Finanční situace v Řecku (dokument v AJ)

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l Global Research l

Important disclosures can be found in the Disclosures AppendixAll rights reserved. Standard Chartered Bank 2012 research.standardchartered.com

Sarah Hewin, +44 20 7885 [email protected]

Thomas Costerg, +44 20 7885 [email protected]

On the Ground | 20:30 GMT 17 January 2012

Euro area Greek default and the threat to EMU

Tough negotiations over Greek debt restructuring raise the risk of a default on its 20 March repayment

Default would have some benefits for Greece and some creditors, but the net impact would be negative

A default would not automatically lead to Greece exiting EMU, but raises broader risks for the euro

Greek worries top a list of risks for EMU in Q1-2012

Negotiations between private-sector creditors and Greece over voluntary debt

restructuring through private-sector involvement (PSI) resume on 18 January, with a

view to obtaining agreement before the euro-area finance ministers meeting on 23

January. Talks stalled on a dispute over the interest rate that would apply to new debt

swapped for old and there is a risk that brinkmanship leads to a renewed impasse.

Restructuring terms need to be settled by end-January if a EUR 14.4bn debt rollover

which falls due on 20 March is to be incorporated into the debt-swap deal. Greece

does not have the wherewithal to cover such a large repayment, so without debt

restructuring, either Greeces official creditors (the EU and IMF) will have to extend

additional loans to Athens, or Greece will default (a hard or disorderly default).

EU governments will be reluctant to find more money for Greece, especially as recent

rating cuts and the threat of further downgrades could make it tougher for most

sovereigns and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to borrow. That

said, some private-sector debt holders are anticipating that international lenders will

not allow a default because contagion risks for the rest of the European Monetary

Union (EMU) would rise. Other creditors (a small share of the total) stand to receive

CDS payouts in the event of default. From the Greek governments point of view,

defaulting would allow larger debt haircuts, lowering the debt/GDP ratio to a more

manageable level than under the PSI. The downside is that Greek banks would face

greater losses on their bond holdings and higher recapitalisation costs.

A Greek default need not lead to euro exit. Popular support for the euro (EUR) within

Greece is strong and the government continues to require official funding (for bank

recapitalisation and to cover fiscal financing needs), so cutting itself off from EU and

European Central Bank (ECB) financing is not an attractive option. Domestic

devaluation has already been substantial and in time should improve competitiveness.

But the politics is unpredictable and elections likely by April may return a government

which is unable or unwilling to meet the terms of EU/IMF financing.

EU banks have already marked-to-market Greek debt and have stress-tested for any

capital-raising needs. But a Greek default would further damage sovereign credibility

across the region, and government debt rollovers might run into trouble. Italy alone

has redemptions of EUR 141bn in February-April, the newly downgraded EFSF is

now even less able to provide a bailout and its successor, the European Stability

Mechanism (ESM), only becomes operational in June. The ECB is likely to have to

increase its secondary market bond purchases perhaps substantially, in the worst

case but will want to see euro-area governments commit to the new fiscal compact

treaty, due to be finalised at the 30 January EU summit.


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On the Ground

GR12JA | 17 January 2012 2

Is Greek default on the cards?

Officials pressing for lower coupons on new debt

Under the PSI debt restructuring agreement (first approved in July 2011, and

expanded in October), Greeces privately held debt stock is to be halved to EUR

103bn from EUR 206bn (this does not include some EUR 54bn of debt at nominal

value held by the ECB and bought at an average of around 80% of face value, as the

ECB does not participate in the PSI. In addition, some EUR 23bn is held by Greek

pension funds, which would be subject to a haircut). Around 10-12% of privately held

debt is covered by CDS, hence holders of that debt would receive payouts in the

event of a forced, or hard, default.

The aim of the debt restructuring is to improve Greeces solvency profile, with a 120%

debt/GDP target ratio in 2020, should the deal proceed with sufficient participation.

Without the transaction, the debt/GDP ratio could approach 200% of GDP this year

(versus 162% in 2011 expected by the IMF), which would make Greece insolvent.The deal would also cut interest payments by EUR 4bn a year.

The plan is to swap existing debt for longer-dated (30Y) paper. Although the original

agreement specified that the nominal haircut should be 50%, it left the door open in

terms of net-present-value loss in the debt exchange (which depends on the interest

rate paid on new debt swapped for old). Negotiations have stalled over the interest

rate, with Greek officials (and the IMF) pressing for coupon payments to be as low as

2-3%, against the 5% sought by the banks lobby, the Institute for International

Finance (IIF), which represents private-sector bond holders. EU representatives are

suggesting a middle ground of 4%. Coupons of 3% and below would inflict a net-

present-value loss that could amount to some 80%, as opposed to around 60%,which creditors had earlier agreed.

In recent months the Greek economy has deteriorated more than expected, such that

the IMF views favourably a lower coupon which would stabilise the debt outlook;

hence pressure on the private sector to accept low interest rates in order to minimise

the additional funding gap (which could be up to EUR 25bn). In addition, Greek

banks recapitalisation needs are likely to have risen beyond the EUR 30bn

earmarked in the EUs second bailout programme (Greek Finance Minister Venizelos

mentioned the need for EUR 40bn recently).

But European creditor governments (and the IMF) are reluctant to extend extra

finance, and could face problems persuading their electorates and parliaments to

agree further funding for Greece, beyond the EUR 130bn package agreed in July

2011. The Greek government aims to agree the terms of the debt restructuring by the

23 January euro-area finance ministers meeting. Participation rates, which may

struggle to reach the 90%+ level desired by officials, will become apparent by mid-

February, after the term sheet is sent to private bond holders.

A Greek default would inevitably result in a greater haircut than is proposed under

PSI, which would hit European banks (with French and German banks the largest

holders of Greek debt), especially as many banks have not provisioned for a worst

case scenario (i.e., only the 50% haircut scenario); that said, stress-testing has

already revealed how much additional recapitalisation will be required, as banks have

been forced to mark-to-market their peripheral debt holdings (although Greek paper

has continued to deteriorate after the stress-test closing date). The ECB is not

included in the PSI; but a default would affect its Greek debt holdings which have

Greeces privately held debt stock

of c.EUR 200bn is to be halved if theterms of PSI debt restructuring

can be agreed

A Greek default would result in a

greater haircut than under PSI,

and would damage the holdings of

the ECB, as well as Greek and

other European banks

Restructuring negotiations have

stalled over the interest rate,

with officials pressing for coupon

payments to be as low as 2-3%


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On the Ground


been purchased in the framework of the Securities Market Programme, potentially

requiring euro-area governments to step in to provide additional capital there, too. As

of 10 January, the ECBs capital and reserves amount to EUR 81.5bn (versus a total

balance sheet size of EUR 2.69trn). The revaluation accounts (which includepotential, unrealised gains from the ECBs monetary and foreign-exchange

operations) provide an additional buffer against losses on Greek paper (EUR 394bn).

Default does not automatically lead to euro exit for Greece

Does default mean that Greece will have to leave the EMU? Not necessarily, and

under the right circumstances (i.e., a managed rather than a chaotic default) the relief

in terms of Greeces debt burden could improve debt sustainability. Key is that official

funding (for bank recapitalisation and to cover fiscal financing needs, as Greece

continues to run a primary deficit) would need to remain in place as Greeces primary

balance remains in deficit, which would require Greece to continue to pursue deficit

reduction and structural reform (the Greek governments aim to reach a primarysurplus this year is likely to be delayed by recession).

The existence of the primary deficit and hence the ongoing reliance on foreign

financing is one argument for Greece choosing not to leave the EMU at this stage.

The paradox is that the reintroduction of a national currency would probably mean

more, rather than less austerity, as the cut-off from official financing as well as

higher spending to recapitalise banks would mean a sharp adjustment to the

budget, likely resulting in both higher taxes and drastic spending cuts, aggravating

the recession.

That said, having broken one taboo by defaulting, some politicians in Greece might

start to back reintroduction of a national currency, particularly in the run-up to

elections pencilled in for April. Since the onset of the crisis, deposit flight has already

claimed around EUR 65bn of Greek deposits, around one-third, according to Finance

Minister Venizelos, and could easily accelerate in the event of default, especially if

politicians started to raise the prospect of Greece leaving the euro.

From EU creditors point of view, the contagion that would be triggered by Greece

leaving the EMU even if it were by mutual consent would be difficult to contain.

Upon any announcement of the reintroduction of a new Greek drachma, we would

expect bank runs across the euro area, especially in other bailed-out countries

(Ireland, Portugal), but this could also affect Italy, and even France.

Even if debt restructuring is agreed in the coming days, Greece will continue to face

quarterly assessments on its progress in meeting the terms of the EU/IMF bailout

programme. The Troika (EU/IMF/ECB) inspectors are currently in Athens to decide on

the next bailout tranche (mission heads arrive on Friday 20 January). The payment

schedule has been pushed back three months, so the next EUR 5bn tranche will be

due in March (the last EU-IMF EUR 8bn tranche was paid in December).

The government is currently negotiating the second Greek bailout, and this tranche

may be the first tranche of the second bailout programme (for European countries,

assistance has been transferred from euro-area member states to the EFSF rescue

fund). Conclusion of the PSI is necessary to ensure that the IMF agrees to back

upcoming bailouts, which it (the IMF) is only prepared to do if there is adequate

financing in place for the upcoming 12 months (and if Greeces solvency can be

proved, or restored).

Greece will continue to face

quarterly assessments on its

progress in meeting the terms of

the EU/IMF bailout programme

Greece continues to require

official funding while it runs

a primary deficit

Having broken one taboo

by defaulting, some politicians

in Greece might back reintroduction

of a national currency


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On the Ground


A deteriorating backdrop to the euro-area crisis

Rating downgrades undermine the EFSF

Following the downgrading of nine euro-area country ratings by Standard & Poors on

13 January, including France and Austria, which lost their AAA status, it was no

surprise that the EFSF was also subsequently downgraded, from AAA to AA+. Other

rating agencies may follow suit: Fitch is set to conclude its review of six countries

currently on rating watch negative by the end of January. Fitch has warned that Italy

could lose its A+ rating, though has indicated that it does not intend to downgrade

France or Austria this year, in which case Fitchs EFSF rating will remain at AAA.

Moodys is due to report on the euro area by the end of Q1-2012 (it will revisit its

ratings), and there is a risk of at least a French downgrade in the coming months,

which might damage the EFSF rating. Most investors require two rating agency

downgrades before they change their investment policy, hence the upcoming

decision from Moodys will be particularly decisive (see At a Glance, 16 January2012, Ratings downgrades add to euro-area debt worries.

Additional euro-area risks for Q1-2012

Questions over the future of the euro and EMU are likely to continue to dominate in

the coming weeks, especially given large sovereign debt rollover requirements and

continuing banking-sector strains. In addition to the Greek debt negotiations and

fallout from the rating downgrades, the focus this quarter will be on the euro-area

economy and evidence of recession, sovereign debt auctions and borrowing costs,

and ratification of the fiscal compact treaty.

Early indications are that the economy moved into recession in Q4-2011, as weanticipated, with German GDP contracting by 0.25% in Q4, according to official

estimates. We expect the economy to contract by 1.5% overall in 2012. Weakening

economic trends pose additional threats to government finances in the euro area.

Table 1: Euro-area sovereign ratings downgraded by S&P

Sovereign ratings as of 13 January 2012 (Standard & Poors)

Country S&P (old) (-) indicates negative outlook S&P (new)

Austria AAA (-) AA+ (-)

Belgium AA (-) AA (-)

Cyprus BBB (-) BB+ (-)

Estonia AA- (-) AA- (-)

Finland AAA (-) AAA (-)

France AAA (-) AA+ (-)

Germany AAA (-) AAA

Greece CC CC (-)

Ireland BBB+ (-) BBB+ (-)

Italy A (-) BBB+ (-)

Luxembourg AAA (-) AAA (-)

Malta A (-) A- (-)

The Netherlands AAA (-) AAA (-)

Portugal BBB- (-) BB (-)

Slovakia A+ (-) A

Slovenia AA- (-) A+ (-)

Spain AA- (-) A (-)

Sources: Bloomberg, Standard Chartered Research

Following the downgrade of nine

euro-area countries, the EFSFhas also lost its AAA rating by S&P


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On the Ground


The role of the ECB in capping borrowing costs for peripheral sovereigns is likely to

become more important. The ECBs second 3Y Long-Term Refinancing Operation

(LTRO), on 28 February, should ensure that 2012 bank funding needs are largely

taken care of. But banks have so far been cautious about buying peripheral bonds enmasse, especially longer dated paper, despite a substantial injection of liquidity at the

December 3Y LTRO (EUR 489bn), and the ECB will probably have to step up its

secondary market bond purchases, especially if market pressure accelerates. Strong

shareholder and regulatory pressure in particular the prospect of another marked-

to-market European stress test discourage increased sovereign exposure.

ECB policy makers want to see more commitment to fiscal consolidation and

discipline before they are willing to step up intervention in secondary bond markets.

Hence the progress of the fiscal compact treaty will be closely watched. Some ECB

members have already complained about the watering down of the clause on

mandatory debt brakes to be inserted in the constitution. Furthermore, the current

project contains exceptions, especially for crisis periods (which could be invoked at

present), which has led to anxiety by some ECB board members.

Set against a backdrop of recession, parliamentary approval for entrenching fiscal

constraints may be difficult to achieve in some countries when it comes to ratifying

the treaty. In particular, Ireland might need a referendum, Finland has to overcome

opposition from eurosceptic parties and Frances presidential election might delay

agreement. The aim is that the fiscal pact should be in force by January 2013. Policy

makers aim to conclude the discussions at the 1 March summit, but some have

pushed for an earlier adoption at the 30 January summit (which might prove difficult).

Europe will be discussed when the G20 deputy finance ministers and deputy centralbank governors meet in Mexico City on 19 January. Mexico which currently chairs

the G20 hopes to obtain agreement on increasing the IMFs resources in the early

months of 2012, which would allow the IMF to provide more support to distressed

euro-area governments (although the IMF highlights the general purpose of the

newly attracted funds, and denies any specific channelling to the euro-area debt

crisis). Uncertainty about the participation of key IMF contributors in particular the

US remains high.

Our view remains that should the crisis intensify, the ECB will gear up its bond

purchases, as other backstop mechanisms are too limited (IMF), lack credibility and

firepower (EFSF), or are simply not ready (ESM).

Against a backdrop of recession,

it may be difficult for some countries

to ratify the fiscal compact treaty

The ECBs second 3Y LTRO should

ensure that 2012 bank funding

needs are largely taken care of


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On the Ground


Table 2: Euro area Key events ahead (Q1-2012)

Date Country Event

18-Jan Greece Talks with private bond holders resume.

Mid-Jan France Socialist Party outlines details of its economic programme.

18-Jan France National summit on labour-market flexibility.

18-Jan G20 G20 finance ministers meet in Mexico.

20-Jan Greece Heads of Troika mission return to Athens (staff already present).

20-Jan Euro area EBA deadline for banks to advise on capital-raising plans.

22-Jan Finland Finland's presidential election.

23-Jan Euro area Euro-area finance ministers' meeting (Eurogroup).

24-Jan EU EU27 finance ministers meet (Ecofin).

25-29 Jan Global World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

30-Jan Euro areaEuro-area heads of state meet to discuss draft of fiscal compact treaty; addresscompetitiveness and jobs.

End-Jan Euro area Fitch likely to revise ratings of countries under Rating Watch, including Italy (A+).

01-Feb Italy First major bond redemption (EUR 25.8bn).

09-Feb Euro area ECB meeting.

15-Feb Euro area Euro-area Q4 GDP growth.

20-Feb Euro area Eurogroup meeting.

21-Feb EU EU27 finance ministers meet (Ecofin).

25-26 Feb WW G20 finance ministers and central bankers meet in Mexico.

29-Feb Euro area ECB allots 3Y LTRO.

01-Mar Euro area EU Council summit (sign off on 'fiscal compact' treaty).

04-Mar Spain Regional election in Andalusia.

08-Mar Euro area ECB meeting.

12-Mar Euro area Eurogroup meeting.

13-Mar EU Ecofin meeting.

20-Mar Greece Major bond redemption of EUR 14.4bn.

30-Mar Euro area Eurogroup meeting.

30-Mar EU Ecofin meeting (with central bankers).

31-Mar Spain Spain's government's deadline for presenting the 2012 budget to parliament.

March Greece Tentative date for voluntary debt-swap deal (precise date TBC).

Q1 EA/EU Moody's to revisit its ratings on European sovereigns.

Sources: Reuters, Bloomberg, Standard Chartered Research


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On the Ground


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Document approved by

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Data available as of

20:30 GMT 17 January 2012

Document is released at

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Finanční situace v Řecku (dokument v AJ)

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