Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World...

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Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow

Transcript of Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World...

Page 1: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence

from MexicoA

Xavier GinéWorld Bank

G20 Meeting, Moscow

Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence

from MexicoA

Xavier GinéWorld Bank

G20 Meeting, Moscow

Page 2: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Motivation• Access to financial services is limited in

developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).

• Several explanations have emerged– Transactions costs, asymetries of information,

financial illiteracy

• Poor quality of the product – Evidence of repayment problems and hidden

charges in credit and savings products among low-income households in Mexico

– Savings: Hidden fees yield negative effective rate

– Credit: Many regulated and unregulated institutions, with large variation in total cost of credit.

Page 3: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Motivation• In 2009, new requirements for disclosure

formats and pricing transparency through modifications to the Law for Transparency and Regulation of Financial Services– Required that consumers be presented with

key financial terms.

• Yet, problems persist, and it is unclear whether these disclosure modifications are effective– Fung, Graham and Weil ‘s “Full Disclosure”

book

Page 4: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Example: Credit

Page 5: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

CAT= 267% CAT= 107%

Example: Credit

Page 6: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Example: Savings

Page 7: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Example: Savings

Page 8: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Why aren’t financial products transparent?

• Financial products are inherently complicated– But then firms would have an incentive

to make simpler products or to provide information

– Is government intervention needed in this case?

• Firms purposefully make products more complicated to maximize profits– Firms make more money when pricing

is not transparent– In this case, firms will resist

transparency initiatives

Page 9: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

What do we do?• Implement two studies to answer the

following questions:– What is the quality of information

provided to low-income customers interested in savings and credit products?

• Does information vary by the type of consumer?

• Are financial institutions complying with the new transparency rules? Are they offering the cheapest products that meet the customer needs?

– How effective are disclosure forms?

Page 10: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Study 1: Audit Study• Trained low income “shoppers”

interested in credit and savings products visit financial institutions to assess the (quantity and quality of) information provided by the staff

• Savings Scripts differed along:• Specific savings needs: 5000 Pesos (USD

385) in a Checking account or Fixed Term deposit.

• Credit Scripts differed along:• Over indebtedness: Asked for a loan

representing 20% or 70% of their household income.

Page 11: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Audit Study

• Both Scripts differed along:• Financial Literacy: Neophytes and

Experienced• Awareness of Competition: Among

experienced shoppers, half mention a previous high interest rate offer, the other half mentioned a low interest rate.

• Formal dress: Shoppers were encouraged to dress formally on alternate interactions with the lender.

Page 12: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Setup• Collaborative effort with CONDUSEF,

member of the National Council for Financial Inclusion

• 4 towns near DF, with population between 30,000 and 50,000 habitants, predominantly from the low-middle income socio-economic group.

• 26 FIs (regulated and not) have presence– Commercial Banks, Low income banks,

SOFOMS, SCAPS and SOFIPOS

Page 13: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.
Page 14: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Setup• Savings

– 4 professional auditors made 7 visits each to different institutions in each town for a total of 112 visits.

• Credit– 18 trained low-income individuals had 115

interactions and 215 visits (each interaction could have up to 4 visits).

• After each visit, auditor had to fill in a questionnaire, validated via audio recording.

Page 15: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

17.3***

9.4

13.812.6

SAVINGS: Interview timeM

inu

tes

Page 16: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience High over indebted

Low over indebted

Financial Literacy Profile Over indebtedness profile

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.034.7***

29.0

32.5***31.1

CREDIT: Interview timeM

inu

tes

Page 17: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

82.0%

84.0%

86.0%

88.0%

90.0%

92.0%

94.0%

96.0%

98.0%

100.0%

88.7%

94.4%

90.6%

92.6%

SAVINGS: Product offered aligned with needs

Page 18: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience High over indebted

Low over indebted

Financial Literacy Profile Over indebtedness profile

0.00

500.00

1000.00

1500.00

2000.00

2500.00

3000.00

1598.29 1670.46

2451.22***

841.27

CREDIT: Requested - Approved amount

Me

xic

an

Pe

so

s

Page 19: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

8.6***

5.4

6.3***

7.7

SAVINGS: Number of information items (of 18)

Ite

ms

Page 20: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

1.5 1.5 1.51.5

SAVINGS: Legal requirements (out of 2)

Ite

ms

Page 21: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.03.7

3.23.4 3.5

SAVINGS : Terms of account (out of 10)

Ite

ms

Page 22: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

2.3***

0.5

1.0***

1.8

SAVINGS: Fees and Commissions (out of 6)

Ite

ms

Page 23: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

67%***

43%

54% 55%

SAVINGS: Pct of terms mentioned from actual product offered

Page 24: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

2.23%2.07%

3.87%***

0.71%

SAVINGS: GAT of actual product of-fered

Page 25: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

1.38***

0.46

0.870.96

SAVINGS: Explanation of termsIt

em

s

Page 26: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

High Experience Low experience Fix term account Checking accountFinancial Literacy Profile Term profile

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

1.061.11

1.26

0.91

SAVINGS: Total number of printed materials

Ite

ms

Page 27: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Summary of Results

• Staff tends to disinform potential clients, especially neophytes– Yet, experienced shoppers rate the staff

higher– In general, staff cannot explain key

terms such as GAT and CAT

• Misalignment of incentives between staff and potential client– Staff adjusts correctly loan size but

client typically ends up with more expensive credit and savings products

Page 28: Financial (Dis-)Information and Disclosure: Experimental Evidence from Mexico A Xavier Giné World Bank G20 Meeting, Moscow Financial (Dis-)Information.

Conclusion and Caveats

• The study covers only one region of one country– Need replication to other contexts

• Disclosure and transparency policies are difficult to implement successfully because FIs have a strong incentive to undo them– They are insufficient for debiasing

customers