Final Shelter Report - Cordaid · 2016-03-29 · shelter programme in response to the 2010 Haiti...

REPORT

FINALEVALUATION

OF

CORDAIDSHELTERPROGRAMMEIN

HAITI2010‐2012

EspelanciaBaptistaMartenTreffers

PeterGiesen

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1. Background ............................................................................................................................................3 2. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................4 3. Methodology .........................................................................................................................................5 4. ProgrammeEvolution ...........................................................................................................................7 4.1 EmergencyResponse ......................................................................................................................7 4.2 EmergencyShelter...........................................................................................................................7 4.3 TransitionalShelter .........................................................................................................................8

4.3.1 Management ............................................................................................................................8 4.3.2 LocationSelection,AssessmentsandProposals ...................................................................9 4.3.3 RuralProgramme...................................................................................................................11 4.3.4 UrbanProgramme .................................................................................................................14 4.3.5 ImplementationPartners ......................................................................................................16

5. Results ..................................................................................................................................................17 5.1 TechnicalResults ...........................................................................................................................19 5.2 SocialResults..................................................................................................................................23

5.2.1 Gender ....................................................................................................................................26 6. ConclusionsandRecommendations ..................................................................................................27 6.1 Dilemmas........................................................................................................................................27 6.2 Effectiveness ..................................................................................................................................28 6.3 Appropriateness ............................................................................................................................30 6.4 Impact.............................................................................................................................................32 6.5 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................................32

Annex1:KeyInformants ............................................................................................................................33 Annex2:TermsofReference .....................................................................................................................34 Annex3:RoleofGroup5............................................................................................................................42 Annex4:ImplementationOverview.........................................................................................................43 Annex5:SurveyDataOverview.................................................................................................................45

Acknowledgement

TheevaluatorswishtothankallCordaidstafffortheirsupportandopennessduringtheimplementationofthisevaluation.WewouldespeciallyliketothankourHaitiansurveyandFGDteamsfortheirhardworkinthefieldwithminimalsupportandpreparation.Aspecialthanksto

CarolynMuntz,copyeditorandSHOdonor,forproofreading.EspelanciaBaptista(AnthropologistandResearchSpecialist)

MartenTreffers(ArchitectandTechnicalSpecialist)PeterGiesen(SocialGeographer,TeamLeaderandReportEditor)

Amsterdam,13July2012

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Executive Summary

CordaidcommissionedthisfinalevaluationofitsSamenwerkendeHulpOrganisaties(SHO)1fundedshelterprogrammeinresponsetothe2010Haitiearthquake,inordertogiveaccounttothosewhodonatedfundsandtolearnlessonsfromtheimplementation.Foradetaileddescriptionoftheprogramme,pleaserefertosection4ofthisreportandtheToRinAnnex2.Cordaidcontractedathree‐memberteamofexternalconsultants,managedbytheCordaidemergencyprogrammeofficerinHQandtheHeadofMissioninthefieldandsupportedbyareferencegroup.Theteamimplementedsevenmethodologiestoanalysetheeffectiveness,appropriateness,efficiencyandimpactoftheprogrammeandconcludesthatCordaidsuccessfullyimplementedahighlyeffectiveshelterprogramme,especiallyintheruralareaofLeogane.Cordaid’surbanprogrammewillprobablyachieveashelterdeliveryeffectivenessofover90%.Cordaidwasnotentirelyabletoadapttheprogrammetothesocial,politicalandlegalcomplexitiesoftheurbancontextinPort‐au‐Prince,asdemonstratedbylargenumbersofpeopleremainingintentcamps.Itsownerdrivenhousingprogrammecomponentstartedlate.Waterandsanitation,livelihoodsandcommunalneedssuchasdrainageremainlargelyunaddressed,astheworkassociatedwiththeintegratedneighbourhoodapproachalsostartedlateandresultswillonlybereachedpartiallyintwopilotprojects.Activitiesspecificallydesignedtoimprovethebeneficiaries’livelihoodsactivitieswerenotimplementedatall.Beneficiariesdeemedtheprogrammehighlyappropriate.Arepresentativesampleof327beneficiariesscored80to90%satisfactionratesoneachofthefivequalityindicators:design,safety,size,assessmentandconstruction.Thiswasconfirmedby19focusgroupdiscussionsand48keyinformantinterviews.However,Cordaiddidnotreachthemostvulnerable,especiallyintheurbanareas.TheneedtobuildshelterswithinHaiti’slegalframeworksandpolicies,contributedtotheexclusionofmanyvulnerablepeoplealreadyduringtheassessmentstage.Largenumbersoftenants,illegallysettledpeople,andyoungadultfamilymembersremaintodayintentcampsinCordaid’soperationalareas.Itisextremelydifficulttoovercomepre‐existingfactors,whichcontributetothehugeinequitiesandextremepoverty,withthistypeofshelterapproach.AcceptingSHOfundingandtheneedtospendalargegrantwithinalimitedperiodoftime,droveaservicedeliveryapproach.Despitesomeofthesedesignissues,theprogrammehasbeguntodevelopthesocialcapitalrequiredtoachievelonger‐termimpact.Withthehelpofspeciallyformedcommittees,CordaidcreatedthesocialinfrastructureforaparticipatoryassesmentandconstructionapproachthatcanbeusedtoachieveCordaid’slonger‐termdevelopmentobjectivesinHaiti.Theextent,towhichthisinfrastructurewillbeabletoaddressinequitiesandinjusticeinHaitiinthefuture,isnowuptoCordaid’sdevelopmentstrategy.

1SHOisacollaborativefundraisingplatformofCordaidMenseninNood,ICCO,KerkinActie,OxfamNovib,SavetheChildren,StichtingVluchteling,TerredesHommes,UNICEFNetherlandsandWorldVisionNetherlands.TheHaiticampaignraisedatotalof€111million,€27millionofwhichwenttoCordaid.

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1. Background AnearthquakehitHaition12January2010andkilledover200,000people,injured300,000,leftmorethanonemillionhomeless,anddestroyedinfrastructure,servicesandhomes.ThecostofreconstructionisestimatedatUS$11.5billion.Haitiwasalreadythepoorestcountryinthewesternhemisphere,ranked149outof182countriesonthe2009HumanDevelopmentIndex,withabout78%ofthepopulationlivingonlessthenUS$2aday.Theearthquakehadarelativelyshallowfocus(lessthan10kilometresbelowtheearth’ssurface)andtheepicentrewasclosetoLéogâne,approximately25kmwestofPort‐au‐Prince,meaningthaturbanareas(withmanypoorly‐constructedbuildings)whereparticularlyhit.Léogânesufferedcloseto80%structuraldamage.Theearthquakeoccurredat16.53localtime,anhouratwhichmainlymanagersarestillatwork,asofficialofficehoursarefrom8amto4pm.Itisalsolikelythattherewasahighernumberoffemalecasualties,asmanywomenwereathomewhentheearthquakestruck,whilemenwereontheirwaybackfromwork.TheGovernmentestimatesthat250,000homesand30,000commercialbuildingswereseverelydamaged,whilethePost‐DisasterNeedsAssessmentidentified105,000completelydestroyedhomesandover208,000damaged.AccordingtoGovernmentfigures,approximately2.3millionpeoplelefttheirhomesatthepeakofthedisplacement.IDPspredominantlysettledeitherasindividualhouseholdsorinsmallhouseholdgroupingsclosetotheirformerareaofresidence.Manysettledinthestreetorparks,inspontaneoussettlementsitesvaryinginpopulationfromahandfulto50,000people,orincollectiveaccommodation.Initially,around1.5milliondisplacedpeoplesettledinthePort‐au‐Princemetropolitanarea,whilearound600,000lefttheaffectedarea,manyfacilitatedbytheGovernment.Othersusingprivatemeans,soughtshelterwithhostcommunitiesinnon‐affectedareas.Upto250,000ofthelatterhavesincereturnedtoPort‐au‐Princeorsurroundingcommunes,eitherashouseholdsorindividually.IOMreportsthatasofApril2012,anestimated421,000individuals(or105,000IDPHouseholds)continuetoresidein602campsandcamp‐likesettlementsacrosstheearthquakeaffectedarea.Thisreflectsadecreaseof14%(ofIDPindividuals)livinginIDPsitescomparedtoitspreviousreportofFebruary2012.

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2. Introduction Thisevaluationwasimplementedbyateamofthreeconsultants:anarchitect,aCreolespeakinganthropologistandasocialgeographer,whowasalsotheteamleader.Theteamhadonlyoneweektopreparefortheevaluation,asitsoriginalproposaltoundertakethisassignmenthadbeenrejectedbyCordaid.Theteam’sproposalwasreactivatedafterthepreferredcandidateprovednotavailable,butthismeantthattwoweeksofpotentialpreparationtimewaslost.Duringinception,theteamidentifiedcontradictionsanddefinitionproblemsintheToR,whichcontainedanumberofquestionspertainingtothequalityandroleofassessments.Thesehadalreadybeenaddressedbymid‐termreview(scopedmainlyaroundmanagement,HRandassessmentissues)andtheteamwasinstructedtoavoidduplicationofalreadyexistinganalysis.TheToRkeyquestionswerebasedondifferentdefinitionsthantheusualOECDDACGlossaryofKeyTermsinEvaluationandResultsBasedManagement,inparticularfortermssuchas‘effectiveness’and‘efficiency’.Effectivenessisusuallydefinedbytheextenttowhichobjectivesareachieved2,buttheToRsuggeststheuseofdecision‐makingandM&Equestionstoinformtheeffectivenessanalysis.SimilarlyCordaidposes‘policyimplementation’questionstoinformtheefficiencyanalysis,whereaspolicyquestionsnormallyreferto‘appropriateness’3.AnotherproblemwiththeevaluationofCordaiddecisionmakingprocessesisthatthesearepoorlydocumented,makingananalysislargelydependentonanecdotalinformationandan‘Informationandexplanationsheet’writtenbytheShelterManager,anexternalconsultantdeployedthroughthecontractwithGroup5.OtherthanthatwewereunabletovalidatethistypeofinformationwithotherofficialCordaidsources(approvedminutes,emails)orreferenceittoanagreedmanagementframework.Duetoalackofpreparationtimetheseissuescouldnotberesolvedpriortotheteam’sdeparturetoHaiti.TheToRprovedevenmoreproblematicwhentheteamarrivedinthefield,wherestaffseemedtohavedifferentexpectationsfromtheevaluation.TheteamsuggestedtotestanumberofhypothesesinanattempttoensurethattheevaluationanswersquestionspertinenttoCordaid’smanagementagenda.Althoughthereferencegroupgavefeedbackonhowtotestthehypotheses,itdidnotprovidefeedbackonhowtoformulatetheminordertoinformactualmanagementinformationneeds.Thisandthefactthatitwastoolatetodevelopthetoolsinawaythatwouldhaveallowedthehypothesestobetestedcausedtheteamtoabandonthisapproach.Theteamlostmorevaluabletimeinthefield,asithadtoorganiselogisticsforthebeneficiaryconsultations,contrarytoagreementsmadewiththosecommissioningtheevaluationinTheHague.Anotherlimitationwasthatallbutoneofthe(former)Cordaid’sHaitidevelopment

2OECDDACGlossaryofKeyTermsinEvaluationandResultsBasedManagement,p.203seealso:Evaluatinghumanitarian,actionusingtheOECD‐DACcriteria(ALNAP)

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programmepartners,declinedtospeakwiththeevaluationteam,excludingtheirperspectiveonsocialcapitalbuildingopportunities.Thisledtothefollowingapproachtoansweringtheykeyquestions:

• Shelter,WASHandsocialcapitalbuildingoutputsinformedtheanalysisofeffectiveness.

• Qualityasperceivedbythebeneficiariesaswellaspolicycomplianceinformedtheassessmentofappropriateness.

• Thepotentialoutcomesoflivelihoods,socialcapitalandprotectionactivitiestoassesstheimpactoftheproject.

• Existingevaluationreportsandotherdocumentsandkeystaffinterviewstoassesstheefficiencyofapproachandoperations.

3. MethodologyInordertoanalyseeffectiveness,appropriatenessefficiencyandimpact,theteamdevelopedsevenmethodologies:

1. Asurveyamongastatisticallyrepresentativesampleof327beneficiaries.2. 19FocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs).16withCordaidbeneficiaries(maleandfemale

separately)ineachofthe8operationalareasandthreeinareaswithnon‐Cordaidbeneficiaries(mixedmale,female).

3. Meetingswithalmostallthecommittees.4. Interviewswithkeystakeholders(KSIs),suchassuppliers,bosses,localNGOs,

internationalNGOs,authorities.5. InterviewswithCordaidkey‐staffinTheHague,Port‐au‐PrinceandLéogâne.6. Directfieldobservations,transversalwalks,ad‐hocmeetingswithbeneficiaries.7. Documentsstudy.

Fortheefficiencyquestions,oursourceswerelimited,butforeachoftheanalysesofappropriateness,effectivenessandimpact,weusedatleastthreemethodologies.Triangulationensuredthateveryconclusionisbasedonverifiedinformation.Thisgivesusalargedegreeofconfidenceinthevalidityofourfindings.EffectivenessofCordaid’sshelterprogrammefocusedonoutput,forwhichwetooktheobjectivesoftheDecember2010proposalsasourstartingpoint.Weanalysed(monthly)reportstomeasuretowhatextenttheseobjectiveswereachievedandthenverifiedthequalityoftheoutputsthroughthesurveys,theFGDs,theKSIsandourownobservations.WedesignedthesurveyquestionnairesintheNetherlandstomeasurebeneficiaryappreciationbasedon5qualityindicators:

1. Shelterdesign,2. Technicalquality,3. Security,

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4. Assessmentprocess,and5. Buildingprocess.

TheCreole‐speakingresearchspecialistontheteamrecruitedandtrainedtenstudentstoconductthesurveys.Thetrainingwasalsousedtotestthequestionnaires,aswedidnothavethetimetodothiswiththebeneficiaries.Surveydata4wereenteredintoanexcel‐sheetandanalysedbythetechnicalspecialistontheteam.ThisallowedustounderstandthequalityandappropriatenessofCordaid’soutputfromthebeneficiaries’perspective,whichwethentriangulatedwiththeresultsfromtheFGDs,KSIsandourownobservationsinthefield.Thesurveysgaveusasolidbasisofquantifiabledata.Weverifiedthesewiththequalitativeinformationweobtainedfromfocusgroupdiscussions,forwhichwerecruitedandtrainedFGDfacilitatorsandnotetakers.Wehadtoabandonourinitialideatoworkwithcontrolgroupsaswelackedsufficientlogisticssupportinthefield.NeverthelessweheldthreeFGDwithnon‐Cordaidbeneficiaries,givingussomebasisforcomparisonoftherelativevalueofbeneficiaryappreciationofCordaid’sprogramme.Wealsointerviewedaselectnumberofkeystakeholders,especiallyCordaidshelterpartners,sub‐contractors,representativesofcoordinatingbodiesandlocalauthorities.Tohelpustotriangulatetheissueoflegitimacy,wemetwithcommittees,beneficiaries’(surveys),andauthorities(KSIs).Staffinterviewsfocusedmainlyonprogrammeapproach,designandmanagementissues.Theresultswherethenverifiedbyinterviewswithkeystakeholdersandourownobservationsinthefield.Thisresultedinthisreport,whichcontainsthreemainsections:

- Chapter4:adescriptivesectionoftheevolutionoftheproject.Thesourcesforthissectionweremainlystaffinterviews5andprojectproposalsverifiedbydirectobservationsbytheevaluators.

- Chapter5:ananalysisofprojectresultsbasedonthebeneficiarysurvey,thefocusgroup

discussions,verifiedbykeystakeholderinterviewsanddirectobservations.

- Chapter6:asectionwhichconcludestheanalysisintermsoftheeffectiveness,appropriateness,efficiencyandtheimpactoftheprojectandrecommendationstostrengthenoperationsalongtheselines.

4Completesetinannex5.5Inkeepingwithevaluationethicalcodesandtheprincipleofconfidentiality,thenamesandpositionsofkeystakeholdersandstaffarewithheld.

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4. Programme Evolution

Thissectionofthereportgivesageneraldescriptionoftheprogrammeandhowitevolvedovertimeintheruralandurbancontext.

4.1 Emergency Response ImmediatelyaftertheearthquakeCordaidsenta‘reconnaissance’teamforitsfirstresponse,whicharrivedon14January2010.Theteamconsistedofacoordinator,alogisticsmanagerandacommunicationofficer.Inthefirstmonth,thisteamsupportedaCordaiddevelopmentpartner‐drivenemergencyresponseprogramme.Partner‐implementedrescue,non‐foodandfooddistributionswerefundedfroma‘solidarityfund’of€250,000.TheteamalsofacilitatedaCordaidmedicalteamandfocusedonpreparingalogisticsbaseinPort‐au‐PrinceandlaterinLéogâneforayettobedefinedprogramme.DiscussionstosupportCaritasHaiti(Cordaid’snaturalemergencypartner)didnotleadtosupportduetoongoingfinancialandadministrativechallengesinthisorganisation.CordaidstaffestimatedthatSHOfundraisingwouldraiseaminimumof€10million.Basedonfieldassessmentsofthecapacityofdevelopmentpartners,theemergencydepartmentraisedconcernsovertheirabilitytoimplementaprogrammeofthissize6.Takingintoaccountthesefactors,Cordaidemergencydepartmentdecidedtoembarkonanoperationalapproach,supportedbyatrustedshelterimplementationconsultancy(Group5),withwhichithadhadgoodexperiencesinIran,Aceh,PakistanandTurkey.OthercomponentsofCordaid’semergencyprogrammeincludedamentalhealthprogramme,butthisfallsoutsidethescopeofthisevaluation.4.2 Emergency Shelter Wewereunabletoestablishapapertrailfordecision‐making,butanecdotalinformationsuggeststhattheSectorManagerapprovedtherequestfromthefieldcoordinatorfor1,250tents.TheideaapparentlycameinresponsetoaCaritasInternationalrequestfromthecommunicationofficer,whohadinformationthatCordaidhadtentsavailableinPakistan.Adistributionreportindicatesthat1379tentsweredonatedtoCordaid’sdevelopmentpartners,whodistributed1133(82%)ofthese.18%remainunaccountedfor(eithermissing,stolenornodataonfile).Ourmethodologieshavenotenabledustolocatethetentsandformerfieldstaff,suggestedthatthetentshavedisintegratedanddisappeared.Wedidnotfindanyphysicalremainsthatcouldbeinspected.Astherewerenorecordswewereunabletoidentifyanybeneficiariestotalkabouttheirappreciationofthetents.6PerspectivesontheCordaidEmergencyIntervention–JaapVermeulenandJimMason,25August2010

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Staffandexternalshelterexpertsinterviewedindicatethattentsarenotagoodemergencysheltersolution(unlessperhapstheyarealreadyinthecountry).Theyareexpensive,logisticallydifficulttomanageandthematerialisnotappropriateforthehumidandhotconditionsofHaiti.Tarpaulinsareeasiertotransportandstore,moreversatile,canbeusedintransitionalsheltersolutionsandhencearepreferredovertents.TwoCordaidstaffmembersstatedthatalargenumber(14,000)oftarpaulinswerealsoordered.CordaidintendedtousetarpaulinsforT‐shelterwalls7.Thiswasnotimplementedresultinginemptyframes,insomecasesformorethanoneyear.Accordingtothesheltermanager,partofthestockwasdonatedtoother(emergency)agencies.4.3 Transitional Shelter ThissectioncoverstheT‐shelterprogrammeanditsevolutionintothebeginningsofapermanenthousingprogramme.Asthetwocomponentsareoperationallyintegrated8theyarepresentedinthesamesectionofthereport,withmanysub‐sectionsrelevanttoboth9.Subsections3and4thissectiondescribetheruralandtheurbanprogrammes,ofwhichthelatterincludestheevolutiontowardsan‘owner‐driven’andpermanenthousingapproach.Cordaiddecidedtoprovidehousingassistance(emergency,transitionalshelter),inearlyFebruary201010.

4.3.1 Management Thissectionanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:• Didthemajorpolicyandimplementationchoicescorrespondtothechangingneedsofthetarget

population?• Analyzethequality,efficiencyandtransparencyofthedecisionmakingprocessforthemainchoicesand

majorshifts.Decisionsmadebywhomandonwhichgrounds?SpecifyrolesandresponsibilitiesdefactoheldbyHQandFieldlevelsandcomparetodejuredesignoftheprocess.

• AnalyzetheeffectivenessandtimelinessofCordaid’seffortstoaccessbackdonorfunding.Cordaidestablishedadecision‐makingplatforminTheHague,calledthe‘Haititaskforce’,whichincludedtheSectorManagerDRR/Emergencies,theProjectOfficer(PV)forHaiti,andtheEmergencyDRRPolicyOfficer.CordaidemergencydepartmentinTheHaguecontractedGroup511,aRotterdam‐basedshelterconsultancyfirm,whodeployedaShelterAdvisor(wholaterbecameShelterManager)toCordaidHaiti.HereporteddirectlytoHQ(deputysectormanageremergencies)untilmidJune2010(strategy,implementationmodesandalternativesetc)anddevelopedproposalsandbudgetsandsentthemtothetaskforceforapproval.

7CordaidMarchandJuneproposals8 ‘ThetransitionalshelterdesigndevelopedbytheCordaidteamisinfactthefirstphaseoftheconstructionforapermanenthouse’(documentcalled:‘TRANSITIONALSHELTERSORPERMANENTHOUSES’)9Annex2providesanimplementationoverview.TheinformationmainlycomesfromCordaidHaitistaffbecausemonthlyprogressreportsdidnotprovidethiskindofoverview.10Informationandexplanationsheet11ForadescriptionofGroup5seeAnnex3.

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TheHeadofMission(HoM)andShelterManagersharedresponsibilitiesforprocurement,tendering,monitoringsystemdevelopment,logisticsandhumanresourcemanagement(exceptforNetherlandsbasedrecruitment).

Cordaidalsohiredanumberof‘barefoot’architects,youngandcommittedarchitects,recentlygraduatedfromuniversity,whoassessedshelterneedsinruralLéogâneandengagedwithbeneficiariestodeveloparangeofpossiblesheltersolutions.

Resultsfromstaffinterviewsindicatethatthisset‐upworkedwell,becauseitmaximisedimplementationrelateddecision‐makingdrivenfromthefield,withthetaskforceandlatertheemergencydepartmentplayingtheroleofverifyingproposals,designandimplementationagainstCordaid’spoliciesandbudget.4.3.2 Location Selection, Assessments and Proposals Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:

• Makeaninventoryoftheassessmentprocessandmentionstrengthsandweaknesses.

• Howwerebeneficiariesselectedandwhatareeventualsideeffectsfrombeneficiaryselectionforcommunities.

Accordingtokeyfieldstaff,theshelterprogrammestartedinLéogâneforthreereasons:

1. CordaidhasanumberofdevelopmentpartnersbasedthereandgiventhefactthatCordaidfromthebeginningintendedtohaveaparticipatoryandsocialcapitalbuildingapproach,theideawastoinvolvethepartnersinthis.

2. Theareawasrelativelyneglectedbytheinternationalhumanitariancommunityinthe

earlystages,asmanyincomingINGOsandotheragenciesfocusedontheneedsclosetothelogisticallymoreaccessibleareasofPort‐au‐Prince,andtotheareaofPetitGoave,furthereastfromLéogâne,whereUNpresenceguaranteedmoresecurity.

3. TheLéogâneareasustainedveryheavystructuraldamageasaresultofitbeingthe

epicentre.ThefieldsuggestiontoprioritiseT‐shelterwasapprovedbythetaskforceinearlyFebruary2010.Seniorfieldstaffreportafocusontechnicalaspectsintheruralareas,aslandtenureandothertypesofsocialprotectionarelessofanissuethere.ThisallowedCordaidtoatrialanumberoftechnicalsheltersolutionsbydevelopingtemporaryshelterprototypes.Areviewofthefirstproposalsrevealsthatotherproposed,andlaterapproved,activitiesincludeddrinkingwater,latrines,infrastructureimprovements,disasterriskreduction,livelihoodsandsocialprotection.ThesamestaffreportthattheurbanneighbourhoodofSainteMarie(290families)waschosenbecausetherewerenoland‐issueproblems(duetochurchownership),andhencewas‘agoodandlowriskexperimentalground’.AccordingtotheSheltermanager,CordaiddeclareditsintentiontoworkinneighbouringVillaRosaasearlyasFebruary2010,asitsdevelopmentpartnerGRETalreadyworkedherepriortotheearthquake.

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InJuly2010,Cordaidindicateditsintentiontoworkintwowesternsuburbs(TisousandNanCocteau)intheareaofCarrefour,asaccordingtotheShelterManager,‘noothershelterorganisationswereactive,whiledamagewassevere’.However,CordaidwasnotabletocommenceconstructionactivitiesinPort‐au‐PrinceuntilDecember2010,eventhoughfieldstaffobtainedapprovallateFebruaryorearlyMarch2010for‘athreemonthstartupproposal’12whichincludedwaterandsanitationactivities.Afterapprovalaconsultantwashiredwho‘stronglyadvisedpermanentsolutions,andtostartwithahygienepromotioncampaign’.Thefactthattheneedforalonger‐termapproachcouldnotberesolvedwithintheapprovedshort‐termstrategyisgivenasthereasonfornotstartingactivitiesuntil2011.StaffreportthatarevisedruralprogrammeproposalinOctober2010andanewurbanproposalincludingadditionalshelters,communitydevelopment,socialprotection,DRR,WASHandlivelihoodcomponentswererejectedduetolackoffundsanddetail.ThisresultedinnewproposalsinDecember2010,whichHQapproved.Forunknownreasonsthebudgetdidnotmatchthenarrativeandfundswereonlyavailableforshelter.Theoperationalareawasexpanded,leavingnoresourcesavailableforsocialcapitalbuilding,WASHorlivelihoodactivities.FieldstaffmentionedthatHQdidnotcapitaliseonexternalfundingopportunitiesforT‐shelterfrominternationaldonors,whichcouldhavebeenusedtofreeupSHOfundsfortheothercomponents.AdeclineintherelativevalueoftheEuroduringimplementationalsolimitedthefundingbaseasbudgetsareinUSD.Fortheurbanprogrammeallocationsforothercomponentsbesidesshelterwereapproved.

CordaidarchitectsassessedthedamageintheruralareasandCordaidestablishedneighbourhoodcommitteestoselectthemostvulnerablebeneficiaries,whowouldbegivenpriority.InurbanareasCordaidselectedbeneficiariesbasedonthegovernmentdepartmentofMTPTC(MinisteredesTravauxPubliques,TransportsetCommunications)assessments.Cordaidstaffvisitedeachhouseholdinordertoassessthetechnicaldamageintheruralareas.MTPTCassessedthedamageintheurbanareas,requiringallhousestobetagged:

● Unsafeforhabitationandhavingtobedestroyedorretrofitted(red),● Needingrepairs(yellow)or● Safeandneedednowork(green).

CordaidstaffverifiedMTPTCdatainurbanneighbourhoodswithacommunitymemberandconducteditsownassessmentsintheruralareas.Thiswaslabourintensivework,especiallyinthevastareaof7ièmeGerard.TheMTPTCassessmentsintheurbanareashadtobeconductedwithoutthebenefitofaregisterorotherkindoflandorhomeownershipregistrationinthespontaneoussettlements.

12Informationandexplanationsheet

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Inadditiontoindividualbeneficiaryparticipationintheconstructionoftheirownshelters,localcommunitymembersparticipatedincommunityforumsandelaboratedcommunityactionplans(CAPs).Theseservedtwopurposes13:

1. Establishcommittees2. Needsidentification

ThecommitteesbecamethecommunitycommunicationandrepresentationplatformforCordaid’sshelterprogrammeandthemainfocusofitssocialcapitalbuildingstrategy.Committeesidentifiedthemostvulnerablebeneficiariesbasedonsuchcriteriaas:

● Lossofbreadwinner● Femaleheadedhousehold● Elderly● Pregnancy● Disability

Basedonthesecriteriacommitteesprioritisedthemostvulnerableamongtheeligiblebeneficiaries.Cordaidstaffverifiedthelists.DuringtheCAPprocessinbothruralandurbanareascommitteesalsoidentifiedotherneedssuchasWASH,infrastructureandlivelihoods.Accordingtokeystaff,Cordaidinitiallysoughttopartnerwithotherorganisations(TerredesHommes)toaddresstheseneeds,leadingtosomeWASHactivitiesandrubbishremovalaspartofpilotsinTisousandVillaRosa,preparingthebasisforastrategyforfulfillingtheobjectiveofcreating“safeandfriendlyneighbourhoods.”BuildinghighqualityT‐sheltersisarelativelyexpensiveapproachandseveralCordaidstaffmentionedthatspendingpressurereinforcedtheargumentstocontinueanelaborateapproachwithmorefeatures(walls)andimplementationin(sub)urbanareasofPort‐au‐Prince.Theadditionalresourceswerenotavailableforotheractivities.OnlyattheendoftheprogrammedidCordaidstarttoimplementabroader(integratedneighbourhood)approach,byincludingtherestorationandconstructionofretainingwalls,drainageandothersanitationsolutions.However,weverifieddirectlyduringfieldvisitstotheurbanareasthatsuchneedsremainlargelyunaddressedinotherCordaidoperationalareasattheendoftheproject14.Livelihoodactivitieswerelimitedtothetemporaryemploymentopportunitiesofferedtotradesmen(‘bosses’)andvocationaltrainingforyoungschooldrop‐outs,recruitedincollaborationwiththeNGOIDEJENintheruralareas.Staffmentionsalsolocalprocurementofconstructionmaterials,aspartofalivelihoodsstrategy.4.3.3 Rural Programme Theoriginalobjectiveoftheruralprogrammewastobuild2,300T‐shelters,3,300latrinesand16wellsandthephysicalrehabilitationoftheenvironment.Additionalobjectivesfocusedon

13CommunityActionPlanning,PracticalGuide(draft)–Haiti,December201014ourvisualinspectionsinSainteMarieandTisoustookplace6weekspriortotheendofCordaidactivities

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livelihoods,disasterpreparednessandsocialprotection15.Aswehavealreadyseen.thesewerenotcoveredbythefirstbudget.AfterCordaidarchitectsassessedthetechnicaldamageandestablishedneighbourhoodcommittees,theagencyengagedanumberofimplementationpartnersandsuppliersinordertodevelopshelterprototypes.Beneficiarycontributionswereinitiallylimitedtopreparingtheplotandassistingwiththeerectionoftimberframes.CordaiddesignedatimberframeshelterbecausethismaterialwasavailablefromsustainableproducersintheUSatareasonablecost.However,Haitihasashortageofskilledcarpentersduetothefactthatpeoplemorerecentlystartedtoprefertheuseofothermaterialssuchasconcreteandmasonry.Timberframeswereprefabricatedanddesignedinsuchawaythattwopersonscouldcarrythem.Theframeswereanchoredinconcretefeet,containedtrussescoveredbyCGIroofingsheetsandhadwallscladdedwithhighqualitytarpaulins.Thedimensionsoftheshelterswere20m2(Spherestandardsusinganaveragefamilysizeoffivepersonswouldrequireaminimumof17.5m2),andweestimatelifespantobeapproximately10years.Thecostforoneshelterintheruralareawasoriginallybudgetedat1,500USD.CordaiddevelopedthefirstprototypesincooperationwithsuppliersofthetimberframesandasearlyasFebruary2010andinvitedbeneficiariestocommentontwodemonstrationsheltersin7ièmeGerardandinLompré,leadingtomodifications.Theseprototypeswerethebasisforthefirsttwocontractsfor75shelterseach,atotalof150,producedbytwosuppliers(MaximaandPromobois)completedinMay2010.CordaidcontinuedtoconsultwiththepopulationinJulyandAugust2010,leadingtofurtherimprovementstothestructuralintegritysuch(certifiedhurricaneconnectorsandstraps)andmodificationstothedesign(thepossibilitytoaddaveranda,anaccessibleceilingforstorage,asecondfrontdoor,backdoor,andaflexiblesquarelayoutbasedon1metrewidepanels,flexibledoorsandwindowlocations).Animportantadditionalmodificationwasthereplacementofthetemporarytarpaulinswithmoresustainablewalls,whichduetoamanagementdisagreementwasnotimplemented,resultinginemptytimberframesforalongperiodoftime.Thesemodificationswereincludedinthedesignforthenextbatchof1850sheltersatanewcostof3,500USDpershelter.HQapprovedrequiredmodificationstothebudgetinJune2010.CordaidcontractedIPAtolaunchanopeninternationaltenderfor1850sheltersinfourbatches(startingendFebruary2010).Reportedlytheresponsewas‘insufficient’andtheemergencymanagerapproveda‘3quote’system,allowingdirectapproachofsuppliers.ThetenderopenedinMarch2010and3quoteswereobtainedinApril2010(Maxima–production,Acieried’Haiti–timbersupply,AllianceDistribution–2lotsforroofingsheetsandhardware).ConstructioninthefieldstartedendofOctoberandCordaiddelivered600shelterstoCARE.Thenexttenderfor940sheltersopenedinOctober2010andwasawardedendofDecember2010toSteelElementsInternational(SEI)–USAfor800shelters.140shelterscancelledforunknownreasons.SteelElementsexperiencedimportdelaysandCordaidawarded250shelterstoMaxima,whichprovedacheaperandmorereliablecontractorthanSEI16.

15CordaidprojectproposalDecember201016InformationandExplanationsheet

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Cordaiddefinedobjectivesandapproachintheruralareasandinformedandvalidatedthiswiththelocalauthorities,whoseimplementationrolewaslimitedastheylackedcapacities,whichwaspartofthereasonCordaidestablishedcommitteeswithwhichtowork.Theroleofbeneficiariesconsistedof:● diggingthefoundationholesandlevellingtheplot● safeguardingandtransport(sometimesoverconsiderabledistances)ofmaterialsfrom

pointofdeliverytoconstructionsite● assistingwitherectingtimberframesandroof● selectingtheboss,oftenCordaidproposedqualifiedbosses

CordaidengagedIDEJENstudentstoerecttheprefabricatedtimberframesandtocovertheshelterwitharoof,assistedbythebeneficiary.WorkingwithIDEJENgaveschooldropouts,oftencomingfrommarginalisedgroups,achancetolearnnewskills.Theauthoritiesintheruralareasonlyhadalimitedroleinthedesign,planningandimplementationoftheruralprogramme.CordaidliaisedwiththeLompreCasec,theMagistrateofGrandGoaveandthemayoranddeputyofLéogâne.However,operationally,Cordaidoptedtoworkthroughthecommittees,whichitregardedasmorelegitimateandeffectiverepresentativebodies.By the end of 2010, Cordaid reorganised the Léogâne office and confirmed its implementingapproach:

1. Thebeneficiarypreparesthelandorplot.2. Thesupplierdeliversthepre‐fabricatedtimberframes,roofsheetsandhardware;the

beneficiarysignsoff.3. Cordaidstaffsignsoffonqualityandquantityofproducts.Acopyofthewaybilliskept

inLéogâneoffice.Thesupplierinvoiceswiththesignedoriginalofthewaybill.TheseareverifiedwiththeLéogânecopiesbeforepaymentsaremade17.

4. IDEJENerectsthestructureandroof,assistedbythebeneficiary.Cordaidverifiesthequalityofconstructionandsignsoffforcompletion.

5. Cordaidpurchasesthesand,gravel,cement,chainlink;thebeneficiarysignsoffforreceipt.

6. Thebeneficiaryselectsabuildertoconstructthefloorandwalls.7. BeneficiaryandCordaidsignoffahand‐overdocument.

Laterin2011,followingtheexampleoftheurbanprogramme(SainteMarieandNanCocteau),Cordaidfundedtherepairsof204housesinGrandGoave,implementedbyFAU.Houserepairstookplaceinparalleltoshelterprovision,withanobjectiveof‘build‐back‐better’,requiringinvestmentsinearthquakeresistantreinforcedcolumnsandbeams.Otherrepairworksincludedroofing,doors,windowsandplastering.Toiletsweresometimesrestoredaswell.Thescopeofworkwaslimitedbythebudgetavailableperhouse.Inordertoassistthebeneficiarieswithrepairs,localtradesmen(‘bosses’)werecontracteddependingontechnicalskills,specificallyfortheshelterfloorandwallsprogram.Theyreceivedthreedaystrainingfrom

17Cordaidreducesrisksandliabilitybyavoidingownershipofshelterkitsinthisway.

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Cordaid,toimprovetheirbasicskillsandtocoachthemintheuseofnewtechniques.FAUtrainedaseparateworkforceforothertypesofrepairs.4.3.4 Urban Programme Theoriginalplanwastobuilt3,000T‐shelters,5,000latrines,repair1,000houses,improvedrinkingwatersupplyanddrainage18.Cordaidwascommittedtoworkwithinthegovernment’spolicyandlegalframeworksandthereforedependentontheoutcomeoftheassessmentsofMTPTC.Delaysinthedeliveryofbuildingstandardsandspecificationsfrustratedtheprocessofadaptingtheruraldesigntourbanconditions.Shortageofland,landtenureissues,delaysintheclearanceofrubbleandcomplexdiscussionsaboutwhetherornotandhowtoaddressdrainage,roadsandwatersupplyproblems,furthercompoundedthedelays.CordaidstarteditsurbanprogrammeinSainteMarieinJanuary2011withacommunityactionplanningexercise(CAP).InMay2011,shelterconstructionactivitiesstartedinTisous,NanCocteauandVillaRosa.Theapproachwasbasedontheruralprogramme,withtechnicalassessment,designandtheestablishmentofacommittee.However,theruraldesigndidnotallowforthepossibilityofasecondstory,acommondesignaspectinHaiti’sdenseurbansettlementsandoftenrentedoutaspartofanowner’slivelihoodstrategy.Smallplotsizeslimitedopportunitiesforothertypesofextensionsandimprovements.SainteMarieisaprivatesettlementwheretheCatholicChurchownsallland,whichismanagedbytheFoyer,itsadministrationoffice.Beneficiariespayatypeoftaxfortheprivilegeoflivingthereandforthesupplyofdrinkingwater(whichisthemaininfrastructuralprobleminthearea)andotherservices.Cordaidwasabletocomplete98sheltersbyAugust2011.StaffattributesthisrelativelyrapidimplementationtotheabsenceoflandtenureissuesinSainteMarie.AlmostsimultaneouslyCordaiddelivered150shelterstoCHFinRavinePintade.Accordingtothesheltermanager,the‘MoUwithCHFwasonlysignedinmid2011andimplementationdelayedsinceCHFcouldnotprepareplotssufficientlyforsheltererectiontotakeplace’.CHFstafftoldusthattheresidentialareaontheslopesofasteepravinewaslargelydestroyed.Thisenabledthemtoplananintervention,whichincludednewroads,pathsandpublicspaces.CHFalsorenovateddrainageandsanitationfacilitiesinthearea.CHFbuiltsteelframe,tarp‐clad,twostoryT‐shelters.Cordaidprovidedanadaptedversionofitsruraldesigntobeneficiarieswhosehouseswereheavilydamagedorcompletelydestroyed.InNovember2011,thepresidentdeclaredtheendoftheemergencyphaseandbannedtheprovisionofT‐shelters.CordaidstoppedT‐shelterconstructioninDecember2011andgavemoreprioritytobeneficiaryinvolvementandtorepairs.Itadoptedanownerdrivenhousing(ODH)approachinwhichthebeneficiarydecideshowtouseaCordaidgrant:completethegroundfloor,enlargethebuilding,repairs,newroof,etc..Cordaidalsoprovidestechnicaladvice

18CordaidProjectProposal,December2010

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fromanarchitectandanengineer.CordaidrolledoutthisstrategyinVillaRosa,NanCocteauandTisousfromMay2012.ODHisanimportantevolution,asitnolongerseesthebeneficiaryasarecipient,butalsoasanactivepartnerandparticipant,notonlyinplanninganddesign,butalsointheconstructionprocessitself.Italsosignalledthetransitiontopermanenthousingsolutions.CordaidHaitihadalreadysignedapartneragreementwithFAUinMay2011,coveringtherepairof855householdsinSainteMarie,GrandGoaveandNanCocteau.Thiswaslateradjustedto955households.FAUassessedanddesignedrepairworksand‘builtbackbetter’53housesinSainteMarie.FAUwasalsocontractedtorepairhousesintheruralareas,andinNanCocteauin2012.TheroleofFAUwastoundertakeadetailedassessment,makearepairplanandbudgetandcontractlocaltradesmen(‘bosses’)toimplementtherepairs,signacontractwiththebeneficiaryandhandoverthehouseaftercompletion.FAUpurchasedconstructionmaterialsfundedbyCordaidandalsomonitoredconstructionwork.Cordaid’sinvolvementwaslimitedtofundingandco‐signingthecontracts.Physicalpresencewaslimitedtothatoftheareamanagerduringsecurityincidents.Althoughonpaperowner‐drivenhousingstartedSeptember2011,ittookuntilDecember2011beforeCordaidstartedtoinvolvebeneficiariesdirectlyinconstructionactivitiesofitsurbanshelterprogrammeinthefield.TheVillaRosaCasecandthemayorofCarrefourbecamemoreactivelyinvolved,astheyassertedtheirroleaselectedofficialsanddutybearersintheprocessofdevelopingwaystosecurelandrightsforformeroccupantswithoutdocuments.CordaidpartneredwithUSbasedNGOBuildChangefortheimplementationofthisprogrammeinasimilarwaytoFAU.Aftertheassessmentandtheselectionofthebeneficiaries,thefollowingstepsaretaken:

1. BuildChangemakesthedesign,togetherwiththebeneficiary;2. BuildChangepreparesthebudgetforthework(iftheworkneededordesiredexceeds

thebudgetthebeneficiaryisaskedtocontributefinanciallyoradjustthedesigntoavailablefunds.

3. TheNeighbourhoodCommitteereceivesasmallfeefromthebeneficiaryforcheckingdocuments.

4. Cordaidverifiesdata(name,eligibilityetc.)andapproves.5. Thebeneficiaryreceivesahalf‐daytrainingfromBuildChange,learninghowtoselecta

boss,howtobuildwithqualitymaterialsandhowtosupervisetheexecutionoftheworks;

6. Thebeneficiaryselectsabossfortheconstructionworks;7. Ifthebossisnew,hereceivesa4daytraining,focusingonconcreteworksandearth

quakeresistantbuilding;8. Thebeneficiaryreceives3or4tranches(retrofitsandnewbuild)ofwhichthelast

trancheis5%ofthecontractamounttobepaidafterfinaldelivery;9. Thebeneficiarypurchasesthematerialsandcontractstheboss;10. Implementation,supervisedbythebeneficiary,assistedbyBuildChangeengineers

whenevernecessary;11. Finaldeliveryinpresenceofthebeneficiary,boss,BuildChangeandCordaid.

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Afinaldevelopmentistheso‐called‘integratedneighbourhoodapproach’(INA).CordaidalreadyparticipatedinaCHFimplementedprojectINAinRavinePintade.Themainideaistoincludesheltersolutionsasanintegratedaspectofurbanplanning,addressingawiderinter‐relatedsetofneeds,suchasWASH,landrights,publicspace,socialprotection,livelihoods,drainage,educationandhealth.Reportedly,INAwasalwaysforeseeninallprogrammeareas,howeverforavarietyofreasonsalreadymentioned,itwasinitiatedlate,neverfullyimplementedandremainslimitedtotwopilotprojectsinVillaRosaandTisous.4.3.5 Implementation Partners Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:

• Wereactivitiescost‐efficientintermsoffinancialandhumanresources–takingintoconsiderationthecontextinwhichtheinterventionhadtobeimplemented,e.g.coststobeincurredtoreachthe

beneficiaries,andapplicationofbenchmarksforthecostingofsupportitems?TakenotethatinsomecasesCordaidoptedforoutsourcing,extendingthechainofpartners(internationalaswellaslocal),

contractors,subcontractorsandimplementers.Compareefficiencyofmoredirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.Contractingout

• Inlaterstages,moreemphasiswasplacedonpartneringwithotherinternationalNGOs(BuildChange,

FondationArchitectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity,Care,etc.).Whatareconsequencesintermsofpolicycoherenceandcostefficiency.Howandbywhomwerethesepartnersidentified,what

werecriteriaforselection?Wasthecontractingprocedurecfmstandinginstructions.

Theimplementationoftheshelterprogrammerequiresinternationalandnationalstaffcapacities,whichCordaiddoesnotpossessonapermanentbasis.SeniorstaffacknowledgesthatCordaidlacksthecapacitytorecruitandsupportprofessionals(urbanplanners,engineers,architects,projectmanagersandcontrollers)forthistypeofoperation.Cordaidimplementedastrategytoboostitsimplementationcapacity:1. ItcontractedGroup5fortechnicaladvice,coordinationandimplementationandrecruited

teamsofinternational‘barefootarchitects’inLéogâneandinPort‐au‐Prince,supportedbyamanagementteamandnationalstaff.

2. ItcontractedtwoINGOs(FondationArchitectesd’UrgenceandArchitectureforHumanity)

toimplementurbanplanningexercisesandathird(BuildChange)toimplementtheownerdrivenhousingstrategy.FondationArchitectesd’UrgencealsoobtainedthecontracttorepairhousesinLéogâneandPort‐au‐Prince.Theirroleswere:

■ generalmappingoftheprojectarea.■ communityplanninganddesigns.■ micro‐planningofimplementation.■ coordinatingthecommunityexecutionofsomeinfrastructureworks

3. CordaidalsopartneredwithCAREtoprovide600sheltersinLéogâne.Cordaidhadthematerialsavailable,buthadnotyetestablisheditsimplementationcapacity(fieldstaff,beneficiaryselection,trainingofbuilders),whereasCAREdidnothavematerials,duelogisticalconstraintsbutdidhaveimplementationcapacity.OtheractivitiesreportedlyincludedthedevelopmentofcommunityinfrastructureandaWASHstudy.

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4. CordaidsignedanagreementwithIDEJENtoimplementcertainaspectsofshelterconstructioninbothruralandurbanareas.

5. CordaidsignedMoU’swithIDHI,PNAOSandGTIHforrubbleclearanceandwithCHFfor

shelterconstructioninRavinePintade.IOMdesignedandimplementedthelatrineconstructioninthepilots.

6. Italsotenderedorcontractedanumberofotherbusinesspartnersforthedeliveryof

materials,construction,trainingandotherservices.DuringtheselectionprocessCordaidhadtoovercomethedifficultyofsevereshortagesoflocalandinternationaltechnicalexpertise,duetotheextremelyhighdemandontheseservicesintheaftermathoftheearthquake.Cordaidusedtheclustermeetingstoidentifypotentialpartnersworkinginthesameareas.Thesheltermanager,whohimselfwascontracted,comparedorganizational,financial,administrativeandstaffcapacities,basedonexpertise,trackrecord,presenceandreputation.WewereunabletofindanyCordaidpoliciestosupportthesetypesofprocesses,eveniftheHoMdesignedsometoolstosupportthesheltermanagerinthisprocess.MostpartnerschargedtheirbackofficecoststoCordaid,whichmeansthatCordaidcontractedimplementationbutalsoqualityassurance,riskmanagement,policydevelopmentandotheroverheads.

5. Results Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestions:

• Whatarebeneficiaries/communitiesperspectivesaboutneedsidentifiedoutsidethescopeofrepairsandconstruction(f.e.WASH,DRR,Livelihoodinterventions)

• HowsuccessfulwereCordaid’seffortstoengenderitsapproachandinteractwiththebeneficiaries?• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)

urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?

• Weretheshelterprogramstrategiesandimplementationchoicescoherentwiththeclustersystem,nationalreconstructionplansandstrategies?

• Howdotheachievedresultsandthemannerinwhichtheyareachieved,compareagainstinternationalqualitystandardsCordaidstrivestoadheretoasdefinedintheSpherestandardsandtheCodeofConductfortheInternationalRedCrossandNGOsindisasterresponseprogrammes.

• WasthereanadequatesystemformonitoringandevaluationinplaceinCordaidHaiti?• Identifymajoreffects(negativeandpositive)atbeneficiaries,communitiesorotherstakeholders(

localgovernment),fosteredbytheprogramme• Werethereanyunintendedside‐effects(negativeorpositive)?

Resultswereinitiallyslowtoemerge.Accordingtokeyinternationalfieldbasedtechnicalstafftheplanningofimplementationseemstohavebeenratherad‐hocanddependentontheavailabilityandpresenceoftheHoMandShelterManagerduring2010.ThediscontinuityofasheltermanagerinLéogânewasmentionedbyCordaidstaffasthemainreasonforthelackofplanningfortheruralprogramme,whichcontributedtoalackofresultsduringthefirstyear.Formerfieldstaffmentionedthattheinitialpilotof150shelterswasnotimmediatelyfollowedbythecompletionof2,000sheltersasplanned,becauseofpoorlogistics,changing

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implementationstrategiesandalackofdirectionwhichendedbytheendof2010,whentheshelterteammoreclearlydefinedtheapproach,leadingtoanincreaseofoutputinearly2011.Fromthispointintime,planningofruralandurbanprogrammesimproved.Timeandactivityscheduleswereincludedinprojectproposals,indicatingactivityimplementationtargetsforallprojectareas.Howeverthesescheduleswerenotsystematicallyupdated,makingthemapoorbasisforprogressmonitoring.ComparisonofCordaidshelterprogrammestotheoriginalandtothemostrecentupdatedobjectivesdocumented(MarchandMay2012respectively),showsthatshelteroutputsandrepairshavebeenlargelyrealised,especiallyintheruralareas,wheredesignoriginatedandimplementationbeganearlier.Cordaidlargelyachieveditssocialcapitaldevelopmentobjectivesthroughtheestablishmentofthebeneficiarycommittees.Thereareevenearlysignsthatthesecommunityplatformsarealreadybecomingsustainable.OriginalintegratedneighbourhoodapproachandWASHobjectiveswerede‐prioritisedintheruralareasandremainedatthepilotphaseintheurbancomponentoftheprogramme.

Originalobjectives Updatedobjectives(March2012)

Results(May2012)

Ruralprogramme

2,300shelters 3,320sheltersprovided

3,003numberofsheltersprovidedandanunknownnumberoffamiliesreturned

1,200housesrepaired 340familieslivinginrepairedhouses

204numberofhousesrepairedand308numberoffamiliesreturned

Safeandfriendlyneighbourhoodinfrastructureandcommunityfacilitiescreated

Excluded NA

Water and sanitation facilities provided toensure3,300 families having andusing latrinesand5,000familieshavingaccesstowater.

Excluded NA

Areducedvulnerabilityofcommunitiestonaturaldisasters,suchashurricanes,floods,landslidesandearthquakes

Notchanged TrainingofbossesRiskmappingexercisesinallprojectareas

Increasedsocialprotectionbyensuringlandlessbeneficiaries(anestimated80%oftargetfamilies)landtenureprotection

Notchanged Theruralprogrammeincludesunknownnumbersofrenters(figuresnotyetavailable)

Socialcapitaldevelopedthroughstrengthenedorganisationof‐,andcooperationbetween,localgovernment,communitycommittees,andnon‐governmentalorganisations.

Notchanged ‐Bonding:settingupofcommittees,involvinglocalNGOs(e.g.IDEJEN),capacitybuildingtocommitteesstartingtotakeplace‐Bridging:thecommitteesthemselvesconsistofmembersfromvariouslocalCBO’s,PANOShasprovidedtrainingtodifferentcommitteesandameetingwithallruralcommitteeshastakenplace

Improvedlivelihoodandincomegeneratingopportunitieswithinthecommunities

Notchanged Labour(bosses,IDEJEN).Purchaseoflocalmaterials(sand,graveletcandintheUrbanODHprogrammeallmaterialsarepurchasedinorneartheneighbourhoods

Urbanprogramme

3,000shelters 856sheltersprovided800housesprovided=1.656shelters/houses

848sheltersfinished84housesfinished=934shelters/housesconstructedandxnumberoffamiliesreturned

1,000housesrepaired 1,059houses 146repairsfinished

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repaired 123housesretrofitted(ODHyellow)=269numberofhousesrepairedandxnumberoffamiliesreturned

Safeandfriendlyneighbourhoodinfrastructureandcommunityfacilitiescreated

Notchanged 2initialprojectsINAstarted2HousesofKnowledgeprovided

5,000 latrines andwatersupplyprovisions in4communities covering approximately 75,000people

340 latrines andwater supplyprovisions in 2communities(Tisous and VillaRosa)

Withinthetwoinitialzones(TandVR)Cordaidprovidesinfrastructureimprovementsincludingdrainage,directlybenefitingapproximately1,200persons.Retrofittingtheurbanhousesoftenincludestherepairsoftoilets(304completed).

Areducedvulnerabilityofcommunitiestonaturaldisasters,suchashurricanes,floods,landslidesandearthquakes

Notchanged OneurbancommitteebeingtransformedintoPlatformCommunautairetoensureformalparticipationingovernmentledurbandevelopment(16/6)3numberofHousesofKnowledgeprovidedTrainingtobossesandbeneficiariesRiskmappingexercisesinallprojectareasAwarenesscampaignsonbuildingstandardsandrisksinurbanareas

Increasedsocialprotectionbyensuringlandlessbeneficiaries(anestimated80%oftargetfamilies)landtenureprotection

Notchanged Theurbanprogrammeincludesunknownnumbersofrenters(figuresnotyetavailable)Theurbanprogrammeincludesanunknownnumberorlandownersthatreceivedtheirownershipthroughtestimonials

Socialcapitaldevelopedthroughstrengthenedorganisationof‐,andcooperationbetween,localgovernment,communitycommittees,andnon‐governmentalorganisations.

Notchanged ‐Bonding:settingupofcommittees,involvinglocalNGOs(f.e.IDEJEN),capacitybuildingtocommitteesstartingtotakeplace‐Bridging:thecommitteesthemselvesconsistofmembersfromvariouslocalCBO’s,PANOShasprovidedtrainingwithdifferentcommittees,theVRcommitteeisbeingtransformedintoaPlatformCommunautaire

Improvedlivelihoodandincomegeneratingopportunitiesincommunities

Notchanged Labour(bosses,IDEJEN,OwnerDrivenWorks)

5.1 Technical Results Thissectionanswersthefollowingquestionsfromthetermsofreference:● HowwerethetechnicaldesignsappreciatedbyCordaid,othersandbeneficiaries?● Whatwereotherneedsandwhatwasdonewiththose?● Whatlevelofparticipationwasachieved?● Wereapproachandresultswithininternationalstandards(Sphere,others)?● Howwassocialcapitaldeveloped?● Werethereunintendedsideeffects?● ComparetheresponsetimeofCordaid’sshelterinterventionswithsimilarshelterinterventionsof

otherNGOsinHaiti.Surveyresultsshowveryhighdegreesofbeneficiarysatisfactionwithfourqualityindicators:design,size,materials,andconstruction.

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● Design○ 27%highlysatisfied○ 61%satisfied

● Size○ 23%highlysatisfied○ 63%satisfied

● Qualityofmaterials○ 27%highlysatisfied○ 66%satisfied

● Executionoftheconstructionworks○ 26%highlysatisfied○ 65%satisfied

Arelativelylargeproportion(32%)ofbeneficiariesdidnotknowwhethertheirshelterissafe(earthquakeorHurricaneresistant),anindicationthatbeneficiariesarenotwellinformedabouttechnicalqualityissues.

● 72%ofbeneficiariesdonotknowthelifespanoftheirshelter● 65%believethattheywillbeabletomaintaintheirsheltersbythemselves● 48%ofmembersofbeneficiaryhouseholdsreceivedtrainingduringtheproject● 24%involvedinconstruction● 12%learnedadditionalskills

BeneficiariesappreciatedthesheltersprovidedbyCordaidnotonlyintermsofdesignbutalsointermsoftheparticipatoryapproachthatCordaidadopted.TheyreportedthatCordaidanditsstaffsoughttheirinputintermsofdesignandculturalappropriatenessoftheshelters,contributingtohighlevelsofsatisfactionaboutthedesignoftheshelters.

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Amongruralresidents,

● 32%ofoursurveyrespondentswerehighlysatisfiedwiththedesignoftheshelters● 62%weresatisfied.

Werecordedalowerlevelofsatisfactionamongurbanresidentswhere

● 16%ofsurveyresponderswerehighlysatisfiedand● 59%weresatisfied.

Urbanresidentsexpressedrelativelymoreoftendissatisfactionwiththedesignoftheshelter(17%),thanruralbeneficiaries(5%).Onelikelyreasonforthisisthatthedesignoriginatedfromtheruralsettingand,despitemodificationstookessentialurbandesignrequirementsinsufficientlyintoaccount.TheruralT‐shelterapproachbecamethedominantfeatureoftheprogramme,notsomuchasaresultofaCordaidpolicy,butaccordingtokeystaff,bydefaultfromitsruraldesignoriginsandthestronginvolvementofarchitects.OtherfactorsmentionedbystaffwereclusteragreementsandGovernmentrequests.Nevertheless,theappreciationoftheshelterdesigngoesbeyonditsculturalappropriateness.Focusgroupparticipantsandsurveyrespondersbelievetheshelterswillprovideahigherlevelofsafetyincaseoffutureearthquakesorhurricanes.Urbanresidentsexpressedthehighestlevelofconfidenceinthestructuralintegrityoftheshelters:

● 18%highlysatisfiedand● 53%satisfied.

Thelevelofsatisfactionwiththelevelofsafetyamongruralresidentswasdistributedmoreevenly:

● 29%highlysatisfied● 34%satisfiedand● 36%didnotknow.

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Althougharelativelyhighproportion(32%comparedto26%ofhighlysatisfiedand39%satisfied)ofbeneficiariesdidnotknowwhethertheirhouseissafe,thereisalsosomeanecdotalevidencethatatleastsomeofthemfeelconfidentwiththesafetystandards.Forinstance,onefocusgrouprespondentreportedthatduringarecenttremor,hestoodathiswindowandwatchedhisneighboursrunfromtheircementblochousesbecausehewasconfidentthattheconstructionanddesignofhisshelterwassolidenoughtowithstandthequake.Committeemembersparticipatedintheprojectevenwhentheyknewthattheywouldnotpersonallybenefitfromtheprojectandcontinuedtodosoevenwhenaspectsoftheprocessbecameproblematic.ThisillustratesconfidenceinCordaidandtheproject.CommitteememberstoldusthatbeneficiariesexpresseddisappointmentinthefactthatotherneedssuchaslivelihoodandWASHidentifiedintheCordaidfacilitatedCAPswerenotincludedintheprogramme.BoththeCAPsandtheproposalscalledforastrategyaddressingabroadspectrumofneeds.InseveralzonesthepopulationandthecommitteescriticisedthefactthatCordaidpromisedotherinterventionsbutdidnotfollowup.

ThisunfortunatelycreatedtensionamongthepopulationandtowardsCordaid.Somecommitteemembersreportedthattheyagreedtoparticipateintheprojectbecauseoftheirunderstandingthattheprojectwouldgobeyondsheltersothatpeoplewhowerenoteligibleforshelterswouldeventuallybenefitinsomeotherway.Committeemembersreportthattheywereheldaccountablebytheirconstituency,tocommitmentstodeliverforwhichinretrospecttheyfoundtheyhadnomandate.CordaidpartnerCHFimplementedanintegratedneighbourhoodapproachintheurbanslumofRavinePintade.CHFupgradedtheneighbourhood’slayoutandreservedpublicspacesforattractiveseatingareaswherepeoplecanmeet,readandstudy.Theypavedroadsandpathsandcoveredandcementedtheareasdrainagecanals.CHFprovidedtwostoreysteelframes,cladwithtarpaulinsandCordaidprovided150oftheirtemporaryshelters.

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BeneficiariesinRavinePintadeexpressedintheFGDhighlevelsofsatisfactionabouttheresults.Theyreportedthattheyarehappywithlifeintheircommunity.Accordingtooneparticipant:“Nowtheneighbourhoodlooksbetter.Mostofthedamagedhouseshavebeenrepaired.Theyhavetakendownthehousesthatcouldnotberepaired.Wearenowsafefromearthquakes.”UnlikemostotherneighbourhoodswhereFGDparticipantscomplainaboutsafetyandsanitationissues,RavinePintaderesidentsreportthattheyfeelsafebecausetheyhelpeachotherandalsodonotmentionsanitationproblemsasoftenasFGDsinCordaidneighbourhoods,probablyduetothefactthatCHFprovidedmoderntoiletsandrepaireddrainage.ResidentsinRavinePintadealsoexpresshighlevelsofsatisfactionwiththewaythedifferentpartsoftheprogrammewerecommunicatedtothemespeciallyduringthemeetingwheretheypresentedtheneighbourhoodplansanddiscussedtheplacementofthelocalpark.5.2 Social Results Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestion:SocialCapital

• InitsshelterprogramCordaidHaitiaimstoapplyasupportdriven,people‐centeredreconstructionapproach.Throughcommunitybasedinterventions,involvingnationalpartnerorganizationandcommunitygroups,Cordaidaimstostrengthensocialcapital.Thestrategyalsofostersanincreaseovertimeintheresponsibilityoflocalcommunitiesandpartnerorganizations.Italsoaimstomaximizetheuseoflocalmaterials,locallaborandlocalskills/techniques.Theseobjectivesdonotnecessarilycontributetotimelinessandefficiencyoftheoperation.Howweretheseobjectivesdefinedandbywhom?Howdidstrategicchoicesdealwithpossibleconflictingobjectives.

Fromtheperspectiveofthebeneficiaries,oneofthemostimportantsocialresultsishousingsecurity.FGDparticipantsconsistentlyreportthat,becauseoftheirconfidenceinthedesignandconstructionofthenewshelters,theyfeelprotectedfromfuturedisastersandabletofocusonrebuildingotheraspects(economic,cultural,health)oftheirlives.FGDswithpeoplewhobenefitedfromtarp‐cladsheltersprovidedbyotheragencies,reportedthattheyfeeluncomfortableleavingtheirhousesforfearoflosingtheirpossessions.BecausetheCordaidsheltersaremadewithdurableand“theftresistant”material,residentsfeelcomparativelysaferandreportengaginginactivitiesthatwillenablethemtocontinuetorebuildtheirlives.Familieswhorented,sharedfamilyplots,orlivedillegallyonhazardousland(ravines,steepslopes,floodproneareas),althoughincludedintheMTPTCassessmentandpossiblytagged‘red’or‘yellow,’wereexcludedbyCordaidasownershipprovidedthelegalbasis.WewereabletoverifydirectlyinTisousandVillaRosathatmanywhowereexcludedfromtheinitialassessments,stillliveintentstoday.AnothergroupnotreachedbyCordaidwerethosewhohad“rien”nexttotheirname,indicatingthattheyhadnotreceivedanMTPTCtag.Staffreportthatithadinsufficientfundstoreachthisgroup,whichincluded:● Rentersorthoserentingaroomintheoccupier’shome.● Housesownedbyfamiliesthatwerenotpresentatthetimeoftheassessments.

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● HousesownedbyfamilieswhowereunwillingtoprovideinformationasaresultofassessmentfatigueorrumoursthatparticipationmightjeopardiseUSvisaapplications

● Plotsalreadyclearedbytheownerscouldnotbetagged.● Taggedwallsremovedbyownersinordertocleartheplotwereexcludedbecausethe

tagwasnotvisibleanymore.SomeownerssuccessfullyaskedMTPTCtobeincludedagain.

● Someofthered‐taggedhousesdidnotneedrepairs,butweretaggedassuchbecauseofneighbouringhazards.

● Coupleswhocouldnotbeaccommodatedbecausethesizeofthenewshelterdidnotprovideadequateprivacyforextendedfamiliesormultiplefamilyunits.

● Someyellowtaggedhousesrepairscostsbeyondthebudgetedamounts.● Fortheurbanprogrammeamajorconditionforselectionwasthepossibilitytobuildan

actualshelterorahouseontheplotownedbythefamily.Iftheplotwasonahazardouslocation,tooclosetoariverbedoriftheplotwastoosmallforashelter,Cordaidexcludedthehousehold.

DespitetheseproblemsCordaidcommunicatedthatitwouldcover100%ofthedamagedhousesinitsoperationalareas.Thiscausedproblemslater,asCordaidwasunabletodeliverfullyonthiscommitment,creatingtensionswiththecommunitiesandevensecurityincidentsinurbanareas.The“rien”categoryincludedresidentswhosehouseswerenottaggedbytheMTPTCorcaseswhereCordaidsurveyorscouldnotverifythetaggingdonebytheMTPTC.InsomecasesthewallonwhichtheMTPTCtagwasplaced,wasnotvisibletotheCordaidsurveyors.Accordingtocommitteemembers,thisgroupcontainedpeoplewhowouldotherwisehavebeeneligibletoreceivehelpfromCordaid.FGDreportsindicatedthatyoungcoupleswereoftenexcludedfromtheproject.Thedecisiononthesizeoftheshelterdidnottakeintoconsiderationmultifamilyhouseholds.YoungcouplesthatusedlivewiththeirparentspriortotheearthquakefoundthattheCordaidsheltersdidnotprovidethemwithadequateprivacy.Accordingtoonecommitteemember,Cordaid’ssurveyfocusedonhousesandnotpeopleandasaresultthesizeofshelterprovidedcouldnotaccommodatethenumberofresidentsthatthepre‐earthquakehousesheld.CordaidbuilthousesaccordingtoSpherestandards.However,thefactthatmanyextendedhouseholdswerenotabletocontinuelivingtogether,duetothesizeoftheT‐shelter,andmanyyoungadultsendeduphavingtoliveinnearbytentcamps,clearlyillustratestheshortcomingofstandardsdrivenapproach.Establishingsheltercommittees(insomecommunitiesknownas‘theCordaidCommittees’)ensuredaparticipatoryapproachbyarepresentativeandlegitimatecommunitybody.WiththeexceptionofNanCocteauwhosecommitteemembersweredrawnfromexistingcommunitybasedorganisations,thedifferentcommunitieselectedtheircommitteesatcommunityforumsorganisedbyCordaid.ByactingoncommitteerecommendationsCordaidensuredanappropriateshelterdesignintheruralareas.Whereparticipationwasmoreproblematic(e.g.inSainteMarieasaresultofftheinfluenceoftheFoyer),beneficiariesvaluedesignless.

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Thesignificanceofthecommunityforumsgoesbeyondtheselectionofthecommitteemembers.Throughtheforumsthedifferentcommunitiescreatedcommunityactionplans(CAP).WhilesomeoftheissuesidentifiedbytheCAPwerebeyondthescopeoftheCordaidproject,theynonethelessallowedthecommunitiestocometoacollectiveunderstandingofthemajorissuestheyfacedandplacedtheminabetterpositiontodevisesolutionstotheseproblemsinthefuture.TheCAPprocessalsoprovidedcommunitieswithatoolforcollectiveneedsassessmentandaconcreteplanwithwhichtheycannowlobbythestateorotherserviceproviders.Thestrategyisalreadybearingfruit,astheVillaRosacommitteerecentlybecameacommunityparticipationplatformintheHaitiangovernment’s16/6program19,anewjointgovernmentandUNhousingstrategyaimedatprovidingpermanentandintegratedhousingsolutionstothepopulationof16remainingtentcampsin6neighbourhoods.Withinthisframeworkthecommitteehavereceivedfurthertrainingandsupportinordertoparticipate.ThisrecognitionofaninformalCordaidfacilitatedcommunityforumasalegitimateformalcommunityconsultationplatformisanimportantandremarkableachievementandapositiveimpactongovernanceissuesinHaiti.MostFGDparticipantsreportthattheyparticipatedintheselectionofcommitteemembers,buteventhosewhodidnotaregenerallysatisfiedwiththeworkofthecommittee.However,inourmeetingswiththecommittees,membersexpressedanumberofconcernsaboutCordaid:● LackofdefinitionoftheirworkandrelationshipwithCordaid:

○ Whilecommitteememberswereawarethattheirpositionwouldnotberemunerated,theydecriedthefactthatsometimestheyfeltthattheirworkwastakenforgranted.

○ SomecommitteemembersclaimthatCordaiddidnottakeintoaccounttheexpensesassociatedwiththeirwork(e.g.theyhadtousetheirpersonalphonetotransmitmessagestobeneficiaries).

● ProblemsintheflowofinformationbetweenCordaid,Committeeandbeneficiaries.

○ Cordaidprovidedinformationlate.○ Committeememberswereharassedbybeneficiarieswhobecameimpatientbecause

ofdelaysinthedeliveryofconstructionmaterial.○ Somebeneficiariesweretoldtoclearthelandandtakedowntheiroldhousesand

hadtowaitalongtimeforconstructiontobegin.Wehaveseenacoupleoftimberframesstillwrappedwithtarpbecausecementandsandhadnotbeendelivered.

19“Theproposed16/6hasbeendesignedtorehabilitate16neighborhoodstorelocateresidentsofsixlargecampsinthemetropolitanarea.LaunchedinAugust2011,itwillcostsome78million[US]including30million[US]allocatedbytheFundfortheReconstructionofHaiti(HRF)whichmobilizes,coordinatesandallocatesincludingcontributionsfrombilateraldonorstofinancepriorityreconstructionprojectssuchasdefinedbytheHaitianGovernment”(MINUSTAH.org)

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● Wereceivedareportthatonecommitteememberbrokeredthesaleofashelter.Thisisinitselfanunfortunateincidentandinnowayasystemicproblem.However,itmayhavecontributedtoalackofconfidenceintheintegrityofothercommitteemembers,assomeofthemreportedbeingaccusedofdoingthesamethingespeciallyinsituationswherepeoplebelievethattheyarequalifiedbutdidnotreceiveshelters.

● CommitteesperceivethatCordaidunderutilisedlocalhumanresources.Severalcommittees

suggestedthat,ratherthanbringingdrivers,engineersandcommunityworkersfromPort‐au‐PrincetoLéogâne,communitymembersbelievethathiringworkersfromthelocalcommunitywouldhavegonealongwayintermsofdevelopingthecommunityandprovidingworkexperiencefortheyouth,unabletofindemployment.

● Somecommittee’smemberswereself‐appointed.

● SainteMarieCommitteehadnorealmandateastheFoyermadealldecisions.

● GiventhelatestartofCordaid’sworkinurbanareas,itisinterestingtonotethatthe

majorityofthebeneficiariesoftheurbanprogrammethinkthatthetimingoftheinterventionwasontimeandthatlessthan20%ofthebeneficiariesqualifiedtheinterventionas‘toolate’:

Theprogrammedidnotprioritiselocallyavailablehousingmaterials,butusedamoretechnicallyappropriateapproach.Environmentalandsupplyconsiderationsledthedecisiontoimportthetimberfortheframes.Otherbuildingmaterialswerepurchasedlocallynotnecessarilytobuildsocialcapital,butbecausetheyweretechnically,environmentallyandintermsoftimingthebestsolution.Usinglocallabourwasmaximisedandsurveysandinterviewsindicatedthatbeneficiaries,localtradesmenandyouthsallfeeltheyhaveacquirednewtechnicalskills,whichtheymaywellbeabletouseiftheartisanalconstructionmarketcontinuestogrow.

5.2.1 Gender Thissectionofthereportanswersthefollowingkeyquestion:

• Appropriatenessasperceivedbytargetgroup/endusers(makethisgenderspecific)

Weanalysedthefocusgroupdiscussionreportstoseeifwecoulddetectanydifferencesbetweenmenandwomeninthewaytheyreflectedontheresultsoftheprogramme.MenandwomenappreciatedtheCordaidshelterinsimilarwaysandweonlyfounddifferencesinemphasis.Womentendedtotalkaboutfamilysizeandthefactthatthehousesweretoosmallforthesizeoftheirfamilies.Womenalsoreportedthatbeforetheearthquakechildrenlivedinseparaterooms,whereasnowtheyallsleepintheoneroom.InterestinglyinTisouswomenreportedthattheyhavegoodrelationshipswiththeirneighbours,whilethemenreportedincreasedargumentsandtensionsbetweenneighbours.ThesetypesofdifferencesmerelyreflectthedifferentinterestsandrolesmenandwomenhaveinHaitiansocietyatlargeandperhapsthemoreharmoniousnatureofinterpersonalcommunicationbetweenwomen,comparedtothatofmen.InHaititheremaybegender

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inequalitiesinafinancial,familial,andinterpersonalsense,butwhenitcomestosocialandcommunityparticipationwomenareaswellrepresentedasmen.Thiswasalsobroughtoutbytheactiveandequalparticipationofwomeninthecommitteesbothasmembersandintermsofvoicingtheiropinionsandconcerns.Vulnerabilitycriteriaincludedpregnantwomenandfemale‐headedhouseholds,illustratingthatbothCordaidandthecommitteestookgenderintoaccountinprogrammedesign.ThisisparticularlysignificantintheculturalcontextofHaitiwhereonemanmayhavemorethanonefamilyandcannotorisunwillingtosupportthemallequally.Committeesprovidedwomenwithaplatformtovoicetheirneeds.FGDreportsshowthatwomencommitteemembersinparticularemphasisedtheneedsofvulnerablefamilies.Giventhedifferenceinlifeexpectancybetweenmenandwomen,thefocusontheelderlyasvulnerabilitycriteriaalsocoversmorewomen,asmanyarewidowedandwithoutthefinancialsupportofapartner.Wealsobelievethatanintegratedneighbourhoodwouldhaveprovidedanopportunitytocreatemorewomenfriendlypublicspaces,mitigatingagainsttherelativelyhighlevelsofsocialviolenceinthedenselybuiltbidonvillesofPort‐au‐Prince.Humanitarianprojectsneedtotakeanygenderspecificdifferencesinneedsintoaccountandaddressthemwherepossible,butagainwehavefoundnoindicationsthattheneedsofmenandwomenweresignificantlydifferent:bothneededshelter.Maybewomenevenmoresothanmenandthechoicetodoshelterinitselfmayhavecontributedmoretotheneedsofwomen.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Dilemmas TheCordaidHaititeamssuccessfullymanagedcomplexdynamicsanddifficultdilemmasassociatedwiththetaskofdeliveringurgentshelterservices,whilstatthesamebeingaskedtobuildsocialcapital.Theneedtoimplementasizeablegrant20withinalimitedperiodoftimerequiredarigorousup‐scalingofimplementationcapacities,asthesewerenotavailablewithexistingpartners.Socialcapitalobjectiveshavebeenlargelyrealised,andwellintegratedintheshelterstrategy.Committeesareactive,seenaslegitimatecommunityrepresentativebodiesbybothbeneficiariesandauthorities.Theyarealsobeginningtoworktogetheronotherissues,asCordaidbroughtthemtogetherinaworkshopinvitingthemtofindsolutionstoremainingcommunityneeds.Anyconcernsthatsocialcapitaldevelopmentmayhaveaffectedtimelydeliveryhaveprovenunjustified.Notonesourcemadethisconnection.Cordaiddidnotaddressunderlyingissuesofpovertyandinequitywithitsemergencyshelterprogramme,norwasthistheobjective.Itwouldrequirethetypeofpoliticalactionandadvocacy,whichwouldnotnecessarilyfurthertheobjectiveofsupplyingthepopulationwithurgentlyneededsheltersolutions.Norwoulditcomplywithhumanitarianprinciplessuchasneutralityandimpartiality.20TotalSHOfundsgranttoCordaidwas€29million

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Thereishoweverahumanitarianobligationtoavoiddoingfurtherharmortoavoidexacerbatingsocialinequities.IfCordaidwouldnothavebeenunderpressuretomeettheveryurgentshelterneedsofaverylargegroupofpeopleandtospendalargesumofmoneyrelativelyquickly,itmayhavebeeninapositiontochoseamorerightsbasedapproach,lessbasedonservicedelivery:identifyandworkwiththemostvulnerable:tenants,landless,andotherwiseillegallysettledgroupswithfewemploymentopportunitiesandextremelysusceptibletohealthhazards,suchacholerainfection.Thiswouldhavemeantworkingoutsidethegovernment’spoliciesandMTPCTassessments.6.2 Effectiveness AnoverviewoftheadjustedobjectivesandrealisedsheltersolutionsasimplementedbyCordaiduntil12June201221indicatesthatCordaidbuilt3,935sheltersandhousesandrepaired/retrofitted876houses,representing81%and40%respectively.Pipelineanalysisshowsthattheadjustedtargetsof4,856shelters/housesand1,177repairswillmostlikelybemetbytheendoftheBuildChangecontract.

Rural Urban Total

objective realised objective22 realised Objective realised

Shelter 2,720 2,403 856 848 3,576 3,251

600 60023 600 600

Houses(ODHred) 680 84 680 84

subtotal 3,320 3,003 856 848 4,856 3,935

Repairs 204 204 403 146 607 350

Houses(ODHyellow) 570 123 570 123

subtotal 204 204 973 269 1,177 473

NotonlywillCordaidachieveitstemporaryshelteroutputtargets,italsodeliveredveryhighqualityoutputsasoursurveyandFGDresultsshow.Thefivebeneficiaryappreciationindicatorsusedforthisevaluationshow80%to90%satisfactionscoresforbothproductandprocess,indicatingthequalityofCordaid’sshelteroutputs.Theearthquake‐affectedpopulationofHaitirequiredshelter,oneofthepriorityneedsforsurvival.ItwasalsoclearwhatthosewhodonatedtotheSHOfundraisingcampaignexpectedCordaidtodeliver:houses.CordaidcannowrightlyandproudlyclaimtobetheNetherlands’leadingshelterproviderinthirdworldnaturaldisasters.

21CordaidMonthlyReportMay201222Maymonthlyreport23implementedbyCARE

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Theprioritisationofshelterinevitablycausedotherobjectivestoplaysecondfiddle.CommunityfeedbackduringFGDs,thesurvey,andcommitteemeetingsallconfirmthatwaterandsanitationobjectivesinparticularremainlargelyunaddressedbyCordaidevenifotheractorsincidentallycametotherescue.Theintegratedneighbourhoodapproachstartedlateandonlyaspilotprojects,meaningthatdrainageandsanitationproblemsforlargenumbersofpeopleremainanimportantissueattheendoftheproject.Cordaidalsometitssocialcapitalbuildingobjectives.Beneficiariesandauthoritiesreviewedtheroleofthecommitteesaspositive.Theirrolehasbeenparticularlycriticalinsituationswherestateinstitutionswereinactiveandillequipped.GrassrootssocialinfrastructurewassuccessfullydevelopedaroundtheshelterinterventionsandlaidsolidfoundationsforCordaid’sotherbusinessunits,UrbanMatters,ResilientLivelihoodsandConflictTransformationforrollouttheirlonger‐termdevelopmentstrategies.ItisunfortunatethatCordaid’spre‐existingdevelopmentpartnerscouldonlyplayaminorroleintheshelterprogramme.Ontheotherhand,Cordaidisnowbetterpositionedtostrategicallyaddresssocial,economicandpoliticalproblemsdirectlywithgrassrootssocialorganisationsinthehighlyurbanisedsocietyofHaiti.Feedbackfromkeyactors,includingIOM,UNHABITAT,andkeylocalauthoritiesconfirmthecommunityfeedback.ItisnowoneofthemosteffectiveshelterprovidersinHaiti.Itssub‐contractingandoutputdrivenmodelhasgreatlycontributedtomeetinghousingneedsinpostearthquakePort‐au‐PrinceandLéogâne.Despitetheeffectivenessoftheshelterprogramme,thereisalackofchecksandbalancesintheproject.Thiswasmanagedbyhavingtherightstaffintherightplace,formostofthetime.DuetoalackoftechnicalshelterknowledgeinTheHague,verificationofprogrammecontenttoensurecompliancewithqualitystandardswasinsufficient.ItwaslefttothediscretionoftheCordaidHaiti‐basedstaff,tojudgetheappropriatenessofsigningmultimillioneurocontractswithpartnersandsub‐contractors.Recommendation1:Cordaidrequiresmoretechnicalshelterexpertiseintheemergencydepartmenttoallowforpolicydevelopment,qualityassuranceandriskmanagementsupportforimplementationmanagersinthefield.

ThefeedbackfromtheHaitifielddebriefingconfirmedourobservationthatthebasisformonitoringatHoMandHQlevelswasinadequate,asdatawerenotcollectedandanalysedsystematicallyuntillateintheprogramme.Thesystempresently(frommid‐2011)usedforprogrammemonitoringwasdevelopedafterthefirstperiodofimplementationbyLéogânebasedstaff,supportedbyconsultants.EarlyattemptstointroduceFilemakerProfailed,asdidanotherattempttodevelopaprogrammeforassessments,incoordinationwiththesheltercluster.Theresultwasanumberofmismatchingdatabases24.ThismeantthatprogressreportscontainedmainlyanecdotalinformationandthatCordaidforalongtimelackeddataforprojectandapproachevolutionanddecision‐making,duetothelackofprioritygiventothisbyHQ,accordingtoseniorfieldstaff.


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Programmemanagersreportedthedatabasetobeextremelyusefulasitprovidesthemwithqualityinformationforfollow‐uponprogressandresults.Thedatabaseisaccessibleandupdatedbyallrelevantshelterstaff,howeverthelogisticsdepartmentdoesnotuseit,eventhoughthisisanavailableoption.Cross‐checkinganddirectinformationsharingbetweendepartmentsisnotpossible.Recommendation2:Cordaidneedstoinvestinastandardiseddatabaseforshelterprogrammesinemergencysettings,andprioritisetherolloutearlyinprogramming.

Oneotherfunctionconsistentlymentionedas‘weak’bystaffmembersbothinTheHagueandinHaiti,waslogistics.TeamshavelearnedthatespeciallyinchallengingenvironmentssuchasHaiti,CordaidrequiresanexperiencedlogisticsteamwithgoodlocalknowledgeandstatedthattheyfoundCordaidhumanresourcedepartmenttolacktheexperience,knowledgeandnetworksrequiredfortherecruitmentofpeoplewiththeseskillsandbackgrounds.CordaidhiredexternallogisticalsupportfirmIPAtoassistwiththepreparation,bidopeningandevaluationofatenderfor1850shelters25.

Recommendation3:Cordaidneedstorecognisetheimportanceofastronglogisticsfunctionandelaboratethespecificationsinitsemergencypolicyaswellasensuringthatthisfunctionissupportedbytherecruitmentofexperiencedfieldlogisticsstaff.6.3 Appropriateness Appropriateness

• Whohasbenefitedfromtheprogram.Identifyif/whichvulnerablegroupswerenotreached.• Werethetechnicaldesigndecisionsand–solutions(i.e.thechoiceforsemipermanentshelters),

appropriatefortheendusers?

• Appropriatenessatotherlevels• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)

urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?



Thetechnicaldesignoftentsasanemergencysheltersolutionprovedinappropriateandinefficient.Expensivetobringintothecountry,notsuitablefortheclimatologicalconditionsandimpossibletointegrateintotheT‐sheltersolutionsweregivenasthemainargumentstoavoidingtheuseoftentsinthefuture.


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Recommendation4:Cordaidshouldavoidtheuseoftentsasanemergencysheltersolution,unlesstheyarealreadyavailableinthedisasteraffectedlocationsandsuitprevailingclimateconditions.

Cordaid’sprogrammewaswellcoordinatedwithbothclusterandnationalpolicies.Beneficiaryeligibilityhadasoundlegalbasis:homeownership.Cordaidworkedwithinthegovernment’s(MTPTC)assessmentframeworks.Unfortunatelythisalsoinsertedsocialproblemsinherentingovernmentpolicies.BeneficiarieswereonlyeligibleforaCordaidshelteriftheyhadaccesstolandinCordaidoperationalareas.Tentcampscontinuetoexistintheseareas,indicatingthatmanypeopledidnotbenefitfromtheprogrammeandthataccesstolandwasalwaysthemostpertinentvulnerabilitycriteriaespeciallyinurbanareas.Cordaidespeciallystruggledwithanappropriateapproachinthemorecomplexpoliticalandphysicalurbansituation.ThefeedbackfromtheFGDsandindividualbeneficiariesshowsthattheyarelesssatisfiedaboutthesizeoftheshelter.UsingtheaveragefamilysizetodetermineaSpherestandardcompliantshelter,createdasheltertoosmallforlargerthanaveragefamilies.Recommendation5:CordaidshoulduseSpherestandardsasindicativeandnotasabsolutestandards.Indicatorsneedtobecontextualisedinconsultationwithbeneficiaries.Sheltersolutionsneedtobemodularsothatbeneficiariescanmoreeasilyadaptthemtotheirneeds(size).Thiswouldneedtoincludetheoptiontobuildtwostoreysindenseurbanareas,allowingextendedfamiliestostaytogetherortorentoutpartoftheirhouseaspartofalivelihoodsstrategy,whilstatthesametimeaddressingthehousingneedsoftenants.

OntheotherhandtheownerdrivenhousingapproachandintegratedneighbourhoodapproachpilotsinTisousandVillaRosaandCHFprojectinRavinePintadecontributedtomoreappropriatesheltersolutionsandprovidedimportantopportunitiestoconnectwithawidersetofneedsandpotentialforlivelihoodsdevelopment.However,duetothelatestartofthisapproach,ityieldedonlypartialresults.Recommendation6:Cordaidneedstoadoptanownerdrivenhousingandintegratedneighbourhoodapproachtoitsshelterprogrammingwhilstaddressingthebroaderneedsofthepopulation,inparticularWASHandlivelihoodsandshouldimplementthisconceptrightfromthebeginning.

Cordaid’simplementationfocusedonprovidingshelters.Otherneedswereidentified,butCordaid’sattemptstoaddressthesewereonlysuccessfulinthetwopilotprojectsintheurbanprogramme.Nevertheless,theintegratedapproachpilotedonaverylimitedscalegeneratedpromisingresultsinownerdrivenhousing,drinkingwaterandinfrastructure.Beneficiaryperspectivesofprogrammeoutputs(shelters)areverypositive.Thequalityandsustainabilityoftheshelters,theselfmanagedrepairsandhousereconstructionsresultingfromtheownerdrivenapproach,ishigherthanwhatnormallywouldbeconsideredT‐shelter,suggestingthatCordaidcanrightlyclaimtohaveprovidedpermanenthousingsolutions.

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6.4 Impact CommitteesbroughttogethermembersofthecommunityfromdifferentCBOswhopreviouslyhadhadlittleinteraction.Inthiswaytheyperformedanimportantbridgingfunctionbetweenthesegroups,strengtheningsocialcapitalandsocialinfrastructureforthefuturedevelopmentoftheirlocalcommunity.TheirinvolvementintheCordaidshelterprogrammeprovidedindividualcommitteememberswithskillsandunderstandingoftheircommunity,strengtheningtheirlegitimacyandmakethembetteradvocatesfortheircommunities.Focusgrouprespondentsreportedahighlevelofsatisfactionwiththeworkoftheircommittees.Eventhosewhodidnotparticipateintheselectionofthecommitteemembersstatedthatnoonecouldhaverepresentedthembetterthantheircurrentcommittee.Thecommunityactionplanningprocessprovidedthemwithanimportantexperience.Nevertheless,Cordaidcouldhavedonemoreintermsofcapacitybuildingthoughtrainingorfacilitatingmeetingsoftheeightareacommitteestodiscusscommonproblemsandsolutionsmoresystematically.Moreimpactmayhavecomefromanearlierandfullerimplementationofotherprojectcomponentsinparticularlivelihoodsandsocialprotection.Again,itneedstobepointedoutthatthesearenotnecessarilycomponentswhichcanbeimplementedinanemergencyphase,astheyrequirelonger‐termcommitmentsandspecificexpertise.Recommendation7:Cordaidbusinessunitswithresponsibilitiesinurbandevelopment,livelihoodsandconflicttransformationneedtoengageearlierandmoreproactivelyinordertoensurethatfutureemergencyprogrammeshaveevenmoreimpact.

6.5 EfficiencyTheaveragecost(includingalloverheads)foreachofthe6033sheltersolutionsisUSD447526,whichtakingintoaccountthesocialresults,seemsarelativelylowcostpersheltersolution.Unfortunately,thereisnobasisforcomparingdirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.Theargumentthatextendingthechainbypayingpartners’overheads,requiresadditionaltransactioncostscanbeeasilyoffsetbytheargumentthatCordaidalsooutsourcedandfundedtechnicalqualityassuranceandriskmanagement.CordaiddirectorsinTheHagueclearlyindicatedduringourinterviewsthatthereisnowaythattheincidentalnatureofemergencyfundingthroughchannelssuchasSHOcanbeusedasabasisfordevelopingtherequiredmanagementinfrastructureonapermanentbasis.

26basedonanoverallexpenditureof€27million.

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Annex 1: Key Informants

1. PaulBorsboom AdjunctSectorManager,Emergencies,CordaidTheHague

2. MichielMollen PolicyAdvisor,DRR,CordaidTheHague

3. EdithBoekraad SectorManager,DRRandEmergencies

4. MirandaVisch ProgrammeOfficerHaiti,CordaidTheHague

5. MartenTjaartRaadsveld FinancialExpertHaiti,CordaidTheHague

6. JeannetteHamersma ProgrammeofficerDRR,LatinAmerica,CordaidTheHague

7. AstridFrey ProgrammeOfficerConflictTransformation,CordaidTheHague

8. AnnaWachtmeister ProjectofficerUrbanMatters,CordaidTheHague

9. HenrivanEeghen ChiefOperationsOfficer,CordaidTheHague

10. IngeLeuverink PolicyOfficerEmergencyAid,CordaidTheHague

11. EricVanDerHorst ITadvisor,CordaidTheHague

12. WilldeWolf ReconnaissanceTeamLeader,Haiti(January2010–1March2010)

13. WimPiels HoMCordaidHaiti,

14. ReneGrotenhuis ChiefExecutiveOfficer,CordaidTheHague

15. PietSpaarman HeadofMission,Haiti

16. HenkMeijerink ShelterManager,Haiti

17. KoenWagenbuur ShelterManager,Haiti

18. JipNelissen AssistantShelterManager,Haiti

19. JamesMorgan RuralShelterProgrammeManager,Haiti

20. AgatheNougaret UrbanPlanner,Haiti

21. VeraKreuwels UrbanPlanner,Haiti

22. OcéanLuckson AreaManager,Haiti

23. PierreLenzDominique AreaManager,Haiti

24. RobertPhoa HeadofFinance,Haiti

25. JamesMorgan RuralProjectManager,Haiti

26. GubertSaintFleury AreaManager,Haiti

27. GilbertFortil AreaManager,Haiti

28. McKenley AreaManager,Haiti

29. KeesdeGier GeneralDirectorMaxima,Haiti

30. NiekdeGoeij HeadofProgramsCRS,Haiti

31. MaximeMichel CHF,Haiti

32. JeanSeoril CHF,Haiti

33. RobPadberg, BND,GeneralDirector,Haiti

34. GordonGoodell TeamLeaderBuildChange,Haiti

35. MadameMichel HeadofHumanResources,CordaidHaiti

36. FlaucinCivile CASEC,Lompre,Léogânearea

37. KarineFournier CanadianRedCross,Léogâne

38. JeanDantonLeger Depute,Leogane

39. JeanCristelDecine ExecutiveSecretary,Léogânemunicipality

40. SarcossinToure ConstructionManager,CAREHaiti

41. CarolinaCordero‐Scales ProgrammeDirector,CAREHaiti

42. Jean‐ChristopheAdrian CountryProgrammeManagerUNHABITAT

43. AdelineCarrier UrbanReconstructionAdvisor,UNHABITAT

44. MaggieStephenson SeniorTechnicalAdvisor,UNHABITAT

45. YvonJerome MayorofCarrefour,Haiti

46. RaoulPierreLouis KazecVillaRosa,Haiti

47. NancyDoran ProjectManagerArchitectureforHumanity,Haiti

48. BenoitBerge HeadofMissionArchitectesded’Urgence,Haiti

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference EvaluationoftheCordaidHaitiShelterProgram2010‐2012

1.Responsibilitiesandlinesofcommunication

TheevaluationwasinitiatedbyPaulBorsboom,HeadEmergencyAssistance

TheevaluationprocessismanagedbyPietSpaarman,HeadofMissioninHaiti.HewillcoordinatetheevaluationactivitiestogetherwiththeShelterProgramseniormanagement.

Theevaluationwillbeimplementedbyateamofatleast2externalevaluators.Utmosteffortwillbe

undertakentoenlisttheservicesofaHaitianconsultanttobepartoftheteam.TheteamwillhaveateamleaderreportingtoPietSpaarman.

TheevaluationwillbeguidedbyareferencegroupconsistingofMirandaVisch,deskofficerEmergencyAssistance,IngeLeuverink,PolicyOfficer,andaMonitoringandEvaluationExpertfromtheSHOQuality

WorkingGroup.Thereferencegroupadvisesthecoordinatingteam.ThereferencegroupwillcommentonthedraftTermsofReferencefortheevaluationandonthedraftfinalreport.Thereferencegroupwillconveneal

leasttwotimesduringthecourseoftheevaluation.

Theresultswillbesharedwith:

• TheCordaidHaitiofficeanditsshelterprogramstaff

• CordaidHQ:theHaitiDisasterRiskReduction/EmergencyAiddepartment,bothatdeskandmanagementlevel,theworkinggrouponshelter,relateddepartments/businessunitssuchasConflictTransformation,UrbanMatters,EntrepreneurshipandHealth.

• SHObackofficeandqualityworkinggroup

• theNetherlandsMinistryofForeignAffairs,anditsHumanitarianAidDivision(DMH/HH)inparticular

• CordaidHaitishelterpartnersandlocalcoordinatingmechanisms

• Beneficiaries

2.Contextandhistory

Formorethan30yearsCordaidhasbeensupportingover30churchandnon‐churchorganizationsinHaitiinthedomainsoffoodsecurity(HaitiNorth,PlateauCentralandtheSouth‐East),disasterriskreduction,health

&protection(especiallythemesrelatedtogenderbasedviolenceandHIV/AIDS),upgradingofslumareasandcivilsocietycapacitybuilding.DuringthelastfewyearsthissupporthadasizeofsomeEUR2.5mperyear(see

annex1,listofpartnerrelations2011).

FollowingtheJanuary12earthquakesomeofCordaid’spartnersbecameengagedinemergencyactivities,

mainlyfooddistributionsthroughtheBNDschoolfeedingprogramandthenetworksofotherlocalpartners.CaritasJacmel(food,hygienekits,clothing,medicine),SOEandURAMEL(primaryhealthcareservices).

Manypartnerssustainheavydamageduetotheearthquakeandareunpreparedandnotequippedtoembark

onlargescaleemergencyresponseactivitiesinthesenseofexpertise,designlogic,monitoringandadherencetosophisticatedstandardsofaccountability.Cordaidthereforeoptstobecomeoperationalandstartsan

emergencyofficeinHaitiinMarch2010.Atthesametime,Cordaiddeploysastaffmembertoassistpartnersindamageassessment(includingtheirown)andtoundertakequickresponseinterventionsinthefirstweeks.

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Cordaid’soperationalpresenceinHaiti

Cordaid,nowoperationalinHaiti,proceedstodesignandimplementagoodnumberofinterventionsinthe

directaftermathoftheearthquake.Amongthefirstresponseinterventionsinthefirstmonthsafterthetragedy,theprovisionoftemporaryshelter(nexttofood,water,medicalcare,partnersupport)constitutesa

significantpartoftheactivities.

Frommid2010onwards,theoverallCordaidHaitiProgram(excludingtheso‐calledMFS‐funds)amountstoEUR37,665,000andisallocatedtofivesectors(Shelter,Health,Livelihood,DisasterRiskReductionand

DisasterPreparedness,andEmergencyAidandProgramSupport).

TheShelterprogramconsistsofconstruction,repairs,neighbourhoodimprovement,andwater&sanitation,ithasabudgetofEUR21.852.689andexpectstoraiseanotherEUR5.292.311.

Twooperationalshelterprogrammesarelaunched:

• theRuralShelterprogramintheareaaroundLeogane.ActivefromMarch2010theprojecttargetedinitiallytheruralcommunitiesofLompré(1stand2ndsection)inLeoganeandthe7thsectionofGrandGoâvecommune.AtalaterstageGrandGoâvecitywasaddedwhenitwasascertainedthatthisareawasnotcoveredbyanyagency,whilethedamagewasveryhigh.

• fromNovember2011onwardtheUrbanShelterprograminCarrefourandTurgeau,twosectionsofPort‐au‐Princecontaininghardhitslumareas:TisousandCocteauandStMarie&VillaRosarespectively.

Thechoiceismadeforhighqualityshelterconstruction,optingforferro‐cementwallsandconcretefloorsthat

givetheTsheltersanexpectedlifespanof15years.Forrepairs,theoptionchosenwastoretrofitdamagedhousesinordertobuildbackbetter.Thefinishedhousescomplywithtechnicalstandardsandbeneficiaries

haveexpressedtheirsatisfactionduringregularmonitoringvisits.

InAugust2011theIntegratedNeighborhoodApproachandOwnerDrivenHousingareadoptedintheurban

setting.Inshort,thisentailsneighborhooddwellersorganizationstakeaholisticviewoftheirenvironmentandinterventionsbeingbasedontheirprioritiesinaninterlinkedway.Theseinterventionsinclude,butare

notlimitedtocommunity‐basedmapping,rubbleremoval,WASH,DRRandinfrastructureprojects.OwnerDrivenHousingsupposesthatfuturehouseoccupantstakechargeofconstructionorrepair,receivingtechnicalassistanceandsubsidiestocomplementtheirownfunds,onthebasisofverificationoftechnicalquality.

3.Purposeandintendeduse

ThemainobjectiveoftheEvaluationistoprovideinsightintheeffectiveness,efficiencyandappropriatenessoftheshelterprogramin2010and2011andtolearnfromtheprocessthroughwhichtheresultsareachieved.

Furthermore,theevaluationaservesanaccountabilitypurposebyreportinghowthefundsprovidedbytheMinistryandthegeneralpublicintheNetherlandshavebeenputtouseandtowhateffect.

Theevaluationwillservetwopurposes:

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1. ToprovidelessonslearnedforCordaidtoimprovetheeffectivenessoftheprocessesandappropriatenessandrelevanceoftheshelterrelatedinterventionsatbothfieldlevelandheadquartersinTheHague,TheNetherlands.

2. Toaccountfortheresultsachievedwiththeprogram,totheMinistryofForeignAffairs,mostnotablyonthreeaspects:

a. Appropriatenessoftheintervention

b. Efficiency

c. EffectivenessandTimelinessoftheintervention

Use

Inordertoensurewidedisseminationthefinalevaluationreportanditssummary(policybrief)willbe

publishedinEnglishandFrench.DisseminationwilltakeplacethroughprintedreportsaswellaselectronicallybypostingthereportonthewebsitesofCordaidHaitiandCordaidTheHague,theSHOandALNAP.

ItisenvisagedtoorganiseaworkshopinHaititovalidatetheprovisionalresultsandaworkshopinthe

NetherlandstodiscusstheevaluationreportwithCordaidseniorstaffandSHO,staffoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsandotherinterestedparties.

Theevaluationwillprovideacomprehensiveoverviewoftheactivitieswhichhavebeenimplementedin2010

and2011andwillassesstheirresults.PartsoftheCordaidshelterprogramarecommissionedorsubcontractedtolocalandinternationalorganizationssuchasIDEJEN,CARE,BuildChange,Fondation

Architectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity.TheevaluationwillassesstheresultsobtainedbythesesubcontractorsandwilllookintotherationaleandqualityoftherelationshipwithCordaidHaiti.

4.Scope

Theevaluationwillcreateanoverview(mappingexercise)oftheexpenditures,allocationsandpolicyand

implementationchoicesbeingmadein2010and2011.Afirstsuccinctoverviewisfoundintheintroductoryremarksabove,under“contextandhistory”.

Projects:theevaluationwillincludeSHOfundedCordaidT‐shelterinterventionsinHaiti,projectnrs:102233

(EmergencyShelter2010),102705(RuralShelter),104606(UrbanShelter).

Theevaluationwillalsocover(attempted)activitiesrelatedtodirectconstructionandrepairs,suchascommunitydevelopment,WASH,DRR,Urbanandregionalplanningandlivelihood.

Timewise:Allactivitiesrelatedtotheabovementionedprojectin2010and2011,wherebytheendofDecember2011willbetakenasacut‐offpoint.ThisisalsotheperiodcoveredbySHO’s2010and2011report

whichisexpectedinApril2012.

Geographical:TheevaluationwillinprinciplecoverallSHOfundedactivitiesinallareasandneighbourhoodsthatformpartoftheshelterprogramgeographiccoverage.Inscopingtheevaluation,therelativeimportance

oftheseareaswillbetakenintoaccount.Forinstance,intermsofactualconstructiontheruralprogramformsthebulkoftheexpenditure.Therelativeweightofvariousinterventionmodeswillbeexpressedinthe

selectionofareastobereviewedinmoredetail.

5.Keyquestions

(note,“Cordaid”istakentomeantheCordaidHaitiofficeanditsaffiliates/subcontractors)

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Appropriatenessasperceivedbytargetgroup/endusers(makethisgenderspecific):

• Whohasbenefitedfromtheprogram.Identifyif/whichvulnerablegroupswerenotreached.

• Howwerebeneficiariesselectedandwhatareeventualsideeffectsfrombeneficiaryselectionfor

communities.

• Werethetechnicaldesigndecisionsand–solutions(i.e.thechoiceforsemipermanentshelters),appropriatefortheendusers?

• Whatarebeneficiaries/communitiesperspectivesaboutneedsidentifiedoutsidethescopeofrepairsandconstruction(f.e.WASH,DRR,Livelihoodinterventions)

• HowsuccessfulwereCordaid’seffortstoengenderit’sapproachandinteractwiththe

beneficiaries?

Appropriatenessatotherlevels

• Wastheinterventionappropriatewithregardtothespecificcharacteristicsofthedisaster:(semi)urbansetting,scale,weakgovernance,damagetoinstitutionalstructures(governmentaswellasNGOs)?



Efficiency

• Wereactivitiescost‐efficientintermsoffinancialandhumanresources–takingintoconsiderationthecontextinwhichtheinterventionhadtobeimplemented,e.g.coststobeincurredtoreachthebeneficiaries,andapplicationofbenchmarksforthecostingofsupportitems?TakenotethatinsomecasesCordaidoptedforoutsourcing,extendingthechainofpartners(internationalaswellaslocal),contractors,subcontractorsandimplementers.Compareefficiencyofmoredirectimplementationwithoutsourcing.

• Didthemajorpolicyandimplementationchoicescorrespondtothechangingneedsofthetargetpopulation?

• Analyzethequality,efficiencyandtransparencyofthedecisionmakingprocessforthemainchoicesandmajorshifts.Decisionsmadebywhomandonwhichgrounds?SpecifyrolesandresponsibilitiesdefactoheldbyHQandFieldlevelsandcomparetodejuredesignoftheprocess.

Ofspecificinterest:

Humanresources

Thedecisiontobecomeoperationalandengageinafairlymassiveoperation(>100staff)is,asfaras

Cordaidisconcerned,exceptional.EvaluateidentificationofHRneeds(capabilitiesneededfortheprogramme)andHRdeploymentandhowdecisionsinHRaffectedtheprogrammeprocess.Onwhat

basisandbywhomwasthedecisionreachedtohirethislargenrofstaff?Werealternativesconsidered?Bywhichlevelsintheorganisation?Thedeploymentofanumberofyoung“barefoot”

expatriatearchitectsinmanagementpositionsisalsofairlyunique.Evaluateexpatandconsultancyinputsfortheprojectsandif/howthesecouldhavebeenmoreeffectiveovertimeconsideringHR

context(nationalandinternational)

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SocialCapital

InitsshelterprogramCordaidHaitiaimstoapplyasupportdriven,people‐centeredreconstruction

approach.Throughcommunitybasedinterventions,involvingnationalpartnerorganizationandcommunitygroups,Cordaidaimstostrengthensocialcapital.Thestrategyalsofostersanincrease

overtimeintheresponsibilityoflocalcommunitiesandpartnerorganizations.Italsoaimstomaximizetheuseoflocalmaterials,locallaborandlocalskills/techniques.Theseobjectivesdonot

necessarilycontributetotimelinessandefficiencyoftheoperation.Howweretheseobjectivesdefinedandbywhom?Howdidstrategicchoicesdealwithpossibleconflictingobjectives.

Contractingout

Inlaterstages,moreemphasiswasplacedonpartneringwithotherinternationalNGOs(BuildChange,FondationArchitectsd’Urgence,ArchitectureforHumanity,Care,etc.).Whatareconsequencesin

termsofpolicycoherenceandcostefficiency.Howandbywhomwerethesepartnersidentified,whatwerecriteriaforselection?Wasthecontractingprocedurecfmstandinginstructions?

Effectiveness&Timeliness

• Makeaninventoryoftheassessmentprocessandmentionstrengthsandweaknesses.Lookatfollowingelements:‐TORforassessmentformulatedandagreed/sharedHO/Field?

‐assessmentmethodologiesused;didtheyincludeparticipativeassessmentmethodologies?

‐relevanceofandgaps(ifany)inassesmentdata(inhindsight)

‐describehowassessmentdatawereusedindecisionmakingprocess?Inwhichphaseinthe

program,bywhom?

• WasthereanadequatesystemformonitoringandevaluationinplaceinCordaidHaiti?

• Identifymajoreffects(negativeandpositive)atbeneficiaries,communitiesorotherstakeholders(localgovernment),fosteredbytheprogramme

• Werethereanyunintendedside‐effects(negativeorpositive)?

• DidCordaidanalyseexistingcapacitiesaffiliates/partnersandanalyserequiredcapacitiesorcompetences(HRneedsassesment)indifferentprojectphasestoachieveobjectives?HowdidCordaiduseexistingcapacitiesofaffiliates/partners?

Makethistimeandperiodspecific:periodMarch‐November2010,December‐August2011,September‐

December2011.

• AnalyzetheeffectivenessandtimelinessofCordaid’seffortstoaccessbackdonorfunding

• ComparetheresponsetimeofCordaid’sshelterinterventionswithsimilarshelterinterventionsofotherNGOsinHaiti.

LessonsLearned

• Onthebasisoftheevaluationoutcome,formulatethemostimportantrecommendationsfor

Cordaid’sshelterresponse.Distinguishbetweenappropriateness,efficiencyandeffectiveness&timeliness.

• WhatareasintheinterventionorPMcycleincludingthedecisionmakingprocesscouldbeapprovedinordertoincreaseeffectivenessoftheintervention.Coulddecisionmakingprocessesbedesigneddifferentlyforbetterresults?

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6.Methodology

Itistheresponsibilityoftheconsultant,incollaborationwiththeHeadofMissionandthereferencegroup,to

developamethodology,in‐linewithNLRCstandards.Itissuggestedatthemomenttoconsiderasaminimum:

1. Deskstudy

a. InventoryofSHOfundedshelterinterventionsimplementedin2010and2011

b. analysisofrelevantprogrammedocumentation:Monthlyreports,needsassessments,CommunityActionPlans,project/programmeplans,progressandcompletionreports,reviewsandevaluationswhichwillenableto(partially)answertheevaluationquestions.

ThisinformationwillbeobtainedfromCordaidHaiti,thecontractedpartnersfortheshelter

program,CordaidHQ.

c. analysisofreviewsandevaluationswhichhavebeencarriedout(theCordaidrealtimeevaluationandtheIOBevaluation,aswellasotherreviewsandevaluationsconductedorcommissionedbyotheragencies)inordertobeabletotriangulatethefindingsofthecurrentevaluationandputthemintocontext.

2. Interviews

WithCordaidHaitistaffandformerstaff,managers/coordinatorsandtechnicaladvisersofeachof

thesignificantshelterpartnerorganisationstodiscussissueswhichemanatefromtheanalysisofthedocumentationmentionedunder1aand1b.

Throughhistoricanalysis,trendsandassumptionswillbecomeclear.Theinformationgatheredthroughsecondarysourceswillbecomplementedandverifiedbyconductinginterviewsatthe

headquartersleveland,inviewofthefastturnoverofkeystaff,withformerstaffmembers.Consultantsandadviserswherepossible.Theseinterviewswillamongstotherthingsprovidea

perspectiveonthewaysinwhichtheinterventionshaveevolved,whatassumptionshavebeenusedandhowtheprocessofstrategicdecisionmakinginprogramdevelopmenthasbeenstructured.

3. Detailedinvestigationatfieldlevel

Basedontheinsightsobtainedinthefirststage,apurposivesampleofactivitieswillbeselectedfor

moredetailedinvestigationatfieldlevel.Theevaluationteamwillindicatewhichactivitieswillbeinvestigated,andhowtheyareselected,aswellaswhichmethod(s)forinvestigationwillbedeployed

andinformCordaidbeforehand.

Thedetailedinvestigationwillentaila3weekmissiontoHaitiaimedatprobingdeeperintotheresultsanddataontheground,lookingatthewaysinwhichtheactivitieshavebeenimplementedas

wellasbringinginawide‐rangeofstakeholderperspectivesontheground.

7.Profileoftheevaluationteam

Experience

- Demonstratedexperiencewithevaluatinglargescaleemergency/reconstruction/recoveryprojects,preferablyshelterprograms

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- Up‐to‐dateknowledgeofcurrent(participatory)evaluationtoolsandmethodsforevaluation

- Atleast5yearsexperienceinDisasterManagement

- KnowledgeofCaritasstructuresandpreferredwaysofworkingisanadvantage

- KnowledgeoftheHaitiancontextbeforeandduringtheemergencyinterventionperiod

Skills

- Efficientcommunication

- Stronganalyticalskills

- abilitytoprocessandanalysedifferenttypesofdata

- Excellentinterpersonalskillsandculturalsensitivity

- Abilitytoworkeffectivelyininterculturalsettings

- Excellentcomputerskills;theevaluatorshouldbeanadvancedword‐userandabletodeliverattractivevisualpresentations.

- FluencyinEnglishandFrenchlanguage,Creoleispreferred

- Abilitytowriteconcise,yetcomprehensiveandattractivereports

- Abilitytomeetdeadlines

AgenderbalancedteamwithatleastoneHaitiannationalispreferred.Theteamwillbeheadedbyateam

leader.

8.Planning

Activity Timing/completiondate

PreparationofToR 7February2012

ReviewbyShelterstaffandpolicy/contractingparties(BC,FAU,AFH,\)

29Febr2012

ReviewofdraftToRbyreferencegroup 29February2012

FinalisationofToR 15March2012

Engageconsultants 1April2012

Deskstudyphase(incl.interviewsintheNetherlands) 9April–13April2012

ProvisionofinformationtoCordaidHaitionthefield

workstage(activitiesselectedandfieldworkapproachandmethods)

BylastweekofApril2012

Fieldstudyphase Intheperiod7May–17May2012(NB.fieldworkmightbeperturbedbyterritorialelectionsinMay)

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Analysisandpreparationofreport 18May‐23May2012

Draftreportforreviewbyreferencegroup 26May2012

Finalreport 1June2012

9.Deliverables

TheevaluatorwillwriteareportintheEnglishlanguageandoneintheFrenchlanguageontheconducted

evaluation.Theevaluationreportshallcontainnomorethan25pages(excludingannexesbutincludinganExecutivesummary(‘PolicyBrief’)ofmaximum5pages).ThereportmustcomplywithOECDDACEvaluation

QualityStandards.Thereportmustbesubmittedbefore26May2012.

Thereportshallcontainageneralsummaryandsectionscoveringmethodology,analysisandfindings.RecommendationswillneedtobeconcreteandapplicablewithintheCordaidresourcesandmandateand

haveclearresponsibilitiesattached.

ItisenvisagedtoorganiseaworkshopinHaititovalidatetheprovisionalresultsandaworkshopintheNetherlandstodiscusstheevaluationreportwithCordaidseniorstaffandSHO,staffoftheMinistryofForeign

Affairsandotherinterestedparties.

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Annex 3: Role of Group 5 byHenkMeijerinkCordaidemergencydepartmentcontractedGroup5(partofframeworkagreement/shelteradvisoryservices–HenkMeijerink).Group5reportedtoAdjunctsectormanageremergencies(AlbertdeHaan).Themanagerdiscussed(alternative)proposalsfromshelteradvisorwiththeTaskforceasbasisforstrategicdecision‐making.Assuchtheexternalshelteradvisorprovidesthe“on‐call”technicalshelterexpertisetoHQ(emergencydept/taskforce)uptillJune2010(seebelow).InearlyFebruary2010Cordaiddecidedtoprovidehousingassistance(emergency,transitionalshelter).CordaidrequestedG5toprepareaproposaltoimplementthefirstyearprogramme(t‐shelters).G5contactedpotentialcandidates(youngarchitects,engineers,logisticians).AweeklaterCordaidcamebackonthisrequestandhaddecided(taskforce?)toimplementtheprogrammethemselves,sinceitwastheintentiontoestablisha3to5yearoperationalfieldoffice.TheCVsoftheyoungprofessionalsweregiventoCordaid.Cordaidrecruitedmostofthem(plussomeadditionalstaff).Cordaidstartedtheadvertisement/recruitmentprocessforasheltermanager.Sinceprocedureswereexpectedtotakeapprox..3months,CordaidrequestedG5tosecondconsultantstoCordaidHaitiinthemeantime.TheseconsultantsreportedtotheHoM–PaulBorsboom(norelationshipwithG5,apartfromadmin).TheG5shelteradvisorreportedtotheHQ(AlbertdeHaanandWimPielsbeingtemporaryPV)andassistedinthestartupi.e.procurement(togetherwithIPA).InApril2010Cordaidcontractedasheltermanager(StephenAdams).ThesecondedG5consultantsremainedinvolvedasasst.sheltermanagerLeoganeandtoassistincommencementurbanprogramme.ThesheltermanagerbecameinfacttheRuralsheltermanager(tofurtherthet‐shelterconstructionprogramme).StephenAdamsleftafter3months(oneofthemainissueswastheworkingrelationwiththeHoM‐WimPiels,whotookoverthesheltermanagerposition,anddisagreementoverthechangeinstrategyregardingpermanentwallingversustarpaulins).Thelastmissionoftheshelteradvisor(HenkM.)ended15thJune2012(withtendersfor1850evaluatedandcontractsreadytosign)withareport(missionnotes)toHQ.InOctober2012theadvisorwasrequestedtoreturntoHaiti,withthemaintasktoadvicethenewHoM(RonLangford)re‐starttheconstructionoft‐shelterprogramme.AfteroneweekitbecameevidentthattheHoMdidnotneedanadvisorbutanimplementeri.e.ShelterManager.HQagreedandtheshelteradvisorbecame(temporary)ShelterProgrammeManagerfromthenon.CordaidsucceededtorecruitanUrbanShelterManagerinDecember2010andlong‐termShelterProgrammeManagerinJanuary2011(plusaprojectmanager).Unfortunatelythelong‐termShelterProgrammeManagerresignedafter3monthsandG5(HenkM)wasrequestedtotakeoverthatpositionagain.Sincetheconsultantcouldnotbeavailablefulltime(3to4weeksmax.)theHoMtookoverthepositionduringhisabsence.FromOct.2011thiswastakenoverbyanotherconsultant(KoenWagenbuur).FromJanuary2011theShelterProgrammeManagementwasoutsourcedtoG5(HenkM,KoenW,andJipNelissen).From16thApril2012thisincludedalsotheruralsheltermanager(JamesMorgan).

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