a sugar mill. In 1961 Poland contributed 7 million rubles to the Five" Year Plan.

The other Sino-Soviet bloc countries have granted aid since 1955 in the form of financial aid and goods. A.ccording to Com­munistsources HungalY contributed 6 million rubles to the Five­Year Plan., Bulgaria gave 4.8 million rubles in goods and, in 1961, made it contrib.ution of more than 2 million rubles to the Five­Year Plan; A.lbania supplied goods valued at 62,300 rubles and Mongolia sent goods valued at 367,000 rubles. Mongolia also donated 100,000 animals to be delivered between 1950 and 1965 and has sent veterinarians and expert stockbreeders to North Vietnam. in 1962 North Korea made a gift of 10 trucks.

Pattern of Foreign Trade

The volume of foreign trade has expanded from an insignificant amount in 1955 to a value of 831.2 million rubles in 1960 (see table 7). The bulk of trade has been with the Sino-Soviet bloc countries, growing in value from 76 million rubles in 1955 to 421 million in 1958. The remainder of North Vietnam's foreign trade :was with 58 countries outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, mainly France, Japan, India and Indonesia.

1957 1958 1959 1960

'i'able 7. North Vietnam's Foreign Trade, 1957-00

(in millions of rubles1)

163,8 204,6 269.2 319.6

398.0 253.2 417.9 511.6

1 For value of ruble, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from USSR Government publication.

Exports

561.8 457.8 687.1 831.2

Exports of products listed as "industrial" by the North Viet­na1lleseregime have steadily drawn abea,d: of agricultural and forestry products in impQrtance. Included in the. industrial cate­gory were coal, handicrafts, ores, cement, lIoor tiles, clothing and footwear. Of this group of commoditiel1, the major items of export were, however, coal and handicrafts. ,Beginning with 1957 over half a million tons of an.thracite '\Vere, shipped to Japan annually. and significant tonnages were shipped to France,Belgium (re" exported through Czechoslovaltia), ,SingaPore and Italy. A con­siderable I\mount of coal was :\lxported in the form of bUl1kering

458 A~O lO041B

foreign ships at Hon Gay, a trading port in the center of the coal region.

Handicrafts, consisting of articles made of silver, ivory, horn, bamboo and cane, have become an important export item, account­ing for a relatively large share of total exports. Sales abroad have risen spectacularly: from a value of 1 million dong in 1955 to 4 million dong in 1956 and to a still higher value in subsequent years.

Of the wide variety of. exports classed as "agricultural and forestry products" -which included rice, peanuts, sesame, castor oil, jute, canned or dried vegetables and fruits, fish and lumber, particularly rare woods-rice and lumber were the most impor­tant. More than 180,000 tons of rice were shipped abroad in 1957 to the Soviet bloc, Indonesia and India. No figures are available for subsequent years, except that $2 million worth of rice was sold to countries outside the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1960. No information is available on quantity of lumber shipped, but it appears to be a popular item among North Vietnam's customers.

Imports

The major portion of imports were producer goods (see table 8). Machinery and equipment ranked first and included large quantities of machine tools, precision, mechanical and optical equipment, electrical and radio apparatus, road-building equip­ment and agricultural machinery. Motor vehicles, especially trucks, and bicycles were also important import items.

Industrial raw materials were next in rank. These consisted of rolled steel, plastics, cotton and cotton thread. Another very important import was petroleum and petroleum products, supplied mainly by the Soviet Union.

Imported consumer goods consisted mainly of fabrics (mostly cotton), sugar and pharmaceuticals.

'Pable 8. Composition of North Vt'etnam's Imports

(in millions of rubles l )

Producer goods Consumer goods

1957 1958 1959 1960

1 For value of ruble, see Gl0tI8ary.

266.6 188.5 356.5 460.6

Source: Adapted from USSR Government publication.

AGO 100418

131.4 64.7 51.4 51.0

459

Balance of Payments No balance of payments account is published by the regime.

The request to the Sino.Soviet bloc. countries for, cancellation of debts totaling 480 million rubles is evidel)ce of No.rth.Vietnam's unfavQrable balance on account with tl1ese cO\lntries .. The regime, however, has continued to point out ~hat the trade lJalance was improving with. exports paying for an increasing percentage of imports. North Vietnam's balance of trade with Japan is favora­ble; information on other trade partners outside the Sino-Soviet bloc is lacking. .

<.,!

460 ~GO .. , 100418

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Section III. Economic

RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING

Among the sources consulted in the preparation ()f this section, the following are recommended as additional reading. Avsenev, M. M. Demokraticheskaya Respublika V'yetnam-Ekon­

omika i Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (The Democratic Republic of Vietnam-Economy and Foreign Trade). (Trans. by United States J()int Publications Research Service, JPRS: 7437.) Len­ingrad: n. pub., 1960.

Bui-cong-Trung. "Aid by Countries in the Socialist Camp in Restoring and Developing the National Economy of the Demo­cratic Republic ()f Vietnam." (Trans. by United States Joint Publicati()ns Research Service, JPRS: 4925, from Demokratic­heskaya Respublika V'yetnam, Institute of the Pe()ples ()f Asia ()f the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1960.) Washington: JPRS, 1961.

Buu-Hoan. "Impact ()f Military Expenditures ()n the South Viet­namese Economy," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXV, De­cember 25, 1958, 839-842.

___ . "Vietnam: Economic Consequences of the Geneva Peace," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXV, December 11, 1958, 753-757.

__ ._. "Vietnam: Structure of a Dependent Economy," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXV, December 18, 1958, 789-798.

___ . "Vietnam's Economic Structure--The Impact of Aid," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXVI, May 14, 1959, 677-680.

Fall, Bernard. Le Viet-Minh: La Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam, 1945-1960. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1960.

___ . The Viet-Minh Regime: Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. (Rey. ed.) New York: Institute ()f Pacific Relations with S()utheast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1956.

Garratt, Colin. "China as a Foreign Aid Donor," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXI, January 19, 1961, 81-87.

Gittinger, J. Price. "Communist Land .Policy in North Vietnam," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII, August 1959, 113-126 ..

___ . "A Note on the Economic. Impact on Totalitariim Land Tenure Change: The Vietnamese Experience," Malayan Eco­nomic Review (The Journal of the Malayan Economic Society), V, October 1960, 81-84.

Gourou, Piette. The Peasants of the Tonkin Delta, A Study of Human Geography, I and II. (Human Relations Area Files,

AGO l0041B 461

"Behavior Science Translations Series.") New Haven: HRAF. 1955.

Hendry. James B. . "Land Tenure in South Viet Nam." Economic Development and Cultural Change. IX. No.1. Pt. 1. 1960. 27-44.

Hoang Van Clli. "Collectivisation and Rice Production." China Quarterly. No.9. January-March 1962. 94-104.

Honey. P. J. "Pham Van Dong's Tour." China Quarterly. No.8. October-December 1961. 42...,44.

Huard. Pierre., and Durand. Maurice. Connaissance du Viet.N am. Paris: Imprimerie N ationale. 1954.

Jones. P. H. M. "The Industry of North Vietnam." Far Eastet'n Economic Review. XXIX. September 22. 1960. 652. 653. 656-660.

___ . "Under Two Plans." Far Eastern Economic ~eview.

XXXII. May 4. 1961. 220. 221. Kaye; William. "A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North

Vietnam." .china, Quarterly. No. 9. January"~arch 1962.82-93. Mende •. Tibor. ",The Two Viet-Nam·s." Listener; LVII. May 2.

1957.701.702. Nivolon. Fran~ois. <.IForeign Trac;Ie." Far Eastern Economic Re·

view. XXXVI. May 31. 1962. 462. 463. Ortiz. Elizabeth. "The Mekong Project of Vietnam." Far Eastern

Economic Review. XXV. November 6. 1958. 596. 597. Pham Minh Duong. "Vietnamese Railways and Their Reconstruc·

tion." Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneen (Special Issue in English: Vietnam 1958). 14' Annee. No. 681. November 29. 195.8.25-31.

Savornin.Andre .• "MinIng Resources .of Southern Vietnam." Marche~ Tropioa:UX et M6diterraneens (Special Issue in English: Vietnam)958). 14' Annee. No. 681. November 29 •. 1958. 16-20.

Scigliano. Robert G .• and Sny\ler. Wayne W. "The Budget Process in South Yietna;rp. ... PacificAffairs. XXXIII. March 1960. 4~60.

Shabad. Theodore. "Economic Development in North Vietnam." Pacific Affairs. XXXI. March 1958. 36-53,.

Tran Viet Son. "Economic Reforms and~grarian Policy in North Vietllam,'.· Asian Cultwre. I. spring 1959 •. 3~54.

Trinh Ngoc sarili. '~Highway Construction Projects of Vietnam." Marches TropicauxetJlUditerraneens (Special Issue in English : Vietnam 1.958). 14' Anl)ee,.~o.681. November 29. 1958.32-36.

Trued. M .. N. '~South Viet-Nam's Industrial Development Center." Pacific Affairs,. xXXIq; '.Sep~~ber .1960, 25~267..

U.S .. Department of Commerce. ~ur.eau of Foreim.Commerce. Basic Data on the Economy of Viet-Nam. (World 'I'radeIn. formati?n Service: "Economic RePOrts," Pt. l.No. 59';'52.) Washington; Bur. of For.; qom., May 1959.

462 AGO, 100~~B

United States Joint Publications Research Service (trans.). Three-Year Industrial Plan is an Important Step in Industrial Socialization of North Vietnam. (JPRS :595-D.) Washington: JPRS, March 17, 1959 .

. Trade, Finance, Labor and Standard of Living in North Vietnam. (JPRS: 1007-N.) Washington: JPRS, December 15, 1958.

Wolfstone, Daniel. "The Measure of the Mekong," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXII, April 20, 1961, 125-131. (News from Viet-Nam, published every two months by the

Embassy of Vietnam in Washington, and Far Eastern Economic Review, published weekly in Hong Kong, have been basic sources of information on Vietnam.)

OTHER SOURCES USED Agency for International Development. Advisory Committee on

Voluntary Foreign Aid. Voluntary Foreign Reiief ProgramB­Activities of Registered Arr.€,ican Voluntary Agencies--Jan­uary 1-Der,emoiJr 31,1961 .. Washington: AID, June 28,1962.

"Agricultural Credit in Viet-N am," International Financial News Survey, XII, March 18, 1960, 289, 290.

Borisov, N. I. "The Fishing Industry of North Vietnam," (Trans. by United States Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS: L-850-N.) Washington: JPRS, December 1958.

"Budget of Viet-Nam," International Financial News Survey, XIII, June 23,1961,189,190.

Bui Van Thinh. "Central Banking in Viet-Nam." Chapter 11 in S. Gethyn Davies (ed.), Central Banking in South and East Asia. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960.

Canada. Department of Mines and Technical Surveys. Geographi­cal Branch. Indo-China, A Geographical Appreciation. (Foreign Geography Information Series, No.6.) Ottawa: 1953.

Dorsey, John T., Jr. "South Viet-Nam in Perspective," Far East­ern Survey, XXVII, December 1958, 177-182.

"Economic Progress in Viet-Nam," International Financial News Survey, XIII, August 18, 1961, 254, 255.

Economist, "Mr. Diem's Towns for Peasants," CXCVII, No. 6129, 1961,575.

"Financial and Economic Reforms in Viet-Nam," International Financial News Survey, XIV, January 19, 1962, 19, 20.

The Forests of Free Viet-Nam. A Preliminary Study for Organi­zation, Protection, Policy and Production. With a foreword by Thomas W. McKinley, Forest Resources Advisor, USOM. Saigon: USOM, March 1957.

"France in South Vietnam," Asian Review, LV, January 1959, 62-64.

AGO l0041B 463

"Industrial Development in Viet-Nam," International Financial News Survey, XIII, October 20,1961,33.

"Industrial and Financial Development Co. Set Up," Vietnam Press, Bulletin No. 218, December 17, 1961, 7 ..

"Industrial Investments Increase in Viet-Nam; Trade Sluggish," Foreign Commerce Weeklll, LXVI, September 25, 1961, 15, 16.

"Insurgency Disturbs Viet-Nam Economy; U.S. Exports In­crease," Foreign Commerce Weeklll, LXVII, January 1, 1962, 24,28.

International Cooperation Administration .. "Fat; East . Conf.erence of Food and Agriculture Officers." Hong Kong ~ April 6-11, 1959,82,83 (mimeo.).

___ . Office of Statistics and Reports. US Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations. Washington: leA, Mltrch 31, 1961.

International Monetal'y Fund. "Vietnam," Thirteenth Annual Report-Exchange Restrictions. Washington: IMF, 1962.

International VOluntary Services Vietnam. Annual Report, June 1960-June 1961. Saigon: IVS, June 14, 1961;

Lacouture, Jean. "Neutralismeet Communisme en Indochine," Le Monde, 50' Annee, January 10, 1961, 3.

Ladejlnsky, W6If."Agrarian Reform in Free Vietnam." Pages 144-173 in Viet-Nam 1960': Studies on National and Interna­tional Affairs (Special issue of Viet-Nam in World Affairs.) Saigon: n.d.

Land Reform Failures in Communist North Vietnam (Special Edition of Review Horizons) (Saigon), n.d.

Lindholm, Richard V. "Taxation in South Viet~Nam," Public . Finance, XIV, No. 3~, 1959, 236-247;

Lindley, Ernest K. "An Ally· Worth Having, " Newsweek, June 29,1959. .

Michigan State University Vietnam Adyisory Group. Field Ad­ministration Division; "Preliminary Research Report on the PMS [Pays Montagnard du Sud]." Saigon: June 1957 (mimeo.).

"NACO Announces New' Loan' Rates," Vietnam Press, Bulletin No. 223, January 2t,1962, 4, 5.

Neese, Harvey C. "Forage Corps in Vietnam." Saigon: Interna­tional Voluntary Services, United States Operations Mission, 1960 (mimeo.). '

"New Banknotes and Coirts·ToBe Issued," Vietnam Press, Bulletin No. 223,'January 21,1962,5.

"New Customs Tariff in Viet-Nam," Intern'ational Financial News Survey, XIII, September 1, 1961, 271.

"New 500 and 20 Piastre Bank Notes," Vietnam Press, Bulletin No. 230, March 11, 1962,9, 10.

'464 AGO l0041B

New York Times, "Joint Communique by United States and South Viet Nam," January 5, 1962. .

Rawlings, E. H. "Decline of French Power in Vietnam," Eastern World, X, April 1956, 11, 12.

Republic of Vietnam. Commissariat General a La Cooperation et au Credit Agricole. Le Mouvement Cooperatif au Vietnam. Saig<m: June 30, 1960.

Republic of Vietnam. Department of Land Registration and Agrarian Reform. Agrarian Reform in Viet-Nam. Saigon: October 31, 1958.

Republic of Vietnam. Directorate General of the Budget and Foreign Aid. National Budget-FiBcal Year 1958. Saigon: 1958.

National Budget-Fiscal Year 1959. Saigon: 1959. _~ __ . National Budget-Fiscal Year 1960. Saigon: 1960. ___ . National Budget-Fiscal Year 1961. Saigon: 1961. Republic of Vietnam. Ministry of Agriculture. The National Col-

lege of Agriculture, Biao. Saigon: 1960. Republic of Vietnam. National Institute of Administration. Re­

search and Documentation Division. Viet Nam Government Organization Manual 1957-1958. Saigon: May 1, 1958.

Republic of Vietnam. Presidential Press Office. President N go Dinh Diem and the Election of April 9, 1961. Saigon: 1961.

Republic of Vietnam. The Secretariat of State for Information. Cai-San. The Dramatic Story of Resettlement and Land Reform in the "Rice Bowl" of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Saigon: n.d.

La Republique Democratique du Viet-Nam. Hanoi: Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1960.

Rose, Jerry A. "The Fight for Rice in Divided Vietnam," Re­porter, V, October 12, 1961, 37, 38.

Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali. Viet-Nam. London: Octagon Press, 1960. Shikanova, 1. A. The Development of the Textile Industry in the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. (Trans. by United States Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS :8022.) Washington: JPRS, March 31, 1961.

Snyder, Wayne W. Budgetary and Financial Administration in Vietnam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, January 14, 1956.

Taussig, H. C. "North Viet Nam's Headaches," Eastern World, XI, March 1957, 12-14.

"Tax Increases in Viet-Nam," International Financial News Sur­vey, XIII, September 8, 1961, 278.

Taylor, Milton C. The Patente (Business LioenseTax) in Viet­nam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, October 1959.

_~ __ . "South Vietnam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress," Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, Fall 1961, 242-256.

AGO lO041B 465

___ . The System of Excise Taxes in Vietnam. Saigon: Michi­gan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, July 1960.

___ . The System of Indirect Taxes in Viet~Nam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, March 1960.

___ . The Taxation of Income in Vietnam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, April 1959.

___ . The Taxation of, Real Property in Viet-Nam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, July 1959.

___ . Taxes of Vietnam. Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, July 1960.

United Nations. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East-1957. Bangkok: UN,1958.

___ . Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East-1958. Bang­kok: UN,1959.

___ . Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East-1959. Bang­kok: UN, 1960.

____ . Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East-1960. Bang­kok: UN, 1961.

United Nations. Technical Assistance Programme. Toward the Economic Development of the Republic of Vietnam. (ST/TAO/ K/VIET-NAM/1 ILO/TAP/VIET-NAM/R.4 FAO/Report No. 539.) New York: TAP, 1959.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Licensing and Exchange Controls-Viet-Nam. (World Trade Information Service: "Operations Reports," Pt. 2, No. 57-77.) Washington: Bur. of For. Com., August 1957.

U.S. Department of Defense. Military Assistance Institute. Re­public of Vietnam. (Station Report.~N. pI.: October 15, 1959.

United States Joint Publications Research Service (trans.). Eco­nomic Reports on North Vietnam from Eastern European Peri­odicals. (JPRS :60S-cD.) Washington: JPRS, March 20, 1959.

___ . First State Farms in the Democratic Republic of Viet­nam. (JPRS :510-D.) Washington: JPRS, January 30, 1959.

__ ~ .. Progress Report on the State Plan for the First Half of 1960 by Premier Pham Van Dong-North Vietnam. (JPRS: 5514.) New York: JPRS, September 8,19.60.

___ . Selected Articles on Relationship Between Indust1'y and Agriculture in North Vietnam. (JPRS: 1501-N.) Washington: JPRS, April 23, 1959.

___ . Selected Newspaper A rticles on Agricultural Socialization in North Vietnam. (JPRS: 116B-;N.) Washington: JPRS, Jan­uary 26,1959.

___ . Selected Newspaper Articles on Bloc Assistance to North Vietnam. (JPRS: 1593-N.) New York: JPRS, May 18, 1959.

466 AGO' 100418

United States Operations Mission to Vietnam. "Agriculture Divi­sion Monthly Report for September 1961." (AGR-61-2652.) Saigon: USOM, October 16, 1961. (Photocopy of typed memo­randum.)

____ . Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1959. Saigon: USOM, 1959.

Building Economic Strength-Annual Report for the 1958 Fiscal Year. Saigon: USOM, 1958.

__ ._. Vietnam Meets its Challenge-Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961. Saigon: US OM, November 20, 1961.

___ . Vietnam Moves Ahead--Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1960. Saigon: USOM, October 1,1960.

United States Operations Mission to Vietnam. Program Office. Research and Statistics Section. Annual Statistical Bulletin. (No.4-Data through 1960.) Saigon: USOM, May 1961.

"Viet-Nam," Foreign Commerce Weekly, LXVI, September 18, 1961,4.

"Viet-Nam," International Financial Statistics, XV, March 1962, 280-283; April 1962, 280-283; and July 1962, 280-283.

Viet-Nam. A Breeding-Country (Special Edition of Review Hori­zons (Saigon), December 1958.

"Vietnam Institutes Fiscal Reforms by Revising Import Tariff, Taxes," Foreign Commerce Weekly, LXVII, January 22, 1962, 135.

"Vietnam-A Market Study," International Trade Review, April 1958, 12, 60.

"Viet-Nam's Supplementary Budget for 1961," International Financial News Survey, XIII, November 17, 1961, 362, 363.

Woodruff, Lloyd W. Local Finance in South Viet Nam. (Local Administration Series, Report No.2.) Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, National Institute of Ad­ministration, May 1961.

Wurfel, David. "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, No.6, 1957, 81-92. (The following periodicals were used as sources of information

on Vietnam: The Washington Post; The New York Times; The Wall Street Journal; The Christian Science Monitor; and Journal d'Extreme-Orient [published daily in Saigon]. Also used was Three-Monthly Economic Review: Continental S.E. Asia [pub­lished by The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., in London], from June 1960 to April 1962.)

AGO l0041B 467

SECTION IV. MILITARY BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 31

THE ARMED FORCES

The military establishments in North and South Vietnam share a common heritage of Vietnamese history and draw upon the roughly equal human resources of a country divided in half, but they differ from each other in almost all other respects. The Viet­namese National Army in the South grew out of a militarized police force which was formed in 1947 and operated until 1954 as a component part of the French Union Forces in Indochina. In the North, on the other hand, the People's Army of Vietnam, organized officially in 1946, developed out of the Communist-led forces which, after World War II, took the offensive against French colonial rule.

When, in 1954, under the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, the country was partitioned along the Demarcation Line, which roughly follows the 17th parallel, the South and the North each embarked on a program to develop its armed forces. Financial, industrial and technical limitations then and since have made both almost entirely dependent on foreign logistical support and advice in training and organization. In the South this assistance comes mainly from the United States; in the North, from the Communist-bloc countries and chiefly from Communist China and the Soviet Union.

The estimated total strength of the South Vietnamese regular armed forces in mid-1962, based on published accounts, was ap­proximately 250,000-about 1.7 percent of the total population of 14,650,000 .. The military establishment reportedly included: the National Army of 170,000; the Navy of 8,000; the Air Force of 5,000; and the Civil Guard of 68,000. A program to strengthen all components was in progress; and the Army, for example, was expected to increase to about 200,000 men by the end of 1962.

Military personnel were, on the whole, young. Many of the senior officers were under 40 years of age and had held subordinate positions in the French Union Forces; the bulk of the junior officers had received commissions after attending Da Lat Military Academy or one of the officer candidate schools. Most of the enlisted men were youths who had volunteered or been drafted after 1954. The combat experience of most junior officers and enlisted men had been gained in clashes with local guerrilla bands after the partitioning of the country.

The estimated total strength of the regular military establish-

AGO l0041B 469

ments in North Vietnam wall estimated to be ,approximately

400,OOO-abQut 2.5 percent of the total population of 16,350,000.

This strength included the At;n;ly of some 300,000 men and the

Militia Units of at least 100,000. There was no separate air force

or navy, but the army figures include,d a group of about 750 avi­

ation specialists and a naval section composed of approximately

2,000 officers and men. Also included were the guerrilla troops,

operating with the Pathet Lao forces in Laos and with the Viet

Cong in South Vietnam; these, with specialists and advisers,

totaled some 20,000 men. Members of the People's Army were

generally older than those of the National Army of South Vietnam.

Many of the senior officers had held high. command positions in the

Viet Minh forces which fought against the French in the Indo­

china War, a);ld most of the Junior officers hail risen from the

ranks. The establishment of conscription in 1959,however, began

to bring younger soldiers and junior .officers into the Army to take

the places of combat-experienced veterans as these returned to

civil life.

BACKGROUND

The Vietnamese pride themselves on the courage and fighting

ability of their men, and they look back on a long history of

bloody .wars, generally defensive but sometimes offensive in

nature. In the tenth century they expelled the Chinese who had

ruled them for nearly a thousand years and thereafter, except for

a brief period. of Chinese occupation, resisted both Chinese and

Mongol invasions. The. first Vietnamese military academy was established in the

mid-thirteenth century. The Vietnamese government at that time

had a dual hierarchy of civil and military mandarins under the

emperor. Many of the Vietnamese generals distinguished them­

selves in successful defensive actions against stronger enemy

forces. Vietnamese historians take special pride in the Vietnamese

forces which stopped the formidable Mongol army of Kublai Khan

in 1285. In three successive campaigns before their final defeat, some

500,000 Mongols attempeted to subjugate a Vietnamese army of

less than 200,000. During the first campaign, in 1281, they suc­

ceeded in occupying nearly all'of what is now North Vietnam. The

Vietnamese, under the command of Prince General· Tran Quoc

Tuan (later known as' Marshal Tran Hung Dao) , regrouped in the

mountains along the Chinese frontier. Profiting from the lessons

learned from the first campaign, Tran Hung Dao compiled the first

Vietnamese military manual, the Binh Thu Yeu Luoc (Essential

Summary of the Mili1;jl;ry Arts), a treatise which dealt with

470 AOO l0041B

weather, terrain and human factors in warfare. After retraining his troops, he defeated the Mongols in 1285, killing their eom­mander, Sogatu.

A final Mongol attack, in which naval forces played a leading part, was repulsed by the Vietnamese who had installed in the river approaches long pointed stakes which, at low tide, pierced the hulls of the Mongol ships. This same technique was employed successfully by the North Vietnamese army against Franco-Viet­namese naval craft during the 1946-54 hostilities.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Vietnamese engaged in intermittent wars with the Chams, their neighbors to the south who occupied much of what is now South Vietnam. Eventually the Vietnamese totally defeated the Chams, seized their lands and all but exterminated them.

A cult of military heroes eventually developed: their exploits are celebrated in song .and story and temples have been erected in their memories. These celebrated events include heroic defeats as well as great victories, as in the case of the Trung sisters who led a revolt against the Chinese in the first century A.D. and chose suicide rather than surrender (see ch. 2, Historical Setting). The episode has long been a source of inspiration to Vietnamese artists, writers and orators, and it is commemorated annually, especially in the South, as an example of self-sacrificing devotion to country.

Some successful generals like Marshal Tran Hung, are also still venerated in both North and South. In the North, however, the historic figures and their achievements have been overshadowed by the officially cultivated images of the personalities and events of the Indochina War and notably the victory at Dien Bien Phu. References to the centuries of resistance against the Chinese are supplanted by laudatory accounts of the "heroic action" of the Chinese People's Army against the "forces of imperialism."

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Strategic Considerations

Situated on the southern and southeastern rim of the Indochina Peninsula, South Vitetnam has many strategic vulnerabilities and some advantages in relation to the neighboring states of Cambodia and Laos. Almost 750 miles long and from 25 to 130 miles wide, it presents its defenders with lengthy sea and land frontiers in rela­tion to territory.

South Vietnam has an area of about 66,000 square miles (com­parable to that of the state of Washington) ; its coastline of ap­proximately 1,200 miles is about 300 miles longer than that of Cali­fornia. The country's boundaries with its neighboring states-­Cambodia (575 miles), Laos (275 miles) and North Vietnam AGO lO041B

471 232_667 0 _ 86 - 31

.(50 miJes)-total approximately 900 miles. The boundaries with .. , .••... ,

Cambodia and Laos are generally unmarked, almost inaccessible

and virtually indefensible in many sections. Maneuver space is so

limited that ground defenses against an attack from the sea or

from Cambodia or Laos would have to be virtually in place. De­

fenses against thrusts from the north or south would risk encircle-

ment. Most of the people in each of the three geographic regions (the

Mekong Delta, the Central Lowlands and the Central Highlands)

live mainly on local resources, requiring little from the outside.

Hence the loss of any particular area, except possibly the Saigon

metropolitan district and the surrounding provinces, would not

necessarily bring about the capitulation of the entire country.

The country is closer to important centers in Southeast Asia and

India than it is to the cities of Central and North China. It is also

farther by air from Saigon to Hanoi (700 miles) than from Saigon

to Singapore (650 miles) or to Bangkok (475 miles). Calcutta is

300 miles closer by air than Shanghai (1,775 miles distant), and

the distance to Peiping (2,150 miles) exceeds that to Darwin,

Australia, by about 100 miles.

Terrain, weather and logistic considerations would present

difficult problems to any military force operating in the area.

In the Mekong Delta region the terrain is flat and poorly.drained.

In the dry season, overland movement is hampered by a close

network of canals and sluggish streams and by extensive areas of

swamp and marshland infested with snakes, leeches and insects.

During the wet season, when vast areas are flooded, transport is

limited to watercraft and amphibious vehicles (see ch. 3, Geog­

raphy and Population).

In the Central Hi~hlands movement is seriously restricted by

rugged mountains and deep, narrow valleys covered with forests

and dense undergrowth. Track and wheeled vehicles are limited

to the few roads. Pack animals and foot troops can move on the

trails only with difficulty. In the wet season movement is likely to

be further complicated by swollen streams with swift currents,

washed-out bridges and landslides. Open and rolling terrain occurs in relatively few areas, such as

on the highland pillteau extending from just east of Saigon to the

uplands around Da Lat and in sections of the Central Lowlands

coast. Large-scale airdrops would be feasible in these areas, but

subsequent troop operations would soon be hampered by the

nearby jungles. The terrain lends. itself to ambush and to the hit-and-run tactics

of guerrilla warfare and is generally unsuitable for conventional

military operations. The dense vegetation throughout the country

472 AGO l0041B

provides good concealment from air and ground observation and favors the escape of raiding parties.

Food and equipment deteriorate rapidly in the hot, humid climate. On the coasts special measures must be taken to protect armament, aircraft and motor transport from the corrosive effects of the sea air. During the wet season, fog, low clouds and torren­tial rains frequently interfere with air operations.

Relation to the National Economy

Manpower and Materiel

It is estimated that about 4,340,000 men are between the ages of 15 and 49 and that about 2,170,000 of these are physically fit for military service. The total manpower employed in maintaining the economy at its mid-1962 level has been put at approximately 2,761,000, and it is believed that about 1,381,000 of these are physically fit for military service (see ch. 13, Labor Force).

Assuming that the effort to meet a large-scale invasion would require a 20 percent increase in the number of able-bodied men engaged in essential nonmilitary work (a total of 1,657,000 as compared with the 1,381,000 engaged in essential nonmilitary pursuits in 1962), there would remain a surplus of approximately 513,000 men available for military service. Deducting the 250,000 already in military service as of mid-1962 would leave 263,000 still available for mobilization. Thus, any mobilization of manpower for military units in excess of 250,000 to 300,000 physically fit males would impose a corresponding decrease in the number of persons engaged in activities essential for maintaining the coun­try's present level of production. Rice production would suffer from a lack of hands during the short but critical planting and harvesting seasons. Transportation and commercial enterprises would also feel the military drain on the limited pool of persons with special skills.

Military Budget

The struggle against the Viet Cong imposes a burden of military expenditure which the country's economy can carry only with ex­tensive foreign aid. Since independence in 1954 South Vietnam's yearly contribution toward the development and maintenance of its military establishment has been well under 20 percent of the actual cost, and the percentage has decreased with rising costs as the security forces have been enlarged and strengthened (seech. 27, Public Finance; ch. 30, iforeign Economic Relations).

The funds allocated for defense in the annual budget have remained fairly constant since 1958. Inl'eIation to the total buqget, the portionalloeated for defense has declined from ap-

AGO l0041B 473

proximately 44 percent in 1958 to less than 39 percent in 1961 (see ch. 27, Public Finance). During this period the budget increases for the Departments of Public Works and Communica­tions, the Interior, National Education and Public Health went mostly into rural programs, particularly those designed to improve security and living conditions in the countryside. Emphasis was placed on the establishment of agrovilles and strategic hamlets, the construction and maintenance of roads, schools and dispensaries, and the creation of the Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps and Re­publican Youth Rural Defense Groups.

In 1961 the military budget amounted to approximately 5,797 million piasters (for value of piaster, see Glossary). Of this amount, however, the United States aid program provided about 4,515 millio;n piasters, exclusive of the cost of such things as weapons, trucks, airplanes and naval craft, which were also ac­quired under the aid program. Including the cost of these items, the South Vietnamese Government actually paid for about 10 per­cent of the national defense costs. At the same time, the allocation to the military establishment was larger than for any other single governmental agency.

Military expenditures have not roused any significant popular criticism, although the subject is among these exploited by Com­munist propagandists over Radio Hanoi and clandestinely in South Vietnam. The human and material sacrifices required to counter Viet Cong terror are part of the experience of the people even in remote villages, but few other than the educated minority are in a position to reflect on the division and expenditures of govern­ment income. Heavy as is the drain of the military budget on funds which might otherwise be spent for economic and social development, the population has in recent years been receiving more economic support and social services than ever before. In the countryside especially, such dissatisfaction as may exist in this realm undoubtedly relates more to the necessity of paying taxes and the personal impact of defense measures than to concern about budget allocation.

Missions and Organizations

Missions

The dual mission of the armed forces is to defend the nation's sovereignty and to bring about the pacification of the national territory. Since the withdrawal of the French Union Forces from Vietnam in June 1956, the principal task of the military has been the internal one of ending threats to the security of the state-­first from armed religious sects and gangsters and currently from

474 AGO 10041D

the Viet Cong (see ch. 21, Public Order and Safety; ch. 23, Sub­versive Potentialities).

The National Army, as the major component of the armed forces, is expected to strike the main blows in offensive operations against the Viet Cong and at the' same time to act as a ready re­serve in support of the operations of the local Civil Guard and Self­Defense Corps against the Viet Congo In addition, elements of the Army perform many important noncombat functions, most of them indirectly related to the improvement of internal security. Most district, provincial and regional chiefs are army officers, and many others are on temperary duty with government civilian agencies, such as the Commission for Agricultural Development and the Interdepartmental Committee for the Development of Strategic Hamlets. Engineer units help construct roads, bridges and dikes; they also clear land and work on irrigation projects. Army medical teams engage in malaria eradication and other com­munity health projects and treat the sick in some rural areas. Army units also distribute insecticides and fertilizers.

The official mission of the Civil Guard is to enforce the law and maintain public order and security in rural areas. It is also re­sponsible for assisting other components of the armed forces in the pacification of the national territory.

The local Self-Defense Corps groups are charged with helping the authorities in the villages and other administrative units in which they are organized to maintain public order and security. They, guard against sabotage and terrorist activities and protect public works. They are also used on emergency relief missions to local areas stricken by fire, flood and devastating storms. Despite their wide range of responsibilities, their police powers are limited to the apprehension of offenders for handing over to the police (see ch. 21, Public Order and Safety).

The general mission of the Navy, as defined by law, is to pro­vide for the security of the sea approaches to the country and for the protection of the inland waterways in the Mekong Delta. It may also be called upon to furnish water transportation for Army

'personnel and materiel. It is charged with maintaining a marine ,group capable of conducting operations either alone or in conjunc­tion with Army forces. The Navy also is responsible for maintaIn­ing coastal and inland waterway patrols to assist, when called upon, customs officials or internal security authorities operating against smugglers or others engaged in illegal activities.

The Air Force, besides providing close air support for the ground troops, has additional missions which include: attacking guerrilla groups and installations; transporting ground forces and their supplies; airlifting airborne troops; aerial reconnaissance; and search and rescue operations.

AGO l0041a 475

Command Structure

The President of the Republic is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Article 37 of the Constitution). Since his inaugu­ration in 1955 President Ngo Dinh Diem has reserved for himself the portfolio of Secretary of State for National Defense. For actual direction of routine affairs in the Department of National Defense, the President is assisted by an Undersecretary of State for National Defense. New policies and all decisions on major issues require approval by the President himself acting in his capacity as Secretary of State for National Defense. A Perma­nent Secretariat General for National Defense keeps the President in close touch with departmental matters (see fig. 18).

The Undersecretary of State for National Defense is assisted by a staff called the Cabinet which is headed by a Director of Cabinet. The Director is responsible for collecting and reviewing documents which require approval of the Secretary of State for National Defense and for the preparation of studies as directed by the Secretary. The Cabinet maintains liaison between the De­partment of National Defense and other departments. It also transmits decisions of the Undersecretary of State for National Defense to the heads of offices and agencies concerned with them within the Department of National Defense and within other ex­ecutive departments.

The Department of National Defense, as of June 1962, consisted of 21 offices, grouped into three general categories: Central Agen­cies, Departmental Services and Logistical Services.

The Central Agencies included the Directorate General of the Civil Guard, Central Inspectorate of the Self-Defense Corps, Gen­eral Military Inspectorate of the Armed Forces, Inspectorate Gen­eral for Military Expenditures, Directorate General of Adminis­tration, Budget and Accounting, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The general function of each inspectorate or directorate is indi­cated by its title. The General Staff is headed by the Chief of the General Staff who has overall responsibility for military organiza­tion and training, for the development of the military establish­ment, and for the general coordination of the activities of the Army, Navy and Air Force. He is assisted by a deputy, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Staff. This officer has four principal assistants: the Armed Forces Field Commander, who is responsible for overall planning; and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force who as the chief representatives of their branches of the General Staff, hold the titles of Assistant Chief of Staff for Army, for Navy and for Air Force, respectively. In mid-1962, Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh, Chief of Staff of the

476 AGO 10041B~

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AGO lOO41B

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477

General Staff, was concurrently Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army.

The General Staff, theoretically a joint staff, is organized into five Joint Staff Sections, abbreviated as J-1 (for personnel mat­ters), J-2 (for intelligence), J-3 (for operations and training), J-4 (for logistics) and J-5 (for psychological warfare and social services). The sections are composed mostly of army personnel, the Army being the largest component of the armed forces. The Joint Staff, in effect, serves as an Army General Staff, which also performs staff functions for the Navy and Air Force.

In the Departmental Services are the Directorates of Person­nel, Military Justice and Gendarmerie, Military Security (coun­terintelligence), Psychological Warfare, Social Services, Veterans Affairs and Geographic Services.

The Logistical Services include the Quartermaster, Engineer, Transportation, Naval Technical, Ordnance, Health and Medical, Signal Communications and Air Force Technical Directorates. These agencies are responsible to the Chief of the General Staff for technical and operational matters but they are under the De­partment of National Defense for administration.

General Organization and Disposition

Army. The country is organized, for military purposes, into three corps areas and, for police and security matters, the Saigon Spe­cial Sector, which includes the capital and its environs. The corps designations, with their headquarters and areas of responsibilities are as follows: I Corps, Da Nang (formerly Tourane)-northern and central coastal provinces; II Corps, Pleiku-the Central High­lands provinces; III Corps, Saigon-the southern part of South Vietnam, including the Saigon Special Sector. The Army's seven divisions are allocated to corps areas generally in proportion to the density of population and the seriousness of the Viet Cong threat in the area. As of mid-1962 the I Corps and II Corps each had two divisions; III Corps in the densely populated southern region had three. Each division is responsible for an area called a tactical zone which generally includes several provinces. The corps area commander can theoretically move his divisions from one province to another within his area of jurisdiction. The prov­ince chief, charged by law with responsibility for security within his province, may request the army commander in his area for additional troops to meet a threatened attack by Viet Cong forces. Differences in rank among these officers frequently complicate the situation. In 1962, 34 of the 39 province chiefs were army officers, and 25 of these held the rank of major-generally lower than that of the zonal military commander. Despite the need for definition of responsibilities and classification of command chan-

478 AGO l0041B

nels, in mid-1962 the coordination of the combat activities of the widely distributed line units seemed to be improving. Navy. The Navy is composed of the small staff section and the Naval Command. The Staff Section, headed by the Commandant of the Navy, consists of several branches, including: operations, which is also concerned with training, communications and intel­ligence matters; Logistics; and Psychological Warfare. The com­mandant is Chief of Staff for Navy on the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Naval Command is composed of the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishments. The Operating Forces consist of the Sea Force, the River Force, the Marine Corps and a paramilitary group called the Junk Force. The Sea Force included various types of small ships, such as escort vessels, minesweepers and shallow­draft landing craft. The River Force consists mainly of armed and armored patrol boats and some plastic motor-powered light vessels to supplement the LCVP (landing craft, vehicle, person­nel), which are too heavy to be carried overland. The Marine Corps Group, with headquarters in Saigon, is organized into sev­eral battalions, each with infantry, light artillery and reconnais­sance'elements; these are similar to units of the United States Marine Corps. The Junk Force is a small fleet of locally con­structed boats armed with rifles and .50-caliber machineguns. They are manned mainly by former fishermen. Supervised. by a few men from the regular Navy, the Force patrols inlets and landing beaches to prevent the entry. of Communist infiltrators and supplies.

The Shore Establishments include the Naval Headquarters, Supply Center and Shipyard-all in Saigon. The Shipyard, among the largest of its kind between Singapore and Japan, was estab­lished in 1886.by French authorities as their main ship-repair facility in the Far East. At the beginning of World War II, it employed up to 3,200 workers and technicians. It was reactivated after the Indochina War under the supervision of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). By 1961 Viet­namese engineers had replaced the 20-odd Japanese technicians who had helped reo~n the yard. Air Force. The Air Force, organized in 1952, remained under French control until 1955, when it became a component of the Armed Forces. The Commander of the Air Force, like his Navy counterpart, is also Chief of Staff for Air on the Joint Staff. The Air Force consists of a small Staff Section and four squardons­fighter, liaison, transport and helicopter. The Squadrons are all based in the Saigon area, principally on a portion of the interna­tional airport, Tan Son Nhut, and at Rien Hoa, 15 miles northeast·

AGO l(10(lB 47.9

of Saigon. Some planes of the liaison type are based at Da Nang, and some training planes are stationed at Nha Trang where flying and technical training courses are conducted. As of mid-1962, some of the facilities at Nha Trang were being transferred to the Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa bases.

The Military and Civil Order

Civilian Controls

The Constitution vests the President with direct and extensive controls over military affairs:

With the agreement of one half of the members of the National Assembly, the President of the Republic shall declare war and eonclude treaties of peace (Article 36).

The President of the Republic shall appoint and dismiss all mili­tary and civil servants in conformance with existing laws, except in cases where the Constitution shall prescribe special procedures (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall he the Supreme Commander of the armed forces (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall bestow all decorations (Article 37).

The President of the Republic shall exert the right of pardon, of mitigation, commutation, cancellation of penalty (Article 37).

The Presldent of the Republic may sign a decree proclaiming a state of emergency, alert or siege in one or many areas; this decree may temporarily suspend the application- of one or many laws in these areas (Article 44).

As Secretary of State for National Defense with 21 offices, in­cluding the General Staff of the Armed Forces, under him, the President controls all aspects of the operation of the military establishment. He apparently believes that the contest with the Communists calls for a merging of civilian and military leader­ship, and he has assigned many military officers to civil posts, especially to those with security functions. At the same time, him­self a civilian, he has, by insistence on the personal loyalty of his appointees and the unhesitating use of his powers of dismissal, held in check any tendencies there might be for the military to develop political ambitions of its own. The attempted military coup of 1960 was put down decisively, and 2 years later there was no visible evidence that any important elements of the military still nourished the attitudes of that time (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities) .

Indoctrination Political indoctrination has been receiving increasing attention

in the armed forces. Methods are both direct (through formal lectures) and indirect (by incorporation into regular military in­struction and training). Initially "political officers" were assigned

480 AGO 10041B

to some troop units, but the title was soon changed to that of "psychological warfare officers." These officers, usually graduates of the Intelligence and Psychological Warfare. School at Cho Lon, conduct indoctrination classes in the units to which they are at­tached and develop propaganda against the Viet Cong and the Communist regime of North Vitenam.

In 1959, out of the 132 hours allotted to the basic training of recruits, only 2 were given to indoctrination. Two years later the training schedule at the Da Lat Military Academy provided for 2 hours a week of "ideological guidance."

Political Influence Military men, individually and collectively, play no overt part

in partisan politics-either in the dominant National Revolution­ary Movement or in any of the other small and tightly circum­scribed minority parties which support President Ngo. Concern that the military establishment remain outside of politics is doubt­less conditioned by regard for both the key role of the military in the defense of the country against the Communist assault and for the potential threat to the established government from an armed force which had developed political ambitions and policies of its own.

The political factions that plagued the military establishment just after independence apparently have been eliminated. In June 1954 when Ngo-then Premier-was given full military powers, he encountered a hostile group of pro-Bao Dai senior officers headed by General Nguyen Van Hinh, Army Chief of Staff, and General Nguyen Van Vy, Inspector General. General Hinh openly criticized Premier Ngo in October 1954 and, within a month there­after, was dismissed from the service with the consent of Bao Dai. He subsequently lent his support to the rebellious sects, and his influence rapidly declined with their defeat in late 1955. Mean­while, Gener8.! Vy had been arrested by troops loyal to the Pre­mier. The dissident officers of the sects and their supporters were also screened out during the process of integrating loyal elements of the religious groups into the Army (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentialities) .

By 1956 virtually all of the elements which supported groups opposing the government had been eliminated from the armed forces. The officers and men who participated in the attempted coup of November 1960 were motivated by 'dlssatisfaction with military policies. Their inability to obtain political support indi­cated a lack of close connection with outside political groups.

Civilian Attitude Toward the Military

The civilian attitude toward the military is generally favorable. Soldiers usually conduct themselves circumspectly and Without

AGO l0041B 481

arrogance in their dealings with civilians. The Republic is too young to have a military tradition of its own-as distinguished from that common to the whole Vietnamese people-and the ex­citement of having a national armed force is still fresh. Military parades and exhibitions are viewed by admiring throngs and the population seems to respond generously to appeals for aid to serv­icemen or their families.

Provincial towns in particular have welcomed military units which give them both protection and an added source of income. Some unfavorable attitudes are reported from villages where mili­tary units have taken over property and tended to monopolize the limited facilities. Many villages, however, have asked for troops to defend them against the Viet Congo

Foreign Influence United States

The strongest foreign influence on the military establishment since the departure of the French forces in 1956 has been that of the United States. A considerable number of American military advisers are distributed among all staff and command echelons from headquarters in Saigon to company-sized units of all com­ponents of the armed forces. Many are teachers in service schools and training camps or instructors in the operation and mainte­nance of technical equipment. A sizable number of Vietnamese officers and men have attended military schools in the United States or have been sent on orientation visits to American military installations. Moreover, almost all materiel used by the armed forces comes from the United States.

France Many senior and noncommissioned officers, some of whom had

as much as 15 years' service in the French forces, continue to hold the training and tactical concepts they acquired at that time. French influence declined markedly after the defeat of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, but in 1955 about 600 Vietnamese officers were train­ing in France as compared to less than 200 in the United States. Even in 1962, 5 years after the last of the French advisers had left the country, Vietnamese officers not infrequently could be heard voicing their doubts about the advantages of the United States military methods as compared with the more familiar French ones. Some were frankly reluctant to make .the change, and their feelings were heightened by the necessity of shifting from French to English as the language of military instruction. These attitudes, which posed a problem for United States advisers, were more frequently encountered in the Army and Navy than in the Air Force, which had relatively few French-trained officers.

482 AGO 100418

Other Countries Methods employed by the Vietnamese against the Viet Cong

owe much to British antiguerrilla tactics in Malaya-particularly the strategic hamlet concept (see ch. 23, Subversive Potentiali­ties). The discipline and training standards of the British troops and British-trained Indian contingent in the occupation forces in 1945 also won the admiration of many members of the armed forces.

The Chinese Nationalist armed forces are favorably regarded by many ranking officers, some of whom have attended military courses in Taiwan. Vietnamese authorities reportedly have re­quested the services of a Chinese Nationalist team to organize a course for navy specialists in Saigon. Generalissimo Chaing Kai­shek is also admired as a military leader, especially for the manner in which his troops are indoctrinated and controlled.

Quality of Manpower

The average adult male is South Vietnam is about 5 feet, 2 inches tall and weighs about 105 pounds. Accordingly he finds some diffi­culty in using many items of American equipment. The standard United States rifile stock is too long; the Browning automatic rifle is too heavy; and American parachutes are too large, causing the light-weight jumpers to descend slowly and be scattered over wide areas on landing.

The South Vietnamese soldier also is generally sturdy and wiry and apt to have good stamina. Active and manually dexterous he is readily trained in the use of modern military equipment. MOst recruits are accustomed to working out of doors in tropical heat, humidity and monsoonal rains. They can live in the field for an extended period on a daily ration of 2 pounds of rice and a portion of nuoc mam (a pungent fish sauce).

Males in the military age group (18 to 45) are subject to the same diseases-principally malaria, trachoma, amoebic dysentery and tuberculosis-which affect the general population. The pro­portion of them who are physically fit for military service is com­monly estimated to be approximately 50 percent (see ch. 16, Health and Sanitation). .

On the whole amenable to discipline and resourceful in carrying out orders, the South Vietnamese soldier manifests little initiative and tends to assume responsibility with reluctance. Reactions under fire are varied and seem to depend largely upon the train­ing and experience of the troops. In antiguerrilla warfare, trained soldiers under capable leadership have displayed excellent combat discipline. American advisers generally regard the troops with whom they are associated as being effective, trustworthy and

AGO l0041B 483

courageous under fire. There have been instances of abandonment of equipment and heavy losses through surrender, but, almost without exception, these have been confined to untrained, poorly led Self-Defense Corps units undergoing surprise attack.

Conscription The conscription system appears to be equitably and efficiently

managed and adequate to meet the needs of the armed forces. Evasion of service-formerly common-is being checked by the application of a comprehensive identity card system. Gradual improvement is also being made in the keeping of personnel files of former servicemen and conscripts by the military affairs sec­tion chief in each district.

The Military Mobilization Ordinance of 1953, presumably still in effect in 1962, prescribed the military service obligations in wartime for all male citizens between 18 and 33 years of age. A conscription program, initiated in August 1957, established com­pulsory peacetime military service for all males 20 and 21 years of age. The first contingent served 12 months, devoting 4 months to basic training at the Quang Trung Military Training Center near Saigon before assignment to duty in units. In January 1959 the service period was extended to 18 months and, in July 1961, to 24 months. Meanwhile, the basic training period was reduced to 2 months.

Conscripts may take an examination for admission to the Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School for reserve officers. Upon the com­pletion of basic training, certain conscripts are selected to take special courses in technical subjects, such as radio maintenance, motor mechanics and field engineering. Others are selected to take advance courses in infantry, artillery or other line units.

Exemptions are given only for health reasons; deferments are granted to students attending universities and advanced schools of fine arts, technical sciences and pedagogy. If two brothers are called up at the same time, one may be given a deferment.

A special program for procuring and training young reserve officers was begun in July 1961. Under its provision all men. be­tween the ages of 20 and 33 years who had had a high school edu­cation or its equivalent were called into service to attend a 6-months' course at the Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School. Another callup under this program was announced in January 1962. Defer­ments are considered only for those in essential occupations. Col­lege students called up during the school year might be given special examinations to permit them to respond to the summons without loss of academic credit or they might be granted a post­ponement until the time when the regular examinations would beheld.

484 AGO l0041B

The conscription of young men born in Vietnam of Chinese parents did not begin until early in 1962 when those between 19 and 30 years of age were directed to determine their callup status with precinct or district authorities. Youths in this category have the same privileges and must meet the same requirements for admission to the Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School as do those of Vietnamese extraction.

Civil service employees, when conscripted or recalled for active duty training, are placed on a "military leave." They receive the pay of their military rank and have re-employment rights at the end of their service. Should they be called up during a period of national mobilization, they are given differential allowances to make their pay appropriate to their military rank or to their civil service grade, whichever is higher.

Training

Training activity has increased steadily in scope and intensity since 1956 when military responsibilities were transferred from the French to the Vietnamese. New military schools have been established. Army, Navy and Air Force personnel have been in­structed in the operation and maintenance of equipment received from the United States. American advisers and instructors have introduced American training methods, tactical doctrines and strategic concepts.

With the intensification of Viet Cong activity which began late in 1958 the training of the ground forces has emphasized anti­guerrilla operations in jungle terrain. Technical skills have not been neglected and, after completing basic training, about 40 per­cent of the conscripts are enrolled in technical courses. Army, Navy and Air Force units receive some combined training; on occasion they have taken part in joint actions against the guer­rillas along the coast or in the waterways of the Mekong Delta, sometimes in conjunction with Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps units.

The Command and General Staff College, which was organized in 1956 at Saigon as the military college, is the highest institution in the military educational system. Its course for field-grade offi­cers offers instruction in staff work, in combined operations and in general academic subjects. The course for selected company­grade officers provides training in staff procedures. Short re­fresher courses apparently are available to selected officers of the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel to keep them abreast of important changes in policy and the use of major new weapons.

The Da Lat Military Academy, established by the French in 1950, is the principal source of career officers for the Army. From

AGO l0041B 485

1953 to 1958 more than 2,500 cadets graduated from 1-year courses with the rank of second lieutenant. In 1957 the cadet course was extended to 4 years. Entrance requirements included: a high school diploma (baccalaureat); age between 17 and 22 years; a physical fitness certificate; bachelor status and a promise to re­main unmarried until after graduation. Of the 200 members of the class which entered in 1957, 57 graduated in 1961 and were granted commissions as second lieutenants.

The Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School, sometimes called the Thu Duc Inter-Arms School or the Thu Duc Military School, was established in the mid-1950's to prepare students for reserve com­missions. By April 1958 it had graduated almost 3,300 reserve officers. Meanwhile the installation was expanded with the addi­tion of special courses in artillery, engineering, ordnance, trans­portation and signal communications. Branch schools developed out of these courses, and the combined schools became known as the Thu Duc Military Schools Complex. The Complex provides theoretical instruction and practical training for officers and en­listed men in the use of equipment and the handling of units in their respective services. As of early 1961, the engineer and signal communications section of the branch schools were situated at Vung Tau. After July 1961, when males between the ages of 20 and 33 with a high school education or its equivalent began to be conscripted and sent to Thu Duc for a 6-month training course, classes in the Officers' Candidate School alone have averaged about 1,500 members. The Complex has become the largest and one of the most important military training institutions in the country.

The Air Training School at Nha Trang conducts basic training courses for pilots, observers, mechanics and other specialists. In 1961 some of the courses and training facilities were transferred to Tan Son Nhut, the major airbase at Saigon, and to the second­ary base at Bien Hoa.

The Naval Training School at Nha Trang, the Navy's main training facility, has two sections designated as Class "A" and Class "B." Class "A" is the Naval Officers' Candidate School. It also gives basic technical training courses for naval specialists and for potential petty officers. Class "B" offers advanced technical training courses, lasting from 3 to 9 months, for specialists and petty officers. The Center for Practical Training at Saigon super­vises on-the-job training for ship and boat crews.

The Intelligence and Psychological Warfare School at Cho Lon was established early in 1956 to train selected officers and non­commissioned officers of the armed forces to be specialists in mili­tary intelligence and psychological warfare. President Ngo, in October 1961, presided over the ceremonies marking the gradua­tion of the first class of staff officers from the school.

486 AGO l0041B

The Anned Forces Language School was established at Saigon in 1956 as an English-language school to give officers and enlisted men a working knowledge of English in preparation for entering foreign military courses. In 1961 plans were under way to add courses in Chinese, Khmer (Cambodian) and Thai languages.

The Military Medical Training Center, sometimes called the School of Military Health, was established in 1956 as an adjunct of the University of Saigon. The Center, commanded by a colonel, is charged with supervising the work of the military medical stu­dents in the medical and phannacy colIeges. It also is responsible for training military nurses, aidmen, pharmacists, medical officers and assistant medical officers.

The Quang Trung Military Training Center near Saigon gives an 8-week course in basic military training to all conscripts and recruits before their assignment to branch courses or technical units. The Center also conducts special training courses for para­military and police contingents.

The Civil Guard Training Center is located at Hai Ninh (for­merly Song Mao) on the South China Sea coast south of Da Lat. It provides training courses for newly fonned Civil Guard com­panies.

The Ranger Training School at Nha Trang is sometimes called the "Commando School" or the "NCO Academy." The Ranger courses vary in length and generally consist of basic training fol­lowed by special courses which include instruction in antiguerrilIa warfare, "commando" tactics, military intelligence and physical training. Both officers and noncommissioned officers are enrolled in some of the special courses.

Members of the armed forces respond welI to all types of train­ing and appear anxious to learn. Most recruits and conscripts are unfamiliar with modern machines and equipment, but a high per­centage of them display an aptitude for technical skills, which they acquire rapidly. Accustomed as most of them are to hard agricultural work and a subsistence standard of living, they adapt quickly to the rigors of antiguerrilla operations.

Logistics Transport, terrain, weather and limited industrial facilities

create special difficulties with respect to supply, distribution, troop movement and evacuation. Logistical problems are paramount in alI military operations, including offensive or defensive action against guerrillas. Almost everywhere in the Mekong River Delta during the wet season, troops and supplies moving on the largely unsurfaced roads encounter extensive flooding, washed-out bridges and deep mud. In many places, shallow-draft river craft and heli-

AGO 10041B 487

copters are the only practical means of transport for extended periods. DurIng the dry season, movement off the limited road net is impeded by such obstacles as swampy jungles, canals, drainage ditches and dikes. In the mountainous areas, traffic, except on the few improved roads, is hampered at all seasons by dense jungle growth, narrow gorges, narrow bridges and steep grades-all favorable for ambushes. In the face of these difficulties, the tend­ency has been to decentralize supply and logistical services to corps areas and to keep supplies in depots to relieve military units as far as possible of the burden of storage and transport.

Equipment

The armed forces are equipped almost entir~ly with United States equipment of the World War II type. Considerable sup­plies are on hand, but some equipment, especially motor vehicles, suffers from the shortage of trained maintenance personnel. Troops appear to feel that they are well equipped, but some man­carried items apparently are too heavy for the average Viet­namese. For example, some units prefer the light and short.. barreled carbine or the Armalite automatic rifle to the heavier 11¥2 pound M-1 rifle.

The Army's heavy weapons include: mortars (60-mm, 81-mm and 4.2-inch); recoilless rifles (57-mm and 75-mm); howitzers (75.mm, 105-mm and 155-mm); antiaircraft guns (40-mm and 90-mm) ; a considerable number of self-propelled guns; and light and medium tanks. In addition, some armored personnel carriers, including those of amphibious type (M-113), are in use. As of mid-1962, several United States Army helicopter companies were available to the Vietnamese forces for evacuation and transport.

Naval units include escort vessels, minesweepers, and a number of light patrol boats and shallow-draft landing craft.

The Air Force is equipped with fighter-trainer (T-28) planes which bear the brunt of the air attack against the Viet Congo Other aircraft include: light bombers (B-26 and AD-6) ; trans­port planes (C-47); liaison and reconnaissance planes (L-20); and cargo planes (C-123), some of which are equipped for spray­ing chemicals and others for troop transport.

Medical Facilities

Medical facilities are expanding, and the military forces ap­parently receive a higher standard of medical care than the gen­eral population. At least four military hospitals are in operation -at Saigon, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Pleiku. In other areas civilian facilities are made available for military use if they are needed.

Physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and technicians

488 AGO 100418

-educated under a government-sponsored program at the Mili­tary Medical Training Center in Saigon-may be drafted for service in the armed forces for a period of up to 10 years.

A presidential decree of May 1962 ordered the conscription of civilian physicians, but information regarding the extent of the callup is not available. As of July 1962, however, about half of the approximately 600 physicians in South Vietnam were serving with the armed forces. In addition, United States aid authorities were recruiting American medical teams composed of surgeons, nurses and hospital technicians to work under the Vietnamese Department of Public Health in provincial capitals and other large towns. Team members were on call to fly to combat areas to treat Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps and civilian casualties, leaving the military medical organization free to care for the regular armed forces.

Medical equipment and supplies appear to be adequate. Con­siderable quantities were turned over to army authorities by the French forces when they withdrew, substantial amounts are pro­vided under the United States aid program, and some are pur­chased with government appropriations. Vaccines, serums and penicillin are manufactured in the Pasteur Institute Laboratories at Saigon, Nha Trang and Da Lat. Facilities are available for collecting, storing, distributing and administering whole blood and plasma (see ch. 16, Health and Sanitation).

Evacuation of sick and wounded during operations in jungle, swampy or mountainous terrain presents serious problems. Many cases are evacuated by helicopter and, in areas accessible to land­ing strips, by conventional aircraft, but litter or pack animals are often the only means available.

Morale Factors

Troop morale varies from one unit to another but generally appears to be good. It is perhaps best in the Air Force because of the relatively high educational requirements for admission, the opportunities it offers for the acquisition of special skills, and the satisfactions derived by its members from the operation of com­plex technical equipment. Similar considerations make for good morale among some components of the Navy, especially the Ma­rines, the Airborne Brigade and the armored units of the Army.

The Director of Social Services in the Department of National Defense has functions which have an important bearing on troop morale. He is charged with planning and supervising social work and mutual assistance activities for military personnel and their families. In 1962 he promoted the establishment of camps for married enlisted men and schools for their children near some of

AGO l0041B 489

the military garrisons. Also active in the field of social services for the military is the Vietnamese branch of the Veterans Asso­ciation (L'Association des Anciens Combattants), which was or­ganized during the colonial period. The Association sends gifts to soldiers in combat units stationed in remote areas and to the sick and wounded in hospitals. In January 1962 it reportedly was trying to establish a committee in each province to act as inter­mediary between the government's administrative services and the families of wounded and killed enlisted men.

The formal recognition of outstanding service is benefiting morale, and promotions, decorations or citations are awarded those who have distinguished themselves in action. In March 1962 about 150 lieutenants and enlisted men were promoted one grade for their "exceptional performance of duty in anti-Commu­nist operations" in Tay Ninh I'rovince.

Ranks

The structure of rank in the Army and Navy broadly resembles those of the corresponding French forces, while Air Force ranks parallel those of the United States Air Force (see figs. 19 and 20). The normal duties and responsibilities of servicemen in the vari­ous ranks and grades are also comparable to those in the United States forces. Because of the small number of officers holding the rank of general, however, some divisions are commanded by colo­nels, while majors and captains command battalions. Likewise the commandant of the Navy is a naval captain and the com­mander of the Air Force is a colonel.

M-ilitary Justice

The military court system consists basically of courts-martial, similar in composition and jurisdiction to the special courts of the United States Army. Each has jurisdiction over the members of the military unit within which it is established. The command­ing officer of the unit within which a court functions convenes it and reviews its decisions. On a higher level are the regional mili­tary tribunals which apparently correspond to the general courts­martial of the United States Army. The regional tribunals have jurisdiction over all military personnel and over civilians charged with offenses. against national security. Heading this system is the Director of Military Justice and Gendarmerie.

The regional tribunals, commonly called special military courts, are established .at Saigon, Ban Me Thuot and Hue. Other special military courts may be formed and their jurisdiction defined, as needed. These courts are composed of: a president having the rank of colonel 0' higher who is licensed to practice law; a member who is chief of the area where the court sits; and a member who is an

490 AGO l0041B

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AGO I0041B 491

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492 AGO 100418