Final Report of Pershing - General John J. Pershing

7/29/2019 Final Report of Pershing - General John J. Pershing

1/128

FINAL REPORTOF

GEN. JOHN J. PERSHINGCOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES


2/128


3/128

t

PARTI.PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION.MILITABY SITUATION :

- 1914.


4/128


5/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.GENERAL HEADQUARTERSAXERICAN EXPEDITIONARP FORCES,Xeptember I, 1919.To the SECRETARYOF WAR.

_ SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith my final report asCommander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces inEurope.PART I.

PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION.


6/128

6 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERST-TING.MILITARY SITUATION.

3. In order that the reasons for many important decisions reachein the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may more clearly understood and the true value of the American effomore fully appreciated, it is desirable to have in mind the maievents leading up to the time of our entry into the war.1914.

4. Although the German drive of 1914 had failed in its immediate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gainGerman forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupierich industrial regions of northern France, embracing one-fourteenthof her population and about three-fourths of her coal and iron. ThGerman armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles in lengthstretching from the Swiss border to Nieuport on the English Channel; her troops were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative rmained in German hands.In the east the rapidity of the Russian mobilization forced Gemany, even before the Battle of the Marne, to send troops to th


7/128

FINAJL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 7not been successful. Although the British fleet had established itssuperiority oli the sea, yet the German submarine blockade haddeveloped into a serious menace to Allied shipping.

1916.6. Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the easternfront at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west,and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in thespring of 1916. But Russia was not yet beaten and early in June,aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in thewest, she began the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrousto Austria.Roumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertooka promising offensive against Austria. The British and FrenchArmies a ttacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned tothe defensive in the west, and in September initiated a campaignin the east which, before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate

for Russia as well as Roumania.SPRING OF 1917.


8/128

8 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.history. Financial problems of the Allies were difficult, supplieswere becoming exhausted and their armies had suaered treme,ndouslosses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil popula-tion but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied moralethat, although their superiority on the western front during thelast half of 1916 and during 1917,amounted to 20 per cent, only localattacks could be undertaken and their effect proved wholly insuffi-cient against the German defense. Allied resources in man powerat home were low and there was little prospect of materially in-creasing their armed strength, even in the face of the probabilityof having practically the whole military strength of the CentralPowers against them in the spring of 1918.8. This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered thewar. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet thiswas temporary, and a review of conditions made it apparent thatAmerica must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible.After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the follow-ing to Washington on July 6, 1917:

Plans should contemplate sending over at least l,OOO,OOO en by next May.


9/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 9larger combat units, it did not include the great body of troops andservices required to maintain an army overseas. To disembark2,000,OOO men, move them to their training areas, shelter them,handle and store the quantities of supplies and equipment they re-quired called for an extraordinary and immediate effort in con-struction. To provide the organization for this purpose, a projectfor engineer services of the rear, including railways, was cabled toWashington August 5, 1917, followed on September 18, 1917, bya complete service of the rear project, which listed item by item thetroops considered necessary for the Services of Supply. Particularattention is invited to the charts herewith, which show the extent towhich this project had developed by November 11, 1918, and thevaried units required, many of which did not exist in our Armyprior to this war.11. In order that the War Department might have a clear-cutprogram to follow in the shipment of personnel and material toinsure the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced andsymmetrical, a comprehensive statement was prepared covering theorder in which the troops and services enumerated in these twoprojects should arrive. This schedule of priority of shipments, for-warded to the War Department on October 7, divided the initial


10/128

10 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.obtained the greater part of the iron required for munitions andmaterial. The coal fields east of Metz were also covered by thesesame defenses. A deep advance east of Metz, or the capture of theBriey region, by threatening the invasion of rich German territoryin the Moselle Valley and the Saar Basin, thus curtailing her supplyz of coal or iron, would have a decisive effect in forcing a withdrawalof German troops from northern France. The military and econ-nomic situation of the enemy, therefore, indicated Lorraine as thefield promising the most fruitful results for the employment of ourarmies.

13. The complexity of trench life had enormously increased thetonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a questionof providing food but enormous quantities of munitions and materialwere needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden ofmeeting the heavy demands of the three and one-half million Alliedcombatants then engaged.The British were crowding the Channel ports and the French wereexploiting the manufacturing center of Paris, so that the railroadsof northern France were already much overtaxed. Even though theChannel ports might be used to a limited extent for shipments


11/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 11a safe distance, as we were to meet an aggressive enemy capable oftaking the offensive in any one of several directions. The area em-bracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, and Chateauroux waschosen, as it was centrally located with regard to all points on the arcof the western front.The ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens were designatedfor permanent use, while Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac were foremergency use. Several smaller ports, such as St. Malo, Sables-dOlonne, and Bayonne, were available chiefly for the importation ofcoal from England. From time to time, certain trans-Atlantic shipswere sent to Le Havre and Cherbourg. In anticipation of a largeincrease in the amount of tonnage that might be required later, ar-rangements were made during the German offensive of 1918 toutilize the ports o f Marseilles and Toulon as well as other smal1e.rports on the Mediterranean.For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces werebased on the American Continent. Three thousand miles of oceanto cross with the growing submarine menace confronting us, thequantity of ship tonnage that would be available then unknownand a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French


12/128

12 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.war department agencies. While the British were organized on anoverseas basis, they were within easy reach of their base of suppliesin England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simpleas compared with ours. Their training could be carried out at homewith the experience of the front at hand, while our troops must besent as ships were provided and their training resumed in Francewhere discontinued in the States. Our available tonnage was in-adequate to meet all the initial demands, so that priority of ma-terial for combat and construction, as well as for supplies that couldnot be purchased in Europe, must be established by those whose per-spective included all the services and who were familiar with gen-eral plans. For the proper direction and coordination of the de-tails of administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and train-ing, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army.The functions of the General Staff at my headquarters werefinally allotted to the five sections, each under can Assistant Chiefof Staff, as follows: To the First, or Administrative Section-oceantonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men andanimals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting,prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work


13/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 13gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Servicesof Supply, keeping always in close touch with the manner andpromptness of their fulfillment. Thus a system of direct responsi-bility was put into operation which contemplated secrecy in prepara-tion, prompt decision in emergency, and coordinate action in execu-tion.19. With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officersrapidly increased, but the available number of officers trained forstaff duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a GeneralStaff college was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, forthe instruction of such officers as could be spared. An intensivecourse of study of three months was prescribed embracing the de-tails of our staff organization and administration, and our systemof supply, and teaching the combined employment of all arms andservices in combat. Officers were carefully chosen for their suit-ability and, considering the short time available, graduates fromthis school returned well equipped for staff duties and with a loyalspirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College car-ried to completion four courses of three months each, graduating537 staff officers.


14/128

14 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most prom-ising soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command ofplatoons and companies. There were graduated from these candi-date schools in France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January I, 1919, graduat-ing 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were to be grad-uated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen,making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to Novem-ber 14,1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as officers.It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it repre-sents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and theimperative and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers.22. Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Alliesin training officers. It was early recommended to the War Depart-ment that French and British ,officers be asked for to assist in theinstruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organiza-tion and development of our own schools, a large number of our

officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. Thetraining of our earlier divisions was begun in close association withthe French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following


15/128

__~

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 15by which their efficiency is to be measured, except.?@ modified in delnil byinstructions from these headquarters.

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantrysoldier. IIe will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both onthe target range and in field tiring. An aggressive spirit must be developeduntil the soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, invlncible in battle.(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our historyhas discipline been so important; therefore, disciplixle of the highest ordermust be exacted at all times. The standards for the American Army willbe those of West Point. The rigld attention, upright bearing, attention todetail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will berequired of every officer and soldier of our armies In France. * * *

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing theimportance of target practice and musketry training, and recom-mending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission oftroops in the United States, while the training in trench warfareso far as necessary be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions,whether serving temporarily with the British or French, weretrained as thus indicated. The assistance of the French units waslimited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instructorstaught t.he use of French arms and assisted in the preparation ofelementary trench warfare problems.


16/128

16 FINAL RBPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.such as that obtained through airplane photography, observationfrom balloons and planes, sensitive instruments for detecting gunpositions and raids to secure prisoners and documents. All such in-formation, together with that from Allied sources, including mili-tary, political, and economical, was collected, classified, and rapidlydistributed where needed.

26. From careful studies of the sysmms and actual participationby our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, anIntelIigence Service was evolved in our forces which operated suc-cessfully from its first organization in August, 1917.With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air andground and the exploitation of prisoners and documents, haveproved more effective than the less direct means. Every unit fromthe battalion up had an intelligence detachment, but only in divi-sions and larger organizations did the intelligence agencies embraceall available means and sources, including radio interception stationsand sound and flash-ranging detachments.27. The subjects studied by the Intelligence Section embraced thelocation of the enemys front line, his order of battle, the history and


17/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 17articles written for the press, the Censorship Division was created.The Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer sod&red, censored all mail written in foreign languages, of whichthere were over 50 used, and frequently checked up letters of entireorganizations.30. The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplishthree broad results:To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information ofour forces.To give to the people of the United States the maximum informa-tion consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as theywere known at the time.There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents,Lvhile visiting correspondents reached a total of 411.

SUMMER OF 1917 TO SPRING OF 1918.31. In order to hinder the enemys conquest of Russia and, if pos-sible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, theAllies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far as


18/128

18 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.divisions could be withdrawn from the Italian front before theFrench and British dared recall their divisions.33. At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large AmericanArmy. Marshal Jo&e during his visit to America had made specialrequest that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visualevidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also *asked for Engineer regiments.and other special service units.The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of itselements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the timebeing French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension wasdeep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The followingextract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conferenceheld on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chiefand the British and French Chiefs of Staff:

General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purelydefensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplustroops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western frontbelieved Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers suffi-cient to gain ascendency.The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situationwith a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With


19/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 19ever, a situation might arise which would necessitate the. temporaryuse of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defen-sive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of ourfirm purpose to form our own Army under our own flag.While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and con-centrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, thetraining of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare. As ourtroops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reasonwhy we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, evenby divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheernecessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocablycommit Americas fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover itwas obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixeddivisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up understress of defeat, with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again,there was no doubt that the realization by the German people thatindependent American divisions, corps, or armies were in the fieldwith determined purpose would be a severe blow to German moraleand prestige.It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger Amer-


20/128


21/128

PART II.OPERATIONS.

EXPEDITIAO SHIPMENT OF Tmom.THE GERMANOFFENEIIVE~m 1918 AND RELATED mmm Aomma~a~s.ALLIED Com.urmm-IN-CHISF.E~~PLOPME~TFAMERICANDIVIGIONSFROMMAXWETO SEPTEMBER,918.


22/128

I .


23/128

PART II.OPERATIONS.

EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS.1. The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to sendto France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops,and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with

October, 6 divisions were to be sent during that quarter, 7 during thefirst quarter of 1918, and 8 the second quarter. While these numbersfell short of my recommendation of July 6,1917, which contemplated


24/128

24 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.and again on December 20, 1917 :

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight pre-pared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire FirstCorps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have beenshipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December,January, and February contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corpswith its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed bythe end of February. Should such a program be caried out as per scheduleand should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed inplacing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of Army troops andauxiliaries, in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipmentsare not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of Decemberand the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions* and manycorps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared that we should be pre-pared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of pastperformances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossibleof fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result willwe be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view offact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greateramount of tonnage must be provided for the ir supply, and also in view of theslow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgentimportance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recom-mended in my cables and by Gen. Bliss.


25/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOqN J. PERSHING. 25THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918 AND RELATED ALLIEDAGREEMENTS.4. The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overranall resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight

days the enemy had completely crossed the old $omme battlefieldand had swept everythin g before him to a depth of some 56 kilo-meters. For a few days the loss of the railroad center of Amientiappeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon Frenchant1 British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless thenew American troops should prove more immediately available thaneven the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the Mili-tary Representatives with the Supreme War Council prepared theirjoint note No. 18. This note repeated the previously quoted state-ment from joint note No. 12, and continued :

The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, and whichcan extend to the other theaters of operations, may very quickly place theAllied Armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and .the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condition (see (a) par. 3) can no longer be maintained, and they con-sider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.


26/128

26 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.situation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in concert withthe armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by himfor their temporary training and service will be made with that end inview.While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of ship-ments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions thatwere to be trained in the British area, as that Government was toprovide the additional shipping according to the six-division planagreed upon even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive.On April 2 the War Department cabled that preferential transpor-tation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun unitsduring the existing emergency. Preliminary- arrangements weremade for training and early employment with the French of suchinfantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation.As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modifiedto give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the,Allies were now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for theshipment o f infantry and its complete incorporation in their units,which fact was cabled to the War Department on April 3, with thespecific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantrybe limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the

--


27/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEE. JOHN J. PERSHING. 27shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in theApril 7 conference. The result of this London agreement was cabledto Washington April 24, as follows:(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and signal troops ofAmerican divisions and the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent overin British and American shipping during May for training and service with theBritish army in France up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess ofthat required for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to malre these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will becarried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir DouglasHaig and Gen. Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up Americandivisions.(a) That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions andsuch corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organiza-tions follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnelbe trained with French materiel and join its proper divisions as soon asthoroughly trained.(c) If, when the program outlined in paragraphs (a;) and (b) is completed,the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry, etc.,of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping availablefor transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangementas will insure immediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at theearliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary


28/128

28 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.ence will be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and servicewith French and British Armies; with the understanding that such infantryand machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artilleryand auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the direction of the Ameri-can Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Allied Armies in France.Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preferenceshould be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units ofsix divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing oversuch other troops as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this program shall be continuedduring the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall,furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 menin June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shallgo to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in Juneshall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Clhief may determine.Subparagraph C. It is aIso further agreed that if the British Governmentshall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall beinfantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a newreview of the situation to determine further action. 5

The gravity of the situation had brought the Allies to a fullrealization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for thetransportation of American troops. Although their views were ac-


29/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 29 We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for theremarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one timeseeme.d practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to

meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues, Gen. Fochhas presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out thatthe nherical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisionsnow oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is nopossibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions(on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up) thereis a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority ofthe Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of Americantroops. He, therefore; urges with the utmost insistence that the maximumpossible number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the short-age of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to beshipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the imme-diate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Alliedreserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, andlooking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimatevictory in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as willenable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He placesthe total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, andurges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion,should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a totalAmerican force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.


30/128

30 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.The following agreement has been concluded between Gen. Foch, Lord Mil-ner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American troops in themonths of June and July : The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by theemployment of combined British and American tonnage. We recommend: (a) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be given to thetransportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz, six divisions without ar-tillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and44,000 replacements for combat troops) ; (2) 25,400 men for the service of therailways, of which 139400 have been asked for by the French Minister ofTransporta~tion; (3) the balance to be troops o f categories to be determined

by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces. (b) For the month of July : (1) Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (four divisions minus artil-lery et cetera amounting to 84,600 men, plus 56,600 replacement) ; (2) thebalance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander-in-Chie f, American Expeditionary Forces. (c) It is agreed that i f the available tonnage in either month allows of thetransportation of a larger number of men than 250,006, the excess tonnagewill be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above. (d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be dispatched in Julymay have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional


31/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 31unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armiesand the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armieswere being assembled and trained for the great campaign which wasto end the war before Americas effort could be brought to bear.Germanys best troops, her most successful generals, and all the ex-perience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supremeeffort.The first blow fell on the right of the British Armies, includingthe junction of the British and French forces. Only the promptcooperation of the French and British general headquarters stemmedthe tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikinglyillustrated the necessity for having someone with sufficient authorityover all the Allied Armies to meet such an emergency. The lack ofcomplete cooperation among the Allies on the westerp front had beenappreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had al-ready received attention by the Supreme War Council. A plan hadbeen adopted by which each of the Allies would furnish a certainnumber of divisions for a general reserve to be under the directionof the military representatives of the Supreme War Council of whichGen. Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came tomeet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found


32/128

32 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS FROM MARCH TOSEPTEMBER, 1918.

11. The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensivecaused me to make a hurried visit to Gen. Fochs headquarters,at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at hisdisposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of ourtroops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building upa distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation ofthe Allies demanded this divergence from our plans.On March 21, approximately 300,000 American troops had reachedFrance. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eightFrench or British divisions, were available-the First and Secondthen in line, and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawnfrom line after one months trench warfare training. The last twodivisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisionsfor the battle ; the Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, whichwas sent to northwest of Paris in reserve ; the Forty-second relievedtwo French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to thesetroops, one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with theFrench in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the


33/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.assembling in its training area and the Third Corps staff had justbeen organized to administer these three divisions. In addition tothe eight divisions already mentioned, the Twenty-eighth and Sev-enty-seventh had arrived in the British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second 1were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British ship-ping, our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we hada force of 600,000 in France.The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on theAisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. TheSecond Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparingto relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity3f Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was de-cloyed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Aions in a gap in the French line,;where it stopped the German ad-dance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third Divi-sion was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of theMarne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reach-ing Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending thatriver crossing.


34/128

34 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front ian effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines neare

to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively, little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the threpreceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficia,l to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that thGerman losses were unusually heavy.15. On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First,Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth Divisions were on the Chateau. Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, somsmall units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experiencemith our troops or with the French; the Forty-second Division wain support of the French east of Rheims; and four colored regimentwere with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine fronwe had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with thBritish Army, three having elements in the line. In our trainin,-areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the proces

of arrival.The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunityfor a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an opera


35/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 35Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetrationof 8 kilometers beyond the river being effected against the Frenchimmediately to the right of our Third Division. The followingquotation from the report of the commanding general Third Divisiongives the result of the fighting on his front :

Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front-linepositions, causing the infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in somecases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road f rom Fossoy toCrezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day(July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the Third Divisionsector except the dead.On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wroteone of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It preventedthe crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank theGermans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men,firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two Germandivisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.16. The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector andthe eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which tomake their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the


36/128

36 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns.It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. Theresult of this counteroffensive was of decisive importance. Due tothe magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissonsby our First and Second Divisions the tide of war was definitelyturned in favor of the Allies.Other American divisions participated in the Marne counter-offensive. A little to the south of the Second Division, the Fourthwas in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. TheFirst American Corps, Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett commanding,with the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the18th and reaching the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st.At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and tookthe heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Charteves andJaulgonne.In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the French division. From this time until August 2 it fought its waythrough the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward


37/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J:PERSHING. 37Infantry Brigade of the Third Division held a sector on the riverline. The transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was orderedat this time, and the control of its front was turned over to theThird Corps.On August I& Gen. Petain began an offensive between Rheims andthe Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossingthe Vesle on September 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateausouth of the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh onSeptember 6. The Twenty-eighth was withdrawn from the line onSeptember 7. Two days later the Third Corps was transferred tothe region of Verdun, the Seventy-seventh Division remaining inline on the A sne River until September 17.The Thirty-second division, upon its relief from the battle on theVesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked fromAugust 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desper-ate fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road.

18. On the British front two regiments of the Thirty-third Di-vision participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again onAugust 9 as an incident of the allied offensive against the Amiens


38/128

38 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.persion of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitiousfor assembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along theAllied frontl, their supply had become very difficult. From everypoint of view the immediate organization of an independent Amer-ican force was indicated. The formation of the Army in theChateau-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of theWoevre, which was to extend from Komcny, east of the Moselle, tonorth of St. Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Fo:hand myself on August 9, and the details were arranged with Gen.Petain later on the same day.

ST. MIHIEL OPERATION.221. At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Com-manders-in-chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations.Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies underhis command and these formed the basis of future cooperation ofthe Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude

should be to maintain the offensive. As the first operation of theAmerican Army, the reduction of the salient of St. Millie1 was tobe undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be


39/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 3923. The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as itwould prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leadingnorth through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us withan advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan Railroad system which was vital to the German armies westof Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessaryfor the production of German armament and munitions.The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against theflanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed

as the general line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)-heights southof Gorze-Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the useon the western face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported bythe attack of 6 divisions of the Second French Army on their left,while 7 American divisions would attack on the southern face,and 3 French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of thesalient. As the part to be taken by the Second French Army wouldbe closely related to the attack of the First American Army, Gen.Petain placed all the French troops involved under my personalcommand.


40/128

40 PISAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.Foch that the general operations as far as the American Army wasconcerned should be carried out in detail by:(a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the SecondFrench Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisions.

(6) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne westto the Souain Road, to be executed on the right by an AmericanArmy astride the Aisne and on the loft by the Fourth French Army.To carry out these attacks the 10 to 11 American divisions sug-gested for the St. Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the SecondFrench Army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Armyon the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation shouldbe initiated on September 10 and the other two on September 15 and20, respectively.25. The plan suggested for the American partiripation in theseoperations nas not acceptable to me because it would require theimmediate separation of the recently formed First American Armyinto several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was di-rectly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct AmericanArmy, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormousamount of preparation had already been made in construction of


41/128

,FIXAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 41be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winterwould force a cessation of operations.

26. The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisneincluding the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left tome. In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or theoffensive spirit. to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met inthe Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and installations had beenprepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So theMeuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilo-meters of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle,west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed undermy command, including all French divisions then in that zone. TheFirst American Army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation,after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edgeof the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not laterthan September 25.As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St. Mihiel opera-tion was limited to the line Vigneullos - Thinucourt - Regnieville.The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time short-ened. 18 to 19 divisions were to be in the front line. There were


42/128

42 FINAL RIWORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions in line, extendingfrom the Moselle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Maj.Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, commanding, with the Eighty-ninth,Forty-second, and First Divisions, the left of this corps being op-posite Montscc. These two Army Corps were to deliver the principalattack, the line pivoting on the center division of the First Corps.The First Division on the left of the Fourth Corps was charged withthe double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some20 kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient, where it wasto make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corps. On the westernface of the salient lay the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Came-ron, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division, Fifteenth FrenchColonial Division, and the Fourth Division in line, from Mouillywest to Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divis-ions, the Twenty-sixth alone was to make a deep advance directedsoutheast toward Vigneulles. The French Division was to make ashort progression to the edge of the heights in order to cover theleft of the Twenty-sixth. The Fourth Division was not to advance.In the center, between our Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, was theSecond French Colonial Corps, Maj. Gen. E. J. Blondlat, command-


43/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 43During the next two days the right of our line west of the MoselleRiver was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the originalorders. This completed the operation for the time being and theline was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force.29. The material results of the victory achieved were very im-portant. An American Army was an accomplished fact, and theenemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcomethe depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstrationof our ability to organize a large Bmerican force and drive it success-fully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in

their superiority and rai?ed their morale to the highest pitch. For thefirst time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassablebarriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently in-sisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions con-cluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spiritsthat without the usual rest they were immediately available for em-ployment in heavy fighting in a new theater of operations. Thestrength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximatelyliOO,OOOmen, of whom about 70,000 were French.


44/128

44 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.31. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was sec-ond to none on the western front. \ All supplies and evacuations ofthe German armies in northern France were dependent upon twogreat railway systems-one in the north, passing through Liege,/while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg,Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carigman-Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to theenemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the con-

struction of east and west lines through that region impracticable.The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans forthe rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern sys-tem be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forcesthrough the narrow neck between Mezieros and the Dutch frontier,the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to theCarignan-Mezieres railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formedthe pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vitalnecessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted inthe convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive Ger-man defensive positions. The effect of this convergence can be best


45/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 45River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positionsfor the desperate defense which the importance of the position wouldrequire him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded andrugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensivefighting.32. When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneouspreparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 days sep-arated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period

i the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount ofsupplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle, over the few roadsavailable, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was oneof the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concen-tration included 15 divisions, of which 7 were involved in thepending St. Mihiel drive, 3 were in sector in the Vosges, 3 inhe neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training arca, and 1 near Bar-;e-Due. Practically all the Artillery, Aviation, and other auxilia-ries to bc employed in the new operations were committed to theSt. Mihiel attack and therefore could not be moved until its successwas assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St.Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on September 13, the


46/128

46 FINAL REPORT OP GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.MEUSE-ARGONNE, FIRST PIIASE.

35. On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in theattack were deployed between the Meuso River and the westernedge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third Corps,Maj. Gen. Bullard commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth,and Fourth Divisions in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen.Cameron commanding, with the Seventy-Ninth, Thirty-seventh, andNinety-first Divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Maj. Gen.Liggett commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, andSeventy-seventh Divisions. Each corps had 1 division in reserveand the Army held 3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes,604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to support the attackof the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation,and the enemy had no tanks.The axis of the attack was the line Mont,faucon-Romngnc-Buz-ancy, the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in thecenter, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of theArgonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest Toithout


47/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 47that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily.The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they at-tacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions.On the night of the 29th the Thirty-seventh and Seventy-ninth Divi-sions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third Divisions, respec-tively, and on the following night the First Division relieved theThirty-fifth Division.38. The critical problem during the first few days of the battlewas the restoration of communications over no mans land. Therewere but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violentartillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually de-stroyed them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increasedthe difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneerssoon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and sup-plies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisionalartillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a pas-sage and was supporting the infantry action.

MEUS?!-ARGONNE, SECOND PHASE.39. At 5.30 a. m. on October 4 the general attack was renewed.


48/128


49/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 4943. Local attacks of the First Army wore continued in order par-ticularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general as-sault. The First and Fifth Divisions were relieved by the Forty-

second and Eightieth Divisions, which were now fresh. An attackalong the whole front was made on October 14. The resistance en-countered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Mariewas captured and the Hindonburg Line was broken. Cunel andRomagne-sous-Montfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2kilometers north of Sommerance. A maximum advance of 17 kilo-meters had been made since September 26 and the enemy had beenforced to throw into the fight a total of 15 reserve divisions.During the remainder of the month important local operationswere carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The FirstCorps, Maj. Gen. Dickman commanding, advanced through Grand-pre ; the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall command-ing, captured the Bois de Banthevillc; the Third Corps, Maj. Gen.John L. Hines commanding, completed the occupation of CunclHeights; and the Seventeenth French Corps drove the enemy fromthe main ridge south of La Grando Montagne. Particularly heavyfighting occurred east of the Meuse on October 18, and in the further


50/128

50 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the tasksuccessfully.While the high pressure of th cse dogged attacks was a great strainon our troops, it was calamit,ous to the enemy. His divisions hadbeen thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his moralehad been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached thebreaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight,it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy rasforced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tacticalorganizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separatedportions of the field.Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, -From thefront line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificentefforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the,enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmount-able were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replace-ments, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick andwounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animatingevery American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy tomaintain the struggle until 1919.


51/128


52/128

52 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.Meuse in a brilliant operation by the Fifth Division, driving theenemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a gonoralwithdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on thehills north of Verdun.By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its rivercrossing to a distance of 10 kilometers east of the Meusc, completelyejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out intothe swampy plain of the Woevre; the Fifth and First Corps hadreached the line of the Meuse River along their respective frontsand the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan,the strategical goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, 41 kilometersfrom our point of departure on November 1. We had cut the enemysmain line of communications. Recognizing that nothing but a ces-sation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, heappealed for an immediate armistice on November 6.48. Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further em-ployment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse andthe Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, whilethe Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey IronBasin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved


53/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 53had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficultthat there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after11 a. m.

49. Between SeptoEber 26 andNovember 11, 22 American and4 French divisions, OQ the front extending from southeast ofVerdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively boaten47 different German divisions, representing 25 per cent of the enemysentire divisional strength on the western front. Of these enemydivisions 20 had been drawn from the French front and 1 from theBritish front. Of the 22 American divisions 12 had, at differenttimes during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own.The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed andwounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 canon, 3,000 machine.guns, and large quantities of material.The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonneoffensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack andduring the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed tothis section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced totake in its defense. From the moment the American offensive beganuntil the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his


54/128

54 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS.

51. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, Americandivisions were participating in important attacks on other portionsof the front. The Second Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Read, command-ing, with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions on the Britishfront, was assigned the task in cooperation with the -AustralianCorps, of breaking the Hindenburg line at Le Cateau, where the St.Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. Tn this at-,tack, carried out on September 29 and October 1, the ThirtiethDivision speedily broke through the main line of defense and cap-tured all of its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed untilsome of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions fromOctober 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners andadvanced about 24 kilometers.52. On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions assistedthe Fourth French Army in its advance between Rheims and theArgonne. The Second Division completed its advance on this frontby the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key pointof the German position, which was captured with consummate dashand skill. The division here repulsed violent counterattacks, and


55/128

BINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 55was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send Americantroops to Italy to show Americas interest in the Italian situation andto strengthen Italian morale. Similarly a request was made bythe Italian Prime Minister at the Abbeville confcrcnce. It wasfinally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessaryhospital and auxiliary services, and the Three hundred and thirty-second Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July,191s. These troops participated in action against the Austrians inthe fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave River and in the finalpursuit of the Austrian Army.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN RUSSIA.55. It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Alliedtroops should be sent to cooperate with the Russians, either at Mur-mansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the BritishGovernment; through its ambassador at Washington, urged Ameri-can participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War

Department directed the dispatch of three battalionsof Infantry andthree companies of Engineers to join the Allied expedition. Incompliance with these instructions the Three hundred and thirty-


56/128

56 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on Sovember 16, con-tcmplated that 2 French infantry divisions and 1 French cav-alry division would be added to the American forces that occupied

the Coblenz: bridgehead, and that 1 American division would beadded to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. Asthis arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due todifference of views regarding the government of occupied territory,it was represented to the Marshal that each nation should be givena well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such terri-tory only the troops of the commander responsible for the particu-lar zone. On December 9 Marshal Foch accepted the principle ofpreserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced theAmerican bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half tothe French command at Mayence.57. Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the Firstor Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans had been made before the Armistice to organize a Third Army and, on November 14,this army, with Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman as commander, wasdesignated as the Army of Occupation. The Third and FourthArmy Corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third,


57/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 57communications, was intrusted to the Fifth and Thirty-third Divi-sions of the Second Army. The city of Luxemburg, garrisoned byFrench troops and designated as the headquarters of the Allied Com-mander-in-Chief, was excluded from our control.Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policyof noninterference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced.Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburgwas given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concernedthe administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, my in-structions were that our troops would not be subject to his control.Later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, MarshalFoch placed the entire Duchy in the American Zone.

RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES.59. On the day the Armistice was signed, the problem of the returnof our troops to the United States was taken up with the War De-partment and, on November 15, a policy recommended of sendinghome certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all availableshipping without clelay. On December 21 the War Department an-nounced by cable that it had been decided to bcgin immediately the


58/128

To maintain a suitable reservoir of mon for Brest and St. Nazairr?,an Embarkation Center was organized around Le Mans, whicheventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and theirrecords were prepared for the return voytlge and immediate demcjbili-zation. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkationservice was charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hun-dreds of thousands who passed through, which required the main-tenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.61. On November 16 all combat troops, except 30 divisions and aminimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to theUnited States. It was early evident that only limited use would bemade of the American divisions, and that the retention of 30 divisionswas not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable tomaintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divi-sions, and he proposed that we maintain 30 divisions in France untilFebruary 1, 25 of which should be held in the Zone of the Armies,and that on March 1 we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of theArmies and 5 ready to embark. The plan for March 1 was satis-factory, but the restrictions as to the divisions that should be inFrance on February 1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. 59


59/128

of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary inas-much as it would probably bc the summer of 1919 before we couldreduce our forces below the number asked. WC were, therefore, ableto keep our available ships filled, and by May 19 all combat divisions,except 5 still in the drmy of Occupation, were under orders to pro-ceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops outilize all troop transports to include July 15.62. The President had informed me that it would be necessary forus to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left thedetails to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1summarizes the agreement reached :

By direction of President, I have discussed with Marshal Foch question offorces to be left on the Rhine. Following agreed upon: The Fourth and FifthDivisions will bc sent to base ports immediately, the Second Division will com-mence moving to base ports on July 15, and the Third Division on August 13.Date of relief of First Division will be decided later. Agreement contemplatesthat after compliance by Germany with military conditions to bc completedwithin timt three months after German ratification of treaty, American forcewillbe reduced to one regiment of Irlfarltry and certain auxiliaries. RequestPresident be informed of agreement.As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third


60/128


61/128

PART III.I. SUPPLY, COORDINATION, MUNITIONS, ANDADMINISTRATION.

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY.cooRDINaTIoNF UPPLYLT HE RONT.TBANsPo~TaTIoNoBp.8.PUBC~A~INGGENCY. QUABTERMASTEB CORPS.h3.N TONNAGE. SIQNALOBPS.REPLACE~~ENTS OF PERSONNEL, MOTOR TRANS~OKF Coma.


62/128


63/128

PART III.SUPPLY, COORDINATION, MUNITIONS, AND ADMINIS-TRATION.

TEE SERVICES OF SUPPLY.1. In February, 1918, the Line of Communications was reorganizedunder the name of the Services of Supply. At that time all staffservices and departments, except The Adjutant Generals, the In-spector Generals, and the Judge Advocate Generals Departments,were grouped for supply purposes under one coordinating head,the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with a General Stat3paralleling, so far as necessary, the General Staff at General Head-

quarters.The principal functions of the Services of Supply were the pro-curement: storage, and transportation of supplies. These activities


64/128


65/128

FINAL REPORT OF GES. JOHN J. PERSHING. 65minimum and that the delivery of supplies to organizations beplaced on an automatic basis as far as possible.4. The principle of flexibility lrad to bc borne in mind in planningour supply system in order that our forces should be supplied, nomatter what their number, or where they might be called upon toenter the line. This high degree of elasticity and adaptability wasassured and maintained t,hrough the medium of the regulating sta-tion. It was the connecting link between the armies and the servicesin the rear, and regulated the railroad transportation which tiedthem together. The regulating officer at each such station was amember of the Fourth Section of my General Staff, acting under in-structions from his chief of section.

Upon the regulating officer fell the responsibility that a steadyilow of supply was maintained. He must meet emergency shipmentsof ammunition or engineering material, sudden transfers of troopsby rail, the hastening forward of replacements, or the unexpectedevacuation of wounded, All the supply services naturally clamoredto have their shipments rushed through. The regulating officer, act-ing under special or secret instructions, must declare priorities inthe supply of things the Army needed most. Always informed of


66/128

66 FIBAL REPORT OF GEE. JOHN J. PEBSHING.wagons; the fourth class covered articles, the flow of which pended upon tactical operations, such as ammunition and constructimaterial. Articles in the first class were placed on an automabasis, but formal requisition was eliminated as far as possible all classes.5. In order to meet many of the immediate needs of troops cing out of the line and to relieve to some extent the great strain the railheads during active fighting, a system of army depots organized. These depots were supplied by bulk shipments fthe advance depots through the regulating stations during tively quiet periods, They were under the control of the chiefsthe supply services of the armies and required practically no struction work, the supplies being stored in open places proteconly by dunnage and camouflaged tarpaulins.6. The accompanying diagram * illustrates graphically the supsystem which supported our armies in France. The ServicesSupply can be likened to a great reservoir divided into three mparts-the base depots, the intermediate depots and the advadepots. The management of this reservoir is in charge of the manding general, Services of Supply, who administ,ers it with



67/128

Europe as purchasers without regulation or coordination, theywould have been thrown into competition with each other, as well aswith buyers from the Allied armies and the civil populations. Sucha system would have created an unnatural elevation of prices, andwould have actually obstructed the procurement of supplies. Tomeet this problem from the standpoint of economical business man-

. agement, directions were given in August, 1917, for the creation of aGeneral Purchasing Board to coordinate and control our purchasesboth among our own services and among the Allies as well. Thesupervision and direction of this agency was placed in the hands ofan experienced business man, and every supply department in theAmerican Expeditionary Forces was represented on the board.Agents were stationed in Switzerland, Spain, and Holland, besidesthe Allied countries. The character of supplies included practicallythe entire category of necessities, although the bulk of our purchasesconsisted of raw materials for construction, ordnance air equipment,and animals. A total of about 10,000,000 tons was purchased abroadby this agency to December 31, 1918, most of which was obtained inFrance.The functions of the Purchasing Agcncy were gradually extended


68/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.


69/128

10. Under the original organization project there were to be tdivisions in each corps of six divisions which were to be used rcsorvoirs of replacements. One half of the Artillery and othauxiliaries of these two divisions mere to be utilized as corps aarmy troops. They were to supply the first demands for replacments from their original strength, after rrhich a minimum of 3,men per month for each army corps in France mas to be forwardeto them from the United States. It was estimated that this wou


70/128

70 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.chine gun units of the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Divisionthen in the vicinity of .Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leing only a cadre of two officers and twenty-five men for each compaTO provide immediate replaccmcnts during the progress of the tles new replacement organizations were formed in the Zone Operations; at first, as battalions, and later, as regional replacemedepots.12. On October 3, a cable was sent the War Department, readas follows :

Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, Aufand Scptcmber have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of theplacement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the Eighty-fourth Eighty-sixth Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are sover SO,000mtn. Vitally important that aI1 ~~l~larm~enls due, including 55requested for October, be shipped early in October. If necessary, some divisin United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shirq?ereplacements at once.

Altogether seven divisions had to be skeletonized, leaving only man per company and one officer per regiment to care for the recoAs a further measure to meet the situation, the authorized streng



71/128

able to obtain 50,000 animals. After many difficulties, the PurchasingBoard was successful in obtaining permission, in the summer of3918, to export animals from Spain, but practically no animals werereceived until after the Armistice.Every effort was made to reduce animal requirements-by in-creased motorization of artillery and by requiring mounted officersand men to walk-but in spite of all these efforts, the situation asto animals grew steadily worse. The shortage by November exceeded106,000, or almost one-half of all our needs. To relieve the crisis inthis regard, during the Meuse-Argonne battle, Marshal Foch rcquisi-tioned 13,000 animals from the French Armies and placed them atmy disposal.

RIZCLASSIFICATION OF PERSONXEL.14. An important development in the Services of Supply Tyas thereclassification system for officers and men. This involved not onlythe physical reclassification of those partially fit for duty, but also the

reclassification of officers according to fitness for special duties. Anumber of officers were found unfit for combat duty, and many innoncombatant positions were found unsuited to the duties on which

72 FINAL BEPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.


72/128

at times upward of 10,000 men, and often using 90,000 tons of per week.Storage requirements necessitated large supply depots at the and in the intermediate and advance sections. Over 2,000,OOO sqfeet of covered storage was secured from the French, but it necessary to construct approximately 20,000,000 square feet ational. The base hospital centers at Mars and Mesves, each 4,000-bed convalescent camps, are typical of the large scale which hospital accommodations were provided. The hospital at Mars, of 700 buildings, covered a ground space of 33 acres andcluded the usual road, water, sewerage, and lighting facilities municipality.

16. Advantages of economy and increased mobility caused adoption of the system of billeting troops. Billeting areas chosen near the base ports, along the line of communications, anthe advanced zone, as strategical requirements dictated. Tho sywas not altogether satisfactory, but with the number of troops taccommodated no other plan was practicable. Demountable barrawere use for shelter to supplement lack of billets, 16,000 barraof this type being erected, particularly at base ports where

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING. P3


73/128

The French railroads, both in management and material, haddangerously deteriorated during the war. As our system was super-imposed upon that of the French it was necessaryo provide themwith additional personnel and much mat&iel. Experienced Ameri-can railroad men brought into our organization, in various practicalcapacities, the best talent in the country, who, in addition to themanagement of our own transportation, materially aided the French.The relation of our Transportation Corps to the French railroadsand to our own supply departments presented many difficulties, butthese were eventually overcome and a high state of efficiency estab-lished.18. It was early decided, as expedient for our purposes, to useAmerican rolling stock on the French railroads, and approximately20,000 cars and 1,500 standard-gauge locomotives were brought fromtho United States and assembled by our railroad troops. We assistedthe French by repairing with our own personnel 57,385 French cars,and 1,947 French locomotives. The lack of rolling stock for Allieduse was at all times a serious handicap, so that the number of carsand locomotives built and repaired by us was no small part of ourcontribution to the Allied cause.

74 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHX J. PERSHING.


74/128

conserved, and what in former wars represented a distinct liabilitywas turned into a valuable asset.The Graves Registration Service, also under the QuartermasterCorps, was charged with the acquisition and care of cemeteriethe identification and reburial of our dead, and the correspondencewith relatives of the deceased. Central cemeteries mere organizeon the American battle fields, the largest being at Romagne-sousMontfaucon and at Thiaucourt in the Woevre. All territory ovwhich our troops fought was examined by this service, and, generallyspeaking, the remains of our dead were assembled in American ceeteries and the graves marked with a cross or six-pointed star anphotographed. A few bodies were buried where they fell or neighboring &en& or British cemeteries. Wherever the soldiewas buried, his identification tag, giving his name and Army serinumber, was fastened to the marker. A careful record was kept the location of each grave.

SIGNAL CORPS.20. The Signal Corps supplied! installed, and operated the ge

FIN& REPORT OF CEN. JOHN J. PERSHINQ. 75


75/128

troops with an organization of zone and town majors, and to havecharge of the renting, leasing, and requisitioning of all lands andbuildings required by the American Expeditionary Forces. Underthe provisions of an act of Congress, approved in April, 1918, theClaims Department was charged with the investigation, assessment,and settlement of all claims of inhabitants of France or any otherEuropean country not an enemy or ally of an enemy for injuries toparsons or damages to property occasioned by our forces. The pro-cedure followed was in accordance with the law and practice of thecountry in question. The efficient administration of this service hadan excellent effect upon the people of the European countries con-cerned.

23. The various activities of the Services of Supply which, at itsheight11 on November 11, 1918, reached a numerical strength in per-sonnel of 668,312, including 23,772 civilian employees, can best besummed up by quoting the telegram sent by me to Maj. Gen. JamesG. Ilarbord, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, upon myrelinquishing personal command of the First Army :

I want the S. 0. S. to know how much the First Army appreciated theproml>t reslxnme made to wery demand for men, equipment, suppllcs, and


76/128

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PRRSRIIVG. 77


77/128

not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture,but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never af-ford to neglect the question.ADMINISTRATION.

%fBDIGAL AND SANITARY CONDITIOiW.28. The general health of our armies under conditions str&ngeand adverse in many ways to our American experience and mode oflife was marvelously good. The proportionate number of men in-capacitated from other causes than battle casualties and injurieswas low. Of all deaths in the American Expeditionary Forces (toSeptember 1, 1919) totaling 81,141, there were killed in action,35,556; died of wounds received in battle, 15,130; other wounds andinjuries, 5,669; and died of disease, 24,786. Therefore, but littleover two-sevenths the total loss of life in the American Expeditian-ary Forces was caused by disease.Our armies suffered from the comnuu~icahlo diseases that usually

affect troops. Only two diseases have caused temporarily excessivesick rates, epidemic diarrhea and influenza, and of these influenza

78 FINAL REPORT OF GliN. JOHN J. PERSHING.


78/128

30. The Army and the Medical Department were fortunate inobtaining the services of leading physicians, surgeons, and specialistsin all branches of medicine from all parts of the United States, rhobrought the most skillful talent of the world to the relief of oursick and wounded. The Army Nurse Corps deserves more than pass-ing comment. These women, working tirelessly and devotedly,shared the burden of the day to the fullest extent with the men,many of them submitting to all the dangers of the battle front.

RECORDS, PERSONREI>, AE;D MAIL BERYICE.

31. New problems confronted the Adjutant Generals Departmentin France. Our great distance from home necessitated records,data, and executive machinery to represent the War Departmentas well as our forces in Prance. Unusually close attention was paidto individual records. Never before have accuracy and completenessof reports been so strictly insisted upon. Expedients had to beadopted whereby the above requirements could be met withoutincreasing the record and correspondence work of combat units.The organization had to be elastic to meet the demands of any force



79/128

addresses, hasty handIing, and readdressing of mail by regimentaland company clerks in the Zone of Operations, and other conditionsincident to the continuous movement of troops in battle, made thedistribution of mail an exceedingly difficult problem.

33. The Inspector Generals Depalhncnt, acting as an independentagency not responsible for the matters under its observation, madeinspections and special investigations for the purpose of keepingcom-manders informed of local conditions. The inspectors worked un-ceasingly to determine the manner in which orders were being car-ricd out, in an effort to perfect cliscipline and team play.The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forcesin the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposeddiscipline among our soldiers which must be regarded as an unusualdevelopment of this war, a fact which materially aided us to or..ganize and employ in an incredibly short space of time the cstraor-dinary fighting machine developed in France.

Our troops generally were strongly imbued with an offensive spiritessential to success. The veteran divisions had acquired not only this

80 FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING.


80/128

of the Judge Advocate Generals Department, whose duty it wrender legal advice and to assist in the prompt trial and just punment of those guilty of serious infractions of discipline.Prior to the signmg of the Armistice, serious breaches of discipwere rare, considering the number of troops. This was clue tohigh sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the ousness of the situation. In the period of relnsntion following cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline Terc naturally numerous, but not even thrn mas the number of trials as greaproportion to the strength of the force as is usual in our service.35. It was early realized that many of the peace-time methodplmishment Fere not the best for existing conditions. In the

part of 1918, it vvas decided that the award of dishonorable charge of soldiers convicmd of an offense involving moral turpituwould not be contemplated, except in the most serious cases.remove these soldiers temporarily from their organizations, clivcommanders were authorized to form provisional temporary tachments to which such soldiers could be attached. These dements were retained with their battalions so that offenders wnot escape the dangers and hardships to which their comrades

FINAL REPORT OF GEN. JOHX J. PERSi?lING. 81


81/128

tioning under the First Section, General Staff. The Department wasdeveloped into four main sections-the Military Police Corps whichserved with divisions, corps, and armies and in the sections of theServices of Supply; the Prisoner of War Escort Companies; theCriminal Investigation Department; and the Circulation Depart-ment. It was not until 1918 that the last-mentioned dcpn

Final Report of Pershing - General John J. Pershing

Documents

Transcript of Final Report of Pershing - General John J. Pershing