet uncotiventional warfare personnel arespecially screened and selected. The specialized

nature of their missions requires individuals (both

officers and enlis ted) to have the following qualities:

youth, above average intelligence, abilih to learn

foreign languages, excellent overall physical con-

dition, and health. ffowever, the paramount pre-

requisite for selection is political reliability. Individual

reliability is assessed in part based o n a spotless record

of participation in young communist organizations,

such as the Young, Pioneers, the kotnsonlol and

DOSAAF. The final approval rests with the KGB.

EQUIPMENT

All varieties of Soviet and enemy weapons and equip-

ment are available to Soviet lJWpersonnel depending

on their mission. Because of the clandestine nature of

these missions and the distances behind enemy lines at

which they plan to opera te,LJW orces normally do notuse Soviet combat vehicles during a mission. Instead,

their small teams are outfitted with the best man-

portable and air-drop and demolition o r incendiary

devices. Additional equipment can be air-dropped into

the area and retrieved later by means of homing

devices.

In most cases, these personnel would be dressed in

foreign uniforms or civilian clothes and equippped

with weapons of the target country. They could use

indigenous civilian or military vehicles for trans-portation. Soviet ITW' eams could be infiltrated by

parachute, sea, or air landings, or penetrate borders

disguised as civilians.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION

Soviet unconventional warfare units receive inten-

sive training. Small groups of men are trained as teams.

Each team has an officer in charge who speaks the

language of the target country fluently; a senior ser-

geant serves as second in command. Othe r members of

the group are trained as radio operators, and weapon

and demolition experts. Besides the normal military

training, the folloaring special skills are emphasized:

'Tactics of infiltrating and exfiltrating the target

area.

Night operational linkups.

Sabotage methods using explosives, incendiaries,

acids, and abrasives.

Parachute training.

Clandestine con~munications.

Hand-to-hand combat and silent killing

techniques.

Imguage and customs of target country.

Survival behind enemy lines.

Iden tifjhg and locating targets.

To make training as realistic as possible, the Soviet

LW training centers are equipped with realistic

models of key targets such as enemy facilities and

we'apon systems.

LW missions require intensive training and

preparation. The Soviets emphasize the following

factors when preparing for special missions:

Absolute secrecy.

Detailed planning and coordination.

Unitv of command.

~ e s " ~ ~ l yrom enemy stocks.

Detailed target lists with alternate objectives.

Multiple destruction methods.

Effective, secure communications.

AN UNCONVENTIONAL

WARFARE SCENARIO

The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the

employment concept for the full exploitation of Sovjet

LW assets.

In support of a coordinated attack, GRU special

purpose teams are airdropped or air-landed into their

respective target areas some days before H-Hour.

Special KGB sabotage teams have been infiltrated over

a longer period of time by clahdestine methods to

include international commercial travel. Thesesabotage teams could be prepared to begin their

operations well before the enemy's rear security

apparatus can be fully alerted. In the prewar period,

some KGB personnel seek to undermine national

resistance through political measures, while sabotage

teams begin isolated acts of sabotage, such as

destroying a key bridge. KGB teams also attempt to

create chaos at major ports and to disrupt

communications.

Shortly before D-Day, additional sabotage teams are

inserted and the majority of "sleeper agents" are

activated.

Sabotage equipment can be smuggled into a coun try

by any number of secret methods and stored in hidden,

but easily accessible caches. Smuggling techniques

may include dropp ing waterproof containers offshore

from ships and submarines. On prearranged signals,

the containers are recovered and stored by clandestine

support personnel.Sensitive or fragile equipment, such as detonators or

electronics material, can be brought into the country

by diplomatic pouch and made acailable to the teams

through established procedures.

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Teatlls attempt to place their explosives andincendiary devices on the targets and set them todetonate at H-Hour. All efforts are made to preventassociation of these acts with the LESR and to maintainthe e lement of surprise for the main attack.

Immediately before 13-Hour, the LW teams locate

targets and prepare to:Destroy nuclear capable Iveaponry.Jam radar installations.Disrupt enemy command, control and communi-

cations ( C 3 .

Kidnap or assassinate key political-militaqleadership.

.Seize or destroy radio and W broadcastingfacilities.

At H-Hour, a wide spectrum of sabotage actions areinitiated simultancously to weaken the military capa-bilities of the enemy. This sudden coordinated assaultwill have serious and inmediate effects on enemyoffensive capabilities. Special units of the regular a ir-borne forces are tasked to destroy nuclear depots,

installations, missile units, and nuclear-associated air-fields. Also, GR l J special purpose units and sabotageand recotlnaissance units of .front, army, and divisionare fully operative behind enemy lines. Their primarymissions ar et o neutrdlize enemy nuclea r systems. Butsecondary missions include disrupting communi-

cations, sabotage of airfields, depots, air defense, keyheadquarters, and logistic centers. Destruction ofthese targets will greatly assist the main offensive, asthe enemy will find it more difficult to organize his

defenses, or to plan, effective counterattacks.

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CHAPTER 6

RIVER CROSSINGS

Soviet military theorists place great emphasis on

high advance rates by armor-heavy columns in the

offense. The Soviets stress that this high advance rate

would be important in the European theater with its

"relatively small" operational depth. Such an offensive

would be impossible without overcoming Europe's

many north-south water obstacles. A 1965 Soviet studyrevealed that in the European theater, forces would

encounter water obstacles up to 100 meters wide

every 35 to 6 0 kilometers, between 100 and 300

meters wide every 100 to 150 kilometers, and greater

than 300 meters wide, every 250 to 300 kilometers.

In response t o these challenges,Sovietplanners have

devoted tremendous resources to improving the river

crossing capabilities of their combat equipment. They

have provided their ground forces with large stocks of

specialized bridging and assault crossing equipment.River crossing figures prominently in most Soviet

exercises.

Keys to successful river crossings

Reconnaissance.Early planning and thorough organization.Destruction of the enemy in the area of the

wate r obstacles.Speed and surprise.Broad front crossings.Swift development of the attack on the far

bank.Continuation of the attack throughout the

crossing.Skillful and rapid engineer employment.Air defense.

EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION

To insure a rapid advance, the Soviets have built river

crossing capabilities into numerous types of ground

force equipment. All Soviet armored personnel

carriers, infantry and airborne fighting vehicles, and

x o u t vehicles produced since the 1960s are amphib-

ious, as are some self-propelled (SP) artillery and

tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) carriers. Soviet

medium tanks have been provided with snorkels forcrossing obstacles up to 5.5 meters in depth. As little as

15 minutes are required to prepare some Soviet tanks

for underwater fording, although up to a half hour is

required for older tanks.

Extensive tank snorkeling training is conducted.

Tank crews train for up to 2 months before their first

underwater crossing. Tanks cross underwater in first

gear and follow a predetermined azimuth with the aid

of the on-board gyrocompass. This direction can be

altered by instructions radioed to the tanks from the

unit commander. lfa tank stalls on the bottom, it mustbe flooded before c rew members using their breathing

apparatus can open the hatches and escape.

A snorkeling tank cannot cross a water obstacle if

the entry slope exceeds 47 percent ( 25 degrees), if the

exit slope is greater than 27 percent ( 15 degrees), or if

the current velocity is more than about 3 meters per

second. Snorkeling is not feasible during winter,

because drifting or unbroken ice could rip away the

snorkel. It is also impossible if the water is deeper than

5.5 meters, if there are craters o r large boulders on theriver bottom, o r if the bottom is too soft.

Unmanned tanks can be moved across a river by

means of a winch system. This system permits a tank

company of 10 tanks to be moved across a river up to

200 meters wide in about 35 minutes (excluding

preparation ). One pulley block and an anchoring unit

are transported to the far bank in a tracked amphibian,

armored personnel cxrrier (APC), or power boat. It

must be installed 30 to 1 5 meters from the water's

edge if three tanks cross simultaneously or 10 to 15meters for a single tank. After tanks are prepared for

underwater crossing, they are pulled across by two

armored recovery vehicles while their c rews cross in

APCs or tracked amphibians.

7Be Sozriets estinzate that &out 60 percent of all

obstacles they ufould encozrnter in Eumpe aw less

tbarz 20 meters riide. Accordingly, there are several

mcxiels of both tank- and truck- launched gap bridges

for rapidly crossing ravines, partially blown bridges,

antitank ditches, road craters, and similar obstacles.

Gap bridging is used frequently in combination with

ponton bridges to provide shore-connecting spans or

to extend the bridge to sacient length.

Each Soviet motorized rifle and tank regiment has

one tank-launched bridge (M'ITJ) per tank battalion;

i.e., one M T er nlotorized rifle regiment and three

per tank regiment. Mounted on aT-54/55 tankchassis,

the MTU assault bridge is 12.3 meters long. The folded

ramp sections of the new MTU-20 (which hasbecomethe Soviet standard) extend the bridges length 20

meters. Both spans have a 50-ton carrying capacityand

can be launched in 3 to 5 minutes without crew

exposure.

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Some Soviet regiments may have received a Czech-

designed scissors bridge ( MT-55 ) with an electro-

hydraulic contro l system that permits bridge emplace-

ment in 1.5 minutes. The MT-55 span is 17 meters long

and can suppor t loads up to 50 tons. The launcher has a

g@-measuring device and infrared equipment for

bridge laying at night.

Each motorized rifle and tank regiment also has a set

of four truck- launched scissors spans (TMM). The

TMM set, with its four 10.5-meter spans, can erect 42meters of class 60 (capable of supporting 60 tons)

bridging in 20 to 40 mintues.

The engineer battalion organic to each Soviet tank

and motorized rifle division provides the division com-

mander with flexible river-crossing support. Equip-

ment organic to the battalion includes PMP ponton

bridging (frequently used to make ferries), power

boats, GSP self-propelled ferries, tracked amphibious

transporters, tank- and truck-launched gap bridging,

and limited stocks of fixed wooden bridges.The assault crossing company of a Soviet division's

engineer battalion has GSP tracked ferries and K-61 or

PTS tracked amphibians. PKP amphibious trailers may

be assigned to units equipped with PTS. Tracked

amphibians are used primarily to transport artillery, air

defense, or logistical elements across mater barriers.

( ' f ie Soviet 122-mm SP howitzer is amphibious.)

The assault crossing company" GSP ferries are used

to transport armor across water obstacles that are

impossible to ford or snorkel. Missile units and other

organizations with heavy equipment also rely on the

GSP.

The Soviet PMP ribbon bridge is revolutionary both

in its simplicity and rapid emplacement time. Its

accordion-like pontons are launched arhen the trucks

on which they are transported are braked at the water's

edge. They are opened automatically by a torsion bar

mechanism, rotated manually 90 degrees, and quickly

joined to form a continuous strip of floating roadway.Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions have a half set

of 16 PMP and two end (ramp) sections in their

engineer battalion.

The engineer battalion's PMP ponton bridge

company can construct 1 19meters of 60-ton bridging

at a speed of 7 meters per minute. PMP pontons also

may be split in half to form 28 1meters of 3.27-meter-

wide, class 20 bridging. Bank preparation is the critical

factor for bridging operations. Erection times lary

depending on enemy resistance, crew training, andconditions at each site. PMP pontons can be retrieved

in about twice the time required to emplace them.

Each ponton carr ier has a jib, winch, and roller system

to accomplish this.

If the water obstacle is wider than the unit's organic

bridging capability, or if the site is not secu re enough

to build a bridge, a PMP company also can form either

eight 40-ton d t s , ive rafts of 60-ton capacity, four rafts

of 80-ton capacity, three 1 10-ton rafts, or two 170-ton

rafts. Configured as three 1 10-ton platforms, the PMP

company can accon~plish he simultaneous lift of nine

medium tanks (three platoons). The PMP bridging

company has six BMK power boats to assist in bridge

enlplacement or raft propulsion. Models ranging from75 to 180 horsepower are in use, most of which are

transported on retractable wheeled struts. The newest

model, BMK-T, is transported and launched from the

same truck that transports the PMP. AIl Soviet power

boats are compartmented for bouyancy. Even if two of

the BMK-T's four compartments areflooded, it will no tsink.

A PIMP bridge permits crossing by tanks at speeds up

to 30 kilometers per hour. Speeds for wheeled vehicles

are greater. The bridge can be built in water having acurrent velocity up to 2 meters per second. By

attaching bow and stern shields to PMP sections, the

crew can emplace the bridge in currents of up to 2.5 or

3 meters per second without loss of stability.

Army and front have river crossing capabili ties in

their organic engineer regiments or brigade. Ponton

brigade regiments and assault crossing battalions also

provide river crossing support.

Each Soviet combined arms or tank army has one

ponton brigade regiment, while two may be subor-

dinate to a fm ~z t.Most PMP regiments are organized

into two battalions of three companies each and have a

total of 108 PRlP pontons capable of bridging 681

meters. l'he regiment also has eight tracked

amphibians ( K- 6 1 or ITS) o r GSP ferries.

Assault crossing battalions that provide amphibious

transport and ferry support to m y rfmtat elements

can be allocated to divisions to speed up crossing

operations. There is one battalion in each army, with

up to three in a f m ~ t .f equipped with the PTS and

PKP trailer, the battalion's two tracked amphibious

companies are able to transport m o towed artillery

battalions simultaneously. Each GSP ferry can

transport one Soviet medium tank.

To provide the logistic support necessary for

planned rapid offensiwres, the Soviets have expended

considerable resources to field a variety of line of com-

munications ( LOC) bridgng. LOC bridges are essen-

tial for the orderly introduction of divisions andcombat forces of successive echelons, as well as un-

interrupted resupply of combat units. They are

emplaced by troops of the Military Transportation

Service. In anticipation of wartime interdiction of

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


existing bridges, the Soviets and their allies have stock-piled obsolescent bridging and prefabricated bridge

sections near strategic crossings.

The NZhM-56, a combination railroad and vehicular

floating bridge, has an estimated carrying capacity of

120 tons. Soviet engineers have designed three new

types of sectional bridging: MARM, SAW$, and BARh4

(Soviet acronyms for small, medium, and large high-

way sectional bridge ). The major discdtlantrzge of sec-

tiomll hridgirzg is its sloz~lerection process. The

average rate of construction is 20 meters per hour ifthe bridge is built from a single bankor 3 0 o 35 meters

per hour if the engineers start fi-om both banks. Sec-

tional bridging frees tactical bridging for further use by

combat forces. MARM is also used to create overpasses

over key road junctions, thus alleviating congestion.

River barges are also used for LOC bridging. Large

numbers of 600-ton barges are available throughout

central Europe. They are placed end to end and con-

nected with special ramps to form a "ribbon" bridge.

Seven such barges would span a 400-meter-wide riverand would take about 24 hours to construct. (For

more information on engineer organization and equip-

ment see FM 100-2-3.)

I TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGSThere are two basic types of Soviet tactical river

crossings, the assault crossing from the march and the

prepared river crossing. The Soviets prefer the

crossing from the march, which is often the expected

method. Normally, the Soviets only conduct the pre-

pared crossing out of necessity within direct enemy

contact.

IAssault Crossing from the March

An assault crossing from the march is conducted

with forces moving-toward the river in dispersed,

normally march, formation, across a wide frontage, attop speed. Fomrard detachments or airborne or heli-

borne forces may seize favorable crossing sites in

advance. All measures are taken to insure that crossing

is conducted as swiftly as possible and that the offen-

sive is continued on the opposite shore.

A decision to conduct a crossing from the march is

made a s early as possible to allow maximum time for

appropriate organization of forces and crossing equip-

ment, and for reconnaissance of crossing sites.

The Soviets prefer crossing sites with gently slopingbanks, fords, and a bend towards the attackers. Soviet

commanders use maps, aerial photognphs, en&' e e r

and combat patrols, radar, signal, and hunian intelli-

gence to determine the following:River width, depth, and current.

Entry and exit gradients.

Composition of river bottom.

Bank composition and height.

Obstacles on banks.

Approach and exit routes.Critical terrain features overlt>oking both banks.

Possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkeling

sites.

Information on enemy defenses.'Ihe number of reconnaissance patrols depends on

the width of the river and the number of required

crossing sites; patrols can vary from squad to platoon

size. Reconnaissance patrols operate up to 50

kilometers forward of a division's main body.

Engineer reconnaissance units are equipped with

tracked amphibians, scout cars, or APCs. They often

mount a profilograph ( a device used to determine

width and depth of rivers) o r the newer echo depth

finder. Although such equipment significantly reducesexposure and reconnaissance time, it appears that

most Soviet engineers use less sophisticated gear-a

variety of bottom probes, rangefinders, and hydro-

metric propellers or simply floats of some type and a

stopwatch for measuring velocity. A sapper platoon

assigned a reconnaissance mission would also typically

have six mine detectors, grapnels with cables,

radiation detectors, and light diving equipment.

Armored personnel carriers, preferably BMPs, make

a rapid amphibious crossing to seize a bridgehead on

the far shore. Their crossing normally is covered by

smoke and supported from the rear shore by all avail-

able fires. Heliborne or, less probably, airborne forces,

may be used to seize and hold a bridgehead on the far

shore. Once the bridgehead is established, tanks cross

by ferry, by fording. or by snorkeling. Artillery and

other combat support equipment crosses on tracked

amphibians. Later, tactical bridging is emplaced for

follow-on forces.The Soviets consider units engaged in a river

crossing to be especially vulnerable to enemy aviation.

They emphasize the need for tactical air defense at

river crossing sites before a crossing is attempted. In

some tactical situations they may choose to move part

of their air defense assets across first to maximize the

range of these weapons in protecting subsequent units

making the crossing. Placement and movement

sequence of air defense assets will wry as the Soviet

commander asses.ses each new tactical situation.Subunits acting as forward detachments advance a s

quickly as possible to the river, bypassing enemy forces

whenever possible, to seize near-shore crossing sites

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


or to swim the river to seize a far-shore bridgehead. Aforward detachment differs from an advance guard,

which has the responsibility of clearing a route for

advancement of its main force. Forward detachments

attempt to slip through enemy iines to force and hold

crossing sites. Advance guards follow and fight through

any enemy encountered to make way for the main

forces.

Based on reconnaissance, the Soviet commander

organizes his unit to insure the most expedient

crossing and continuation of the offense. 7 k Sozrietsstess that tactical air support is more critical during

rizm crossing operations than during other t@es of

ground operations.

A motorized rifle battalion acting as a forward

detachment usually is reinforced with a tank company,

an artillery battalion, ferry and tracked amphibians, and

air defense, antitank, and chemical defense subunits

ranging from squad t o company size. When acting as a

forward detachment, a motorized rifle battalion would

be 2 or 3 hours in front of the main body.

Advance guards destroy enemy forces to insure

unhindered advance by the main force. As they

approach the water barrier, advance guards exploit the

success of forward detachments or air landedelements, forcing the obstacle from the march and

developing the attack into the depth of enemy defenses

when possible.

Motorized Rifle Battalion Assault CrossingI

DEPLOYMENT LINE

TK COARTY BN

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


GSP ferry and PTS amphibian platoons have beenattached to the motorized rifle battalion from

regiment and division. The battalion deploys into

company columns about 5 kilometers from the water,

and the APCs of the motorized rifle conlpanies deploy

on line in three separate sectors about 400 to 500

meters from the bank. The attached tank company and

artillery support the crossing by fire. Few tanks are

transported in the first wave. Artillery, ATGMs, anti-

tank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments

(possibly equipped with mechanized minelayers)cross immediately after the first echelon.

Another variant is shown below which depicts an

assault crossing 13). two motorized rifle companies

while the th ird company and support elements cross

over a ponton bridge. Bridges are erec ted only after the

far shore has been secured to a depth precluding direct

enemy fire o n the crossing site. However, if the enemy

defense has been neutralized by fire or the opposite

bank has been seized by airborne or heliborne forces,

bridge construction may begin along with tlle assault

crossing.

Crossing times for a motorized rifle battalion varydepending on the width and velocity of the river, time

required to prepare embankments, enemy acthit):

visibility, and equipment available. Motorized rifle

battalion crossings have been described as lasting from

15 minutes to an hour and a half. The first figure

probably considers only combat elements, excluding

support and logistic elements.

Tank unit crossings are more complicated than

motorized ritle assaults. Although tanks may he

attached to support motorized rifle assault crossings, atank battalion usually crosses in the second echelon.

However, a tank battalion could cross in the first

echelon in a weakly defended sector.

A tank battalion crosses a river by fording, by going

over bridges, by being tratlsported aboard ferries or on

tactical ponton bridging, or by snorkeling. Although

Soviet tank crews receive periodic underwater

training, snorkeling is the least-preferred option. Some

elements snorkel across at one site while others cross

elsewhere by other means. Sealing areas are selected

near concealed routes about 3 o 5 kilometers from the-Engineer Support of Motorized Rifle Battalion Crossing

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8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


river. Snorkels are installed about 1 to 2 kilometersfrom the water barrier.

Some tanks provide fire suppor t for the crossing, and

artillery is used for both direct and indirect fire. The far

bank must be secured before tank snorkeling starts.

Efpcient traffic co~ztmls essentinl. If the traffic

controller permits tank formations to mass, they

become a lucrative target for enemy aviation and

artillery. T ank cross under Rater in column formation

ar approximate$. 30 meter intervals. They cross at low

speeds without shifting gears or halting. The tank must

be halted to remove waterproofing before the turret

can traverse and the main gun can fire.

Once motorized rifle and some tank elements have

crossed, artillery and air defense elements are crossed

on tracked amphibians.

A typical regimental crossing sector would be 10

kilometers wide, with two to three battalions crossing

in the first echelon. Regiments will be allocated

tracked an~phibians,SP

ferries, and ponton bridgingfrom division, army, or.front organizations mission

and resources dictate. Tracked amphibians carry

artillery, air defense, and support units, while GSP

ferries transport tanks. With engineer support, amotorized ritle regiment can cross a river 200meters

wide with a current of 2 meters per second in 2 or 3hours. A tank regiment normally does not cross in the

first echelon. Once PMP bridging hay been erected,second echelon motorized rifle or tank regiments

normally can cross in less than an hour.

Depending on the tactical situation, a division

crosses a major water barrier with one , two, or three

regiments in the first echelon in a zone 20 to 30

kilometers vide. A division's combat elements can

cross a 200-meter-wide river in approximately 5 or 6hours, using equipment organic to the division. If

reconnaissance and site preparation time is included, a

division's tctal crossing time may approximate 9 hours.

A di~isionmight receive reinforcement from army or

front engineer units.,

The Soviets believe river crossings can be managed

successfully with equipment presently organic to their

maneinrer units. However, some Soviet theorists

express concern that present levels may prove inade-

quate to conduct successive crossings of two or more

major water obstacles. One way to solve this problem

is to leapfrog divisions. Army- and,flu)rzt level engineerunits have augmentation potential sufticient to estab-

lish a significant number of ponton bridges.

Combat bridging is fiirther supplemented by LOC

sectional bridging. According t o Soviet estimates, LOC

bridging can be erected by road construction troops in

as little as 8 hours after the initial assault crossing. It is

left in place for subsequent use by,froizt -level units.

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8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


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8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Prepared River Crossings

Apparently because they expect to cross most rivers

from the march at lightly defended or unoccupied

sites, the Soviets devote considerably less attention to

the enemy-opposed prepared crossing. Such a crossing

requires detailed planning and preparation, cen-

tralized control, and massive suppression of enemy

fires. They conduct a prepared crossing from a position

in contact. The prepared crossing is used as a lastresort, when an assault crossing from the march fails or

is not possible.

A prepared crossing requires intensive reconnais-

sance. By day. troops observe enemy defensive

positions and activity. Under cover of darkness

engineer and reconnaissance patrols measure the

river, inspect obstacles, and pinpoint crossing areas.

During preparation, troops make maximum use of

existing fortfication as well as cover and concealment

of personnel and equipment. They prepare roads and

cross-country routes for movement to crossing sites,a s

are assembly areas and artillery positions. Such work is

performed at night under the guise of improving the

defense.

Twice as many troops as had occupied defensive

positions normally launched the initial assault in a pre-

pared river crossing. It generally takes place either at

night or under a smoke screen. An artillery preparation

is fired against enemy strongpoints. Airborne orheliborne forces may be used to block enemy

reinforcements. Some artillery is employed in the

direct fire role to neutralize enemy weapons

remaining in the enemy defensive sector.

The prepared crossing is conducted similarly to the

assault crossing. Numerous APC's swim across on a

broad frontage supported by all available direct and

indirect fires. Tanks and other heavy weapons and

equipment follow. Bridging is emplaced only when

bridge sites are secure from enemy observation and

direct fire.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


CHAPTER 7

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

Mountain environments \.a q widely according to

soil composition, surhce configuration, altitude,

latitude, and clinlatic pattern. The Soviets consider any

relief feature rising 200 meters above the surrounding

area to be a mountain. As a result, combat in mountains

is hampered by:

The number and condition of roads.

The screening effect of mountains on electronicequipment.

Fluctuations in weather.

Increased wear and tear on equipment, increased

fuel consumption, and logistical requirements.

Reduced rates of advance.

Slides and floods.

Difficulty of bypassing NBC contaminated zones.

Limited maneuwr space for troops and vehicles.

Masking of artillery fires.

Requirement for special training and equipment.

/ a FFENSIVE ACTION

The nature of the terrain governs offensive action inI L T

the mountains. The goals of offensive actions are to

control passes, road junctions, built-up areas, andI adjacent high groundSoviet tactics in the mountains are planned to bypass

enemy defensive positions, attack the enemy from the

flanks and rear, and break up coordination bemeenI defending units.

Specially tailored regimental and/or battalion

groups launch attacks on several axes (mainly in

valleys and along roads and bridges ). Conlpanies attack

on one axis, battalions usually on one, and regiments

along two o r three. Specially equipped helicopters are

employed to assist in communications. Extensive use is

made of combat engineers, who may be attached down

to platoon level.No specific mountain divisions have been identified

in the Soviet Army h r many years. A few divisions

located in or near mountainoils areas do receive some

mountain warfare training, but the majority do not.

Airborne forces are considered to be the best suited

troops to fight in the mountains. Since the invasion of

Afghanistan, Soviet military literature has devoted

increased attention to mountain warfare problems

and training for all combat arms. Recent open source

articles state that some military districts have estab-lished mountain training centers to rotate combat

battalions and regiments, as u~ el l s combat support

units, for field training in mountain warfare.

Special training emphasis includes overcoming

obstacles, weapons firing in adverse weather, and the

use of natural cover.

Drivers receive special instruction in ascending and

descending steep slopes and fording mountain rivers.

Particular attention is paid to personnel being able to

orient themselves.

Special equipment necessary for mountain warfareincludes blocks, spades, and towing cables for tracked

vehicles and lighter indirect fire weapons, such as the

76-mm mountain gun and the 160-mm mortar, for

division and regimental artillery.

Tanks are used in the mountains mainly as mobile

armored artiller).. Hon~ever, mountainous terrain

restricts tank use to roads and ridges. Tanks are vul-

nerable to mines and plunging fire in narrow defiles

and may be unable to elevate their main guns suf-

ficiently to engage targets above them. In narrow

defiles, a single knocked-out tank is likely to block the

enti re defile.

Use of tanks in the mountains also poses special

problems with regard to maintenance and logistics.

Tracks are thrown and clutches burn more readiky, and

overheating may occur. Tanks operating in the

mountains need 30 to 50 percent more fuel and addi-

tional coolant.

Extensive reconnaissance is required at all times to

avoid enemy antitank ambushes. During mountain

warfare, tanks may double their march and prebattle

formation intervals.

Tanks may precede infantry attacks but more often

will support ground attach by fire. Tanks may be

attached to platoon level, one tank per motorized rifle

platoon.

Mountain warfare requires additional radios -aswell

as numerous retransmission sites. Troops may receive

special clothing and rations. NBC equipment isincreased, and each soldier receives a second decon-

tamination kit.

Marksmanship and gunnery pose several problems

in the mountains; for example, firing uphill, downhill,

and on the slant. This is particularly important for tank

gunnery, since accuracy is so dependent on flat tra-

jectory firing.

Motorized rifle battalions often attack inde-

pendently, in .separate zones, because of the limited

numher of routes in mountainous terrain. Battalioncommanders are assigned missions lasting longer than

usual and receive attachments of artillery, mortars,

tanks, engineers, and NRC subunits. The amount and

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


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HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT

ftelicopters may be employed in the nlountains forthe following missions:

Reconnaissance.

Communications, co mn~an d, nd control.

Resupply.

Air de fense , particularly against enemy

helicopters.

Evacuation.

Artillen adjustment.

Close air support.

Troop lift.Mountainous terrain degrades ground-to-air con]-

munication. Also, evasive flight techniques are ilsed to

avoid radar and visilal detection. 'Illis flight method

often degrades FM transmissions and reirlforces the

requirement for radio relay or retransmission sites.

Mountain weather tentis to change rapidly and

severely. Fog, frontal systems, wind, icing, and storms

can easily disrupt or delay helicopter operations.

Changes in temperature, relative humidity, and air

pressure, affect lift capability. Increases in any of these

factors plus higher altitudes mean decrased lift capa-

bility. For a given load, the helicopter must produce

extra pourer, which requires more fuel and incrc-dses

engine strain.

Mountain winds are almost inlpossible to predict.

On the windward side of mountains, air flow normally

is steady. But on the leeward side, winds are turbulent,

with strong vertical currents. Turbulence, even from

moderate winds (10 to 12 knots), can seriouslyhamper helicopter operations. Aircrews thus require

special training to minimize the hazards of strong

winds. Turbulence may preclilde helicopter usage or

require that helicopters be f l o w at greater altitudes,

increasing the risk of detection and enemy fire.

Besides limited visibility, low clouds and fog may

cause helicopters to ice up. ice o n rotor blades results

in significant loss of lift. And since ice does not break

off rotor blades uniformly, severe rotor blade

imbalance can occur.Mountain terrain con~plicateslight route selection.

Routes may not always be the most direct nor provide

the best cover and concealn~ ent. pace for maneuver

may be very limited and formation flying impossible.

Landing zones also may be lin ~it ed oth in number and

suitability. These factors can increase the amount o f

time necessary for a helicopter operation, increasing

the chance for enemy obsewation and enemy fire.

Greater intervals between aircraft also mean an

additional navigational load on a c h aircrew and mayreduce mutual support. Mountain flying puts a greater

strain on helicopter crews , tiring them Inore and faster

than usual.

Helicopter target priorities include the following:Enemy strongpoints on the axis of advance.

Mortars, antitank weapons, and artillery

threatening the advance.

<:oilnterattack forces and reserves.

'Targets on the reverse side of slopes screened

from attacking ground forces.

Close air support in mountains is less rigidly

controlled than over flat battlefields. Roving search-

and-destroy missions are more common particularly

on the reverse sides of slopes. 'Ibis is a departure fromthe more rigid control maintained at lower altitudes.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

Engineer support in the mountains will require a

greater than normal range of assets and will be mo re

extensive and dacult to perform than over more

normal terrain:

Mountain roads and trails may require extensive

construction, improvement, maintenance, and repair

to withstand militan tr&~c and xvere weather

conditions.

landing strips and helipads must be cleared.

Preparation of cold weather shelters is necessary.

Greater time and equipment are required t o con-

struct anything in rock.

Materials may be d81cult to obtain in the

mountaim, adding t o the logistics burden.

Combat engineers (sappers) are attached to unitsattacking independently as well as to flanking detach-

ments and heliborne assault forces. A motorized rifle

battalion employed as a flanking detachment receives

one or ~o engineer platoons. A motorized rifle

company with a similar mission receives one or two

engineer squads. These engineers support recom ais-

sance, obstacle clearance, and water and dry gap

crossing.

LOGISTICS

Mountainous terrain severely handicaps all logistic

operations. Road networks normally are few and in

poor condition and require extensive engineer

support. Supply routes are major targets, and

~nou ntaitl s afford excellent opportunities for

ambushes and attacks.

The combined problems of terrain, cold, ice, and

dampness make rapid and reliable con~munications

extremely difficult in the mountains. Not only areoperational problems increased but so are problems of

nlaintenance and supply of communication

equipment.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Mountain Logistics ConsiderationsI

Rations. Caloric requirement increases due to

more strenuous activity.

Cold-weather gear.

Fuel. While l imited road nets andsteepslopes

probably reduce the number of vehicles

operating i n th e mountains, th e vehicles that

are employed use more fuel. Aviation fuel

requirements increase as the use of helicopters

increases.

Ammunit ion. Indirect f i re expenditures

increase, largely because of difficulty in

adjust ing fir e on steep slopes and because of the

decreased bursting radius caused by firing in

sno w or forested areas. Quantiti es of explosives

used in obstacle reduction may increase as

muc h as tenfold.

Spare parts. High consumption-rate spare

parts include tires, tracks and pads, fuel pumps,

brake shoes, tie rods, and transmissions.

C O M M A N D A N D C ON TR OL

Since mountainous terrain restricts line-of-sightcommunication such as FM and multichannel radio,extensive use is made of relay and retransmission sites.However, siting communication facilities on highground has its own problems. These include

difficulties in establishing the sites, loss of communi-cation mobility, and increased likelihotxi of locationsbeing predicted or discovered and then destroyed.Wire may be used extensively, but because of rnoun-tainous areas installation and maintenance effort isgreater than normal, especially in deep sno\v andextreme cold.

In general. Soviet command elements are echelonedin depth and dispersed over the entire frontage. Theyalso locate as near aspossible to the troops, nearer than

they would be on flat terrain. For exanlple, divisionmain command posts may be as close as 3 kilometersfrom the fi ~m ar ddge of the battle area ( FERA). Tt ~e ymove, at least daily, with divisional fowa rd commandelenlellts moving every 2 hours . Division headquartersdeploy on the main axis of advance.

A I R D E FE N S E

In mounta ins, air defense is more difficult because of

problen~sn maintaining unit integrity of both maneu-ver and air defense units. Comprehensive air sumeil-lance and air defense fire support is mor e tiifficult. Airdefense units operate iinder a greater than normal

degree of decentralization. This flects fire controldown to section level. As a result, the inlportance ofshoulder-fired surface-to-airmissiles (SAMs) is greatlyincreased, as is the antiaircraft role of small arms fire.

5lobile air defense systems may be unable to

accompany maneuver elements. Instead they movefrom high point to high point along the best availableroutes of advance to obtain the best radar coverage,obsenation, and fields of fire.

N B C E FFE CTS

Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NRC) effects arereduced significantly in mountain warfare because ofterrain and the more rapid t~atural econtamination

caused by changing weather conditions and constantwinds. Terrain and minds hamper accurate predic tionof downwind toxic agent travel. Generally, cooldaytime temperatures s l ou the evaporation process,

permitting a contamination hazard to remain longer.However, mountain winds may nulli@ this feature.Mountain winds and stable atmospheric condit ions

enhance downwind coverage of chemical and bio-logical agents. Temperature and humidity also altecttheir sunival>ilit).. Cool temperatures generally favorsurvival of chemical and biological agents, and higherhumidit). increases effectiveness. Snow deposi ted ontop of a contaminated area can increase the hazard'sduration. Sunlight, however, destroy3 most chernical

and biological agents. With little protection from thesun available above the t imberline, the effectiveness ofchemical and biological agents is reduced at highaltitudes.

The following bct or s influence the effectiveness ofnuclear strikes in the mountains.

Mountain terrain reduces the casualty zone of a

nuclear weapon.Shock m~ v e ropagation is intensified in narrow

valleys and defiles o pe nk g in the direction of the burst.

Casualties may result from rockfalls, avalanches,and landslides, which may occur at considerabledistances from ground zero .

Reverse slopes greatly attenuate the shock wave

e k c t when the height of burst does not exceed theheight of the ridge.

h nuclear weapon may be used only when the

burst wrill not impede the advance of friendly forces bycausing rockfalls, landslides, and destruction of roads.Ix,w-yield air bursts are considered to be the best

choice of nuclear firepower,Irregular terrain patterns reduce the accuracy of

collateral damage predic tion, damage estimation, and\ulnerability analysis.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Snow melted by thermal radiation may cause flashflooding.Thermal radiation also may be reflected by snow

and the thinner atmosphere of higher elevation,thereby arnpllfylng its effects.

Fallout prediction is unreliable because of thestrong winds varying in speed and direction.

Melting snow will contribute to the residual radia-tion pattern, possibly polluting water and bathingsources.

MOVEMENT

Mountain marches are always carried out along themost accessible routes into the area. The rate ofadvance in low mountains and hills may be halved,even without the additionally slowing effect of enemyaction, poor weather, or natural obstacles.

Terrain restrictions often make deploying from themarch impossible. Security measures are of greater

concern, and surprise is more dacult to achieve. Inthe Soviet view, well-prepared defenders generallyhave several advantages over attacking units:

The defender probably is more familiar with theterrain.

The defender can achieve surprise more readily.The defender is more mobile.Attacks are more vulnerable.

In the offense, Soviet forces attempt to locate breaks,gaps, and breaches in the enemy's defenses and seekdead space and covert approaches to the enemy'sposition. Approaches may be created by reducing oneor two defensive strongpoints by the heaviest availablefire support and following this with a smokescreen.Flank attacks and envelopments take on even greaterimportance in mountains. Frontal attacks rarely areconducted without coordinated diversionary attackson the flanksor rear. The frontal attack must have very

h ea~ yir or artillery supportif

it is not supported bydiversionary attacks.Attacking directly from the march is possible only

when routes and space permit combined arms deploy-ment. Since room for maneuver and fire support, anddetailed knowledge of the terrain and enemy defensesare required, attacking directly from the march willnot occur often.

Attacking from positions in direct contact providesthe time for Soviet commanders to make personal

reconnaissance, to develop fire support plans, and toplan flanking and enveloping attacks. However, the factthat attacking forces are vulnerable to enemy fire whilein their static positions is a great disadvantage.

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet military doctrine stresses speed, firepower,and shock action at all levels. However, mountainclimate and terrain seldom permit even one of these

offensive features, let alone ail three. As a result, theSoviets have had to adjust their offensive doctrine tothe mountain environment. These modificationsinclude the following:

Limiting the use of nuclear firepower. Sincenuclear weapons create extra obstacles in themountains, the Soviets stress the use of small-yield airbursts.

Increasing the role of the helicopter for command,control, and communications, evacuation, resupply,close air support, artillery adjustment, and troop lift,particularly for troop placement behind enemy lines.

Placing greater emphasis on initiative and self-sufficiency of units operating in the mountains.Combat actions are much more decentralized. Sub-units are reinforced and task organized at lower levels.

Placing artillery and mortars close to the FEBA

since mountains considerably restrict their mobility.

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Desert terrain and its environment have the

following characteristics:

Primarily sandy or rocky desert soil.

A shortage or complete lack of water.

Extremely sparse vegetation.

A small population and poorly developed road

nets.

Less than 10 percent natural masking by relief,

with up to 75 percent of a given area observable from

heights.

Sudden and extreme fluctuations of temperature.

Absence of landmarks for orientation and land

navigation.

Strong winds which blow sand and dust, resulting

in decreased visibility; communications degradation;

and increased maintenance problems and require-

ments for engines, running gear, and all types of

weapons.Lack of developed roads normally forces military

movements onto open terrain. Trafficability depends

primarily on the nature and condition of the ground

and its use rate. While dry, loose, sandy soil can hinder

cross- country movement, it can be adequate-to-good

when wet. Saline soil may be rock-hard when dry but

very difficult to negotiate when wet. Soil traflicablefor

a few vehicles may not hold up for entire columns.

Columns may have to disperse over a 200- to 300-

meter width. Moving sands create the most unfavor-able movement conditions, as traction (even on foot),

is often almost impossible to obtain. Moving sands

affect trafficability, visibility, navigation, and par-

ticularly orientation.

Other factors influencing movement rates are

visibility, state of driver training, eficiency of route

marking, and greater need for maintenance halts. The

planning and preparation of movement and combat

under desert conditions are particularly critical.

Movement planning includes reconnaissance, obstacleidentification, route marking, and grading of elevations

and descents.

The difficulty of orientation and navigation in open

terrain with few landmarks, further complicated by

reduced visibility, requires marking routes with stable

signs that have good day and night visibility. Signs

indicate the route and also warn of dangerous areas.

Combat actions are characterized by:

Wide frontages.

Wide gaps between units.

Frequent independent operations by regiments or

battalions.

Increased logistic requirements.

The need to control (in both offense and defense)

water sources, inhabited areas, developed roads,

railways, and particularly junctions and airfields.

THE OFFENSE

The1973

Arab-Israeli War impressed on the Sovietsthe need for full combined arms cooperation in desert

warfare. They pay particular attention to suppression

of enemy antitank and ai r defense weapons.

Reconnaissance is conducted across a broad front,

on many axes, and in depth. It must identtfy gaps in

enemy defenses, and the best directions of attack.

Maintaining orientation in the desert is a special

problem. The basic method of off-road navigation is

movement o n an assigned azimuth. This is supple-

mented when possible by reference points, elevations,and rare identifiable features such aswells, canals, and

buildings.

Control measures for movement normally include

detailed designation of:

Routes and marking methods.

Available landmarks.Formations to insure security for flanks and rear.

Added communications to support wide dispersal.

Location of water, fuel, and supply points.

Axes of attack and march routes.Some Soviet vehicles are equipped with directional

gyroscope systems that permit holding the required

Desert Movement

TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS

Sandy hil ls, loose sand, shaleSandy val leysClay-surfaced desert

ESTIMATED SPEED OF MOVEMENT

DAY NIGHT

7 - 8 k m p h1 0 - 1 2 k m p h2 4 - 2 6 k m p h

5 - 6 k m p h8 - 1 0 k m p h

2 2 - 2 4 k m p h

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CAMOUFLAGE

direction for 1.5hours with no greater than a2 degreeerror. With careful adjustment, these systems can beused up to 5 hours without orientation.

Since the desert offers few handicaps to maneuver,attacks normally are carried out from the march and athigh speed. In general, offensive tactics are the same asdescribed in FM 100-2- . However, frontages normallyare wider, with gaps being accepted, and objectives areat greater depth. Regiments attack on separate axes.They are reinforced with sufficient support assets to

allow independent action. Motorized rifle battalionsalso may operate independently.

Forward detachments are employed to penetrategaps in enemy defenses and carry out harassing attacksin enemy rear areas. Airborne or airmobile forces mayseize objectives in depth, normally at night.

Frontal attacks in the desert against prepareddefenses historically have proven unsuccessful. There-fore, the Soviets generally conduct mounted attacksagainst the flanks or rear of enemy defenses. When this

is not possible, dismounted infantry may be used tocreate gaps, which then are exploited by tanks.

THE DEFENSE

Defense in the desert is difticult du e to open terrain,lack of cover and concealment, wide frontages, gapsbetween defending units, and reliance on local watersources. The attacker probably will probe constantly

and attack when visibility is reduced.Soviet defenses are organized in greater depth.

Distances between echelons are greater and forcesmore dispersed. Reserves, mainly tank-heavy, are heldin greater depth than usual and may be employed tocounter enemy enveloping and encircling movement.Motorized rifle company and battalion frontages in theforward area are similar to those in the normal defense.Motorized rifle companies normally organize in asingle echelon. Divisions and regiments may defendindependently. Mined sectors, and areas of limited traf-ficability may be lightly defended. They may be

covered only by mobile patrols or outposts.Since the possibility of a night attack is greater in the

desert, the night defense requires:Maximum use of night-vision devices and elec-

tronic surveillance.Forward repositioning of tanks after dark, with

tank fires and antitank weapons fires concentra ted on

roads and likely avenues of approach.Intensive patrolling and many observation andlistening posts.

Carefully prepared counterattack plans and routes.

Due to sparse vegetation, deserts generally affordlittle natural concealment and even less means forcamouflage. Forces are particularly vulnerable toobservation, especially from aircraft, radar, and heatdetection. As a result, camouflage in the desert is ofincreased importance but is also much more difficultto accomplish.

The Soviets use camouflage paint designed to blendequipment and vehicles in with their background andto break up outlines. The following measures are used

to screen movement and attacks:Cover of darkness.Bad weather, especially sandstorms.Smoke.

Smoke also may be used to conceal firing positions.A supported unit sometimes uses smoke as referencepoints in artillery adjustment and control ofmovement. (For more information on smoke, see FM100-2-1.)

HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT

Helicopter employment in the desert is hindered by:Increased maintenance requirements.Lack of cover and concealment.

Low air density.Higher degree of pilot training required.Low-level navigation is more difficult in the desert

since reference points are few.

LOGISTICS

Desert operations place special strains on logisticsdue to:

Great dispersion of supported units.

Greater maintenance requirements.Limited concealment and toter, making logistic

facilities easier targets.Increased requirement for water and fuel.

Soviet commanders operate well forward and arehighly mobile. Communications may be affected bydesert weather and atmospheric conditions. Artilleryunits must be highly mobile to keep up with supportunits and to reduce their own vulnerability.

NBC EFFECTS

Desert terrain affects the behaklor and influences

the deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons. Because of the relative flatness and lack ofvegetation, chemical and radiological effects arecomparatively even and steady in all directions.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Nuclear weapons employnent norlnally results inconsiderable dust clouds which remain in upper air

levels for many hours. High tenlpentures decrease air

density, enabling nuclear blast waves to move faster.

Greater levels of perspiration map increase the effec-

tiveness of some chemical agents.

Air instability (a result of tenlperature variations at

various levels of the air ) greatly affects all NBC agents.

As a general rule, the air is more stable and more suit-

able for NBC employment during the cool of desert

nighttime than during the heat of the afternoon.During the afternoon, for example, the instability of

the air may cause rapid and irregular dissipation of

chemical o r radioactive clouds. High desert \vivinds may

&ect the distribution patterns of chemical and nuclear

clouds as well as dissipate their effects.

Nuclear blasts, even from air bursts, raise con-

siderable quantities of sand and dirt which inhibit

obsenration and maneuver. This effect and the

atmospheric disturbance caused, are particular threatsto helicopters.

Nuclcqr radiation patterns vary widely depending on

weapon yield, wind, and the magnesium, sodium, salt,

and silicon content of the terrain. Thermal radiation

effects are greater than normal since there is usually

less terrain masking in the desert than elsewhere.

High desert temperatures increase the i~lcapaci-

tating effects of liquid agents close to the target. Air

instability, wind, and faster evaporatio~l ates cause

most chemical agents to dissipate relatively quicklyand irregularly. High desert temperatures may kill

most biological agents.

Individual protective clothing can be worn in high

temperatures for only short periods of time without

risking heat illnesses and dehydration. Wearing tif indi-

vidual protective clothing also results in less efficient

physical activity. Rest breaks become more important,

and water consumption increases.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


The Soviet Army is well prepared to operate under

extremely cold conditions. Because of Soviet

geography and climate, over 60 percent of Soviet

divisions are located in and train in areas subject to

extreme cold at least part of the year.

The Soviets recognize the following effects of

extreme cold on military operations:

Tactics must be modified to accornmodate restric-

tions on movement.Human and mechanical eficiency are reduced

considerably.

The importance of shelters is increased.

Construction of defenses is hindered by frozen

earth.

Swamps and rivers become passable.

Deep snow reduces the effectiveness of high-

explosive shells, mines, and nonpersistent gas while

increasing the thermal radiation effects of nuclear

explosions.

Vehicles are more difficult to operate and

maintain.

Electromagnetic anomalies and storms disrupt

communications.

Deep snow makes orientation difficult.

* The range of bullets and shells is reduced.

Fluid medical supplies, such as plasma and

morphine, will freeze if not well protected.

Air support is restricted.

P L A N N I N G A N D P R E P A RA T IO N

Soviet preparations for operations in extreme cold

include:' .Special clothing and equipment,particularly heavy

Iwinter overcoats, hats, fur-lined mittens, and felt boots.

An enriched, high.calorie diet with hot food and

drink provided as often as possible.

Warming tents and shelters provided wheneverpossible.

Special oils and lubricants for vehicles and crew-

served and individual weapons.

In extremely cold wea ther, the Soviets use special

fuel mixtures, oils, and lubricants. Vehicles also are

fitted with special winterized couplings on fuel pumps.

engine heating and cooling systems, and exhaust

systems. Batteries also receive special attention.

Heaters and warming covers aid in starting vehicles.

Wheeled ~e hic les 'ca rr~hains and are positionedbehind tracked vehicles in march columns whenever

possible. Sandbags, mats, cables, and pioneer tools also

add to over-the-snow capability. Tanks carry logs or

beams for use as traction aids. Wheeled vehicle tire

pressure is reduced to aid mobility. March columns

include tanks with dozer blades, snow-moving equip-

ment, and road graders.

No special organizations for winter or arctic warfare

are known to exist in the Soviet Army. However, for at

least part of the year, most Soviet divisions train in cold

or extremely cold conditions. Individual trainingstresses ski-drawn movement behind tanks and APC's,

cold injury prevention, equipment care and cleaning

(especially weapons), and camouflage. Skiing is par-

ticularly stressed.

THE OFFENSE

Attack frontages are probably larger in snow

because of the difficulty in maneuvering. Reserves are

also probably larger than normal.

Troops may attack on skis or sleds towed behind

tanks. On reaching th e assault line, troops release tow

cables or ropes and form an assault line, making a

coordinated attack with the tanks. When tracked

vehicles are used to tow infantry on skis, tanks can tow

two squads and APCs can tow one. Soldiers are

expected to be able t o fire their weapons while being

towed.

In deep snow (defined as I.5

to2

times the groundclearance of vehicles), troops may attack mounted on

tanks. Pursuit may be conducted by tank-borne

infantry ( if snow conditions or lack of roads preclude

use of APCS) or on skis.

In cold weather, attack assembly areas are located

closer to the enemy than usual. This lessens approach

distances and therefore minimizes fatigue and cold-

injury exposure time. Second echelon and reserve

forces follow closer than normal to reduce com-

mitment time.

THE DEFENSE

The Soviets attempt to use adverse weather to their

advantage. They delay the attacking enemy and deny

him shelter, thus prolonging his exposure to the cold.

Populated areas and forests provide shelter and

often are used as strongpoints. The strongest defensive

positions are located along most likely avenues of

approach --roads and areas of light snow. Snow is usedto conceal strongpoints as much as possible. Parxpets

of packed snow are built around weapons and vehicles.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


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CHAPTER 10

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


COMBAT IN CITIES

Although their doctr ine stresses speed and dynamicmaneuver, the Soviets fully realize that movementthrough urban areas may result in greater ammunitionexpenditures and casualties and slower rates ofadvance. The Soviets have long acknowledged thatcombat in cities will be unavoidable at times. Givenurbanization trends in Western Europe, combat in

cities could be more the rule than the exception in thatarea.Soviet ground forces consider combat in cities to

consist of only those missions conducted in heavilypopulated cities and towns. Combat in isolated villagesor groups of buildings along roads in agricultural oropen areas are considered actions in or against strong-points and are outside the scope of this chapter.

The Soviets classify towns and cities according toshape, population, and perimeter. The Soviets calcu-

late that in Europe there are one or two small cities forevery 200 to 300 square kilometers of terrain. In aEuropean conflict, there is potential for involvement incombat in cities on the average of every 40 to 60kilometers.

The decision to attack a city or town may be politi-cally, strategically, or tactically motivated and normallyis made at army level or above. Tactical reasons forattack may include:

The city or town is key terrain.The area encompasses vital communications

crossings.It is necessary to protect an exposed flank.

It serves as a diversionary operation.It would tie down enemy troops and reserves.The built-up area is unavoidable due to the extent

of urbanization.In the offense, the Soviets plan for their lead

echelons to cut off and to destroy enemyforces before

they can occupy cities. Ifthis is not possible, the Sovietsplan to bypass pockets of resistance with leadingechelons and continue the advance. Bypassed enemy-held areas are sealed off and may be neutralized byfollowing echelons.

DOCTRINE

Soviet principles for offensive combat in cities atdivision level are:

Conduct initial attacks from the march, afterreconnaissance.

Launch attacks from positions in contact with theenemy if initial operations fail to make progress.

Decentralize command and control to the maxi-

mum possible extent.Maintain continuous pressure on the enemy

through day and night combat.Conceal movement through the use of smoke,

darkness, or low ~lsibility.Integrate company-sized tank,motorized rifle, and

combat engineer assault groups with the direct sup-port of antitank guns and the direct and indirectsupport of artillery and mortars.

While combined arms assault groups provide the

main effort during combat in cities, heliborne assaultson key points may be used. Helicopters may liftmotorized rifle troops to key points in the battle area.During combat in cities, a Soviet division normallyattacks in two echelons at each level of command withthe following frontages:

Diin'sion 4 to 6 kilometersRegiment 2 to 3 kilometersBattalion 400 to 600 metersCompany 200 to 300 meters

Main axes are along major roads to capture key areas,to disrupt the defense, and to cross the area in theshortest possible time. Division and regimental axesare major roads. A battalion might advance on two o rthree parallel streets, with one company axis perstreet.

Combat on such restricted frontages and axes ofadvance, results in the following sigtllficant controlproblems:

Difficulty in coordinating attacks progressing atdBerent rates with fire support.Communications problems caused by a large

number ofVHF radios operating in close proximity andbeing screened by buildings.

Soviet Classification of Urban Areas

POPULATION SIZE CLASSIFICATION ESTIMATED PERIMETER

100,000 or more Large More than 25 kilometers

50,000 to 100,000 Average 15 to 25 kilometers

Less than 50,000 Small Less than 15 kilometers

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Identification of targets and coordination of fire street patterns as well a s the strength of defending

against targets in depth. forces. Attacking forces are not evenly distributedLogistic problems, particularly the resupply of around the built-up area. They are employed over the

ammunition, which may be used at an extremely high most favorable avenues of approach. Because of the

rate in intense combat. manpower-intensive, close-combat nature of combat

The commander determines force size and compo- in cities, motorized rifle rather than tank units are pre-

sition based on the area's size, shape, building type,and ferred. Normally, regiments coordinate the attacks and

Tactics and Analvnis

REPRESENTATIVE TACTICAL FEATURES

OF CITY AlTACK

(Main Force bypasses. Second echelon

forces execute fro ntal holding attack and

attack from rear.)

LEGEND:

1. Forward detachment operating in advance to

seize critical bridges, junctions, or installations

2. "Reconnaissance by battle." Probing attac ksto

determine defensive positions.

3. Withdrawal routes blocked by tankelementsor

airlanded forces.

8obile obstacle detachments block withdrawal

routes and protect main force flanks.

SOVIET ANALYSIS

OF THE-LAYOUT OF CITIES- r---- - \ Ip-. . , . . ..-7- Z" .1. -2

CHECKERBOARD

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


battalions conduct them. Division and regimental

resources reinforce the battalions as required. Indi-

vidual battalions may have a variety of missions,.

depending on the situation. Reserves are created at

regimental rather than division level.

Motorized rifle battalions maybe employed in either

the first or second echelons of an assault on a city or

town. In either case, their organization, tasks, and

assault tactics are probably the same.

In combat in cities, the Soviets call their assault

battalions "assault detachments." They are organizedinto two echelons. Each company is formed into an

"assault group." A typical combat organization for an

assault group is:

A motorized rifle company.

One or two tank platoons.

Antitank guns.

An artillery battery, in the direct fire role.

A combat engineer platoon.

Flamethrower and chemical specialists.

Besides the fire support on hand at company level,the battalion commander normally has artillery and

mortar units under his control to give indirect fire

suppor t to his assault groups. Indirect fire weapons are

employed to destroy enemy strongpoints and to neu-

trafize enemy reserves.

Assault groups are task organized. A representative

assault group may include:

Attack or seizure groups consisting of a motorized

rifle platoon reinforced by tanks.

A covering and holding group consisting of up to amotorized rifle platoon reinforced by antitank guns.

A fire support group which includes attached

artillery in the direct fire role and flamethrowers.

A group of combat engineers equipped with

bangalore torpedoes and mineclearing devices.

One or two motorized rifle squads may be used as a

resenreforce to either strengthen attacking or holding

groups or to carry out a contingency task. Tank units

are used to:Senre, with combined arms reinforcement, as an

advance guard in the approach to the city.Cut off or envelop the enemybefore he reaches the

built-up area.

Envelop the city.Reinforce infantry in street fighting.

Serve as a mobile reserve.

Artillery is decentralized during offensive combat in

cities. The commander may attach up t o 50percent of

available artillery to assault groups to be used in thedirect fire role. The remainder is organized into an

artillery group to provide on-call indirect and counter-

battery fire. Howitzers and mortars are used for

counterbattery tasks. Preparatory fires are shorter than

normal, 5 to 20 minutes being the historical

precedent.

The missions of engineer subunits accompanying

assault groups are engineer reconnaissance, destruc-

tion of buildings, mine clearance, and clearing routes

of rubble to allow movement of tanks, APCs, and

artillery.

Antiaircraft weapons, both handheld and crew-

served, are used to cover artillery firing positions and

commanders' observation posts against low-flyingaircraft and helicopters. When not engaged in this

primafy role, they suppress enemy ground fire.

Unlike combat in more open terrain, the Soviet

doctrine stresses decentralized control in combat in

cities. This puts a heavy burden on the battalion's com-

munication systems. However, only through decen-

tralization can they cope with the tactical problems of

controlling troops fighting in close quarters.

It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used

within a city. Extensive destruction and contaminationwould only hinder offensive progress. 7beymu?),ow

ever, use norpersistent chemical uleapons because of

their potential for human destruction uttbout

causing material damage.

The Soviets can be expected to use psychological

warfare, including threats, promises, misinformation,

and rumors. These would be directed against both

military defenders and the civilian population.

THE OFFENSE

Combat in the cities imposes demands for a slower

pace and tempo of attacks; longer duration of commit-

ment; shorter, intense preparatory fires; and specially

tailored forces. Soviet tactics reflect these concepts.

Initial reconnaissance of a target urban area is made

following stucty of large-scale maps, aerial photo-

graphs, and background intelligence reports. Tactical

intelligence will update such background data from

long-range reconnaissance patrols, agent reports,

aerial reconnaissance, and signal intelligence. When

required, task-organized reconnaissance groups

drawn from motorized rifle and tank units reinforce

divisional and regimental reconnaissance.The specific mission of reconnaissance units and

groups from division and regiment is to identify:Enemy deployments outside the built-up area.

Strongpoints within the city.

Command posts and communications centers.Reserves.Enemy withdrawal routes and successive defen-

sive positions.

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I LEGEND:

-0-.-Regimental boundary Morta r battery (1 20 mm ) *> Mined barracade

I ---Battalion boundary . Truck-mounted bridge -X-X- Portable obstacle

I BQ otor~zed ~f le ompany Mine-sweeping tank equ~ ppedwlth

re~nf orced y tanks ~n he attack mine-cleanng roller& Blockhouse

Motorized r~fle latoon ~n he attack ($ Battallon commander Destroyed bridge

I A Battallon commander's command post - - - ( Control llne Barbed wlre barr~er

-lxed rnlnefteld

Company commanders command post e0.0 l:S: t X Ant~tank edgehogs(ant1 personnel and antitank)

- Build~ngs most structures@ Anlllery battery In flrtng pos~tton Concertina wlre obstacle * - - --.. are of stone)

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


On receiving his orders from the regimental com-

mander, a battalion commander clarifi&his mission by

studying his superior's concept of attack. He imme-

diately gives his subordinates a warning order con-

taining the battalion's mission, with his guidelines for

its completion. The battalion commander then makes

his estimate of the situation. He assesses the enemy, the

need for reconnaissance missions, the battalion's

combat organizations, tasks for his own troops, and

terrain. Using large-scale maps and aerial photographs,

the battalion commander studies the objective areaand assigns tasks to individual assault groups.

If' time and situation allow. the battalion commander

conducts a terrain reconnaissance of his objective,

from a suitable vantage point. The assault group com-

manders accompany him, and they coordinate on- the-

ground reference points and targets for supporting

weapons. During this reconnaissance, the commander

selects and defines departure lines and unit

boundaries.

The battalion commander and his statTprepare theattack order, which includes:

Objectives to be seized.

Approach routes, lines of departure, and phases

(lines) for assault.

Method of assault of individual buildings and

blocks.

Actions of flanking units.

Method of destroying bypassed groups of enemy.

Details of fire and movement.

Details of smoke, chemical, and f lamethrower use.

Locations of command posts and control points

and the procedure for moving them forward during

the attack.

Control of battalion offensive tactics in ci ties differs

significantly from combat in open terrain. Company-

sized assault groups attack concurrently and inde-- -pendently. A major reason for decentralization is the

greatly restricted area of observation and radio trans-

mission range. The Soviets pay particular attention to

the difficulties of coordinating indirect artillery fire.

The battalion command observation post is located

200 to 300 meters behind the assault groups. The

battalion commander personally assigns indirect fire

missions to the artillery commander, who is collocated

with him. The Soviets believe that the battalion com-

mander, by staying as far forward as possible, can

personally influence the conduct of an attack

Preparatory indirect artillery fire against urban

targets is intensive but short, normally lasting only 5 to20 minutes. Tactical aircraft attack enemy resenre

positions, artillery emplacenlents, and communica-

tions centers. As assault units reach a safety line.

artillery fire is shifted to the enemy rear. Smoke is usedto conceal approach routes.

Canals and rivers that flow through cities pose

significant obstacles to the attacker. Accordingly,

reconnaissance elements identlfy likely crossing

areas and standing bridges which are designated as

priority objectives. Assault crossing parties with

tank-launched bridges may be positioned well forward

in attack units.After destroying strongpoints at the edge of the cit),

assault groups move forwarti on major roads to~vardthe center of the city. Smoke may be used to cover

flanks or conceal forward movement. Infantqnlen

carry up to twice the normal allocation of ammunition

to compensate for high intensity of fire. If resistance is

light, the Soviets may move illfantry fonv;ird by

mounting them either in APCs or o n tanks. Most

common, however, is for infantry subunits to move on

foot along streets, clearing buildings one b! one.

Where necessay, they clear houses by simultaneous

assaults from roof and ground floor. They also iiseautomatic weapons and grenades extensively. Colnbat

engineers attached to assault groups make en t n and

exit holes through masonry u~alls. They make

maximum made of underground passages. Specially

assigned teams follow up assault groups to clestroy

small enemy parties that survive the initial ;tssaults.

Tanks are used t o support infantry and to neutralize

enemy strongpoints. Soviet doctrine calls for strong

reserves of tanks at both battalion and regimental

levels.

Tactics for fighting at night remain basically the

same as those used by day. The Soviets try to maintain

the same attack intensity at night. Illurnination is iised

both as an aid to their own troops as well asa means to

blind the enemy.

The battalion second echelon is used to exploit thc

success of first echelon assault groups. Normally, the

regimental commander gives the order to commit the

battalion second echelon to the assault. It may leapfrog

through first echelon subunits already in contact ~v i th

the enemy. Occasionally, the second echelon n~ust

complete the task of first echelon subunits.

THE DEFENSE

The Soviets regard cities as military, political, and

economic centers that are probable targets for an

enemy nuclear strike. Accordingly, they plan t o

establish their defensive positions on the appro ICI e sto the city whenever possible. This allo\~she Soviets

to use ordinar). field defensive tactics, which are more

economical in manpower and equiptnent. Homc~er.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


there are circumstances that may dictate defensewithin a city. They are:

To stop an enemy offensive in which a city is the

objective.To defend a port or naval base.

To defend a key political or economic base.

Soviet troops in contact with the enemy are most

likely to set up the defense of a city after an unsuc-

cessful meeting engagement or attack, during a with-

drawal, or when a tactical stalemate has been reached.

The Soviets regard such a forced defense as a criticalpoint in combat that could cause the transition from

nonnuclear to nuclear warfare.

Defense of a city when not in contact with the

enemy gives time for reconnaissance and building of

fortifications. Units operating well beyond the out-

skirts of the city protect the preparations. A defense of

this type may be set up to protect a military base, aport ,

or an economic, political, or transportation center.

Rear echelon units o r reserves usually accomplish the

defense of such areas.The Soviets consider the city's layout and types of

structures, the time of year, and the climate important

in the planning of the defense. The Soviets experi-

enced these factors in World War 11, and they are a

pervasive influence in current Soviet military theory

and practice.

The Soviet concept of defense in cities is to draw

enemy manpower and equipment into kU zones and to

destroy them. The tactics and weapon systems used

depend on the situation and terrain. A key principle at

the operational level is to include an urban area in a

larger zone of defense. In this way, the Soviets hope to

give commanders suficient maneuver room to

maximize the delivery of firepower-especially that of

tanks-and so to inflict the heaviest possible casualties

on the enemy.

The Soviets try to canalize enemy movement into the

defended zone of a city by strongly held positions on

the flanks. The use of nuclear and chemical weapons tocreate contaminated areas on the flanks can achieve

the same ends as phpically occupying positions and

expending enormous amounts of conventional

firepower. Soviet doctrine calls for control of the rate

of enemy advance by launching local counterattacks.

The enemy is to be defeated and repulsed on the

outskirts, if possible. The Soviets plan to allow the

enemy to engage in close combat in the center of the

city only as a last resort.

A motorized rifle battalion normally defends as partof a regiment. The battalion maybe placed in either the

regimental first or second echelon of defense. In the

first echelon, its mission is to prevent penetration of

the built-up area. In the second echelon, its mission is

to contain an enemy penetration and restore first

echelon positions. There is a degree of tactical flexi-

bility within these missions in that battalions may find

that the direction of enemy assault has changed a

primary approach into a secondary one, or vice versa.

Battalions positioned on primary approaches have

smaller frontages than those placed o n secondary ones.

The mission of a reserve battalion is to reinforce or

replace battalions in the first or second echelons or to

c&er gaps created in the defense by enemy use ofnuclear weapons.

A motorized rifle battalion usually holds a number of

company strongpoints. It is reinforced by tanks, anti-

tarkguns, and artillery employed in the direct fire role.

Other artillery and mortar units also provide indirect

fire support.

The defense in both the first and second echelons

consists of a series of company-sized strongpoints.

Each company is reinforced by tanks and artillery

according to its mission and the tactical situation.Although the maximum frontage of a strongpoint is

about 20 0 meters, the exact frontage and depth of the

battalion depend on:

The echelon.

The combat s trength of the battalion.

The estimated strength of the enemy.

The layout of the city and the types of buildings.

A company of tanks normally is attached to a

motorized rifle battalion defending in a city. The

company is employed either as platoons or as single

tanks set in ambush positions. Tanks may be used in a

mobile role with two or three alternate positions for

each tank, or they may be employed in a stationary role

to reinforce the antitank defense. On the outskirts of

the city, tank units channel enemy forces into the kill

zone or conduct counterattacks to slow the enemy

rate of advance. Tank ambush positions are set up in

the villages beyond the city limits as well as on the

outskirt; of the city proper.Motorized rifle battalions receive up to 50 percent

of divisional artillery, including heavy artillery, to be

used in a direct fire role. Artillery pieces are emplaced

either singly or as platoons and come under the com-

nund of the motorized rifle company commander.

~ a c h un has two or three positions. The artillery

remaining under direct control of the regiment or

division is emplaced in covered positions outside the

city and delivers indirect fire on request. Antitankguns

are under the direct command of the motorized riflebattalion comn~ander. moke conceals the movement

of troops and equipment within strongpoints and the

movement of reserves between them.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


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8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


A combat engineer platoon may be attached to a

txtttalion and normally remains ~lnderhe cetitralizedcontrol of the battalion conlmander. Engineer duties;re:

To lay mines and prepare obstacles.1'0 p r e ~ a r e or the tlcmolition of buildings and

clc;tr fields of fire.'10 create passages through buildings for covered

movement in and between strongpoints.To carry oi ~ t mergency rescue work.

<:hemic;tl defense specialists are attached to thehatt;~lion to monitor chemical and radiological1laz;rds. 'n'hey also perform decontamination afternuclear or chemical attack.

Abiation is used in ground attack to destroy enemynuclear deliver). systems, break up enemy attacks, andneutralize enemy forces attempting to bypass the city.In addition, aviation has th e mission to destroy enemyaircraft ~ ~ s e dn close support of ground combat.

According to Soviet sources, tactical air defense

requirements for cornbat in cities include a muchmore restricted use of air defense weapons due to th eclose, confined nature of combat in a built-up area.Smaller, lighter antiaircraft artillery can be deployed inopen spaces such as parks, major intersections and ontlat roofed buildings. Manportable surface-to-airmissiles (SAiMs) can be used in a sinlilar role. But thelarger SA'LIs, which depend on their engagementradars, may find the built -up area highly restrictive o rirnpossihle to operate in effectively. Air defense assets

may be deployed o n the more open , peripheral areas ofcities along likely avenues of approach by hostileaircraft.

Hefore establishing a battalion defense, the battalioncommancler conducts an estimate of the situationincluding the following:

Enern) maneuver areas and approaches to his

~mhition.Probable e ne ~n y uclear and conventional targets.Length of projectecf stay in the defensive position.

Support required from attached and flankingforces.

Stockpiling anmmunition, food, medical supplies,

and mrater.'Ike structure of buildings and likely areas of

defense.'The batt'tlion comm ande r the n locates the

clefencling con~panies'strongpoints and supportirigdetachments, obsemtion posts, and kill zones. The

battalion commander's order contains the followingbasic elements:

The mission and reinforcement of each company.Sectors of fire and areas of concentrated fire.

Boundaries and detiiil of flank protection.

Kcsene responsibilities.Tasks of supporting tanks and artillery.

Engineer duties.Security arrangements.Defense lneasiires and warnings against nilclear

*and chemical weapons. The battalion commanderends his ord er wi th details of tire coordination.

In organizing the fire plan, the battalion co mmanderpositions his tanks and antitank weapons at th e edge of

;he town. After the initial antitank- battle. rem ak in gweapons are ~vithdraw n o prepared positions withinthe built-up area. A few antitank guided missiles(ATGMs) may he relocated to successive firingpositions within the city. ATGMs are not suited for

firing at close-range targets because of their nlinirnun~range limitations. Tanks and antitank weapons covermajor roads, parks, and squares. Artillery and mortarscover possible enemy approaches. klected artilleryalternate positions allow the guns to be used in the

direct tire role. The guns cover lines or areas in naturalor engineer ohstaclis. Besides the firepower under th edirect c o~ nm an d f the battalion commander, theregiment also has an indirect fire si1ppor.t plan. Theweapons remaining under division and higher control

are located outside th e city fo facilitate their redeploy.ment. Air st rikes from tactical aviation, including bothfixed-wing and helicopters will also support groundforces.

A reinforced motorized rifle battalion deploys in one

or two echelons, depending on the s ize and layout of

its assigned sector. A re se ne of one or two platm)ilsnoimallyr is created when the battalion deploys in asingle echelon. W%en the battalion deploys in twoechelons , the mission of its secon d echelon is to hold aposition and to destroy by counterattack any pene-tration of the battalion's first echelon. Such counter-attacks may be carried out in conjunction with eitherbattalion or regimental reserves.

Thc company creates strongpoints in buildings andprepares for all-around defense. Doors and windows- -that are not required for use are filled lvith bricks orsandbags. Holes for firing handheld weapons areknocked through walls. 'The troops mine, barricade, ordestroy stairnays. Access betw een f loors is achieved bycutting holes through the floors and using ropes orladders. <;overed communication routes by under-ground passage connect the strongpoints. Food andira ter ar e stored in strongpoints in places wher e they

will be protected from nuclear or chemical contami-nation. Weapon systems locate on different floor levelsto cover dead space. Snipers are positioned o n roofsand in attics.

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The gaps bet\veen strongpoints, streets, and open

areas &m ined and obstacles set up. Bridges overrivers and canals are eithe r destroyed or prepared for

demolition. Buildings are blo\vn down both to clear

sectors of fire ant1 to create obstacles for enemy armor.

The Soviets stress the importance of fire fighting

during combat in cities. They point out that com-

bustible material should be removed from strong-

points, as it can lead to gaps being made in the

defense. Besides the fire hazard, continuous

monitoring is kept of the chenlical and biological

hazard. Layers of warning systems encompass all meansof communication within the company strongpoints.

Chemical specialists also acconlpany patrols forward

of the main defense.

Battalions obtain intelligence from observation andL,

listening posts, adjacent units, and th e regimental staff.

While in defensive positions on the outskirts of the

city, APC-mounted reconnaissance patrols are sent ou t

to maintain contact with the enemy. When combat

moves into the city, foot patrols remain in contact with

the advancing enemy. Ambushes are prepared on themost likely enem). approaches to maintain se cu ri h and

to gain tactical information.

The defensive fire plan is designed to separate

enemy infantry and tanks. Artillery breaks up enemy

formations approaching the built-up area. Fires are

used on the enemy's flanks to canalize movement into

kill zones.

A mobile covering force engages enemy reconnais-

sance and lead units before they reach the edgeo f

thebuilt-up area. The covering force maneuvers to meet

the enemy threat as it dc~~ el op s,hile combat remains

on the outskirts of the built-up area. Once enemy

pressure intensifies, the covering force withdraws and

takes up a prepared defensive position.

Once the enemy reaches the edge of the built-up

area, the Soviets recognize that combat will break

down to a series of small-unit engagements at the

company strongpoints. These engagements are fought

at close range with both heavy and handheld weapons.When enemy infantry and tanks attack together, Soviet

defenders try to destroy the infantry first. This makes

the unsupported tanks an easier target in the city.

If the enemy succeeds in penetrating a company

strongpoint, the Soviets plan immediately to call in a

heavy volume of artillery and mortar frre to prevent

enemy advancement into the sector. Battalion

resources-second echel on companies of the

battalion reserve-conduct the counterattack along

planned routes. If the battalion deploys in a single

echelo n, the bat ta lion reserve makes the

counterattack.

The Soviets pay considerable attention to the design

and use of mock-ups and ranges for training in street

fighting. Much of the training is carried out to achieve

physical fitness. There are indications that motorized

rifle troops learn the skills of combat in built-up areas

under simulated battle conditions.

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In the Soviet view, night cannot be a reason for

decreasing activity. On the contrary, they use the dark

of night to achieve surprise, to increase the rate of

advance, and to win time. The Soviets consider

darkness to be more of an advantage and an oppor-

tunity than a rmson for interruption of combat.

Combat at night is normally an extension of combat

actions begun during the day. The battle may be

carried on into the night to retain the initiative with a

high offensive tempo.

The Soviets recognize that darkness favors the per-

formance of marches and maneuvers; makes it easier to

concentrate men and materiel in a decisive direction;

hampers enemy use of most weapons, airborne troops,

and aviation; and provides favorable conditions for

achieving surprise. By skillfully employing the advan-

tages of night conditions, attacking units can fulfill

their mission with smaller losses in personnel andequipment.

Night also presents problems. It is more difficult to

orient oneself at night and to maintain direction of

movement. Effectiveness of aimed fire is reduced, and

reconnaissance and selection of targets become more

difficult. The Soviets feel, however, that these negative

factors can be successfully overcome through frequent

and careful training.

Soviet doctrine states that thedifficultyinherent in a

night attack aids the soldier in the defense and that thedefender is more c odd ent . However, they also recog-

nizes that a well-organized surprise attack has a strong

negative psychological effect on the defender.

CONDITIONSAFFECTING NIGHT COMBAT

Darkness modifies the outline, shape, and coloring

of local objects and distorts separation distances. Dark

objects seem farther away than they really are, whilelighter ones appear to be closer. According to the

Soviets, on a clear night one can recognize land relief

and coloration up to 400 meters with the naked eye.

Under a high moon, one can spot a moving man at 240

meters, and using binoculars, at 700 meters.

Sound is another factor that changes at night and

leads to both physical and psychological distortion. At

night, sounds seem louder and carry farther. Direc-

tions from which sounds originate cannot always be

determined. Weather conditions such as rain can affect

both audibility and visibility and serve as a definite

advantage for the attacker.

The lack of convection (vertical streams of air ) also

affects night combat, since the persistence of gas, fog,

or smoke is considerably increased in the absence of

vertical air streams.

Night combat also is aEected by the physical and

psychological conditions of the troops. Darkness

stimulates the imagination and a feeling of insecurity

Night Factors

DISTANCES AT WHICH LIGHT SOURCES

CAN BE OBSERVED AT NIGHT WITH THE NAKED EYE

SOURCE DISTANCES

Vehicle headlights 4- 8 km

Muzzle flashes from single cannons 4-5 kmMuzzle flashes from small arms 1.5 -2 km

Bonfire 6- 8 km

Flashlight up to 1.5-2 km

Lighted match up to 1.5 km

Lighted cigarette .5-.8 km

NOTE: For obser va t i on f r om t he a i r, t hese d i s t ances a r e ~ncr ea sed t o 3

t i m es .

DISTANCES AT WHICH SOUNDS ARE AUDIBLE TO MAN

AT NIGHT IN OPEN AREAS

SOURCE DISTANCES

Cannon shot up to 15 km

Single shot from a rifle 2-3 krn

Automatic weapons fire 3- 4 krn

Tank movement

-on a dirt road up to 1.2 km

-on a highway 3- 4 km

Motor vehicle movement

-on a dirt road up to 5 00 m-on a highway up to 1 km

Movement of troops on foot

-on a dirt road up to 300 m

-on a highway up to 600 m

Small arms loading up to 5 00 m

Metal on metal up to 300 m

Conversation of a few men up to 300 m

Steps of a single man up to 40 m

Axe blow, sound of a saw up to 500 m

Blows of shovels and pickaxes up to 1,000 mScreams up to 1,500 m

Oars on water up to 2,000 rn

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


that might eventually lead to panic. Nights normally are

resenred for rest. Fatigue and symptoms of exhaustionmay affect those \I.ho have to stay alvake.

Darkness reduces the effectiveness of all types of

fires. Effective fires are almost impossible \vithout

night-vision equipment or illumination. Soviet artiller).

and aviation make \vide use of illumination but still

encounter difficulties in spotting rounds and in con-

ducting artillery reconnaissance. Darkness severely

hampers visual identification and ;tcquisition of enemy

aircraft by regimental air defense elements. Night

conditions can increase the morale of tank troops by

lessening the possibility of their tanks being destroyed

by antitank artillery. Ho\velrer, orientation, location,

maintaining direction of movement, and the general

difficulty of operating vehicles in darkness can com-

plicate the employment of tanks. Coordination rvith

other units is also d81cult .

First echelon engineer support is Illore important

during combat at night. Soviet engineers are trained to

use illuminating signs and markers to designate direc-

tion of movement, destroyed areas, and passages

through obstacles.

Chemical weapons have a greater effect on rnan-

power at night du e to atmospheric conditions. Con-

sequently, Soviet commanders are urged to increase

chemical and radiation reconnaissance at night.

However, monitoring devices are difficult to read and

NBC reconnaissance is considerably complicated.

Notifying the troops of contaminated areas is more

difficult in darkness, and commanders are advised toappoint more observers than during the day to provide

a timely warning of the contaminated area. Voice

signals are used to warn persortnel. Signal tlashes are

not used as a warning because they reveal friendly

locations.

EQUIPMENT

I l luminat ion devices include i l luminat ing

cartridges, rockets, shells. aerial bombs, searchlights,mines, mortars, tracer shells, and flares.

They are employed to:

Improve visibility of the ground and of enemy

targets.

Observe the battle area.

Orient troops during the course of battle.

Support the conduct of aimed fire.

Blind the enemy and to combat his illumination

wppo rt equipment.

Issue commands.

Illumination may be periodic or continuous. The

latter is reserved for a major attack against centers of

resistance or fortified areas or for repulsing

cou~lterattacks.7;he h~zsic t7'izct~Ies ii the ettzploj~ttieilt f illutrzi-

iwtio~i ler~icesare striprise avzd ~rzassiilg.Massing is

achieved through a consecuti\,e concentration of

illumination equipment. The Soviets consider radius,

intensity, and duration important in determining

which particular dekice to use.

Aerial flares producing one million candlepower of

illumination burn 3 to 6 minutes and provide a circle of

illumination .5 to 4 kilometers in diameter, depending

on their height above the ground. An artillery star shell

illuniinates the ground for 30 seconds over a circle 5 0 0

to 1 ,500 meters in diameter. Illuminating cartridges

with a range of 200 to 2 5 0 meters burn for 7 seconds

and illuminate an area with a diameter of 200 to 24 0

meters.

On flat terrain or terrain sloping upwards toward the

enemy, targets are illuminated from behind. Targets on

terrain slanting downhill tona rd the attackers are

illuminated from the front. Illuminating devices are

employed so as not to reveal the location and dispo-

sition of friendly troops, to blind them, or to impair

their night \ision.

Illumination of the terrain usually is effected

according to the senior commander's plan. He defines

illumil~ation upport missions, including the general

order for terrain illumination, intensity and duration of

the mission, disposition of the enemy's defense and key

objectives, measures for disorienting and blinding the

enemy, and measures for countering the enemy'sillumination and night vision devices. The commander

also decides how illumination will be used to control

and maintain coordination among his subunits. He

defines signals for target designation and specifies

combat illumination equ ipment reserves and how they

will be used.

Illun~ination upport also may be used in othe r ways

in the conduct of night combat. Searchlights can be

used to blind the enemy, thus making it difficult for

him to deliver aimed fires. During the march, illumi-nation orients subunits advancing to deployment lines.

This prevents confusion in combat formations, and

insures precise coordination. Luminous markers along

the routes of advance facilitate the rapid advancement

of second echelon units and resenre forces. Such

markers are used to identiQ concentration areas.

Luminous distance indicators also are attached to a

vehicle's rear light. The driver can determine the

distance to the vehicle in front of him based on the

number of red stripes he can see (e.g. ,one continuousred stripe is visible at 5 0 meters, nvo red rectangles

can be seen at 30 meters). Knowing thest: distances,

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


the driver can adjust his spacing and speed

accordingly.

InFrared night vision sighting devices include infra-

red binoculars, drivers' indirect vision devices, and

searchlights installed on vehicles. Radar could be

included in this grouping since it is used to conduct

reconnaissance and to adjust fire. Reportedly the

Soviets also have passive infrared vision devices.

While these instruments permit better obsercation,

they do have range limitations. At longer ranges they

are limited to defining the form, silhouette, and degreeof contrast of an object. Active infrared devices operate

on the principle of "illuminating" the ground object by

means of infrared rays and converting the reflection of

targets into a visible image. The enemy can detect the

emissions of active devices easily and for that reason

they are used sparingly. Passive devices do not emit

rays and therefore cannot be detected. The infrared

night observation system, NSP-2, and the infrared

night-driving device, TVN-2, can be used either

actively or passively. In complete darkness, it ispossible with these devices to identrfy local features

and engineer construction, to maintain observation of

activities, to conduct aimed fire, and t o drive vehicles

without headlights. However, night vision devices are

not effective in healy fog or during heavy rains.

Tanks also have infrared (IR) sighting equipment for

the main armanlent and searchlights that can be

equipped with an IR filter. Targets can be identified up

to 800 meters. Nez~wtheless, ctiz~eR can betray the

exact position of the user i f the enenzy is using IRsensors. This hazatd is readily appreciated by- the

Soviets in their night combat. Tank drivers use IRbinoculars regularly in night training. Tank com-

manders use binocular-type passive IR sensors.

Sound-monitoring devices can provide observation

of the enemy when night vision devices are ineffective

or cannot be used for security reasons. The monitoring

devices can pick up noises made by the movement of

personnel and vehicles and by the firing of various

types of weapons. Enemy activities can be determined

based on the sound detected. Heat detection devices

also are used in defining the direction to a target. In the

future, the Soviets expect to be able to use heat

detection instruments to determine not onlv the

location of arms and equipment but also the location of

personnel.

'fiere are three types of land navigation systems

used in the Soviet ground forces. All three systems

depend on a directional gyroscope, an instrumentdesigned to accurately preserve an initial reference

bearing during movement. The three systems are self-

contained, do not depend on emissions from elec-

tronic transmitters, and do not require space on the

radio wive band. They are not susceptible to intercept,

jamming, or othe r electronic measures.

The GPK-48 and GPK-59 navigation systems are

installed in some T-55 and T-62 tanks. The driver only

has to w it ch the instrument on, give it time to warm

up, and set his heading. The GPK-I8 was designed to

give direction in snorkeling operations but has no

built-in compensation to allow for the earth's rotation.

The instrument is accurate only for periods of 15

minutes without resetting. The more recentlydeveloped GPK-59 has a compensating mechanism

and can operate accurately for up to 90 minutes.

A computer and display navigation system known as

"the coordinator" is installed in some command tanks.

The system consists of six components, three ofwhich

require no access by the crew except for inspection.

The system displays map coordinates in northings and

eastings rounded off to the nearest 10 meters. The

vehicle heading displayed is in Soviet mils on coarse

and fine scales. The instrument is 90 percent accurate.Once set, it can be used to navigate within a 100-

kilometer grid square.

Another Soviet navigation system has a map plotter.

This is not installed in tanks but may be used by some

motorized ritle units.

There is also evidence of a new navigation system. It

appears to be an improved version of "the coordi-

nator." The newer system permits operation within a

100-kilometer grid square without resetting. The

instrument displays plus and minus coordinates on 1kilometer and 200-meter scales from the present

location. Bearing to the destination is shown on a

separate dial.

THE MARCH

The night march is an essential element of night

combat. The Soviets learned the importance of night

marches during World War I1 when many of their

important operations began with long night marches.

Regardless of thei r difXculty, night marches are a

necessity. Their preparation, organization, security,

and execution require a great deal of attention. The

successful execution of a night march depends to a

large degree on the general maintenance, organi-

zation, concealment, and rapid movement of all units.

The commander must identrfy areas that will

present difticulties for concealment and provide

instructions for the use of night vision devices, illumi-nation instruments, and communications. Extensive

use is made of light-signaling equipment (flashlights,

signal lights, etc.). By means of these devices, signals

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


may be transmitted indicating the start or finish of an)activit), changes in di rection of nio\.ement, positionh.requests for fire support, ancl other tasks.

Strict light and sound disciplil-te is paramount andmust be maintained at all times, particularly \vhenpassing through open areas. Active infrared night\.ision devices are used \vhen approvecl by the marchcomnunder.

Comn~unications etween platoons and companiescan be conducted by messengers or betlveen

battalions by messengers using motorcycles. Shortradio transmissions can be employed for comniuni-cations between regiments. Ihring the night march,security elements are located closer t o the main Iwdythan during the day.

Reconnaissance is conducted before and during thenight march. Reconnaissance element s do not rangeout as far during th e night as they do during the day.Resides enemy information, Soviet reconnaissanceunits collect information on the condition of the

march route, exis tence of bypsses. favorable locationsfor Lvater crossings, and obstacles. The number andstrength of reconnais.sance units are increased at nighton both the flanks and the head of the column.Chemical radiation reconnaissance patrols areprovided with infrared devices, illun~inat ingmarkers,contaminated sector boundary ~lia rke rs, nd signs todefine contaminated sectors.

Concealment from enemy radar is aided by travelingnear population centers, near railroads, and on roads in

forests.Normally, long halts are not made at night hecausc

the hours of darkness must be ~ ~ s e do the maximumextent for movement. During short sunlnler nights.troo ps are given only a 5 - o 10-minute rest at each reststop. Rest s tops are taken at sources of \\ater or fitel.Rest stops must not be made near large populationcenter s, railroad stations, bridges, and other objects ofpossible enemy interest. Rest s tops are never taken inopen areas or near ravines or defiles. Strict blackoutand noise discipline are maintained. The use of lightand t he building of fires are prohibited.

Senior commanders organize traffic control service.Subordinate commanders are infonned as to h o ~ vtr&lc control is organized, where trait control postshave been set up, and ho\v b~p;ts.ses and difficultsectors of the route are marked.

THE OFFENSE

A night attack may be the continuation of daytimecombat, o r it may be the start of a new attack. A con-tinuation of a daytime attack must be carried through

without a break so that the enemy will not have time tobring up his reserve or t o regroup. An artilleryprepara-tion usually precedes the night attack. However, toavhieve surprise, an attack may be launched withoutpreparatory fires, tanks, or the use of illumination.

Nlght attacks are most often launched 2 or 3 hoursbefore da\vn to permit daylight explo itation of success.111e success of a night attack ultimately depends onprecise organization, concealment of preparations.surprise, control and coordination of combat and sup-

porting units, fire support, and illun~ina ting nd night\,ision dc ~i ce s.

The command er plans illumination of the objective,light signals for coordination. boundary lines forattitcking units, the means of destroying enemy illumi-

nating devices, and the assignment of reference points.'lhe battalion commamier locates himself where hecan obs ewe both enemy and friendly forces. The com-nun der of supporting artiller) ~tsi ~all ys located withthe battalion comnlancler.

Another control measure is the assignment of:ui~nuthso each unit. The Soviets depend on t he use ofazimuths imd cons ider the m a valuable supplement toreference points.

Control is exercised further by designating guide~lni ts. ach battalion designates a guide conlpany; eachcompany, a guide platoon; and each platoon, a guidesquad. Guide subunits are centrally located andprovided lvith night visio11 devices and illuminationmeans.

In an attack from a position in dir ect con tact withthe enerny, subunit direct ions of attack and passagesthro~tghminetields o r obstacles may be designated byone-way glo\ving makers emplaced in the ground.Markers for difierent subunits may have distinctiveshal xsor colors.

If the attack is made from the march, subunits maybe assigned an azimuth of attack. Locations for deploy-ment from march formation to prebattle formation andthen to attack formation mayk designated by groundmarkers, signal lights. o r tlares. The dep ths of subunitobjecti\,es in a night attack \vould probably be red ucedfrom da).time depths.

(;omplicated maneuvers are avoided because of dif-ficulties of control at night. A short halt at an assaultline may be ordered to orient subunits and to clarifythe missions. Thc Itrosl cottrrtzor~ rtl~ickomzatiotl a1

rziglb is tbc. litle .fi)?-ttzrrtiotl.

motorized rifle subunits usually attack dismounted

at night. They niay conduct a mounted attackif

theterrain is ver). open , if enemy defenses have k e nsuccessfiill~~neiitralizedyrcombat upport means, andif illumination is abundant.

recognition signals. me comrnander plans the number

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Within the attack formation, distances bc.t\xreen

tanks, dismounted riflemen. and APCs is reduced.Riflemen probably attack o n line with o r immediatelybehind the tanks. APCs prob;tbly follo\v at :I distance ofapproximately 100 meters.

E illumination is abundant, subunit attack frontagesare probably the same as those for an attack in daylight.Lf little o r no illumination is available or used, or if dif-ficult terrain must be crossed, attack frontages prob-ably are reduced. As in a daylight attack, the Sovietcommander tailors his forces and tactics to thesituation.

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact location ofartillery bursts and to conduct artillery reconnaissanceduring periods of artificial illumination and \%hen ightvision devices are used. Consequently, maneuver sub -units are assigned more supporting direct fire weaponsat night. Supporting lveapons either move separatelyfrom the maneuver subunits, nlove several hundredmeters to their rear, or move directly on line with

them. Some artillen may remain at the line of depar-ture to suppor t the.attack \%.hensubunits move out tothe attack.

Illumination assures effective artillery fire todistances of not more than 3,000 meters. The closestline of illumination ( wh en illuminating shells are usedin windless weather) is fixed at no less than 500

meters from the guns detailed to carry out direct tire.The targets to be destroyed by direct fire should bel~ca tedap~roximate lyn the center of the illuminated

zone.Illumination by searchligllt is periodic. Searchlights

are turned on for 10 or 15-seconds and then switchedoff for the same period of time. Illun~inatiot~semployed in a manner to hinder the etiemy's activitybut not dixlose the objective of Soviet activity.

Each artillery battalion designates one platoon forillumination missions. Illumination can be eitherperiod ic or continuous. In the latter case, illuminatingrounds are fired every 2 0 to 30 seconds, 5 to 1 0

seconds less than the full burning time of one round.The most important tasks of reconnaissance

elements in a night defense are titnely detection ofenemy preparation for a night attack, location ofenemy illumination equipment, and detection ofenemy engineers penetrating obstacles. Ambushesmay be s e h p , and friendly patrols may be sent ou t atnight to reconnoiter gaps between stron@oints or o n

exposed flanks.One of the most important measures in night

defense is illumination s~ippor t. This includesilluminating the ground area, blinding the enemy,setting up marker lights, and determining mutual

and location of illumination posts, the amount and typeof illu~ninating quipment to allocate to units, thereserve to be retained for his ow n disposal, targetindication procedures. and illumination readinesstime. Incendiary shells may be employed to s tart firesto blind o r illun~ inate he enemy.

Planning for a counterattack begins with thepreparation and organization of a night defense. Thenight counterattack must be simple and carried outquickly. A determined surprise night counterattack,even by a small force, could have considerable impacto n the enemy's night attack because of its psycho-logical impact.

Artiller)., mortars, and tanks are given preparatory

fire missions against any enemy penetration and insupport of the counterattack. The unit commanderallocates tasks t o th e artillery and mortars to prepareconcentrated fire in the area of probable enemypenetration.

Anight counterattack usually is conducted in oneechelon. With a single-echelon combat formation,

conlbined amls cooperation and control are con-siderably sinlplified.

THE DEFENSE

Night creates Inany difticulties for the attackingforces but offers considerable advantage to thedefender. Darkness reduces the effectiveness of an

attacker's reconnaissance, observation, and aimedfires. Darkness also provides the defender with be tte rconcealment than the attacker. It is more difficult atnight for the attacker to maneuver and control hisforces. The defender, on the other hand, can moveforces under the cover of darkness from the FEBA orfrom areas threatened by the enemy before the attackbegins, thus conseming his forces and causing theenemy to attack areas of little value.

The difficiilties in organizing a night defense requi re

a comprehensive defense operation order. Tl1e moreiniportant items of an order are:

Possible enemy night activities.Reference poin ts.Tasks for reconnaissance.k i d s .Location of observation and listerring posts.

Security.I-:tilization of night vision devices.

The fire plan.An illumination plan.Signals for \%,arning, ontrol, and ident if cation.

Camouflage.

11-5

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


In a night defense, the command obsena tion post is

located near the FEBA so the commander can conduct

his own battle surveillance using night 1-ision devices

and illumination equipment. Additional observation

posts can be established in the forward area if required.

It may be necessary to reinforce night defenses and

to increase the density of fire in front of the fonvardarea as well as in sectors not occupied by friendly units.

Reserves or second echelon forces may be moved up to

the forward area for the night.

TRAINING

Since the Soviets consider night operations to be a

normal activity, their training patterns reflect this

attitude. The Soviets claim to devote about 5 0 percent

of training time to night training.

The Soviets begin their training for nigh:h:conibatwith the individual soldier and then progress to unit

training. The soldier learns to select and reccynize

orientation points that may escape his attention during

the daytime. He is trained tu ~ecognizedifferent

sounds and to estimate their rangc :tnd direction. He

also learns to use night vision deviLt.s and artificial

illumination. He is taught night tiring techniques.

Special training is set aside for night tank and truck

driving.

'fie Soviet soldier is given a number of trainingproblems that he must solve in total darkness, without

the aid of night vision or il lun~ination evices. This is

don e to prepare him psychologically for night combat

and to develop initiative and resourcefulness. 'The

problems are based as much as possible on actual

combat conditions. Psychological training is expec ted

to develop confidence and a feeling of superiority.

Some physical training is conducted at night.

Soldiers run through a conventional 200-meter

obstacle course at night, crossing obstacles such asditches, bomb craters, fences, palisades, lvalls,

trenches, pits, streams, and ravines under combat

conditions.

Although the Soviets devote a great deal of time to

night training, indications are that for the most par t the

training is stereotyped, unrealistic, and frequently

noncombat-related. Soviet night training reflects the

fact that they plan to move a lot at night. Thus, night

marches and related activities (reorganization, mainte-

nance, and preparations for a daylight attack) composethe bulk of Soviet night training.

Training for movement at night also indicates a

discrepancy between doctrine and practice. Despite a

variety of available night vision devices, vehicular head-

lights and flashlights are used often to help maintain

control and orientation.

A great deal of night movement and training takes

place only after thorough reconnaissance, planning,

and rehearsal are conducted during daylight hours.

Soviet night training is directed more at movement,

preparation for daylight attacks, construction of field

fortifications, and resupply than at preparation for

large-scale night combat.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

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THE REAR AREA

The Soviet concept of the "rear area" visualizes

modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This

rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of

the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital.

To the Soviets, there are two aspects of the rear area

concept: broad and narrow. The broad aspect includes

the entire country, its population, economy, govern-

ment, and its political structure. It is the productionbase for necessary war materiel, the mobilization base

for personnel replacements, and the control center for

the complete war effort. The narrow aspect includes

the activities of all military units that supply technical,

materiel, and medical support to combat forces in

established theaters of military operations (TVD).Soviet rear area support is organized on three

different levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

Strategic

Strategic rear area operations are conducted at the

national level by the Ministry of Defense. They extend

into the theater of combat operations during wartime.

Strategic rear area operations procure personnel,

materiel, and services needed by the military. These

operations prepare the Soviet economy and the Soviet

people to provide sustained support in case of war.

Also, central rear services, which is the highest logistic

organization of the armed forces, serve both to link the

national economy and the armed forces and to directly

support operational forces.

Operational

Operational rear area functions are conducted by

front and army rear area support elements. Military

districts, groups of forces, and army support elements

are the principal points of delivery for materiel andequipment contracted by the Ministry of Defense.

Most items are received, stored, and prepared for

release to combat units directly from industry. Support

activities in the operational rear area are conducted

mainly from fured or semifixed installations.

I Tactical

The tactical rear is at division and lower. Tactical

rear area operations meet the immediate combatneeds of supported units. Divisions carry about 3 to 5

days of supplies.

Soviet rear area support has a dual task: peacetime

support and wartime support. In peacetime, rear area

support maintains the Soviet armed forces in a high

state of preparedness for commitment on short notice.

Soviet military doctrine requires that the armed forces

and the entire population constantly be prepared for

the sudden outbreak of a major war. In wartime, rear

area support provides technical, materiel, and medicalsupport to forces engaged in combat. The Soviets think

a major war in Europe is likely to be a short, highly

intense conflict with conventional or nuclear weapons

disrupting the flow of service support. They expect

logistic requirements to be quite large when their

offensive is in the initial stage. After the penetration,

logistic requirements will lessen because attacking

forces will encounter less organized resistance deep in

the enemy's rear.

The Soviets also recognize the need to prepare for along c o a c t and to support combat forces that attain

and hold deep objectives. Service support units in the

operational (army and front) rear and the Soviet

central logistic system provide this in-depth, ollow-on

support. Service support is organized to keep pace

with rapidly advancing frontal forces (mechanized

and armored units supported by aviation). l h e central

logistic system may deploy to theaters of military

operations (TVDs) and directly support operational

forces if required.

CHIEFS OF THEREAR AN D THEIR C OMMANDS

The overall system of rear area support is the respon-

sibility of the Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed

Forces. He is also one of the Deputy Ministers of

Defense. He is the principal controller and coordinator

of the many logistic organizations and assets whichmake up the central rear services. However, the organi-

zation of specific rear area operations is the respon-

sibility of each individual unit commander.

The Soviets emphasize the commander's respon-

sibility to organize his own rear area operations at

every level of command The commander delegates

this responsibility to his deputy commander of the rear

also known as the chief of the rear.

The Soviets stress the important role played by the

chief of the rear. He is a rear services officer who isdirectly subordinate to his commander. There is a rear

services officer at every level of command down to

regiment. He assumes responsibility for rear area maintain continuous rear area command and control

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


details, which permits the commander to devote hisfull energies to combat operations.

The rear area command and control is based on the

commander's operational decisions. The commander

may make these decisions or delegate this resq~on-

sibility to his chief of the rear. Specific rear area

decisions include designating deployment areas and

direction of movement for rear service elements;

determining supply and evacuation points, size of

necessary reserve units, and the periods of their forma-

tion; speclfylng medical and technical support; estab-lishing rear area security measures; and designating

initial and subsequent locations of the rear area

command post.

Each chief of the rear has a staff to assist in planning

and providing rear area support. The staff coordinates

with arms and services tasked with logistic functions

and responsibilities. The chief of the rear, together

with arms and services representatives, develops both

a rear area support plan based on the commander's

decision and any instructions from the chief of the rear

of the next-higher level. This plan contains speciftc

deployment and movement schedules for rear area

elements, control and coordination measures for their

activities, and measures for rear area security.

The chief of the rear coordinates basic rear support

matters with the unit's chief of staff and arms and

services representatives. He keeps them updated on

the equipment status, the availability of reserves, and

the medical support. The chief of staff, in turn, providesthe chief of the rear with timely information regarding

the mission and the commander's decisions.

Rear area command posts (CPs) are established at

all echelons fromfront to regiment. A rear CPmust be

able to communicate with the parent unit and with

subordinate, adjacent, and higher rear area command

posts. CP personnel include the chief of the rear, his

staff, and the communications, transportation,

security, and traffic control troops.

Rear area communications are guided by the samebasic principles that are applied to all Soviet communi-

cations: continuity, mobility, and redundancy. Com-

munication means include messengers, wire, and radio

(single-channel, multi-channel, tropospheric scatter).

Radio links are supported by airborne, ground-based,

and sateuite relays. Data links extend from the Ministry

of Defense to at least front rear area command posts.

Secure voice communications are established down to

regmental rear.

The rear area command post's mobility and sunri\a-bility are improved by employing an "operations

group." The functions of the operations group are to

during redeployment of the main rear area CP. Theoperations group consists of a few rear area staff

officers with limited communications who tem-

porarily can maintain command and control of rear

area operations while the command post relocates.

LEVELS OF COMMA ND A ND CONTROL

Soviet rear area support is controlled at three levels:

strategic, operational, and tactical.

Strategic

At the strategic level, the Ministry of Defense is

responsible for all rear area activities of the armed

forces. Within the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of the

Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces accomplishes central

coordination of all support activities. He and the rear

services staff coordinate support operations of the

deputy commanders for the rear of the service

components and troop branches, the sixteen military

districts within the USSR, and the groups of Soviet

forces deployed outside the USSR.

Directly subordinate to the Chief of the Rear are the

support directorates common to all services and

branches (food, clothing, POL, medical, and veterinary

services). The Chief of the Rear coordinates with the

service branch directorates as well as with special

troop directorates on matters falling within their

jurisdiction.In wartime, central logistics units, resources, and

command and control elements may deploy to a

theater of military operations (TVD). The functions of

these elements would be to support operational

formations and to organize the use of theater

resources.

Operational

The highest level administrative headquarters inpeacetime are the military districts in the USSR and

groups of forces outside the country. In wartime, both

have sufficient communications and staff elements to

form fronts. There are no mnts as such in peacetime.

The military district is a high-level military territorial

administrative command. It includes military areas,

recruiting districts, military schools, installations, and

garrisons. W'hen units in a military district are formed

into a wartime front, elements of the military district

staff may provide the basis for the ront rear area staff.The military district continues to provide command

and control for assigned central rear senices missions

and other suppor t functions. The peacetime rear area

support organization of a group of forces can quickly

weapons and associated equipment is the respon-

sibility of the deputy commander for armaments.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


assume command and control of front rear areaoperations.

The wartime operational combined arms formations

are fronts and armies. The rear area operations for

these formations is accomplished by a chief of the rear,

(also called the deputy commander for the rear) and

his support units.

Command and control of rear area operations are

conducted from rear area command posts. The f?r,rzf

establishes its rear arca command post 150 to 2 0 m

behind the FEBA. The army locates its rear area com-

mand post about 100 km behind the FEBA. In high

tempo offensive operations, rear area command posts

move frequently.

At front and army, the chief of the rear has varying

degrees of authority for accomplishing the following

rear area functions:

Controlling rear area security, including contro l of

combat elements tasked to provide rear area security.

Tasking directorates with specific supportmissions.

Assigning deployment areas to support units in the

rear area.

Coordinating with chiefs of service troops, tank,

rocket troops and artillery, and the Central Military

Transportation Directorate (VOSO ) for rear area sup-

port in their respective areas.

Issuing instructions to subordinate chiefs of the

rear about the administration of support activities.

Tactical

At regiment and division, the chief of the rear

(deputy commander for the rear) supenrises a staff

which includes deputies for food; petroleum, oils, and

lubricants (POL); and clothing. Coordination is made

with engineer, signal, transportation, chemical, and

ammunition directorates. Vehicle maintenance,

repair, and recovery is the responsibility of the deputy

commander for technical affairs. The repair of onboard

These activities are coordinated with the chief of therear.

Chiefs of the rear at regiment and division have small

statfs to coordinate the activities of all combat service

support elements at their respective levels. However,

their basic command responsibility changes for rear

area security. If requirements dictate, tactical units can

be rear area security missions under the

operational control of the chief of the rear.

Division and regiment rear area command posts are

equipped with fully mobile communications facilities.

Division rear area command posts will be about 30 krnbehind the line of contact; regiment rear area com-

mand posts will be about 15 krn behind the line of

contact.

There is no chief of the rear (deputy commander for

the rear) lower than regtment. The unit commander

below regiment is his own manager of rear area

operations.

At tank and motorized rifle battalion level, the com-mander is assisted by the following personnel:

Chief of battalion staff (similar to US battalion

executive officer) is the principal assistant for

organizing and administering battalion rear area

operations.

Buttalion technical officer is responsible for

organization and control of maintenance, repair, and

salvage of both combat and noncombat vehicles.

Buttalion s14pp[y platoon commnn&r orders,

stores, and distributes all supplies and equipment. Hecommands a supply platoon consisting of a supply

section and an ammunition and motor transport

section. The ammunition and motor transpor t section

operates the battalion's cargo and POL trucks.

At company level, a company technical officer assists

the commander in logistics. The company technical

officer supenrises weapons crews in field maintenance

and light repair. He also is assisted by a company first

sergeant who is accountable for company-level supply.

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES

Comparison of US and Soviet military elements hasled to the incorrect view that the Soviet logistic struc-ture is austere and inadequate to support their combatforces. Because of differences in concept and organi-zation, Soviet logistic operations have been falselyreferred to as the "Achilles' heel" of Soviet militarypower. However, Soviet military forces do receive

effective logistic support. The Soviets have spentenormous sums of money to develop a modern andhighly mechanized logistic support system. Materiel-handling equipment is increasing in both quantity andquality. The use ofpallets, containers, and packages hasgreatly improved the efficiency of Soviet logisticefforts. The Soviets have increased the depth and rangeof forward service areas and increased the mobility andrange of logistic formations in support of frontline

forces. They have developed a tactical pipelinecapability and introduced improved transportationassets in great numbers. Also, Soviet capabilities for airdelivery to forward areas and the use of helicopters forresupply have shown marked improvements.

I Centralized PlanningThis principle requires concurrent tactical and

logistical planning as well as coordination with civilian

industry and transportation. Centralized planninginsures coordination of civilian war production withmilitary requirements.

I - Tailoring of Logistic Units

This principle allows allocation of logistic resourcesto the combat elements most essential to the successof the mission. Tailoring allows the Soviet military toassign priorities for logistic support.

Fixed Supply PrioritiesThe Soviet logistic system operates on the following

sequence of priorities:1. Ammunition of all types.2. POL.3. Technical supplies.4. Rations and clothing.

However, these priorities can change with the

combat situation. For example, a unit advancingrapidly with no opposition has a greater need for POLthan for ammunition.

Delivery Forward

Higher headquarters handle supply requirementsfor their subordinate units. Supplies and services aredelivered directly to subordinate units using theorganic transportation assets of the higher head-quarters. For example, an army headquarters uses itsown trucks to deliver supplies to its subordinatedivisions. In emergencies, one level maybe bypassed in

supply delivery.A division may deliver supplies directlyto subordinate battalions, or a regiment may deliverdirectly to subordinate companies. This concept doesnot prevent a subordinate unit from using its assets toobtain supplies from its superior headquarters,especially in critical situations.

Continuous Supply Base Support

Supply bases and repair facilities are established asfar forward as possible to insure the flow of suppliesfrom the central logistics level directly to combatunits. These echelons of bases from the homeland todeployed battalions assure continuous support fortactical elements.

Standardization of EquipmentThe Soviet system of standardization is both exten-

sive and effective. For example, of the 3,544 parts thatmake up the ZIL- 131 3 11'2-ton truck, 45 percent maybe used on other ZIL-produced vehicles, and 23

percent may be used on other trucks of the sameweight class. AT-62 tank and the MAZ 537 tank trans-porter share a common power plant. The chassis used'for the amphibious PT-76 light tank has been adaptedfor BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, SA-6 andFROG-2,-3, -4 and -5TELs, the GSP amphibious ferry,the GT-T amphibious tractor, the ASU-85 airborne SP

gun, and the ZSU-23-4 SPAA gun. Extensive standardi-zation has reduced the volume of repair parts andimproved the Soviets' ability to repair forward throughcannibalization. Also, obsolete vehicles and weaponscan be retained for training purposes without having tokeep a large stockpile of repair parts.

Supply Accountabilityand Resource Conservation

The Soviet system is stringent in these areas, andpenalties for unnecessary waste generally are severe.Soviet military publications continually stress resource

13-1

conservation and honor personnel who effectively Supply and service functions common to all military

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


conserve supplies.

Complete Use of Transportation

The Soviet logistic system uses rail transport when-

ever possible to move supplies from the Soviet Union

to j h n t or army level depots. Other transportation

assets, primarily motor assets, are used from that point

forward. The Soviet military has three separate groups

of transportation personnel-railroad troops, motor

transport troops, and pipeline troops. Soviet doctrinecalls for using tactical combat vehicles to move addi-

tional POL and ammunition stocks, especially in the

preparation phase before offensive action.

Complete Mobile Support

From division to company, materiel and servicing

facilities operate from wheeled vehicles. Critical

supplies such as ammunition are boxed and uploaded

on , support and combat vehicles. These measures

support a continuous, rapid offensive.

Forward Positioning of Support Elements

Soviet maintenance and medical facilities operate

under similar procedures. Both attempt to locate in

areas of greatest need with emphasis on quickly

returning lightly wounded personnel and repairable

equipment to the combat elements. Personnel and

equipment requiring additional atteotion are

evacuated to the next-level facility.

Use of All Possible Resources

Soviet troops are taught to forage for food in local

areas and to use captured stocks of food, ammunition,

and equipment. While food preparation and clothing

supply procedures have improved, the supply

priorities discussed above may require the use ofenemy materiel.

CENTRAL-LEVEL LOGISTICS

Organization

The joint policy and control agency in charge of

logistics support for the armed forces is the Office of

the Chief of the Rear within Ministry of Defense

(MOD). The Chief of the Rear, a deputy Minister ofDefense, provides logistical nput to plans developed at

the highest levels of Soviet government.

units and personnel for which the Chief of the Rear hasresponsibility include: food, clothing, personal

equipment, fuel and lubricants, medical andveterinary

services, post exchange, transportation planning, and

research and development, procurement, storage,

issue, and maintenance of common-use items. While

these areas are the direct responsibility of the Chief of

the Rear, other troop component items are the respon-

sibilities of other directorates and troop commands.

Force components, troop commands, and military

districts have rear service directorates. The deputycommander for the rear is responsible for movement

of supplies and troop units, and evacuation of

casualties and materiel. Under his control, motor

transport assets are centralized for operational

employment, especially in a preoffensive buildup and

for resupply of advancing elements. Centralized

control allows use of motor transport assets from

second echelon units in frontline operations.

Resources Management

The total amount of resources allocated to the

military is a political decision. The Politburo of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party probably

determines the amount of yearly production allocated

to the armed forces for current consumption, and the

allocation to be held in reserve. The Council of

Ministers (of which the Minister of Defense is a

primary participant), and its subordinate agencieswork out the details of the allocation plans.

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) prepares its budget

proposal in conjunction with other agencies of the

state. The General Staffpreparespreliminaryestimates

of armed forces requirements. The State Planning

Commission reviews and modifies these estimates in

the light of priorities assigned to other government

agencies and the resources available. The MOD then

submits the estimates to the Council of Ministers for

approval as a part of the annual state budget. TheGeneral St&, with the State Planning Commission,

further defines the military requirements and directs

its various headquarters and directorates to prepare a

detailed procurement program. This program then

provides the data needed for the arms and services and

the subordinate elements of the Chief of the Rear to

prepare their own specific procurement programs.

Other agencies of the MOD have specialized

procurement responsibilities that are not delegated to

the Chief of the Rear. The Main Rocket and ArtilleryDirectorate is responsible for development and

procurement of self-propelled and towed artillery,

mortars, tank guns, antitank guided missiles, air

defense guns, small arms, and all types of ammunition,Preparation and placement of orders require close

coordination between the MOD, the State Planning

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


lubricants, and cleaning materials for weaponmaintenance. The Main Armor Directorate is respon-sible for development and procurement of tanks,

infantry fighting vehicles, and certain other armored

combat vehicles. ?he Central Auto-Tractor Direc-

torate is responsible for developing and procuring

wheeled and tracked prime movers, military trucks

and trailers, adverse-terrain vehicles, fuels and lubri-

cants, and for repair and maintenance of vehicles,except for tanks and other armored combat vehicles.

Agencies of the Ministry of Defense have special

troop resource management responsibilities for thearmed forces. The Chief of Engineer Troops is respon-

sible for supply, storage, and maintenance of engineer

equipment and materiel. The Chief of Chemical

Troops is responsible for supply, storage, and mainte-

nance of chemical equipment and materiel. ?he Chief

of Signal troops is responsible for supply, storage, and

maintenance of signal equipment and materiel.

Commission, and the economic ministries responsiblefor executing the military requirements. Representa-

tives of the major force components and of the direc-

torates and troop commands perform the function forthe MOD under the supervision of the Chief of the

Rear.

Accountability is extremely important in the

procurement process. The Communist Party and theMilitary Industrial Commission oversee the entire

research, development, and acquisition process. MOD

Central Finance Directorate maintains fiscal control.

Representatives of MOD main technical directorates

are stationed at factories to inspect finished materiel.

The MOD directb tasks military industry research

institutes, munitions plants, shipyards, and other

production facilities, as well as non-military research

institutes, and design and production facilities of otherindustrial ministries to develop and produce military

items.

MOD Logistics Organizations

IMINISTER OF DEFENSE

r I IDeputy Minister

(Deputy Minister of Defense)I-=- =---

TECHNICAL DIRECTORATES

Chief Main Rocket and

Artillery Directorate

Chief Main Armor Directorate

Chief Central Auto-Tractor

Directorate

DIRECT SUBO RDINATES TO

CHIEF OF REAR

Main Trade Directorate

Central Finance Directorate

Administrative Management

Directorate

Personnel Directorate

Central Food Directorate

Military Tourism Department

Clothing Supply Directorate

Fuel Supply Directorate

Central Military

Transportation Directorate

Central Military

Medical Directorate

Chief of Railroad Troops

Veterinary Service

BRANCHES AND SPECIAL

TROOPS

Chief of Rocket and

Artillery Troops

Chief of Armored Troops

Chief of Engineer Troops

Chief of Chemical Troops

Chief of Signal Troops

Chief of Highway Construction

Troops

Billeting DirectorateLEGEND:-ubordinationI oordination

Logistic Stockpiles

The logistic storage ofwar materials consists offour

major categories: state, strategic, mobilization, and

The front is not a fixed organization but is tailored

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


mobile reserves.

State Reserves. Foodstuffs, petroleum products,

manufactured goods, and other strategic raw materials

are stored in special government warehouses. Theseitems can be issued only with the express permission

of the State. While these stocks are considered to be

separate from the military items held in strategic

reserve, military use of at least part of these items is

anticipated.

Strategic Reserves. These reserves are stocks of

supplies and equipment controlled by the MOD. These

stocks are similar to stocks in State reserves and are not

planned for early use in a conflict.

Mobilization Reserves. These materials are held for

issue to newly activated, large military units and for

resupply to combat units in the early stages of a

conflict. One directorate in the MOD determines thelevel and configuration of these stocks. It also is

responsible for their accountability and maintenance.

The military districts coordinate mobilization

measures between military and civilian sectors.

Mob ile Reserves. Ammunition, fuel, rations, and

equipment are located with deployed ground units

and transported by the unit's organic transport.

Ground forces maintain these supplies for use in

immediate conduct of ground operations. These

supplies are distributed throughout the ground forces

in both tactical and support elements. Quantities of

these supplies are established by published norms.

They are constantly checked and kept at proper levels.

An emergency reserve of supplies is maintained within

these stocks. It can be used only on order of the unit

commander.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS

Within the Soviet logistic system, the bulk of logistic

units are concentrated at two levels,pant and army.

This concentration supports the Soviet philosophy of

streamlined, highly mobile combat elements at

division and below. The responsibility and the primary

means for logistic support are maintained at these

higher levels. Tactical units are free to engage the

enemy in high-speed and highly mobile action. This

reduction of logistic personnel at the tactical levelexplains how Soviet divisions can be smaller than US

divisions but have more firepower.

to meet specific objectives based on forces available,mission requirements, enemy forces, and the physical

geography of the area of operations. Tailoring atTects

the number and type of subordinate combat elements

and the number and type of assigned logistic units. The

logistic operation of the front is extensive and

complex, and it serves as the major connecting link

between the industrial base of the Soviet Union and

forces engaged in combat.

Generally located between 150 to 200 kilometers

from the FEBA, thefront rear area is served by air,high-way, rail, and pipeline from the USSR. Rail transport

bears the burden of movement requirements to the

m n t . Despite improvements in motor transport, rail

transport is used to carry the majority of Soviet war

materiel as far forward as possible.

The fro nt supply complex has a wide range of fixed

and mobile depots and other facilities such as major

hospitals and capital maintenance facilities. At this

level, depots are administered by each service, special

troop directorates, and the various subordinateelements under the chief of the rear. When the

distance between fm nt and army rear areas is great, a

front logistic base may be formed and located in the

forward portion of the front area This logistic base is

situated along a railroad line when possible and also issupported by highway, air, and pipeline.

The army is the highest-level peacetime combined

arms formation. It has a permanent staff plus assigned

combat support and combat service support elements.

With the exception of its reduced size, the army

logistic base is similar to that of the fron t. Logistic

elements are basically the same for both tank and com-

bined arms armies.

The army logistic base normally is located within

100 kilometers of the forward edge of the battle area

(FEBA). Like the m nt , the army rear area is served by

rail, highway, air, and pipeline when possible. Ifdistances between the army and its subordinate

divisions' rear area become great, or the number ofunits to be supported changes, a forward army logisticbase is established. Multiple transport modes service

this forward base as much as possible. From this base

forward, motor transport is used for the bulk of

materiel movement.

TACTICAL LOGISTICS

At the tactical level, Soviet logistic support is fully

mobile. Streamlined logistic elements support therespective tactical units with ammunition, POL, and

rations to insure continuous combat operations.

Front Logistics Elements

I

FRONT COMMANDER

I OEPUTY COMMANDER I

I CHlEF OF STAFF I

II

I I - I I I I

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


I

CHlEF OF ARMORCHEF DEPUTY COMMANDER CHIEF CHIEFw CHlEF

CHlEF OF THE REARCHlEF

TROOPS & STAFFWHEELEO/TRACTOR FOR MISSILE & ARTILLERY - SIGNAL TROOPS ENGINEER TROOPS

& STAFFCHEMICAL TROOPS

TROOPS & STAFF TECHNICAL MATTERS TROOPS & STAFF & STAFF & STAFF & STAFF

a . a

a . . a a a.SIGNAL EQUIPMENT ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

MAINTENANCE BASE HQ. REPAIR BATTALION REPAIR BATTALION I FRONT BASECHEMICAL EQU lPM ENT

& SUPPORT COMPANY. PARTS/EQUIP DEPOT REPAIR BATTALIONPARTS/EQUIP DEPOTa.• ARTILLERY/ORONANCE

a MAINTENANCE BATTALION II AMMUNITION DEPOTS IIa

& PARTS OEPOT. •t

a

BRIOGE ROAD RAILROAOCOHSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION

TRAFFIC CONTROL

BATTALION BATTALION BATTALIONBRIGADE. • WHEELED TRACTOR. MAINTEMNCE BATTALIONI SAM MOBILE MISSILE I

a& PARTS DEPOT TECHNICAL BASE

a•a

b m B dREAR SECURITY MILITARY TRADE LAUNDRY SHOWER

OlVlSlONL TAFF DETACHMENTa

OETACHMENT

aMOBILE VEHICLE SSM MOBILE MISSILE

• RECOVERY BATTALION TECHNICAL BASEa k B I. RATIONS EQUIPMENT. - REPAIR DEPOT CLOTHING EQUIPMENT MOTOR TRANSPORT VETERINARY• ARMORED VEHICLE

MAINTENANCE BATTALIONIPARTS DEPOT

MISSILE TRANSPORT COMPANYREPAIR COMPANY BRIGADE DETACHMENT

BATTALION

J

MEDICALMEDICAL PIPELINE

TAWK REPAIR I MISSILE FUEL DETACHMENT CONSTRUCTION FIELO BAKERIESOTOR TRANSPORT

BATTALION TRANSPORT BATTALIOWBATTALION BRIGADE

LEGEND. Techn~cal hannel- ommand channel TANK RECOVERY I FIELD POST OFFICE MILITARY BANKBATTALION

SLAUGHTER HOUSE

----- When dellvery d ~stances ecome axcess~ve, he

base may be d~splac ed orward, or Front SupplyBase Sect~onsmay be establ~shed, r d~splacedo

the rear or Front Base Rear When necessary. MOBILE TANK REPAIRmob~l e Army Advance Supply Bases w ~ l l e WORKSHOPestabl~shed mmed ~atelyeh~nd ~v~sronectors

Supply elements deliver materials to the rear of combat supply actions. There are no branch depot chiefs at this

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


elements deployed on the FEBA. Medical and mainte-

nance elements deploy as far forward as possible toaccomplish rapid retum of lightly wounded personneland lightly damaged equipment to the combat units.

Personnel and equipment requiring additional atten-tion are evacuated from the battlefield.

Divisional combat service support elements are

completely mobile. The division mobile logistic basenormally is located approximately25 to 40kilometersfrom the FEBA in the offense, and up to 50kilometers

in the defense. Logistic elements are organized similarto logistic elements at army level. The logistic base isheaded by a logistics officer, assisted by branch depotchiefs, and subordinate to the deputy commander for

the rear. Maintenance operations are the responsibility

of the deputy commander for technical matters. Motortransport, medical, and field bakery facilities areorganic to the division. Supplies are delivered to

regiments and battalions.At regimental level, supplies are loaded on vehicles

tomaintainequal mobility with combat elements. Theregimental chief of rear services is responsible for a l l

Locations of Tactical Logistic Eleme nts

level to assist him. Maintenance functions are the

responsibility of the deputy commander for technicalmatters. Located up to 20 kilometers from the FEBA,

these logistic elements directly supply subordinatebattalions, and also may supply line companies when

required.Battalion logistic support is self-contained. Supplies

are maintaineu with the suppiy and maintenanceplatoon and transported on battalion vehicles. Pre-

scribed norms of supply are maintained for all classesof materiel, with replenishment provided directly by

regiment or division logistic elements. The battalion

chief of staff is the organizer of rear service functions.The deputy commander for technical matters is in

charge of maintenance support. The supply platoon

commander is responsible for receipt, storage, anddelivery of supplies to companies. He also deploys andoperates battalion ammunition, fuel, and ration points.

The battalionfel'dsher (a physician's assistant) is chiefof the battalion medical section. He is responsible for

gathering and evacuating woundedpersonnelfrom thecompanies and the battlefield.

U N I T

COMPANY

BATTALION

REGIMENT

LOGIS TIC E LE ME N T

Ammunition Supply PointRations Supply Point

Medical Point

Ammunition Supply Point

Repair Point

Rations Supply PointMedical Point

Ammunition Supply Point

Repair Point

POL Supply Point

Rations Supply Point

Medical Point

Damaged Motor Vehicle

Collecting Point

D IS TA N C E FR OM

FEBA ( I # T H E

OFFENSE)

4 KM5 KM

5 KM1.5-3 KM

10-15 KMUP TO 1 5 KM

10-15 KM

10-15 KM

5-7 KM5-7 KM

D IS TA H C E FR OM

FE BA ( I N TH E

D E FE N S E )

100-150 M

UP TO 1 KM

100 M

2-3 KM

3-5 KM

3-5 KM1.5-3 KM

10-20 KM

UP TO 20 KM

10-20 KM

10-20 KM

6-10 KM6-10 KM

The company commander is responsible for organi-zation of his rear services. The deputy commander fortechnical matters is responsible for organization of

elements, warehouses, shops, and other facilities.Military districts and groups of forces are the principalpoints of delivery for material and equipment con-

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


company-level maintenance. The company first

sergeant, who is a warrant officer or a senior non-commissioned officer, is responsible for accountabilityand maintenance of the unit's weapons, ammunition,fuel, food, etc. Medical and sanitary matters are super-vised by the unit commander and the battalionfel'ashw.

SUPPLY

Supply is an operational function of MOD subor-dinate directorates, of other directorates, and of troopcommands at MOD level that handle special-purposeequipment and supply. The Organizational and Mobili-ration Directorate of the General Staff is responsibiefor management of the uninterrupted supply of allforces in the initial phases of conflict.

Military district commanders have immediate direc-

tive and administrative authority for supply matters.They exercise these responsibilities through a deputy'1ommander for rear services. The deputy commanderdirects the operations of the subordinate logistic

tracted for by the MOD and delivered by industry. Theweapons, ammunition, and other manufactured goodsare shipped directly to the military district or group offorces. They assume full responsibility for storage andeventual release of the material to units.

Below the military district or group of forces, armyand division st& reflect the organization of the higherunit in logistic matters. Supply elements at army and

division are subordinate operationally to theircounterparts at the next higher headquarters.To simphfy logistic planning and to standardize

ordering and issuing procedures, the Soviets divide themajor classes of supplies into specific quantities ordistribution lots. These quantities are called "units offire" for ammunition, "refills" for POL, "daily ration"for food, and "set" for spare parts and accessories.These amounts originally are computed based onphysical conditions or limitations. However, once a

specific quantity has been prescribed as the unit ofissue, the quantity itself is no longer referred to, and allfuture references are given in multiples of the unit ofissue.

Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March

IMEDICAL POINT SUPPLY PLATOON

f I\

REPAIR SHOP

LEGEND:

Motorized rifle battalion, reinforced withFuel truck Field kitchen

- tanks and artillery in march column (van pak 170/MO)

Battalion ambulance with trailer Fuel truck with trailer Truck with water trailec

@ Battalion ammunition truck tT@a ck with field kitchen trailerKQepair workshop wi th trail er

NOTES:

1.When there is no enemy threat fuel trucks are often placed at the head

ofthe rear service elements.

2. Distances betwee n rear service vehicles in the ma rch are normally the same as thosese paratin gother

vehicles.

Rear Service S u ~ ~ o r t 1

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DURING THE

A7TACK

IN THE DEFENSE

MRC Motorized rifle companyI A attalion technical observation point

I A attalion medical point

I A attalion refueling point

I A attalion food supply point

Battalion ammunition supply point

13-8

p &4 Motorized rifle c0mp.w n n f n *

+E.mpny medim, mruationoi,,,by tanks in the attack

Regimental commander's command h m p m y ammunition supply pointobservation post

P Battalion commander's command

observation postDepresw

Mixed mine field

,...A Regimental boundary adparmnnrl and antitank)

h Battalion boundary Mortar (12Omm) in fuing position

Ammunition

The chief of rocket troops and artillery plans priate amo unts by type and keeps a running account

the supplies and est imates the expenditure of al l of the am ounts o n hand in un its and in depo t stocks.types of ammunition. Th e amm unition officer o r his The chief of rear services integrates the arnrnuni-

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


staff calculates expected usage. He orders appro- tion or de r into his supply transport plan. He allocates

I7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM 300 .007

Standard Units of Fire for Soviet Weapons

WEAPONS

7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, DRAGUNOV

7.62-mm LMG, RPK

7.62-mm GPMG, PK/PKS

12.7-mm HMG, DSHK

14.5-mm HMG

I 100-mm A/T Gun, T-12 1 6 0 1 1.75

NO. OF ROUNDS PER

UNIT OF FIRE

100

I A/T Rocket Grenade, RPG-7

73-mm A/T Gun, SPG-9

ATGM. AT-4 and AT-5

WT. PER UNIT

OF FIRE (METRIC TONS)

.003

1,000

2,500

120

100

.020

,075

.020

.06

20

80

4

,110

.65

.08

1.80

1.35I 120-mm Mortar I 80

I1 152-mm Howitzer 6 0 3.75

160-mm Mortar

240-mm Mortar

122-mm Howitzer

I 240-mm MRL 1 3 2 8.9

60

12.0

6.20

I 120 (3 salvos)

40

80

130-mm Field Gun

2.18

3.20

8 0

23-mm ZSU-23-457-mm AAA S-60

FROG-7I2,000

200

1

SA-6, SAM

SA-8, SAM

SA-9, SAM

T-64/72 Tank, 125-mm

1X 7.62-mm MG

1X 12.7 MGBRDM-2

1X 14.5-mm MG

1X 7.62-mm MG

1.42.0

3.0

I

3

4

4

40

2,500

200

500

2,000

AT-5

BMP (Troop Carrier Version)I 1X 73-mm Gun I 40 I .325

2.1

.05

.20

1.7

.075

.035

,145

,060

1X 7.62-mm MG 2,000

25

.060

,270

transportation assets to move ammunition between

depots and user units.Planning is based on the unit of fire for each weapon

trailers (4,200 liters), 200-liter drums, and 20-liter

cans for supply. Motorized rifle and tank divisionsnormally carry sulXcient reserves t o refuel their units

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Soviet planners use the unit of fire to computeammunition and transportation requirements.

A Soviet unit's basic load is a multiple of the unit offire. It includes the amounts hauled in the unit trainsand stored in the depot at the next higher head-quarters. It varies with the unit's mission, degree ofenemy resistance, e tc. A multiple of the uni t of fire isassigned for weapons before each major operation or

phase. The multiple assigned changes with the situa-tion. Assignment is based on the mission, the enemy,and the availability of ammunition.

The chief of rocket troops and artillery computesthe number of rounds by type of weapon needed tosupport the commander's operations. The chief of rearservices then calculates the weight to determinetransport requirements.

PO LFuels and lubricants are second only to ammunition

to resupply Soviet forces. Rail, pipeline, and waterwaysmove POL to Jhnt and army. At front, depots aremaintained with a 12-day supply. At army level, POLdepots maintain a 2- to 3-day supply. Advance bases areestablished near division rear boundaries when thedistance between army depots and first echelondivisions exceeds 100 kilometers. Divisions carry a 3-

to 5-day stock of mobile fuel.Atfront and army POL depots, fuel is stored in tanks.Oil and lubricants are stored in 150- to 500-literdrums. Divisions use fuel tankers (5,000 liters), fuel

twice.Computation of fuel requirements is based on

"refills." A unit's refill is the total requirement for allvehicles in the unit. For tracked vehicles, one "refill" isthat amount carried aboard in integral fuel tanks. Forwheeled vehicles, one refill is equivalent to thatrequired for a 500-kilometer range.

Tactical pipelines may deliver fuel as far forward as

division rear areas. Pipeline brigades o r battalions maybe found at front and army levels.

A brigade can lay about 45 miles of 4-inch pipelineper day, while a special pipeline battalion can lay up to19 miles per day. A recently developed pipelayingmachine requires only two operators to lay and couplepipe. Tactical pipelines normally are connected toportable fuel tanks. When the pipeline extends overflat terrain, mobile pumping stations are located atapproximately 9 mile intervals. In rough or moun-tainous terrain, the stations would be closer together.

A refueling point in rear areas may contain severalrubberized-cloth fuel containers capable of refuelingnumerous vehicles simultaneously. It may be estab-lished along a specific route to refuel all passingvehicles.

Army, division, or regimental fuel service trucks maydeliver fuel to battalion refueling points or, possibly,directly to vehicles.

Units on the move refuel their vehicles during resthalts, probably firom tanker trucks and trailers.Wheeled vehicles may refuel from cans carried onboard.

POL Held in Units 1IN VEHICLES IN UNIT LOGISTIC BASE

/ (METRIC TONS) I OR TRAIN METRIC TONS e

Combined Arms Army

Tank Army

Motorized Rifle Division

Motorized Rifle RegimentI

5,000

4,000

700

Motorized Rifle Battalion

Tank Division

Tank Regiment

17,500

1 1,000

1,450

90

Tank Battalions

160

1

9

800

120

11

1,700

240

NOTE: Motorczed r i f le and tank divisions normally carry suf f ic~e nt eserves to refuel their units twice.

25 40

POL Refill

UNIT GASDIESEL TOTAL

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


i 1 NOTE: A unft's refil l is the total requirement for allve h~c lesn the unit.

Rations

MRR (BTR EQUIPPED)

MRR (BMP EQUIPPED)

Tank REGT

INDEP TANK BN (MRD)

ANTITANK B N (MRD)

ARTY REGT (DIV)

ARTY REGT (ARMY)

Rations are issued based on meals per man per day.The Directorate of Rations Supply of the Ministry ofDefense develops norms for a day's supply of rations.Norms are based primarily on expenditure of energyfor caloric requirements of military personnel. The

I Council of Ministers approve these norms and thenorms are announced by orders of the Minister ofDefense. Basic ration norms determine the amount offood products that are issued to feed one man for a 24 -hour period. Supplemental norms determine theamount of products to be issued in excess of the basicration norms based on conditions under which themen are serving or the nature of their service. Dryrations are issued on the basis of 1 kilogram per manper day while fresh rations are based on 2 kilograms

per man per day. Divisions cxrry a 5-day food supply.If

possible, at least one hot meal is served per day.The chief of the rear is responsible for all ration

support. He must provide a timely and uninterruptedsupply of rations and technical equipment for thepreparation of food and for baking bread under fieldconditions.

59,990

45 0

40,896

30 6

31,763

23 8

4,636

3 5

6,132

4 6

38,472

28 8

14,121

10 6

67,860

57 7

101,737

86 5

115,350

98 1

53,246

45 3

2,835

2 4

2,756

2 3

28,010

23 8

Clothing

Enlisted personnel and officers receive militaryclothing at the time of induction. Supplementaryclothing including field clothing is issued after they

127,859 ltters

102 7 metrlc ton

142,632 l~ters

11 7 1 metrlc ton

147,113 l~ters

121 9 metrlc ton

57,882 liters

48 8 metrtc ton

8,967 ltters

7 0 metrtc ton

41,228 llters

31 1 metrlc ton

42,13 1 ltters

3 4 4 metric ton

have arrived at their unit assignment. Subsequentreissues occur at specified intervals. Personnel equip-ment is issued from the unit depot. The depot stampsclothing articles with the month and year that the itemwas issued for wear. Accountable items for group use(tents, coveralls, sports equipment) are the personalresponsibility of the individual who signs the handreceipt.

Vehicles

Procurement and resupply of vehicles and end itemsare the responsiblity of the various chiefs of servicearms or technical services. The Soviet system does nothave a resupply procedure fo i unit end itemswhile the

unit is engaged tactically. The unit in combat isreplaced by another unit when attrition reaches acertain level.

Mobile contact teams fix repairable equipment andreturn it to action as soon as possible. This is the onlyway to replace equipment end items. Damaged equip-ment is not repaired in the field if it requires more thana few hours work. (See Maintenance and Recovery.)

A certain number of wheeled and tracked vehiclesare kept in storage in peacetime to preserve them. A

minimum number of vehicles are kept for normaltraining and administrative uses, generally from 15 to35 percent of the vehicles authorized

Repair parts and subassemblies are stocked at

maintenance units fromfmnt through battalion levels.Repair parts supply is accomplished by routine,

eliminates use of water for washing, laundry, and

bathing. The absolute minimum allowance of water is3 liters which is for drinking only and normally is not

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


medium, and capital maintenance units. Repair partsthat are stocked and used according to the followingsystem:

Routine repairs. These include replacement oftires, windshields, and common fuel and electric itemssuch as fuel pumps and carburetors. These repairsusually are done by units at regimental or divisionlevels.

Medium repairs. These rapairs involve replace-ment or overhaul of engines or transmissions, usuallyare accomplished by a division, army, or pont .

Capiul *airs. These repairs involve major over-haul and reassembly of major subcomponents andrepair parts. This activity takes place only at army andabove, including evacuation to the industrial base.

Under this system, the users submit their requests tothe next higher maintenance unit which supplies theitem from stocks on hand. Mobile reserve supplies are

maintained on trucks fromfront to regimental levels.They are replenished as soon as possible after beingexpended.

Water Supply

The water supply in the field is planned by engineersin cooperation with the medical service. When timepermits, a water supply plan is drawn up to include a

survey, a water supply chart, and a work schedule. Thelocation of existing water resources in the expectedzone of operations is established for the survey. Thewater supply chart indicates which water wells to use,where to dig new wells. and how to deploy watersupply stations. The work schedule designates waterpoints and the soldiers assigned to them. The schedulealso shows daily water requirements, transportationrequirements for hauling the water, and equipment forhandling it .

Engineers organize water supply points in the rear ofJronts and armies. Water supply points for all lowerechelons are organized by organic engineer units or bythe soldiers themselves under the direction of the localcommander. The daily requirements for areas wherewater points are widely scattered are carefullycomputed to determine the amount of transportationneeded.

The normal rate of water consumption per man isabout 10 liters per day. This includes water for

drinking, food preparation, washing, laundry, andbathing. Under restricted water conditions, the dailyallowance is reduced to about 5 liters per daywhich

maintained for more than 3 days.

Engineer, Signal,Chemical, and Medical Items

Items peculiar to these services are procuredthrough separate channels under the supervision of

4

the chiefs of the services from front to regimental

levels. Medical supplies are handled through inde-pendent channels,a s a separate function of the chief ofthe rear.

Supply Distribution System

The peacetime military district, or the wartimefront, receives its supplies fkom the national storagedepots or in some cases directly from the industrialproduction line. Fm?zt delivers the items directly to

m y epots. In turn, army delivers equipment to sup-ported divisions, and the divisions deliver to theregiments. If necessary, intermediate echelons maybe

bypassed to deliver items directly to the user.

Supply Installations Schematic

F R O N T F O R W A R D

SUPPLY BASE(S)

IL I I *

CE NT RAL S T O RAG E DEPOTS

ARMY MOBILE ISUPPLY BASEp r r * r r

m

A D V A N C E A R M Y

SUPPLY BASE(S)

I --D I V I S I O N M O B I L E

SUPPLY BASE

* NOTE: When dellvery distances

become excessive, the base may

be d~spla ced forward. or front

Supply Base Sectlons may be

establtshed When necessary.

mobile Army Advance Supply

Bases uvlll be established Im-

m e d ~ a t e l y b e h ~ n d d ~ v ~ s i o n C O M P A N Y

sectors.

The front and army logistic bases are large com-plexes providing all combat service support needs. Atdivision level, supply bases are as closeto the ongoingbattle as possible. Critical ammunition and POL are

Rail TransportThe Soviet Union has over 83,000 miles of railway

track, of which over 20,000 miles are electric. Thissystem handles from 66 to 85 percent of the freighttrattic and 50 percent of the passenger traffic in the

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


uploaded and sent forward as required.Supplies are moved in bulk m a d y by rail and pipe-

line but also by road from the strategic rear into theoperational rear where dumps are established orreplenished. Fuel is sent to the tactical rear by tankeror pipeline, or is held in fuel dumps to replenishsecond echelon forces before they are committed.

The conditions of the ongoing battle dictate thelocation of dumps and stockpiles. Being highly mobile,divisions do not create stockpiles but maintain mobilestocks as far forward as possible.

At division level, replenishment depots are set up ata convenient road junction, but supplies remainuploaded whenever possible. The replenishmentdepot is under the command of a deputy commanderfor resupply, who is subordinate to the division chief ofthe rear. Usually, divisional supply points are well

dispersed.Air resupply may be considered on a small or

moderate scale when other methods have failed orwhen extreme speed is essential. High-value cargo,such as nuclear warheads or NBC protective clothing,

Soviet Union. Railroads are the principal means oftransporting military hardware from the USSR Railtransport also may be used to carry fuel from rear areasto the fmnt.

Rail transport in peacetime fills under the super-vision of the Ministry of Railways. This agency is auniformed sen ice with ranks similar to the military. It

also operates all civilian railway services within theUSSR Military rail forces work with civilians in every-day operations, but in wartime, the railway systemreverts to military control.

A Railroad Troops Directorate handles rail construc-tion and maintenance of the MOD-controlled tracks. Itoperates trains carrying sensitive military cargo such asmissiles over the civilian rail system. Also, militaryrailroad troops participate in construction projects inthe civilian sector.

In time of war, the military rail transport staff of them n t chief of the rear plans and directs rail shipmentsand movements. Front logistic bases probably wouldbe located near large rail centers. The chief of rail-

have high priority for air supply.

Rail System

~ T R A N S P O R T A T I O N

I The various transportation services under MOD aretraffic management, railroad operations, railroadmaintenanceind construction, highway constructionand maintenance, highway regulation, and operationof all transport modes including pipelines.

Traff ic Management

Tr&c management for the MOD is the respon-sibility of the Central Military Transportation Direc-

torate (VOSO). The VOSO is subordinate at MOD levelto the Chief of the Rear. They are responsible formanagement of defense transportation requirementsusing military and civilian resources. The VOSO hasst& elements down to army level. These elementsadvise chiefs of the rear services on transportationplanning requirements. The VOSO elements collocatewith civil transport authorities at rail, water, and airfacilities and assist them in developing transportationplans. The VOSO officers at various transport

ierminals, stations, and installations are assigned as"military commandants." They exercise garrison com-manders' functions for the facility.

Sovie t Union has 83,000 mi les o f ra i lway t rack

of wh ich over 20,000 mi les are e lectric .Rai l roads are the pr inc ipa l means of t rans-po r t i ng mi l i ta ry ha rdwa re f rom th e USSR.

66-85% FREIGHT

TRAFFIC

50% PASSENGER

TRAFFIC

R a i l w a y s y s t e mhand les f rom 66 to85 pe rcen t o f thef re igh t t ra ff i c and 5 0p e r c e n t o f t h epassenger t ra f f ic .

In t ime o f w ar t he mi l i ta ry ra i l t ransport s ta f f o ft h e front ch ie f o f the rear p lans and d i rects ra i lsh ipmen ts and movements.

transport at front level is responsible, through yard

and regulating elements, for dispatch of supplies fromrail stations to army logistic bases.

does not have to support itself. Thefmnt or army has

the support mission for the divisions.Besides military transportation, he Soviets intend to

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


Motor Transport

Extensive use of motor transport begins at front

level. If rail transport facilities are available atm n t ,

they are used with motor transport used at army level.

Motor transport units are organic to Soviet ground

forces fromfront to battalion levels. The normal sizes

of motor transport units are as follows:Front. Motor transport brigade.

Army. Motor transport regiment.

Dikision. Motor transport battalion.

Regiment. Motor transport company.Battalion.Motor transport section with the supply

platoon.Company.No specific motor transport section.

The primary means of delivery below army level is by

truck. The priority given to the movement of ammuni-

tion is shown by the two ammunition transportcompanies in the motor transport battalion at division

level. These companies have 60 URAL-375 trucks with

each having a 4.5-ton carrying capacity and GO cargo

trailers with a similar carrying capacity. These trucks

have all-wheel drive ( 6 X 6), giving them an off-road

capability that is well suited for frontline ammunition

delivery.

The petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) transport

company has the same basic truck as the ammunition

company. The POL version of the URAL-375 has a

5,550-liter tank with a 4,200-liter tank mounted on a

trailer. The POL company has 80 trucks and 80 trailers.

The other company in the battalion is the cargo

transport company. This company has about 60

medium and light cargo trucks. Its mission is to deliver

items of supply other than ammunition and bulk fuel.

A major strength of Soviet motor transport is the

great quantity and extensive use of trailers. Loaded

trailers are pulled forward to fighting units andexchanged for empty trailers. The empty trailers are

returned to rear logistic bases for reloading. In this

manner, fighting units maintain maximum quantities

of critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel.

At army level, the Soviets have one or more motor

transport regiments, with perhaps 1,000 plus trucks

per regiment that can be used to support subordinate

divisions. This massive amount of transport at army and

j k n t levels upholds the Soviet concept of "delivery

forward." This concept allows the chief of the rear atthese levels the flexibility to mass logistic support

assets to the engaged divisions. As a result, the division

use motor transport vehicles from the civilian sector.

They also mobilize reserve transportation units called

avtokolonnas. The avtokolonnas are drawn from the

civilian economy to make up for shortages in military

units. The individuals in the avtokolonnas are

experienced drivers with their own trucks and tool

kits. They drive their own trucks in the armed forces

and return to civilian life following demobilization.

Second echelon unit logistic elements support fmtechelon units. This practice increases the transport

capability for logistic support to the first echelon

regiments and divisions. Logistic bases can be located

deeper in the front or army rear areas. This placement

reduces congestion in the main combat area, but

requires long lines of communication that could be

likely targets for enemy air interdiction strikes.

To assist in control of their huge numbers of

vehicles, the Soviets have special traffic control

elements. The personnel of these units are trained

traffic regulators equipped with black uniforms, white

belts, gauntlets, helmets, signal flags, and wands. They

are positioned along march routes at critical points to

direct column movement. Because maps are sensitive,

restricted documents in the Soviet military, traffic

regulators are critical to vehicular movements.

Demand for POL will not diminish in the future,and

Soviet development of tactical pipeline construction

units is designed to meet this need. Construction ofpipelines as far forward as possible will allow the

Soviets to decrease their reliance on motor transport

of POL.

Weaknesses

The Soviet transportation system is not without

weaknesses. Due to differences in rail gauges between

the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Soviets have to trans-

load at the border. They have organized the necessaryequipment and personnel to conduct transloading

operations. However, it is still highly likely that during

peak trafEc periods delays will be experienced at these

border locations.

Traffic congestion also would be intense in the rear

since masses of wheeled vehicles move supplies to the

frontline units. Overtasking ofvehicles s normal under

certain conditions. During the offensive, vehicles

might be overloaded 75 percent for cross-country

movement and 100 percent on hard-surface roads.This overtasking leads to rapid vehicle malfunction and

breakdown.

MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY 1

Forward positioning of maintenance and recovery on higher-level maintenance units t o provide direct responsibility for specific commodities. In many unitsoperations provides effective support for the high- and backup support. this individual is the deputy commander of technicalspeed tempo of Soviet combat operations. Lower-level Maintenance responsibility above battalion level is matters. The arrangement of command and technical

units have limited maintenance capability and depend commodit y oriented.A staffofficer at each level has the channels for this system is shown in figure below.

Staff and Repair/Maintenance Unit Responsibilities

EC H ELO N S

Tank/Tracked Vehicle

Maintmancr

Mot or Vehicle/Tractor

Maintenance

T Y PE U N I T S / S Y S T E M S R E Q U I R I N G M A I N T E N A N C E

Missiles/Artil lery

Maintenance

Engineer

Maintenance

Signal

Maintenance

Chemical

Maintenance

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FRONT/ARMY

Staff point

of contact

Chief main

responsible

units

Armor

maintenance

battalion

Tracked vehicle

maintenance

company

Tankhack

repair platoon

maintenance

company

Battalion repair/

evacuation group

Battalion repair

workshop

Driver/crew

maintenance

Battalion repair

workshop

Battalion repair/

evacuation group

Driver/crew

maintenance

StaH point

of contact

IRONT - Up to 600 km tank director

responsible

units

Chief motor

vehicle/tractw

director (front)

Deputy commander

of technical

matters (Army)

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

From FEBA

' :EDlVlSlON20-70 km

From FEBA

REGlMENT20-70 km

From FEBA

BATTALION20-70 kmFrom FEBA

COMPANY20-70 km

From FEBA

Wheeled vehicle

maintenance

battalion

Wheeled vehicle

maintenance

company

Motor vehicle

repair platoon

maintenance

company

Supply and

maintenance

section, motor

transport company

Battalion repair/

evacuation group

Battalion Repair

workshop

Driver/crew

maintenance

Supply and

maintenancesection motor

transport Company

Battalion repar

workshop

Battalion repalrl

evacuation group

Oriver/crew

maintenance

(front)

Deputy commander

of technical

matters (Army)

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Staff pointof contact

Chief of

rocket troops

and artillery

Chief of rocket

and artillery

armament

services

Chief of

artillery

Weapons

maintenance

supervisor

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

responsible

units

Artillery

ordnance

maintenance

battalion

Ordnance

maintenance

company

Weapons/

ordnance

maintenance

company

Battalion repair

workshop

Battalion repacr

workshop

Staff point

of contact

Chief of

engineers

Division

engineer

Regimental

engineer

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

r e s p o m l l e

units

Engineer

brigade/

regiment

Maintenance

platoon

engineer

battalion

Engineer

company

Regimental

engineer

company

Regimental

engineer

company

Staff point

of contact

responsible

units

Chigf of

sigvals

-Division

signal

officer

~edrnental

chief of

signals

Communications

platoon

leader

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Staff point

of contact

Radio battalion

Wire battalion

Signal regiment/

brigade

Supply and

maintenance

company

Signal battalion

Signal company

Comunications

platoon

Battalion

communications

platoon

responsible

units

Chief of

signals

Chief of

chemicals

Regimental

chemical

officer

Chemical

warfare

instructor

Deputy commander

of technical

matters

Chemical

defense

battalion

Division

chemical

defense

battalion

Chemical

defense

company

Regimental

chemical

defense company

Regimental

chemical

defense company

Maintenance Facilities

Maintenance facilities in the field are provided forthe following items of equipment:

OrganizationalMaintenance Capabilities

Company Level. Only driver and crew preventivemaintenance and routine inspections are conducted at

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Tracked vehicles.Wheeled vehicles.Artillery and ordnance.Engineer equipment.Signal equipment.Chemical equipment.

Service for these items is provided by fvred andmobile repair facilities that extend repair capabilitiesforward into the battle area

Vehicle Repair

The Soviets classify repairs as routine, medium, orcapital.

Routine Repairs. Replacement, adjustment, orrepair of individual components that can be madewithin a short time. Major components are not dis-assembled. This category is performed at levels belowdivision.

Medium Repairs. Major overhaul of at least two

basic asemblies. This category of maintenance isperformed at regimental o r division level.

Capital Repairs. Major overhaul or complete dis-assembly of a piece of equipment. This is the mostextensive category of maintenance and can be

performed at army and front levels.In wartime, the types of repair that are performed at

each level depend on the tactical situation. Generally,they are of a lesser degree than in peacetime.

Technical Services

The Soviets also use periodic checks of equipmentknown as technical services. Examples of a technicalsenice for a tank are:

Routine iqectwn. Conducted before tank

movement as a preoperational check and takes 40minutes.

Preuentive maintenance swvice number I . Con-ducted after tank movement and at 100- to 150-kilometer intervals during a long road march. This

company level.

Battalion Level. The repair workshop contains ashop truck and four mechanics who make routinerepairs on tracked and wheeled vehicles. In combat,this repair workshop can be reinforced with a vehicle

recovery section.

Regimental Level. The maintenance company per-forms routine and some medium repair functions.Motorized rifle and tank regiments have both wheeledand tracked vehicle workshops. Each of these elementsmay form repair and evacuation groups (REGS) to,provide support to subordinate battalions.

Division Level. The maintenance battalion iscomposed of a headquarters company; tracked vehiclemaintenance company; wheeled vehicle maintenancecompany; ordnance maintenance company; andspecial task, recovery, and supply and sen ice platoons.Within the companies, there are shop vans, supplytrucks, tank retrievers, and tow trucks. Both routine

and medium repairs may be performed. In combat,these companies establish damaged vehicle repair andcollection points that are similar to regimental REGS.

Army Level. Combined arms and tank armies havetheir maintenance capabilities augmented byfmnt as

required. Army units can provide mobile detachmentsfor forward operations if necessary.

Front Level. Fmnt maintenance units are mannedand equipped for capital repairs. These units operatefrom fixed facilities or mobile detachments.

Maintenance Responsibilities

The chief of missile and artillery armament atregiment and above is responsible for the maintenance

of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery,and missiles. Motorized rifle and tank regimentsusually have two or three armorers to perform lightrepair on smallarms nd on some automatic weapons.Armorers in artillery regiments can d o routine mainte-

mobile repair shop for maintenance of artilleryweapons. It can perform electrical welding andriveting, disassembly and assembly of mechanical andoptical parts, and adjustment of fire controlequipment. Atfront level, the artillery repair capability

damaged item, it is evacuated to either army or@ntfor necessary maintenance. Higher-level unit transpor-tation assets accomplish the evacuation.

If evacuation from lower to higher echelons is notpossible, vehicles may be left along specified evacua-

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includes complete overhauling of some types andcapital repairs on the heaviest types of artillery.

A signal company is found at regimental level. Theoperators repair signal equipment, when possible.Radio, telephone, and radar units generally have sometesting equipment and spare parts for routine repairs.Medium repairs are done at division level. Signal repair

units perform capital repairs at army level and higher.Engineer and chemical equipment maintenance andrepair are accomplished in the same manner as signalequipment at division and higher echelons.

Recovery and Repair During Combat

During battle, a technical observation point (TOP)is established in the forward area of each combatbattalion. The purpose is to monitor the battlefield for

damage, to assist crews, and to call repair and recoveryunits forward.

The TOP is composed of several vehicle operators,one or more mechanics, a medic. the battalion NBCinstructor, and at least one combat engineer. It issupervised by the deputy commander for technicalmatters. The entire go u p is mounted in an APC withradios and night vision devices. The TOP maintainsradio contact with the battalion commander and withrecovery and repair elements. Company TOPS maybeestablished if the battle area is beyond observationrange of the main TOP.

The chief of the TOP will assess the nature ofdamage and status of the crew of an out-of-servicevehicle and initiate action to recover the vehicle andaccomplish repairs. Ifrepairs can be made in 5hours orless, the battalion repair and evacuation group (REG)repairs the vehicle on site or evacuates it to the REGrepair and evacuation site. A REG usually is composed

of one tracked recovery vehicle, a tank repair work-shop van, and a parts truck. Regimental REGS may be

used to support a specitic battalion ifrequired. Repairpriorities are based on the required repair time, withequipment requiring the least time for repairs beingcompleted fmt .

~ q u i ~ m e n that requires more than 5hours to repairis taken along an ewcuation route to the regimentalREG. The division evacuates vehicles or equipmentdamaged beyond the repair capability or capacity of

the regiment t o the division's damaged vehicle collec-tion point. If the division is unable to repair the

tion routes to await mobile maintenance teams whichprovide direct or backup support. The higher unit'steam will remain to complete repairs as the lower unitsmove forward in support of continuing combat opera-tions. A major goal of the mcu at io n process is to cleardamaged equipment from avenues of approach offollow-on combat units.

Weaknesses

Anafysis of the Soviet maintenance concept revealssome possible weaknesses. First, their centralizedcontrol may be a substitute for poor low-level repaircapability.

Second, divisions are heavily dependent on backupmaintenance support from higher levels. Duringextended combat engagements, division maintenance

units could not keep up with repair requirementswithout backup support from army or front level.Therefore, it is critical to keep the evacuation routesand lines of communication open from division tohigher levels.

Third, there are no dedicated mechanics at companylevel. Should a damaged vehicle's operator or crew beincapacitated, the company must rely totally onmaintenance support from battalion or higher level.

MEDICAL SUPPORT

The Soviet military medical system provides supportto the ground forces under the direction of the CentralMilitary Medical Directorate of the Ministry ofDefense. The Central Directorate supervises thesupplying of medical equipment and the training ofmedical personnel. Besides the peace and wartimeprograms directly related to the active armed forces,

the system ties in with the civil sector in screeninghealth records of draft-age youth and in performingnatural disaster relief functions.

The two principal missions of the military medicalservice in combat are the evacuation and treatment ocasualties, and thepreventlon of disease in thearea of

operations. Other missions of the military medicalservice plans for and provides medical support to thearmed forces, and supervises troop unit medicaltraining programs. They organize and direct military

medical research, and publish articles on militarymedical subjects. The military medical service also has

responsibility for monitoring and maintaining

adequate health conditions within the area of combat

operations. The primary concern of this activity in thefield is the prevention of epidemic disease within the

ranks. The medical service is further responsible for

medical support units of battalions and regiments that

may redeploy several times during a 24-hour period.

Repeated forward redeployment of medical units andcontinuous rearward aacuation of casualties demand

close cpordination between medical levels and

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the combat readiness of the militarymedical staff of the

armed forces. The staff is divided into the following

categories: military physicians,fel'dshers (physicians'

assistants), pharmacists (technical medical staff), and

medical corpsmen (company medical staff).

In wartime, each command level of the Soviet Army

from company to front has organic medical support

units or personnel. At each level, medical support unitsare subordinate to both the combat unit commander,

or his deputy commander for the rear, and to the next

higher level of the military medical service. For

example, the battalionfel 'dsk is subordinate to both

the battalion commander and to the regimental senior

physician. However, the senior physician at the next

higher level advises only on questions of medical

support and organization. This system responds to the

needs of combat units and allows close coordination

between medical levels for the treatment and evacua-

tion of casualties.

DoctrineSoviet doctrine divides the range of medical treat-

ment into three categories. The first category of pro-

cedures includes only mandatory lifesaving measures.

The second category includes procedures to prevent

severe complications of wounds or injuries. The finalcategory of treatment includes procedures that willbe

accomplished only when there is a low casualty load

and reduced enemy activity.

In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical

support system, Soviet doctrine emphasizes the

importance of "self-help" and mutual aid among indi-

vidual soldiers. Each soldier is equipped with a packet

of field dressings and an NBC protection kit. He also

receives a required number of hours of first-aid

training each year. The concept of self-helpand mutualaid extends beyond the battlefield to the casualty

collection points and the battalion medical point. It is

intended to reduce the demands made on trained

medical personnel, particularly when the use of NBC

weapons results in a sudden and massive influx of

casualties.

The focus of Soviet combat doctrine on high-speed

offensive operations calls for a highly mobile medical

support system. Its component units must be capable

of repeated forward deployment with a minimum lossof efficiency. Mobility is particularly important for

medical and combat commanders.

Soviet combat medical doctrine stresses the timely

return of recuperated sick and wounded to their units.

Consequently, at each stage of evacuation medical per-

sonnel- detain and accommodate those casualties

whose expected recovery period falls within pre-

scribed limits. Only casualties whose prognoses

indicate extended recovery periods reach a front orhome-country hospital. Medical personnel also super-

vise the selection and preparation of grave sites topre-

clude health hazards. Responsibilities for burial,

however, fall on other rear Grvices personnel.

The basic principle of Soviet combat medical

support is multistage evacuation with minimum

treatment at each level. From company throughfront,

each level has specific responsibilities for the care of

the sick and wounded. Besides treating the wounded,

medical personnel handle virtually all of their own

administration, especially at the lower levels. As

casualties move through the combat evacuation

system, medical personnel at each level make effective

use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the

wounded (triage). They treat the lightly wounded

who can be returned to combat and those casualties

who would not survive further evacuation without

immediate medical attention. The Soviets emphasize

that major medical treatment should be performed atan army-level mobile field hospital.

In combat operations, the military medical service

recognizes four levels of administration and medical

care below front level: company and battalion,

regiment, division, and army.

Company and Battalion Medical SupportCompany and battalion medical personnel make up

the immediate battlefield support. Their primaryconcerns are locating and collecting casualties and

providing first aid before evacuation to the regimental

medical point. Each company or battery normally has

one medical corpsman.Afel'dsher may be attached to

the company when heavy casualties are anticipated

The company commander or platoon leaders,with the

assistance of the medical corpsman, select and train

enlisted personnel to serve as orderlies or stretcher

bearers. Each platoon has a minimum of two orderlies.

Medical personnel accompany the combat units in acombat vehicle or other available transport. If separate

Schematic of the Soviet Army's Combat Medical Support

Collection & first aid

Supported by:

Feldsher

medical corpsmen

R E G I M E N T D I V I S I O N ARMY

I IFirst treatment by a Treatment by physician and

II Specialized medical treatment! physician if necessary ! minor surgery II I

Supported by: Supported by: Supported by.

I hree physicians I Medical battalion Hospital base

1 Dentist I Independent medical detachments II wo feldshers I from Army II Two medical corpsmen I

LE GE ND:

Frontline transport

@ Ambulance

/?\ Battalion medical point

Regimental medical point

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evacuation hospitals

I I I

medical transport is not available, the medical corps-

man accompanies the command element. The soldierstrained as orderlies ravel with their squads or crews. Ifthe regimental senior physician has allocated addi-tional personnel and evacuation transport to abattalion, the battalion commander may in turnaugment company medical personnel and transport.

Duties of the company medical corpsman includemonitoring personal hygiene, inspecting the companyarea for health hazards, and supervising sanitary andantiepidemic measures. He also instructs the troops in

first aid and the use of their individual medical

equipment.Before a combat operation, the battalion fel'dshw

informs the corpsmen of arrangements for the evacua-tion of the wounded. This information includes thelocation of casualty collection points and the coordi-nation of available medical evacuation transport.A fel'hher, a medical corpsman, an orderly, and a

driver form the nucleus of the battalion medical point.The point is located 1.5 to 3KM behind the FEBA.Depending on the number of additional medical

transport vehicles assigned, several driver and order&

teams also may senT e he battalion.Battalion medical personnel collect casualties from

the companies and provide minimum treatmentbefore evacuation to the regimental medical point.Casualties remain at the battalion medical point for avery short time. The battalion fel'dsher serves as thechief of the battalion medical point and organizes andsupervises battlefield medical operations. Besidesmonitoring t he health conditions in the battalion, hedirects ambulance teams manned by orderlies in the

@ Landing field

Q edical clearing point

I

( ospital for the lightly wounded

Medical battalion

Division medical point

lndependent medical detachment

(not deployed)

lndependent medical detachment

(deployed)

A Mobile field hospital

u

SS Specialized Surgical

ID Infectious Disease

N Neurological

T Therapeutic

NOTE: Soviet symbols used throughout.

evacuation of wounded from the company collection

points.The battalion medical corpsman's duties are demand-ing. He provides medical treatment to the woundedand supervises the orderlies at the battalion medicalpoint. He also participates in medical reconnaissancefor the battalion, assists in removing the wounded fromthe battlefield, and monitors radiation levels at thebattalion medical point. He directs decontaminationoperations, carries out antiepidemic measures, anddistributes supplies under the fel'&ber's direction.

13-19

Regimental Medical Support

At regimental medical points, the seriously

wounded are examined and provisionally treated by a

physician. The regimental senior physician is amember of the commander's staff and serves as the

administrative medical officer for the regiment. He

fel'dsbw may also check dressings and administer

analgesics.

Each regimental medical point also has an isolationsection and a decontamination section. ?he isolation

section, staffed by an orderly, accommodates those

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usually does not practice as a physician at the regi-

mental medical point. The chief of the medical point is

subordinate directly to the regimental senior

physician. He directs and participates in the medical

treatment of casualties. There are two additional

officers, a junior physician and a dentist. Additional

medical personnel assigned to the regimental medical

point include twofel'dsbers, two medical corpsmen, a

pharmacist, seven orderlies, and four ambulance

drivers. Support personnel serving the medical point

include an electrical mechanic, a radio operator, and a

field kitchen staff.

The duties of the regimental senior physician before

enemy contact are extensive. He must know the

regiment's objective and the desired organization of

the rear services. He receives instructions from the'

division senior physician with regard to augmentationand the replenishment of medical supplies.I

The major elements of the regimental medical point

are reception and sorting, dressing, and evacuation.

Other elements are a disinfectionldecontamination

area and an isolation area.

The physician at the receiving and sorting element is

usually the chief of the medical point. Medical order-

lies and a registrar are selected from the lightly

wounded to assist him. As the chief of the medical

point receives casualties who have passed through thesorting point, he divides them into four categories:

those who require immediate medical attention at the

regimental medical point; those who are to be

evacuated to the next medical echelon with little or no

treatment; those who are lightly wounded who will

remain at the medical point and return to dutywithin 3to 5 days; and those for whom medical treatment is

futile. Within the receiving and sorting element, anti-

biotics, antitoxins, and antidotes are provided only to

casualties with NBC injuries.The major part of the medical treatment provided in

the regimental medical point takes place in the

dressing area under the direction of the junior regi-

mental physician and dentist.

The evacuation element of the regimental medical

point occupies an area of 15 to 20 square meters. It

consists of separate holding areas for the stretcher-

borne and for the ambulatory wounded. Afel'dsher

supervises the evacuation element according to

instructions from the medical point chief concerning

evacuation priorities and modes of transportation. The

suspected of having contracted contagious diseases.

Such casualties remain in isolation at the medical point

until they can be evacuated to a specialized field

hospital or a higher-level isolation facility.

Regimental Medical Treatment

TREATMENT OF

PHYSICAL WOUNDS:

Arrest of external bleeding.Treatment for shock, including inject ions.Performance of t racheotomy.Closed heart massage and/or intracardial

inject ion.

Catheterization.Emergency ampu tat ion.Primary dressing of burns.Removal of radioact ive substances from

gastrointest inal t ract.

TREATMENT OF

CHEMICAL AGENT CASUALTIES:

lnject io n of ant idotes.Art i f ic ial respirat ion and oxygen therapy.

Treatment for pulmona ry edema.lnject io n of gastr ic lavage.Adm inis t rat ion of absorbents.

TREATMENT OF

BACTERIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES:

Isolation.Placement of protect ive mask on each

infected soldier.Adm i n i s t r a t ion o f an t i b i o t i c s and s u l -

fani lamide.

TREATMENT OF

LOWEST PRIORITY:

Spl int improvement .Treatment of extensive soft-t issue wounds

and in jur ies to large jo ints or nerve t runks.Provis ion of nova caine blocks for shock.lnject io n of analgesics.Transfus ion therapy for second- and th i rd-

degree shock.lnject ion of ant ibiot ics and ant i toxins.

Division M edical SupportXtw primary combat mission of the medicul

battalionis

the akployment and operation ofthe

diuision medical point. Before reaching this level,

casualties receive only the most basic medical treat-

ment. Even at division level, only minor surgical opera-

point deploys approximately 12 kilometers from the

FEBA during offensive operations or some 20kilometers when in defense. It normally deploys along

the main supply route and uses existing structures

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


tions can be performed due to limited personnel and

facilities. Any major operations must be deferred until

the casualty reaches an army-level mobile field

hospital.

The division senior physician commands the

medical battalion of each combat division. As with the

regimental physician, the division senior physicianoccupies a primarily administrative post, assuming

responsibility for the overall supervision of division

medical support. He also serves on the division com-

mander's staff. His immediate subordinate, the chief of

the division medical point, serves on the staE of the

deputy commander for the rear.

The division medical battalion contains the

following elements:

Headquarters.

Medical company, which contains a surgicalplatoon, an internal medicine platoon, a receiving and

evacuation platoon, a resuscitation section, a dental

section, a pharmacy section, a morgue.

Collection and evacuation company.

Disinfection and decontamination platoon.

I Transport platoon.I Supply and service platoon.

The medical company forms the operational core of

the division medical point. The medical company has

at least three surgeons, a therapist, and a stomatologist

(mouth specialist) on its staff. The disinfection and

decontamination platoon is staffed with an epi-

demiologist and a toxicologist. It supervises the treat-

ment of casualties who have infectious diseases and-

with the field laboratory facilities-monitors the bio-

logical environment. The personnel of the collection

and evacuation company are used to augment both

regiment and battalion casualty collection efforts. The

primary mission of the transport platoon is evacuationof casualties from the regiment to the division. At the

discretion of the division senior physician, personnel

and vehicles from this section may assist in battlefield

casualty collection and evacuation. The supply and

service platoon has responsibility for the reception,

storage, distribution, and replenishment of medical

and food supplies for the division and subordinate

medical units.

The division medical point is designed to handle up

to 400 casualties per 24-hour period. Casualties areexpected to reach the division medical point Erom the

battlefield within 12 to 18 hours. The division medical

point requires an area 150 meters square. The

receiving and sorting facilities deploy &itst, closely

followed by the disinfection and decontamination

facilities and the operating area The dressing station

and hospital accommodations receive the next

priority. The evacuation section, the medical supply

point, and the medical personnel accommodationsmake up the final stage of deployment. Full deploy-

ment requires approximately 2 to 3 hours.

The initial steps of division sorting remain the same

as at the regimental level. Casualtieswho present ahazard to others because of NBC contamination are

sent to the decontamination or isolation area. ?h ephysician at the receiving and sorting area divides the

patients into the same four general categories as wasdone at regimental level. Though the majority of

wounded continue evacuation through the medical

point with only minimal treatment, more casualties

remain for treatment and/or convalescence than is thecase at the regimental medical point. The larger staff

and facilities permit a broader range of medical

treatment, but the rate of casualties and the battle

conditions determine the extent.

The Soviets stress the need for rapid and efficient

performance of battlefield medicine in the event of

massNBC

casualties. ?he facilities and organizationalarrangements for the treatment ofNBC casualties that

exist at every command level indicate Soviet antici-

pation and preparation for combat in an NBC

environment.

As with the battalion and regimental medical points,the division medical point maintains close contact

with advancing combat units. Soviet doctrine calls for

movement by echelon to accomplish the necessary

forward deployment while still providing an accept-

able level of care for the incoming wounded and non-transportable casualties.As many of the personnel andas much equipment as can be spared are moved to the

next deployment area. The division senior physician

coordinates with the army chief of medical service in

arranging for the transfer of the casualty flow to

another division medical point or an independent

medical detachment.

Army-Level Medical SupportAt army level, there are two types of medical support

elements: the independent medical detachment and

13-21

the mobile field hospital. Independent medical

detachments are medical battalions under the com-

mand of the army chief of medical service. He uses

these units to augment the division medical battalions

in the event of mass-casualty situations. Independent

forward of the hospital base. Here physicians examine

casualties aboard each ambulance and, if the nature of

their injuries permits, routes the ambulance directly to

the appropriate mobile field hospital.

The evacuation hospital deploys in the rear of the

8/8/2019 FM 100-2-2 July 1984


medical detachments also ease the burden on division

medical points during forward deployment. When an

independent medical detachment deploys, the army

chief of medical service informs the regimental and

division senior physicians of the deployment so that

casualty evacuation can be diverted when necessary.

7;bepnpntnutyedical support unit at army leuel isthe mobilefield hospital. The army-level mobile field

hospitals form the fourth administrative level of the

military medical service. This is the first level of the

combat evaucation system capable of doing major

surgery and giving extended care. 'Ihese hospitals are

mobile and capable of forward deployment. They con-

stitute the largest and most extensive military medical

facilitywith this capability. These and other army-level

hospitals generally are organized into a hospital base

that deploys along the major evacuation route from thedivision medical points and independent medical

detachments. This base may include any or all of the

following types of hospitals:

Mobile field hospitals: infection and disease,

specialized surgical, neurological, therapeutic.

Sorting hospital.Hospital for the lightly wounded.

Evacuation hospital.

The hospital base deploys close to the FEBA to allow

casualties to arrive from the battlefield within 24

hours. The individual mobile field hospitals deploy no

closer than 5 kilometers to one another to reduce the

effect of nuclear attack. Deployment of a specialized

mobile field hospital is accomplished within 2 to 4

hours after arrival at the deployment area. It is in these

hospitals that the majority of casualties, having passed

through subordinate echelons with minimum treat-

ment, receive specialized and intensive a r e . To make

such care easier, there are teams of medical specialistswith support personnel and equipment that can

augment the normal staff of a mobile field hospital.

These teams usually consist of surgical specialistssuch

as opthalmologists, neurosurgeons, and ear, nose, and

throat specialists.

In extreme circumstances, direct evacuation of

casualties is made from regiment, or even battalion, to

the hospital base. In this situation, the sorting hospital

deploys in the forward area of the hospital base to

receive, diagnose, and dispatch incoming wounded tothe appropriate mobile field hospital. The sorting

hospital establishes a medical distribution point

hospital base to treat casualties awaiting evacuation to

homecountry hospitals and to receive casualties from

the other mobile field hospitals. Aeromedical evacua-

tion, particularly by helicopter, will probably play an

important role. Helicopters can evacuate seriously

wounded troops directly from the battlefield to the

army hospital base, the lowest level capable of per-forming major surgery.

Soviet doctrine does not call for the frequent

redeployment of hospitals established at the frontlevel. These hospitals often are established in existing

military and civilian medical institutions. They receive

those casualties whose recuperation period exceeds

acceptable limits for the mobile field hospital.

REAR AREA SERVICESData available on rear area services are limited. The

Soviets consider these topics sensitive, and as a result

little information is available in open sources.

Personnel Replacements

The personnel replacement system is significant to

the Soviets because of the size of their forces. Per-

sonnel replacement during intensive combat opera-

tions in both conventional and nuclear environmentsi

has been the subject of much study by the Soviets.

Soviet personnel replacement procedures are struc-

tured on four levels: individual, incremental,

composite unit, and whole unit.

Individual Replacements. This system is used in

both peacetime and wartime. It appears to be most

applicable in the officer, some NCO, and specialist

,assignments. The sources of replacement personnelare school graduates, reserve assignments, medical

returnees, and normal reassignments.

Incremental Replacements. This system, datingfrom World War 11, replaces entire small units such as

weapon crews, squads, and platoons. Replacements

can be obtained from training units or from follow-on

forces.

Composite Unit Formations. When continuity ofthe mission is of paramount importance, composite

units may be formed from other units reduced by

combat operations. Composite units may be con-

stituted up to division or corps level.

Whole Unit Replacement. Since Soviet planners

first considered the mass casualties associated with

police. KGB and MVD elements provide some security

functions. An element known as the Commandant's

Service, or Komenrlatura, possesses some military

police-related functions. These functions include

traftic control, enforcement of military discipline, and

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nuclear war, this particular method has received

almost continuous study. Within this concept, entire

armies can be brought forward from second echelon

or reserve forces to replace first echelon forces

rendered ineffective. Passage of large units through

other forces to forward positions is a complex

operation that requires detailed planning and effectivecontrol. The Soviets are amrare of the problems

associated with such a maneuver.

Soviet planners realize that personnel replacement

requirements will encompass all of the above pro-

cedures. The Soviets receive semiannual experience in

both individual and bulk replacement operations. In

their troop rotation exercises, thousands of troops are

moved by both air and rail transport. The Soviet Union

devotes manpower and money to the retention of a

large reserve base that is updated constantly by troopsreleased from active duty. The Soviet reserve pool

consists of several million men with relatively recent

training. Finally, the Soviet Army maintains a system of

training units throughout its forces to train new

recruits, some reservists, and some specialists. Per-

sonnel services and replacement procedures are exer-

cised and evaluated frequently.

Civil AffairsIt is likely that activities involving Soviet forces and

citizens of other nations, in particular other Warsaw

Pact countries, are administered in wartime by Com-

munist Party and Soviet governmental organs, political

sections of Soviet military elements, and sections of

both the KGB (Committee of State Security) and the

MVD (Ministry of Internal AfTairs).

Military PoliceThe Soviet armed forces do not have a precise

military element that would equate to the US military

some civil affairs actions.

Prisoners of War and Civilian DetaineesThis subject is among the most sensitive issues to the

Soviets. Involvement of KGB, MVD, and political

organs is probable.

D E V E L O P M E N T A L T R E N D Sfi e main direction of i m v e m e n t s in the Soviet

seruice support system over thepast decade has beento increase mobility, efficiency,and ta&rdization.

The Soviets have tried to bring new technology and

improved management techniques into their service

support operations. These measures have led to large

increases in the "logistical tail."Prepa cwng and containerization of supplies into

standard units of issue have been initiated to reduce

handling and delivery time. Computers have been

introduced to allow the chief of the rear at operational

and strategic levels to evaluate his resources andassetsquickly for a proposed operation. He can formulate

support plans which optimally support the com-

mander's concept of operations and respond to the

support requirements generated by rapid changes in

the battlefield situation.

Railway facilities have been improved Also,

increasing emphasis is being placed on the use of

aerial, automotive, and pipeline delivery.

Some apparent disparities exist between rear area

theory and practice. Soviet doctrine calls for the con-

tinuation of combat operations at night. It also pre-

scribes nighttime as the primary time for combat units

to replenish their ammunition, fuel, food, and other

supplies. However, Soviet writers frequently note thedifficulties in accomplishing nighttime link-up

between support and advancing supported units in

field exercises.

CHAPTER 14

REAR AREA PROTECTION

In the Soviet view, rear area protection and security

comprise the comprehensive coordination of more

,* Emergency use of weapons and equipment under-

going repair (crews generally remain with equipment

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than just the rear of military forces in contact with the

enemy. The Soviets also believe that general war willinvolve more than the armed forces fighting along

i established front lines. A future large-scale war,whether conventional or nuclear, will include wide-

spread espionage, sabotage, infiltration, airborne and

amphibious operations, and massive destruction thatwill occur throughout the nation. So total war willinvolve the total population.

The Soviets have established an extensive and

encompassing program of organizations and pro-

cedures to conduct rear area security. Security andprotection of the rear area is critical. It includes

vital installations, airfields, communications and

transportation nets, critical industries, strategicweapons, and large troop formations. In the event

of a large-scale general war, this program wouldimmediately go into operation insuring, among other

things, the following:Rear area security and protection of combat,

combat support, and combat service support units and

areas of operation.Security and protection of lines of communication.Security and protection of borders and coastlines.

Mobilization of reserves.

Civil defense.

Suppression of local insurgents.Defense against airborne attack.

Defense against unconventional warfare

(including saboteurs, partisans, and propaganda).Damage control.

UNIT SECURITY

All units, fkom the smallest through front level,are responsible for-the security of their own rearareas. In larger organizations (regiment and up),

elements of the second echelon have most of theresponsibility for security. Organic personnel and

equipment carry out basic security and damage con-

trol in the rear area. Appropriate measures includethe following:

Comprehensive security plans.Locating support units near combat troops for

added protection.

Temporary assignment of combat units to securitymissions (usually second echelon elements).

Employment of guards, sentries, and patrols.

during repair).Use of convalescent sick and wounded for defense

during critical situations.

At army and front level, electronic warfare and air

defense elements are located to provide thoroughcoverage of the entire area of operations. Combat

support and combat service support elements alsohave rear area security responsibilities from the rear

area of units in contact to the rear boundary.

KGB TROOPS

Besides its major role in intelligence activities, the

Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsible for

border security and special communications. In theevent of an enemy invasion, the KGB border guard

detachments would fight delaying actions untilrelieved by ground forces units. Conversely, during a

Soviet offensive, border guard missions would include

securing the operational armies' rear, conductingcounterespionage, forestalling desertions, thwarting

deep enemy penetrations, and conducting mop-upoperations in the rear area.

MV D TROOPS

Interior troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

(MVD) are primarily responsible for maintaining

domestic security. Missions in the civilian sectorinclude criminal investigation, motor vehicle inspec-tion and control, and issuance of visas. In wartime, theyalso have the missions to suppress insurrection, to

conduct counterespionage,and to transport prisoners.

KGB and MVD troops are organized, equipped, andtrained much the same as Soviet ground forces, but

special attention is given to security functions. Ingeneral, KGB and MVD troops are considered to be

extremely reliable and are very well trained.

MILITARY DISTRICTS

The 16 Soviet military districts are administrativecommands which do not correspond to the politicalboundaries of the Soviet Union's 15 republics. In

wartime, the assets of many military districts probably

would be organized into fronts, providing both thecommand and control structure and units for combat

operations.

Military activity within a military district continues,however, wen when troop units are deployed else-where. Military installations such as schools andgarrisons, and operations such as logistics and com-munications would continue to function, and in

Civilian civil defense formations insure a potentiallyvaluable labor force for the Soviets. They are also asource for intelligence gathering, particularly in areasthreatened by airborne or seaborne attack, guerrilla orpartisan activity, or large-scale invasion.

Civil defense receives extensive propaganda treat-

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certain instances, even be augmented.Military district mobilization plans cover not only

units, installations, and activities of the district, but alsothe call-up of reserves. Reserve call-up is selective topermit orderly activation and to insure an adequatelabor force for critical civilian occupations. Civil

defense activities also are conducted through themilitary district command structure.

Overall civil defense of the Soviet Union is directedby a Deputy Minister of Defense. Civil defense troops,numbering approximately 40,000,are a branch of theSoviet military under the command ofthe Chief of CivilDefense. They are subordinate to deputy commanders

for civil defense in the 16military districts.Most civil defense efforts involve organization and

training for survival, rescue, repair, and restoration.?he intent is to involve the Soviet population. Civildefense is one of several means of involving the popu-lation in disciplined activity and of keeping them awareof the ever-present "threat" posed by the enemies ofthe Soviet Union.

Perhaps 70 percent of workers engaged in vitalindustry belong to civil defense organizations. Their

principal objectives are:To prevent panic.To maintain law and order.To maintain agricultural and industrial

production.To insure organized decontamination.

Civil defense activities involve over thirty millionpeople and are closely tied to the overall war and sur-vim1 effort. Organized and trained personnel, con-trolled by the government, will be capable of at leastthe following activities:

Fire fighting.First aid.Camouflage of industrial targets.Chemical defense and decontamination.Damage control.Rescue.Public order and safety.Communication and warning.

Evacuation.Reconnaissance.Radiological monitoring and decontamination.

ment in the Soviet media. There is civil defense trainingin schools, for housewives, and for retirees besides thetraining given in factories and civil defense formations.

However, Soviet civil defense programs have beencriticized for their lack of imagination, heavy ideolo-

gical (rather than practical) emphasis, lack of realism,poor quality instruction, inadequate planning, andpoor coordination. Many mass evacuation plans havenot been rehearsed for years, if at all. Nevertheless, theSoviet civil defense program reaches virtually everycitizen in the nation with at least minimal instructionand indoctrination. Despite widespread cynicism andapathy, the program is large and growing. It is probablythe most highly developed civil defense effort in theworld.

RESERVES

Soviet conscripts have a reserve obligation until age50. The total Soviet potential reserve manpower poolis estimated to be twenty fwe million men. About 6.8million of these men are young, recently-trainedveterans.

Soviet reservists are not organized in specific reserveunits. Instead, reservists called up for training report t o

existing active units. In the event of a large-scalemobilization, reservists will be assigned where irequired. Many would fill out low-strength divisionsand other units.

The Soviet reserve system provides a vast resource offormer servicemen. Younger and more recentlytrained personnel probably would be mobilized forcombat service. Older reservists easily could take overnumerous garrison, guard, and rear arearesponsibilities.

Given such vast numbers of men with prior militaryservice plus a citizenry which has received consider-able exposure to civil defense indoctrination andtraining, the Soviets can count on a population that ispotentially more aware and prepared, and that is usedto discipline. (For more information on Sovietreserves, see FM 100-2-3).

I NDUSTR I AL SURVI VAL

The Soviets expect to survive and to win any futurewar. To do this, special attent ion has been devoted to

protecting the industrial and technological base. Pro-

tective measures include dispersion of industrial

facilities, physical hardening of Eactories, stockpilingmaterials and parts, constructing shelters for workers,

and creating evacuation plans. Dispersion reduces

vulnerability but it also increases the transportation

over 14 and the Soviets claim about eighty million

members. DOSAAF stresses each citizen's obligation to

defend the Soviet Union. Its basic propaganda themesare patriotism and the external threat.

Major DOSAAF activities include sports, preinduc-

tion military training, and technical specialist training.

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problem and the security burden.

DOSAAF

The Voluntary Society of Assistance to the Army,

Aviation, and the Navy (DOW F) is yet another Soviet

organization that could play a role in rear area security

and protection. D O W s a paramilitary organization.

Its primary goals are producing a military-conscious

society, preparing the civilian population for military

emergencies, and preparing preinduction-age youth

for military service. Membership is open to anyone

Many reservists join DOSAAF to take advantage of the

latter activity, as it is a good way to acquire or improve

technical skills. DOSAAF activities are coordinated

with theKomsomol (Young Communist League) and

with civil defense organizations.

In practice, the DOSAAF program sometimes fails to

achieve its goals. It has a large, cumbersome bureau-

cracy. DOSAAF has been aitized in the Soviet press fori

indciency, inadequate coordination, and poor

quality instruction. The premilitary training program

sometimes is criticized for its lack of quality. (For more

information on DOSMF, see FM 100-2-3.)

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA A . . . . . . . . antiaircraft artillery. . . . . . . .A G .army artillery groupE M P . . . . . . . . electromagnetic pulseE S M . . . . . . . . . lectronic warfare support

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A A l C V . . . . . . airborne amphibious infantrycombat vehicle. . . . . . .C R V .artillery command andreconnaissance vehicle. . . . . . . .CV .armored command vehicle

A GI. . . . . . . . .

auxiliary intelligence gatherers. . . . . . . .IC V .amphibious in fantry combatvehicle

A M R P . . . . . . . artillery mobile reconnaissancepost

An-(no.) . . . . . Soviet designation for aircraftfrom Antonov design bureau

A P C - T . . . . . . . armor piercing cappedtracer round. . . . . .P I - T . . .armor piercing incendiary

tracer round. . . . . . . .P-T .armor piercing tracer roundAPVO . . . . . . . Aviation of National Air Defense. . . . .S-(no.) .US designation for Soviet

air-to-surface missileA S C . . . . . . . . armored scout carA S M . . . . . . . . . ir-to-surface missile. . . . . . . .S W .antisubmarine warfare. . . . .T-(no.) .US designation for Soviet

antitank guided missile

. . . . .T G M . . .antitank guided missileBAF . . . . . . . . . battalion assault force

(naval infantry)BV R . . . . . . . . . . eyond-visual-rangeCBU . . . . . . . . cluster bomb unit. . . . . . .E S . . .chief of engineer services. . . . . . .I N C . .commander-in-chiefC O M I N T . . . . communications intelligence

(US term). . . . . . . .O P .command observation postC R P . . . . . . . . . combat reconnaissance patrolCRTA . . . . . . . chief of rocket troops and

artilleryD A G . . . . . . . . .division artillery groupD F . . . . . . . . . . direction findingDO1 . . . . . . . . . date of introductionD O S A A F .... Voluntary Society of Assistance

to the Army, Aviation, and Navy(premilitary training organization)

D Z. . . . . . . . . . .

drop zone. . . . . . . . .C M electronic countermeasuresELINT . . . . . . . electronic intelligence (US term)

measures (US ter m)F A C . . . . . . . . . forwa rd air controllerFEBA . . . . . . . forward edge of the battle area

(US acronym used in this manualas the equivalent of the Soviet

term "forward edge")F O P . . . . . . . . . forwa rd observation postFrag-HE . . . . . fragmentation high-explosive

roundi

F R O G . . . . . . . free rocket over groundFS . . . . . . . . . . fin-stabilized round. . . . . . . . .SE .forw ard security element

(of the Advance Guard)GAZ-(no.) . . . mediu m truck produced by

Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant

G R U . . . . . . . . general staff's ma in intelligencedirectorate

HE . . . . . . . . . . .high-explosive roundHEAT . . . . . . . . igh-explosive antitank roundHE1 . . . . . . . . . .high-explosive incendiary roundHEP . . . . . . . . . . igh-explosive plastic roundH V A P . . . . . . . .hyper-velocity armor piercing

roundH V A P F S D S . .hyper-velocity armor piercing

fin-stabilized discarding Sabot

roundI F V . . . . . . . . . . infantry fighting vehicleIl-(no.) . . . . . . . Soviet designation for aircraft

from l lyushin design bureauI N A . . . . . . . . . information not available at the

UNCLASSIFIED levelIR . . . . . . . . . . . infraredI R B M . . . . . . . . ntermediate-range ballistic

missileI- T . . . . . . . . . . . ncendiary tracer roundKamAZ- (no. ) .medium truck produced by

Kama River Motor Vehicle PlantKGB . . . . . . . . Committee for State SecurityKrAZ-(no.) . . . heavy truck produced by

Kremenchug Motor Vehicle PlantL M G . . . . . . . . light machinegunL O C . . . . . . . . . line of communicationsL O P . . . . . . . . . lateral observation postLRA . . . . . . . . . long range aviation

LuAZ-(no.). .,

.light truck produced byLutsk Motor Vehicle PlantL Z . . . . . . . . . . . landing zone

Glossary-

. . .AZ-(no.) .heavy t ruck produced byMinsk M otor Vehic le Plant

MCLOS . . . . . .manual-command-to-line-of-

sight guidanceMi-(no.) . . . . . Soviet designat ion for hel icopter

f rom M i l des ign bureau

. . . . .ACLOS semiautomatic-command-to-line-

of-sight guidance

. . . . . . . . .AM surface-to-air missi le

. . . . . . . .hp.. .Shaf t horsepower. . . . . . . .LAR s ide- look ing a i rborne radar

. . . . . . . . . . .P self -propel led

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MiG-(no.) . . . Soviet designat ion for aircraf tf rom Mikoyan-Gurev ich des ignbureau

MOD. . . . . . . . Min is t ry of Defense; Minis terof Defense

MOD . . . . . . . Mobi le Obstac le Detachment(Engineer Element )MOP . . . . . . . . mobile observat ion postMPA . . . . . . . . M ai n Pol i tica l D irec torateMRBM . . . . . . .med ium-rang e ball is tic m iss i leMRD ........ motor ized r i f le d iv is ionMRL . . . . . . . . mult ip le rocket launcherMRR . . . . . . . .motor ized r i f le regimen tMSD . . . . . . . . movement support detachment

(engineer e lement )

MVD . . . . . . . . Min is t ry of Internal Af fa i rsOMG . . . . . . . . operat ional maneuver groupPOL . . . . . . . . . petroleum, oi ls, lubricantsPPO . . . . . . . . . pr imary par ty organizationPGM . . . . . . . . .prec is ion-guided muni t ionsPVO.. . . . . . . . ai r defensePWP . . . . . . . . plast ic ized wh i te phosphorusRAG . . . . . . . . regimen tal ar t i l lery groupRAP. . . . . . . . . . ocket-assisted project i leR D F . . . . . . . . . radio d i rec t ion f inding

REC.. . . . . . . . . adioelectronic combatREG . . . . . . . . . epai r and evacuat ion grouprkh . . . . . . . . . . . ussian abbreviat ion ( l i teral ly:

radio-chemical) used as suff ix inSoviet designat ions for NBCreconnaissance vehicles

RVGK . . . . . . . Reserve of the Suprem eHigh Command

SA-(no.). . . . . US des ignat ion for Sov ietsurface-to-air missi le

.....PAAG .se l f-propel led ant ia i rc raf t gu n. . . . . . .RBM. short-range bal l ist ic missi le

. . . . . . . .RF. .strategic rocket forcesSS . . . . . . . . . . . pin-s tabi l ized round 1.....S-(no.) .US des ignat ion for Sov iet

surface-to-surface missi le

. . . . . . . . .SM surface-to-surface missi le A

......TOL.. .shor t takeof f and lan ding a i rc raft. . . . .u-(no.) .Soviet designat ion for aircraf t

f rom Sukhoi des ign bureau. . . . . . . .ASM tact tcal air-to-surface missi le

..........D . tank d iv is ion. . . . . . . . . .EL t ransporter-erector- launcher

. . . . . . .ELAR transporter-erector-launcher-

and-Radar

........OP. . technical observat ion point. . . . . . . . . .R . t ank reg iment. . . . .u-(no.) .Sov iet des ignat ion for a i rc raf t

f rom Tupolev des ign bureau. . . . . . . . .VD . theater of mil i tary operat ions

. . .AZ-(no.). . l ight t ruck produced byUlyanovsk Moto r Vehic le Plant

. . . . .ral-(no.) medium t ruck produced by

Ural Motor Vehic le Plant (not anacronym)

. . . . . . . . . .W unconvent ional warfare i. . . . . . . .OSO Centra l M i l i tary Transportat ionDirectorate

. . . . . . . . . .TA mil i tary t ransport aviat ion. . . . .TOL.. . .vert ical takeoff and landing

. . . . . . .VS.. .Soviet Air Force. . . . . . . .P. . .wh i te phosphorus....ak-(no.) .Soviet designat ion for aircraf t

f rom Yakov lev des ign bureau *

. . . . .IL-(no.) .med ium t ruck f rom L ikhachevMo tor Vehicle Plant

Glossarv-2

NATO N ICKNAMES

Air-To-SurfaceMissiles

KANGAROO, AS-3KELT, AS-5KERRY, A S- 7KINGFISH, AS-6

Antitank GuidedMissiles

SAGGER, AT-3SPANDREL, AT- 5SPIGOT, AT-4SPIRAL, AT -6

Surface-To-AirMissiles

GAINFUL, SA-6GAMMON, SA-5GANEF, SA-4GASKIN, SA-9

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KIPPER, AS -2KITCHEN, AS -4

AircraftBACKFIRE, Tu-26BADGER, Tu- 16BEAR, Tu-95

BLACKJACK, Tu-7BLINDER, Tu-22

BREWER, Yak-28CAMBER, 11-86CAN DID, 11-76CLINE, An-32COALER, An-72

COCK, An-22COOTI1-1 8CUB, A n- 1 2CURL. An -2 6FARMER, M/G-IFENCER, SU-24FIREBAR 6, Yak-28PFISHBED, MiG -21FllTER A, SU- 76FllTE R C, SU -17

FLANKER, SU-27FLOGGER 6, MiG-23FLOGGER D, MiG-27FOXBAT, MiG-25FOXHOUND, MiG-31FRESCO, MiG-17FULCRUM, Mi G- 29

SWATTER, AT- 2

HelicoptersHALO A, MI -26HARE, MI-1HARKE, MI-10, MI-1OKHIND, MI-24HIP, M I- 8

HOMER, MI-12HOOK, MI-6HOPLITE, MI-2HOUND. MI-4

RadarsBIG FRED, MT-SONEND TRAY, R MS -1FIRE CAN, SON-9, SON-9AFLAP WHEELFLAT FACE, P-15GUN DISHLONG TROUGHPORK TROUGH

PORK TROUG H 2, SNA R-6SMALL FRED, BMP-SONSMALL YAWN

GECKO, SA-8GOA, SA-3GRAIL, SA -7GUIDELINE, SA -2

Surf ace-To-Surf aceMissilesSCALEBOARD, SS-12

SCUD A, SS- 1bSCUD B, SS - lc

Glossary-3

FM 100-2-2

16 JULY 1984

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By Order of the Secretary of the Arm y:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

General. United States Army

Chief of Staff

Off ic ial :

ROBERT M. JOYCE

Major General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, and USAR: To be dis t r ibuted in accordance wi th DA Form 12-1 1B, Require-

me nts for Hand book on Agressor Mi l i tar y Forces (Qty rqr block no. 287); Agress or Order of Bat t le

Book (Qty rqr b lock no. 2 88 ) and Operat ions of Arm y Forces in the F ie ld (Qty rqr block no. 405).

Addi t ional copies may be requis i t ioned rom the US Arm yA dju tan t General Publ ications Center ,28 00 Eastern Boulevard, Bal timore, M D 21220.

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PR INT ING OFF ICE : 1 9 8 4 - 7 3 9 - 0 3 3 : 2 1 2

FM 100-2-2 July 1984

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Transcript of FM 100-2-2 July 1984