FINAL REPORT ON THE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT OF...

ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

FINAL REPORT ON THE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT

OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SYSTEM

OF SUDAN

(21 to 30 November 2006)

International Civil Aviation Organization

Final Safety Oversight Audit Report ― Sudan August 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background......................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 ICAO audit team composition ........................................................................................... 1 1.3 Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. 2

2. OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE AUDIT MISSION .............................................. 2 3. AUDIT RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 3

3.1 Critical element 1 — Primary aviation legislation.............................................................. 3 3.2 Critical element 2 — Specific operating regulations .......................................................... 5 3.3 Critical element 3 — State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions ............... 6 3.4 Critical element 4 — Technical personnel qualification and training ................................ 8 3.5 Critical element 5 — Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety critical

information.......................................................................................................................... 9 3.6 Critical element 6 — Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations11 3.7 Critical element 7 — Surveillance obligations ................................................................. 12 3.8 Critical element 8 — Resolution of safety concerns......................................................... 13

4. VISITS TO THE INDUSTRY/SERVICE PROVIDERS ......................................................... 15 5. AUDIT FINDINGS AND DIFFERENCES DATABASE (AFDD) .......................................... 15 6. STATE AVIATION ACTIVITY QUESTIONNAIRE (SAAQ)............................................... 15 7. COMPLIANCE CHECKLISTS (CCs) ...................................................................................... 15 8. FOLLOW-UP ACTION .............................................................................................................. 16 APPENDICES 1 — Audit findings and recommendations

1-1 Findings and recommendations related to primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations

1-2 Findings and recommendations related to civil aviation organization 1-3 Findings and recommendations related to personnel licensing and training 1-4 Findings and recommendations related to aircraft operations certification and

supervision 1-5 Findings and recommendations related to airworthiness of aircraft 1-6 Findings and recommendations related to aircraft accident and incident investigation 1-7 Findings and recommendations related to air navigation services 1-8 Findings and recommendations related to aerodromes

2 — Graphic representation of the lack of effective implementation of the critical elements 3 — Corrective action plan proposed by Sudan

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Final Safety Oversight Audit Report — Sudan August 2007

ICAO UNIVERSAL SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT PROGRAMME

Final Report on the Safety Oversight Audit of the Civil Aviation System of Sudan

(21 to 30 November 2006)

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background 1.1.1 The 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly (Assembly Resolution A32-11 refers) resolved the establishment of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), comprising regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized safety audits of all Contracting States. The mandate for regular audits foresaw the continuation of the Programme, and the term “safety audits” suggested that all safety-related areas should be audited. The expansion of the Programme “at the appropriate time”, as recommended by the 1997 Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for Safety Oversight, had thus been accepted as an integral part of the future of the Programme. 1.1.2 The 35th Session of the ICAO Assembly considered a proposal of the Council for the continuation and expansion of the USOAP as of 2005 and resolved that the Programme be expanded to cover all safety-related Annexes (Assembly Resolution A35-6 refers). The Assembly also requested the Secretary General to adopt a comprehensive systems approach for the conduct of safety oversight audits. 1.1.3 Assembly Resolution A35-6 further directed the Secretary General to ensure that the comprehensive systems approach maintain as core elements the safety provisions contained in Annex 1 ― Personnel Licensing, Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft, Annex 11 ― Air Traffic Services, Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Annex 14 ― Aerodromes; to make all aspects of the auditing process visible to Contracting States; to make the final safety oversight audit reports available to all Contracting States; and also to provide access to all relevant information derived from the Audit Findings and Differences Database (AFDD) through the secure website of ICAO. 1.1.4 In accordance with Assembly Resolution A35-6, safety oversight audit reports have been restructured to reflect the critical elements of a safety oversight system, as presented in ICAO Doc 9734 ― Safety Oversight Manual, Part A — The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System. ICAO Contracting States, in their effort to establish and implement an effective safety oversight system, need to consider these critical elements. 1.2 ICAO audit team composition 1.2.1 The safety oversight audit team was composed of: Mr. César Castillo, team leader, personnel licensing (PEL), aircraft operations (OPS) and aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); Mr. Ignacio Flores, team member, primary aviation legislation (LEG), civil aviation organization (ORG) and aerodromes (AGA); Mr. Milen Dentchev, team member, on-the-job training (OJT)/AGA; Mr. Samuel Mandeng, team member, airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); and Mr. Englebert Zoa Etundi, team member, air navigation services (ANS).

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1.3 Acknowledgements 1.3.1 ICAO expresses its sincere appreciation for the assistance provided to the audit team during the preparation and conduct of the audit. The professionalism and enthusiasm of all personnel who interacted with the audit team greatly contributed to the success of the audit mission. 2. OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE AUDIT MISSION 2.1 The comprehensive systems approach for the conduct of safety oversight audits consists of three phases. In the first phase, the level of implementation of Annex provisions is assessed and differences from ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) are identified for each Contracting State through a review of a duly completed State Aviation Activity Questionnaire (SAAQ) and Compliance Checklists (CCs) for all safety-related Annexes, as well as through a review of documents developed by the State to assist it in implementing SARPs and in maintaining an effective safety oversight system. In the second phase, the State being audited is visited by an ICAO audit team to validate the information provided by the State and to conduct an on-site audit of the State’s overall capability for safety oversight. The third phase of the audit process consists of the activities following the completion of the on-site audit. 2.2 The safety oversight audit of Sudan was carried out from 21 to 30 November 2006 in accordance with the standard auditing procedures provided for in ICAO Doc 9735 — Safety Oversight Audit Manual and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed to on 16 May 2005 between Sudan and ICAO. The audit was carried out with the objective of fulfilling the mandate given by the Assembly which requires ICAO to conduct a safety oversight audit of all Contracting States (Assembly Resolutions A32-11 and A35-6 refer), reviewing a State’s compliance with ICAO SARPs set out in all safety-related Annexes and their associated guidance material, as well as with related Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS). Furthermore, the objective was also to offer advice, as applicable, to Sudan in implementing these provisions. 2.3 The audit team reviewed the SAAQ and the CCs submitted by Sudan prior to the on-site audit in order to have a preliminary understanding of the civil aviation system established in the State, to determine its various functions as well as to assess the status of implementation of relevant Annex provisions. Information provided and assessed prior to the conduct of the audit was validated during the on-site audit phase. In this regard, particular attention was given to the presence of an adequate organization, processes, procedures and programmes established and maintained by Sudan to assist it in fulfilling its safety oversight obligations. 2.4 The audit results, including the findings and recommendations contained in this report, reflect the capabilities and limitations of the civil aviation system of Sudan as assessed by the audit team. They are thus based on evidence gathered during interviews conducted by the audit team with Sudan’s technical experts and background information provided by such personnel, review and analysis of civil aviation legislation, specific regulations, related documentation and file records. Considering the time that was available to conduct the audit and the fact that the safety oversight audit team members could only review and analyse information and documentation made available by the State, it is possible that some safety concerns may not have been identified during the audit. The findings and recommendations related to each audit area are found in Appendix 1 to this report. 3. AUDIT RESULTS 3.1 Critical element 1 — Primary aviation legislation

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“The provision of a comprehensive and effective aviation law consistent with the environment and complexity of the State’s aviation activity, and compliant with the requirements contained in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.”

3.1.1 The Sudanese Government has developed and promulgated a legal framework to establish rules of operation and division of responsibility within the Sudanese civil aviation system. The legal framework consists of the Civil Aviation Act, 1999, the Civil Aviation Authority Act, 1999 and the Air Navigation Regulations 2004 (ANRs). 3.1.2 The primary aviation legislation in the form of an Act is promulgated once the President gives assent to it after a series of reviews by various Ministries, after approval by the National Assembly and passing through Parliament. The process of amending the Act is the same as the one of initial promulgation and it may take several years for an amendment to be introduced. 3.1.3 The Civil Aviation Act, 1999 (the “Act”) came into force on 15 June 1999 and has not been amended since. Section 160 of the Act empowers the Board of Directors of the Sudan Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA), upon approval of the Minister of Aviation, to make regulations, in the form of ANRs, orders and rules. Under Section 6 of the Act, the SCAA is recognized in the Act as “the supervisor of all matters of civil aviation in the State”. Section 4 of the Act makes provision specifically for the implementation of international agreements and conventions. 3.1.4 The Civil Aviation Authority Act, 1999 (the “Authority Act”) was promulgated on 15 July 1999. Sections 5 and 16 provide for the establishment of an autonomous SCAA as the responsible Government agency for all civil aviation activities in Sudan, and the Director General as the CEO, respectively. 3.1.5 Enforcement of the legislation is addressed in Sections 15, 58 and 152, Chapter XIV ― Unlawful Acts against the Safety and Security of Civil Aviation. However, a policy and procedures for enforcement have not yet been developed. In addition, the penalties (Sections 154, 155 and 156, Chapter XV ― Sanctions and Penalties of the Act) are set at a level which will not deter violations of the established regulatory requirements. The Act empowers the Director General to grant exemptions from one or more conditions in the Act; however, no policy or procedures for the issuance of exemptions have been developed. 3.1.6 Section 70 of the Act provides the representatives of the SCAA with the authority to enter the locations connected with the air activity of the operator to inspect and control implementation of operational requirements, laws, rules, systems and instructions prescribed in the State. In this respect, the Director General has issued credentials and a letter of delegation to its regulatory staff. Sudan has not ratified Article 83 bis and has not entered into any agreements with another State for the transfer of the duties and responsibilities envisaged by Article 83 bis. 3.1.7 Personnel licensing provisions under the Act are contained in Chapter V. Section 45 ― Flight Crew Licences and Section 46 ― National Flight Crew Licences establish the requirements for the issuance of a valid certificate for aircraft command crew members in which any pilot flying a Sudanese aircraft should be in possession of a Sudanese licence. Provisions relating to maintenance licences and privileges of their holders are established in Sections 49 and 50 of the Act. Provisions on the licensing of air traffic controllers are established in Article 51. The Act also refers to the issue, validation and renewal of certificates, relating to civil aviation services under Article 48. The Act also makes reference, in Article 47, to the exemption from the conditions for obtaining the flight crew licence during training. Additional provisions regarding “personal

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aviation record” (logbook), “aviation taught” (training) and “aviation institutes and clubs” are respectively established under Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Act. 3.1.8 National provisions regarding aircraft operations are contained in Sections 8, 9, 61, 63 and 70 of the Act. They address requirements for operation of an aircraft within Sudan, including inspection, detention of aircraft, issuance of the air operator certificate (AOC), air carriage and aerial work operations. Under Chapter VIII of the Act, Branches I to VII contain detailed provisions entitled “Applicable Rules and Systems” (I), “Institution and Operation of Aviation” (II), “Operations Manual and Flight Manual” (III), “Flight Crew” (IV), “Aircraft Instruments and Equipment” (V), “Aircraft Loading” (VI) and “Air Operations” (VII). 3.1.9 The basic airworthiness legal instrument in Sudan is the Act. This legislation provides for aircraft registration, environmental noise requirements, and certificates of airworthiness, maintenance organization approvals, and surveillance of airworthiness activities. These portions of legislation enable the Director General of the Authority to promulgate regulations for the implementation of the airworthiness-related provisions of the ICAO Annexes. 3.1.10 In the area of air navigation services (ANS), there are limited provisions. In accordance with Chapter II of the Act, Branch I ― Devices and Telecommunications, the SCAA is authorized to control and licence all telecommunications business and services relating to the safety of air navigation and regularity of air traffic. 3.1.11 With respect to search and rescue (SAR), Sections 107 to 117 of Chapter X of the Act contain essential provisions for the organization and coordination of SAR services within SAR areas for which Sudan is responsible, including rendering SAR assistance, cooperation with neighbouring States, compensation of expenses and termination of SAR operations. 3.1.12 With respect to aerodrome activities, Chapter II, Branch II of the Act provides for the establishment of aerodromes and landing areas under the authority of the SCAA and delegates the right to the Director General to manage them. However, there are no provisions requiring aerodrome certification. Articles under the Act include the “Establishment and Operation of Aerodromes and Landing Areas”, “Aerodromes and Civil Aviation Installations deemed to be Public Money”, “Categories of Aerodromes, its Management and Supervision”, and the “Use of Aerodromes and Supervision of the Authority over the Aerodromes”. In addition, Article 152g of Chapter XV ― Sanctions and Penalties of the same Act provides for a monetary fine not exceeding one million Sudanese dinars in case of contravention of the provisions of this Act, the regulations, or orders made there under. 3.1.13 The Act contains comprehensive provisions concerning accident and incident investigation which, in general, comply with the Chicago Convention and ICAO Annex 13. Chapter IX ― Aircraft Accident and Incident of the Act establishes general and specific provisions with regard to aircraft accident and incident investigation. Section 94 empowers the Directorate of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention (AAICD) as the authority for instituting technical investigation and as the entity responsible for initiating and conducting aircraft accident and incident investigation in Sudan. However, the Act does not provide the AAICD with absolute independence to decide on the conduct of an investigation. It allows the intervention of the General Manager who “shall specify the system of investigation”.

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3.2 Critical element 2 — Specific operating regulations

“The provision of adequate regulations to address, at a minimum, national requirements emanating from the primary aviation legislation and providing for standardized operational procedures, equipment and infrastructures (including safety management and training systems), in conformance with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Note.— The term ‘regulations’ is used in a generic sense to include instructions, rules, edicts, directives, sets of laws, requirements, policies, orders, etc.”

3.2.1 The civil aviation regulations in Sudan are contained in the ANRs which were promulgated by the Minister of Aviation in February 2004. Sections 160 and 138 of the Act empower the Board of the SCAA and the Director General, respectively, to issue operating regulations in the form of bulletins, notices and other publications. Section 36 of the Act gives the Director General the power to make regulations for the rules of the air and the systems relating to the flying of aircraft, air navigation, the protection of persons and property on the surface, and the use of the airspace of the State. However, Sudan has not promulgated comprehensive regulations to enable the implementation of all ICAO Annexes; the current ANRs cover only the provisions of Annexes 1, 6 and 8. 3.2.2 The SCAA has developed the Sudanese Civil Aviation Regulations (SUCARs) which address the provisions of all safety-related Annexes. However, these SUCARs are not yet promulgated, except for SUCAR 14 ― Aerodromes. 3.2.3 A number of differences exist between the ICAO SARPs and Sudan’s regulations and practices. However, ICAO has not been notified of these differences, including their publication in the aeronautical information publication (AIP). The SCAA has not established documented procedures for reviewing all ICAO Annex amendments in an effective and timely manner, monitoring compliance with ICAO SARPs and amending its regulations, when appropriate. 3.2.4 The Act, the Authority Act and ANRs are available to the public in the form of publications and on the SCAA websites, namely caa-sudan.net and caaofsudan.org. 3.2.5 Part IX ― Personnel Licensing (including Validation of Foreign Licences) of the ANRs was promulgated in February 2004. The ANRs address the SARPs of Annex 1 although they have not been amended since their publication. Part IX is divided into five volumes: Volume 1 ― Pilot Licensing, Volume 2 ― Flight Engineer Licensing, Volume 3 ― Cabin Crew Licensing, Volume 4 ― Maintenance Personnel Licensing, and Volume 5 ― Medical Certification. The differences between Part IX of the ANRs and Annex 1 have not been identified by Sudan and notified to ICAO. 3.2.6 Aircraft operations regulations have been established through the promulgation of the ANRs which cover the provisions of ICAO Annexes 6 and 18. ANRs directly addressing aircraft operations are: Part VII ― Air Operator Certificate (AOC), and Part VIII, Volumes 1 to 5 and 7 which relate to general operating and flight rules, air transport operation ― large aeroplanes, small aeroplanes, foreign operator, operation of ultralight aircraft and operation of gliders. Part X relates to operations of helicopters and Part XI to the conveyance of dangerous goods. However, these regulations have not been updated since their promulgation. Part VIII, Volume 6 ― Balloons has not yet been developed. Sudan has not yet identified significant differences between its ANRs and ICAO Annexes 6 and 18 SARPs and has not published them in the national AIP. Regulations concerning the safe transport of dangerous goods by air are contained in Part XI, Volume 1 ― Conveyance of Dangerous Goods and address the provisions of ICAO Annex 18 and the

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Technical Instructions (TI). Current aircraft operations regulations are available to the public through the SCAA. 3.2.7 The Director General promulgated in 2004 the ANRs, Parts 1 to 7, which establish the airworthiness regulations for the registration of aircraft, the certification of aircraft and aircraft products, and the certification of maintenance organizations for commercial aircraft. The design code accepted for the certification and importation of aircraft in Sudan is the Joint Aviation Requirements (JARs) airworthiness code. The ANRs lack completeness, clarity, precision and consistency in references, creating an opportunity for different interpretations resulting in implementation difficulty. In the area of airworthiness, the SCAA has established procedures for the introduction of Annex provision amendments into its national regulations and for the amendment of the new regulations to fully implement current Annex requirements and for the identification of any remaining differences between ANRs and SARPs. The procedures, which make the Department Directors and the Airworthiness Review Board responsible for the revision of the regulations, were complete with the designation of the members of this board. The established standards are made available to all Sudanese air operators, training organizations and maintenance organizations by Internet. 3.2.8 With respect to ANS, Sudan has not yet promulgated appropriate regulations to enable adoption of all the ANS-related ICAO Annexes although ICAO SARPs are being implemented in practice. However, the SCAA has not yet implemented either an air traffic service (ATS) safety or runway safety programme in accordance with the provisions of Annex 11 and Doc 4444. 3.2.9 On 19 September 2006, Sudan promulgated SUCAR 14 which covers the provisions of Annex 14, Volume I and an Aerodrome Certification Regulation (ACR) requiring certification and surveillance of international and public-use aerodromes. The ACR empowers the aerodrome regulatory staff to inspect and access aerodromes at any time and to require aerodrome operators to submit an Aerodrome Certification Manual (ACM) to enable the certification of aerodromes. Sudan has not yet identified differences to ICAO Annex 14 SARPs and has not published any significant differences in its AIP. 3.2.10 With respect to aircraft accident and incident investigation, Sudan has not yet developed and implemented ANRs related to ICAO Annex 13. However, a draft set of regulations identified as the SUCARs and already printed are awaiting a final review by the different areas concerned in the SCAA. 3.3 Critical element 3 — State civil aviation system and safety oversight functions

“The establishment of a civil aviation authority (CAA) and/or other relevant authorities or government agencies, headed by a Chief Executive Officer, supported by the appropriate and adequate technical and non-technical staff and provided with adequate financial resources. The State authority must have stated safety regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies. Note.— The term ‘State civil aviation system’ is used in a generic sense to include all aviation-related authorities with aviation safety oversight responsibility which may be established by the State as separate entities, such as: CAA, airport authorities, air traffic service authorities, accident investigation authority, meteorological authority, etc.”

3.3.1 The Act and the Authority Act provide the legal basis for the establishment and functioning of an autonomous SCAA headed by the Director General, who reports to the Civil Aviation Board (CAB). The CAB is responsible to the Minister of Presidential Affairs.

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3.3.2 The SCAA is made of the following eight directorates: a) Directorate of Air Navigation Services; b) Directorate of Aviation Affairs and Air Safety; c) Directorate of Aerodrome Engineering; d) Directorate of Regional Airports and Strips; e) Directorate of Planning and Development; f) Directorate of Khartoum Airport; g) Directorate of Administrative Affairs; and h) Directorate of Finance and Administration. 3.3.3 The SCAA has sufficient financial resources to fulfil the State’s responsibility for safety oversight. Most of the funding comes from the fees generated by aviation activities and services provided to the industry such as licensing, certification, airport and air navigation services and levies. The staff of the SCAA has been provided with sufficient office equipment and facilities to accomplish their responsibilities effectively. The SCAA has no regional offices. Although the SCAA has sufficient resources, Sudan has not established a mechanism that would enable the SCAA to attract and retain experienced and qualified personnel and most of the technical staff leaves the SCAA for higher paying industry positions. 3.3.4 The SCAA has developed functions and responsibilities for some technical areas; however, job descriptions for aerodromes and air navigation service regulatory personnel have not yet been developed. Sudan has not established clearly who is the responsible authority for dealing with ICAO-related matters and no coordination or formal agreements have been established between the SCAA and the authorities providing meteorology (MET), telecommunications and cartographic services. Sudan has also not established a clear separation between the regulatory and service provider functions in the areas of aerodromes, air operators, ATS and aeronautical information services (AIS). 3.3.5 With respect to licensing activities in Sudan, licences for flight crews, flight operations officers and air traffic controllers are administered by the Safety and Flight Operations Directorate (SFOD), and licences for maintenance personnel are administered by the Airworthiness Directorate, both of which report to the Aviation Affairs and Air Safety Directorate. The Director of the SFOD has further delegated crew licensing responsibilities to one licensing officer supported by twenty-eight designated flight examiners from the industry. Air traffic controller licences are issued by one air traffic control (ATC) inspector who has three designated examiners as well. Four designated medical examiners support the licensing section; however, no medical assessor has been recruited to evaluate and assess medical fitness reports. 3.3.6 The SFOD of the Aviation Affairs and Air Safety Directorate is also responsible for the certification and supervision of commercial air transport operators in Sudan. The operations technical staff of the SFOD consists of four inspectors responsible for both personnel licensing and aircraft operations. One additional inspector has been assigned to deal with dangerous goods matters. However, the SFOD staffing is insufficient to fulfill Sudan’s responsibilities for safety oversight with regard to aircraft operations, certification and surveillance. Job descriptions have been established by the SCAA in the organizational structure of the SCAA Manual. However, some of the functions and responsibilities of the SFOD described in the SCAA Manual do not match the guidance provided in the Operations Inspector Handbook. 3.3.7 The Airworthiness Division Management Exposition (ADME) establishes the functions and responsibilities of the Airworthiness Directorate. The primary function of the Airworthiness Directorate includes the development of regulations related to airworthiness, the registration of aircraft, aircraft type certification, the approval of modifications and repairs, the issuance and renewal of certificates of airworthiness, the approval of design and production organizations, and the approval of aircraft maintenance

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organizations. The Division is also in charge of the airworthiness certification of air operators and the licensing of maintenance personnel. The Airworthiness Division is located at Khartoum Airport and is headed by a Director of Airworthiness who reports to the General Directorate of Aviation Affairs and Air Safety. The Director of Airworthiness has a written delegation from the Director General to issue and sign the different civil aviation airworthiness certificates and licences including ratings and approvals as well as the power to delegate in writing to his subordinates. The Airworthiness Division consists of three sections, namely, the Maintenance Section, the Airworthiness and Licensing Section, and the Inspection and Control Section. The ADME describes the functions and responsibilities of each section. However, the job descriptions for airworthiness inspectors have not been developed. Inspectors have been issued credentials to facilitate access for inspections of aircraft and facilities, and they are provided with sufficient delegated authority to allow them to execute their mandate. The Airworthiness Division has a total staff of thirteen inspectors plus three technical support staff, one of whom is the librarian. 3.3.8 In relation to ANS safety oversight, the SCAA has not established any ANS inspector positions within the Directorate of Air Navigation Services, and effective mechanisms have not been implemented for the supervision of all ANS matters. As far as service provision is concerned, the SCAA provides for ATS, AIS, communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS) and SAR services while MET services are provided by the Meteorological Authority of Sudan and aeronautical charts services (MAPS) by the National Survey Authority. In addition, the National Telecommunication Corporation is the telecommunication regulator established by the Telecommunication Act, 2001. However, formal arrangements have not yet been established by the SCAA with the MET and MAPS service providers. 3.3.9 With respect to SAR services, Sudan has established a National Committee and an Experts Group where government administrations are represented. An aeronautical rescue coordination centre (ARCC) is located at the Khartoum Airport, and a joint RCC is being planned. 3.3.10 The Aerodrome Engineering Directorate reports directly to the Director General of the SCAA and is responsible for the maintenance of aerodrome electrical equipment, civil engineering and visual aids. It conducts regular inspections at all the civil aerodromes in Sudan and has the necessary qualified personnel, equipment, office space and transportation to carry out its aerodrome maintenance and inspection activities. The Director General of the SCAA has tasked a manager within that directorate to develop a separate regulatory structure for the certification and continuous surveillance of civil aerodromes. 3.3.11 Chapter IX ― Aircraft Accidents and Incidents of the Act establishes that “the Directorate of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention” is the entity responsible for aircraft accident and incident investigation in Sudan. The Directorate is composed of four investigators (including the Director) belonging to different specialties. However, the job descriptions and minimum recruitment requirements for these positions have not been clearly established. The Director reports to the Minister; however, the General Manager (Director General of the SCAA) is also involved in some decision-making activities and therefore the Directorate does not have complete independence in the conduct of accident and incident investigation in Sudan. 3.4 Critical element 4 — Technical personnel qualification and training

“The establishment of minimum requirements for knowledge and experience of the technical personnel performing safety oversight functions and the provision of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level. The training should include initial and recurrent (periodic) training.”

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3.4.1 The SCAA has developed a training policy and programme for some of its regulatory staff. However, the training programme covers general areas and does not include initial, recurrent and specialized training, or OJT. In addition, the SCAA has not developed a mechanism to maintain the training records of its technical staff. 3.4.2 The SFOD has not established specific qualification requirements for the licensing officers within the SFOD. In addition, the competency of the licensing officers and operations inspectors in the SFOD has not been maintained due to lack of training. Concerning designated medical examiners, qualification requirements are not followed and training records reviewed by the ICAO audit team revealed that only some of the designated medical examiners have completed an aviation medicine course. 3.4.3 Sudan has established minimum qualifications and experience for its airworthiness inspectors to include either a university/college degree in engineering or an aircraft maintenance engineer licence, along with at least five years of practice/experience working either in the industry or in the Airworthiness Directorate. The initial training provided includes a basic course and OJT. All Airworthiness Directorate inspectors have educational and technical experience, which compares with the experience of their counterparts in the industry. Inspectors are also provided with recurrent and specialized training, as determined by a five-year training programme plan established in 2005. Inspector training records are maintained and available. 3.4.4 In the area of ANS, Sudan has not yet established a safety oversight system and there are no qualified and experienced inspectors to conduct regulatory and surveillance functions. The SCAA has not yet established qualifications and experience requirements with respect to the recruitment of ANS inspectors, and no training programmes have been developed. 3.4.5 The SCAA has not yet established minimum qualifications for new aerodrome regulatory staff and has not developed a formal training programme that includes initial and recurrent training as well as OJT. No training records have been maintained for aerodrome inspectors and the SCAA has not developed a formal review mechanism to ensure that aerodrome regulatory staff training needs are defined and implemented on a periodic basis. 3.4.6 The Directorate of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention has not yet established minimum qualification and recruitment requirements for its accident/incident investigators. Furthermore, some of them have limited or no experience as accident investigators and some have not received specific training. The Directorate has not established and implemented adequate training programmes to include initial, recurrent, on-the-job and specialized training for its aircraft accident and incident investigators. 3.5 Critical element 5 — Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety critical information

“The provision of technical guidance (including processes and procedures), tools (including facilities and equipment) and safety critical information, as applicable, to the technical personnel to enable them to perform their safety oversight functions in accordance with established requirements and in a standardized manner. In addition, this includes the provision of technical guidance by the oversight authority to the aviation industry on the implementation of applicable regulations and instructions.”

3.5.1 Guidance material is provided by the SCAA to its personnel licensing and operations staff within the SFOD in the form of the Sudan Civil Aviation Procedures (SCAPs) for personnel licensing (PL)

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and for operations (OPS). 3.5.1.1 The SCAPs addressing personnel licensing are: a) SCAP PL 1 ― Pilot licensing b) SCAP PL 2 ― Flight engineer licensing c) SCAP PL 3 ― Cabin crew licensing d) SCAP PL 4 ― Maintenance personnel licensing e) SCAP PL 5 ― Medical certification f) SCAP PL 6 ― Commercial pilot licensing (aeroplane) integrated training course

without instrument rating g) SCAP PL 7 ― Commercial pilot licensing (aeroplane) integrated training course with

instrument rating h) SCAP PL 8 ― Airline transport pilot licence (aeroplane) integrated training course i) SCAP PL 9 ― Flight engineer licensing integrated training course 3.5.1.2 Facilities and equipment have been provided for the conduct of licensing functions, including computers, printing facilities, telephones and facsimiles. However, designated medical examiners have not been provided with guidance material for the conduct of their medical certification activities. The SCAA evaluates medical reports received from designated physicians. 3.5.1.3 The SCAPs pertaining to operations are: a) SCAP OPS 1 ― Aircraft leasing b) SCAP OPS 2 ― Minimum equipment list/configuration deviation list (MEL/CDL) c) SCAP OPS 3 ― Flight operations manual (FOM or OM) d) SCAP OPS 4 ― Flight time limitation (FTL) e) SCAP OPS 5 ― Cockpit crew training f) SCAP OPS 6 ― Cabin crew training g) SCAP OPS 7 ― Extended-range twin-engines operations (ETOPS) h) SCAP OPS 8 ― Reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM) i) SCAP OPS 9 ― Air operator quality system j) SCAP OPS 10 ― Operator operating minima 3.5.1.4 The operations inspectorate staff is not familiar with the SCAPs and several of the procedures established have not been followed. Additional guidance to the SFOD technical staff in the areas of personnel licensing and operations is provided through the Personnel Licensing Handbook and the Operations Inspector Handbook. Detailed guidance on oversight of the transport of dangerous goods by air has yet to be developed and published in the Operations Inspector Handbook. 3.5.2 The Sudanese airworthiness inspectors have access to the technical library, which includes the State/law regulations, orders/instructions, ICAO Annexes, design organization documentation, maintenance organization procedures manuals, operator maintenance control manuals, maintenance programmes including reliability programmes and relevant guidance material. Procedures used by staff are compiled into the Airworthiness Inspector Handbook and the Personnel Licensing Inspector Handbook and are accessible to all staff. The Airworthiness Directorate has a procedure to issue aircraft registration certificates. The SCAA has established a system to receive regularly mandatory continuing airworthiness information such as ADs, service bulletins, etc., for the types of aircraft registered in Sudan. The Directorate has also developed and established procedures for the issuance of a certificate of airworthiness for export for Classes I, II and III products. Inspectors have access to regulations and to all different documents related to

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airworthiness by Internet. 3.5.3 An ANS inspector manual to enable effective safety oversight is not available to provide guidance for the implementation of regulatory policies, procedures and surveillance programmes. 3.5.4 The production of guidance and safety critical information, such as AIS, MAPS, notices to airmen (NOTAMs) and Sudan’s AIP, is the responsibility of the SCAA. The NOTAM office (NOF) at Khartoum Airport has an AIS automation system and is connected to the Cairo and Saudi Arabia NOFs. The AIP, in general, is compliant with ICAO Annex 15 SARPs and is kept up to date. In addition, the SCAA website contains other safety-related information such as application forms for matters relating to airworthiness, aircraft operations, personnel licensing and flight plans. 3.5.5 With respect to SAR, a national aeronautical SAR manual has been compiled to provide information and instructions on the requirements and procedures to be followed during the conduct of SAR operations. SAR letters of agreement have not been established with all ten neighbouring States, except with Kenya and Ethiopia where different levels of commitment have been formally agreed upon. 3.5.6 The aerodrome certification process has not started yet in Sudan. The SCAA has not developed guidance material for the regulatory staff and the aerodrome operators have not been made aware of the national requirements for aerodrome certification. Procedures for continuous surveillance in each specialty area have also not been developed. The aerodrome maintenance staff have access to a central technical library, which is not up to date, but electronic copies of the latest amendment of Annex 14 and other ICAO documents are available in the Aerodrome Engineering Directorate. 3.5.7 Guidance for the investigation of accidents and incidents in Sudan is provided in the AAICD Accident Investigation Procedures Manual. The manual has been developed following some ICAO Annex 13 provisions and the Act. However, the manual is not supported by the ANRs as there are no specific regulatory provisions in the ANRs. Concerning a technical library, the AAICD does not have one of its own and the SCAA library is not readily accessible. Moreover, although the AAICD has some photo and video cameras, the investigators have not been provided with tools and equipment for the conduct of incident and accident investigation such as means of communication and transportation, protective equipment against biological hazards and other hazards at accident sites, and investigation field kits with essential personal items packed and ready to proceed without delay to the accident site. 3.6 Critical element 6 — Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations

“The implementation of processes and procedures to ensure that personnel and organizations performing an aviation activity meet the established requirements before they are allowed to exercise the privileges of a licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval to conduct the relevant aviation activity.”

3.6.1 Licences and ratings or approvals are signed by the Director of the SFOD and by the Director of the Airworthiness Directorate for the relevant specialties. Proper delegation of authority has also been issued to all inspectors concerned in the issuing process. However, licensing procedures are not closely followed in cases such as the issuance of the medical certificate which does not occur as published in the guidance. There are no flight training organizations in Sudan, therefore Sudan validates or converts foreign licences into Sudanese licences. Licences are of the expiring type with a period of validity of five years. Private pilot licences (PPLs), commercial pilot licences (CPLs) and airline transport pilot licences (ATPLs) are validated or converted in accordance with such requirements and procedures. However, the Crew

- 12 -


Personnel Licensing Section within the SFOD does not ensure the validity of the original licence with the issuing State. In addition, the National Civil Aviation Institute, which has not been formally certified as a training organization by the SCAA, covers different areas of aviation activity. Medical assessments are carried out by four designated medical examiners although not all have had an aviation medicine course. 3.6.2 The certification of air operators in Sudan is conducted by the Operations Section of the SFOD. However, the procedures established are not adhered to and the number of operations inspectors available to conduct safety oversight activities is insufficient. Furthermore, there is no coordination between the airworthiness and the operations inspectorates for the approval of aviation activities which are related to both areas, such as MEL and RVSM approval. Activities pertaining to safety oversight of the transport of dangerous goods by air are handled by one inspector who is not experienced and has not received sufficient training in order to ensure compliance with requirements and to appropriately evaluate approvals and exemptions or exceptions granted to some air operators. 3.6.3 In the area of airworthiness of aircraft, the SCAA requires that each domestic applicant for the renewal of a certificate of airworthiness present an application with the last yearly inspection certification package. For aircraft being imported a certificate of airworthiness for export is accepted with an inspection being conducted by an approved maintenance organization (AMO). When there is no bilateral agreement with an exporting country, an AMO must perform a comprehensive aircraft inspection, which will result, after an assessment by the SCAA, in the issuance of the certificate of airworthiness. Currently, the reference to the Act on the certificate of airworthiness is insufficient to adequately identify the airworthiness code for the aircraft, as required by ICAO Annex 8. The Airworthiness Directorate is involved in the process of certification of aircraft operators but there is no proper coordination with the Flight Operations Directorate. An AMO is required to provide the competent authority with a Maintenance Organization Exposition (MOE) specifying its intended scope of work and showing how the organization intends to comply with Sudanese regulations. For domestic AMOs, the Airworthiness Directorate issues the certificate based on the approval of the MOE, assesses the readiness of the organization, method of control, supervision of maintenance and their consistency with the nature and extent of the operations specified. For the approval of a foreign AMO, the Airworthiness Directorate follows the same procedure for issuing the approval of a domestic AMO and is also responsible for its surveillance. The domestic and foreign AMO certificates remain valid for a period of two years as long as the AMO continues to comply with Sudanese regulations. 3.6.4 In the area of ANS, the SCAA has established and implemented procedures for the issuance of air traffic controller licences for personnel providing ATS. The National Telecommunication Corporation issues the radio licences for aeronautical telecommunication stations upon the approval of the SCAA report. 3.6.5 In terms of MET and AIS provisions, Sudan has not implemented a well-organized quality system, in accordance with ICAO Annexes 4 and 15, respectively. 3.6.6 At this time no aerodrome has been certificated in Sudan. All the aerodrome operators have been asked to submit an aerodrome manual and an aerodrome emergency plan. However, although only Khartoum Airport has developed the necessary manuals, they have not been reviewed yet to ensure compliance with national regulations. Aerodrome certification guidance material and formal application forms have not yet been developed. 3.7 Critical element 7 — Surveillance obligations

“The implementation of processes, such as inspections and audits, to proactively ensure that aviation licence, certificate, authorization and/or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the

- 13 -


State to undertake an aviation-related activity for which they have been licensed, certified, authorized and/or approved to perform. This includes the surveillance of designated personnel who perform safety oversight functions on behalf of the CAA.”

3.7.1 The personnel licensing staff and the operations inspectors within the SFOD have not established surveillance activities as part of the licensing functions of the SFOD. The SCAA has delegated functions such as periodic proficiency checks, en-route checks, type rating checks, and instrument rating checks to several pilots within the industry. However, the designated examiners are not required to submit evaluation reports to the SCAA. These designated flight examiners are also not kept under the supervisory and technical control of the SFOD and the latter has no means to identify when a designated examiner does not perform his/her duties in accordance with prescribed procedures. In addition, the SFOD has not established surveillance and control activities over its designated medical examiners and there is no medical assessor to evaluate medical reports submitted by designated medical examiners. 3.7.2 Surveillance procedures have been established in Volume 2 ― Inspections of the Operations Inspector Handbook. However, the guidance in the handbook is not followed and surveillance activities are limited to an annual audit plan which is not always accomplished. There are no en-route, ramp, random, or ground inspections conducted to ensure that air operators continue to comply with the ANRs. Safety oversight of dangerous goods activities and procedures are not conducted and there was no evidence of enforcement action taken for violations to the Act or the ANRs. The SCAA has not yet implemented a system for the supervision and control over its air operators. 3.7.3 The certificate of airworthiness remains valid as long as all airworthiness requirements continue to be met and the aircraft remains on the Sudanese registry. The domestic AMO audit inspection programme developed and implemented by the Airworthiness Directorate complies with and exceeds the requirements established in the regulations to completely review the compliance with the certification requirements in a 24-month period with a follow-up inspection every four months. The foreign AMOs are inspected once in a 12-month period. The development of the continued surveillance programme for AOC holders in Sudan is accomplished in accordance with the SCAA Airworthiness Handbook, Chapter 27, which contains detailed guidance for the provision of continuing surveillance by carrying out a main base inspection twice a year, line station once a year and random checks. 3.7.4 With respect to ANS, in the absence of a safety oversight system, the SCAA does not conduct any surveillance. However, the SCAA performs inspection activities which support the overall assessment of a system safety performance. These consist of quality assurance initiatives for ANS service provision. A technical committee has been formed for the exchange of information and resolution of safety matters relating to the safety performance and inspectors are being appointed. 3.7.5 The SCAA has not developed a formal surveillance programme to ensure that aerodrome operators comply with national regulations. Air traffic controllers from each tower control conduct inspections twice a day; however, they are limited in scope and cover only runway and taxiway lighting and obstacle surveillance. The maintenance personnel of the Aerodrome Engineering Directorate conduct infrastructure inspections and review civil and electrical engineering issues. The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome lighting, signs and markings comply with their national regulations. 3.8 Critical element 8 — Resolution of safety concerns

“The implementation of processes and procedures to resolve identified deficiencies impacting aviation safety, which may have been residing in the aviation system and have been detected by the regulatory authority or other appropriate bodies.

- 14 -


Note.— This would include the ability to analyse safety deficiencies, forward recommendations, support the resolution of identified deficiencies as well as take enforcement action, when appropriate.”

3.8.1 The Act contains general enforcement provisions to support the imposition of sanctions and penalties to any infringement of the regulations. There are no procedures to be followed after violations are observed, including guidance on the follow-up of deficiencies. Very little evidence of actions taken against the violation of the Act, the ANRs or any safety-related provisions concerning personnel licensing and aircraft operations was shown to the ICAO audit team. 3.8.2 In accordance with the Act, it is the SCAA’s obligation, as the State of Registry, to issue and adopt ADs. All foreign ADs are reviewed by the SCAA for applicability against the Sudanese register and if applicability is confirmed, the DCA will issue a supplementary letter requesting AOC holders and/or aircraft owners to comply with the applicable foreign ADs. During a SCAA inspection of an AMO or AOC holder, the action to be taken by the responsible inspector depending on the severity of the finding identified is defined in the Airworthiness Handbook. Airworthiness inspectors have the authority to impose penalty fees and to retain aircraft on ground until corrective actions are taken. The SCAA has developed a Service Difficulty Reporting System for the reporting of faults, malfunctions, defects and suspected unapproved parts to the SCAA. These reports are forwarded to the organization responsible for the type design. 3.8.3 With respect to ANS, no surveillance is conducted and no mechanism has been established for the resolution of safety concerns, such as deficiencies identified by the Planning and Implementation Regional Group (PIRG) or the ANS service provision quality assurance committee. In addition, there is no system for the ATS provider to report ATC incidents to the SCAA. 3.8.4 The SCAA has not developed and implemented processes and procedures to resolve deficiencies identified during the aerodrome inspections. The SCAA has direct responsibility to manage aerodrome operations, including maintenance and surveillance; this may create a conflict of interest for the resolution of safety concerns. A safety management system has not been established. Aerodrome operators do not monitor and analyse incident occurrences and trends as an element of the safety management system. No effective follow-up has been put in place and no enforcement procedures have been developed for the various stakeholders to ensure that aerodrome deficiencies are corrected in a timely manner. 3.8.5 Chapter 94(4) establishes the responsibility of the AAICD to submit to the Minister and the SCAA any recommendations which are applicable to these entities after an accident or incident investigation has taken place in Sudan. In addition the AAICD Manual on Investigation follows ICAO Annex 13 provisions for the production of accident and incident reports. However, some procedures for sending the reports to the operator or to the manufacturer have not been developed. Furthermore, Sudan has not established, as the State conducting the investigation, procedures to address any safety recommendations arising from its investigations to accident investigation authorities in other State(s) concerned and, when ICAO documents are involved, to ICAO. Procedures for preparing and sending accident data reports to ICAO, involving aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over 2 250 kg, as soon as practicable after the investigation is finished and for preparing and sending the incident data report to ICAO if conducting an investigation into an incident of an aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over 5 700 kg, have also not been established. Investigation reports that were reviewed by the ICAO audit team confirmed that established procedures were followed and investigation reports complied with ICAO Annex 13 SARPs. The SCAA has established a mandatory and a voluntary incident reporting system; however, the database established is not compatible with the ICAO accident/incident reporting (ADREP) system and the European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS), and the database is not analysed to institute

- 15 -


preventive actions. 4. VISITS TO THE INDUSTRY/SERVICE PROVIDERS 4.1 Accompanied by staff members of the State’s civil aviation system, the audit teams visit aviation service providers, operations and maintenance departments of operators and maintenance organizations, aeronautical product/equipment manufacturers, aviation training institutes, etc. The objective of the visits is to validate the capability of the State to supervise the activities of these service providers, airlines and organizations. 4.2 In the case of Sudan, the audit team visited the following organizations: a) Sudan Airways and the National Institute for Civil Aviation (PEL); b) Sudan Airways (OPS); c) Sudan Airways and Blue Bird maintenance shop (AIR); d) ATS, AIS, MET, area control centre (ACC) and RCC of Khartoum International

Airport (ANS); e) Operations managers, including rescue and fire fighting (RFF) and fire station

(apron, runway, taxiway, etc.), of Khartoum International Airport (AGA); and f) Air Accident Investigation Central Directorate (AIG). 5. AUDIT FINDINGS AND DIFFERENCES DATABASE (AFDD) 5.1 The general objective of the AFDD is to assist States in identifying the elements that need attention in the implementation of the proposed corrective action plan. The information is also intended to assist States in establishing a priority of actions to be taken to resolve safety concerns identified by the audits. Appendix 2 to this report contains a graphic representation of the lack of effective implementation of the critical elements of the safety oversight system (ICAO Doc 9734, Part A refers) in Sudan and at a global level (average results from all States audited). The graphic representation enables the audited State to prioritize the necessary corrective actions and to identify assistance requirements based on its personnel, technical and financial capabilities in consideration of its safety oversight obligations. 6. STATE AVIATION ACTIVITY QUESTIONNAIRE (SAAQ) 6.1 The SAAQ is one of the major tools required for conducting a comprehensive systems approach-based safety oversight audit. As such, all Contracting States are required to complete the SAAQ and submit it to ICAO for proper evaluation and recording. The submitted information enables ICAO to maintain an up-to-date database on the State’s civil aviation activities. Sudan has submitted its SAAQ to ICAO, which can be found at www.icao.int/soa. 7. COMPLIANCE CHECKLISTS (CCs) 7.1 The CCs are one of the main tools used in the conduct of safety oversight audits under the comprehensive systems approach. As such, all Contracting States are required to complete the CCs and submit them to ICAO for evaluation and recording. The submitted information enables ICAO to maintain an up-to-date database on the State’s level of compliance to the ICAO SARPs and assist in facilitating the conduct of a standardized audit of all Contracting States. As a result, States will be enabled to have a clear

- 16 -


picture of the implementation status of the relevant SARPs. Sudan has partially submitted its CCs to ICAO, which can be found at www.icao.int/soa. 8. FOLLOW-UP ACTION 8.1 In accordance with the MOU agreed to between Sudan and ICAO, Sudan submitted a corrective action plan on 8 May 2007 and an update to the action plan on 28 June 2007 and 2 August 2007. The action plan submitted was reviewed by the Safety Oversight Audit (SOA) Section and was found to fully address most of the findings and recommendations contained in this report. The proposed action plan, including comments and clarifications provided by the State, is attached as Appendix 3 to this report. Comments by ICAO on each corrective action are found in Appendix 1 to this report.

— — — — — — — —


APPENDIX 1

Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-1-01

LEG/01SUDAN

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO

PRIMARY AVIATION LEGISLATION AND CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS

1.009; 1.025; 3.005; 3.007; 3.011; 4.003; 4.005; 4.011;

5.001; 5.007; 6.015; 6.017; 7.009; 7.011; 7.013; 8.003;

8.015;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:

Refer to Doc 9735, Appendix F for the document reference(s) associated with the protocol questions identified in this

finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan developed and promulgated Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) which cover some provisions of the Annexes. In

addition, the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) has developed Sudanese Civil Aviation Regulations (SUCARs)

which should cover the provisions of all of the safety-related Annexes; however, most of the SUCARs have not yet been

promulgated. The SCAA has established a procedure to address amendments to ICAO SARPs or for the identification and

notification of differences to ICAO. However, this procedure has yet to be implemented.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Director General should ensure that the SUCARs are in line with ICAO SARPs and promulgate them accordingly. A

transition period for this change should also be established in order to allow air operators to comply with the new

regulations whenever applicable. In addition, the SCAA should implement its procedure for the review of amendments to

the ICAO Annexes for their timely implementation or for the identification and notification to ICAO of differences, if any.

The significant differences should be identified and published in the aeronautical information publication (AIP).

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY THE STATE:

Corrective action plan and comments submitted by the State are found at Appendix 3-1-1 of this report.

Estimated Implementation Date: 31/08/2008

COMMENTS BY ICAO:

The corrective action plan submitted by the State fully addresses this ICAO finding and recommendation.

Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-1-02

LEG/02SUDAN



1.031; 1.033; 7.007;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 X CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not promulgated regulations regarding the interception of civil aircraft above its territory and for the mandatory

compliance to interception orders from other States for any civil aircraft under its registry or operated by its operators.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should promulgate regulations regarding the interception of civil aircraft above its territory and for the mandatory

compliance to interception orders from other States for any civil aircraft under its registry or operated by its operators.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-1-03

LEG/03SUDAN



1.055; 4.371;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8 X

FINDING:

The Civil Aviation Act, 1999, the ANRs and the only promulgated SUCARs specify sanctions and penalties in the event of

a contravention. However, the established penalties are insufficient to be considered an economic deterrent. In addition,

Sudan has not yet established a policy and procedures for the enforcement of i ts primary aviation legislation and

regulations in the State.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should revise the Civil Aviation Act, 1999 or the regulations to increase the penalties accordingly to reflect current

economic levels and thus provide an effective deterrent for the contravention of any regulations issued pursuant to the Act.

In addition, Sudan should develop a policy and procedures for the enforcement of the aviation regulations applicable in the

State.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-1-04

LEG/04SUDAN



1.205;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Although the SCAA has published a comprehensive AIP, the significant differences to ICAO SARPs and procedures are

not included, in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should include significant differences in the AIP in accordance with the requirements of Annex 15, paragraph

4.1.2.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-1-05

LEG/05SUDAN



1.301;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan is following the provisions of ICAO Annex 5 in pract ice; however, Sudan has not yet establ ished formal

requirements with respect to the specific units of measurement to be used in air and ground operations.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish formal requirements with respect to the specific units of measurement to be used in air and ground

operations in accordance with ICAO Annex 5.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-2-01

ORG/01SUDAN


CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

2.007; 2.019;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The Civil Aviation Act, 1999 establishes the SCAA as the authority responsible for supervising all matters relating to civil

aviation in Sudan. However, other authorities which provide services to the SCAA such as weather information and

reports, charts and telecommunications are providing their services without any coordination with the SCAA. As a result,

the SCAA cannot ensure that there is no overlap of responsibilities and which authority is responsible for coordinating

ICAO-related matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish coordination procedures with those authorities providing services to the SCAA in order to

ensure that there is no overlap of responsibilities and that the services provided are in accordance with ICAO SARPs.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-2-02

ORG/02SUDAN



2.021; 5.029; 7.051; 7.265; 8.011;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not clearly separated its responsibilities as the State regulatory authority from those as the State providing

services in the areas of aerodromes, aircraft operations, aeronautical information services (AIS), and air traffic services

(ATS). This may create a potential conflict of interest between the regulatory enforcement functions and the functions of a

service provider.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish a clear separation between its State regulatory functions and its service provision functions in the

areas of aerodromes, aircraft operations, AIS and ATS, in order to ensure that there is no potential conflict of interest.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-2-03

ORG/03SUDAN



2.053; 2.103; 3.109; 4.025; 7.061; 7.209; 7.269; 7.325;

7.373; 7.417; 8.039; 8.041;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not established a mechanism to ensure that the SCAA has sufficient qualified technical staff to enable the State

to meet its national and international obligations related to civil aviation safety oversight in the areas of personnel

licensing, aircraft operations, aerodromes and air navigation services. In addition, due to the disparity in salaries between

the industry and the SCAA, the SCAA is unable to attract and retain adequately qualified and experienced technical staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish a mechanism to ensure that the SCAA has sufficient qualified technical staff to enable the State to

meet its national and international obligations related to civil aviation safety oversight in the areas of personnel licensing,

aircraft operations, aerodromes and air navigation services. In addition, Sudan should ensure that the SCAA is able to

attract and retain adequately qualified and experienced technical staff.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-2-04

ORG/04SUDAN



2.105; 3.111; 3.113; 3.115; 3.117; 3.119; 3.455; 4.051;

4.053; 4.055; 4.057; 4.059; 4.341; 6.123; 6.125; 6.127;

6.129; 6.131; 7.065; 7.067; 7.069; 7.071; 7.073; 7.211;

7.213; 7.215; 7.217; 7.219; 7.277; 7.279; 7.281; 7.283;

7.285; 7.333; 7.335; 7.337; 7.339; 7.341; 7.381; 7.383;

8.371;8.057;

8.055;8.053;8.051;7.503;7.501;7.499;7.497;7.495;

7.433;7.431;7.429;7.427;7.425;7.389;7.387;7.385;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 X CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA is providing some training on an ad hoc basis to its technical staff and some of the training conducted does not

cover essential elements to maintain a qualified workforce. The SCAA has not developed formal training programmes and

policies that make a commitment to provide initial, recurrent and specialized training or on-the-job training (OJT),

including attending workshops and seminars for the regulatory staff, with the exception of airworthiness. In addition, the

SCAA has not established a system for the maintenance of technical personnel training records.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should develop and implement formal training programmes that cover essential elements to maintain a

qualified workforce. In addition, training policies should provide initial, recurrent and specialized training or OJT,

including attending workshops and seminars for the regulatory staff dealing with personnel licensing, aircraft operations,

aerodromes, accident investigations and air navigation services. Furthermore, the SCAA should establish a formal system

for the maintenance of technical personnel training records.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-2-05

ORG/05SUDAN



2.201; 4.071; 8.067;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The central library of the SCAA is in the process of being fully established and the personnel tasked with maintaining the

library will be receiving training for administering the library. Several directorates are not using the central library as their

main source of acquiring the needed documents; consequently, the documents at the directorates were outdated. In

addition, the SCAA has not established a method to ensure receipt, control and distribution of technical documents, ICAO

Annexes, and guidance material.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should fully establish the central library and implement a method to ensure receipt, control and distribution of

technical documents, ICAO Annexes, and guidance material.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-01

PEL/01SUDAN


PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING

3.257;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has not established procedures for re-establishing the privileges of an expired licence.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish procedures for re-establishing the privileges of an expired licence.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-02

PEL/02SUDAN



3.261; 3.263; 3.601; 3.603; 3.605; 3.607; 3.609; 4.043;

4.045; 4.047; 4.049;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 X CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The SCAA delegated functions such as periodic proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and instrument

rating checks to some pilots within the industry. However, the SCAA does not require that these reports be submitted to the

SCAA, specifically those related to crews that have not performed their duties in accordance with prescribed procedures

and privileges of their licences. In addition, the designated flight examiners are not kept under the supervisory and

technical control of the SCAA and the SCAA has no means to identify when a designated examiner does not perform

his/her duties in accordance with prescribed procedures.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should require that a copy of all proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and instrument rating

checks be submitted to the SCAA in order to ensure adequate quality control. The SCAA should implement a system for

the designation of flight and practical examiners and ensure control and supervision over the designated personnel. In

addition, to ensure positive quality control of check procedures, SCAA inspectors should observe or monitor a sufficient

number of checks conducted by designated examiners each year.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-03

PEL/03SUDAN



3.307; 3.309; 3.311;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has implemented procedures for the validation and conversion of foreign licences. However, the procedures

established do not require the personnel licensing staff to contact the issuing State systematically to ensure the validity of

the licence to be converted or validated. In addition, the SCAA has not implemented requirements to be met by the

applicant before the conversion of the licence, if the original licence is not in full compliance with Annex 1.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should implement procedures to systematically contact the issuing State to ensure the validity of the licence to

be converted or validated and should establish requirements to be met by the applicant before the conversion of the licence,

if the original licence is not in full compliance with Annex 1.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-04

PEL/04SUDAN



3.403; 3.405; 3.415; 3.419;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has not implemented an adequate system for the medical certification of its licence holders. Since the system in

place does not include a medical assessor, the evaluation of the medical reports submitted by the designated medical

examiners are not evaluated. Moreover, the SCAA has not established procedures for the medical assessment in cases

where medical standards prescribed in Annex 1, Chapter 6, are not fully met by a licence holder.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish a system to ensure the medical certification of its licence holders. In addition, the SCAA

should recruit a medical assessor for the evaluation of medical reports submitted by the designated medical examiners.

Medical evaluation procedures should include the medical assessment in cases where medical standards prescribed in

Annex 1, Chapter 6, are not fully met by a licence holder.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-05

PEL/05SUDAN



3.451; 3.453; 3.457; 3.459; 3.461;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 X CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The SCAA has not implemented an adequate system for the designation of medical examiners. Some of the designated

medical examiners have not received training in aviation medicine and the SCAA has not developed a training programme

that includes initial and refresher training or attendance to seminars and workshops on aviation medicine. Moreover, the

SCAA does not conduct any supervision or control activities over its designated medical examiners.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should implement a system for the designation of qualified medical examiners by which initial and refresher

training is provided. In addition, designated medical examiners should participate in aviation medicine seminars and

workshops. Moreover, the SCAA should implement a system for supervision and control of the designated medical

examiners.



COMMENTS BY ICAO:

The corrective action plan submitted by the State partially addresses this ICAO finding and recommendation. The State has

not addressed the provision of initial and refresher training to designated medical examiners.

Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-06

PEL/06SUDAN



3.651; 3.653;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The Personnel Licensing Section within the Safety and Flight Operations Directorate (SFOD) of the SCAA has not

established requirements for aviation personnel to demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the language used for

radiotelephony communications. Moreover, the SCAA has not yet established a plan to implement relevant ICAO

provisions to ensure that licence holders would demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the language used for

radiotelephony communications at the level required for their licence as of March 2008.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish requirements for aviation personnel to demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the

language used for radiotelephony communications. The SCAA should establish a plan to implement relevant ICAO

provisions to ensure that licence holders would demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the language used for

radiotelephony communications at the level required for their licence as of March 2008.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-07

PEL/07SUDAN



3.701; 3.705;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The Personnel Licensing Section within the SFOD has not established a well-organized record-keeping system to maintain

a personal file for each applicant and licence holder, which would contain all correspondence, applications, assessments,

examination results and other licensing documentation. Records are kept by air operators, and designated flight examiners

do not submit to the SCAA a copy of results on all periodic proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and

instrument rating checks.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish a system for record keeping according to which personal files and records would be kept for

each applicant and licence holder and would contain all correspondence, applications, assessments, examination results

and other licensing documentation. Designated flight examiners should be required to submit a copy of all periodic

proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and instrument rating checks to the SCAA immediately after an

inspection has been completed.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-08

PEL/08SUDAN



3.751; 3.753; 3.763; 3.765; 3.767; 3.769;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The SCAA has not established an adequate system for the certification (authorization) and oversight of aviation training

organizations such as the National Civil Aviation Institute, by which the SCAA would ensure compliance with established

requirements, the development of a training and procedures manual, the qualification and competency of instructors,

appropriate facilities and equipment, etc., as contained in Annex 1.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish an adequate system for the certification (authorization) and oversight of aviation training

organizations such as the National Civil Aviation Institute, by which the SCAA could ensure compliance with established

requirements, the development of a training and procedures manual, the qualification and competency of instructors,

appropriate facilities and equipment, etc., as contained in Annex 1.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-3-09

PEL/09SUDAN



3.811; 3.813;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The Personnel Licensing Section within the Directorate of Airworthiness of the SFOD has established procedures for the

issuance, validation and conversion of aircraft maintenance technicians, engineers and mechanics licences. However, the

SCAA has not established a method or procedure for the conduct of oversight of the aircraft maintenance licensed

p e r s o n n e l . N o e v i d e n c e o f e n f o r c e m e n t a c t i o n s t a k e n b y t h e S C A A w i t h r e s p e c t t o a i r c r a f t m a i n t e n a n c e

technician/engineer/mechanic licences was available for review.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should implement a method or procedure to ensure that appropriate oversight is conducted over licensed

aircraft maintenance technicians, engineers and mechanics. The procedure should include actions to be taken by the SFOD

when an aircraft maintenance technician/engineer/mechanic has not performed his/her duties in accordance with the

prescribed procedures and privileges of his/her licence.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-01

OPS/01SUDAN


AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS CERTIFICATION AND SUPERVISION

3.155; 4.075;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has established procedures and guidance material through the approval of the Sudan Civil Aviation Procedures

(SCAP-PEL and SCAP-OPS) concerning personnel licensing and aircraft operations safety oversight activities. However,

the SCAPs are not followed in detail by the inspectors in their routine activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that all its inspectors are familiar with and implement the SCAPs in their daily safety oversight

activities and that its inspectors follow the SCAPs.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-02

OPS/02SUDAN



4.023; 4.101; 4.105; 4.127;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The SFOD has not established and documented coordination procedures on certification and approval activities with the

Airworthiness Directorate. The approval of manuals or procedures which are related to airworthiness and operations, such

as the minimum equipment list (MEL) or reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) operations, is conducted without a

clear definition on the responsibility for approval, and the required assessment and appropriate evaluation of their contents

are not established in a coordinated manner in either of the inspector handbooks.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish coordination procedures for its certification and approval activities to ensure that specific

approvals such as the MEL or RVSM operations are coordinated between the directorates involved.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-03

OPS/03SUDAN



4.103; 4.121; 4.123; 4.125;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAPs provide comprehensive procedures to accept or approve, as applicable, the contents of the applicant’s

operation manual, including the review of the organizational structure and the duties and responsibilities of the managing

personnel . However, the SFOD inspectors are not famil iar with and do not fol low SCAPs procedures in deta i l.

Consequently, one major air operator in Sudan has not implemented several ANR requirements and some of the manuals

reviewed by the ICAO audit team had no evidence of formal approval by the SFOD.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should ensure that air operators provide a copy of the operations manual together with all amendments and/or

revisions, for review and acceptance and, where required, for approval. The SFOD should ensure that inspectors adhere to

established procedures and conduct a review of air operators ' safety document system to ensure that appropriate

implementation has been achieved.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-04

OPS/04SUDAN



4.109;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SFOD has not established an adequate filing system where all documents related to the certification process for

obtaining an air operator certificate (AOC) are systematically stored, and the SFOD does not keep records of manuals

approved or of amendments which have been authorized.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should establish a comprehensive filing system where all documents related to the certification process for

obtaining an AOC are systematically stored. The SFOD should keep records of manuals approved or of amendments which

have been authorized.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-05

OPS/05SUDAN



4.131; 4.133; 4.135; 4.137;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not established and promulgated several provisions under ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6 regarding flight data

recorders (FDRs) and cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and the SFOD does not conduct sufficient oversight in order to

verify implementation.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish and promulgate the latest ICAO Annex 6 provisions regarding FDRs and CVRs. The SFOD should

ensure that inspectors verify compliance by all AOC holders.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-06

OPS/06SUDAN



4.149; 4.151; 4.305;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SFOD does not ensure that air operators establish in their operations manual standard operating procedures (SOP) for

each phase of flight and instructions on the clarification and acceptance of air traffic control (ATC) clearances, particularly

where terrain clearance is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD shoud ensure that air operators establish in their operations manual SOP for each phase of f l ight and

instructions on the clarification and acceptance of ATC clearances, particularly where terrain clearance is involved.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-07

OPS/07SUDAN



4.157; 4.201; 4.203; 4.205;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not established requirements for the implementation of a safety management system or an accident prevention

and flight safety programme in the ANRs in accordance with ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 3 provisions. The ICAO audit

team visited a major air operator and confirmed that the air operator had not implemented such a system.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should amend the ANRs to address the provisions of ICAO Annex 6 related to a safety management system and

accident prevention and flight safety programme and should ensure that the requirements are implemented by all Sudanese

air operators.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-08

OPS/08SUDAN



4.187; 4.221; 4.231; 4.233; 4.235;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SFOD does not ensure that air operators develop, publish, distribute and revise a training manual, as part of the flight

safety documents system, which includes training programmes and syllabi for initial, recurrent, transition (conversion),

re-qualification, upgrade, recency of experience, familiarization, differences, safety management and/or other specialized

training, as applicable. Manuals reviewed by the ICAO audit team showed no evidence of formal approval by the SCAA,

and training records revealed that training had not been provided to some of the flight operations officers within the air

operator. In addition, the flight operations officers are issued a licence which does not comply with the provisions of

Annexes 1 and 6 for flight operations officers/flight dispatchers.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that adequate surveillance is conducted over the Sudanese air operators by the SFOD to ensure

compliance with training requirements established in the ANRs. The SFOD should ensure that training is provided and all

manuals and training programmes are approved by the SCAA. In addition, licences for flight operations officers/flight

dispatchers should comply with the provisions of ICAO Annexes 1 and 6, Chapter 10.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-09

OPS/09SUDAN



4.271; 4.273;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not established requirements for air operators to establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and

report on routine meteorological observations during departure and en-route and climb-out phases of the flight and special

and other non-routine observations during any phase of the flight. In addition, the SFOD does not ensure that air operators

establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and report on volcanic activity. Air operators visited by the

ICAO audit team were not complying with these Annex 3 provisions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should implement requirements for air operators to establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and

report on routine meteorological observations during departure, en-route and climb-out phases of the flight and special and

other non-routine observations during any phase of the flight. In addition, the SFOD should ensure that air operators

establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and report on volcanic activity in accordance with Annex 3

provisions.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-10

OPS/10SUDAN



4.321; 4.323; 4.325;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not implemented requirements to ensure that existing air operators have established an organizational structure

which includes the responsibilities and authority for the management of all ground handling functions prior to the issuance

of an AOC. However, the SFOD is informally requiring this from new air operators and a ground handling procedures

manual was being reviewed for approval.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should implement requirements for air operators to establish an organizational structure which includes the

responsibilities and authority for the management of all ground handling functions prior to the issuance of an AOC. These

requirements should be included in the air operators' operations manual.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-11

OPS/11SUDAN



4.335; 4.339; 4.343;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 X CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not designated and notified to ICAO the appropriate authority responsible for the transport of dangerous goods

by air. Furthermore, the SCAA has designated an officer to be responsible for safety oversight of dangerous goods

activities; however, the designated officer has not received proper training and is not qualified to determine the granting of

exemptions and approvals for the transport of dangerous goods by air. In addition, the SCAA has not established a

dangerous goods training programme for its technical staff on adequate guidance for its dangerous goods inspectors.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should designate and notify to ICAO the appropriate authority responsible for the transport of dangerous goods by

air. In addition, the SCAA should establish a dangerous goods training programme for its technical staff and adequate

guidance for its dangerous goods inspectors. Training on transportation of dangerous goods by air should be provided to all

SFOD inspectors as part of their initial and recurrent training, and specialized dangerous goods training should be provided

to the designated officer.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-12

OPS/12SUDAN



4.345; 4.347; 4.349; 4.351; 4.353; 4.355; 4.357; 4.359;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SFOD grants specific authorizations for the transport of dangerous goods by air; however, it does not ensure that

authorized air operators follow dangerous goods procedures such as the development and use of an acceptance checklist to

prevent acceptance of dangerous goods for transport by air unless they are accompanied by a completed dangerous goods

transport document and unless their marking, package, overpack or freight container have been inspected in accordance

with the procedure contained in the Technical Instructions (TI). Also, the SFOD does not ensure that authorized operators

will not load dangerous goods into the aircraft unless the appropriate loading, segregation and inspection for damage or

leakage procedures are followed. In addition, the SFOD has not established inspection, surveillance and enforcement

procedures with a view to achieving compliance with its dangerous goods regulations.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should ensure that authorized air operators follow dangerous goods procedures by establishing inspection,

surveillance and enforcement procedures with a view to achieving compliance with its dangerous goods regulations.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-13

OPS/13SUDAN



4.361; 4.363;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Dangerous goods training programmes of air operators are subject to review and approval by the SFOD, as applicable;

however, the SFOD does not ensure that ini t ia l and recurrent dangerous goods t ra ining programmes have been

implemented and maintained by the organizations or agencies which are involved in the transport of dangerous goods by

air. In addition, the SFOD does not ensure that dangerous goods procedures and training programmes are incorporated in

either the operations manual or a separate document as part of the flight safety documents system and that these training

programmes are approved. A major Sudanese air operator could not show compliance with training programmes, and

manuals reviewed had not been formally approved by the SFOD.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should ensure that initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programmes are implemented and maintained

by the organizations or agencies which are involved in the transport of dangerous goods by air. In addition, the SFOD

should ensure that dangerous goods procedures and training programmes are incorporated in either the operations manual

or a separate document as part of the flight safety documents system and ensure that the training programmes are approved.

The SFOD should conduct a review of all air operators to verify compliance with the approved training programmes.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-14

OPS/14SUDAN



4.369;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SFOD does not ensure that air operators develop procedures to convey information to emergency services and to

appropriate authorities in the event of an incident or accident of an aircraft carrying dangerous goods. An air operator

visited by the ICAO audit team did not have clear procedures established, and the flight operations officers could not

clearly describe the steps to follow in case of an emergency.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should ensure that air operators develop procedures to convey information to emergency services and to

appropriate authorities in the event of an incident or accident of an aircraft carrying dangerous goods.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-15

OPS/15SUDAN



4.401; 4.409;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SFOD does not ensure that air operators establish a policy and procedures to enable cabin crew to discreetly

communicate to flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the passenger cabin. In addition, there

was no evidence that security programmes had been approved by the SCAA and that procedures and security training

programmes were being complied with.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFOD should ensure that air operators establish a policy and procedures to enable cabin crew to discreet ly

communicate to flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the passenger cabin. In addition, the

SFOD should implement a survei l lance and inspect ion programme to confi rm compliance with a l l the secur i ty

requirements.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-4-16

OPS/16SUDAN



4.443; 4.449; 4.451; 4.453;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SFOD is unable to accomplish the requirements of the annual audit plan which includes one annual visit to each air

operator due to insufficient number of qualified and trained inspectors. The SFOD is not conducting en-route inspections

and random inspections of any kind. In addition, the SFOD has not established a system for tracking deficiencies. The

ICAO audit team confirmed that minimal enforcement is being conducted concerning suspensions, revocations or

pecuniary fines.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SFDO should establish and implement a comprehensive surveillance and inspection programme to include all types of

inspections throughout the year. Inspectors should be trained and actively participate in inspection and surveillance

activities in all areas.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-5-01

AIR/01SUDAN


AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT

5.027;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has not developed job descriptions for the technical staff of the Airworthiness Directorate.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should develop job descriptions for the technical staff of the Airworthiness Directorate.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-5-02

AIR/02SUDAN



5.263; 5.333;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The Airworthiness Directorate and the SFOD of the SCAA have not established appropriate coordination arrangements

between the two directorates when evaluating an air operator for the issuance of an AOC and for the review of specific

operation approvals issued in conjunction with an AOC such as MEL and RVSM operations.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish formal coordination arrangements between the Airworthiness Directorate and the SFOD when

evaluating an air operator for the issuance of an AOC and for the review of specific operation approvals issued in

conjunction with an AOC such as MEL and RVSM operations.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-5-03

AIR/03SUDAN



5.285; 5.287; 5.305; 5.307; 5.395; 5.397;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The procedures established by the Airworthiness Directorate for the review and approval of an operator's maintenance

control manual, operator's maintenance programme and aircraft maintenance organization's maintenance procedures

manual is not in accordance with the provisions of Annex 6, Chapters 8 and 11 and Doc 9760.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that procedures are established for the review and approval of the maintenance control manual,

maintenance programme and maintenance procedures manual in accordance with the provisions of Annex 6, Chapters 8

and 11 and Doc 9760.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-5-04

AIR/04SUDAN



5.425; 5.429;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that approved maintenance organizations (AMOs) establish minimum qualifications for the

managers, certifying staff, auditors, and mechanics and that AMO employees receive initial and recurrent training

appropriate to their assigned tasks and responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that AMOs establish minimum qualifications for the managers, certifying staff, auditors, and

mechanics and that AMO employees receive initial and recurrent training appropriate to their assigned tasks and

responsibilities.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-5-05

AIR/05SUDAN



5.451; 5.453;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The Airworthiness Directorate does not conduct oversight of reliability programmes received from the operator and does

not initiate a special evaluation or impose special operational restrictions if information obtained from reliabili ty

monitoring indicates a degraded level of safety.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should conduct ongoing oversight of reliability programmes and should initiate a special evaluation or impose

special operational restrictions if information obtained from reliability monitoring indicates a degraded level of safety.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-01

AIG/01SUDAN


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

6.001;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 X CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not promulgated a comprehensive national set of regulations with regard to Annex 13. The Directorate of

Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention (AAICD) relies on the Accident Investigation Procedures

Manual, promulgated by the Director General on 11 November 2006 as a regulatory source. However, the manual requires

the designated investigation authority to comply with ICAO Annex 13 provisions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should promulgate a set of regulations in compliance with ICAO Annex 13 SARPs to serve as the national

regulations for aircraft accident and incident investigation in Sudan. The aircraft accident inquiry SARPs contained in

Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention should be prescribed as the procedures to be followed by Sudan for inquiries into

accidents involving death or serious injury and should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 of the

Chicago Convention.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-02

AIG/02SUDAN



6.005; 6.023;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Although several provisions under Chapter IX of the Act provide for the independence of the AAICD, in charge of

conducting aircraft accident and incident investigation, Article 94(3) allows for the intervention of the Director General

who "shall specify the system for investigation into aircraft accidents and incidents, and the system for the composition of

the commissions thereof, and the rules to be followed in conducting the investigation of such accidents and incidents, and

the manner in which they may be notified, and the manner by which their effects may be removed, in addition to all rules

which are to be followed, upon occurrence of an accident, by those who are concerned from pilots and others, including the

detention of the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder".

RECOMMENDATION:

The Government of Sudan should amend its legislation to provide for the independence of the AAICD which is in charge

of conducting aircraft accident and incident investigation in Sudan.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-03

AIG/03SUDAN



6.111; 6.117; 6.119; 6.351;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 X CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

The AAICD consists of four investigators, including the Director, who have not received specialized training in accident

and incident investigation. In addition, the AAICD has not established job descriptions or minimum requirements to

become an accident investigator.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should develop pertinent job descriptions, minimum requirements to become an accident investigator, and the

minimum training needed to maintain competence.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-04

AIG/04SUDAN



6.133;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established measures to relieve experts seconded by a State CAA or other organization in the State as

investigators from their regular duties during an aircraft accident investigation.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish measures to relieve experts seconded by a State CAA or other organization in the State as

investigators from their regular duties during an aircraft accident investigation.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-05

AIG/05SUDAN



6.201; 6.203; 6.205; 6.207;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD does not provide its investigators with tools and equipment for the conduct of accident and incident

investigation such as field kits, protective equipment against biological hazards and other hazards at the accident site,

means of transportation and communication, global positioning systems, etc.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the AAICD provides its investigators with tools and equipment for the conduct of accident

and incident investigation such as field kits, protective equipment against biological hazards and other hazards at the

accident site, means of transportation and communication, global positioning systems, etc.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-06

AIG/06SUDAN



6.311;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Up-to-date contact information for aircraft accident investigation authorities in other States was not available to the

relevant personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that up-to-date contact information for aircraft accident investigation authorities in other States is

available to the relevant personnel.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-07

AIG/07SUDAN



6.319;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not established procedures for forwarding accident/serious incident notifications to the States involved and,

when applicable, to ICAO, in the following situations where it is not the State of Occurrence:

a) as State of Registry, in the case of an occurrence in a non-Contracting State or outside the territory of any State; and

b) as State of Registry or State of the Operator, when the State of Occurrence is not aware of a serious incident.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish procedures for forwarding accident/serious incident notifications to the States involved and, when

applicable, to ICAO, in the following situations where it is not the State of Occurrence:

a) as State of Registry, in the case of an occurrence in a non-Contracting State or outside the territory of any State; and

b) as State of Registry or State of the Operator, when the State of Occurrence is not aware of a serious incident.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-08

AIG/08SUDAN



6.355; 6.357; 6.361;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not established requirements to protect the evidence and maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its contents for

such a period as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation, including protection against further damage, access

by unauthorized persons, pilfering or deterioration. In addition, procedures have not been established for ensuring that in

the event of an accident, all ATS communication recordings and documents associated with the flight are secured and

placed in safe keeping. Moreover, there are no procedures in place for the read-out of the flight recorders without delay

although it is done in practice.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish requirements to protect the evidence and maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its contents for

such a period as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation, including protection against further damage, access

by unauthorized persons, pilfering or deterioration. Procedures should also be developed for ensuring that in the event of

an accident, all ATS communication recordings and documents associated with the flight are secured and placed in safe

keeping, for the read-out of the flight recorders without delay and are made available to investigators for investigation

purposes.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-09

AIG/09SUDAN



6.369;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for inviting to participate in the

investigation:

a) the operator, when neither the State of Registry nor the State of the Operator appoints an accredited representative; and

b) the organizations responsible for the type design and the final assembly of the aircraft, when neither the State of

Design nor the State of Manufacture appoints accredited representatives.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for inviting to participate in the

investigation:

a) the operator, when neither the State of Registry nor the State of the Operator appoints an accredited representative; and

b) the organizations responsible for the type design and the final assembly of the aircraft, when neither the State of

Design nor the State of Manufacture appoints accredited representatives.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-10

AIG/10SUDAN



6.373; 6.375; 6.377; 6.379;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures for:

a) ensuring compliance with occupational health and safety legislation during the investigation process; and

b) carrying out examination or testing of aircraft parts or components, when necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish procedures for:

a) ensuring compliance with occupational health and safety legislation during the investigation process; and

b) carrying out examination or testing of aircraft parts or components, when necessary.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-11

AIG/11SUDAN



6.393; 6.397;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures for appointing an accredited representative, in particular when specifically

requested to do so by the State conducting an investigation (for an accident to an aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over

2 250 kg) or, as the State having suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens, for sending an expert to the State of

Occurrence.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish procedures for appointing an accredited representative, in particular when specifically

requested to do so by the State conducting an investigation (for an accident to an aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over

2 250 kg) and, as the State having suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens, for sending an expert to the State of

Occurrence.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-12

AIG/12SUDAN



6.409; 6.417;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for sending a copy of the draft final

report for comments:

a) through the State of the Operator to the operator; and

b) through the State of Design and State of Manufacture to the organizations responsible for the type design and the final

assembly of the aircraft.

In addition, as a State participating in an investigation, the AAICD has not established procedures for preventing from

circulation, publishing, or giving unauthorized access to a draft report or any part thereof, or any documents obtained

during an investigation without the express consent of the State which conducted the investigation, unless such reports or

documents have been already published or released by that latter State.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for sending a copy of the draft final

report for comments:

a) through the State of the Operator to the operator; and

b) through the State of Design and State of Manufacture to the organizations responsible for the type design and the final

assembly of the aircraft.

In addition, the AAICD should, as a State participating in an investigation, establish procedures for preventing from

circulation, publishing, or giving unauthorized access to a draft report or any part thereof, or any documents obtained

during an investigation without the express consent of the State which conducted the investigation, unless such reports or

documents have been already published or released by that latter State.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-13

AIG/13SUDAN



6.423;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8 X

FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation of accidents or incidents, to address,

when appropriate, any safety recommendations arising from its investigations to accident investigation authorities in other

State(s) concerned and, when ICAO documents are involved, to ICAO.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation of accidents or incidents, to address,

when appropriate, any safety recommendations arising from its investigations to accident investigation authorities in other

State(s) concerned and, when ICAO documents are involved, to ICAO.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-14

AIG/14SUDAN



6.435; 6.437;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The AAICD has not established procedures for preparing and sending accident data reports to ICAO, involving aircraft of a

maximum take-off mass over 2 250 kg, as soon as practicable after the investigation is finished and for preparing and

sending the incident data report to ICAO if conducting an investigation into an incident of an aircraft of a maximum mass

of over 5 700 kg.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should establish procedures for preparing and sending accident data reports to ICAO, involving aircraft of a

maximum take-off mass over 2 250 kg, as soon as practicable after the investigation is finished and for preparing and

sending the incident data report to ICAO if conducting an investigation into an incident of an aircraft of a maximum mass

of over 5 700 kg.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-6-15

AIG/15SUDAN



6.509;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The accident and incident database available at the AAICD, including the one from its accident and incident reporting

system, is not developed in a standardized format to facilitate the effective analysis of information obtained.

RECOMMENDATION:

The AAICD should implement an accident and incident database, including the one from its accident and incident

reporting system, in a standardized format to facilitate the effective analysis of information obtained.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-01

ANS/01SUDAN


AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES

7.003;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 X CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not developed and promulgated any legislation to ensure that air navigation services (ANS) called for under

Article 28 of the Chicago Convention are provided.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should develop and promulgate a legislation to ensure that ANS called for under Article 28 of the Chicago

Convention are provided.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-02

ANS/02SUDAN



7.017;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has not established a procedure for the formulation and distribution of guidance material on ANRs to all ANS

providers and operators.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish a procedure for the formulation and distribution of guidance material on ANRs to all ANS

providers and operators.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-03

ANS/03SUDAN



7.045;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Sudan has not established a mechanism/system for the elimination of deficiencies identif ied by the Planning and

Implementation Regional Group (PIRG).

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish a mechanism/system for the elimination of deficiencies identified by the PIRG.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-04

ANS/04SUDAN



7.033; 7.035; 7.037; 7.039; 7.041; 7.053; 7.059; 7.063;

7.083; 7.087; 7.089; 7.203; 7.207; 7.231; 7.233; 7.271;

7.275; 7.287; 7.289; 7.327; 7.331; 7.343; 7.345; 7.375;

7.379; 7.391; 7.395; 7.419; 7.421; 7.423; 7.435; 7.437;

7.455; 7.487; 7.489; 7.493; 7.505; 7.507;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 X CE-4 X CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The SCAA has not established a safety oversight system in the ANS areas. As a result, the SCAA does not have an

effective ANS safety oversight capability due to lack of policies, procedures, surveillance programmes, and qualified and

experienced personnel with the legal authority to regulate and oversee in the fields of air traffic management (ATM),

Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Operations (PANS-OPS), AIS, aeronautical charts, communications, navigation

and surveillance (CNS), meteorological services (MET) and search and rescue (SAR).

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish an effective safety oversight system in the ANS areas, including the appointment of qualified

and experienced inspectors with the legal authority, comprehensive policies and procedures, and effective surveillance

programmes in the fields of ATM, PANS-OPS, AIS, aeronautical charts, CNS, MET and SAR.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-05

ANS/05SUDAN



7.043;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that the ANS providers adopt policies and procedures on human factors principles.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the ANS providers adopt policies and procedures on human factors principles.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-06

ANS/06SUDAN



7.081; 7.085;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that the ATS provider develops policies and procedures for determining the capacity of the

ATS system, including the number of staff required to ensure the provision of an adequate ATS system and the recruitment

and retention of qualified and experienced ATS staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the ATS provider develops policies and procedures for determining the capacity of the ATS

system, including the number of staff required to ensure the provision of an adequate ATS system and the recruitment and

retention of qualified and experienced ATS staff.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-07

ANS/07SUDAN



7.161; 7.163; 7.165; 7.167; 7.169; 7.171; 7.173; 7.175;

7.177; 7.179; 7.181; 7.183; 7.185; 7.187; 7.189;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8 X

FINDING:

The SCAA has not established an ATS safety programme and a runway safety programme, nor has it identified the

required resources or developed guidelines to implement such programmes. In addition, there is no system for reporting

ATC incidents and safety reviews are not regularly conducted by qualified personnel in accordance with the provisions of

ICAO Doc 4444.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish an ATS safety programme and a runway safety programme and should identify the resources

required and develop guidelines to implement such programmes. In addition, a system for reporting ATC incidents should

also be established and safety reviews should be regularly conducted by qualified personnel in accordance with the

provisions of ICAO Doc 4444.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-08

ANS/08SUDAN



7.111; 7.113;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that the separation minima implemented by the ATC facilities are in accordance with ICAO

PANS-ATM and Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS) and are listed in the AIP.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the separation minima implemented by the ATC facilities are in accordance with ICAO

PANS-ATM and SUPPS and are listed in the AIP.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-09

ANS/09SUDAN



7.115; 7.117;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

Although the SCAA is sending traffic information to the regional monitoring agency (RMA) of the AFI region, it has not

established and implemented monitoring mechanisms for RVSM, including verifying that aircraft and air operators are

approved for operation in RVSM airspace.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish and implement appropriate monitoring mechanisms for RVSM, including verifying that

aircraft and air operators are approved for operation in RVSM airspace.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-10

ANS/10SUDAN



7.119; 7.121;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has not ensured the implementation of procedures for read-back of safety-related parts and other relevant

information of ATC clearances and instructions, and the control of movement of persons or vehicles on the manoeuvring

area of the aerodrome, in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 11.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that procedures for read-back of safety-related parts and other relevant information of ATC

clearances and instructions, and the control of movement of persons or vehicles on the manoeuvring area of the aerodrome,

in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 11, are implemented.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-11

ANS/11SUDAN



7.267; 7.301; 7.303; 7.305; 7.311;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

A properly organized quality system has not been established for AIS services. In addition, there is no mechanism to

ensure that aeronautical data quality requirements related to publication resolution and data integrity has been established

in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 15.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that a properly organized quality system be established for AIS services. In addition, a

mechanism should be established to ensure that aeronautical data quality requirements related to publication resolution and

data integrity are in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 15.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-12

ANS/12SUDAN



7.351; 7.353; 7.355; 7.359; 7.361; 7.363;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The cartographic services are provided by the National Survey Authority and the Directorate of Aerodrome Engineering

within the SCAA. However, the SCAA does not ensure that:

a) aeronautical charts are accurate before they are made available to users;

b) the establishment of a mechanism for aeronautical data quality requirements related to the data integrity and charting

resolutions are in accordance with the provisions of Tables 1 to 5 in Appendix 6 of ICAO Annex 4; and

c) provision of cartographic services by the National Survey Authority is in accordance with ICAO Annex 4.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that:

a) aeronautical charts are accurate before they are made available to users;

b) the establishment of a mechanism for aeronautical data quality requirements related to the data integrity and charting

resolutions are in accordance with the provisions of Tables 1 to 5 in Appendix 6 of ICAO Annex 4; and





COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-13

ANS/13SUDAN



7.241; 7.243; 7.245; 7.247; 7.249; 7.251; 7.253; 7.255;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has not established procedures and guidance material to ensure that the PANS-OPS service is provided in

accordance with the requirements established in ICAO Doc 8168 and Annex 4. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that

all procedure design documentation is retained by the service provider so as to allow any data anomalies or errors found

during the production, maintenance or operational use of the procedure to be corrected.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish procedures and guidance material to ensure that the PANS-OPS service is provided in

accordance with the requirements established in ICAO Doc 8168 and Annex 4. In addition, the SCAA should ensure that

all procedure design documentation is retained by the service provider so as to allow any data anomalies or errors found

during the production, maintenance or operational use of the procedure to be corrected.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-14

ANS/14SUDAN



7.131;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has establ ished procedures and guidance material for the implementat ion of ICAO Annex 10 by the

aeronautical telecommunication service provider. However, there is no documented coordination procedures between the

SCAA and the Na t iona l Te l ecommunica t ion Corpo ra t ion , wh ich i s t he au tho r i t y fo r l i c e n s i n g a e r o n a u t i c a l

radiocommunication stations.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish documented coordination procedures with the National Telecommunication Corporation,

which is the authority for licensing aeronautical radiocommunication stations.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-15

ANS/15SUDAN



7.415; 7.451; 7.453; 7.467; 7.473; 7.475;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

Formal arrangements for the provision of MET services, including an operational agreement, have not been established

between the meteorological authority of Sudan and the SCAA. In addition, a properly organized quality system containing

procedures, processes and resources has not been established for MET services in accordance with the provisions of ICAO

Annex 3.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that formal arrangements for the provision of MET services, including an operational agreement,

be established with the meteorological authority of Sudan and that a properly organized quality system containing

procedures, processes and resources is established for MET services in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 3.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-16

ANS/16SUDAN



7.459;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that the wind sensors for local routine reports are appropriately sited to give the best

practicable indications at touchdown zone.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the wind sensors for local routine reports are appropriately sited to give the best practicable

indications at touchdown zone.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-17

ANS/17SUDAN



7.465;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that MET offices issue wind shear warnings for aerodromes where wind shear is considered a

safety factor.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that MET offices issue wind shear warnings for aerodromes where wind shear is considered a

safety factor.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-7-18

ANS/18SUDAN



7.515; 7.517; 7.519; 7.529; 7.531; 7.533; 7.535; 7.537;

7.539; 7.541; 7.543; 7.545;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 X CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that the SAR services meet the provisions of ICAO Annex 12, including sufficient qualified

staff who are skilled in the coordination and operational functions and who have prepared detailed plans of SAR operations

within the search and rescue regions (SRRs) for which Sudan is responsible.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the SAR services meet the provisions of ICAO Annex 12, including sufficient qualified staff

who are skilled in coordination and operational functions and who have prepared detailed plans of SAR operations within

the SRR for which Sudan is responsible.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-01

AGA/01SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.081;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The national regulations require the certification of all international and public use aerodromes; however, no aerodrome

has been certified in Sudan.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should certify all the international and public use aerodromes in accordance with their national regulations.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-02

AGA/02SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.031; 8.033; 8.035; 8.045; 8.069;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 X CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 CE-8

FINDING:

Sudan has not yet established an organizational structure for the certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes

functions, responsibilities and job descriptions of aerodrome regulatory technical personnel, guidance material for each

technical specialist area and inspector credentials.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should establish an organizational structure for certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes functions,

responsibilities and job descriptions of aerodrome regulatory technical personnel, guidance material for each technical

specialist area and inspector credentials.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-03

AGA/03SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.083; 8.085; 8.087; 8.089; 8.091; 8.093; 8.099; 8.101;

8.103; 8.105; 8.169; 8.171; 8.201;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has not established a process for the certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes:

a) submittal of a formal application form;

b) referrals to competent State entities for clearances with necessary documentation;

c) coordination with local ATS authorities regarding integration of activities;

d) ensuring that the aerodrome operators recruit an adequate number of competent personnel;

e) acceptance of non-compliance with the requirements, including risk assessment and notification;

f) use of checklist for the certification process;

g) procedure for evaluating the impact of changing aerodrome physical characteristics;

h) assessment of aerodrome visual aids;

i) amendment of an aerodrome certificate; and

j) a filing system, with a certificate register for each aerodrome.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish a process for the certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes:

a) submittal of a formal application form;

b) referrals to competent State entities for clearances with necessary documentation;

c) coordination with local ATS authorities regarding integration of activities;

d) ensuring that the aeredrome operators recruit an adequate number of competent personnel;

e) acceptance of non-compliance with the requirements, including risk assessment and notification;

f) use of checklist for the certification process;

g) procedure for evaluating the impact of changing aerodrome physical characteristics;

h) assessment of aerodrome visual aids;

i) amendment of an aerodrome certificate; and

j) a filing system, with a certificate register for each aerodrome.




Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-03

AGA/03SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.083; 8.085; 8.087; 8.089; 8.091; 8.093; 8.099; 8.101;

8.103; 8.105; 8.169; 8.171; 8.201;

COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-04

AGA/04SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.063; 8.115; 8.119; 8.121; 8.281; 8.325;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has not developed procedures and guidance material for aerodrome operators and regulatory staff with respect

to:

a) the submittal, review and subsequent amendments of aerodrome manuals;

b) evaluating the impact of safety whenever a change to the aerodrome facility or equipment is proposed;

c) preventing aircraft from entering permanently closed runways and taxiways;

d) making aerodrome operators aware of all the requirements for granting an aerodrome certificate;

e) obstacle control; and

f) the return of a runway to operational status after a runway surface overlay.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should develop procedures and guidance material for aerodrome operators and regulatory staff with respect to:

a) the submittal, review and subsequent amendments of aerodrome manuals;

b) evaluating the impact of safety whenever a change to the aerodrome facility or equipment is proposed;

c) preventing aircraft from entering permanently closed runways and taxiways;

d) making aerodrome operators aware of all the requirements for granting an aerodrome certificate;

e) obstacle control; and

f) the return of a runway to operational status after a runway surface overlay.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-05

AGA/05SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.123; 8.363; 8.365; 8.407; 8.409;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 X CE-7 CE-8 X

FINDING:

The national regulations require the establishment of a safety management system (SMS) as part of the aerodrome manual;

however, only one aerodrome manual has been submitted and the SMS has not been formally implemented at any of the

aerodromes in Sudan. The SCAA has not issued guidance for the development, implementation and evaluation of the SMS.

In addition, as part of this system, the State does not analyse accident and incident occurrences, does not enable the

exchange of safety information across the aerodrome industry and does not require aerodrome operators to ensure that

organizations performing activities at the aerodrome meet safety requirements laid down by the aerodrome operator.

RECOMMENDATION:

Sudan should ensure that aerodrome manuals are submitted and that the SMS is establishes as part of the aerodrome

manual in accordance wi th the i r na t ional regula t ions . The SCAA should i ssue guidance for the deve lopment ,

implementation and evaluation of the SMS. In addition, as part of this system, Sudan should analyse accident and incident

occurrences, ensure the exchange of safety information across the aerodrome industry and require aerodrome operators to

ensure that organizations performing activities at the aerodrome meet safety requirements laid down by the aerodrome

operator.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-06

AGA/06SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.273;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators remove objects that are not required for air navigation purposes from

the runway strip.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that aerodrome operators remove objects that are not required for air navigation purposes from

the runway strip.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-07

AGA/07SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.135;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

A properly organized quality system has not been established in Sudan for ensuring that the accuracy, integrity and protection

requirements for aeronautical data reported by the aerodrome operator are met throughout the data transfer process.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that the accuracy, integrity and protection requirements for aeronautical data reported by the aerodrome

operator are met throughout the data transfer process.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-08

AGA/08SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.147; 8.257;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators maintain good friction characteristics and low rolling resistance on

the runways. Furthermore, the SCAA has not specified minimum friction level and maintenance planning level to enable

aerodrome operators to initiate maintenance actions and report slippery conditions due to rubber build-up on the runway.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that aerodrome operators maintain good friction characteristics and low rolling resistance on the

runways. In addition, the SCAA should specify minimum friction level and maintenance planning level to enable

aerodrome operators to initiate maintenance actions and report slippery conditions due to rubber build-up on the runway.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-09

AGA/09SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.327; 8.329;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 CE-8 X

FINDING:

The national regulations require aerodrome operators to conduct bird strike hazard assessments; however, none has been

conducted. In addition, Sudan does not forward bird strike reports to ICAO.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that all aerodromes in Sudan conduct bird strike hazard assessments in accordance with national

regulations and forward bird strike reports to ICAO.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-10

AGA/10SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.293; 8.295;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators conduct a full scale disaster drill and the review of the aerodrome

emergency plans in accordance with their national regulations. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome

operators include human factors in the development of their aerodrome emergency plans.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that aerodrome operators conduct a full scale disaster drill and the review of the aerodrome

emergency plans in accordance with their national regulations. In addition, the SCAA should ensure that aerodrome

operators include human factors in the development of their aerodrome emergency plans.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-11

AGA/11SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.203; 8.205; 8.207; 8.217; 8.221; 8.225; 8.227; 8.231;

8.259;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators' plans for signs and markings meet national requirements. In addition,

the SCAA does not ensure that these plans are integrated as a whole into the runway incursion programme to prevent

vehicles or aircraft from unauthorized entry to a runway, taxiway or a permanently closed or unserviceable area.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that aerodrome operators' plans for signs and markings meet national requirements. In addition,

the SCAA should ensure that these plans are integrated as a whole into the runway incursion programme to prevent

vehicles or aircraft from unauthorized entry to a runway, taxiway or a permanently closed or unserviceable area.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-12

AGA/12SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.311; 8.315;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA does not ensure that rescue and fire fighting (RFF) personnel meet the minimum response time required in their

national regulations. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that RFF personnel are appropriately trained, including live

fire training with pressure-fed fuel fires.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should ensure that RFF personnel meet the minimum response time required by the national regulations and

ensure that they are appropriately trained, including live fire training with pressure-fed fuel fires.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-13

AGA/13SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.367; 8.369; 8.373; 8.375; 8.377;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.

CE-1 CE-2 X CE-3 CE-4 CE-5 X CE-6 CE-7 X CE-8

FINDING:

The SCAA has not developed a regulatory statement defining the circumstances and rationale under which aeronautical

studies and/or risk assessments may be used, and no guidance has been made available to aerodrome operators and

regulatory staff on how to develop and evaluate aeronautical risk assessments. The SCAA does not have a process to

control the use of aeronautical studies/risk assessments in granting exemptions to requirements.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should develop a regulatory statement defining the circumstances and rationale under which aeronautical

studies and/or risk assessments may be used, and guidance should be made available to aerodrome operators and regulatory

staff on how to develop and evaluate aeronautical risk assessments. The SCAA should develop a process to control the use

of aeronautical studies/risk assessments in granting exemptions to requirements.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:


Auditee:

Audit Period: 21/11/2006 - 30/11/2006

APPENDIX 1-8-14

AGA/14SUDAN


AERODROMES

8.401; 8.403; 8.405; 8.411; 8.413;

DOCUMENT REFERENCE:


finding.


FINDING:

The SCAA has not established a formal aerodrome surveillance programme to ensure that aerodrome operators comply

with regulatory requirements. Furthermore, there are no procedures for dealing with deficiencies found during an

aerodrome inspection.

RECOMMENDATION:

The SCAA should establish an effective surveillance programme to ensure that aerodrome operators comply with

regulatory requirements, including procedures for dealing with deficiencies found during an aerodrome inspection.




COMMENTS BY ICAO:



APPENDIX 2

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEMLACK OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION (%)

29.44

36.07

45.1341.99

57.02

33.67

43.28

47.46

13.64

27.03

51.96

87.50

40.14

49.48

65.79 65.91

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Primary AviationLegislation

Specific OperatingRegulations

Civil Aviation Systemand Safety Oversight

Functions

Qualification andTraining of Technical

Staff

Procedures andTechnical Guidance

Licensing andCertificationObligations

SurveillanceObligations

Resolution of SafetyConcerns

Global: (62) Audited States: 41.75% Audit of: SUDAN 50.17%

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 3-1-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO PRIMARY AVIATION LEGISLATION AND

CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS

AUDIT FINDING LEG/01

Sudan developed and promulgated Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) which cover some provisions of the Annexes. In addition, the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) has developed Sudanese Civil Aviation Regulations (SUCARs) which should cover the provisions of all of the safety-related Annexes; however, most of the SUCARs have not yet been promulgated. The SCAA has established a procedure to address amendments to ICAO SARPs or for the identification and notification of differences to ICAO. However, this procedure has yet to be implemented.

STATE’S COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS∗

The SCAA agrees with the team recommendation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) PROPOSED∗ ACTION OFFICE

ESTIMATED IMPLEMENTATION

DATE(S) 1-The Director General will ensure that the SUCARs are in line with ICAO SARPs and promulgate them accordingly. A transition period for this change will be 6 months after coming into force.

SSSC August 2008

2-The SCAA will implement its procedure for the review of amendments to the ICAO Annexes for their timely implementation or for the identification and notification to ICAO of differences, if any.

SSSC December 2007

3-The significant differences will be identified and published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) of Sudan.

SSSC and ANS December 2007

∗ Text reproduced as submitted by Sudan

APPENDIX 3-1-2




Sudan has not promulgated regulations regarding the interception of civil aircraft above its territory and for the mandatory compliance to interception orders from other States for any civil aircraft under its registry or operated by its operators.





DATE(S) Sudan will promulgate regulations regarding the interception of civil aircraft above its territory and for the mandatory compliance to interception orders from other State for any civil aircraft under its registry or operated by its operators

Legal Office/ANS December 2007


APPENDIX 3-1-3




The Civil Aviation Act, 1999, the ANRs and the only promulgated SUCARs specify sanctions and penalties in the event of a contravention. However, the established penalties are insufficient to be considered an economic deterrent. In addition, Sudan has not yet established a policy and procedures for the enforcement of its primary aviation legislation and regulations in the State.





DATE(S) Sudan will revise the Civil Aviation Act, 1999 and the regulations to increase the penalties accordingly to reflect current economic level and thus provide an effective deterrent for the contravention of any regulations issued pursuant to the act. In addition, Sudan will develop a policy and procedures for the enforcement of the aviation regulations applicable in the State

SSSC June 2008


APPENDIX 3-1-4




Although the SCAA has published a comprehensive AIP, the significant differences to ICAO SARPs and procedures are not included, in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.





DATE(S) Will be included in the AIP, in accordance with the requirements of Annex 15, paragraph 4.1.2.

SSSC June 2008


APPENDIX 3-1-5




Sudan is following the provisions of ICAO Annex 5 in practice; however, Sudan has not yet established formal requirements with respect to the specific units of measurement to be used in air and ground operations.





DATE(S) Sudan has adopted BSI Standards (British Standards Institution). However, SSSC will take the responsibility for promulgating the formal requirements with respect to specific units of measurement to be used in air and ground operations. In this respect ICAO Annex 5 will be included in SUCAR Part 5.

SSSC December 2007


APPENDIX 3-2-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

AUDIT FINDING ORG/01

The Civil Aviation Act, 1999 establishes the SCAA as the authority responsible for supervising all matters relating to civil aviation in Sudan. However, other authorities which provide services to the SCAA such as weather information and reports, charts and telecommunications are providing their services without any coordination with the SCAA. As a result, the SCAA cannot ensure that there is no overlap of responsibilities and which authority is responsible for coordinating ICAO-related matters.





DATE(S) SCAA will sign an agreement with service providers such as weather information, telecom, charts and other service providers, delineating the area of responsibility and ensuring SCAA safety oversight over the service providers.

SCAA Legal Office

and ANS December 2007


APPENDIX 3-2-2



Sudan has not clearly separated its responsibilities as the State regulatory authority from those as the State providing services in the areas of aerodromes, aircraft operations, aeronautical information services (AIS), and air traffic services (ATS). This may create a potential conflict of interest between the regulatory enforcement functions and the functions of a service provider.


The SCAA agrees with the finding of the ICAO audit team.



DATE(S) Sudan will establish a clear separation between its State regulatory functions and service provision functions in the areas of aerodromes, aircraft operations, AIS and ATS in order to ensure that there is no potential conflict of interest .

DGCA December 2008


APPENDIX 3-2-3



Sudan has not established a mechanism to ensure that the SCAA has sufficient qualified technical staff to enable the State to meet its national and international obligations related to civil aviation safety oversight in the areas of personnel licensing, aircraft operations, aerodromes and air navigation services. In addition, due to the disparity in salaries between the industry and the SCAA, the SCAA is unable to attract and retain adequately qualified and experienced technical staff.





DATE(S) Sudan will establish a mechanism to ensure that the SCAA has sufficient qualified technical staff to enable the State to meet its national and international obligations related to civil aviation safety oversight in the areas of personnel licensing, aircraft operations, aerodromes and air navigation services . In addition, Sudan will ensure that the SCAA is able to attract and retain adequately qualified and experienced technical staff. The Cabinet has issued a Decree permitting the SCAA to enhance salaries and payment for qualified technical staff.

DGCA December 2008


APPENDIX 3-2-4



The SCAA is providing some training on an ad hoc basis to its technical staff and some of the training conducted does not cover essential elements to maintain a qualified workforce. The SCAA has not developed formal training programmes and policies that make a commitment to provide initial, recurrent and specialized training or on-the-job training (OJT), including attending workshops and seminars for the regulatory staff, with the exception of airworthiness. In addition, the SCAA has not established a system for the maintenance of technical personnel training records.





DATE(S) The SCAA will develop and implement formal training programmes that cover essential element to maintain a qualified workforce.

Training Directorate By December 2009

In addition, training policies will provide initial, recurrent and specialized training or OJT, including attending workshops and seminars for the regulatory staff, dealing with personnel licensing aircraft operations, aerodromes, accident investigations and air navigation services.


Furthermore, the SCAA will establish a formal system for the maintenance of technical personnel training records.



APPENDIX 3-2-5



The central library of the SCAA is in the process of being fully established and the personnel tasked with maintaining the library will be receiving training for administering the library. Several directorates are not using the central library as their main source of acquiring the needed documents; consequently, the documents at the directorates were outdated. In addition, the SCAA has not established a method to ensure receipt, control and distribution of technical documents, ICAO Annexes, and guidance material.





DATE(S) The SCAA will fully establish the central library and implement method to ensure receipt, control and distribution of technical documents, ICAO Annexes and guidance material

DGCA December 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING

AUDIT FINDING PEL/01

The SCAA has not established procedures for re-establishing the privileges of an expired licence.





DATE(S) 1- ANR part IX and relevant SCAP shall be amended to

include regulation for re issuance of an expired license. LIC October 2007

2- Regulation shall be based on attending courses and proficiency checks. LIC October 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-2



The SCAA delegated functions such as periodic proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and instrument rating checks to some pilots within the industry. However, the SCAA does not require that these reports be submitted to the SCAA, specifically those related to crews that have not performed their duties in accordance with prescribed procedures and privileges of their licences. In addition, the designated flight examiners are not kept under the supervisory and technical control of the SCAA and the SCAA has no means to identify when a designated examiner does not perform his/her duties in accordance with prescribed procedures.


SUDAN CAA AGREES WITH ICAO TEAM RECOMMENDATION.



DATE(S) 1- A circular No 04/2007 addressed to all operators requiring

them to submit to the CAA copies of the proficiency, en-route, type rating, instrument rating, and skill test reports etc. irrespective of the net result attained by the candidate.

LIC. September 2007

2- A procedure to ensure the positive control and supervision over the designated examiner shall be structured and implemented.

LIC. September 2007

3- A plan to carry out the aforesaid procedures shall be based on two checks be conducted by the designated examiner before applying for his designation renewal

LIC. September 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-3



The SCAA has implemented procedures for the validation and conversion of foreign licences. However, the procedures established do not require the personnel licensing staff to contact the issuing State systematically to ensure the validity of the licence to be converted or validated. In addition, the SCAA has not implemented requirements to be met by the applicant before the conversion of the licence, if the original licence is not in full compliance with Annex 1.





DATE(S) 1- The license conversion and validation requirements

procedures in the ANR IX & SCAP Pel. Shall be amended to include a system of contacting the issuing authority to ensure the validity of the license to be converted or validated. The procedure shall require co-ordination between S CAA and Sudan Diplomatic mission in the issuing states.

LIC. October 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-4



The SCAA has not implemented an adequate system for the medical certification of its licence holders. Since the system in place does not include a medical assessor, the evaluation of the medical reports submitted by the designated medical examiners are not evaluated. Moreover, the SCAA has not established procedures for the medical assessment in cases where medical standards prescribed in Annex 1, Chapter 6, are not fully met by a licence holder.





DATE(S) 1- A comprehensive system shall be adopted particularly to

include. a- Records of medical reports. b- Recruiting a medical assessor. c- Establishing evaluation process

LIC. December 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-5



The SCAA has not implemented an adequate system for the designation of medical examiners. Some of the designated medical examiners have not received training in aviation medicine and the SCAA has not developed a training programme that includes initial and refresher training or attendance to seminars and workshops on aviation medicine. Moreover, the SCAA does not conduct any supervision or control activities over its designated medical examiners.





DATE(S) 1- The SCAA will promulgate procedures for recruiting

Aviation Medical Assessors to ensure a supervision and control over the Designated Aviation Medical Examiners.

LIC. March 2008

2- The Designated Medical Examiners will be required by the SCAA to participate in Seminars and Workshops

LIC March 2008


APPENDIX 3-3-6



The Personnel Licensing Section within the Safety and Flight Operations Directorate (SFOD) of the SCAA has not established requirements for aviation personnel to demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the language used for radiotelephony communications. Moreover, the SCAA has not yet established a plan to implement relevant ICAO provisions to ensure that licence holders would demonstrate their ability to speak and understand the language used for radiotelephony communications at the level required for their licence as of March 2008.





DATE(S) 1- The SCAA is currently using English language in all

documentation and operation. Ref. ANR Part IX Vol 1 & 2.

LIC. March 2008

2- The ANR Part IX shall be amended to require proficiency in English language level 4 to qualify for conversion or validation

LIC. March 2008


APPENDIX 3-3-7



The Personnel Licensing Section within the SFOD has not established a well-organized record-keeping system to maintain a personal file for each applicant and licence holder, which would contain all correspondence, applications, assessments, examination results and other licensing documentation. Records are kept by air operators, and designated flight examiners do not submit to the SCAA a copy of results on all periodic proficiency checks, enroute checks, type rating checks, and instrument rating checks.





DATE(S) 1- A filing and recording system is under process LIC. October 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-8



The SCAA has not established an adequate system for the certification (authorization) and oversight of aviation training organizations such as the National Civil Aviation Institute, by which the SCAA would ensure compliance with established requirements, the development of a training and procedures manual, the qualification and competency of instructors, appropriate facilities and equipment, etc., as contained in Annex 1.





DATE(S) 1- The SCAA has issued a Doc No o1 establishing procedure

for the certification of aviation training organization. LIC October 2007

2- The ANR Part IX shall be amended accordingly LIC October 2007


APPENDIX 3-3-9



The Personnel Licensing Section within the Directorate of Airworthiness of the SFOD has established procedures for the issuance, validation and conversion of aircraft maintenance technicians, engineers and mechanics licences. However, the SCAA has not established a method or procedure for the conduct of oversight of the aircraft maintenance licensed personnel. No evidence of enforcement actions taken by the SCAA with respect to aircraft maintenance technician/engineer/mechanic licences was available for review.





DATE(S) The CAA will establish a procedure for the conduct of oversight of the aircraft Maintenance licensed personnel and will enforce actions against licenses as deemed necessary.

LIC June 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS CERTIFICATION AND SUPERVISION

AUDIT FINDING OPS/01

The SCAA has established procedures and guidance material through the approval of the Sudan Civil Aviation Procedures (SCAP-PEL and SCAP-OPS) concerning personnel licensing and aircraft operations safety oversight activities. However, the SCAPs are not followed in detail by the inspectors in their routine activities.





DATE(S) A training plan& scheduled round the year program, in co-ordination with the CAA training institute, is under construction to promote inspectors' familiarity with the SCAPs and its implementation.

FLI.OPS. October 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-2



The SFOD has not established and documented coordination procedures on certification and approval activities with the Airworthiness Directorate. The approval of manuals or procedures which are related to airworthiness and operations, such as the minimum equipment list (MEL) or reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) operations, is conducted without a clear definition on the responsibility for approval, and the required assessment and appropriate evaluation of their contents are not established in a coordinated manner in either of the inspector handbooks.





DATE(S) A co-ordination procedure on certification and specific approvals, with the Airworthiness Directorate is under construction.

FLI.OPS January 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-3



The SCAPs provide comprehensive procedures to accept or approve, as applicable, the contents of the applicant’s operation manual, including the review of the organizational structure and the duties and responsibilities of the managing personnel. However, the SFOD inspectors are not familiar with and do not follow SCAPs procedures in detail. Consequently, one major air operator in Sudan has not implemented several ANR requirements and some of the manuals reviewed by the ICAO audit team had no evidence of formal approval by the SFOD.





DATE(S) 1- All Operators shall be instructed, to include in their operation Manuals all mandatory materials required by SCAA, and submit copies of their respective Ops. Manuals for review and approval.

OPS. October 2007

2- SFOD inspectors shall be instructed by circulars to follow approval procedures in the SCAPS-OPS and ensure implantation.

OPS. October 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-4



The SFOD has not established an adequate filing system where all documents related to the certification process for obtaining an air operator certificate (AOC) are systematically stored, and the SFOD does not keep records of manuals approved or of amendments which have been authorized.





DATE(S) A- A filing system specialist shall join the SFOD and shall receive before Oct. 2007 the relative necessary training.

FLT.OPS. October 2007

B- The current system is being reviewed and an adequate filing system shall be established to address the ICAO recommendations.

FLT.OPS. October 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-5



Sudan has not established and promulgated several provisions under ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 6 regarding flight data recorders (FDRs) and cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and the SFOD does not conduct sufficient oversight in order to verify implementation.





DATE(S) Inspectors Handbook shall include procedures on how to ensure the verification of compliance by AOC holders.

FLT.OPS. March 2007

SCAA shall develop and promulgate several provisions under ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter 6, regarding FDRs and CVRs.

FLT.OPS. August 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-6



The SFOD does not ensure that air operators establish in their operations manual standard operating procedures (SOP) for each phase of flight and instructions on the clarification and acceptance of air traffic control (ATC) clearances, particularly where terrain clearance is involved.





DATE(S) The ANR shall be amended to the effect that operators should include in their Ops Manuals & SOPs requirements to ensure , on each phase of flight, the clarification and acceptance of Air Traffic Control (A.T.C) clearances, particularly when terrain clearance in involved.

FLT.OPS October 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-7



Sudan has not established requirements for the implementation of a safety management system or an accident prevention and flight safety programme in the ANRs in accordance with ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 3 provisions. The ICAO audit team visited a major air operator and confirmed that the air operator had not implemented such a system.





DATE(S) The SCAA will promulgate SUCAR Part 6 to include requirements for implementation of SMS within the companies.

FLT.OPS March 2008

Inspectors are required to conduct audit and surveillance on AOC holders to ensure their compliance with SUCAR Part 6. FLT.OPS March 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-8



The SFOD does not ensure that air operators develop, publish, distribute and revise a training manual, as part of the flight safety documents system, which includes training programmes and syllabi for initial, recurrent, transition (conversion), re-qualification, upgrade, recency of experience, familiarization, differences, safety management and/or other specialized training, as applicable. Manuals reviewed by the ICAO audit team showed no evidence of formal approval by the SCAA, and training records revealed that training had not been provided to some of the flight operations officers within the air operator. In addition, the flight operations officers are issued a licence which does not comply with the provisions of Annexes 1 and 6 for flight operations officers/flight dispatchers.





DATE(S) A – The SCAA shall require all operators to develop, publish and distribute a CAA approved Training Manual as part of the Operation Manual & the Flight Safety Documents System.


B- Separate approvals are constructed and issued for specified manual which constitute parts of the Operations Manual.

FLT.OPS March 2008

C- SFOD shall instruct inspectors to exert attention through adequate surveillance to ensure that Operations comply with the training requirements establish in the ANR.

FLT.OPS March 2008

D- The SCAA ANR part VIII Val 2 subpart 3 Air Transport Operations and Part IX personnel Licencing " and the relative Pel / Ops. SCAPs shall be amended to include Flight Operation / Dispatch methods of control and supervision of operations so as to comply with the provisions in ICAO Annex 6 and Annex 1.

FLT.OPS August 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-9



Sudan has not established requirements for air operators to establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and report on routine meteorological observations during departure and en-route and climb-out phases of the flight and special and other non-routine observations during any phase of the flight. In addition, the SFOD does not ensure that air operators establish a policy and procedures for flight crew to record and report on volcanic activity. Air operators visited by the ICAO audit team were not complying with these Annex 3 provisions.





DATE(S) 1- The ANR shall be amended ,in accordance with Annex 3 provisions, to include an item requiring flight crew on international flights to report and record observations of: A-Meteorological conditions on the different phases of flight and special other non-routine observation. B-Special aircraft observations of pre-eruption volcanic activity, a volcanic eruption or volcanic ash cloud.

FLT.OPS June 2008


APPENDIX 3-4-10



Sudan has not implemented requirements to ensure that existing air operators have established an organizational structure which includes the responsibilities and authority for the management of all ground handling functions prior to the issuance of an AOC. However, the SFOD is informally requiring this from new air operators and a ground handling procedures manual was being reviewed for approval.





DATE(S) 1-, DOC. #0 2/2007" regarding the certification of Air Handling Agency has been issued to meet the ICAO recommendation

FLT.OPS June 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-11



Sudan has not designated and notified to ICAO the appropriate authority responsible for the transport of dangerous goods by air. Furthermore, the SCAA has designated an officer to be responsible for safety oversight of dangerous goods activities; however, the designated officer has not received proper training and is not qualified to determine the granting of exemptions and approvals for the transport of dangerous goods by air. In addition, the SCAA has not established a dangerous goods training programme for its technical staff on adequate guidance for its dangerous goods inspectors.





DATE(S) 1- Sudan CAA shall notify ICAO that the appropriate

authority. responsible for transport of D.G. is FSOD/D.G. Department.

FLT.OPS December 2007

2- A training program for D.G. inspectors is under construction and shall be included in the relevant inspectors Hand Book. FLT.OPS March 2007

3- D.G. inspector's guidance shall be established and included in the relevant H.B.

Specialized D.G. training shall be provided to the D.G. inspector

FLT.OPS August 2007


APPENDIX 3-4-12



The SFOD grants specific authorizations for the transport of dangerous goods by air; however, it does not ensure that authorized air operators follow dangerous goods procedures such as the development and use of an acceptance checklist to prevent acceptance of dangerous goods for transport by air unless they are accompanied by a completed dangerous goods transport document and unless their marking, package, overpack or freight container have been inspected in accordance with the procedure contained in the Technical Instructions (TI). Also, the SFOD does not ensure that authorized operators will not load dangerous goods into the aircraft unless the appropriate loading, segregation and inspection for damage or leakage procedures are followed. In addition, the SFOD has not established inspection, surveillance and enforcement procedures with a view to achieving compliance with its dangerous goods regulations.





DATE(S) 1- FOD/D.G. Department circulated a safety notice No, 20 dated 12 th DEC.06 to all operators and GHA holding a D.G. transport approvals suspending their approvals.


2-To re-grant D.G. approvals they have to conform to the requirements stated in notice #20.


3-The above mentioned notice # 20 has been extracted from ANR XI which was approved by DGCA on 14 th NOV 06 replacing ANR XI issued and approved on 2004, the contents of which are either similar to , or adopting provisions of ICAO tech. Instructions for safe transport of D.G. by air.


4- Inspections, audits, surveillance and enforcement procedures are established and implemented.

FLT.OPS Implemented


APPENDIX 3-4-13



Dangerous goods training programmes of air operators are subject to review and approval by the SFOD, as applicable; however, the SFOD does not ensure that initial and recurrent dangerous goods training programmes have been implemented and maintained by the organizations or agencies which are involved in the transport of dangerous goods by air. In addition, the SFOD does not ensure that dangerous goods procedures and training programmes are incorporated in either the operations manual or a separate document as part of the flight safety documents system and that these training programmes are approved. A major Sudanese air operator could not show compliance with training programmes, and manuals reviewed had not been formally approved by the SFOD.





DATE(S) 1-Ref. safety notice # 20-appendix1-4-12, initial and recurrent D.G. training shall be either a part of the ops. Manual or separate document for the purpose of re-granting the D.G. transport approval.

FLT.OPS Implemented

2- A procedure to review air operators and agencies procedures for verification and compliance with approval training programs has been established in ANR XI CH.10 and approved in 2006 and implemented in March 2007.

FLT.OPS Implemented


APPENDIX 3-4-14



The SFOD does not ensure that air operators develop procedures to convey information to emergency services and to appropriate authorities in the event of an incident or accident of an aircraft carrying dangerous goods. An air operator visited by the ICAO audit team did not have clear procedures established, and the flight operations officers could not clearly describe the steps to follow in case of an emergency.





DATE(S) 1-A procedure to convey information to emergency services and appropriate authorities, in the event of incident or accident of an aircraft carrying D.G., is incorporated in ANR XI-9-6, approved in 2006 and implemented in March 2007.

FLT.OPS Implemented

2- To that effect, safety notice # 20 Referred to in appendix 1-4-12, 13 has made the developing of information conveyance procedure, a requirement for re granting D.G. transport approval.

FLT.OPS Implemented

3-Implementation and compliance are ensured in the relevant inspector H.B. FLT.OPS Implemented


APPENDIX 3-4-15



The SFOD does not ensure that air operators establish a policy and procedures to enable cabin crew to discreetly communicate to flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the passenger cabin. In addition, there was no evidence that security programmes had been approved by the SCAA and that procedures and security training programmes were being complied with.





DATE(S) 1- The ANR shall be amended to reflect the requirement for

discreet communication between the cabin and flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches.


2- The SFOD inspection program shall be amended to confirm compliance with the respective security requirement.



APPENDIX 3-4-16



The SFOD is unable to accomplish the requirements of the annual audit plan which includes one annual visit to each air operator due to insufficient number of qualified and trained inspectors. The SFOD is not conducting en-route inspections and random inspections of any kind. In addition, the SFOD has not established a system for tracking deficiencies. The ICAO audit team confirmed that minimal enforcement is being conducted concerning suspensions, revocations or pecuniary fines.





DATE(S) 1- Annual audit plan has been established by the SFOD to

cover a whole year inspections on all operators.


2- Route and random inspections will be conducted when sufficient qualified Flight Operation Inspectors are available.


3- A new ANR Part XIII "Enforcements and Sanctions" has been developed.



APPENDIX 3-5-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT

AUDIT FINDING AIR/01

The SCAA has not developed job descriptions for the technical staff of the Airworthiness Directorate.


SCAA agrees with ICAO Team findings.



DATE(S) The Airworthiness Management Exposition has been amended to include clearly the job description for the technical staff of the Directorate of Airworthiness the

A/W Completed


APPENDIX 3-5-2



The Airworthiness Directorate and the SFOD of the SCAA have not established appropriate coordination arrangements between the two directorates when evaluating an air operator for the issuance of an AOC and for the review of specific operation approvals issued in conjunction with an AOC such as MEL and RVSM operations.





DATE(S) Formal coordination arrangements between the two Directorates are on progress ,however written procedures with an acceptable level of implementations will be established

SFOD & A/W Before January 2008


APPENDIX 3-5-3



The procedures established by the Airworthiness Directorate for the review and approval of an operator's maintenance control manual, operator's maintenance programme and aircraft maintenance organization's maintenance procedures manual is not in accordance with the provisions of Annex 6, Chapters 8 and 11 and Doc 9760.





DATE(S) 1- (MME) Maintenance Management Exposition, Document

Control CAA/DOC/MME/01has been amended to comply with ICAO Annex 6 and Doc 9760.

A/W Completed December 2006

2- Operator's Maintenance Program (MP) Document Control CAA/DOC/AMS/01has been re-issued to comply with ICAO Annex 6 and Doc 9760.

A/W Completed May 2007

3- Aircraft maintenance origination's maintenance procedures manual (MPM) Document control has been prepared and shall be re-issued to comply with ICAO Annex 6 and Doc 9760

A/W August 2007


APPENDIX 3-5-4



The SCAA does not ensure that approved maintenance organizations (AMOs) establish minimum qualifications for the managers, certifying staff, auditors, and mechanics and that AMO employees receive initial and recurrent training appropriate to their assigned tasks and responsibilities.





DATE(S) 1- ANR 2004 Part V and Part VI shall be amended to include

Sudan CAA requirement for the AMO to establish minimum qualification for the managers, certifying staff, auditors and that (AMO) employees received initial and recurrent training appropriate to their assigned tasks and responsibilities.

A/W Before September 2007

2- Sudan shall ensure the competency of the AMO employees and their qualification in accordance to the amended ANR Part V and Part VI

A/W Before September 2008


APPENDIX 3-5-5



The Airworthiness Directorate does not conduct oversight of reliability programmes received from the operator and does not initiate a special evaluation or impose special operational restrictions if information obtained from reliability monitoring indicates a degraded level of safety.





DATE(S) 1-Reliability Program Document control shall be issued to

evaluate the reliability program receive from the operators and impose special Operational restriction if information obtained indicates a degraded level of safety

A/W Before March 2008

2- Airworthiness Directorate shall conduct ongoing oversight of reliability program receive from the operators

A/W Before March 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

AUDIT FINDING AIG/01

Sudan has not promulgated a comprehensive national set of regulations with regard to Annex 13. The Directorate of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Prevention (AAICD) relies on the Accident Investigation Procedures Manual, promulgated by the Director General on 11 November 2006 as a regulatory source. However, the manual requires the designated investigation authority to comply with ICAO Annex 13 provisions.





DATE(S) The Sudan will promulgate national regulations in compliance with ICAO Annex 13 and article 26 of Chicago Convention as a base for aircraft accident/incident investigation.

Legal Office/SSSC By the end of June 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-2



Although several provisions under Chapter IX of the Act provide for the independence of the AAICD, in charge of conducting aircraft accident and incident investigation, Article 94(3) allows for the intervention of the Director General who "shall specify the system for investigation into aircraft accidents and incidents, and the system for the composition of the commissions thereof, and the rules to be followed in conducting the investigation of such accidents and incidents, and the manner in which they may be notified, and the manner by which their effects may be removed, in addition to all rules which are to be followed, upon occurrence of an accident, by those who are concerned from pilots and others, including the detention of the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder".





DATE(S) The Sudan will amend the Air Act to ensure the independence of the Air Accident Investigation Central Directorate

SSSC March 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-3



The AAICD consists of four investigators, including the Director, who have not received specialized training in accident and incident investigation. In addition, the AAICD has not established job descriptions or minimum requirements to become an accident investigator.





DATE(S) 1- The SCAA will establish job descriptions and minimum requirements for accident investigator.

AAICD December 2007

2- On 4-10 Feb. one of AACID staff member has attended a course at Singapore; we are planning to send 3 to Pakistan or Singapore by the end of 2007 depending on the available resources. job description will be issued

AAICD By December 2009


APPENDIX 3-6-4



The AAICD has not established measures to relieve experts seconded by a State CAA or other organization in the State as investigators from their regular duties during an aircraft accident investigation.





DATE(S) Sudan CAA will established procedures to relive experts from other organization in the state from their regular duties during investigation

DGCA May 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-5



The AAICD does not provide its investigators with tools and equipment for the conduct of accident and incident investigation such as field kits, protective equipment against biological hazards and other hazards at the accident site, means of transportation and communication, global positioning systems, etc.





DATE(S) All required materials for investigators to conduct investigation have been ordered AAICD May 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-6



Up-to-date contact information for aircraft accident investigation authorities in other States was not available to the relevant personnel.





DATE(S) Do 9756 is available to the directorate. AAICD Completed


APPENDIX 3-6-7



Sudan has not established procedures for forwarding accident/serious incident notifications to the States involved and, when applicable, to ICAO, in the following situations where it is not the State of Occurrence: a) as State of Registry, in the case of an occurrence in a non-Contracting State or outside the territory of

any State; and b) as State of Registry or State of the Operator, when the State of Occurrence is not aware of a serious

incident.





DATE(S) Will be added to procedure manual

AAICD

December 2007


APPENDIX 3-6-8



Sudan has not established requirements to protect the evidence and maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its contents for such a period as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation, including protection against further damage, access by unauthorized persons, pilfering or deterioration. In addition, procedures have not been established for ensuring that in the event of an accident, all ATS communication recordings and documents associated with the flight are secured and placed in safe keeping. Moreover, there are no procedures in place for the read-out of the flight recorders without delay although it is done in practice.





DATE(S) 1- Requirements and safe custody will be established. AAICD 1- December 2007 2- With regard to the other part, procedures are available in the manual AAICD 2- Implemented


APPENDIX 3-6-9



The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for inviting to participate in the investigation: a) the operator, when neither the State of Registry nor the State of the Operator appoints an accredited

representative; and b) the organizations responsible for the type design and the final assembly of the aircraft, when neither

the State of Design nor the State of Manufacture appoints accredited representatives.





DATE(S) Procedures will be established. AAICD December 2007


APPENDIX 3-6-10



The AAICD has not established procedures for: a) ensuring compliance with occupational health and safety legislation during the investigation process;

and b) carrying out examination or testing of aircraft parts or components, when necessary.





DATE(S) a) Occupation health manual will be issued in accordance

with occupational health act.

AAICD December 2007

b) Arrangements and procedures will be established with universities locally & foreign agencies.

AAICD June 2008


APPENDIX 3-6-11



The AAICD has not established procedures for appointing an accredited representative, in particular when specifically requested to do so by the State conducting an investigation (for an accident to an aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over 2 250 kg) or, as the State having suffered fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens, for sending an expert to the State of Occurrence.





DATE(S) The procedures for appointing an accredited representative available on the investigation manual will be amended to include maximum take-off mass over 2250 kg.

AAICD July 2007


APPENDIX 3-6-12



The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation, for sending a copy of the draft final report for comments: a) through the State of the Operator to the operator; and b) through the State of Design and State of Manufacture to the organizations responsible for the type

design and the final assembly of the aircraft. In addition, as a State participating in an investigation, the AAICD has not established procedures for preventing from circulation, publishing, or giving unauthorized access to a draft report or any part thereof, or any documents obtained during an investigation without the express consent of the State which conducted the investigation, unless such reports or documents have been already published or released by that latter State.





DATE(S) AAICD Manual will be amended to include these procedures.

AAICD

October 2007


APPENDIX 3-6-13



The AAICD has not established procedures, as the State conducting the investigation of accidents or incidents, to address, when appropriate, any safety recommendations arising from its investigations to accident investigation authorities in other State(s) concerned and, when ICAO documents are involved, to ICAO.





DATE(S) Will be entered in the procedure manual AAICD

May 2007 – December 2007


APPENDIX 3-6-14



The AAICD has not established procedures for preparing and sending accident data reports to ICAO, involving aircraft of a maximum take-off mass over 2 250 kg, as soon as practicable after the investigation is finished and for preparing and sending the incident data report to ICAO if conducting an investigation into an incident of an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg.





DATE(S) • The AAICD will establish procedures for preparing

and sending accident data reports mentioned above

AAICD December 2009


APPENDIX 3-6-15



The accident and incident database available at the AAICD, including the one from its accident and incident reporting system, is not developed in a standardized format to facilitate the effective analysis of information obtained.





DATE(S) • AAICD will implement database • Visits to other Investigation Authorities to see how can

be done.

AAICD June 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES

AUDIT FINDING ANS/01

Sudan has not developed and promulgated any legislation to ensure that air navigation services (ANS) called for under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention are provided.





DATE(S) SCAA will revise the Air Act to incorporate Article 28 of the Chicago Convention.

DGCA December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-2



The SCAA has not established a procedure for the formulation and distribution of guidance material on ANRs to all ANS providers and operators.





DATE(S) ANS 7.017 Formulated a work group to establish a procedure for the formulation and distribution of guidance material on ANRs to all ANS providers and operators

ANS By the end of October 2007


APPENDIX 3-7-3



Sudan has not established a mechanism/system for the elimination of deficiencies identified by the Planning and Implementation Regional Group (PIRG).





DATE(S) ANS 7.045 Sudan civil aviation will establish a mechanism/system for the elimination of deficiencies identified by the Planning and Implementation Regional Group (PIRG)

DGCA December 2007


APPENDIX 3-7-4



The SCAA has not established a safety oversight system in the ANS areas. As a result, the SCAA does not have an effective ANS safety oversight capability due to lack of policies, procedures, surveillance programmes, and qualified and experienced personnel with the legal authority to regulate and oversee in the fields of air traffic management (ATM), Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Operations (PANS-OPS), AIS, aeronautical charts, communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS), meteorological services (MET) and search and rescue (SAR).





DATE(S) ANS 7.033 Establish and implement a safety oversight system for ensuring the effective implementation of safety-related policy and procedures in the air navigation fields • ANS 7.035 A mechanism to oversee, in an objective

manner, that the entity responsible for the provision of ANS is effectively implementing safety-related policy and procedures.

• ANS 7.037 Develop a manual/handbook for ANS inspectorate staff incorporating applicable procedures for all functional areas to be covered within the framework of its safety oversight system.

• ANS 7.039 Availability of documents to all ANS staff • ANS 7.041 Delegate ANS inspectorate to execute their

mandate of regulatory oversight. • ANS 7.053 Define responsibility of the ATS inspectorate

staff. • ANS 7.059 Establish the minimum qualifications and

experience for ATS inspectorate personnel ANS 7.063 Conduct safety oversight over the service provider for ATS.

ANS for all items below

December 2008 for all items below


APPENDIX 3-7-4 (CONT’D)




DATE(S) • ANS 7.083 Develop job descriptions for ATS staff. • ANS 7.087 Develop a training programme, including

refresher training for ATS staff. • ANS 7.089 Maintain a training records or files for ATS

staff. • ANS 7.203 Define functions and responsibilities of the

PANS-OPS inspectorate staff. • ANS 7.207 Establish the minimum qualifications and

experience for PANS-OPS inspectorate staff. • ANS 7.231 Conduct oversight over procedures specialists

or service provider. • ANS 7.233 Establish a mechanism/system with frame for

elimination of deficiencies identified by PANS-OPS inspectorate staff..

• ANS 7.271 Define functions and responsibilities of AIS inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.275 establish the minimum qualifications and experience for AIS inspectorate personnel..

• ANS 7.287 Conduct oversight over the entity providing the aeronautical information service.

• ANS 7.289 Establish a mechanism/system with time frame for elimination of deficiencies identified by AIS inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.327 Define functions and responsibilities of the cartographic inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.331 Establish the minimum qualifications and experience for the cartographic inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.343 Conduct safety oversight over the entity providing the cartographic services.

• ANS 7.345 Establish a mechanism/system with time frame for elimination of deficiencies identified cartographic inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.375 Define functions and responsibilities of the CNS inspectorate staff






DATE(S) • ANS 7.379 Establish the minimum qualifications and

experience for CNS inspectorate personnel. • ANS 7.391 Conduct oversight over the entity providing

the Aeronautical telecommunication service. • ANS 7.395 Establish a mechanism/system with time frame

for elimination of deficiencies identified CNS inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.419 Define functions and responsibilities of the MET inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.421 Develop job descriptions for MET staff. • ANS 7.423 Establish the minimum qualifications and

experience for MET inspectorate personnel. • ANS 7.435 Conduct oversight over the entity providing

the MET service. • ANS 7.437 Establish a mechanism/system with time frame

for elimination of deficiencies identified MET inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.455 Establish a training programme for MET technical staff.

• ANS 7.487 Employ a sufficient number of qualified technical staff to carry out safety oversight tasks over the RCC and, as appropriate. Rescue subcentre (RSC)

• ANS 7.489 Define functions and responsibilities of the SAR inspectorate staff.

• ANS 7.493 Establish the minimum qualifications and experience for SAR inspectorate personnel.

• ANS 7.505 Conduct safety oversight over the RCC and, as appropriate, RSC.

• ANS 7.507 Establish a mechanism/system with time frame for elimination of deficiencies identified by SAR inspectorate staff.


APPENDIX 3-7-5



The SCAA does not ensure that the ANS providers adopt policies and procedures on human factors principles.





DATE(S) SCAA will promulgate regulations in the upcoming SUCAR requiring ANS providers to adopt human factor principles.

ANS December 2007

SCAA has nominated 9 inspectors to attend courses on human factors at Queen Nur College in Jordan.

ANS December 2007

SCAA will conduct audits and surveillance to ensure that the ANS providers are in compliance with CAA requirements on Human Factors.

ANS December 2007


APPENDIX 3-7-6



The SCAA does not ensure that the ATS provider develops policies and procedures for determining the capacity of the ATS system, including the number of staff required to ensure the provision of an adequate ATS system and the recruitment and retention of qualified and experienced ATS staff.





DATE(S) • ANS 7.081 Policies and procedures for determining the

capacity of the ATS system, including the number of staff required to ensure the provision of an ATS system and recruitment and retention of qualified and experienced ATS staff.

ANS December 2008

• ANS 7.085 The service provider responsible for ATS will develop job descriptions for ATS staff

ANS December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-7



The SCAA has not established an ATS safety programme and a runway safety programme, nor has it identified the required resources or developed guidelines to implement such programmes. In addition, there is no system for reporting ATC incidents and safety reviews are not regularly conducted by qualified personnel in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Doc 4444.





DATE(S) ANS 7.161 Iimplementation of ATS safety management

programme. ANS 7.163 Implementation of systematic ATS safety

management programme and identification of required resources.

ANS 7.165 Implementation of systematic ATS safety management programme and development of guidelines.

ANS 7.167 Establish a requirement for ATS provider to implement a safety management system.

ANS 7.169 Approve of the safety management system established by the ATS provider. ANS 7.171 Carry out of the ATS safety management system.

ANS 7.173 Establishment of criteria for determination of safety performance indicators and safety performance targets to be used for the monitoring of safety performance and the assessment of safety or new systems and procedures within the ATS system. ANS 7.175 Safety management system is characterized by proactive approach. ANS 7.177 Safety management system includes provisions for safety assessment to be carried out for any safety-related change to the ATC system.


y By December 2009 for all items below






DATE(S) ANS 7.179 Make of provisions for post-implementation monitoring to verify that the defined level of safety to be met. ANS 7.181 ATS define lines of responsibility, including direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management. ANS 7.183 Regular conduct of safety reviews. ANS 7.185 Available of qualified personnel at the level of the service provider to conduct safety reviews. ANS 7.187 Establishment and implementation of a system for reporting ATC incidents. ANS 7.189 Establishment and implementation of a runway safety programme


APPENDIX 3-7-8



The SCAA does not ensure that the separation minima implemented by the ATC facilities are in accordance with ICAO PANS-ATM and Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPS) and are listed in the AIP.





DATE(S) * ANS 7.111 The separation minima implemented by the ATC facilities are in accordance with ICAO PANS-ATM

ANS December 2008

* ANS 7.113 Regional Procedures (SUPPS) and are listed in the AIP

ANS February 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-9



Although the SCAA is sending traffic information to the regional monitoring agency (RMA) of the AFI region, it has not established and implemented monitoring mechanisms for RVSM, including verifying that aircraft and air operators are approved for operation in RVSM airspace.





DATE(S) * ANS 7.115 Establish and implement a process for verifying that aircraft and air operators are approved for operation in RVSM airspace.

ANS+OPS+A/W December 2008

* ANS 7.117 Establish and implement appropriate monitoring mechanism for RVSM,

ANS+OPS+A/W December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-10



The SCAA has not ensured the implementation of procedures for read-back of safety-related parts and other relevant information of ATC clearances and instructions, and the control of movement of persons or vehicles on the manoeuvring area of the aerodrome, in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 11.





DATE(S) SCAA will develop and promulgate procedures for read-back of safety related parts and other relevant information of ATC clearances, instructions and control of movement of persons and vehicles on the manoeuvring area of the aerodrome in accordance with ICAO SARPs in Annex 11. This will be done in SUCAR Part 11.

ANS December 2008

SCAA will ensure the implementation of set procedures by conducting audit and surveillance on this process.

ANS December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-11



A properly organized quality system has not been established for AIS services. In addition, there is no mechanism to ensure that aeronautical data quality requirements related to publication resolution and data integrity has been established in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 15.





DATE(S) • SCAA has established an agreement with an international

quality company to establish quality systems within ANS • ANS 7.267 Establish a properly organized quality system

for AIS service.. • ANS 7.301 Develop a written terms of reference for AIS

technical staff. • ANS 7.303 Develop a training programme for AIS

technical staff. • ANS 7.305 Maintain training records or files for AIS

technical staff. • ANS 7.311 Establish a mechanism by establishing a unit

responsible for ensuring that aeronautical data quality requirement related to published resolution and data integrity has been established in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 15


April 2008

December 2007

December 2007

December 2007

December 2007

December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-12



The cartographic services are provided by the National Survey Authority and the Directorate of Aerodrome Engineering within the SCAA. However, the SCAA does not ensure that: a) aeronautical charts are accurate before they are made available to users; b) the establishment of a mechanism for aeronautical data quality requirements related to the data

integrity and charting resolutions are in accordance with the provisions of Tables 1 to 5 in Appendix 6 of ICAO Annex 4; and






DATE(S) • ANS 7.351 Develop a written terms of reference for

cartographic technical staff. • ANS 7.353 Develop a training programme for

cartographic technical staff. • ANS 7.355 Develop a training records or files for

cartographic technical staff • ANS 7.359 Establish a mechanism to ensure that

aeronautical data quality requirements related to the data integrity and charting resolutions are in accordance with the provisions of table1 to 5 in Appendix 6 of Annex 47.

• ANS 7.361 Maintain up to date reasonable measures for aeronautical charts

• ANS 7.363 Availability of all applicable charts.


December 2009 for all items below


APPENDIX 3-7-13



The SCAA has not established procedures and guidance material to ensure that the PANS-OPS service is provided in accordance with the requirements established in ICAO Doc 8168 and Annex 4. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that all procedure design documentation is retained by the service provider so as to allow any data anomalies or errors found during the production, maintenance or operational use of the procedure to be corrected.





DATE(S) * Develop terms of reference for PANS-OPS technical staff. * Develop a training programme for PANS-OPS technical staff. * Maintain training records or files for PANS-OPS technical staff. * Carried out flight inspections of instrument flight procedures, including obstacle. * Publish obstacle clearance altitude/height (OCA/H) in flight procedures.

• Establish and publish operating minima (e.g. visibility, MDA, DH, DA MDA/H,DA/H) for instrument approaches at aerodrome.

• Develop procedures in the AIP for PANS-OPS in accordance with the criteria established by SCAA.

Retain all procedures design documentation so as to allow any data anomalies or errors found during the production, maintenance or operational use of the procedure to be corrected.

ANS Nominated Director of ATS Ahmed Eisa to establish procedure and guidance material to be completed by December 2007


APPENDIX 3-7-14



The SCAA has established procedures and guidance material for the implementation of ICAO Annex 10 by the aeronautical telecommunication service provider. However, there is no documented coordination procedures between the SCAA and the National Telecommunication Corporation, which is the authority for licensing aeronautical radiocommunication stations.





DATE(S) ANS 7.131 An agreement for licensing aeronautical Radio communication stations between SCAA and national Telecommunication Corporation.

ANS December 2007


APPENDIX 3-7-15



Formal arrangements for the provision of MET services, including an operational agreement, have not been established between the meteorological authority of Sudan and the SCAA. In addition, a properly organized quality system containing procedures, processes and resources has not been established for MET services in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 3.





DATE(S) • ANS 7.415 Establish a formal agreement between

ATS and MET for the provision of MET services. • ANS 7.451 Entity providing MET services will

establish a properly organized quality system. • ANS 7.453 Entity providing MET services will

develop job description for its technical staff. • ANS 7.467 Establish a criteria for special observation

with MET authority. • ANS 7.473 MET offices readiness for providing

briefing, consultation and flight documentation to flights crew members and/or other flight operators' personnel.

• ANS 7.475 Ensure that the MET reports are issued in accordance with the format in Annex 3.

DGCA+ANS for all items

below

By December 2007 for all items below


APPENDIX 3-7-16



The SCAA does not ensure that the wind sensors for local routine reports are appropriately sited to give the best practicable indications at touchdown zone.





DATE(S) ANS 7.459 The SCAA to ensure that the wind sensors for local routine reports are appropriately sited to give the best practicable indications at touchdown zone

ANS December 2008


APPENDIX 3-7-17



The SCAA does not ensure that MET offices issue wind shear warnings for aerodromes where wind shear is considered a safety factor.





DATE(S) ANS 7.465 The SCAA to ensure that MET offices issue wind shear warning for aerodrome where wind shear is considered is safety factor.

ANS June 2009


APPENDIX 3-7-18



The SCAA does not ensure that the SAR services meet the provisions of ICAO Annex 12, including sufficient qualified staff who are skilled in the coordination and operational functions and who have prepared detailed plans of SAR operations within the search and rescue regions (SRRs) for which Sudan is responsible.





DATE(S) SCAA will develop and promulgate SARPs Service requirements to be in compliance with ICAO provisions of Annex 12 which will be in the coming SUCAR Part 12.

ANS December 2008

SCAA will recruit qualified staff who are sufficiently skilled in coordination and operational functions.

ANS December 2008

SCAA will prepare detailed plan of SARPs OPS within the SAR for which the Sudan is responsible and sign the agreement accordingly.

ANS December 2008


APPENDIX 3-8-1

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN PROPOSED BY SUDAN RELATED TO AERODROMES

AUDIT FINDING AGA/01

The national regulations require the certification of all international and public use aerodromes; however, no aerodrome has been certified in Sudan.





DATE(S) • SCAA will certify Khartoum International Airport as

required by the national regulations.

DASS Before June 2008

• SCAA will certify all Sudanese international and public use airports as required by the national regulations.

DASS By December 2009


APPENDIX 3-8-2



Sudan has not yet established an organizational structure for the certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes functions, responsibilities and job descriptions of aerodrome regulatory technical personnel, guidance material for each technical specialist area and inspector credentials.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish an organizational structure for the

certification and surveillance of aerodromes.

DGCAA By June 2007

• SCAA will provide guidance materials for each technical specialist area and credential inspectors.



APPENDIX 3-8-3



The SCAA has not established a process for the certification and surveillance of aerodromes that includes: a) submittal of a formal application form; b) referrals to competent State entities for clearances with necessary documentation; c) coordination with local ATS authorities regarding integration of activities; d) ensuring that the aerodrome operators recruit an adequate number of competent personnel; e) acceptance of non-compliance with the requirements, including risk assessment and notification; f) use of checklist for the certification process; g) procedure for evaluating the impact of changing aerodrome physical characteristics; h) assessment of aerodrome visual aids; i) amendment of an aerodrome certificate; and j) a filing system, with a certificate register for each aerodrome.





DATE(S) • The SCAA will establish a process for certification

and surveillance of aerodromes that includes all the aspects mentioned above.



APPENDIX 3-8-4



The SCAA has not developed procedures and guidance material for aerodrome operators and regulatory staff with respect to: a) the submittal, review and subsequent amendments of aerodrome manuals; b) evaluating the impact of safety whenever a change to the aerodrome facility or equipment is proposed; c) preventing aircraft from entering permanently closed runways and taxiways; d) making aerodrome operators aware of all the requirements for granting an aerodrome certificate; e) obstacle control; and f) the return of a runway to operational status after a runway surface overlay.





DATE(S) The SCAA will establish procedures and guidance material for aerodrome operators and regulatory staff with respect to the following aspects:

- submittal, review and subsequent amendments of aerodrome manuals; - evaluating the impact of safety whenever a change to the aerodrome facility or equipment is proposed; - preventing aircraft from entering permanently closed runways and taxiways; - making aerodrome operators aware of all the requirements for the grant of an aerodrome certificate; - obstacle control; and

- return of a runway to operational status after

DASS

DASS

DASS

DASS

DASS DASS

By September 2007 By August 2007 By October 2007 By December 2007 By October 2007 By December 2007


APPENDIX 3-8-5



The national regulations require the establishment of a safety management system (SMS) as part of the aerodrome manual; however, only one aerodrome manual has been submitted and the SMS has not been formally implemented at any of the aerodromes in Sudan. The SCAA has not issued guidance for the development, implementation and evaluation of the SMS. In addition, as part of this system, the State does not analyse accident and incident occurrences, does not enable the exchange of safety information across the aerodrome industry and does not require aerodrome operators to ensure that organizations performing activities at the aerodrome meet safety requirements laid down by the aerodrome operator.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a procedure to insure that the

SMS is submitted as part of the aerodrome manual in accordance with the SCAA regulations.

DASS Before December 2007

• The SCAA will issue guidance for the development, implementation and evaluation of an SMS


• The SCAA will commence analyzing accidents and incidents occurrences as part of SMS as soon as the SMS manual is submitted to the operators.


* The SCAA will enable the exchange of safety information cross the aerodromes industry and will enforce aerodrome operators to ensure that organizations performing activities at the aerodrome meet safety requirements laid down by the aerodrome operator.



APPENDIX 3-8-6



The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators remove objects that are not required for air navigation purposes from the runway strip.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a procedure to insure that

aerodromes operators will implement the SCAA regulations regarding the removal of obstacles from runway strip.


• SCAA will provide the aerodromes operators, all the necessary manuals and guidance materials that will help the aerodromes operators to control and remove obstacles from runway strip.



APPENDIX 3-8-7



A properly organized quality system has not been established in Sudan for ensuring that the accuracy, integrity and protection requirements for aeronautical data reported by the aerodrome operator are met throughout the data transfer process.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a quality system to ensure the

accuracy, integrity for aeronautical data transfer reported by the aerodrome operators.



APPENDIX 3-8-8



The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators maintain good friction characteristics and low rolling resistance on the runways. Furthermore, the SCAA has not specified minimum friction level and maintenance planning level to enable aerodrome operators to initiate maintenance actions and report slippery conditions due to rubber build-up on the runway.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish procedure and guidance material

to ensure that aerodrome operators maintain good friction characteristics and low rolling resistance on runways.

DASS December 2009

• SCAA will initiate guidance material specifying minimum friction level and maintenance planning level to enable aerodrome operators conduct maintenance actions.

DASS December 2009


APPENDIX 3-8-9



The national regulations require aerodrome operators to conduct bird strike hazard assessments; however, none has been conducted. In addition, Sudan does not forward bird strike reports to ICAO.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a procedure and guidance

material for bird strike hazard assessment

DASS By the end of December 2009

• SCAA will start forwarding Bird strike reports to ICAO

DASS By the end of

December 2008


APPENDIX 3-8-10



The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators conduct a full scale disaster drill and the review of the aerodrome emergency plans in accordance with their national regulations. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators include human factors in the development of their aerodrome emergency plans.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a procedure to ensure that

aerodrome operators conduct a full scale disaster drill and the review of the aerodrome emergency plans.

DASS Before October 2008

• SCAA will establish a procedure to ensure that aerodrome operators include human factors in the development of aerodrome emergency plans.

DASS Before October 2009


APPENDIX 3-8-11



The SCAA does not ensure that aerodrome operators' plans for signs and markings meet national requirements. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that these plans are integrated as a whole into the runway incursion programme to prevent vehicles or aircraft from unauthorized entry to a runway, taxiway or a permanently closed or unserviceable area.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish procedure regarding the signs ,

marking to meet the SCAA standards


• SCAA will establish procedure to ensure that the operators plans for signs and marking are integrated as a whole into the runway incursion program.



APPENDIX 3-8-12



The SCAA does not ensure that rescue and fire fighting (RFF) personnel meet the minimum response time required in their national regulations. In addition, the SCAA does not ensure that RFF personnel are appropriately trained, including live fire training with pressure-fed fuel fires.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish procedure and guidance material

for the RFF personnel to meet the minimum response time required.

DASS Before August 2008

• SCAA will establish a training program for RFF personnel to ensure that they meet the minimum response time

DASS Before August 2008


APPENDIX 3-8-13



The SCAA has not developed a regulatory statement defining the circumstances and rationale under which aeronautical studies and/or risk assessments may be used, and no guidance has been made available to aerodrome operators and regulatory staff on how to develop and evaluate aeronautical risk assessments. The SCAA does not have a process to control the use of aeronautical studies/risk assessments in granting exemptions to requirements.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish a regulatory statement defining

the circumstances and rationale under which aeronautical studies and / or risk assessment may be used and guidance will be made available to the aerodrome operators and regulatory staff on how to develop and evaluate aeronautical risk assessment.

DASS December 2009

• SCAA will establish a process to control the use of aeronautical studies / risk assessment in granting exemptions to requirements.

DASS December 2009


APPENDIX 3-8-14



The SCAA has not established a formal aerodrome surveillance programme to ensure that aerodrome operators comply with regulatory requirements. Furthermore, there are no procedures for dealing with deficiencies found during an aerodrome inspection.





DATE(S) • SCAA will establish an effective aerodrome

surveillance program.


• SCAA will establish a procedure for dealing with deficiencies found during an aerodrome inspection.


— END —


FINAL REPORT ON THE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AUDIT OF...

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