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Fisheries Commission -European Parliament Brussels, 23 ... · Fisheries Commission -European...
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Fleet management and regulation access to fish stocks
Olivier GuyaderNatural resources economist
Marine economics unit - Ifremer, UMR AMURE
Fisheries Commission - European ParliamentBrussels, 23 November 2011
Outline1 The issue of overcapacity, and its economic /
institutional drivers
2 The need for efficient access regulation mechanisms
3 Pros and cons of administrative/market approaches
4 Bio-economic implications of the transition to MSY
5 Concluding remarks
1. The issue of excess capacity, and its economic /
institutional drivers
Trends in the EU fishing fleet capacity (in terms of kW), 1992-2008(Source: EC, 2008)
Effective+18%
Effective+18%
Nominal-25%
Nominal-25%
Whatever the interest of widening the approach of fisheries management to marine ecosystems, a major cause for fish stocks overexploitation has been well identified for long :
(increasing) excess harvesting capacity
Fish are common pool resources
Individual catches are a function of other’s effort
Individual effort
Development of excess capacity
Economic losses
Pressure on resources
Individually rational choices
Collectively rational choices≠
Excess harvesting of fish stocks
Key drivers are institutional / economic
User conflicts
Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Hardin, 1968
Non-excludability Rivalry in consumption
The issue has a time-dimension
• Negative externalities between fishers harvesting the same stocks increase with anthropic pressure, which generates feedback loop:
Anthropicpressure on
stocks
Externalities between fishers
Excess harvesting capacity
• Anthropic pressure on stocks is fostered by:
− Technical progress, which increases catchability− increasing demand for fish− And by public incentives to the increase in fishing effort
(Mesnil 2009, Sumaila 2009).
2. The need for efficient access regulation
mechanisms
So, what can be done?
• Development of excess capacity is an endogenous tendency in the fishing industry, but it is by no means unavoidable.
• It can be successfully neutralized by proper fisheries management.
• But this cannot be achieved by conservation measures (including MPAs – see e.g. Hannesson, 1998).
Basically, fisheries management is (or should be) composed of two complementary types of measures:
Conservation :Preservation of
productive / reproductive capacity
of stocks (and habitats)
Access regulation :
Allocation of this capacity among
harvesters
Selection of harvesters
Determination of individual harvesting shares
Limitation of total catch
Selectivity of catches, gear impacts
Regulating access to fish resources:questions to be answered
Control variable ?
Catchesor
Non-transferable individual
authorisations
Control method ?
administrative (norms / rules) or
economic (incentives)
TaxationTransferable
individual authorisations*
* So-called « rights-based management »
Effort
Co-management
3. Pros and cons of approaches
No approach to the problem is exempt from difficulties
Control variable
• multi-dimensional nature of effort, and strong substitution possibilities between its components
• technical progress requires permanent adjustments
Difficulties related to controlling « fishing effort »
• monitoring of landings
• discards
Difficulties related to controlling catches
Control method
• criteria for the selection of operators
• fine-tuning of allocations to changes in individual circumstances
• de facto transferability
Difficulties related to administrative approaches
• sensitivity of the initial allocation issue
• possible market distorsions
• negative social effects attributed to the use of these instruments (employment, concentration)
Difficulties related to rights-based approaches*
*taxation is seldom used as an access regulation instrument
Source: Copes (1986), ... OECD (2010)
Regulation by effort
Source: Le Gallic, 2006
Diversity of approaches in practice – the OECD experienceRegulation by catches
XXXXXXXXUnited-States
XXXXXXCanadaXXCorea
XXIceland
XXXXNetherlandsXPoland
XXPortugal
XX(X)XXFranceXGreece
XIrelandXXXItaly
XXXXSpainXFinland
XXXBelgiumXXXXDenmark
(X)XXGermany
XXSweden(X)XXXXXUnited-Kingdom
XMexicoXXXNorway
XNew-Zealand
XXXJapan
XXXXAustralia
Transferable indiv.
quota
Individual quota
Quota / vessel
Community quota
Transferable effort/vessel
Transferable limited
licences
Territ. Use
Rights
Effort / vessel
Limited licencesCountry
XXXXXXXXUnited-States
XXXXXXCanadaXXCorea
XXIceland
XXXXNetherlandsXPoland
XXPortugal
XX(X)XXFranceXGreece
XIrelandXXXItaly
XXXXSpainXFinland
XXXBelgiumXXXXDenmark
(X)XXGermany
XXSweden(X)XXXXXUnited-Kingdom
XMexicoXXXNorway
XNew-Zealand
XXXJapan
XXXXAustralia
Transferable indiv.
quota
Individual quota
Quota / vessel
Community quota
Transferable effort/vessel
Transferable limited
licences
Territ. Use
Rights
Effort / vessel
Limited licencesCountry
Examples of access regulation instruments in France
EffortCatches
Economicincentives
Administrative
Method
Variable
EU licence
Licence and quotas individuels (Abalone Northern Brittany)
Scallop licences with hoursat sea, gear regulation
Licences for bivalves
Second hand vesselmarket
NephropsLicence
individual quota bluefin tuna
Bay of BiscaySole individualquota (POs)
BB Sole Fishingpermit per
métier
Administration
Fisheries committees
Producers organisations
An example of de facto transferable fishing rights:
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bill
ion
cons
tant
eur
os (f
ixed
base
in 2
003)
Physical value Value of intangible assets
The implicit value of fishing rights capitalized in the price of second hand vessels in France (source: Guyader et al., 2005)
Source: Gutierrez, Hilborn, Defeo, Leadership, social capital and
incentives promotesuccessful fisheries, Nature, 2011
Survey: 130 co-managed fisheries
Role of co-management in successful fisheries
4. Bio-economic implications of the transition to MSY
bio-economic simulations of management options in the BB common sole fishery (constant TAC 4100 tons / fleet)
Source: Macher, Guyader et al., 2011, Merzéréaud et al., 2011, Simmonds et al., 2011
Catches
Access regulation regime, enforcement and governance to be
strengthened in order to stay aroundMSY
and avoid- increase in fleet capacity,
- rent dissipation, - overexploitation
yields per vessel, fleets profitability
Biomass Catches
5. Concluding remarks• The major cause of fisheries mismanagement is well identified: it is
the failure to address successfully the endogenous tendency to excess harvest capacity (often worsened by public subsidies)
• Solutions to this problem are also well known: individualisation of fishing rights, based wherever it is possible on catches, rather than on effort (uncontrollable in the long run) individual quotas + licence per gear or métier to promote more selective gears
• Innovative co-management arrangements seems to be a condition for successful management (acceptation and enforcement)
• The transferability issue is often misunderstood: once individual fishing rights have been clearly defined, they get a value and become transferred. As a result, the question is not: should individual rights be transferable, but rather: how to institute and regulate an efficient and fair system of transferability ?
5. Concluding remarks• Role of norms in the definition of individual fishing rights allocation,
especially regarding the impacts of fleets on the ecosystem • As long as the issues concerning access regulation are not solved,
conservation measures, wether “traditional” or more “ecosystemic” (e.g. MPAs) are likely to bring poor results.
Thank you for your attention
The link between access regulation and resource conservation:recent empirical evidence
(Costello, Gaynes and Lynham, Science 321, 1678 (2008))
1950 Year2000
0%
10%
20%
30%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
% collapsed fisheries
Without ITQs With
ITQs
% ITQsimplemented
The survey: 11,135 world fisheries, 1950-2003.
Main conclusions:•27% of non-ITQ fisheries were collapsed in 2003.
Among which 121 fisheries under ITQs in 2003.
Left axis: % of collapsed fisheries (landings < 10% of historical record).
•but only 13% among those under an ITQ management system.
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Catch Capacity for biologists
– Fishing pressure (F) =
capacity X fishing activity X efficiency X capturability
Fishing effort
– Yields (CPUE) =
fishing pressure X biomass