Finance and Solutions of UNSC

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UN Security CouncilStudy Guide

Taipei Model United Nations 2015

May 21 – May 24


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Table of Contents

Welcome Letter ................................................................................................................................ iii

Topic Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

I. The Situation in Ukraine ####################################################################################################################################### $

II. Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in Africa ######################################################################## %

Committee Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3

Committee History ##################################################################################################################################################### &

Committee Mandate ################################################################################################################################################### '

Topic I: The Situation in Ukraine .................................................................................................... 6

Background ################################################################################################################################################################### (

Statement of Problem ################################################################################################################################################ )

Spread of Conflicts in Eastern Ukraine ########################################################################################################## )

Concerns for Human Rights ############################################################################################################################ $%

Past Actions ############################################################################################################################################################### $&

Minsk Protocol ##################################################################################################################################################### $&

Minsk Protocol II ################################################################################################################################################ $'

Possible Solutions #################################################################################################################################################### $*

Dilemma ################################################################################################################################################################# $*

Questions Must be Answered ########################################################################################################################## $(

Topic II: Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in Africa .......................................... 17

Background ################################################################################################################################################################ $+

Terrorism in Africa ############################################################################################################################################# $+

Role in the Issue ####################################################################################################################################################### $)

The role of the United Nations system ######################################################################################################### $)

The role of the Security Council ##################################################################################################################### %$

Statement of Problem ############################################################################################################################################# %&

Transnational organised crimes in which terrorist groups often engage ######################################## %&

Strategic impacts of interaction of terrorism and transnational organised crime ######################## %*

The linkage of terrorism and transnational organised crime complicates conflict prevention

and resolution. ###################################################################################################################################################### %+


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Case Study ################################################################################################################################################################## %)

Possible Solutions #################################################################################################################################################### &,

Possible solutions ################################################################################################################################################ &,

Questions must be answered ########################################################################################################################### &$

Rules of Procedure ........................................................................................................................... 32


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Welcome Letter

Dear Delegates,

This year, the Chair of the Security Council is Po-Kuan Wu. He is currently a senior student

majoring in Diplomacy at National Chengchi University (NCCU), and has taken part in an

exchange student program in Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Spain. He has attended TMUN twice

in 2012 and 2013, and several international MUNs respectively in New York, Madrid and

Maastricht. This is his second time being part of the TMUN staff. Ilenia Chen and Ava Yang will

be serving as co-Chairs. Ilenia Chen is now a senior student in Department of Diplomacy at NCCU,

and has also studied international relations in Seoul National University. She was a Delegate in

Council of European Union in 2013 TMUN and received Best Delegate award. Ava Yang majors in

Diplomacy at NCCU, and is currently a sophomore student.

The Security Council is one of the most influential and powerful institutions in international

community dedicating to the maintenance of peace and security. It is not only a principal organ of

the United Nations, but also the only one empowered to adopt resolutions that carry legally binding

effect. This year, the topics on the agenda of the Security Council are:

1.

The Situation in Ukraine

2.

Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in Africa

The study guide will provide you a brief introduction to the Committee mandate and the

background of the topics. However, it is not meant to replace further research and we highly

encourage you to explore in depth the positions of your representing countries. Additionally, due to

the fact that both the issues are still ongoing, delegates are expected to follow up all the latest

developments.

We hereby welcome you to the 2015 Taipei Model United Nations. We wish you all the best in

preparations, and look forward to meeting you in the conference.

Sincerely,

Po-Kuan Wu, Chair

Ilenia Chen, Co-Chair

Ava Yang, Co-Chair


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Topic Introduction

I. The Situation in Ukraine

Owing to its extraordinary ethno-linguistic demographic feature, historical background and

geographical location, the struggle between pro-Europe and pro-Russia factions has always been a

critical issue in Ukraine’s political and foreign affairs, bringing division and instability to the

Country. In 21st November 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abandoned a

trade agreement with the European Union, and instead sought a closer tie to Moscow. Opposing the

pro-Russian policy, civilians began to occupy the Independence Square (Maiden Nezalezhnosti) in

Kiev in November 2013. This demonstration was named Euromaiden due to its appeal for a closer

European integration. In response to the Parliament’s decision to replace the Yanukovych

administration with a pro-European one in February 2014, Crimea passed a succession referendum

on joining Russia with a 97% approval rate in March; moreover, protesters occupied government

buildings and later proclaimed independence in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and

Luhansk. Since then, the conflicts between Western-backed Ukrainian government and pro-Russian

separatists have resulted in great amount of casualties as well as humanitarian crisis. On 5th

September 2014, brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),

two sides of conflicts reached a truce, the Minsk Protocol. Nevertheless, the tenuous ceasefire

agreement has failed to curb recurrent shelling and skirmishes.

The issue firstly drew the attention of the Security Council in February 2014. However, the Council

has yet virtually made concrete contributions to the Ukrainian crisis in its meetings. A wide range

of issues is involved in the crisis, including the effective implementation of Minsk Protocol, human

rights and humanitarian problems, the succession of Crimea to Russia, cross-border inflow of

weaponry and foreign fighters, Western sanctions against Russia and so forth. Addressing the threat

to both domestic and international peace, the Security Council must act and prevent the crisis from

further escalating and overreaching.


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II. Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in Africa

Noting the threat posed by rampant terrorist activities, the international society is increasingly

focusing on conditions that allow terrorist groups to operate, recruit fighters, generate revenue and

obtain resources. Because of porous nature of borders and ramshackle state structure in the region,

terrorist groups, including but not limited to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement

for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Eddine, Al Shabaab, and Boko Haram, are

able to carry out and benefit from transnational organised crime. In addition, African states have

routinely highlighted the fact that cross-border crime would weaken state authority and capabilities

as well as increase the risk of conflict relapse and even the outbreak of civil war. Addressing the

linkage of transnational organised crime and terrorism is of paramount importance to combat

terrorist activities in Africa, and therefore has grabbed the attention of the UN. The Security

Council adopted the resolution 2195 on 22nd December 2014, in which Member States expressed

their deep concern over the connections between some forms of transnational organised crime and

terrorism. Accordingly, the Security Council shall take the impact of cross-border crimes in to

account for its future actions for combating terrorist groups in Africa.


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Committee Mandate

The Security Council is one of the 6 principle bodies of the United Nations. Its primary

responsibilities are to maintain international peace and security as well as to adopt actions whenever

peace and security are threatened. Additionally, since the Council is the only UN organ empowered

to make legally binding decisions, all of the Member States are obligated to comply with the

resolutions made by the Council.7

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Council is provided with a number of powers to

maintain international security. Pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Council could

determine the existence of any threat to the international society and formulate relative advice. 8

When a concern raised by possible threat is brought to the Council, in most of time, the Council

would firstly choose peaceful means and call upon countries involved to convene negotiation. The

Council may carry out diplomatic tools such as assigning investigation groups or recommending

methods, dispatching a mission, appointing envoy or suggesting the Secretary-General to serve as

moderator to engage in and to arrange a pacific settlement.9 Yet when the situation seems to further

deteriorate, the Security Council could adopt stronger actions to prevent the escalation of the

conflicts. In order to cease the outbreak of conflicts, the Council may undertake economic sanctions

or financial restrictions, issue peacekeeping or peace building programs, or even take military

actions by assigning collective troops to the area in attempt to stabilise the situation. 10

Aside from the aforementioned granted power, the Security Council may establish subsidiary

organs when it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.11 These subsidiary organs can

be procedural or substantive. Current missions of its subsidiary organs include peacekeeping

operations, counterterrorism, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and recommendation of new

members. The Council also cooperates with several international and regional organisations as well

as non-governmental organisations to further implement its resolutions. For instance, the Security

Council has coordinated with North Atlanta Treaty Organization (NATO) in the 2011 Libyan civil

war.12 Also, during the Syrian conflict, the Security Council remains as an intimate cooperator with

7 United Nations, the Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.


9 United Nations Security Council, Mandate. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/.

10 Ibid.11

United Nations, the Charter of the United Nations, Article 29.12

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1937, S/RES/1937 (30 August 2010). See also North Atlanta TreatyOrganization, NATO and Libya, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm#


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the Arab League.13

Each Member State of the Security Council has one vote.14 The passage of any voting requires 9

affirmative votes; however, 5 permanent members possess veto power on substantive matters,

which means that when one of the P5 members casts a negative vote, the passage of the resolution

would be doomed to failure.15 Veto power was frequently used during the Cold War, especially by

the United States of America and the former Soviet Union.16 During the past two decades, the

frequency of the use of veto power has comparatively decreased. Many recent resolutions are

adopted by consensus instead.17

13 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 253, A/RES/66/253 (21 February 2012).


15 Ibid.

16 United Nations, Security Council Report, In Hindsight: The Veto. Retrieved from

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-11/in_hindsight_the_veto.php. United Nations, SecurityCouncil Report, The Permanent Members and the Use of the Veto: An Abridged History (2013). Retrieved from

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SCR-veto-insert-2.pdf.17

Supra note 16 . See also United Nations, Security Council Report, In Hindsight: Consensus in the Security Council

(2013). Retrieved fromhttp://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-01/in_hindsight_consensus_in_the_security_council.php.


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Topic I: The Situation in Ukraine

The situation in Ukraine has been the hub of international attention ever since the conflict began in

2013. Fire has spread from Kiev to the border of Russia and Ukraine. Violations of human rights as

well as the involvement of illegal armed groups triggered the anxiety of all members of the Security

Council particularly. Governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the leaders of separatist groups in certain areas of

Donetsk and Luhansk regions have held rounds of dialogues, trying to reach agreements on

peaceful solutions for ceasing tensions in Ukraine. However, the efficacy of agreements signed until

today still remains doubt. In mid February 2015, under the mediation of leaders of Germany and

France, all parties involved in the conflicts met in the capital of Belarus again, and led to the deal of

Minsk Protocol II, a package aiming at ceasefire.

Background

The diversity of the composition of Ukrainian population is considerable, and such diversity has

become the cause for domestic conflicts and protests ramping all over the regions of Ukraine ever

since November 2013, when former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych declined to sign an

agreement on broader integration with the European.18 In the aftermath, rebel groups occupied the

presidential palace in Kiev and the Parliament removed Yanukovych from his presidency.

Moreover, provinces in Ukraine began to proclaim the status of autonomy one after another,

exacerbating the crumbling sovereignty and unity of the nation. In Crimea, key sites such as airports,

communications and public buildings, including the regional parliament, reportedly continued to be

blocked by unidentified armed men.19 “There are further reports of armed personnel taking control

of regional administration buildings in several cities in the East and South of Ukraine,” reported by

the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations.20

18 United Nations, UN News Center, In wake of unrest, UN welcomes dialogue between Ukrainian President and

opposition, 31 January 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID =47051. VNc8PlWUePU.19

United Nations, Security Council, 7124th

Meeting , S/PV. 7124 (1 March 2014), retrieved from

http://research.un.org/en/ukraine.20

Ibid.


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At the end of February 2014, given that the deterioration of the situation threatened the territorial

integrity of Ukraine, the Security Council held the first meeting discussing the crisis in Ukraine at

the request of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations from Ukraine.21 Considering the

violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the

Security Council expressed grave anxiety for the situation in Ukraine and called for direct dialogue

between all parties concerned.22

The situation worsened when the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea declared its desire for

independence and holding a referendum to join Russian Federation on 16th March 2014 when

Russian troops had been deployed across the border into Eastern Ukraine by the time.23 The

European Union and the United States subsequently moved to apply targeted sanctions against

Russian and Crimean officials as the referendum of Crimea turned out to be in favor of succession

from Ukraine.24 In response to the referendum by Crimean, the Security Council generated a draft

resolution reaffirming the unity of sovereignty of Ukrainian government and denying the validity of

the referendum.25 Nonetheless, with the opposition of Russian Federation, the document failed to

become an official resolution during the seventh time that the Security Council has convened to

discuss the urgent crisis in Ukraine.26 Though similar contents of the document was passed as

resolution 68/262 in late March of the same year,27 the territorial integrity of Ukraine had already

been undermined. The Crimean referendum provided a precedent for rebel groups holding control

of cites in Ukraine to neglect Ukrainian sovereignty and cause more conflicts and damages to local

civilians, especially in the East and South parts of Ukraine.28

21 United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Ukraine

to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2014/136 (28 February 2014), retrievedfrom http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2014/13622

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 189, S/2014/189 (15 March 2014), retrieved from from


United Nations, UN News Center, UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked , 15 March 2014,retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47362#.VQWGV4HLdOI.24

Ibid. 25

Supra note 21.26


Meeting , S/PV. 7138 (15 March 2014), retrieved from

http://research.un.org/en/ukraine.27 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 68/262, A/RES/68/262 (1 April 2014), retrieved fromhttp://www.germania.diplo.de/contentblob/4446020/Daten/5094947/ungvreskrimannexion.pdf.28

United Nations, UN News Center, Backing Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid , 27 March 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47443#.VQWK YoHLdOI.


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UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon met in March 2014 with current Russian President Vladimir

Putin in Moscow to seek for a peaceful solution to de-escalate the tensions between Russia and

Ukraine through diplomatic means.29 In spite of the concerns of President Putin regarding the

Russian minority in Ukraine, United Nations emphasized the protection and respect to human rights

of all people in the nation.30 Regional groups such as Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) have also paid much attention to and efforts in appeasing the tensions in Ukraine

with the UN, since the security in Eurasia has been drastically threatened by the intense situation on

the continent.31 During his briefing, Chairperson Didier Burkhalter of OSCE proposed to the

Security Council the establishment of an International Contact Group on Ukraine to support the

state in better implementations on international instruments for human rights, democracy, and rule

of law.32 However, there are scant chances for any parties to ameliorate the situation in Ukraine

when conflicts are spreading like fire in the country.

Statement of Problem

Spread of Conflicts in Eastern Ukraine

Due to the civil unrest in Kiev and the referendum of Crimea, the Province of Donetsk decided to

vote on the decision for their status in 2014.33 Donetsk Oblast is located on the very eastern part of

Ukraine and next to the border with Russian Federation. The geographic demography turned the

province into one of the centers for pro-Russia conflicts in Ukraine. The separatist groups in

Donetsk took control of the regional governmental buildings and declared the forming of Donetsk

People’s Republic in April 2014.34 The protesters later on asked Moscow to deploy temporary

peacekeeping force to Donetsk to assist in the defense against the government in Kiev.35 Aside

from Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa, and Kharkiv have also become focal points of anti-government

separatists while the authority in Kiev has been taken over by parties in favor of framing close

relationship with the Westerns.36

Cities are occupied with armed insurgents; roads are blocked; and

29 United Nations, UN News Center, In Russia, Ban Calls for Honest and Constructive Dialogue between Kyiv and

Moscow, 20 March 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47390&Kw1=UKRAINE&Kw2=&Kw3=#.VNc-rlWUePW.30

Ibid. 31

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, retrieved fromhttp://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm.32

United Nations, UN News Center, Head of European security bloc outlines areas for greater collaboration with UN ,24 February 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47213#.VNdD41WUePU.33

Richard Galpin (2014). Ukraine Rebels Hold Referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk, BBC News, retrieved from

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27360146.34 Vladimir Radyuhin (2014). Activists in Donetsk proclaim independence, The Hindu, retrieved fromhttp://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/activists-in-donetsk-proclaim-independence/article5883598.ece.35

Ibid .36

David Stern (2014). Ukraine Elections: Pro-Western Parties Set for Voctory, BBC News, retrieved from


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monitors sent by international organizations are captured as hostages by unrest groups in these

areas.37 In response, government in Kiev placed prohibition of entry on passengers from Russia

into eastern Ukraine. Such developments in those areas led to a further destabilisation of the

country and the region, as well as the unity of Ukraine itself.38

At the request of the Permanent Representative of Russian Federation to the United Nations, the

Security Council conducted several emergency sessions in mid 2014 with a view to alleviating the

spread of conflicts in Eastern Ukraine. Nonetheless, no vivid outcomes were produced during these

sessions.39

(Independence of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, source: BBC News Europe, 2014)

On the other hand, Russia, Ukraine, the United States of America, and the European Union gathered

in Geneva in April 2014, and reached an agreement on ceasefire, taking the area from the brink of

waging wars.40 The pact called for the disarming of unrest groups and vacating governmental

buildings and public spaces, while states in the dialogue promised to grant pardon to criminals.

Kiev also promised to hold immediate discussion for constitutional reform and devolving powers to

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29782513.37

United Nations, Security Council, 7167 th

Meeting , S/PV. 7167 (2 May 2014), retrieved fromhttp://research.un.org/en/ukraine.38

Ibid.39

United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2014/264 (13 April 2014),retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/264.40

Bridget Kendall (2014). Ukraine Crisis: Deal to ‘De-escalate’ Agreed in Geneva, BBC News, retrieved fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27072351.


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regional governments.41 To ensure implementation of the agreement, OSCE is obliged to serve as

an inspector and a contributor to support the government in Kiev to prevent clashes from going

further.42 Nevertheless, what the agreement offered was only a glimmer of hope as parties have

sought to give different interpretations of what had been agreed upon.43 The collisions therefore

continued.

After the presidential election in May 2014, Petro Poroshenko took office as the incumbent

Ukrainian President.44 To tackle the instable situation, the new office along with Russia and OSCE

created the Trilateral Contact Group, aiming at facilitating dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. 45

During their meeting in Donetsk in June 2014, President Poroshenko announced a peace plan for

Eastern Ukraine, and ordered ceasefire for a week starting from the 20 th of June.46 The plan was

composed of fifteen clauses for achieving peace after truce, stating the safety guarantees for

participants of negotiations, amnesty of those who laid down weapons, liberation of hostages, and

decentralization of power through elections.47 The President also called for establishing a buffer

zone for ten kilometers on the border of Ukraine and Russia.48 Nonetheless, separatists were not

satisfied with the plan, appealing that Poroshenko should respond to the primary demand of

Donetsk to withdraw his troops and recognize the status of the Republic.49 The ceasefire existed in

name only, even after Poroshenko extended three days of truce.50 With the failure of the peace plan,

demonstrators assembled in Kiev to protest against extension of ceasefire, considering that

separatists have been bringing chaos and murders to their own country.51

41 Julia Borger, Alec Luhn (2014). Ukraine crisis: Geneva talks produce agreement on defusing conflict, The Guardian,

retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/ukraine -crisis-agreement-us-russia-eu.42

Supra note 40. 43


Meeting , S/PV. 7165 (29 April 2014), retrieved fromhttp://research.un.org/en/ukraine.44 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Ukraine, Early

Presidential Elections 25 May 2014: Final Report, 30 June 2014, retrieved fromhttp://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/120549.45

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Press

Statement by the Trilateral Contact Group, 31 July 2014, retrieved from http://www.osce.org/home /122142.46

Press Office of President of Ukraine (2014). In Donbas, Petro Poroshenko presented the peaceful plan on the

settlement of the situation in the east of Ukraine, Press Office of President of Ukraine, retrieved fromhttp://www.president.gov.ua/en /news/30566.html.47

Ibid .48

Ibid .49

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Latest from theSpecial Monitoring Mission in Ukraine based on information received until 22 June 2014, 18:00 (Kyiv time), 23 June

2014, retrieved from http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/120113.50 Steve Rosenberg (2014). Ukraine Crisis: President Poroshenko Extends Truce for East, BBC News, retrieved fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28066188.51

Ukraine Crisis: Leaders to Hold More Talks Amid Clashes, 2014 June, BBC News, retrieved fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28079876.


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A striking incident happened following the dissipation of the peace plan: the crash of Malaysia

Airline’s flight MH-17, in which Ukraine and Russia accused each other to be responsible for the

contrived disaster on grounds that the flight was shot down by a sophisticated surface-to-air missile

in the province of Donetsk.52

The Security Council called an emergency meeting on 18th July 2014. Representative of Russian

Federation questioned on what led a Ukrainian aviation dispatcher to send a passenger flight

through an area of military clashes, and described that Russia “placed all blame on the authorities in

Kiev and calls for the Ukrainian side to take decisive measures to prevent such incidents in

future.”53 On the other hand, the Ukrainian government believed the accident was an act of

terrorism, since two Ukrainian jets were shot down near the same location several days prior to the

incident, with terrorist leaders claiming responsibility for those acts.54 Despite the divergent stances

in the Security Council, Member States adopted resolution 2166 unanimously.55 The resolution

emphasizes the need for full, comprehensive, and independent international inspections of the crash

site, coordinating by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) with the support of

Trilateral Contact Group, and urges all parties to cease military activities immediately to ensure the

integrity of the site and security of the inspectors.56 It was the first time that regional separatist

groups agreed to cooperate with OSCE in east Ukraine and supported the dialogue of Trilateral

Contact Group.57

52 United Nations, Security Council, 7219

th Meeting , S/PV. 7219, 18 July 2014 , retrieved from


Ibid .54

Ibid .55


Meeting , S/PV. 7221 (21 July 2014), retrieved from

http://research.un.org/en/ukraine.56 United Nations, Security Council, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 , S/RES/2166 (21 November 2014), retrievedfrom http://research.un.org/en/ukraine.57

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, PressStatement by the Trilateral Contact Group, 18 July 2014, retrieved from http://www.osce.org/home/121390.


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(Crash site of Malaysia Airline’s Flight MH-17, source: BBC News Europe, 2014)

Concerns for Human Rights

Much attention should be paid to the deteriorated situation of human rights of civilians in conflicts.

According to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in the United Nations, Ivan

!imonovic, who had ordered immediate deployment of a UN monitoring team in mid March 2014

to investigate violations of human rights and to prevent the spread of fear in the country via any

means, there has been no rule of law in the regions controlled by paramilitary forces.58 Human

rights cannot be protected and guaranteed; information is blocked or twisted; and insecurity has

been dominating the minds of Ukrainian populations due to the unpredictable future and lack of

protection.59 Activists and journalists are very likely to be stopped, detained, interrogated, or

beaten by the special police force at checkpoints.60 Arbitrary arrest, torture, and poor medical

treatment are also common kinds of human rights violations performed by many other

unidentifiable armed troops.61 Eight observers of OSCE were even held in captivity since late May

2014 in Donbass area until the short ceasefire in June.62

The personal security of Ukrainian

officials in local governments is very much likely to be threatened and put in danger as well.

Referring to the second report of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission based in Ukraine,

criminality such as abducting official members of electoral commissions carries extremely negative

58 United Nations, UN News Center, Ukraine: UN deploys human rights monitors amid troubling signs in east, Crimea,

14 March 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=4735 5#.VNdGe1WUePU.59

Ibid .60 Ibid .61

Ibid .62


Meeting , S/PV. 7205 (24 June 2014), retrieved fromhttp://research.un.org/en/ukraine


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impacts on the organization of elections in eastern and southern regions.63 In addition, refugees

trying to leave areas under control of anti-governmental military forces had turned into targets of

military operations, especially in Luhansk region.64 The longer the tensions remain, the more such

tragic incidents may occur, making ceasefire and finding peaceful solution an urgent task for all

Member States of the United Nations at this moment.

Past Actions

Minsk Protocol

The informal representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic took part in the fifth round

of peace talks between Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE in Minsk, and later signed a peace accord in

September 2014, known as the Minsk Protocol.65 The Protocol greatly resembles with the peace

plan of Ukrainian President Porosheko but contains only twelve clauses, including decentralization

of power, amnesty of individuals involved in events happened in Donetsk and Luhansk area, and

recognition for the local government provisional arrangements in Donetsk and Luhansk.66 Parties

also agreed to set up security zones in the border of Russia and Ukraine, under permanent

monitoring of the OSCE.67 Minsk Protocol brought ceasefire between all sides concerned, and

banned any unilateral or bilateral offensive operations, especially in security zones.68

However, the ceasefire agreement was again violated by both parties in Ukraine, and the protocol

was practically signed in vain. On 2nd November 2014, rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk conducted

elections for the Republic, and declared themselves as de facto independent from Ukraine,

threatening to expand territory under their control.69 A full mobilization, including the creation of

local armies and security forces, was also announced.70 Kiev condemned the elections as being

outside the framework of the Ukrainian Constitution and laws as well as breaking the Minsk

Protocol.71 President Poroshenko asked the Parliament to abolish the articles, which are meant to

63 United Nations, UN News Center, Ukraine: UN Official cites worsening human rights situation in southern, eastern

regions, 21 May 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News ID=47855#.VNdG0lWUePU.64

United Nations, UN News Center, Ban ‘deeply disturbed’ by reported attack on refugee convoy in eastern Ukraine,18 August 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48509#.VN dHE1WUePU.65

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral

Contact Group, signed in Minsk , 5 September2014, retrieved from http://www.osce.org/home/ 123257.66

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Protocol on the results of consultations of the TrilateralContact Group, signed in Minsk , 5 September2014, retrieved from http://www.osce.org/home/ 123257.67

Ibid .68

Ibid .69

United Nations, UN News Center, Ukraine: Ban Deplores Planned Holding of November ‘Elections’ by RebelGroups, 29 October 2014, retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID =49195#.VQWkZIHLdOI.70

Ibid .71


Meeting , S/PV. 7311 (12 November 2014), retrieved fromhttp://research.un.org/en/ukraine.


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provide years of autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk, and halted economic subsidies offered to

separatists.72 In January 2015, the separatists claimed that they will no more have further talks

regarding ceasefire, and were absent in the latest round of the Trilateral Contact Group.73 With the

evaporation of efforts put in Minsk Protocol, there are chances for return of full-scale conflicts,

enhancing the amount of casualties and increasing hostilities.

Minsk Protocol II

Concerning the collapse of Minsk Protocol signed in September 2014, leaders of the European

Union, particularly Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, and President of France,

Francois Hollande, facilitated dialogues between Ukraine, Russia, and representatives of separatist

groups in Minsk in February 2015.74 Outcome of the meeting was an agreement known as the

Minsk Protocol II, which comprises “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk

Agreements” and a declaration of political leaders to support the package to be carried out. 75 The

document requires ceasefire right after the adoption of the agreement, graduate withdrawal of heavy

weapons from troops of Ukrainian government, Russia, and separatists, ensuring pardon and

amnesty of persons in connection with conflicts, releasing hostages, and reinstatement of full

control of state border by the government of Ukraine.76 Furthermore, the Package demands the

creation of working groups by OSCE to monitor the fulfillment of all articles agreed upon, and

urges the framing of buffer zone between Ukrainian governmental troops and rebel groups.77 In

response to the new protocol, the Security Council called a meeting in 17th February 2015, and

passed resolution 2202 in support of the new peace document.78

72 David Stern (2014), Ukraine Crisis: President Poroshenko’s Threat after Rebel Polls, BBC News, retrieved from

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29891556.73

Karoun Demirjian, (2015), Pro-Moscow Rebel Faction Snubs Further Cease-fire Talks in Tense Eastern Ukraine, theWashington Post , retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/

pro-moscow-rebel-faction-snubs-further-cease-fire-talks-in-tense-eastern-ukraine/2015/01/23/224f30c3-2d91-4d6e-b8df-fce448a7ce40_story.html.74

Ukraine Ceasefire: The 12-Piont Plan, 2015 February, BBC News, retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29162903.75

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2202, S/RES/2202 (17 February 2015), retrieved from http://research.

un.org/en/Ukraine.76 Ukraine Ceasefire: The 12-Piont Plan, 2015 February, BBC News, retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29162903.77

Ibid .78

Supra note 76.


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(Buffer zone in Minsk Protocol II, source: Ukraine National Security & Defense Council)

However, rebel groups in Donetsk and Luhansk regions approached to Debaltseve, and captured the

city after putting their signatures on the Minsk Protocol II, claiming that Debaltseve was not

incorporated into the areas for security zone.79 As skirmishes and conflicts continue to cause

casualties in several parts of the country, the Ukrainian government has already called for sending

peacekeeping troops of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the peace accord.80

Possible Solutions

Dilemma

Given from the implementation of previous agreements signed, Member States cast doubt on

whether the new pack of Minsk Protocol II could be fully fulfilled and obeyed by conflict parties.

Even though Ukrainian and Russian governments agreed to withdraw weapons and troops deployed,

there still remain difficulties for the world to tell if long-lasting peace could take place in Ukraine.

How to effectively implement the Protocol, therefore, has become a question that the Security

Council as well as the government of Ukraine and Russian Federation must urgently answer in

79 Anton Zverev (2015), Battle rages for town where Ukraine rebels reject ceasefire, Reuters, retrieved fromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/16/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0LK13K20150216.80


Meeting , S/PV. 7395 (27 February 2015), retrieved fromhttp://research.un.org/en/ukraine.


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order to prevent further violations of human rights and infringement of the sovereignty and

territorial integrity.

Questions Must be Answered

Several questions that the Security Council shall discuss in the sessions are:

A.

How to effectively implement the new Minsk Protocol II signed in February 2015 to

achieve longstanding ceasefire and peace?

B.

What are the peaceful solutions for the greater autonomous status of Donetsk and Luhansk

regions? How to maintain the integrity of sovereignty and territory of Ukraine, while

preventing tensions from escalating?

C. How to address issues of human rights especially in Eastern Ukraine? Should protection of

human rights be put into any peace accords agreed by all parties concerned?

D. How shall the Security Council respond to the human rights and humanitarian violations

found by the reports of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine? And how to

ensure safety of humanitarian personnel in rebel controlled areas during missions?

E. In what conditions should Western sanctions imposed on Russia and east Ukraine be

lifted?


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Topic II: Terrorism and Transnational Organised

Crime in Africa

Background

Terrorism in Africa

In recent years, widespread terrorist activities pose a great challenge and threat to the international

peace and security, especially in some parts of Africa and Middle East. However, due to the

transnational nature of the terrorist acts, no area of the world is immune from its proliferation, and

no single state is able to tackle the spread of terrorism independently. Over past 2 years, terrorist

incidents have been reported in some 40 UN Member States, and the deaths and injuries have

continued to mount. 81 The coordinated international cooperation is therefore of profound

importance to address the challenge.

Political turbulence, social tensions, economic inequality and sectarian or ethnic conflicts all could

be the roots of terrorism.82 African states are especially vulnerable to the threats of extremism and

terrorism because of their loosely controlled borders and political instability. The lack of good

governance and religious tensions, coupled with loose borders and weapons control, provide the

opportunistic terrorists with environment to operate and grow. Terrorist groups, including but not

limited to Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar Eddine, and other Al-Qaida

affiliates, constitute a formidable threat to the security and stability in the region, resulting in loss of

civilian lives and properties as well as undermining states’ authority and governance capacity.

Furthermore, terrorist activities frustrate the efforts made to promote social and economic

development.83 Mali, Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Algeria, Kenya and their

neighbouring countries, where Islamic extremists and Al-Qaida affiliates exploit the fragile political

and security climate to conduct operations, are all victims of such threats.84

81 United Nations, General Assembly, Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations

Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: report of the Secretary-General, A/68/841.82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.


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African States affected by terrorist activities (source: http://www.nctc.gov/site/map/)

Role in the Issue

The role of the United Nations system

In response to the threat to the regional peace and stability driven by terrorist groups, the United

Nations has long devoted itself to counter terrorism and provide humanitarian assistance. TheGeneral Assembly and the Security Council are two main UN organs dealing with this issue.

Currently, the international legal framework on counter-terrorism comprises 18 international

instruments, each of which relates to a specific terrorist activity. 85 Acknowledging that the

terrorism would not be defeated by separated actions, and collective actions and comprehensive

measures are necessary, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Global

Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 as a new phase of UN efforts to counter terrorism.86

Aside from direct military or police responses, Member States has further moved to address the

conditions and environments that facilitate the operation of terrorists. Transnational organised crime

is believed as a major financial source for those militant groups, by which they can raise fund,

recruit new members and obtain weapons. Since 2000, the linkage of transnational organised crime

and terrorism has been put on the Council’s counter-terrorism agenda.87

85 United Nations, United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/.

86 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 288, A/RES/60/288, (20 September 2006).

87 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1373, S/RES/1373, (28 September 2001).


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The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In 2006, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 60/288 “The United Nations Global

Counter Terrorism Strategy.” Established with a view to promoting comprehensive and coordinated

responses at all levels to counter terrorism, the Strategy is composed of four pillars: (a) measures to

address the conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism, (b) measures to prevent and combat

terrorism, (c) measures to build State’s capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen

the role of the United Nations system in this regard, and (d) measures to ensure respect for human

rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. 88 To follow

up the implementation of the Strategy, the General Assembly requests review report every two

years to examine progress made by the UN system on countering terrorism worldwide. 89 In the

Strategy and its reviews, Member States repeatedly expressed their concern on the conditions and

factors that propel the extremism and terrorism.90 In addition, they noticed that military actions,

law enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone are insufficient to combat extremism

and terrorism.91

Provided by two of the four pillars of the Strategy, the international society must address those

conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism in order to defeat it. The crimes related to terrorism

therefore were regarded as important issues that have to be dealt with. The Strategy suggests that

the international cooperation and coordination shall be strengthened in the regard, especially on

border and custom controls as well as information and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, the

Strategy underscores that realization of sustainable economic and social development supported by

rule of law and good governance would be an effective way to curb the spread of terrorism.92

In order to ensure the coherence of UN actions against terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism

Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established in 2005. 93 Operating under the

Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs, the CTITF, with its UN

Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), entities and working groups, is the main UN body to

coordinate and oversee the implementation of the measures stipulated in the UN Global

)) Supra note 87. 89

Ibid . See also United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 282, A/RES/66/282, (29 June 2012). United Nations,General Assembly, Resolution 276, A/RES/68/276, (13 June 2014).90

Ibid .91

Ibid .92

Supra note 86, 87, 89. See also United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 62/272, A/RES/62/272, The United

Nations Global Terrorism Strategy (15 September 2008). United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 64/297,A/RES/64/297, The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (13 October 2010).93

United Nations, Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force, retrieved fromhttp://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/index.shtml.


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Counter-Terrorism Strategy.94 The CTITF works jointly with different regional entities, including

those in central, eastern and southern Africa, to help develop regional coordinated strategies with an

aim at preventing and countering terrorist acts in those regions. 95 Specifically, they work

extensively with states to implement counter terrorism measures, including bolstering border

management and combating money laundering.96

Various UN agencies took actions in compliance with the first pillar of the United Nations Global

Counter Terrorism Strategy. In Mali, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO) integrates and strengthens the safeguarding of cultural heritages in the

region.97 Additionally, the UNESCO cooperates with African Development Bank and the Economy

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to develop educational tools for the promotion of

human rights, peace and democracy, and also assists in improving local educational materials and

resources.98 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports the reform of national

and local community security sectors as well as conflict prevention efforts. 99 The

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTCED) under the Security Council has

hosted regional workshops for government, civil society and regional international organisations

representatives to discuss effective strategies for prohibiting and countering incitement.100

Money Laundering and illegal trafficking of drugs are main financial sources for terrorists.101 In

this regard, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive

Directorate (CTCED), the Al-Qaida Committee and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) have made many efforts, including providing capacity development advice on

anti-money laundering to several African governments and organising or joining African regional

workshops on freezing terrorist assets, combating money-laundering and the financing of

terrorism.102 In addition to addressing the financing of terrorist groups, the UNODC provides a

comprehensive response to terrorism, including crime prevention, drug control, combating

measures on transnational organised crime and corruption as well as other related international

94 Ibid. See also United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 64/235, A/RES/64/235 (14 January 2010).

95 United Nations, Security Council, Report of Secretary-General on the work of the United Nations to help States and

subregional and regional entities in Africa in fighting terrorism, S/2014/9 (9 January 2014).96

United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 4 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to theUnited Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2014/869 (4 December 2014).97

Supra note 95.98

Ibid .99

Ibid .100

United Nations, General Assembly, Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United NationsGlobal Counter-Terrorism Strategy: report of the Secretary-General, A/68/841.101

Ibid .102

Ibid .


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cooperation.103 The World Bank also assists Member States in North and sub-Saharan Africa in

enacting laws and regulations in line with the relevant international standards.

Aside from UN initiatives, the UN is in close cooperation with its partnered organisations to deal

with relevant issues. The World Custom Organization, for instance, works with North and West

African and Sahel countries to improve their border control and management with assistance from

the UN.104 The International Maritime Organization assists the Government of Somalia and the

regional authorities of Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug in sustaining offshore maritime security

and the implementation of UN Convention on Law of the Sea.105

The role of the Security Council

Counter-terrorism has been an important issue within the Security Council since 1990s. In 2012,

under the presidency of Togo, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement concerning the

negative impacts of the transnational organised crime on security and stability in Africa. 106

Through the presidential statement, the Security Council expressed concern about the serious threat

posed by terrorism and its increasing links with transnational organised crime and drug

trafficking.107 Recently, building on the attention raised by African states, on 19 December 2014,

the Security Council adopted resolution 2195, calling for international and regional cooperation on

capacity-building in the regard, and requesting the Secretary-General to submit reports to the

Council on efforts of UN entities to address the problem of terrorists benefiting from transnational

organised crime.108 In addition, through the resolution, the Security Council expressed concerns

that terrorists benefiting from transnational organised crime in some regions may contribute to

undermining affected States, and complicating conflict prevention and resolution efforts.109

Thus far, the Council has established the Al-Qaida Sanction Committee, the Counter-Terrorism

Committee (CTC) and the 1540 Committee to execute the measures to counter terrorism stipulated

in its resolutions.

103 Ibid .

104 Ibid .

105 Ibid .

106 United Nations, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2012/2 (21 February

2012).107 Ibid .

108 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2195, S/RES/2195 (19 December 2014).

109 Ibid .


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A. Al-Qaida Sanction Committee

With the adoption of resolution 1267 in 1999, the Security Council established the Al-Qaida

Sanction Committee for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of sanctions imposed on

Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.110 The resolution requests Member States to conduct sanctions in

order to prevent individuals or entities on the list from acquiring weapons and recruiting new

members.111 In addition to overseeing the implementation of sanctions, the Committee also is in

charge of revising the Sanction List. Any state may submit requests calling for adding to or deleting

individual or entity from the list, and the Committee shall consider those submissions. 112 In 2011,

the Security Council decided to split the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanction Regime as resolution 1989

stipulates that the Al-Qaida Sanction List established pursuant to resolution 1267 would only

remain those names of individuals and groups associated with Al-Qaida. 113

B. Counter-Terrorism Committee

The Security Council resolution 1373 established the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),

whose responsibility is to bolster the ability of Member States to prevent terrorist acts.114 The

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTCED) is the institution undertaking the

decisions of the Committee, conducting expert assessments of each Member States and facilitating

counter-terrorism technical assistance to countries. The CTC is guided by Security Council

resolutions 1373 and 1624, which regard the criminalisation of financing terrorist groups, denying

safe haven for terrorists and sharing information among governments on any groups planning or

practicing terrorist acts as main measures combating terrorism.115 Through country visit, technical

assistance, country reports, best practice and special meetings, the CTC and CTCED work to ensure

the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in Member States.116

C. 1540 Committee

On 28 April 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 1540 which obligates

Member States to adopt legislations and measures to refrain non-state actors from developing,

acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using Weapons of Mass

110 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1267, S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999).

111 United Nations, Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning

Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, retrieved from:

http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/information.shtml.112

Ibid .113

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1989, S/RES/1989 (17 June 2011).114 Supra note 87.

115 United Nations, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/.

116 Ibid .


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Destruction (WMD) such as nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their deliver systems.117

The Committee cooperates with international, regional and sub-regional organisations, and acts as a

clearinghouse to match offers and request States to implement the resolution.118 On 20 April 2011,

the resolution 1977 adopted by the Security Council affirms that the proliferation of WMD remains

as a threat to international peace and security due to its close tie to terrorist groups. The mandate of

the 1540 Committee is therefore been extended for a period of ten years to 2021.119

Statement of Problem

While there is no explicit definition for “transnational organised crime,” the UN Convention against

Transnational Organised Crime (2000) defines the “organised criminal group” as “a structured

group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of

committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention,

in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”120 Transnational

organised crime, such as trafficking of persons, drugs, illicit arms and weapons, illicit trade in

natural resources, kidnapping for ransom and extortion, bank robbery, money laundering, maritime

piracy and other crimes, benefits and facilitates actions and activities of terrorist groups. 121

Through transnational organised crime, terrorist groups are able to attain the resources, funding,

weapons and other material demands.122 Such linkage has exacerbated conflicts in affected regions

and has eroded the foundation of sustainable and socio-economic development, complicating the

efforts to realise peace and stability in Africa.123

Transnational organised crimes in which terrorist groups often engage

A. Illicit drug trafficking

Africa has been a transit region for illicit drug trafficking: illicit drugs are transported mainly from

Latin American through West Africa to the ultimate destinations in Europe by means of aircrafts or

maritime trafficking.124 Western African opportunistic terrorist groups therefore are able to earn

117 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004).

118 United Nations, Comparative Table Regarding the United Nations Security Committees Pursuant to Resolution

1267 (1999) & 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), retrieved from:http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/comparative_table.pdf.119

United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1977, S/RES/1977 (20 April 2011).120

United Nations, The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, (15 November 2000).121

Supra note 108. 122 Ibid .

123 Ibid .

124 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on transnational organized crime and illicit drug


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profit from their logistic service in smuggling. The flow of pure cocaine to European market

generated more than $1 billion revenue in 2010.125 In the same year, around 1.5 metric tons of

methamphetamine had been transported from West Africa to East Asia, generating revenues of

more or less $90 million.126 Heroin, originated from the South-West Asia and destined for Europe

had also been detected in transit West African countries, particularly in Ghana and Nigeria. 127

B. Human Trafficking

Organised criminal syndicates are notorious for their human trafficking network. The economic

stagnation in Africa fosters the smuggling of migrant, especially from North West Africa to

Europe.128 In recent years, some 5,000 African women have been subjected of human trafficking

towards Europe for sexual exploitation purpose. 129 Moreover, since women are especially

vulnerable to those crimes when the number of refugees and internally displaced persons

accelerates, constant armed conflicts in the region deteriorate the situation.130 An emerging trend in

recent years is the use of Africa as a transit hub for Asian migrants travelling to Europe or North

America.131

C. Illicit trade and smuggling of weapons and ammunition

The issue of illicit trade is especially serious in northern Africa. In the wake of collapse of

al-Gadhafi’s regime, former fighters and arms dealers took advantage of the porous nature of south

Libyan border to smuggle weaponries and ammunition into Sahel region.132 It is suggested that

terrorist groups, including AQIM, Ansar Eddine and MUJAO, may purchase and obtain these

weapons, complicating the security situation in Sahel-Sahara region, particularly in Mali and

Niger.133 With sufficient weaponry, insurgent groups in northern Mali were able to control the

region and fought against the Malian governmental army.134

trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel region. S/2013/359 (17 June 2013).125

Ibid .126

Ibid .127

Ibid .128

Ibid .129

Ibid .130

Ibid .131

Ibid .132

Mark S. and Fiona M. (2014). Illict Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses. Retrieved from UnitedStates Institute of Pease, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW96-Illicit-Trafficking-and-Libyas-Transition.pdf133

Ibid .134

Ibid .


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AQIM moved from North Africa into Sahel. Moreover, in 2014, Boko Haram, staged a cross-border

raid into Cameroon that led to the kidnapping of the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister, Amadou

Ali.143 Over time, the incapability of African states to provide safety and stability within its own

territories resulted in the decreased allegiance of their population to the states. The diminished

support further created spaces for alternative entities to provide public service and subsequently

control some parts of the territory.144

B. Transnational organised crime weakens states capabilities, including military and police

capabilities.

Cross-border criminal offenders, with their profits generated from their illicit trade, often bribe state

security officials, undermining the effectiveness of state security institution and military

discipline.145 For instance, Malian officials’ compliancy with illicit drug traffickers has emerged as

an obstacle for regional cooperation and has undermined the capabilities of Malian Army, reducing

its effectiveness to tackle the rise of AQIM.146 Similarly, in Libya, after the fall of Qaddafi, illicit

markets and cross-border smuggling have weakened central government’s authority due to the fact

that armed groups perpetrating them are harming the consolidation of statehood which is critical in

the post-conflict transition period.147

C.

Transnational organised crime facilitates terrorist organisations, making terrorist groups

more formidable rivals to States.

Participating in criminal activities enables terrorist organisations throughout Africa to easily acquire

weapons, cash and resources. Terrorist groups and other non-state armed groups therefore become

viable rivals to the states as providers of livelihoods and protection.148 In Somalia, Al-Shabaab

profits greatly from its illicit cross-border charcoal trade, which at one point generated revenues of

over $25 million a year.149 In fact, Al-Shabaab has become a market governance role, collecting tax

and tribute from other traders.150

While in Mali and Libya, following the collapse of Qaddafi

regime and the ineffective border control, cross-border smuggling and trafficking of drugs and

143 Ibid .

144 Ibid .

145 Ibid .

146 Wolfram L. (2012). Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region. Retrieved from Carneigie Endowment

for International Peace:

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region.147

Supra note 132. 148

Supra note 96. 149 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security

Council 2002 (2011), S/2012/544 (13 July 2012).150

Ibid .


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weapons have become a catalyst for conflicts, which even has contributed to the expansion of

conflicts.151

The linkage of terrorism and transnational organised crime complicates conflict prevention and

resolution.

The intersection of transnational organised crime and terrorism eventually leads to the difficulty to

reaslise the effective conflict prevention and efforts for four reasons.152 First of all, it increases the

risk of conflict relapse: research suggests that rebel groups, terrorist groups and other non-state

armed groups with access to illicit markets may have less incentive to leave the conflicts or accept a

political settlement, since the conflicts are in many cases beneficial and profitable.153 Besides,

those conflicts may last longer if the participating groups have the opportunity to exploit conflict

resources.154 For another reason, the participation in criminal activities may lead to internal split of

rebel groups, complicating the peaceful process or external mediation. New fronts may also emerge

if branch entities acquire sufficient resources to operate on their own, and have the chance to

practice its own objectives.155 This situation further increases the risk of cross-border conflicts

spillover and internationalisation of civil wars.156 The Malian conflict which is the result of

cross-border arms trafficking resulting from the Libyan conflict is a prominent case in this

regard.157 Finally, when neighbouring countries attempt to deal with transnational organised crime,

they would inevitably confront with terrorist groups, who operate those criminal activities, resulting

in the outbreak of larger conflict.158 For instance, Kenya was drawn into a conflict after raids

launched by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab.159 Similarly, Mauritania’s response to the attacks from

Malian terrorist group, AQIM, turned out to expand the conflict zone.160

151 Supra note 96. See also supra note 131.

152 Supra note 96.

153 Ibid . See also James C. (2013). Strengthening mediation to deal with criminal agendas. Retrieved from Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Strengthening-mediation-to-deal-with-criminal-agendas.pdt.154

Supra note 96. See also James D. F. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 275-301.155

Supra note 96. United Nations Security Council, Fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanction MonitoringTeam, S/2014/402 (10 June 2014).156

Supra note 96. 157

Ibid .158 Ibid .

159 Ibid .

160 Supra note 96.


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In addition, the safety and security of civilian and UN mission personnel are under the threat posed

by the intersection of transnational organised crime and terrorism. Due to the fact that the profitable

transnational organised crime enables terrorist groups to independently acquire resources and

income regardless of their social base, civilian become more likely to be targets of attacks. Given

the longstanding hostility of terrorist groups to the United Nations, mission personnel are facing

risk of being attacked.161 Besides, since they have less incentive to appeal support from local

community, armed groups tend to be more brutal in their attacking methods.162

Case Study

In recent years, Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), by cooperating with its associated groups,

has taken advantage of weak state control and internal instability to takeover the northern territory

of Mali.163 Fearing that the region would become a safe haven for AQIM and other terrorist groups,

the international society focused on operational-level assistance and made efforts to enhance the

capabilities of local security sectors through providing technical support and launching military

missions.164 However, the international society did not perceive the fact that many terrorist groups

are also the conductors of criminal network in the region, and rather overlooked the strategic level

of the question: how terrorist groups acquire resources for operation through transnational

organised crime, and the subsequent negative impacts resulted from such intersection. The

involvement of AQIM in criminal activities enables the group to maintain its power and operation.

Furthermore, Sahel governments’ complicity with organised crime is another main factor that

allows AQIM to grow and effectively control the northern Mali.165

The kidnapping for ransom has been a lucrative measure for AQIM and its associated entities. Since

2007, the AQIM has carried out a series of kidnaping for ransom across the region, including

southern Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and northern Mali.166

It is estimated that the income from

kidnaping is between $40 million and $65 million.167 By April 2012, 42 foreign nationals had been

abducted, among whom, 24 were released, 5 were killed and the rest were being held as hostage

161 Ibid .

162 Ibid . Karen B. (2013) Conclusion, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance.

(Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2013), p.270.163

Supra note 146. 164

Supra note 96 165

Jean-Pierre F. (2009). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat? Retrieved fromhttp://carnegieendowment.org/files/al-qaeda_islamic_maghreb.pdf.166

Supra note 146. 167

Ibid .


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until the end of August 2012. 168 The perpetrators especially target those nationals whose

government would be willing to negotiate for ransom.169

Additionally, organised crime related to drug trafficking might be a major factor of outbreak of the

conflict in northern Mali for the reason that government’s complicity with drug trafficking eroded

the rule of law, the state authorities and security institutions.170 For instance, the former Malian

leadership tried to use organised crime as a resource for the exercise of influence in north by

allowing its local allies to engage in criminal activities, while leading to the lost of control of

northern territory eventually.171

The AQIM obtains their weaponry mainly through weapon smuggling. In the aftermath of the crisis

of Libya, because of loose border control and weak state authority, large inflow of weapons and

ammunition from the Libyan arsenal was smuggled into the Sahel region and enhanced the military

power of insurgent groups in northern Mali.172

The AQIM is a prominent case showing how a terrorist group exploits weak state structure and

porous border to exercise transnational organised crime. Through engagement in transnational

organised crime, the group strengthened their capability to control their occupying territory and

fought against governmental military force. The collusion and corruption between Malian state

officials and smugglers further weakened state capabilities to combat terrorist groups. To counter

terrorism in northern Africa, addressing the linkage of the AQIM and its criminal activities is

imperative.

168 Ibid .

169

Ibid. 170 Ibid .

171 Ibid .

172 Supra note 124.


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Possible Solutions

Possible solutions

The issue of the intersection of transnational organised crime and terrorism is rather complicated;

therefore, the Security Council must consider multidimensional measures and resolutions on both

operational and strategic level. In addition, with the view to reducing the strategic space that

transnational organised crime affords terrorist groups, it is necessary for the Security Council to

initiate a strategic review to consider comprehensive and robust measures to address the intersection

of transnational organised crime and terrorism in Africa, as well as its negative impacts on conflict

prevention efforts.

The Security Council shall review and consider the role of its subsidiary bodies as well as current

conflict prevention efforts in supporting African states to tackle the transnational organised crime in

the context of the UN counter-terrorism strategy, and contain the assessment of transnational

organised crime into its missions and conflict resolution efforts. In addition, since the porous nature

of borders is one of the factors that allows the growth of trafficking and smuggling, the Security

Council shall consider concrete measures to improve border management among African states,

especially where terrorist groups are operating. Moreover, the Security Council may adopt

measures to assist governments in addressing the collusion structure between state officials and

traffickers, enhancing the capabilities of government to counter terrorism and fully control its

territory and investigating the identities and activities of those groups or individuals involved in

transnational organised crime with the possibility of imposing punitive and targeted sanctions.173

Finally, the Council is recommended to consider options for strengthening the Council’s use of

different tools to reduce the negative impacts of terrorist involvement in transnational organised

crime.174

173 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2013/189 (26 May

2013).174

Supra note 96.


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Questions must be answered

A.

What measures shall be adopted by the Security Council to address the linkage of terrorism and

transnational organised crime, and to reduce the negative impacts produced by such linkage?

B.

What adjustments shall be made to current efforts and missions operated by the subsidiary

entities of the Security Council to tackle the intersection of transnational organised crime and

terrorism?

C.

How to tackle the problem of porous nature of borders of African states and the very lucrative

synergies between terrorism and transnational organised crime?

D. How to address political and social grievances for stopping collusion and corruption of state

authorities between traffickers and state officials?

E. How the actions of the Security Council can be better integrated into the UN Global Counter

Terrorism Strategy in order to tackle the connection between terrorism and transnational

organised crime?


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RULES OF PROCEDURE

OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL

TAIPEI MODEL UNITED NATIONS


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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 36

I. SESSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 37

RULE 1.1 DATES OF CONVENING AND ADJOURNMENT .................................................. 37

RULE 1.2 PLACE OF SESSIONS .............................................................................................. 37

II. AGENDA ..................................................................................................................................... 37

RULE 2.1 PROVISIONAL AGENDA......................................................................................... 37

RULE 2.2 ORDER OF AGENDA .............................................................................................. 37

III. SECRETARIAT ........................................................................................................................ 37

RULE 3.1 DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL............................................................. 37

RULE 3.2 DUTIES OF THE SECRETARIAT ............................................................................ 38

RULE 3.3 STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARIAT .................................................................. 38

RULE 3.4 THE RULES COMMITTEE ...................................................................................... 38

RULE 3.5 SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ......................................................................................... 38

IV. LANGUAGE .............................................................................................................................. 38

RULE 4.1 OFFICIAL AND WORKING LANGUAGE ............................................................... 38

RULE 4.2 INTERPRETATION (ORAL) OR TRANSLATION (WRITTEN) ................................ 38

V. GENERAL RULES ..................................................................................................................... 38

RULE 5.1 DIPLOMATIC COURTESY ...................................................................................... 38

RULE 5.2 DELEGATION COMPOSITION ............................................................................... 39

RULE 5.3 DRESS CODE ........................................................................................................... 39

RULE 5.4 OBSERVER STATUS ................................................................................................ 39

VI. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS ...................................................................................................... 39

RULE 6.1 QUORUM ................................................................................................................. 39

RULE 6.2 GENERAL POWERS OF THE CHAIRPERSON ...................................................... 39

RULE 6.3 AUTHORITY OF THE COMMITTEE ...................................................................... 40

RULE 6.4 VOTING RIGHTS ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS .................................................. 40

RULE 6.5 ROLL-CALL .............................................................................................................. 40


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POINTS ............................................................................................................................................. 40

RULE 6.6 POINTS OF ORDER................................................................................................. 40

RULE 6.7 POINTS OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE ...................................................... 40

RULE 6.8 POINTS OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE ..................................................................... 40

RULE 6.9 POINTS OF INQUIRY .............................................................................................. 41

RULE 6.10 YIELDS ...................................................................................................................... 41

RULES GOVERNING SPEECHES .............................................................................................. 41

RULE 6.11 SPEECHES ............................................................................................................... 41

RULE 6.12 GENERAL SPEAKERS LIST .................................................................................... 41

RULE 6.13 PROVISIONAL SPEAKERS LIST ............................................................................. 41

RULE 6.14 SETTING SPEAKERS TIME ..................................................................................... 42

RULES GOVERNING DEBATES ................................................................................................ 42

RULE 6.15 MODERATED CAUCUS .......................................................................................... 42

RULE 6.16 SUSPENSION OF THE MEETING .......................................................................... 42

RULE 6.17 ADJOURNMENT OF THE MEETING ..................................................................... 42

RULE 6.18 ADJOURNMENT OF DEBATE ................................................................................ 43

RULE 6.19 CLOSURE OF DEBATE�

Finance and Solutions of UNSC

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