FLORENTIN SMARANDACHE ŞTEFAN VLĂDUŢESCU (COORDINATORS)

COMMUNICATION NEUTROSOPHIC ROUTES

Acknowledgment: This work was partially supported by the grant number 33C/2014, awarded in the internal grant competition of the

University of Craiova.

FLORENTIN SMARANDACHE ŞTEFAN VLĂDUŢESCU

(COORDINATORS)

COMMUNICATION NEUTROSOPHIC ROUTES

Educational Publishing

2014

Peer-Reviewers:

Odette Arhip, Professor, PhD, Ecological University, Bucharest Ştefan Colibaba, Professor, PhD, “A. I. Cuza” University, Iaşi Mihaela Colhon, Assistant Professor, PhD, University of Craiova

Copyright 2014 by editors and authors for their papers

Education Publishing 1313 Chesapeake Avenue Columbus, Ohio 43212 USA Tel. (614) 485-0721

EAN: 9781599732831

ISBN: 978-1-59973-283-1

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Contents

Introduction: Thesis of neutrosophic routes of communication 7 Florentin Smarandache, ŞtefanVlăduţescu

Chapter 1. Communication and neutrosophic reinterpretation 11 Florentin Smarandache, ŞtefanVlăduţescu Chapter 2. Information and Computer Engeering in neutrosophic managerial decision 35 Ioan Constantin Dima, Mariana Man Chapter 3. Neutrosophic Inflexions in Seneca’s Tragedy 55 Alexandra Iorgulescu Chapter 4. Communication as the Main Source of Neutrality in Ancient Rome 69 Mădălina Strechie Chapter 5. Humor in the Religious Discourse: between Paradoxism and Neutrosophy 88 Daniela Gîfu Chapter 6. Non-places, Neutral Spaces and the Specificity of Communication in Postmodern Francophone Literature 105 Alina Ţenescu Chapter 7. Incidence of the Neutrosphy and Popular Elements in the Sculptural Works of Romanian Constantin Brâncuşi 123 Mihaela-Gabriela Păun

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Chapter 8. Information and company's innovative-creative activity under the current conditions of the market economy 141 Maria Nowicka-Skowron, Sorin Mihai Radu Chapter 9. Use of computer engineering in company's commercial and transport logistics 185 Janusz Grabara, Ion Cosmescu Chapter 10. A neutrosophic mirror between communication and information 206 Bianca Teodorescu

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Introduction: Thesis of neutrosophic routes of communication

Florentin Smarandache1, ŞtefanVlăduţescu2

1University of New Mexico, PhD, Professor, USA 2University of Craiova, PhD, Associate Professor, Romania

I. Any manifestation of life is a component of communication, it is crossed by a communication passage. People irrepressibly generate meanings. As structuring domain of meanings, communication is a place where meanings burst out volcanically. Manifestations of life are surrounded by a halo of communicational meanings. Human material and ideatic existence includes a great potential of communication in continuous extension. The human being crosses the path of or is at the intersection of different communicational thoroughfares. The life of human beings is a place of communication. Consequently, any cognitive or cogitative manifestation presents a route of communication. People consume their lives relating by communicationally. Some communicational relationships are contradictory, others are neutral, since within the manifestations of life there are found conflicting meanings and/or neutral meanings. Communicational relations always comprise a set of neutral, neutrosophic meanings. Communication in general is a human manifestation of life with recognizable profile. Particularly, we talk about scientific communication, literary communication, pictorial communication, sculptural communication, esthetic communication and so on, as specific manifestations of life. All these include coherent, cohesive and structurable series of existential meanings which are contradictory and/or neutral, neutrosophic. It can be asserted that in any communication there are routes of access and neutrosophic routes. Any communication is traversed by neutrosophic routes of communication.

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II. The studies in this book are application of the thesis of neutrosophic routes of communication and highlight neutrosophic paths, trajectories, itineraries, directions and routes in different forms and types of communication. In Chapter 1, Florentin Smarandache and Ştefan Vlăduţescu develop the thesis of neutrosophic routes in the hermeneutics of text; they emphasize the fact that any text allows an infinity of interpretative routes: some based on linguistic-semiotic landmarks, others sustained by sociologic ideas, others founded by moral reference points, others founded by esthetic aspects and so on. A neutrosophic route can always be found in a text, that is a route of neutral elements, a thoroughfare of neutralities. Professors Ioan Constantin Dima and Mariana Man, in Chapter 2, reveal that is not insignificant for a system to ensure that the events observed are representative for its universe, that they are observed in a precise, neutrosophic and coherent manner and that there are analysis patterns, deeds scientifically established to enable valid estimations and deductions.

Alexandra Iorgulescu (Associate Professor at the University of Craiova, Romania) decodes the neutrosophic inflections of Seneca’s tragedies (Chapter 3). Assistant Professor Alina Ţenescu (University of Craiova) analyzes (in Chapter 4) the non-space in contemporary French novel. The non-space is identified as a neutrosophic neutrality, which allows an application of the methodology and hermeneutics of neutrosophy. Finally, there is revealed a richness of meaning that provides the neutrosophic approach. In Chapter 5, Mădălina Strechie (Senior Lecturer at the University of Craiova, Romania) illustrates the communication as a key source of neutrality in Ancient Rome communication. The contribution of Daniela Gîfu (Senior Lecturer at the University of Iaşi, Romania) gives relevance to the "religious humor"

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in the reference system created by the two mega-concepts launched and imposed by Florentin Smarandache, neutrosophy and paradoxism (Chapter 6). Chapter 7, prepared by Professor Mihaela Gabriel Păun (a Romanian language and literature teacher), focuses on the neutrosophic determining of Romanian popular incidences in the brilliant sculptural work of Romanian artist Constantin Brâncuşi (an unstoppable spiritual-aesthetic river appeared out of everyday folk tributaries). In the Chapter 8, Professors Maria Nowicka-Skowron and Sorin Mihai Radu show that the major moments of reproduction are governed only by generally valid rules, and the main dimension of operating such an economy is the market and mechanisms of the market created in principle from the movement of prices according to the demand and supply ratio on the competitive market.. Professors Janusz Grabara and Ion Cosmescu demonstrate that being aware of the role that an information system in the company plays and its impact on individual processes, this article presents an information system used in the selected company (Chapter 9). In Chapter 10, Bianca Teodorescu (from University of Craiova) shows that communication represents a category more enlarged than the information and has an ordinate concept; information is a part in the process of global communication.

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Chapter 1. Communication and neutrosophic reinterpretation

Florentin Smarandache1, ŞtefanVlăduţescu2 1University of New Mexico, USA 2University of Craiova, Romania

Abstract

The study focuses on revealing the predominantly neutrosophic character of any communication and aesthetic interpretation. (Neutrosophy, a theory grounded by Florentin Smarandache, is a coherent thinking of neutralities; different from G. W. F. Hegel, neutrality is the rule, the contradiction is the exception; the universe is not a place of contradictions, but one of neutralities; the material and significant-symbolic universe consists predominantly of neutrality relationships). Any communication is accompanied by interpretation; sharply, aesthetic communication, by its strong ambiguous character, forces the interpretation. Since, due to comprehension, description and explanation, the interpretation manages contradictions, understanding conflicts and roughness of reading, aesthetic interpretation is revealed as a deeply neutrosophic interpretation.

Communication and aesthetic interpretation prevalently manage neutralities but contradictions.

1. Introduction There is a demon that revives communication whenever it seems to get tired. It is the same demon that triggers the production process. It is the Platonic demon dialogically invoked in Socrates’ speech. Subsequently, the demon appears in Charles Baudelaire's poetics. Well, this demon is installed at the beginning of the millennium on the horizon of hermeneutics. A restless demon pushes us to understand increasingly more. It makes the spirit of questioning extend its claims against its comprehension limits.

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The man wants to understand everything. When something remains incomprehensible, he tries to understand the incomprehensible. This attempt could be part of an implacable destiny of comprehensiveness. “But our purpose in this world is to seek to understand even the incomprehensible” (E. Simon, 1998, p. 215). Ambition comes from an unbearable helplessness. In addition, it folds on the inner propensity towards comprehension. The spirit is built by understanding the universe. For this purpose, it does not allocate any surplus of energy. It is not exhausted and does not bother to look like this. It is its way of being: knowledge is its way of being. Heidegger gave an affirmative answer to the question whether understanding is the way of being of the human being every time we are ourselves. This thesis of the Dasein - understanding opposes the inaugural Aristotelian thesis of human being - knowledge. Stagira begins his Meta-physics:”Everyone has the desire to know”. Therefore, the main propensity of historical being is knowledge that leads to comprehension as an incipient. Knowledge presides comprehension. The existential impulse cogitatively draws the inclusion perspective. Once caught as occurrence, comprehension creates a new ideal that becomes a means. Knowledge does not defeat comprehesion, but raises the possibility of doing it without the benefit of it. Knowledge could be defeated only by its own excesses. Everything falls into excess. Boileau showed “to excel in your art means to get out of it”. Art and artless knowledge can slip into excess: the former into the empty rhetoric, the latter in doubt, amphibole and paralogism. Maybe knowledge does not have surplus, so the excess could not have consequences. What is surplus is not always harmful, but signs that knowledge falls in excess are there: it falls at least in some respects. When knowledge builds false premise, the excess enters the conclusions.

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2. The neutrosophic search of message Science of interpretation, hermeneutics has a dimension that wraps itself in imposture. To get the message away, hermeneutics must be based on speech. Unfortunately or fortunately, the speech is a product and a meeting (Mihnea Costoiu, Plesu, Arsene, Alesincu & Iancu, 2009; Costoiu, Adamescu, Svasta, Nicola, Pleşu, Iancu,... & Tălpuş, 2010). The message represents the meeting. Not everything that is met has visibility, too. The elements come together, they are not seen. The interpretational consciousness makes the comprehension and knowledge games. The unbalancing accents draw ideas through which substance elements are expelled from the interpretational process. It is well- known the situation created by New Criticism, both as a set of common options and individual choices of its generic members. First, Roland Barthes, by his interpretations, brought the matter of author into debate. Caught in the challenge of radicality abandoning the authorial, Picard expressed himself as an obsolete spirit. Through his intervention, defending the interpretation as an explanation of the work by the author's intentions and influences of the authorial context, Picard led the lansonism to rejection. In the battle with the intransigent retrogradism that seemed to impede the normal development of the theory of interpretation, Roland Barthes writes in 1968 an article of a hardness over the accuracy of hermeneutical reality: “La mort de l' auteur”. The battle against the author’s debilitation or elimination is led not by oneself. Michel Foucault joins Barthes who, on another road than the structuralist one, reaches the battlefield, fighting back psychoanalytically. He does not only question the essence of the author, but, what is more, he tendentiously questions the authenticity of the author who must be usurped. In the article “Qu'est -ce qu'un auteur?” (Foucault, 1969), M. Foucault destroys the author while questioning him; the title is the preventive preview of winding the author’s theme, a senator

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without rights for whom history chooses an evanescent destiny. The common part of the Barthes - Foucault theme is the progression that the author really comes to life in the late Middle Ages. He becomes, in time, a historical character. Renaissance reveals the individual behind the man. The person who writes gets to acquire, by incidence, the normal importance in terms of the reasoning of that era. The realistic novel raises the author at the status of the world's creator. Decay begins with Nietzsche (“Thus spoke Zarathustra”) and Proust: by spraying the authorial omnipotence and divestment of building the world. Subsequently, the author becomes the intersection of voices. Along with the New French Novel and structuralism, the overthrow of the author is initiated. “The king is dying” is used: in his epoch, this decisive emissary of the Creator is sent to the rhetorical props of novelistic thinking. If there has been a stage in the evolution of literature when the life and biography of work represented the author's life and work, then the time has come to his fall from grace and fall while doing his duty. Not only does he fall, but he also disappears. The period in which the author and his work interpret each one is followed by a period of the author's temptations of isolation from his own production. From the identification of the work’s intention with the author's intention and till the irreconcilable segregation of the two, the road was, in terms of 2-3 thousand years cultural history, a short one. If you look at things in a balanced way, murdering the author is a secondary chapter. This is because when creating the text, the producer cannot succumb. The speech, E. Benveniste postulates, is the product of a speech instance which vehicularly gathers around a certain I. Even when he produces in his way, the figure of the creative spirit translates an “I in the third person”. The creative spirit replaces the author rightly. Taking up the idea that the removal of the author, unwillingly plotted by Nietzsche, Proust (and by delimiting the

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biographic ego from the profound ego) and Paul Valéry (by finding indelible congruence between the profound ego and the pure ego), forms the post- factum basis for the action with seductive poetic effects. Removing the author means the exhaustion and destruction of the ego for the generation of the theorist Barthes. They tended to lead to extinction even the courage to say “I” in a text. The aim was peeling the connotations of “the ego”. The author of the 60’s and 70’s is a paper man, as F. Flahault calls him. The furious reaction is that the work paradigm, regarding the original and irreducible creation, is deconstructed and then replaced with the text paradigm supported by the speech and language. The author’s figure has been clouded, and his exit from the interpretation scene was celebrated. The death of the author and the authorial history has been sounded through a trompet. The writer's life and inspiration have been debunked and deconstructed. The context of the production has been annihilated. The Barthes - Picard controversy should be seen as an attempt to assassinate the genetic criticism and a setup of the work myth without an author. Valéry is brought to testify that the poem, in this case the text, is made by itself. In a battle, the author and the influence of his personal history fall on writing.

In the absence of the author, perceived as being unnecessary for his work, the interpretation becomes fragmented (Adamescu, Costoiu, Corocăescu, Pleşu, Iancu, Adamescu... & Tălpuş, 2010; Costoiu, Plesu, Isopescu, Soriga, Alesincu & Arsene, 2012). The author being excluded and murdered, the demon of creation vanishes. The text without a writer loses its traditional coherence. It is out of history. It does not testify about human evolution and knowledge. A hard reply to the biographical interpretation, New Criticism tries to read the text as having no author or as having one but with no interpretation importance. The interpretation object gets to be an orphan. Developed in fragments, the demon gains in depth. “Placing in the abyss” (concept introduced by Lucien Dällenbach) is

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the power of the fragment that controls the whole. The writing is not intended as a synthesis, but as an amplified representation of the fragment. The whole has all the power of the fragment. The analysis does not close by synthesis. The interpretation focuses on detail. It takes it as a model and theorizes it. Without an author, the work becomes the theory of a work. The project of the interpretation spirit is confirmed in a fragment. The detail worked on does not allow the vision of the whole. Theorizing the fragment is beneficial. The structuralist, “semanalytic” and psychoanalytic processes investigate the depths of the fragment and raise them to the power of work. The exercise is respectable. The theoretical gain is admirable. Among them the interpretation spirit’s inability stands out to keep the innocent analysis throughout the ongoing of the work. The text fragment cannot raise itself as work, for it cannot be someone’s work: the author of the work has deceased leaving only fragments behind.

Generally speaking, Barthes and Picard cannot reconcile, though they would have reasons. Time has softened Picard’s retrogradism. The years brought the shocking novelty of the Barthesian approach to normal dimensions.

Taking history as an application of the cogitative brings hermeneutics the assumption of new responsibilities. We now know that the text has a consciousness that makes it work. It is clear that the speech includes this consciousness. It additionally stores the consciousness of the discursive activity. The language production presents a coordinating expanded consciousness: a consciousness of textuality and a consciousness of the type of discourse in progress. The creative spirit carries a double figuration: in textualization the discursive production is done and it is done with the typological integration consciousness of the product. The interpretative spirit values the experience of the author’s assassination. Hermeneutics returns the producer in discourse. He is not the light through which

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to understand and explain the text. Thus formed, he returns in the way he should be, only as that consciousness producing speech.

The speech has, of course, an author who lives by the very speech that he produces. The author exists. He should not be wronged and made, by his own biography, the interpreter of his own work. The author knows what he is writing, the hermeneutist knows what has resulted. Sometimes explicitly, but always implicitly, the producer introduces in his speech his theories of production in progress. In the language used, the author inserts schemes and interpretation instructions. However, the author is not a privileged hermeneutist. He does not have to be done any favors. His opinion is the opinion of any interpreter. His choice should not be denied, but neither be privileged. In their interpretation judgment each one is right. The author has a formidable opponent: the specialized reader. This one undermines his authority, warning him that the work as production is authorial, but the work as interpretation does not belong to him anymore.

Once written, the work is in the power of interpretation. During interpretation it is only the value of assumptions that dictates under which meanings are extracted / assigned. In interpreting the criterion is capitalizing the significance, understood as signifying potency. In speech we find the author's intentions and history, biographemes and ideology. Interpretation provides transformation, by reading, of the speech into work. In this approach, the hermeneutist does not start from scratch. He is in the hermeneutical situation, and this provokes everything. The situation pre-exists interpretation. It includes pre - production conditions: the producer’s intentions, the default interpretation, the theoretical consciousness, the symbolic generalizations, models, integrated examples. It does not include the author's post-productive performance. The situation is allowed to the hermeneutist and restrictive to the producer-author. In the

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interpretation of his own work, the author is not a reliable person. The hermeneutist is always reliable. The interpreter’s limit is the author quality. Once written, the work refuses whoever produced it, and it isolates and wrongs him. Never will any author provide the best interpretation of his own work, if such an interpretation is there somehow. The author does not have a right of interpretation derived from the right he has previously had to write. When ending the work, he loses his power over the product. As interpretation, the work exceeds the authorial jurisdiction. The work is for the author, as for any other hermeneutist, a closed shop. Leaving the room, the producer of the speech loses, without ever having it, the key to interpretation. The best interpretation of the work is the work itself. It remains eternal: and also its own interpretation. The author produces his work as an interpretation, all the others consume it. The hermeneutist does not have special obligations to the text or to its producer. At the limit, he may even turn negatively the producer's interpretation instructions. He can also ignore, even overthrow the advanced intentions in some way (as production or post –production) by the author. Where appropriate, the text elements can be given meanings that did not fall within the significant assumptions portfolio with which the author put the text for consumption circuit. Heidegger values in Parmenides’ interpretation the idea that the hermeneutist must retrieve in the philosophical text the presuppositions and nuances of thinking in the first message. The truth is that the hermeneutist does not need to in isolation and self-sufficiently cover the reconstruction of the nuances and assumptions as if he were the first lecturer immediately the text has been written. If he did it, he would miss his purpose, being unable to stand outside the re-contextualization of the speech with historical hermeneutical means of reception. The hermeneutist cannot escape from his time reading grid. Heidegger's experience of Greek thinking is an

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admirable and unrepeatable exception. At its core is the belief that translation is interpretation. Heidegger starts from his own translations-interpretations that differ substantially from authorized translations. His translations are, we say, philosophical. These translations-interpretations are then interpreted in a suspected Greek thinking. Hence the outstanding, but inimitable interpretations. Heidegger 's interpretation gives examples. His interpretation opens the texts to unexpected directions, leading destructively and deconstructively to their explosion. The hermeneutist Heidegger behaves as if the text had made available the nuances and assumptions at the time of its production. But can anyone be a contemporary lecturer with the writing of a text 2,500 years ago? Heidegger’s interpretative attempts intend to confirm it. They really do that. Unfortunately, these hermeneutical experiences close a road. Jean Paulhan, talking about Heidegger’s interpretations and the “Sein und Zeit”, accuses him that he thinks as “a red skin”, as a savage who cannot reach abstraction. This retardation of Heidegger, it was argued in “La preuve par l'etymology” (1953), is manifested by his etymologizing vocabulary. Heidegger’s understanding is etymologizing - distorting. Paulhan's criticism would have been totally justified if Heidegger's approach had not been such a strong individuality both in vocabulary and as a cogitation way (see the Heideggerian’s “siget”). The truth is quite different. As production presuppositions are erased by time, the text gets obscured, the evidence dissipates. This is the moment when interpretations are absolutely necessary. To be able to understand the philosophical message “we must, P. Hadot claims, stand in a particular reading horizon. We need to know how philosophical doctrines to which texts align came as a justification or argumentation of a way of life different schools choose, starting from the Pythagoreans”. The school shapes the philosophical character and creates some type of relationship with the master. It operates a way of life where the

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members meet together, think and meditate, go through spiritual exercises. The remaining texts do not give their whole message to us if we do not know the school and the lifestyle to which they integrate. Without getting into the horizon of the school message, the texts do not talk to us. Besides their doctrine and existential condition, the texts will appear orphan. They will be in some ways mute. We will not be able to recover their messages sufficiently. Downloading the speech message will be improper. Heidegger believes that the message (SAPS) is lost when we translate ancient texts into modern languages. Hermeneutists agree that there is an irrepressible tendency to project modern meanings of words on the texts. Any reading is contextual, situational, circumstantial. We cannot escape from conditioning the present time. Trying to abandon the cogitative and language perspective of the present moment is doomed to failure. The hermeneutist cannot entirely escape from the condition of present time being. A cogitative and language horizon permeates every reading. Heidegger believes that the text must be interpreted within the hermeneutical horizon of the moment of its production. The interpreter must be positioned correctly in the temporal area of the productive thinking. The Pythagoreans should be interpreted within the cogitative and language horizons of their age. Their message can be consumed and makes sense only in terms of entry into the consumational horizon of the creative moment of productive thinking. Realizing the impossibility or at least the arbitrariness of such a step into the unknown, Gadamer (2001) proposes a mediating solution. To achieve the philosophical message of the texts, the hermeneutist must build a fusion of horizons. He must mediate by commuting the potential and pre-suppositional horizon of the go forth text with the hermeneutical horizon of his interpretational existence. The solution is the fusion between the speech horizon with

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the hermeneutist’s horizon. Re-contextualization must be performed as commution. The beginning of philosophy is the beginning of school. Along with Plato and Aristotle, philosophy became the philosophy of school, it philosophically imposed a way of life and built a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary had an esoteric touch. It was the philosophical thinking that created the school rather than the vocabulary. In this respect, Aristotle's answer given to the letter of Alexander is enlightening. When philosophy has become philosophy of school and has acquired a philosophical vocabulary, it was then when they, Plato and Aristotle, had the privilege “imposed” by themselves in reading the elders, in terms of their doctrine, as precursors. They do not see that the elders think differently. They do not deny that these think philosophically: it would mean to individualize them. The two ones find that, to annihilate them, they must transform them into precursors. Their attitude is one of absorption. The pre-Socratic philosophy is absorbed into their philosophy of school. It is Nietzsche who will respond to this captive attitude writing: “I do not have precursors“. Interested in the proto-chronic strengthening of his own message, Plato and Aristotle make precursors from predecessors. In their discursive project they would subminatively get the idea of non - precursor originality of the inaugural philosophers as Heidegger calls them. They know that originality has a priority component and they do not allow the pre-Socratics to be beginners, as Heidegger does. They know very well that the originality comes from the message and within their own message they decant the strong essence of the pre-philosophical literary. Plato and Aristotle open the paradigm of philosophy as a discipline that lies at the foundation of philosophy as a school occupation. With them the discipline structures the school. Is it not possible, Heidegger asks, in this way, to the benefit of philosophy as a discipline that we lost the pre-Socratic Greek philosophical thinking, Heraclitus,

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Parmenides and Anaximander? Before Socrates there is an eminently oral philosophy based on teacher-student relationship, a relationship of direct communication, filtered by Plato in his writing. Heidegger reads Kant in an overturned way and against the grain. People say that Immanuel Kant is a metaphysics critic in the sense that the philosopher from Königsberg would require to put an end to the old dogmatic metaphysics which is considered not to have rational legitimacy. What people say is wrong, Heidegger shows in “Kant and the problem of metaphysics”: “Critique of Pure Reason” is a metaphysical work. The first sentence of the book on Kant states most clearly what the reflection on him aims: “The following investigation sets itself the task to interpret Kant's critique of pure reason as a foundation of metaphysics, to highlight the question of metaphysics as a matter of fundamental ontology”. If it is to interpret Kant as a metaphysician, this interpretation that he offered, regarding him, is called Neokantianism. In Neokantianism, Kant’s work appears as a theory of knowledge. “Critique of Pure Reason” is interpreted as “theory of experience” or even as “theory of positive sciences”. The reality of sciences is supposed and then their foundation is sought. Criticism is not limited to the question of a critical concept of nature that should be extended through a critical concept of history, but it is related to the guiding question of metaphysics, what is the being? We wonder if there appears in Kant's thinking the question of the being, coming from the Antiquity? For Kant, metaphysics is related to the “nature” of man. Fundamental ontology, as ontological analysis of human “nature” provides the foundation on which metaphysics can count; therefore it is essential to “possibilize” metaphysics. The idea of fundamental ontology as foundation of metaphysics must be confirmed in an interpretation of “Critique of Pure Reason”, because a foundation of metaphysics can never be born from nothing, “but from the strength and weakness of a tradition which prescribes it the possibilities of what it will take”. If

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metaphysics is the nature of man, then it “exists factually” as the man, meaning that “it has always developed in one form or another“. A foundation of metaphysics must relate to “the tradition already contained in it” and resume the transformed task already performed once. Metaphysics (ontology in the broad sense of the word) asks regarding the being of being. It is thus special metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysical asks, from the beginning, concerning the being of being, in order to determine the being as a whole starting from a superior being - the supreme being or divinity. When God, in the Christian faith, was understood as the creator of man and the world, theological metaphysics has split into three parts of the traditional metaphysic specialists (natural theology, psychology, cosmology). “Copernican revolution” made by Kant has no other purpose than asking the question concerned with the possibility of ontic knowledge depending on the possibility of ontology itself. Thus, in Kant's thinking, for the first time since Plato and Aristotle, metaphysics is again problematical. Kant called transcendental that knowledge that does not generally deal with the being or objects, “but the way we know the objects, the extent to which it can be a prior one”. Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge (a prior synthesis in the Kantian sense). “Transcendental knowledge does not examine the being itself, but the possibility of a preliminary understanding of the being, respectively the constitution of the being of being. To problematize the possibility of ontology is to inquire on the possibility, meaning the essence of this transcendence to understand the being, and it means to philosophize transcendentally” (Kant, 1994, p.51). Insofar “pure reason” knows priori principles, transcendental philosophy is the question about the possibility of ontology, critique of pure reason. In “Critique of Pure Reason” Kant carries the essence unit of transcendence, questioning, always at a new level, the problem of unity of thought and intuition.

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Transcendental imagination, Heidegger interprets, is shown to be, in the end, the root from which intuition and thinking are growing. In his thinking, Kant leaves - as metaphysics in general – from the still and steady presence, but he does not think that presence in its complete temporal character. On the contrary, time is diverted to the other moment of transcendence, to intuition. Pure ego, according to the interpretation that dominates everywhere, is out of the scope of any temporality and placed in opposition to all that is time. Transcendental ego is not understood by Kant as the factual existence, essentially temporal. Thus Kant repeats the capital mistake of Descartes, who did not interpret at the original level the ontological meaning of sum in cogito sum, but from the perspective offered by traditional metaphysics. In his book on Kant, Heidegger tries to highlight the “unsaid” in his thinking, to present the time as a problem, as it belongs to the transcendence of understanding the being. Kant's inability to make the time and the world visible in their originality has its roots in the forgetfulness of the time and the world specific to metaphysics. Therefore, concerning the manner in which he made research in his critique on pure reason, Kant says that it contains a “metaphysics of metaphysics”. If ontology is designed as questions regarding the being of being and thus the kernel of metaphysics, then metaphysics of metaphysics is the foundation of ontology, the fundamental ontology. In his book on Kant, Heidegger calls this fundamental ontology “metaphysics of the Dasein”. Kant’s critical idea refers to the possibility and ways of knowing and on how much we can know. This idea is in opposition to the idea of system. Although he tackles the system by the three critiques, Kant makes system practice. On the other hand, the critical idea rises above metaphysics, suspiciously speaking about its possibility. The deficiency in the critical idea about metaphysics does not provide immunity to metaphysics. The critical reflection is incapable of

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saving the critique of pure reason from what it criticizes. Kant's fundamental work, tackling metaphysics, gets to turn into an exceptional metaphysics. Kant's metaphysical intransigence is another metaphysics: the authorial intention does not have the force required for the practical achievement. The intention fails. The treatment occurs as a tool to strengthen the so-called diseases. Heidegger looks at Kant in terms of metaphysics, so he sees a metaphysician. Heidegger's interpretative thesis is that “Critique of Pure Reason” is not on the theory of knowledge, but on metaphysics. It attracts as an argument the idea expressed by Kant in his “Logics” that metaphysics is the true philosophy, unique philosophy (Kant, 1970, p. 86). In Kant we deal with traditional metaphysics. Heidegger, as a hermeneutist, is in the horizon of his own conception of metaphysics: ontology is “guaranteed metaphysics” and metaphysics must rotate around ontology. For Kant generalis metaphysics (ontology) is “transcendental philosophy”. Kant's metaphysics is in the transcendental realm discovered by Kant and imposed to the philosophy that followed. As far as the transcendental is concerned, we have to do with anything else rather than knowledge, because space and time as pure intentions exceed the existential. The transcendental is a being. Examining this aspect of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, C. Noica shows: “This meeting of the finite consciousness and the being itself is undoubtedly proclaimed more by Heidegger rather than Kant, who saw the possible raising of awareness on the noumenal level only for the moral one (in Critique of Practical Reason), or, on the line of regulative principles, for consciousness of reflective judgment “Critique of Judgment” (C. Noica, 1992, p.105). C. Noica finds, moreover, the idea that “the world would be an embodiment, would be a thought that Heidegger attributes to Kant” (C. Noica, 1992, p. 106). To move up a step his level: Noica proves some inadequacy. This is because any interpretation is in part an assignment of

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thoughts, ideas, meanings, intentions. Noica is solidary with Heidegger. The gesture of interpretation comes out of inadequacy and gets into the infidelity attributable to each interpretation. The interpretative des-instruction apophatically comes in connection with the self astonishment in Heidegger's thought: when assessing that Heidegger would separate from Kant by claiming that he wants to render not so much what Kant said, but “he meant”. In fact, the allocation of authorial intentions is part of the variability of interpretation. Even rejected, intentions make their way through rejections to the relevant interpretational message from the level of the text work of speech. The philosophical message is unable to communicate without the author. In the absence of the idea of producer, the philosophical message is isolated from the internal philosophical practice that any philosophical discourse progresses. The message comes after. Occurring so, he binds irrepressibly to a certain practice: silence, asceticism, spiritual exercise, ataraxia etc. If there is not any kind of author, the speech is a dead and hostile letter. The author does not exist as a provider of message, but just as a producer of discourse. Any word on how to interpret the speech, in order to draw any message, any word means another speech of the same power with any other interpretation. “The problem of the text arises for the reader”, shows J. Derrida (1997, p. 226). So the question is not for the author, unless he considers a normal interpreter as any other. The message is an orphan, it has no authority. Only the speech has one. But the hermeneutist cannot remain in a communicative rationality if he does not invest the text with an illusory author. This author that the hermeneutist projects into the text is the hermeneutist himself. In this way, the hermeneutist becomes the adopted author of the discourse and recipient of the spiritual message. Kant is Kant, meaning the Kantian speech and message. Heidegger is Heidegger even when he interprets Kant. Noica is

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Noica both when he interprets Kant and when he wants to induce his own Kant, in an unannounced way, over Heidegger’s speech. The same dilemma of positioning the hermeneutist towards the speech and message is exposed by J.-P Vernant, describing it as a “matter of reading” (1995, p.100). How should we read Hesiod? Like V. Goldschmidt does “hit by the effort to systematize” the Hesiodic text? Or like J. Defradas, for whom, on the contrary, Hesiod “has no established system and he does not avoid, classifying his heroes, to interrupt the process of decay, or to contemplate, “empirically”, as he is, a future less bleak than the past? In the first case, shows Vernant, the text is “highly” analyzed. It is recognized that the task of the interpreter is to lift up at the level of a rich, complex, and semantic work, of a work with its own type of coherence that we just have to try to find out. Facility is denied. It seeks, by reading patiently, repeated day after day, to realize all the details and at the same time to always integrate them into the assembly. If any difficulty appears in deciphering the text, it is attributed to a deficiency in the reader’s understanding rather than to the creator’s contradictions or negligence. In the latter case, the bottom Hesiod is “lowly” analyzed. What we can ask for interpretation is one thing: to have good foundation, the power to give a personal sense to the message taken from otherness’ speech (Neacşu, 2005). The foundation comes from what Gonseth called “recognition of the other”, from the lucid consciousness of otherness as a message in itself. If the message is said to the other, then the best foundation to interpret otherness’ speech is the self-recognition as another. Without inaugurating the tradition of the other's philosophical interpretations as otherness who says something but he would have wanted to say something else, Heidegger gives an example that the hermeneutist can experience his “private concept” in another private concept. A private language is impossible. By language non – impossibility a private concept is visible. It is not

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only possible, not only probable. The private concept is part of a good foundation. In fact, hermeneutics differentiates between what the author said and what he wanted to say, it is just one interpretation experience. The author is a productive illusion in terms of interpretation. The author lives in the hermeneutist’s expectations system. Through this “genius opposition genius” (do not call him “malign genius” like Descartes) the text message is profiled in the constituent interpretation instance. It is not the text that needs an author, but the hermeneutist. The interpreter is unable to be alone with the speech. It is beyond his powers to let the text present itself with no time, no place, no intentions, just like addressing, speech and message. 3. Conclusion The reader is an avid interpreter. If it were just a quality of the discourse, interpretability would be redeemed, it would be annihilated. The text brings one interpretability and the hermeneutist another. From this tension of interpretabilities comes the openness and immortality of valuable works. A work dies not when it is not read for a while in order to find the best foundation. A work dies only when the internal interpretability, as a message reserve, is finished. The work dies when it no longer speaks to us. Dead works are cold stars. References Balaban, D. C. (2009). Publicitatea: de la planificarea strategică la implementarea media. Polirom. Bosun, P., & Grabara, J. (2014). Consideration on online education in Romania. International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences, (14), 59-65. Bosun, P., Teodorescu, M., & Teodorescu, B. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility – Collaborating for the Future. International Journal of Education and Research, 2(3).

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Bosun, Petre, & Modrak, Vladimir (2014). Using the Delphi method in forecasting tourism activity. International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences, (14), 66-72. Bunăiaşu, C. M. 2011. Proiectarea şi managementul curriculumului la nivelul organizaţiei şcolare. Bucureşti: Editura Universitară. Cace, C., Cace, S., Cojocaru, Ş., & Nicolăescu, V. (2012). The European Social Fund Within the Context of the Economic Crisis from Romania. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Călin, Alexandru R. (2010). Communication Competences Training for Managers through Role-Play Activities. Annals of the University of Craiova, Economic Sciences Series, 3. Călin, R. A., & Bunăiaşu, C. (2010). Communication and Mass- media-from Information to Formation. Petroleum-Gas University of Ploiesti Bulletin, Educational Sciences Series, 62. Cojocaru, D. (2011). Attending parenting education programmes in Romania. The case of the Holt Romania Iasi programme. Revista de cercetare şi intervenţie socială, (32), 140-154. Cojocaru, D. (2013). The Participatory Evaluation of Children in Child Welfare Case Study: The County of Iasi, Romania. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 92, 192-196. Cojocaru, D., & Cojocaru, S. (2011). The deprivatization of family and its effects on parenting in Romania. Revista de Cercetare şi Intervenţie Socială, (33), 209-222. Cojocaru, D., & Cojocaru, S. (2011). The deprivatization of family and its effects on parenting in Romania. Revista de Cercetare şi Intervenţie Socială, (33), 209-222. Cojocaru, S. (2009). Clarifying the theory-based evaluation. Revista de Cercetare şi Intervenţie Socială, (26), 76-86.

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Cojocaru, S. (2010). The appreciative perspective in multicultural relations.Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, 4(10), 36-48. Cojocaru, Ş. (2013). Rhetoric about Vulnerabilities of Childhood in Family Migration. Ad hoc Research and Methodological Errors. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 92, 202- 206. Cojocaru, Ş., & Cojocaru, D. (2011). Naturalistic Evaluation of Programs. Parent’s Voice in Parent Education Programs. Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences. Cojocaru, Ş., & Sfetcu, L. (2013). Partnerships in Social Economy. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 92, 197-201. Cojocaru, S., Sandu, A., & Ponea, S. (2010). Appreciative Evaluation of Training Programs: Case Study: Lumen Consulting and Training Center. Social Research Reports, 8. Colhon, M. (2013). Automatic Lexical Alignment between Syntactically Weak Related Languages. Application for English and Romanian. In Computational Collective Intelligence. Technologies and Applications (pp. 266-275). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. Colhon, M., & Tandareanu, N. (2010). The inference mechanism in

conditional schemas. Annals of the University of Craiova-Mathematics and Computer Science Series, 37(1), 55-70.

Counsell, D., & Popova, J. (2000). Career perceptions and strategies in the new market-oriented Bulgaria: an exploratory study. Career Development International, 5(7), 360-368. Dascălu, B. M. (2014). Echivocul imagologic în Caietele lui Emil Cioran. Studii de Ştiinţă şi Cultură, (1), 29-35. Frunză, M. (2009). Ethical and Legal Aspects of Unrelated Living Donors in Romania. Journal for the Study of Religions & Ideologies, 8(22).

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Frunză, S. (2011). The Relational Individual in a Communication Built Society.Transylvanian Review, 20(3). Frunză, S. (2012). Minimal Ethics and the New Configuration of the Public Space. Journal for the Study of Religions & Ideologies, 11(32). Frunză, S., Bobb, C. V., Frunză, M., & Grad, O. (2010). Altruistic living unrelated organ donation at the crossroads of ethics and religion. A case study.Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, (27), 3-24. Gavrilovici, C., & Oprea, L. (2013). Clinical ethics, Research ethics and community ethics–The moral triad of nowadays society. Revista Romana De Bioetica, 11(3). Gavrilovici, C., Cojocaru, D., & Astarastoae, V. (2012). About autonomy, vulnerability and fragility. Gavriluţă, N. (2012). Science and Religion in the New Age Mentality. European Journal of Science and Theology, 8(3), 65-71. Grabara, J., Kolcun, M., & Kot, S. (2014). The role of information systems in transport logistics. International Journal of Education and Research, 2(2). Hristea, F., & Colhon, M. (2012). Feeding syntactic versus semantic knowledge to a knowledge-lean unsupervised word sense disambiguation algorithm with an underlying Naïve Bayes model. Fundamenta Informaticae, 119(1), 61-86. Maior, G. C., & Matei, M. (2005). The Black Sea region in an enlarged Europe: changing patterns, changing politics. Mediterranean Quarterly, 16(1), 33-51. Olimid, A. P. Democracy Promotion in Post-Communist Countries. Congruence between Historical. Otovescu, D. (2006). Sociologie generală. Editura Beladi, Craiova.

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Pintea, A. (2013). Intertextuality, Dialogism and the Social Construction of Journalistic Discourse. Studia Universitatis Petru Maior-Philologia, (15). Popova, J. (2013). Attitudes and Prerequisites for the Establishment of an Integrated Cultural Identity within Romanian- Bulgarian Cross-Border Region along the Danube River. Journal of Danubian Studies and Research, 3(1). Posaştiuc, C. (2011). Reengineering Intelligence. Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence, (06), 5-13. Prisecaru, B. (2014). Smart Intelligence in an Interpolar Age of Incertitude. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27(2), 334-350. Bajdor, P., & Grabara, I. (2014). The Role of Information System Flows in Fulfilling Customers’ Individual Orders. Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, 7(2). Sălcudean, M. (2009). Tudor Arghezi: discursul polemic. Iaşi: Institutul European. Sandu, A., & Caras, A. (2013). Philosophical Practice and Social

Welfare Counselling and Supervision of Ethics. Philosophical Practice: Journal of the American Philosophical Practitioners Association (American Philosophical Practitioners Association), 8(3).

Sandu, A., & Ponea, S. (2010). „Social constructionism as a semiotical paradigm. An analitical aproach of social creativity”. InventicaA 2010. Siminică, Marian, & Traistaru, Aurelia (2013). Self-Directed Learning in Economic Education. International Journal of Education and Research, 1(12). Smarandache, F. (1999). A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic. Philosophy, 1-141. Smarandache, F. (2002). Neutrosophy, a new Branch of Philosophy. MULTIPLE VALUED LOGIC, 8(3), 297-384.

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Smarandache, F. (2003). Definitions derived from neutrosophics. arXiv preprint math/0301340. Smarandache, F. (2005). A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrsophic Logic. Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability. Infinite Study. Smarandache, F. (2010a). Strategy on T, I, F Operators. A Kernel Infrastructure in Neutrosophic Logic. In F. Smarandache (Ed.), Multispace and Multistructure. Neutrosophic Transdisciplinariry (100 Collected Papers of Sciences) (pp. 414-419). Vol. 4. Hanko: NESP. Smarandache, F. (2010c). The Neutrosophic Research Method in Scientific and Humanistic Fields. In F. Smarandache (Ed.), Multispace and Multistructure. Neutrosophic Transdisciplinariry (100 Collected Papers of Sciences) (pp. 732-733). Vol. 4. Hanko: NESP. Smarandache, F., & Păroiu, T. (2012). Neutrosofia ca reflectare a

realităţii neconvenţionale. Craiova: Editura Sitech. Ştefan, M., Bunăiaşu, C., & Strungă, A. 2012. Academic learning– from control and s sytematic assistance to autonomy. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 33, 243-247. Stoica, D. S. (2004). Comunicare public. Relaţii publice. Iaşi, Editura Universităţii Al. I. Cuza. Stoica, D. S. (2007). Political Correctness and Wooden Language. Revista Transilvană de Ştiinţe ale Comunicării, 5, 60-64. Strunga, A. C., & Bunaiasu, C. M. (2013). The Investigation of the Curricular Preferences of the Students from the Primary and Preschool Pedagogy Specialization. Revista de Cercetare şi Intervenţie Socială, (40), 61-77. Tabără, V. (2012). Dezvoltarea capacităţii administrative. Bucureşti: Editura CH Beck.

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Traistaru, Aurelia, & Avram, Marioara (2014). A computational line of comprehension of account. International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences, 13, 79-88. Mihnea Costoiu, R. I., Plesu, V., Arsene, I., Alesincu, S., & Iancu, P. (2009). New developments for electronic document management in university Politehnica of Bucharest. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, 18, 3Q9. Costoiu, M., Adamescu, D., Svasta, P., Nicola, S., Pleşu, V., Iancu, P., ... & Tălpuş, M. (2010). Integrated Software Application for University Research Management. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, 21. Adamescu, D., Costoiu, M., Corocăescu, M., Pleşu, V., Iancu, P., Adamescu, G., ... & Tălpuş, M. (2010). Integrated Software Application for University Management of Material Resources. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, 21. Costoiu, M., Plesu, V., Isopescu, R., Soriga, S. G., Alesincu, S. H., & Arsene, I. (2012). Electronic Document Management Information System for Universities. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, 29. Neacşu, S. (2005). Sistemul informaţional statistic în învăţământul românesc după 1990. Ed. Fundaţiei Univ. pentru Toţi. Unguru, E., Ponea, S., Sandu, A., & Cojocaru, S. (2010). Analysis of professional competencies in social services supervision. Social Research Reports, (17), 3-56. Vlad, L. B., & Coldea, F. (2011). Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Relations. Impact Strategic, (1), 99-105.

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Chapter 2. Information and Computer Engineering in neutrosophic managerial decision

Ioan Constantin Dima1, Mariana Man2

1University Valahia, PhD Professor, Târgovişte, Romania 2University of Petroşani, PhD Professor, Petroşani, Romania

Abstract The history of information engineering is a research of a theory, of a conception about susceptible information, basically to be used for justifying or improving the tools and procedures to process the information used in the management of systems. In this context, the efforts aiming the integration of information engineering into the decision theories, as they appear in microeconomics, game theory with participants and statistic decision theory are certainly useful. However, they prove to be incomplete if not misleading to support a reflection on the architecture of information systems and its possible change. At its beginnings, these connections together with the choices determined a reflection on the assessment and reasoning problems. It is not insignificant for a system to ensure that the events observed are representative for its universe, that they are observed in a precise, neutrosophic and coherent manner and that there are analysis patterns, deeds scientifically established to enable valid estimations and deductions. Keywords: information engineering, decision, intelligence of complex systems, computer engineering, managerial decision 1. Introduction The management of systems requires collecting, processing and transmitting a large quantity of data concerning the internal state of the system and its relations with the environment. All these data, along with the technical means for collecting, processing and transmitting it form the structure of the informational flow. This may be: descending

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flow (it achieves the connection between the driving system and driven system); ascending flow (it achieves the connection between the driven system and driving system); collateral flow (it achieves an exchange of information between the subsystems of the system); external flow (it achieves the connection with its outer environment). In any system, two flows circulate, the technological flow and informational flow, where no gaps should exist. Avoiding the gaps is done by optimising the correlations between the technological and informational flow, by means of determining and probabilistic mathematical models, prepared under the operation of that system. The informational flow is designed as an assembly of processes and means of collection-processing, storage and transmission of data from the driven system to the driving system and vice versa, in order to optimally guide the operation of the driven system. Based on such a flow, the driving system knows the actual activity of the driven system critically examines the situations, adopts decision to guide the system as a whole towards the objective. This is done when the informational flow is rational, meaning: it is flexible under the aspect of the operating mechanism of the informational content; it has a high qualitative level regarding the accuracy, flexibility and age of information, minimum response time of the action triggered; it is operative, continuous and efficient; it is surprising, selective and accessible, it provides a maximum efficiency with a minimum cost. The informational flow is rational when its organisation is modern, which involves meeting the following principles: the achievement of the unit between the technological flow and the informational one; the correlation between the organisational structure and modern informational flow of the system; the achievement of a direct dependence between the processing level and information efficiency; concordance between the information transmitted and the received one; the achievement of a dependence between the hierarchic level and information level.

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The analysis of the informational flow in order to characterise it is a phased process that includes: the analysis and synthesis of the information flow; the rationalisation of the data strings and agglomeration of the processing sequences; designing the data collection, processing and transmission equipment; the implementation of the new informational flow; establishing the efficiency of the new informational flow operation. The purpose of the informational flow analysis consists in knowing the current state of the system and adopting a set of decisions concerning the optimum management of the input and output states of the system.

2. The Information – Decision Relation and its Complexity 2.1. Preferential Character The preferences of the organisational systems and components are often less clear than the rational choice theory implies them. They are often vague and contradictory, develop over time and according to the experience and decision processes. The choice conception pleading the contemporary decision theory and microeconomics postulates the optimisation of basic options of two circumstances. The first one has as objective the uncertain future consequences of the actions that could be engaged; the second one, the decision maker’s uncertain future preferences faced with these consequences once they shall be materialised (Baranger, 1993). The first circumstance got the attention of decision adopting specialists to a larger extent than the second one. A large part of the science of management, microeconomics and operational research is dedicated to improving either the optimisation calculations used for complex choices, or the assessment of probability distribution of the future consequences of an action. No comparable effort has been made to understand or improve either the formulation of alternatives, or the circumstance of future preferences. The alternatives and preferences

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are generally considered as data. Of course, in practice, management science and decision theory techniques are often used by decision makers authorised to discover the alternatives and clarify their objectives. However, the decision theory participates itself to great extent to this effort and considers that preferences control the choices, but is not interested in elaborating them. This exclusion of preferences is justified most frequently by a requirement of neutrality in relation to the values, if one may say that a particular optimisation technique has undeniable qualities or that a certain treatment to process the data has a remarkable statistical efficiency. It is impossible to say the same for the preference engineering procedures. Along with ignorance, this argument can be accused that any decision system favours the preferences that can be measured through this system, in the detriment of those which are not measurable. With all these deficiencies, the decision engineering virtues should not be doubted, which tries to be as independent as possible of the decision maker’s system of values. An argument may be however advanced – simultaneously more technical and more accurate – and namely that preferences postulated by the decision theory differ greatly from the decision makers’ actual preferences. The theory implies that preferences are either coherent, stable and exogenous, or susceptible to become so. Preferences evolve over time, so it is difficult to predict them. It is considered that actions can be often controlled and achieved, but at the same time, the experience resulted from actions and their consequences changes the preferences. These are therefore exogenous in relation with the decision process. Each of these aspects of the preferences complicates the decision theory. This is constrained by the incoherent preferences that cannot be harmonised on the indirect way of the utility exchange. Because preferences evolve over time and because those

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that are important for a decision are future preferences resulting from current actions, one may – legitimately – doubt the utility of a theory that supports the hypothesis of stable preferences. And when preferences are endogenous, it is impossible to break down the process of adopting a decision into successive problems: defining preferences and then achieving the actions selected. The reality disturbs the basic scheme of conventional decision theory. It is not impossible for it to be able to resist, and the coherence, stability and exogenous assumptions appear as being doubtful (CIPD, 2005). One may also imagine a possibility to suppress the problems the ambiguous preferences arise, meaning decision makers would be created in the direction of formulating stable, coherent and exogenous preferences. But such an approach to the problem requires more confidence in the virtues of non-ambiguous preferences than that which our experience may allow. Therefore, it would not be too difficult to suggest decision engineering specialists to dedicate more time to studying the dynamics of preference comparisons, endogenous changes of these preferences and problems of incoherence between preferences or between them and actions. These conclusions could be extended on the information engineering in the service of adopting the decision. Computing systems contribute in preparing the preferences to the same extent where they contribute in their implementation into practice, also contribute to complicating them to the same extent as to simplifying them.

2.2. Pertinent Character Adopting the decision in economic organisational entities is often less coherent than the decision theory implies it. The problems, solutions and actions often have just a fairly weak connection between them, rather of simultaneity than of casualty. Information strategies are relatively independent of specific decisions. According to the decision theory, information strategies are deliberately

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developed to solve the uncertainties concerning certain pertinent future situations for selection. In reality, the behaviour of systems does not correspond very well to this vision. It seems that information is collected and processed without particularly considering the pertinence for the decisions stated. Empirical studies on adopting the decisions into systems indicate that most of the decisional theories underestimate the coherence of the decision process, because there is less coordination in the systems compared to that existing between solutions and problems, between purposes and means, between the orientations of one day and those of the next day or between various elements composing them. The elements, solutions and problems are randomly combined, which hardly leads to any forecast of action or result. Some specialists concluded from these remarks that decision processes in the systems are completely disorganised. On the contrary, others tried to define other concepts of the order that would enable understanding these processes. The rupture between the information process and decision process is also observed in the strategic field, where strategic analysis services are not subordinated to strategy responsibilities, which does not prevent them to continue expressing their suggestions. The research reports cause diffuse optical changes rather than the direct effects on decisions. Generating and elaborating the information concerning the problems and solutions seem to be due rather to professional and cultural standards than to an anticipation of direct contributions to decisions (Dima & Man, 2012). Several explanations to this separation between the information structure and decision structure may be found. For example, it is probably safe that close connections between information and its makers increase vulnerability of decision makers to a manipulation by information providers. It is also true that future decision options are pretty vague to lead to a disaccord between the benefits of different information strategies. Under these circumstances, the cost/benefit analyses for these

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different strategies are essentially sensitive to relative costs and selecting a strategy does not significantly depend on the decision structure it determines. These explanations are however less significant than the fact they seek to explain a certain situation. The pertinence structure in a system is more complicated and less connected to the decisions that do not enable forecasting the decision theory. An information system provided to correlate the information with a series of well defined decisions is not necessarily useful to make decisions in a context where attention and logical connections between solutions and problems are ambiguous.

2.3. Significant Character Most of the information collected and recorded is not primarily intended to contribute directly to adopting the decision, but it is rather a basis for interpreting the deeds. As information is provided and decision adopting processes occur in a structure, the first individual decisions of particular feature appear. The theories of rational selection do not indicate how the information processing and decision adoption independently contribute to developing the meaning. One can say that decisions are indeed not “adopted” into a system, but that they develop themselves into a significant context. It seems that information processing results less from an uncertainty regarding the consequence of possible decisions than from the confusion of speech regarding the possible optional world, their connection to familiar scenarios, our description and interpretation on evolution. The information gives meaning to a decision situation and therefore changes the structure of both researched opinions and preferences. The meanings of the experiences shared are developed and changed by processing the information and running the decisions, and the excessive temerity of creator’s independence (or vice-versa) and as an elegant reasoning, as a sophism (or vice-versa).

For reasons which have nothing to do with decisions, a general information becomes debate subject and ends by contributing to

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modifying the decision strategies. Consequently, a good information strategy is not as much that dissipating uncertainties of a structured assembly of options, correlated with a predetermined assembly of preferences, but rather what makes the assembly “information + desires + options” to advance into a productive direction, simultaneously developing the ideas on what is “productive” and the tools to achieve them. The decision processes are also not simply means to choose between options, actually not referring to specific decisions. In the abstract, adopting the decision is a process that call for high symbolic activities, which devote the essential values of a company, particularly the idea that life is under human’s control and that this control is exercised through the individual and collective choices based on an explicit anticipation of options and their likely consequences. These sacred values are interpreted and reinforced by means of the information systems and decisional processes. The processes of selection are to the same extent processes of involvement into action, which enable organising information and arguments in order to raise and maintain the conviction that the action selected is wise and therefore the necessary enthusiasm for implementing it into practice. If they are not achievable, the implementation is compromised, and if they are achieved too well, decisions are badly weighed and their consequences badly assessed. The “a posteriori” justification of the selected actions, understood by elaborating the information and delayed non-assessment of decisions may be considered as being part of this engagement process. The “a posteriori” justification of choices reflects the awareness of what we owe to life for a long time now, in relation to the time we spend to predict or adopt our decisions. These ritualistic, symbolic and affirmative components of the decisions and decision process do not represent chaotic manifestations of an irrational culture. So much more, the

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information strategies are therefore strategies for controlling the interpretations and creating a vision only to clarify the decisions.

3. Information Engineering and its Influence on Decision Process 3.1. Influence on Decision Theory The researches on adopting the decision have shown that in practice decisions are made, which are in contradiction with the perceptions of the theory. But, they partly set contradiction on the limits of the theory and not simply on the limits of human behaviour (George & Jones, 2007). For example, a rigid joint between the information and decision is not useful in ambiguous situations where preferences, causal structures and meanings are vague and changeable. As it has been previously shown, this type of situation is frequent. And if numerous decision problems of the contemporary systems fall without difficulty within the theory of decision and are suitable to its laws, those most interesting of these decision problems mostly do not fall into this frame (Adamescu, Costoiu, Corocăescu, Pleşu, Iancu, Adamescu... & Tălpuş, 2010; Costoiu, Plesu, Isopescu, Soriga, Alesincu & Arsene, 2012). The difficulties arose from the ambiguity of preferences, pertinence, intelligence and meaning can be illustrated by a reflection on some aphorisms suggested by decision theory:

Never start an action unknowingly. To the extent where it is operated inside the anticipative and consequential framework of rationality, it is important to know what is desired before acting. But, it is obvious that intelligent decision makers often behaved as if they would not believe in this need. They see in action a way to discover and elaborate preferences, rather than a modality to operate based on them;

Refrain yourself under ignorance. One of the axioms of the theory of rational choices is that actions are justified by understanding and anticipating their consequences. Even if it

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is admitted that this understanding of consequences cannot be total, the optimal amplitude of ignorance is determined by its expected consequences. But, it is certain that a decision maker can act intelligently without explicitly knowing the “consequential” reasons of his/her actions, but following his/her intuition, complying with his/her rules and duties or following his/her peers’ notice;

Do not ask a question if its answer cannot change your decision. In the decision theory optics, the value of an information is related to reducing the uncertainties which surround choice. Or, the essence regarding the information collected, purchased or communicated does not have this direct pertinence for decisions. It enables the creation of a background of knowledge and meanings, usable for possible actions or to explain the experience. The participants understand the collection of information as an investment into a collection of knowledge and as an aid to define and choose preferences and options;

Do not speak before knowing what you want to say. Certain communication theoreticians say that a message must be fully understood by its issuer before being sent, as accurately as possible, to its addressee. But a large part of the effective communication in systems overcomes the ambiguous formulations and leads to answers representing the message and seeks its possible meanings.

The conclusion is simple; an information system can be designed based on a static and precise decision structure and this is a good idea. But the information engineering has a more difficult and more important duty: designing a system for imprecise decision structures and which modify. In some cases, the problems can be reduced to a standard problem variant, supposing that the distribution of probabilities of

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uses and possible users is known or can be assessed, which is proved to be of limited utility. Taking into account that an explicit solution of a complex problem is of a completely different difficulty level than that of the initial problem, this solution shall not solve the deeper problems of ambiguity (Lis, Lapeta & Novak, 2005). These more general problems have been discussed before, but not really solved in the institutes related to the knowledge systems of advanced cultures. It is possible, at least in principle, to imagine a system for generating and diffusing the knowledge that explicitly identifies the probable decisions to adopt, the knowledge needed to these decisions and expected marginal output of other knowledge tools (Neacşu, 2005). This approach has already been suggested for decisions of assignment within the knowledge systems like science, journalism or education. But it is clear in each of these cases that the “ex-ante” connection between the information forecasted uses, its generation and actual uses is rather a connection of weak intensity. In general, one may notice that preferences are developed during the problem solving and construction of interpretations asking the question how this more intelligent elaboration is stated. It shall be noticed that rules contain the essence of an inoperable historical experience. A way to estimate and increase the probable value of information of certain inexplicable rules shall also be sought. One can also highlight that the best approach to such problems is often achieved by a resolution of problems, slightly structured and exporatory. 3.2. Influences on Decision Makers’ Activities These remarks regarding the ambiguity of the information-decision adoption connections also reappear frequently in the recent behaviour of systems. If they are exact even partially, they shall have consequences concerning the reflection on the information

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systems. Actually, they must take into account the characteristics of the elements, even though they are in causality relations. Three classical approaches may be distinguished when dealing with the human deficiencies through engineering, and namely:

The first approach consists in adapting the system to the observed features of human beings. Instead of a supporting system in decision making, disconnected from the world, as decision makers want it and which they do not use, the system may be designed to provide them with the information in a familiar and useful form. The main difficulty for this approach consists in understanding the users’ demands and in adapting the system to these requests. This is not as easy as it seems;

The second approach consists in changing the how the decision makers adopt their decisions and attitude in relation to the information. In over three decades of training and consultancy, scientific management and operational research have operated important changes in the field of adopting the decisions in modern systems. Recent researches regarding the decision behaviour have been related to the strategies of improving the capacities of information processing by the human brain. Decades of efforts for determining the decision makers to adopt a behaviour closer to the decision theory precepts have proven that this is not an easy duty because the prejudices, “a priori” reasoning and decision makers’ wisdom are resistant to decision theory attacks and modern statistics;

We should also emphasise the problem of capacities of storage and data processing which the computer-based information systems have available, which considerably lowers the advantages of carefully prepared classical data collection. Contemporary researches in the field of data processing seem to show that the exploratory analysis of the data collected, without reference to a precise use, clearly progresses to prior formulation of the needs for information.

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This shall verify the arguments according to which future information systems are not supported anymore by the idea of a close connection between the collection of information and anticipation of its use.

4. Intelligent Processes in Complex Systems Even if the individual participants often try to act intelligently inside the system, calculating the consequences of the actions considered, their behaviour is often modified by the need to be subject to the rules that encode the lessons learnt from experience through a complex system of partially overlapped elements (Mihnea Costoiu, Plesu, Arsene, Alesincu & Iancu, 2009; Costoiu, Adamescu, Svasta, Nicola, Pleşu, Iancu,... & Tălpuş, 2010). Modern theories of adopting decision and interactive competition are theories of intelligence calculated for its own interest (Kiperska-Moron &Krzyzaniak, 2009). Let us imagine a world where decision makers concerned with their personal interest are “niches”, themselves being placed within markets, crowds, political institutions, etc. Every participant tries to make decisions (or reflect on decisions) in a such way as to promote their personal interest as he/she determines it by comparing the expected consequences of various options. These considerations extend to all decision processes and on getting the information necessary for these decisions. The evolution of intelligent processes within the complex systems knows three stages:

Stage 1. Collectiveness is divided into the innocent (naïve) and intellectuals. Those in the second category are intelligent, those in the first category are not. Intelligence acts towards promoting personal interest with all subtlety and possible imagination. The information is a tool in the service of the intelligent ones and competition rewards people according to their relative intelligence in using this tool;

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Stage 2. Competition gradually removes naivety. People less intelligent are eliminated by competition and lose either their naivety, or the means of livelihood. Once the naives are eliminated, the intelligence margins are decreased and they have no more effect on the distribution of positive results. All participants are intelligent or services can be provided to some who are intelligent. This is what is affirmed by numerous theories of competition applied in politics, ecology or economy. The most recent aspects of this idea are notions of rational anticipation and efficient markets in economy. The hypotheses according to which adaptation is relatively rapid do not exist. A new exogenous intake and existence of some sufficient reserves of intelligence available at any moment are questionable, but still acceptable for simplicity;

Stage 3. Finally, intelligence loses both its “victims” and competitive advantage. The elimination of those lacking intelligence reduces the competitive value of the intelligence forms that lead to this elimination.

It is however in the interest of every surviving competitor to continue to behave intelligently as long as the others also behave so, even if this has no effect on its relative competitive power, due to the generalisation of this behaviour. 5. Conclusions The energy consumed in intelligence does not come from elsewhere, which makes all participants to be intelligent and vulnerable to the new forms of penetration resulted from the outside. This evolution only applies to information engineering and draws the attention on the problems raised by the dynamics of competition systems even if it underestimates the importance of these problems. When competition occurs over long periods of time, the style of the dominant behaviour does not seem to consist in the confidence

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grated to intelligence, meaning the conscious elaboration of subtle strategies by individuals concerned by their own interest. It is not a surprise that those studying the decision behaviour have noted that the rules followed by individual participants to draw conclusions concerning the given scientific tools or to make decisions are often wiser than the theory laws and statistics which they breach. The intelligence of rules does not lie in their capacity to solve the correctly identified and understood problems, but in how it deals with all problems that are poorly understood, half understood or absolutely unidentified. [7] Recognising these default capacities of the rules should incite to attempts for a better understanding and improvement of the processes dependent on history, instead of seeking to replace these processes. In the field of information engineering, the first manifestations of the evolutionary rules are professional norms of all those who process the information. This regulation of behaviour has evolved with the experience. It has been codified by means of discussions and debates and dedicated by creating a profession and appropriate training institutions. It is clear these standards threaten on the free competition of intelligences and are justified if the unlimited efficiency of this competition can be proven, as the restrictions are also unjustified if the unlimited efficiency of mental competition can be proven. From this point of view, the information engineering standards are cultural standards of decency. All these standards include an experience of the limits and advantages of calculated intelligence, which cannot be exploited explicitly by an isolate participant acting in a frame of the intelligence. The rules of these standards on intelligence are therefore real.

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