Fire Fighter FACE Report No. 2003-41, Live-Fire Exercise in Mobile ...

Live-Fire Exercise in Mobile Flashover Training Simulator InjuresFive Career Fire Fighters - Maine

December 13, 2004A summary of a NIOSH fire fighter fatality investigation

SUMMARYOn October 17, 2003, four male career fire fighterswere slightly injured while participating in a live firetraining evolution inside a propane-fueled mobileflashover training simulator. Multiple burn evolutionshad been conducted over a two and one-half dayperiod without incident prior to the explosion.Minutes after the four-man crew advanced a hoselineinto the mobile training trailer, an explosion occurred.The crew members were knocked down by the forceof the explosion and became momentarilydisoriented, but were able to exit the trailer undertheir own power. A fifth male fire fighter stationedon the outside of the trailer was also slightly injuredwhen he was hit by an exit door that he wasmonitoring which was forced open by the blast.NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize therisk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• follow manufacturer’s recommendations forset-up and operation of training simulators

• consider using a carbon monoxide monitorto ensure carbon monoxide does not buildup to a dangerous level inside the trainingsimulator

· ensure that Standard Operating Guidelines(SOGs) specific to live-fire training aredeveloped and followed

· consider having an ambulance on-siteduring live-fire training exercises

Additionally, training simulator manufacturers should:

• provide ventilation systems within trainingsimulators that ensure a complete airchange is accomplished between burnevolutions

• consider using programmable logiccontrollers (PLC) and computerizedelectronic data monitoring systems to avoidthe possibility of improper operation

Additionally, the National Fire Protection Association(NFPA) should consider:

• developing a new standard covering mobilelive-fire training simulators

The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and PreventionProgram is conducted by the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose ofthe program is to determine factors that cause or contributeto fire fighter deaths suffered in the line of duty.Identification of causal and contributing factors enableresearchers and safety specialists to develop strategies forpreventing future similar incidents. The program does notseek to determine fault or place blame on fire departmentsor individual fire fighters. To request additional copies ofthis report (specify the case number shown in the shieldabove), other fatality investigation reports, or furtherinformation, visit the Program Website at

www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.htmlor call toll free 1-800-35-NIOSH

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

F2003 Injury in the line of duty...41

Mobile Training Trailer

Live-Fire Exercise in Mobile Flashover Training Simulator Injures Five Career FireFighters

Investigative Report #F2003-41Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation And Prevention Program

INTRODUCTIONOn October 17, 2003, four male career fire fighterswere slightly injured while participating in a live-firetraining evolution inside a mobile flashover simulator(training trailer). A fifth male fire fighter stationedoutside the trailer to monitor the exit door was alsoslightly injured when the force of the explosion causedthe door to swing open and hit him. The next week,a consulting firm was hired by the insurance carrierrepresenting the trailer owners to investigate the causeof the explosion. A preliminary report released onOctober 30, 2003, concluded that the explosion wasthe result of a carbon monoxide ignition. OnNovember 6, 2003, the International Association ofFire Fighters (IAFF) notified the National Institutefor Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) ofthese injuries and requested that NIOSH conductan investigation into the incident. On December 4-5, 2003, a Safety Engineer with the NIOSH FireFighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Programinvestigated the incident. Meetings were conductedwith the fire department chief officers, the fire trainingofficer, local and state representatives of theInternational Association of Fire Fighters, and thecity safety inspector. The NIOSH investigatorinterviewed the injured fire fighters, the officers whoplanned and coordinated the training, the operatorof the training trailer during the training exercise, andrepresentatives from the two fire departments whoowned the trailer. The NIOSH investigator alsodiscussed the incident with representatives of thecompany that manufactured the training trailer, as wellas an explosion expert at NIOSH and the leadinvestigator from the engineering consulting firmworking for the trailer owners’ insurance carrier. TheNIOSH investigator reviewed the fire department’sstandard operating guidelines (SOGs), the trainingtrailer operations manual, maintenance records,certified operator log, and a report of the incidentcontracted by the trailer owners’ insurance carrier.The NIOSH investigator inspected andphotographed the trailer. Following the incident, the

two fire departments owning the training trailerremoved it from service and requested that the trailermanufacturer examine and test the trailer and refurbishit to better-than-new conditions by repairing alldamages and upgrading the ventilation system. OnApril 22 and 23, 2004, the NIOSH investigatorreturned to witness testing of the trailer by themanufacturer, following refurbishment.

DepartmentThe fire department involved in the training incidentis comprised of 237 career fire fighters, has 7 firestations, 1 fire boat, 1 air rescue unit and serves adaytime population of approximately 128,000 (night-time population 65,000) in an area of about 18 squaremiles.

TrainingThe department currently requires all personnel tomeet the State fire fighter requirements and have aminimum of National Fire Protection Association(NFPA) Firefighter Level 1 certification. The fivefire fighters injured during this incident all met thisrequirement. On the day of the incident, the firedepartment was in the process of having every firefighter go through live-fire training in the training trailerover a three-day period. The training evolution wasbeing managed by a lead safety officer, a leadinstructor, and a fire control officer who had receivedspecialized training from and been certified by thetrailer manufacturer. Note: The trailer operationsmanual states that only those persons who havebeen trained and certified in the safe operationof the training simulator are authorized to operatethe training trailer. The operations manualspecifically states that “only one authorizedindividual is to be in the operator control roomwhile a live burn is in progress.”

Equipment and PersonnelThree crews, each consisting of four fire fighters,reported at a time to participate in the training exercise.




At the time of the incident, the following crews wereon-scene:

Engine 1Ladder 4 (attack crew at the time of theexplosion)Engine 11

Also on scene were the safety officer, lead instructor,and the fire control officer, as well as emergencymedical services (EMS) personnel.

Personal Protective EquipmentAt the time of the incident, each fire fighter enteringthe training simulator trailer was required to weartheir full array of personal protective clothing andequipment, consisting of turnout gear (coats andpants), helmet, gloves, boots, and a self-containedbreathing apparatus (SCBA).

StructureThe structure used for live-fire training purposes inthis incident is a fully self-contained, commerciallyavailable flashover simulator and live-fire trainingtrailer. The trailer measures 52 feet long by 12 feetwide. The trailer is divided into two compartments,a 40-foot steel burn chamber and a 12-footequipment room. The equipment room houses two420 pound liquid propane cylinders, a gasoline-powered electrical generator, an air compressor, asmoke-generating machine, an electrical controlpanel, and a panel containing gas control valves, flamedetector controls, and safety shut-off valves. Themain burn chamber is constructed from a shipboardcargo container and has a wooden fire-retardant floorand metal walls and ceiling. The burn chambercontains three gas-fired props constructed of ¼-inchthick steel plate metal. These props simulate a bed,cabinet, and kitchen range (see Photo 1). The burnchamber also contains temperature and gas sensors,and two hinged moveable partitions that can be usedto divide the burn chamber into 3 separate rooms.Each partition has a door in the center to allowmovement throughout the burn chamber. Two ceiling

mounted flashover bars (1-inch perforated pipes)extend from the front of the burn chamber past thefirst partition wall. The burn chamber has 3 entrancedoors, two windows, an exhaust ventilation fan, aroof hatch and an operator control room isolatedfrom the rest of the burn chamber (Figure 1).

The operator control panel located in the controlroom contains a master on/off switch, touch-screenpanel, indicator lights, and an emergency-stopbutton. The individual props are lit using the touch-screen panel to ignite pilot burners using electronicigniters. Once the pilot burner is lit, the operatormust manually operate a hand control valve tosupply the desired amount of propane gas to themain burner on each prop. The operator can thencontrol the size and intensity of the flame generatedby the main burner by manually operating eachcontrol valve (Photo 2 and Photo 4). The flashoverbars do not have there own igniters. Propaneemitting from the flashover bars is ignited by theflames from the props underneath. Note: Thetrailer is designed so that only one prop andone flashover bar are intended to be operatedat the same time. The operations manualcontains a warning indicating that failure toturn off the gas valve once the flashover bar isextinguished… “could result in gasaccumulating in the area and cause severeinjury to the students, the fire control officer,or other persons in proximity to the area.”

Emergency shut-off buttons are located inside theburn chamber and on both sides of the trailer exterior.The burn chamber contains a temperature sensorwhich will automatically shut down the system if theambient temperature inside the burn chamberexceeds 500 degrees Fahrenheit.

The trailer is designed to provide flexibility inpresenting a number of training simulations by varyingthe inner partition walls. The burn chamber can be




entered from both sides and the rear. Entry can alsobe made into the burn chamber down a stairwaythat leads from the roof to the rear of the burnchamber to simulate attacking a basement fire. Doorsin the partition walls can be secured to simulateforced-entry.

The trailer was purchased new from the manufacturerby two neighboring fire departments in February2002. The trailer was constructed to meet therequirements of the National Fire ProtectionAssociation (NFPA) 58, Liquefied Petroleum GasCode [NFPA 2001].

FuelThe three burn props and the two flashover bars arefueled by compressed liquid propane gas (LPG).Two 420 pound steel tanks are mounted vertically inthe front of the equipment room to provide fuel tothe props and flashover bars. (Photo 3)

WeatherOn the day of the incident, the air temperature wasapproximately 55 degrees Fahrenheit with clear skiesand calm wind.

INVESTIGATIONOn October 17, 2003, four male career fire fighterswere slightly injured while participating in a live-firetraining evolution inside a mobile flashover simulatortraining trailer. A fifth fire fighter stationed outsidethe trailer was also slightly injured. These fire fighterswere taking part in a three-day training exercise inwhich the fire department sought to have every firefighter in the department go through a series of live-fire training evolutions. The fire departmentcontracted with two neighboring departments to usea mobile flashover simulator training trailer ownedby the two neighboring departments. The agreementcalled for the departments owning the trailer topresent the training by providing a safety officer

responsible for the overall safety of the trainingexercise, a lead instructor responsible for the traineesinside the training trailer, and a fire control officer(operator) who is responsible for the set-up andoperation of the training trailer

The fire department coordinated the scheduling ofindividual apparatus companies to attend the trainingexercises so that every fire fighter in the departmentwould go through the live fire training. Threecompanies (four-man crews) reported to the trainingsite at a time. The three companies rotated throughthe training exercise with each company acting asthe attack crew, backup crew and standby. Eachattack crew experienced three evolutions inside thetrailer. The first evolution involved advancing a 1 ¾-inch hoseline through a side door, turning toward thefront of the trailer, forcing open the partition doorsand then proceeding forward to extinguish the props.The second evolution involved advancing the hoselinefrom the top of the trailer down the interior stairway,turning left, forcing open the first partition door, andthen advancing to the front of the burn chamber toextinguish the props. As the attack crew advancedthe hoseline, the fire control officer would randomlyoperate the bed and cabinet props and the flashoverbar. The stove prop was not used during the trainingexercise. The third evolution involved studying fireprogression through a simulated flashover. The twopartitions were opened and the attack crewadvanced to the center of the burn chamber. Thefire control officer would light one of the props andthen use the two flashover bars to simulate fireprogressing through flashover. Each attack crew wasbriefed by the attending safety officer on what toexpect during the training exercise prior to enteringthe trailer. This briefing included how the trainingexercise would be conducted, location of emergencyshut off buttons, location of the lead instructor insidethe burn chamber, and how to direct water towardthe props to extinguish the flames without damaging




the burners. Each burn evolution would lastapproximately 5 minutes. In accordance with themanufacturer’s operations manual, the trailer wasventilated for one minute between each burn evolutionby turning on the exhaust fan and opening the sidedoors and windows. This training exercise was thefirst time that the department had used the mobiletraining trailer.

The propane tanks were refilled between the secondand third days of the training exercise. The fire controlofficer reported trouble igniting the props on themorning of the incident (the third morning).

At the time of the incident, the attack crew wasbeginning the second evolution of its three-evolutionsequence. The attack crew (Ladder 4) was thesecond company to enter the training simulator duringthis three-company rotation. This was also the secondthree-company rotation of the day. The first trainingrotation started at approximately 9:00 AM. Thecompanies involved in the incident (Engine 1, Ladder4, Engine 11) began their rotation about 10:00 AM.Engine 1 was the first company to serve as the attackcrew. The fire control officer encountered problemslighting the different props during Engine 1’s burnevolutions. At one point, the advancing attack crew(Engine 1) had to hold up at the second partitiondoor and wait approximately 30 - 45 seconds forthe props and flashover bars to light properly. Ladder4 was the second company to serve as the attackcrew during this rotation. During their pre-evolutionbriefing, the safety officer advised the Ladder 4 crewthat the fire control officer was experiencing problemslighting the props and not to use much water toextinguish the flames.

The Ladder 4 crew advanced into the burn chamberduring their first evolution without experiencing anyproblems. During the second evolution, the crewadvanced to the first partition. They could see fire inthe front of the burn chamber. The nozzleman and

second fire fighter (backup man on hoseline)advanced through the doorway. They had not yetbegun to apply water to the fire. The Ladder 4 captainwas third on the hoseline and was just passing throughthe doorway when an explosion occurred somewherein front of the crew, knocking them backward. Justprior to the explosion, three of the four crew membersreported seeing a white fog or cloud in the air insidethe trailer. None of the crew members received anydamage to their personal protective equipment orclothing. None of the crew members saw a “fireball”or experienced an increase in heat at the time of theexplosion. They all reported hearing the sound of anexplosion and feeling the pressure wave as it knockedthem backward. The force of the explosion blewopen the trailer’s outer doors and windows. TheLadder 4 crew members were shaken-up anddisoriented, but were able to exit the trailer undertheir own power. A fifth fire fighter, stationed outsidethe trailer to monitor the left side exit door, was slightlyinjured when the force of the explosion caused thedoor to swing open and strike him on the shoulder.A fire department ambulance and EMS crew weredispatched to the training site and the injured firefighters were treated on scene. None weretransported following the incident.

The operator control room is positioned so that thefire control officer has a view of the trailer interiorthrough two glass windows. The fire control officeris supposed to have complete control over the live-fire evolution. Once the safety officer in charge ofthe training session indicates that all checks have beenmade and the evolution is ready to begin, he or sheinforms the fire control officer who then goes throughthe start up process and lights the props. When theprops are properly lit, the fire control officer signalsthe lead instructor who then directs the attack crewto enter the burn chamber. At the time of the incident,the fire control officer had just lit the bed and cabinetprops. The safety officer stepped into the controlroom to check with the fire control officer about how




the burn evolution was progressing. The fire controlofficer noticed a bright flash inside the burn chamberand heard a loud bang.

The week following the incident, the trailer was movedto a city public works maintenance garage. Thetrailer was examined by representatives of the firedepartment, the two departments owning the trailer,and by the investigators hired by the trailer owners’insurance carrier. The gas lines were pressurizedand checked for leaks. No leaks were detected atthis time and the investigators hired by the insurancecarrier concluded that the explosion was most likelycaused by carbon monoxide building up to the lowerexplosive limit being ignited by the bed and cabinetprop flames.

The exact cause of the explosion was not determinedby this investigation. However, there are twoplausible scenarios. The first is the accumulation ofcarbon monoxide to a point above its lower explosivelimit of 12% as concluded by investigators for thetrailer owners’ insurance carrier. The second is theaccumulation and ignition of excess raw propanewithin the burn chamber. In most cases, propaneintroduced into the burn chamber would simply beburned off by the prop flames. However, certainsituations, such as extinguishing the flashover barwithout shutting the flashover gas valve, as highlightedin the operations manual, can lead to theaccumulation of raw propane within the burnchamber. Opening the flashover gas valve beforethe prop flames have reached sufficient height to ignitethe propane introduced through the flashover barcould also allow propane to accumulate within theburn chamber. The difficulty noted in igniting andsustaining the prop flames could have alsocontributed to an accumulation of propane within theburn chamber. Propane is heavier than air and wouldtherefore accumulate near floor level. Explosionexperts at NIOSH do not support the theory that

the explosion was the result of an accumulation ofcarbon monoxide. On the day of the incident, thestove prop in the middle section of the trailer wasnot functioning. Any propane accumulating as a floorlayer in the middle section would not have an ignitionsource to burn it off until the leading edge of thepropane gas reached the prop flames located in thefront of the trailer. The raw gas monitoring systeminside the burn chamber would normally shut downthe system before raw propane accumulated to ahazardous level. The movement of the crew enteringthe middle section of the trailer could possibly havecaused a mixing of accumulating raw propane (nearfloor level) with room air which was then ignitedwhen the leading edge reached the burning props inthe front of the trailer producing the relatively weakexplosion. Members of the crew reported seeing awhite cloud within the burn chamber prior to theexplosion. This cloud was most likely the result ofintroducing cold ambient air into the chambercontaining the warm metal props and residual watervapor from previous training evolutions. Table 1presents a comparison of the properties of carbonmonoxide to propane gas. During the incident, thefire fighters inside the burn chamber did not receiveany burn injuries or thermal damage to their turnoutgear. They also reportedly did not notice aperceptible increase in heat. Carbon monoxide andpropane have different chemical properties and thusit is difficult to compare the characteristics ofexplosions resulting from similar quantities of the twogaseous compounds. Carbon monoxide producessignificantly less thermal energy than does the samevolume of propane. Also, during an explosion,combustion takes place within milliseconds, whichmight explain the lack of thermal injury / damage.One would generally expect to observe a fire-ball orbright flash of light during a propane explosion, whilea carbon monoxide explosion would produce lesslight.




RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONRecommendation # 1: Fire departments shouldfollow manufacturer’s recommendations forset-up and operation of training simulators.

Discussion: Safe operation and use of any type ofequipment is dependent upon following properoperating procedures established by themanufacturer. Modifying operating procedures maylead to an unanticipated situation. Even slightvariations in operating procedures can lead tounexpected events which may result in injury or evendeath to the participants. It is possible that an excessamount of propane was introduced into the burnchamber, possibly through the flashover bars, beforethe props were properly burning. Once the propswere ignited, the flames would then ignite the propanewithin the burn chamber. Similarly, deviation fromthe manufacturer’s recommended procedures forventilating the simulator between burns could lead toan accumulation of carbon monoxide and otherproducts of combustion.

Recommendation # 2: Fire departments shouldconsider using a carbon monoxide monitor toensure carbon monoxide does not build up to adangerous level inside the training simulator.

Discussion: Carbon monoxide explosions arerelatively rare, but do occur. By design, live-firetraining simulators must be tightly built and therefore

provide the opportunity for carbon monoxide andother combustion by-products to accumulate.Carbon monoxide monitors are readily available in anumber of sizes and configurations from hand-heldto rack-mounted designs. In this incident, the traileris designed to continuously monitor for theaccumulation of raw propane and will automaticallyshut down the system if raw propane is detected atlevels above safe limits inside the burn chamber(approximately 25% of the lower explosive limit ofpropane gas or 0.5% propane). The use of a carbonmonoxide detector, either hand-held or integratedinto the simulator’s controls, would provide additionalassurance that the burn chamber is properly ventilatedand safe for continued operation.

Recommendation # 3: Fire departments shouldensure that Standard Operating Guidelines(SOGs) specific to live-fire training aredeveloped and followed.

Discussion: Standard operating guidelines (SOGs)should be developed to cover training exercises,including the use of live-fire and flashover simulators.These SOGs should address all aspects of the trainingexercise, including safe operation of the trainingsimulator, Rapid intervention Team (RIT) operations,SCBA use, water supply and hoseline operations.These SOGs will form the foundation as to how thetraining will be conducted. NFPA 1403, Standardon Live Fire Training Evolutions, does not specifically

Table 1. Properties of Propane and Carbon Monoxide [NAO (2002), NFPA (1997), Engineering Tool Box (2004)]

Molecular WT

Specific Gravity (air = 1)

Flammability Range

Ignition Temperature

Btu/FT3

Propane C3H8

44 1.52 2.1 – 9.6% 842 0F 2516

Carbon Monoxide CO

28 0.97 12.5 – 74% 1128 0F 314

mmiccich

mmiccich




mention mobile training simulator trailers but doesaddress gas-fired training buildings [NFPA 2002].Chapter 5 of NFPA 1403 (chapter 5.2.12.2)requires a preburn plan be prepared and utilized duringpreburn briefing sessions [NFPA 2002]. The SOGsshould be in written form and included in the overallrisk-management plan for each fire department[Foley 1998]. If these procedures are changed,appropriate training should be provided to all affectedmembers. In this incident, SOGs covering the useof the flashover simulator trailer had not beendeveloped by any of the fire departments involved.The fire departments owning the trailer relied uponthe operations manual supplied by the trailermanufacturer as the basis for operating guidelines.

Recommendation # 4: Fire departments shouldconsider having an ambulance on-site duringlive-fire training exercises.

Discussion: The NFPA 1403 Standard on Live FireTraining Evolutions, chapter 5.4.11, states thatemergency medical services shall be available on siteto handle injuries [NFPA 2002]. In this incident,EMS-trained staff were present during the burnevolutions, but an ambulance was not on site at thetime of the explosion. An ambulance wasimmediately dispatched to the scene following theexplosion. In this incident, the injured fire fightersdid not require transport to a medical facility.However, if more serious injuries had occurred,delaying transport could have had an adverse impactupon those injured.

Recommendation #5: Training simulatormanufacturers should provide ventilationsystems within training simulators that ensurea complete air change is accomplished betweenburn evolutions.

Discussion: Live-fire training simulators should bedesigned and equipped with a ventilation system to

ensure that products of combustion are removed inorder to prevent the build-up of potentially explosivegas mixtures. Proper ventilation is also important toensure that fuel gases are efficiently consumed duringthe live-fire process. The trailer involved in thisincident incorporates an exhaust ventilation systemthat is designed to purge the burn chamber for atleast sixty seconds between burn evolutions.However, this exhaust system is located at the backend of the trailer, away from the props. The positionof the two partition walls as well as the exterior doorsand windows could influence the effectiveness ofpurging the burn chamber between evolutions.During this training exercise, the trailer doors andwindows were routinely opened between burnevolutions to aid in ventilating the burn chamber. Afterthe incident, the trailer was retrofitted with a secondexhaust fan located at the front of the burn chamberabove the bed and cabinet props.

Recommendation # 6: Training simulatormanufacturers should consider usingprogrammable logic controllers (PLC) andcomputerized electronic data monitoringsystems to avoid the possibility of impropersystem operation.

Discussion: The trailer involved in this incident isdesigned with hand-operated gas control valves thatmust be manually opened and closed to control theflow of propane to the various props within the burnchamber. This design allows for the possibility ofopening and closing valves improperly, with thepotential to lead to unsafe conditions if themanufacturer’s operating procedures are not properlyfollowed. The use of electronic programmable logiccontrollers would reduce or eliminate the possibilityof improper operation. Integrated carbon monoxideand other sensor systems could automatically shutdown the system in a fail-safe mode whenever unsafelevels of explosive gases are encountered within thesimulator. Additional strategically located fuel sensors




and electronic fuel controls would help preventignitions from an accumulation of flammable gases.

Recommendation # 7: The National FireProtection Association (NFPA) should considerdeveloping a new standard covering mobile live-fire training simulators.

Discussion: Currently, NFPA standards do notspecifically address mobile live-fire trainingsimulators such as the trailer involved in this incident.NFPA 1403, Standard on Live Fire TrainingEvolutions, does contain requirements for gas-fueled training simulators but this standard is mainlytargeted to permanent structures [NFPA 2002].Many NFPA standards contain performance anddesign requirements for equipment such as self-contained breathing apparatus, personal protectiveclothing, fire apparatus and many others. A newstandard with requirements covering the performanceof propane or natural gas-fueled mobile live-firetraining simulators would enhance the safety of firefighter training by ensuring proper ventilation, fuelconsumption rates, safety controls and other featuresare standardized.

REFERENCESEngineering Tool Box [2004]. Fuel gases andexplosive and flammability concentration limits. http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/9_423.html. Dateaccessed: Nov 2004.

Foley S. [1998]. Fire department occupational healthand safety standards handbook. First Edition.Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.(chapter 3)

NAO [2002]. Gas composition table. NAO Inc.http://www.nao.com/gascompositiontable.htm. Dateaccessed: Nov 2004.

NFPA [1997]. Fire protection handbook. Quincy,MA: National Fire Protection Association. p.3:33-34.

NFPA [2001]. NFPA 58, Liquefied petroleum gascode. Quincy, MA: National Fire ProtectionAssociation.

NFPA [2002]. NFPA 1403, Standard on live firetraining evolutions. Quincy, MA: National FireProtection Association

INVESTIGATOR INFORMATIONThis incident was investigated by Timothy Merinar,Safety Engineer, NIOSH, Division of SafetyResearch, Surveillance and Field InvestigationsBranch.




Bed prop

Cabinet prop

Flashover bar # 2

Flash over bar # 1

Temperature and raw gas sensor ports

Photo 1. Inside view of front of burn chamber




Photo 2. Operator control panel. Individual gas controlvalves are shown at the bottom

Photo 3. LPG cylinders in equipmentroom at front of trailer.




Photo 4. View thru rear doors showing cabinet prop at lower leftand flashover bar at ceiling ignited. Dividing partition walls havebeen swung out of the way.




Control Room

Bed

Cabinet

Range

Flashover Bar # 1.

Flashover Bar # 2.

Side Entrance (Single Door)

Rear Entrance (Double Doors)

Side Entrance (Single Door)

Stair access to/from roof)

NOTE: Drawing not to Scale

Figure 1. Training trailer layout showing location ofLadder 4 crew at time of explosion

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