Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch

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© Colin Lizieri 2009 20 September 2009 Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch Colin Lizieri Grosvenor Professor of Real Estate Finance University of Cambridge

Transcript of Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch

Page 1: Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch

© Colin Lizieri 200920 September 2009

Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch

Colin Lizieri

Grosvenor Professor of Real Estate Finance

University of Cambridge

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Agenda

• Townshend and Daltrey (1966)• Context: Gearing, Capital Values, the Credit Crunch• Obtaining Capital for Development• Public Sector Roles and Techniques• Public-Private Finance: Issues and Questions• Observations on Risk, Return and the Market

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Gearing and Commercial Real Estate

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UK Bank Lending on Commercial Real Estate

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Q2 2009: £244billion outstanding … source, Bank of England

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Context: European CMBS Issuance

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Source: Lizieri (2009), Barclays Capital, Moody’s

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Context: Falling Yields and Rising Values

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Values rose by 52% January 2001 to June 2007. Source: IPD

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Context: Value Gains Wiped Out Post-2007

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Values fell by 44% June 2007 to July 2009. Source: IPDRecall that a fall of 44% is reversed by a rise of 79%

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Capital for Private Development Post-2008

• Closing Down of Public Debt Markets– No direct capital market access or rate competition– “Originate and Distribute” models, loan book liquidity

• Shifts in Private Debt Markets– Credit and liquidity crises– Non-performing loan impacts and risk ratings– Regulation, Basel II (and III?) and capital adequacy– Margins, loan terms, security and flexibility

• Private Equity– A global crisis, not localised– Recovery funds, vulture funds and sovereign wealth funds

• Public Capital– Stabilisation measures, QE and public finances– “Discretionary” spending and “low priority” programmes

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Public Sector: Financial Roles and Techniques

• Roles– Direct investment in infrastructure and regeneration– Partnership, risk sharing and support – Planning, coordination and regulation

• Existing Mechanisms– HCA, RDA, LA activity– PPP, Local Asset Backed Vehicles

• New and Proposed Mechanisms– Business Rates Supplement, Community Infrastructure Levy– JESSICA and Regional Infrastructure Funds– Tax Increment Financing / ADZs

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Public Sector Financial Inputs: Issues

• New Mechanisms and Market Timing– “Glacial progress” versus “Not Now”

• The “TIF” Approach– Displacement and substitution effects– “Incremental revenue” – new build or value uplift?– Capital costs and revenue implications

• Competition and Incentives– Planning flexibility, development stance and tax incentives– Democratic choice and Tiebout effects– NIMBYism and coordination issues

• Risk and Return– Linking local finance to property and capital market cycles?– A fair share of risk – developers’ profits in partnerships

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Some Observations …

• We Need More Financial Innovation Not Less … – Post credit crunch perceptions and regulation– Vanilla-plain finance and “the flight to quality”– Debt securitisation is a good idea, not a bad one

• Long-Term Perspectives– Short-term return chasing, efficiency and decisions– Risk-return tradeoffs versus new paradigms– Economic fundamentals matter

• Shifting Market Perceptions– Gearing, Return and Risk – Asset Risk and Finance Risk– How Risky is Regeneration Really? – Are prime “institutional” investments really safer?

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Global Office Investment?

• Heavy Concentration of Global Real Estate Investment– 49% of 2007, 2008 deals were City offices– 64% of deals, 79% of office deals in Global Financial Centres

• But Global Financial Centres are More Risky– Occupier, Investment, Development and Funding markets linked– Markets are linked across cities and regions– Vulnerable to linked shocks, systemic risks

• Impact on Risk of Investment Portfolios– Portfolios not well diversified– Ignoring fundamental risk drivers

• Implication – a Key Role for Local and Regional Markets– Must make the case– Must make the case in the right language …

11See: Colin Lizieri (2009) Towers of Capital, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell

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Investment Concentration and Risk

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-80.0% -70.0% -60.0% -50.0% -40.0% -30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0%

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Frankfurt

Paris

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Dublin

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Stockholm

Oslo

Dubai

Madrid

Office Values Fall From Peak

Selected Cities Q2 2009

Rent %

Cap Val %

Source: CBRE/Lizieri

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Real Estate Performance 1980-2008

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• Superior Risk Adjusted Returns and Diversification Benefitso City offices 7.5% p.a. return, 13.6% standard deviationo East industrial 10.1% p.a. return, 12.2% standard deviationo East retail 10.2% p.a. return, 10.1% standard deviation

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© Colin Lizieri 200920 September 2009

Finance, Regeneration and the Credit Crunch

Colin Lizieri

Grosvenor Professor of Real Estate Finance

University of Cambridge