ELECTION

Duty of COMELEC

Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, the rule is that the COMELEC shall have only the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy. (Sec. 78, BP 881)

Effect Filing

An appointive public official is considered resigned upon filing of his certificate. (Sec. 66, BP 881;Sanciangco vs. Rono, 137, SCRA 671).This includes an employs of a GOCC organized under the Corporation Code (Without original charter), since the law makes no distinction. (PNOC EDC vs. NLRC, 222 SCRA 831)

Any elective official, whether national or local who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any other office shall not be considered resigned from office. (sec. 26, COMELEC Resolution No. 3636, Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9006)

Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy

Form written declaration under oath. There was no withdrawal of candidacy for the position of mayor where the candidate, before the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, personally appeared in the COMELEC office, asked for his certificate of candidacy and intercalated the word vice before the word mayor and the following day wrote the election registrar saying that his name be included in the list of official candidates for mayor. (Vivero vs. COMELEC, L 81059, Jan 12, 1989)

Since his certificate of candidacy for the office of board member was filed by his party, and the said party had withdrawn the nomination which withdrawal was confirmed by the candidate under oath, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 73. His filing under oath within the statutory period of his individual certificate for candidacy for the separate office of mayor was, in effect, a rejection of the party nomination on his behalf for the office of board member. (Ramirez vs. COMELEC, L-81150, Jan 12, 1992)

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA327 (Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondents appointment.Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power toapprove all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.MENZON V. PETILLA | Guttierez, 1991

FACTS On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice-Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. SangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in said office. petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDP Regional Counsel, Atty. ZosimoAlegre, sought clarification from Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. that "there is no succession provided for in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-governor and that the designation of a temporary vice-governor is not necessary. In view of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar, the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8, ResurreccionSalvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan be modified accordingly Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor and the SangguniangPanlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition sought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. -During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor. On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D. Menzon. On September 6, 1990, respondent LeopoldoPetilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of our resolution. The motion prayed that this Court uphold the petitioner's right to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as such.

ISSUE(1) WON there was a vacancy.(2) WON the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments--YES

HELD/RATIO(1) YES. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensucontrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. It can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor LeopoldoPetilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. There is no satisfactory showing that LeopoldoPetilla, notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. (2) YES. Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor is valid. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. In the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. It was best for Leyte to have a full- time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor. And even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. The appointment has the color of validity. The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte -The additional compensation which the petitioner has received, in the amount exceeding the salary authorized by law for the position of Senior Board Member, shall be considered as payment for the actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.

CABAGNOT v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincialgovernmentofAklanwasapprovedbytheJointCommissiononLocalGovernment Personnel Administration.The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364) regular plantillapositions from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with the Office ofthe Governor allocated onehundred forty four (144) fromthe previous sixty(60) positions.Petitioner herein, issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officials andemployees to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffingpatternfortheevaluationandassessmentoftheProvincialPlacementCommittee. 21 supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to petitioner pursuantto Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the CivilService Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656(1988) entitled An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Officers andEmployeesintheImplementationofGovernmentReorganization.Theyprayed that they be appointed to the positions they applied for to which theyareeligible,havingtherequirededucationalbackground,trainingandexperience. They likewise sent petitioner individual letters reiterating theirqualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments topositionslowerinrankthantheirpositionspriortothereorganization.Petitioner denied their plea.Upon appeal, CSC found that irregularities attended the election of the twomembers representing the first and second level personnel to the PlacementCommittee based on the affidavit executed by one Nida E. Melgarejo and theletterappealofsomethirty-seven(37)employeesoftheprovincialgovernment of Aklan. Furthermore, it found petitioner to have violated Sec. 7of the Rules on Reorgnization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. of 1988providingpreferenceforappointmentofemployeesholdingpermanentpositionsconsideringthatprivaterespondentswhowereallholdingpermanent appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization wereproposed to positions much lower than their former items despite the factthattheirolditemswerecarriedoverinthenewstaffingpattern.TheCommissionfoundnoreasonfordisplacingtheservicesofprivaterespondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84) additional positionsfor the Office of the Governor alone.The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private respondentswere demoted because of the wide disparity between the former positionsheld by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner.

ISSUE/S:Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstatingthe dismissed employees.

HELD:Yes.Withrespecttothesixteenprivaterespondents,respondentCommission committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be"immediatelyappointedandrestoredtotheirpositionsorpositionsofcomparableorequivalentrankwithoutlossofseniorityrightswithbacksalariesreckonedfromdatestheyshouldproperlyhavebeenappointedthereto effective the date of thereorganization of said province."It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement ofgovernment employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. TheCSC, as thecentral personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard theconstitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the presentcase, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasonsclearlyexplainedtherein,isindubitablyintheperformanceofitsconstitutional task of protecting and strengthening thecivil service.However, with respect to private respondent Oczon, we hold that respondentCommissiondidcommitgraveabuseofdiscretioninorderinghisreinstatement with back salary, considering that he was not terminated as aresult of the reorganization

CITY OF MANILA VS SUBIDO

17 SCRA 231 (123 Phil. 1080)- Political Law Law on Public Officers Vacancy of an OfficeIn 1966, Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas appointed 500 employees to the city government. However, Commissioner Abelardo Subido of the Civil Service Commission refused to confirm the saidappointmentsbecause he avers that Villegas is no longer the mayor of Manila because in 1965, he accepted a presidential appointment as a director in the NAWASA (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority).Villegas insisted he is still the mayor because in the first place, he was merely designated as a director of NAWASA and that he later resigned as such. He further argued that Subido, as the Civil Service Commissioner has no power to determine whether or not Villegas vacated his public office. On that point, Subido averred that he must necessarily determine if Villegas was still the mayor in order to further determine if theappointmentsmade were valid.ISSUE:Whether or not Villegas vacated the mayoralty office as determined by the Civil Service Commissioner.HELD:No. The Civil Service Commissioner has no such power. The court did not pass upon the issue of whether or not Villegas vacated his office, hence, theappointmentshe made should be confirmed by the Civil Service because Villegas is still considered the mayor of Manila.What Subido should have done, since he was doubtful of Villegass authority, was to inform the Solicitor General and the latter may file aquo warrantoproceeding to oust Villegas from the mayoralty of Manila if there are valid grounds. The Supreme Court cannot rule on whether or not Villegas is still the mayor of Manila because the case before them is not aquo warrantocase.

DEBULGADO V. CSC (1994) NEPOTISM[ G.R. NO. 111471, SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 ]

FACTS:Rogelio R. Delgado, a mayor of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, appointed his wife Victoria T. Debulgado as Head of the General Service Office of the City Government of San Carlos. The Civil Service Commission disapproved the promotions it violated the prohibition against nepotic appointments and not to promotional appointments.

ISSUE:Does nepotism apply to promotion?

HELD:Yes. The prohibitory norm against nepotism covers all appointments without any distinction between different kinds or types of appointments. Section 59 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned and controlled corporations. The promotional appointment of Victoria by her husband, the mayor falls within the prohibited class of appointments.The court ruled that the Civil Service Commission had the authority the promotional appointment extended to the petitioner.

AGUINALDO VS SANTOS

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly electedGovernorof the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter toGovernorAguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to theRepublic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of severalmunicipalitiesin Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or activelyparticipatingin its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for60 daysfrom notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision findingpetitionguilty as charged andorderinghis removal from office. Vice-GovernorVargas was installed asGovernor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed apetitionfor certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/orrestraining orderwith the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas asGovernor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position ofGovernorof Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted thepetition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventualproclamationasGovernorof Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position ofGovernorof Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position ofGovernorof Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates forgovernorof Cagayan province.The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.The foregoing rule, however, finds noapplicationtocriminalcases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on boththe Constitutionand a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President thepower of controlover all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine thatthe acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials. Moreover, inBagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, butadministrativelywhere the quantum of proof required is onlysubstantial evidence.(Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

CSC v. Dacoycoy

306 SCRA 425April 29, 1999, PARDO, J.:Nature: Appeal via certiorariFACTS-Suan, Citizens Crime Watch VP, filed w/ CSC QC a complaint vs. Dacoycoy, the Vocational School Administrator for Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, for HABITUAL DRUNKENESS, MISCONDUCT AND NEPOTISM.-on Nepotism: His two sons were recommended by Mr. Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of BCAT, was recommended by Dacoycoy, then approved by DECS Regional Director Dioko, w/ provision that such shall be under the immediate supervision of Daclag. As for Ped Dacoycoys appointment as casual utility worker, Dacoycoy was the one who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. Ped stated in his position description form that his father was his next higher supervisor.*CSC Regional Office (fact-finding): issued corresponding formal charge, found no substantial evidence to support charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct but GUILTY OF NEPOTISM on 2 counts: appointment of 2 sons as driver and utility worker, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control, DISMISSED. MR DENIED. APPEALED to CA*CA: reverse and set aside CSC: HE DID NOT APPOINT OR RECOMMEND HIS TWO SONS, so NOT GUILTY.ISSUE: SCOPE of BAN ON NEPOTISM:WON a public official could be liable for nepotism even if he did not appoint his relative (but his relative is under his immediate supervision)HELD: YES. GUILTY OF NEPOTISM>>>The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious.Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator.He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision.Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under respondents immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.Both positions are career positions.Applicable law: Sec.59 (see de leon for the copy)Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:a)appointing authority;b)recommending authority;c)chief of the bureau or office, andd)person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.In the last two mentioned situations, it isimmaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is.To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.ON WON CSC is the party to appeal when CA reverses its judgment: YES. Now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that:a.the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office andb.not included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary orc.when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative chargesDEBULGADO vs. CSCS NOT APPLICABLE: The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment.Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative.Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there.-Remember that NEPOTISM BAN was meant to be comprehensive!DISPOSITION. GRANT PETITION, REVERSE CA DECISION

REYES vs. COMELECG.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996

FACTS:

Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan anadministrativecomplaint against incumbent Mayor Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate thepositionof mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the order.

Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyess certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.

The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified ascandidateand, consequently, set aside hisproclamationas municipal mayor. Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in theadministrativecase against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that hiselectionon May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highestnumberof votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcias prayer.

ISSUES:

1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.

2. WON petitioners reelection rendered theadministrativecharges against him moot and academic

3. WON thecandidatewho obtains the second highestnumberof votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winningcandidateis disqualified.

HELD:

1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.The filingof a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent theadministrativedecision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interruptthe courseof the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrestthe courseof the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.

2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a publicofficialcould not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of theadministrativedecision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.If a publicofficialis not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in theadministrativecase, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thusvalidly removed from officeand, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he wasdisqualifiedfrom running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there wasno provision similar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any electivepositionon the ground that he hasbeen removedas a result of anadministrativecase. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betraysthe patternof delay he employed to render the case against him moot by hiselection.

3. Thecandidatewho obtains the second highestnumberof votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winningcandidateis disqualified.To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualifiedcandidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments eitherpersonally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.

In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner

SALALIMA VS. GUINGONA

Facts:- NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale, which the Province conducted because of NPCs failure to pay real property taxes assessed.- The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized respondent Governor to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC. Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite the availability of the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Provinces comment on the NPC petition. - A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall receive P50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property subject matter of the case which is P214 Million.- The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorneys fees when the COA disallowed further disbursements for lack of the requisite prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Sol Gen and the written concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.- An administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice Gov. Azaa, and other Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members relative to the questioned retainer contract and the disbursement of public funds in payment thereof.

Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement

Held: YES. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities.

Ratio: Sec. 481 LGC: requires the appointment of a legal officer to represent the LGU in all civil actions and specal proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them Attendant Irregularities: No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the disbursements were made The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the Governor to sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago, a different entity The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm despite the fact that it didnt appear as counsel for the Province in the SC case Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, the P38.5 Million attorneys fees is unconscionable and violative of (a) COA Circular No. 85-55-A prohibiting irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds; and (b) Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

*** However, it was held that respondents could no longer be subject to disciplinary action for such administrative misconduct as it was committed during a prior term.

Garcia v. MojicaPosted onOctober 3, 2012G.R. No. 139043September 10, 1999Facts:On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendationIssues:1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local Government Code.Held:1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

G.R. No. 189171, June 03, 2014EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA,Petitioner,v.DAN JOEL LIM AND RICHARD TAN,Respondents.D E C I S I O NSERENO,C.J.:This case involves a Petition for Review onCertiorari1filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008, and its subsequent Resolution3dated 26 August 2009. Both dismissed the Petition for Review4filed by Edilberto L. Barcelona (petitioner) for lack of merit.

The CA affirmed the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions dated 18 December 20065and 28 August 2007,6which in turn affirmed the Order dated 27 September 2000 issued by the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Roy V. Seeres (Chairperson Seeres or simply Chairperson). The Order barred petitioner, who was then the officerincharge of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, from entering its premises a month before the Efficiency and Integrity Board (Board) could investigate the administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct filed against him.

The records disclose that on 14 August 2000, respondent businessman Dan Joel Lim (Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) with the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Lim claimed as follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint against Lim;7and (2) petitioner, then an NLRC officer, demanded ?20,000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. On the strength of this sworn statement, the NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.

On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop by Top Gun Billiards around seven oclock in the evening, expecting to receive the ?20,000 petitioner was demanding from him; otherwise, petitioner would order that Top Gun Billiards be closed. After Lim handed him the marked bills, petitioner began counting them. The latter was arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag.

After being duly informed of his constitutional rights, petitioner was brought to the NBI office where he was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. Thereafter, he underwent ultraviolet light examination. The Certification dated 16 August 2000 of the NBIForensic Chemistry Division stated that his hands showed the presence [of] Yellow Fluorescent Specks and Smudges,8and that[s]imilar examinations made on the money bills showed the presence of yellow fluorescent specks and smudgesx x x.9

In a letter to the City Prosecutor of Manila, NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr. recommended the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. The NBI filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on 18 August 2000 an Information against petitioner for the crime of robbery.

It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by the NBI, Richard Tan (Tan), owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, had filed a similar extortion Complaint against petitioner. The latter supposedly asked him to pay ?15,000 in exchange for the settlement of a fabricated case.10

Reports of the circumstances leading to the arrest and filing of the Complaints against petitioner were submitted by Tan and Lim to Chairperson Seeres. On 17 August 2000, copies of the documentary evidence11against petitioner were likewise endorsed to the Chairperson.12

Finding aprima faciecase against petitioner, Chairperson Seeres issued Administrative Order No. 902 Series of 2000 on 1 September 2000, formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct. The Order created a panel (the Board) to look into the present case; require petitioner to file an answer to the charges; conduct an investigation; and thereafter submit its report/recommendation.13The Order also placed petitioner under a 90day preventive suspension upon receipt thereof.

The Board issued a Summons dated 19 September 2000 directing petitioner to answer the charges against him. Both the Order and the Summons were served on him, but he refused to receive them.14He never filed an Answer.

Lim, Tan, and the NBI agents involved in the entrapment operations appeared at the preliminary investigation conducted by the Board on 28 September 2000 in order to confirm their accusations against petitioner.

On 23 October 2000, the Board conducted a hearing attended by petitioner with three of his lawyers. He manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself to its jurisdiction.15Thus, he left without receiving copies of the Order and other documents pertinent to the case.16

The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that petitioner had been caught redhanded in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been substantially established,17the Board in its 31 October 2000 Report/Recommendation18found him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of this recommendation by NLRC Chairperson Seeres on 14 November 2000, petitioner was dismissed from service.

A copy of the Boards Decision was received by petitioner on 22 November 2000. On 1 December 2000, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the Proper Responsive Pleading, but it was denied.19

Petitioner appealed to the CSC. In his Appeal Memorandum,20he presented his side of the story. He claimed to have visited Lims establishment to play billiards every now and then. Before going home, he would supposedly drop by the place, which was a mere 5 to 10minute tricycle ride away from where he lived.21When Lims employees discovered that petitioner worked for the NLRC, they told him of their employers labor law violations.22Thus, petitioner assisted them in filing a case against Lim and later scheduled the case for a conference on 10 August 2000.

Two days before the scheduled conference, petitioner was informed by one of the employees that Lim wanted to speak with him. Lim supposedly offered petitioner money to drop the labor case filed against the former. According to petitioner, this offer was flatly rejected.23

The next day, when petitioner went to Lims establishment to play billiards, a billiard hustler by the name of Abel Batirzal (hustler) informed him that Lim required everyone playing in the establishment to lay a wager on the games they played.24Since he abhorred gambling, petitioner decided to discourage the hustler by raising the amount the latter proposed.25

Petitioner lost to the hustler. As the former was about to leave the establishment, he discovered that his cellular phone and pack of Philip Morris cigarettes were no longer where he left them. The security guard on duty informed him that a certain Ian Gumban had stolen the items.26

Petitioner went straight to the Western Police District Station and filed a Complaint for theft, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, swindling, and violation of city ordinances against Lim and three of the latters employees or friends.27

A day after the foregoing incident, or on 10 August 2000, neither Lim nor his employees appeared at the scheduled conference. On the evening of the same day, petitioner went to Lims establishment to check on the employees. There they told him to consider their Complaint withdrawn, since Lim had already decided to settle the case with them. Accordingly, the case was dropped from the NLRCs calendar.28

Petitioner claims that on 16 August 2000, the day of the alleged entrapment, he received a call from Lim. The person who had stolen petitioners cellphone was supposedly willing to return it at seven that evening at Lims billiards hall.29

When petitioner arrived, he saw Lim and one of the latters employees. Lim approached petitioner and informed him that the thief could no longer return the phone. The thief had allegedly decided to just pay the value of the phone and entrust the money to Lim. The latter tried to give the money to petitioner and urged him to count it, as the former was not sure how much the thief had given. Petitioner supposedly refused to receive and count the cash and, instead, insisted that Lim arrange a meeting with the thief.30

Because petitioner would not take the money, Lim inserted the wad of cash into the open pocket of the formers shoulder bag.31Just when petitioner was about to pull out the money and throw it back to Lim, the NBI agents appeared and arrested petitioner who recalls the incident as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x [W]hile trying to retrieve the unduly incriminating wad of money to throw it back to Mr. Lim, about five or seven burly men accosted petitioner without properly identifying themselves and with strongarm tactics, handcuffed him over his vehement protestations. One of the burly men even pointed his gun at petitioners face as he and his companions wrestled petitioner to a car. x x x.32

With respect to Tan, petitioner claims that the latter never demanded or received any sum of money from him. Allegedly, Tan was only displeased with petitioners active assistance to one of Tans aggrieved employees.33

Petitioner further claims that even before Chairperson Seeres formally charged him with dishonesty and grave misconduct, the former had already filed an urgent request for an emergency leave of absence because of the alarming threats being made against him and the members of his family.34

Petitioner asked the CSC to nullify the 27 September 2000 Order of Chairperson Seeres. The Order barred petitioner from entering the NLRC premises a month before the hearing conducted by the Board. He then questioned its impartiality. As proof of his allegation, he made much of the fact that the Board denied his Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File a Proper Responsive Pleading.35

Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it. The dispositive portion of its Resolution36dated 18 December 2006 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREFORE, the appeal of Edilberto S. (sic) Barcelona is herebyDISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 14, 2000 of Roy R. Seneres, [Chairperson,] (NLRC) finding him guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of disqualification from reentering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and bar from taking any civil service examinations is herebyAFFIRMED.37

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 15 January 2007.38He questioned the validity of his dismissal by asserting that before its implementation, the NLRC had the legal duty of obtaining its confirmation by the Department of Labor and Employment (Labor) Secretary.39

On 28 August 2007, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CSC through a Resolution.40

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA in the assailed Decision dated 26 September 2008.41

A Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Honorable Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso)42was then filed by petitioner. The latter cited the following reasons for the prayer for inhibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) Honorable Justice Veloso was a Commissioner of public respondent NLRC at the time of the subject incident; and

2) The undersigned counsel, eldest son of petitioner, just recently resigned from the law firm where the daughter of Justice Veloso is working.43

Justice Veloso, in a Resolution44dated 27 February 2009, stated that while the grounds invoked by petitioner did not constitute valid bases for an inhibition, the former would voluntarily inhibit to assuage petitioner in whatever fears he may have over the CAs handling of the Motion for Reconsideration.

Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Resolution45dated 26 August 2009 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In spite of his voluntary inhibition, Justice Veloso still signed the herein questioned Resolution to signify his concurrence.

Hence, this Petition praying for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the appellate court and the dismissal of the administrative Complaint filed against petitioner.46

This Court required respondents Lim and Tan to file their respective Comments, but neither of them complied. Since copies of the Resolution ordering them to Comment were personally served upon them, the Court resolved to consider them to have waived their right to comment on the Petition.47

Petitioner comes before this Court raising the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. The CA decided a question of substance not in accord with the applicable law and jurisprudence when it:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. Denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration with the participation of Justice Veloso, who had earlier voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.b. Ruled that petitioner was not denied due process of law in spite of overwhelming proof that the NLRC chairperson failed to act with impartiality in deciding petitioners case.c. Ruled that petitioners appeal to the CSC had not been filed on time, even though the commission itself did not question the timeliness of that.d. Ruled that the findings of the CSC were supported by evidence.

2. The CA, like the CSC, failed to address all the issues presented by petitioner when it chose to keep silent on the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarya. The denial of the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case; andb. The failure of the disciplining authority to obtain the confirmation by the Department head of the formers decision to dismiss petitioner from service.48

We reduce the issues to the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryI

Whether petitioner was denied due process of law;II

Whether the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence;III

Whether the CA had the authority to review matters not assigned by the parties as issues;IV

Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case has been violated by the CSC; andV

Whether the NLRC violated the Civil Service Rules provision, which allows the execution of a penalty of removal decreed by a bureau or office head, pending appeal thereof to the CSC, only when the penalty has been confirmed by the Secretary of the department concerned.

Petitioner was not denied due process of law.

Petitioner claims he was denied due process of law due to the partiality of Chairperson Seeres, the Board, the CSC, and the CA.

Considering the many complaints of petitioner, we deem it best to present an exhaustive outline of his entire evidence therefor. Below are several circumstances he cites to prove that he was not afforded the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal.

According to petitioner, Chairperson Seeres served not only as the formers accuser, but also as judge and executioner.49The Chairpersons partiality was supposedly demonstrated by the following acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. On 10 November 2000, petitioner and his two sons allegedly approached and asked Chairperson Seeres why he was persecuting petitioner. The Chairperson supposedly replied:Wala akong pakialam. Pasensya kayo. Tapos na ang tatay ninyo!502. Chairperson Seeres issued defamatory press releases to the media announcing the preventive suspension of petitioner and depicting the latter as a corrupt government official. The Chairperson allegedly took advantage of the situation of petitioner in support of the formers then prospective political career, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x [A]t the expense of petitioner, [he] took advantage of the opportunity to project himself as a graft buster to further his sagging political career and burning senatorial ambitions by immediately issuing press releases and causing the malicious publication of the petitioners preventive suspension without affording the latter due process of law.51

3. Lim never filed a written complaint against petitioner as required by Section 8 of the Civil Service Rules and, consequently, the latter was not given the chance to file a counteraffidavit or comment on the written Complaint as mandated by Section 11 of the Civil Service Rules.4. No preliminary investigation was conducted as required by Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules.5. Chairperson Seeres failed to serve the formal charge to petitioner in accordance with Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules).526. The Order dated 1 September 2000, which immediately placed petitioner under a 90day preventive suspension, supposedly violated the requirement in Section 19 of the Civil Service Rules that an order of preventive suspension be issued only upon service of the formal charge.7. The Board created by Seeres to investigate the case denied the Motion for Extension of Time filed by petitioner, in order to ensure that the latter would no longer be able to return to work.

As for the Board, its lack of and glaring absence of impartiality and objectivity was supposedly shown by the following:531. A substantial portion of the Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that it delved into petitioners expression of protest against the Chairpersons unfair treatment, and thereby reinforced petitioners apprehension that the case would not be resolved on its merits.2. The denial of petitioners Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the Proper Responsive Pleading dated 1 December 2000 was allegedly unjust and groundless.

With respect to the CSC, petitioner claims that it curiously amended Section 43(2) of the Civil Service Rules only three weeks after he had filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution denying his appeal.54

Lastly, petitioner bewails the supposed haphazard manner in which the CA disposed of his claim that he had been denied due process of law. He claimed that it simply dismissed the issue through a onesentence ruling, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn the alleged failure of the NLRC to observe impartiality, suffice it to say that petitioner failed to present proof to substantiate his selfserving allegations.55

In the eyes of petitioner, it would appear that every agency of the government that had a hand in this case was, at his expense, either motivated by personal bias or driven by the desire to advance its members political or professional careers in the government.

Petitioners claims are without merit.

Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, Chairperson Seeres did not act as the formers accuser, judge and executioner.56To be clear, the accusers of petitioner were Lim and Tan, while his judge was an independent Board formed to investigate his case. This Court is aware that the Board only had the power to recommend, and that that latters recommendation was still subject to the approval of the Chairperson. Still, petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process on this basis alone, because the remedy to appeal to the proper administrative bodythe CSC in this casewas still made available to him.

Petitioner claims that Sections 8, 11, 12, 16, and 19 of the Civil Service Rules were violated by Chairperson Seeres. Petitioner misses the point that strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object as well as to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.57

This Court finds that both Chairperson Seeres and the Board essentially complied with the procedure laid down in the Civil Service Rules. Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.58

The claim of petitioner that he was denied due process is negated by the circumstances of the case at bar.

The Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that both complainant and respondent were given the opportunity to be heard by the Board and to adduce their respective sets of evidence, which were duly considered and taken into account in its Decision.

Petitioner insists that Lim never filed a written complaint against him as required by Section 8 of the Civil Service Rules. Petitioner further complains that he was not given the chance to file a counter affidavit, a right provided by Section 11 of the Civil Service Rules. The records disclose, however, that reports leading to his arrest and the filing of the Complaint against him were submitted by Tan and Lim to the Chairperson of the NLRC. On the basis of the sworn statements supporting the criminal Complaint against petitioner, Chairperson Seeres found a prima facie case against him and issued the Order formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Furthermore, the Board gave petitioner the chance to answer the charges against him when it issued its 19 September 2000 Summons for that very purpose. He does not deny that he was served a copy of the Summons, but that he refused to receive it. It was his choice not to file an answer. After he decided to waive this right, we cannot now allow him to claim that he has been deprived of the right to air his side through an answer or a counteraffidavit.

Petitioner further claims that Chairperson Seeres violated Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules when the latter dispensed with the requirement of conducting a preliminary investigation. It is important to note that this preliminary investigation required by Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules is not the same as that required in criminal cases. Section 12 defines a preliminary investigation of administrative cases in the Civil Service as an ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices. Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that either Chairperson Seeres or the Board failed to examine these records. In fact, the records show that, on 28 September 2000, Lim and Tan appeared in the preliminary investigation conducted by the Board to confirm their sworn statements and the criminal cases they had filed against petitioner. That he submitted no documents for consideration in the preliminary investigation was his choice.

According to petitioner, no formal charge was ever filed against him as mandated by Section 16 of the Civil Service Rules. He now claims that Chairperson Seeres had no right to place him under preventive suspension, because Section 19 of the Civil Service Rules requires that a formal charge be served on petitioner before an order of preventive suspension may be issued. The provision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 19.Preventive Suspension. Upon petition of the complainant ormotu proprio,the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension upon service of the Formal Charge, or immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge involves:a. dishonesty;

b. oppression;

c. grave misconduct;

d. neglect in the performance of duty; or

e. If there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary evidence on file with his Office.

In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining authority or head of office, may reassign respondent to other units of the agency during the formal hearings.

In this case, the Order was the formal charge. It was served on petitioner, but he refused to receive it. He claims that on 27 September 2000, or a month before the hearing conducted by the Board, Chairperson Seeres barred him from entering the NLRC premises. Petitioner was thereby denied access to evidence and witnesses that could support his case.59But, as revealed by Section 19, Chairperson Seeres had the right to issue an Order of preventive suspension pending investigation by the Board, because petitioner was being charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Moreover, the Order of Chairperson Seeres preventing petitioner from entering the latters office was also valid under Section 19. This Order was meant to preclude petitioner from possibly exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or to prevent him from tampering with documentary evidence on file with his office. This preventive measure is sanctioned by law.

As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to adduce his evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the requirements of due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of evidence.60

As regards the charge of lack of impartiality, we agree with the CAs pronouncement that petitioner failed to substantiate his selfserving allegations. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.61

Chairperson Seeres released statements to the media regarding the case of petitioner and allegedly told him and his children that the Chairperson did not care about their woes. Assuming this allegation to be true, it did not necessarily mean that Chairperson Seeres was incapable of deciding the case without bias. These acts did not satisfactorily prove the claim that in order to promote and further his political ambitions, he took advantage of petitioners situation. As the NLRC Chairperson, he had the duty to answer the questions of the media on the status of the cases against graft and corrupt practices involving government officials under his commission. Furthermore, his statements to petitioner and the latters family are not sufficient for this Court to believe that every one of his acts, in relation to the case of petitioner, was meant to ensure the latters downfall at whatever cost.

Similarly, the denial of petitioners Motion for Extension of Time, does not prove that the tribunal failed to be impartial.

Petitioner is banking on one incident in which his Motion was denied. The denial in itself, without any extrinsic evidence to establish bias, does not prove that he was denied his right to be judged by an impartial and independent tribunal. While petitioner had the right to file a Motion for Extension of Time, he did not have the right to expect that the Motion would be granted. Absent any proof that the denial of this motion was made in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court will not interfere with the pronouncement of the quasijudicial body.

Lastly, the CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules whenever it deems the amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this change was made for the sole purpose of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the cases before it and, on the basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules.

We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the authority to apply the new provision retroactively. The consequence of an illegal retroactive application of a provision is discussed below.

The finding of the CSC thatpetitioner is guilty of dishonesty andgrave misconduct is supported by theevidence.

With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the factual findings of the CSC, the CA ruled as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryFinally, it is wellsettled that findings of fact of quasijudicial agencies such as the Civil Service Commission are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court and the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.62

Petitioner now claims that the CA did not even bother to discuss his allegation that the findings of the CSC were not supported by evidence.63Unimpressed by the CA Resolution, he is now asking this Court to review the factual findings of the CSC.

Believing that the CSC found him guilty based on theSinumpaang Salaysayexecuted by Lim before the NBI, petitioner insists that this piece of evidence is insufficient to support the CSCs conclusions.64He claims that there is no specific allegation in the sworn statement of Lim whether petitioner demanded money from the former; who set the alleged August 16, 2000 meeting at Mr. Lims billiard center; how it was agreed; and what was the purpose of that meeting.65

Petitioner casts doubt on the veracity of the statements of Lim, who supposedly filed a report against him with the NBI a few days after filing a theft Complaint against him.66According to petitioner, Lim should not be believed, because all of the latters allegations are fueled only by vengefulness.

After claiming that Lims statement should not be trusted because of illmotive,67petitioner now questions the motives of the CSC and the NBI.

Anent the reliance of the CSC on theSinumpaang Salaysay, petitioner decries:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryTo an unprejudiced, reasonable mind, the statement of Mr. Lim is not sufficient evidence to pin down petitioner for such a serious offense as Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. The NLRC read more into the document and put words into the mouth of Mr. Lim.

Unfortunately, the CSC blindly affirmed the NLRCs findings just to dispose of the case after unreasonably sitting on it for more than six (6) long years.68

With respect to the NBI agents, petitioner harps on their eagerness to believe Lims Complaint without even bothering to investigate. Petitioner explains his point:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary[T]he NBI agents who conducted the alleged entrapment operation were motivated by the desire to record an accomplishment and to obtain commendatory results due to the highly competitive police function and law enforcement activities.69

We affirm the CAs findings.

First, except for his accusations, petitioner presents no proof that the CSC blindly affirmed the NLRCs ruling just to get rid of the case. A reading of the Resolutions of the CSC reveals otherwise. They thoroughly discussed the factual circumstances surrounding this case, the evidence, and why and how the conclusion was reached. In order to overcome the validity of these Resolutions, petitioner must present evidence to prove that the evidence relied on by the CSC was unsubstantial.

In attempting to prove that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove his guilt, petitioner asks this Court to focus on the inadequacy of LimsSinumpaang Salaysay.Contrary to these assertions, however, the following pieces of evidencein addition to Lims sworn statementwere considered by the CSC in resolving petitioners appeal:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. The sworn statement of Tan, who appeared in the preliminary investigation conducted by the Board to confirm that he had filed a similar extortion Complaint against petitioner;702. The Report and the evidence presented by NBI Special Investigator Marvin E. de Jemil, who appeared before the Board to confirm the contents of his Report, findings, and evidence against petitioner in support of the administrative charges filed against the latter; and3. The statement of the arresting officers who apprehended petitioner in the entrapment operation, and who also appeared in the continuing investigation to affirm the contents of their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.71

Factual findings of administrative bodies like the CSC are binding on this Court, unless these findings are not supported by substantial evidence.72In this case, we rule that the findings of fact and conclusions of the CSC have passed the test of substantiality. It is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by the evidence on record; or, stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.73The absence of substantial evidence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, whether direct or circumstantial.74

All the pieces of evidence presented before the CSC point to the guilt of petitioner. Several persons, both private individuals and law enforcers, came forward to testify and present evidence to prove the allegations against him. In fact, each testimony corroborated the testimonies of the others, effectively allowing the CSC to form a complete picture of the incidents that led to the ultimate act of extortion.

As defined in the landmark caseAng Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,75all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence, which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence presented in the present case is more than enough to support the conclusion reached.

Where the findings of fact of a quasijudicial body are supported by substantial evidence, these findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate court.76Thus, the CA did not err in ruling that the CSC had committed no error in finding that petitioner was guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

In the case at bar, petitioner accuses the NBI agents of being driven by illmotive. In the absence of credible evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties prevails over his unsubstantiated and selfserving assertions, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryBetween the naked assertions of accusedappellant and the story recounted by the NARCOM agents, jurisprudence dictates that the latter is to be given more weight. Aside from having in his favor the presumption of regular performance of duty, we find as the courta quodid that the testimony of Lt. Cantos is more credible, being fully and convincingly corroborated, as opposed to that of accusedappellant. Besides, no improper motive to falsely accuse appellant could be imputed to him. In the absence of proof of such motive to falsely impute a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses must prevail over the selfserving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed up.77

This rule holds true for the present case. Not only do the NBI agents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties; their statements are credible and corroborated as well. After being caught redhanded, petitioner needs extrinsic evidence to back up his allegations to prove that the NBI agents had an ulterior motive to falsely impute the crime to him.

The appellate court has the authorityto review matters that the parties have notspecifically raised or assigned as error.

Petitioner questions the propriety of the following pronouncement of the CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWe likewise note that petitioners appeal to the CSC was made beyond the reglementary period. Admittedly, petitioner received the Decision of the NLRC on 22 November 2000. Petitioners motion for extension of time within which to file the proper responsive pleading filed on 1 December 2000 did not stop the running of the period for its finality, and the Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum were filed only on 27 December 2000 or one (1) month and five (5) days from receipt of the Decision. Petitioner erroneously counted the period within which to appeal from the date he received the Order denying his motion for extension to file his responsive pleading.78

While petitioner does not deny that his appeal to the CSC was filed beyond the reglementary period, he argues that the timeliness of his appeal has never been an issue. He thus claims that only the issues raised by the parties may be resolved by the Court.

Petitioner is mistaken. An appeal throws the entire case open for review,viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary[A]n appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.79

Petitioner adds that the CA erred in applying technical rules strictly. According to him, if its strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is within this Courts power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation.80

We agree with petitioners claim that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice, and that technical requirements may be dispensed with in meritorious cases. However, we do not see how the CA, in deciding the case at bar, could have overlooked this policy. Although it took notice of the failure of petitioner to file his appeal with the CSC on time, and perhaps used this failure as a supporting argument, it did not dismiss the Petition on that sole ground. In fact, a perusal of the CA Decision now in question will reveal that the appellate court took cognizance of the case and adequately discussed the pertinent issues raised by petitioner.

No violation of the right of petitionerto the speedy disposition of his case.

Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and Appeal Memorandum with the CSC on 27 December 2000,81but it only issued its Resolution on 18 December 2006.

According to petitioner, he sees no justifiable reason for the sixyear delay in the resolution of his appeal before the CSC.82He is now asking this Court to rectify the wrong committed against him and his family by absolving him of the administrative charges.83

Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies.

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case must also be considered.84

Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr.,85laid down the guidelines for determining the applicability of Section 16, Rule III, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. x x x.

The CSC maintains that [p]etitioner failed to assert such right before the proceedings in the CSC and, even assuming that there was delay in resolution of his appeal before the CSC, no prejudice was caused to him.86

Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the fact that he made several telephone calls to inquire about the status of his appeal87and sent to the Commissioner of the CSC a letter dated 2 March 2001, informing the latter that the case had been forwarded to CSCMain without action of CSCNCR,88sufficiently proves that he did not fail to assert his right.

On this particular point, we have to agree with the CSC that the alleged telephone calls made by petitioner are selfserving and lack corroborative evidence.89Since there is no way of ascertaining whether or not he actually made these phone calls, this allegation cannot be given any probative value.

As to the letter petitioner allegedly sent to CSC Commissioner Jose Erestain, Jr., it is apparent from the face of the letter that there is no indication at all that the intended recipient actually received it.

The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. Ones right to the speedy disposition of his case must therefore be asserted.90Due to the failure of petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.

The NLRC did not violate the ruleagainst the execution of a penaltyof removal pending appeal to the CSC.

According to petitioner, when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC on 15 January 2007, Section 43 of Rule III of the Civil Service Rules provided that a penalty of removal from government service could not be executed pending appeal, unless the Department Secretary concerned confirmed the imposition of the penalty,91viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 43.Filing of Appeals. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper.Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of the case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and securely bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the appellate authority. (Emphasis supplied)

However, on 7 February 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070244,92which amended the aforementioned provision of the Civil Service Rules. The pertinent portion of the CSC Resolution reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySection 43. Filing of Appeals. Decisions of heads of department, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except where the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the decision of the head of an attached agency imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office is appealable directly to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the penalty imposed shall be executory, including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is attached.

A notice of appeal including the app