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Final External Evaluation of the Deepening Peace in the Niger-Delta Program (Final Report) Search for Common Ground, Nigeria

Augustus Emenogu 12/28/20 Evaluation Team

Leader

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DISCLAIMER

“This document covers program activities implemented with the financial assistance of the

German Cooperation. The views expressed herein, should not be taken, in any way, to reflect the

official opinion of the German Cooperation, and Search for Common Ground, Nigeria is not

responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.”

The Deepening the Peace in the Niger Delta project, was funded by the German Cooperation

support a locally led peace architecture that is inclusive, at all levels of society. The project is in

its second phase aimed to scale up impact and build on the positive results yielded from

successful implementation of the project’s pilot phase (November 2018 – September 2019).

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our evaluation team would like to express its thanks to all the individuals who took the time to be interviewed and share their perspectives on and experiences with the German Cooperation Deepening Peace in the Niger Delta Program, Nigeria. Many thanks to the SFCG team, for their steadfast engagement during the evaluation process as, for providing constant support to the evaluation team during all phases of the assessment process. Additionally, the evaluation team would like to give a special thanks to the engaged research assistants, program beneficiaries, community stakeholders and government partners, without whom we would not have been able to garner support for interviews and field engagement activities. The evaluation team is deeply grateful to all of the people who assisted with setting up meetings and facilitated data collection.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

ACRONYMS 6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7

SECTION 1. 12

1.1. 12

1.2. 13

1.3. 13

1.4. 14

1.4.1. 14

1.4.3. 14

1.4.4. 14

SECTION 2. 15

2.1. 15

2.2. 16

2.2.1 16

2.2.2. 17

2.3. 18

2.4. 18

2.4.1. 18

2.4.2. 18

2.4.3. 19

2.5. 19

2.6. 20

2.7. 20

2.7.1. 20

2.7.2. 21

SECTION 3. 21

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3.1. 21

3.2. 22

3.3. 22

SECTION 4. 23

4.1. 23

4.1.1. 23

4.1.2. 24

4.2. 26

4.2.1. 26

4.2.2. 26

4.3. 27

4.3.1. 27

4.4. 28

4.4.1. 28

4.4.2. 29

4.4.3. 30

SECTION 5. 32

5.1. 32

5.1.1. 32

5.1.3. 34

5.2. 35

ANNEXES 34

ANNEX 1. 37

1.1. 37

ANNEX 2. 38

2.1. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) Error! Bookmark

not defined.

2.2. ORIGIN OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY PROGRAM (NDAP) Error! Bookmark not

defined.

2.3 THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

INTERVENTIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF PEACEBUILDING Error! Bookmark not

defined.

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2.4. THE CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA Error! Bookmark not defined.

2.4.1. 38

2.4.2. 44

2.5 46

2.6. 46

ANNEX 3. 48

ANNEX 4. 52

ANNEX 4.1. 52

ANNEX 4.2. 57

ANNEX 4.3. 62

ANNEX 5. 68

5.1. 68

5.1.1. 68

5.2. 68

5.2.1. 68

5.2.2. 69

5.2.3. 69

ANNEX 6. 70

ANNEX 7. 72

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ACRONYMS CSO Civil Society Organization

DMEL Design, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

FGD Focus Group Discussions

FIDA International Federation of Women Lawyers

GMOU Global Memorandum of Understanding

IRC Information Resource Center

KCMB Koko Community of Integrated Businesses

KII Key Informant Interviews

LGA Local Government Area

LPC Local Project Committee

MNC Multi-national companies

NAWOJ National Association of Women Journalists

NCWS National Council of Women Society

PANDEF Pan-Niger Delta Forum

PIND Partnerships Initiatives in the Niger Delta

PLC Public Limited Company

SDN Stakeholder Democracy Network

SFCG Search for Common Ground

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW

The “Deepening the Peace in the Niger Delta” Project is funded by the German Cooperation, to

support a locally led peace architecture that is inclusive, at all levels of society. The project is in

its second phase of implementation (October 2019 - December 2020), aiming to scale up impact

and build on the positive results yielded from successful implementation of the project’s pilot

phase (November 2018 – September 2019). In the first phase of the project, including a period of

no cost extension (Jun – Sep 2019), the project focused on Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers states,

directly benefiting communities in eight (8) Local Government Areas (LGAs) i.e. Rivers State:

Okrika, Gokana, and Port Harcourt LGAs, Bayelsa State: Southern Ijaw and Kolokuma/Opokuma

LGAs, and Delta State: Warri North, Warri South-West, Isoko South LGAs.

This project recognizes that if members of communities are empowered with non-violence means

of resolving conflicts and embrace dialogues, and thus develop locally-owned and sustained

mechanisms for conflict prevention and dispute resolution, the risk of intergroup violence will be

reduced and norms and institutions favorable towards peace and reconciliation will be reinforced.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The proposed evaluation methodology adopts a multi-tier evaluative process to meet the objective

of the evaluation study i.e. Tier 1 – Outcome Harvesting (OH), Tier 2 – Outcome Mapping (OM)

and Tier 3 – Most Significant Change (MSC). Outcome Harvesting (OH) collected (“harvested”)

evidence of what changed (“outcomes”) and, then, working backwards, determined whether and

how the intervention contributed to these changes. This proved to be especially useful in complex

situations when it is not possible to define concretely most of what an intervention aimed to

achieve, or even, what specific actions were being taken over a multi-year period. This informed

the selection of this evaluation approach by the ETL to deliver on the objectives of the final

evaluation study.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

STRENGTHENED CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS Interviewed government respondents confirmed that the project contributed in no small measure in strengthening their capacity through their active involvement in project activities (figure 9). Specifically, interviewed government actors noted that their strengthened capacity enabled government actors to more readily engage with local actors and community members to address drivers of community conflict, as well as improved their ability to provide opportunities for government/community-led initiatives; due mainly to the creation of safe spaces for peaceful dialogue across intervention communities. This also led to the increased participation of government stakeholders’ in dispute resolution across all target communities; as well as engaging in dialogues with community and traditional rulers. These actions by government stakeholders were most effective in countering violent extremism; as government actors showed a willingness to enter partnerships that enabled local communities get involved in peaceful dialogues and promote communal-centered dispute resolution action.

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ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

Initial assessment findings from the rapid conflict study in 2019 identified 5 key driving factors of

violent conflict in the intervention states by interviewed respondents i.e. unemployment (83.2%),

poverty (56.8%), lack of government response to citizen’s needs (41.8%), no/poor education

(37.7%), and no/low participation of youths in decision making (28.8%). The final evaluation

findings identified the lack of employment opportunities (Delta), poor education (Delta), prevailing

poverty (Bayelsa) and human rights abuses (Delta) as the key drivers of conflict across

intervention states in the Niger Delta. These collective drivers have a more psycho-social

dimension; not unrelated to the COVID - 19 pandemic situation; as more households struggle with

mental health issues emanating from a series of national events.

A new research published in the journals Psychiatry Research and Behavior Research and

Therapy has also warned that long after a COVID - 19 vaccination is developed and the

coronavirus death toll is tallied, the impact on mental health will linger, continuing to inflict damage

if not addressed. With the WHO figures showing that less than 10 percent of mental health

patients in Nigeria (i.e. 50 million people) have access to care.1

CREATING LINKAGES BETWEEN CITIZENS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The rapid conflict study (SFCG 2019) highlighted the nature of prevailing conflict dynamics across

target communities/states in the Niger Delta. The study findings revealed that predominantly,

cultists and politicians were reported to be most involved in perpetuating acts of violence across

all three states, with reports of politicians paying these cultists to intimidate their opponents

through killings, kidnapping and ballot box snatching. These cultists are in turn protected from the

law by political “godfathers”. Following these, security forces (most prevalent in Bayelsa state),

militants, ex militants (most prevalent in Bayelsa state), and multinational companies (MNCs)

(most prevalent in Delta state) were also mentioned. To address this conflict dynamics challenge,

the project significantly involved key stakeholders in all three (3) intervention states.

This was most evident in Delta state, where community dialogues served as the prominent means

of addressing potential conflict situations; as generally speaking respondents stated that they

regarded such platforms as being credible and offered a non-threatening space to freely express

their concerns without fear of intimidation by state and non-state actors alike. The project was

successful in creating linkages between citizens and local authorities, by providing capacity

building opportunities for different actors in each intervention state. Government actors and

communities readily partnered on measures to promote peaceful resolution of conflict through

sustained dialogue and advocacy engagements. Despite this, government-led and CSO –led

initiatives were not as successful as community dialogues in fostering and restoring the social

fabric in intervention communities.

EVALUATION CONCLUSION

1 Government Raises Alarm Over Mental Health of Covid-19 Survivors

Nigeria: Govt Raises Alarm Over Mental Health of Covid-19 Survivors - allAfrica.com

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EXPANDING SPACE FOR DIALOGUES

There remain significant opportunities to continue the expansion of existing spaces for dialogues

across intervention states and communities for different actor led initiatives. For example, future

project activities should focus on building up alternative spaces for dialogues among non-

traditional actors e.g. traders, media practitioners and teachers i.e. school centered activities. The

impact of the COVID pandemic cannot be fully measured in present terms, as hitherto established

norms and life patterns have been disrupted beyond all spheres of life globally. What is therefore

required, is a new way of communicating and advocating for change beyond current dialogue

options. For example, the #ENDSARS protest highlighted the significant reach and credible

mobilization drive achievable by social media platforms. Exploring such tech-enabled dialogue

options would certainly amplify the voices of community actors and beneficiary alike, as

increasingly state and federal governments tend to respond actively to citizen’s concerns when

there is a critical mass of emerging narratives on any issue. Importantly, the recent #ENDSARS

protests that swept through Nigeria and started in Delta State; show the increased importance for

expanding spaces for dialogues among community and government actors. By expanding the

participation of target beneficiaries in engaging in governance and resource issues, the project

also addressed the drivers of conflict in the Niger Delta. Refer to the table below for notable

opportunities for expanding spaces for dialogue in the Niger Delta.

ADOPTING COMMUNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION OPTIONS AND EMERGING FORMS OF VIOLENCE Initial findings from the rapid assessment study conducted by SFCG in 2019, showed that

although there remains a prevalence of certain types of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta (e.g.

cultism, political power, and conflicts over resources or livelihoods, conflict over territorial

boundaries and political power); community members are more willing to utilize community

centered mechanisms to resolve disputes. Interviewed respondents mentioned that the program

assisted in building the capacity of community members to reduce conflict and violence by actively

advocating peaceful resolution alternatives.

For example, community members were successful in resolving conflict in Apam community

where two factions had clashed repeatedly. There is also an emergence of new forms of violent

conflict (e.g. sexual and domestic violence; ethnic conflicts); which was exacerbated by adopted

lockdown measures instituted by Federal and State governments in response to the COVID -19

pandemic. This extended to a rise in hate crimes, militancy/insurgency acts, religious sect

motivated actions and acts of terrorism. However, community structures were able to address

these emerging conflicts because the project built the capacity of community local actors to

resolve conflict and mitigate violence. The community members also agreed to live peacefully

and engage in peaceful dialogue, by nominating leaders to represent their interests during town

hall forums, and organized round table discussions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are proposed for future implementation i.e.

● Addressing emerging forms of violence: The global COVID - 19 pandemic led to

increased domestic and sexual violence across intervention communities; as more

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households experienced significant loss of economic livelihoods and net household

incomes; with multiple recessions occurring in the fiscal year of 2020 for the Nigerian

economy that remains heavily dependent on the Oil and Gas industry centered in the Niger

Delta. Follow-on project activities would have to develop creative measures to address

these emerging forms of violence e.g. hate crimes, militancy/insurgency acts, religious

sect motivated actions and acts of terrorism.

● Promoting strategic partnerships: Evaluation findings show that although the project

successfully leveraged certain partnerships (i.e. CSOs/NGOs, government officials) to

facilitate peaceful dialogues; these partnerships were less active in Rivers State; as

beneficiaries relied on community actors. More effort should be made to strengthen these

partnerships in Rivers State; while also supplementing established relationships in Delta

and Bayelsa State. The project should look to engage other actors in more collaborative

activities (i.e. military operatives, media, and academia) especially with community actors

in Rivers and Bayelsa states.

● Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)/Community Engagements need to be improved

across all three (3) intervention states i.e. promote community centered engagements that

amplify local voices and sustain dialogue among a diverse group of participants. The

evaluation findings show that beneficiaries rely on communal support systems for

dialogue; because of the lack of trust in government actors. Therefore, any follow-on

project design will benefit from the conduct of a state specific Political Economy Analysis

(PEA) study as a baseline assessment to uncover underlying power dynamics, mitigating

factors and influential actors that have the potential to positively/negatively affect the

effectiveness of proposed project activities i.e. government/CSO/Community led

initiatives. ● Linking up with established governance mechanisms should be prioritized for follow-

on project design should consider identifying possible links with established governance

mechanisms like the Open Governance Platform (OGP) to provide an elevated platform

for amplifying the voices of community and CSO actors. An established PEA action plan

will put forward notable engagement platforms that can be leveraged to sustain project

outcomes (sustainability) and also ensure collaborative support for community actors.

● Capacity building sessions should be more targeted to specific needs of beneficiaries

in each intervention state to sustain positive outcomes and foster community ownership.

Any proposed intervention should build on existing activities conducted by Local Project

Committees (LPCs) and Information Resource Centers (IRCs) in each intervention

community by conducting a capacity assessment study viz-a-viz a community needs

assessment; to ensure proposed sessions are contextual relevant and meet the

expectations of target beneficiaries. ● Increase involvement of stakeholders: It is imperative that the next phase of project

implementation involves the development of an engagement plan for different

stakeholders i.e. government, CSO and communities to further strengthen linkages

between citizens and local authorities. This also offers a unique learning opportunity for

the project; through the conduct of quarterly collaboration mapping studies by the

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) team to ascertain the changing space for

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engagement of key actors through strategic engagements facilitated through deliberate

project activities. Overtime, the project could then learn from successful advocacy efforts

to increase stakeholder engagements that strengthen linkages between citizens (target

beneficiaries) and local authorities.

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW The “Deepening the Peace in the Niger Delta” Project is funded by the German Cooperation, to

support a locally led peace architecture that is inclusive, at all levels of society. The project is in

its second phase of implementation (Oct 2019 - Dec 2020), aiming to scale up impact and build

on the positive results yielded from successful implementation of the project’s pilot phase (Nov

2018 – Sep 2019). In the first phase of the project, including a period of no cost extension (Jun –

Sep 2019), the project focused on Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers states, directly benefiting

communities in 8 LGAS (Rivers State: Okrika, Gokana, and Port Harcourt LGAs, Bayelsa State:

Southern Ijaw and Kolokuma/Opokuma LGAs, and Delta State: Warri North, Warri South-West,

Isoko South LGAs).

This scale up phase of the project

targets 20 communities in 20 LGAs

in the three focus states, (Rivers

State - Okrika, Gokana, Port

Harcourt, Khana, Obio/Akpor,

Asari-Toru and Ogba/

Egbema/Ndoni; Bayelsa State -

Southern Ijaw,

Kolokuma/Opokuma, Ogbia,

Sagbama, Ekeremor, and Brass),

Delta State - Aniocha North, Isoko

South, Udu, Ughelli South,

Ukwuani, Warri North and Warri

South West) and continued to

engage diverse stakeholders

including Government authorities,

security agencies, community

leaders, women and youths, to

collaboratively respond to conflict

drivers in the region.

FIGURE 1. MAP OF NIGER-DELTA, NIGERIA

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1.2. PROGRAM OBJECTIVE The overall goal of the project is to support an inclusive, multi-level dialogue process to peacefully

address governance and resource issues driving conflict in the Niger Delta. This project goal is

being achieved through two specific objectives and corresponding outcomes:

Objective 1: Strengthen linkages between citizens and local authorities in the Niger Delta to

respond to drivers of violence in the region. Expected outcomes:

● People of the Niger Delta, including militants and ex-militants, feel that cooperation

between them and local authorities is strengthened; ● Platforms for collaborative response to underlying conflict issues by communities,

government, and security are established in project LGAs.

Objective 2: Amplify the voices of key stakeholders, particularly women, youth and marginalized

groups to contribute to discussions around regional conflict issues and promote peace in the Niger

Delta region. Expected outcomes:

● 2.1 Journalists and civil society organizations increase their capacity to report on elections

and manage rumors;

● 2.2 Increase in the number of voices of women, youth and marginalized groups

contributing to discussions on regional conflict issues in the Niger Delta; and

● 2.3 Increase in public awareness and support for peace in the Niger Delta.

1.3. EVALUATION PURPOSE Building understanding and trust is the most critical precondition to peace building. With the

growing population and resultant lack of control of resources such as land and crude oil proceeds,

communities in the Niger Delta are prone to conflicts over these resources. In the absence of

understanding and trust, intra and inter communal clashes are rife and further clashes with the

Oil Producing Companies are also common. This project recognized that if members of

communities are empowered with non-violence means of resolving conflicts and embrace

dialogues, and thus develop locally-owned and sustained mechanisms for conflict prevention and

dispute resolution, the risk of intergroup violence will be reduced and norms and institutions

favorable towards peace and reconciliation will be reinforced.

The final evaluation study provides information on the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability

of the project, for internal accountability and learning which can be used for designing, planning

and implementation of future programs and for accountability to donors. The evaluation study

further determined the level of adherence to the planned activities and associated results planned

during project implementation.

The objectives of the final evaluation study are outlined:

● To determine the project’s contribution and impact in achievement minimizing conflicts

arising from governance and resource issues

● To document outcomes/impact in line with all project expected outcomes and objectives.

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● To determine the extent to which the project is having an impact on gender and inclusion

dynamics, specifically the role of women, youth and marginalized groups in peace building

in the communities. ● To determine the capacity and motivation of project beneficiaries to sustain the gains of

the intervention especially the platforms created by the project after the lifespan of the

project.

● To provide an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and gaps in the project

implementation, and recommendations for addressing the weaknesses and challenges

which will inform future programming.

● To provide and share actionable lessons learned and recommendations for the design

and implementation of future projects.

1.4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS Lines of inquiry will be determined more in detail and should include:

1.4.1. RELEVANCE ● How relevant were the project strategies, activities and partnerships to the specific context

and objectives of the project?

● How relevant were the project strategies, activities and partnerships to the result of the

project?

1.4.2. EFFECTIVENESS

● To what extent were the objectives of the intervention achieved?

● What components of the intervention have been more successful and what components

proved to be more challenging?

1.4.3. IMPACT ● To what extent can changes (intended/unintended, positive/negative) be attributed to the

program?

● What particular features of the program have made a difference in the governance and

resource issue conflict in the communities?

● What is the influence of other factors and conflict context on the impact of the project?

1.4.4. SUSTAINABILITY ● To what extent are the benefits of the program likely to persist after donor funding ceased?

● What are the major factors that are influencing the sustainability of the program?

● If the project has contributed to strengthening the linkage between the citizens and local

authorities to address the drivers of conflict, how sustainable are these linkages?

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SECTION 2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

2.1. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION METHODOLOGY To meet these objectives and provide useful insights from the above-mentioned evaluation

questions. The final evaluation employed a multi-tier methodology approach as shown in Table

1. below.

TABLE 1. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Evaluation Methodology

Outcome Harvesting (OH)

Outcome Harvesting (OH) collected (“harvested”) evidence of what changed (“outcomes”) and, then, working backwards, determine whether and how the intervention contributed to these changes. This proved to be especially useful in complex situations when it is not possible to define concretely most of what an intervention aimed to achieve, or even, what specific actions were being taken over a multi-year period. This informed the selection of this evaluation approach by the ETL to deliver on the objectives of the final evaluation study. The Outcome Harvesting (OH) is the first evaluation tier employed by the final evaluation study. The outcome harvesting process incorporated a desk study review of primary data from SFCG Nigeria regarding program reports i.e. especially the rapid conflict assessment study conducted at the commencement of program intervention. Leading from this, the evaluation team proceeded to conduct a deep dive to review secondary data (via a literature review) on specific deepening peace in the Niger-delta program areas. Refer to Annex for Evaluation Literature Review.

Outcome Mapping (OM)

Outcome Mapping (OM) is a methodology for planning and assessing projects that aim to bring about

'real' and tangible change. It has been developed with international development in mind and can also

be applied to projects (or program) relating to evaluation communication, policy influence and research

uptake. This approach is especially useful for evaluating the German Cooperation sponsored

intervention, because the outcome of peacebuilding interventions is targeted at bringing about real

change in the lives of people in the Niger Delta. The OM process will commence with interviews with

identified respondents and stakeholders (i.e. based on established lines of enquiries outlined in the

evaluation matrix). The evaluation team will also survey SFCG Nigeria program stakeholders during

respondent interviews. Output from this analysis stage (visuals and data) shall be used by the evaluation

team to further showcase documented program outcomes from the end line evaluation findings.

Most Significant Change (MSC)

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The Most Significant Change (MSC) technique is a form of participatory monitoring and evaluation. It involves the collection and selection of stories of change, produced by program or project stakeholders. Upon collation of field data by the evaluation team, the Data Management Evaluator (DME) analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data to generate associated charts per Evaluation Questions (EQs). Each generated data chart was then presented as consolidated tables across intervention states (i.e. Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa). The next step was to highlight key evaluation findings from collated responses and then make comparison across each EQ from the Rapid Conflict Assessment Findings presented at Baseline. This was done to identify the MSC achieved by SFCG Nigeria during the implementation period of the program in Nigeria. This will be achieved through a comparative analysis of baseline and end line evaluation findings across both intervention LGAs. All evaluation findings (visuals, data, and narrative contents) were used to explain SFCG Nigeria program outcomes for each EQ.

2.2. EVALUATION SAMPLING Sample sites were selected through a stratified multistage cluster sample design. Strata will be

selected at the Local Government Area (LGA) level, and include key characteristics and factors

expected to impact progress towards outcome (i.e. geographic location, socio-economic features,

etc.). For the sampling of households/Respondents for the survey; the proposed sample sizes

had 95% confidence interval, enabling results to be generalized to the project intervention areas.

An additional 10 percent (%) sample of project beneficiaries were included to address non-

respondents or incomplete questionnaires. Strategically, a buffer list, containing randomly

selected beneficiaries in proposed sample sites was generated and reserved for replacement

should any or a combination of the following situations arise:

• If, by chance, the evaluation team were unable to reach a respondent for an interview. • A selected respondent was not willing to participate in the interview i.e. provide

informed consent; and/or • A selected respondent relocated from the area for unknown reasons.

The evaluation team will ensure that the proposed sample frame incorporates reasonable levels of certainty that the findings are representative for the target population i.e.

● Reasonable ability to generalize the intervention’s effectiveness to similar contexts; and ● Reasonable ability to generalize the insights into what works and why for similar contexts.

2.2.1 DETERMINATION OF EVALUATION SAMPLE SIZE This was done using sample size for estimating single proportions (Ref: Epi calculator). The

sample size was derived from the program target for the period under review.

N is the minimum sample size; and Deff is the design effect (Deff=2)

Zα is the standard normal deviate corresponding to a 2 sided level of significance (α) of 5%

p is prevalence of drivers/prevalence of conflict which is unknown (50%)

q is (1-p) and d is the level of precision (d=5%),

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Accepting a level of confidence of 95%, a precise margin of 5%, an estimate of 50% (assuming

that the drivers/prevalence of conflict among is unknown) and standard normal deviate at 95%

confidence level and adjusting for non-response at 10% and incomplete interviews.

2.2.2. SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS FOR EVALUATION STUDY. Random sampling was used to select 50% of the total sites in the respective states. Numbers were allocated to all the sites and the first 50% randomly selected were included in selected target survey sites. The number of respondents interviewed per site was a function of sample size and the number of sites selected for the study in each state. It was assumed that all the prospective respondents had matching characteristics and therefore were selected for the interview based on their availability as at the time of conducting the study in the selected sites, males and females within the age of 20 – 50+. Furthermore, data collection prioritized the engagement of women and youth respondents to understand their involvement on the project. The evaluation questionnaires were designed to gather data to answer each of the evaluation questions. A list of these questions and proposed tools will be submitted to SFCG Nigeria i.e. Evaluation Matrix. Upon completion of the desk review, the ETL worked in close collaboration with the SFCG Nigeria team to secure approval of all developed data collection instruments used for onward field testing (through the adoption of mobile-app /remote data collection options). The evaluation sample target was exceeded by ninety-one (91) sample interviews. TABLE 2. EVALUATION SAMPLE SIZE

States

Sample Size

No of Beneficiaries reached by project

No of Target Respondents

Number of Completed

Questionnaires

Achieved Sample

Target

CBQ

GSQ PSQ

Bayelsa 1027 168 128 72 1 201

Delta 1732 176 185 15 2 202

Rivers 1357 171 124 77 2 203

Total 3299 515 437 164 5 606

TABLE 3. COMPLETED TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

Bayelsa State

Completed Interviews

Delta State

Completed Interviews

Rivers State

Completed Interviews

Ekeremor

15

Aniocha North 20 Asari-toru Choba

8 Asaba 32

Kolokuma-opokuma

27

Isoko South

39

Gokana

2

Opodo 1 Khana 16

Oshimili South 9 Obio-Akpor 14

Udu 22 Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni 15

Ogbia 17 Ughelli South 18 Okrika

7 Sagbama 11 Ukwuani 3

Southern Ijaw

35

Warri North

36

Asari-toru

29

Yenagoa 23

Warri South West 5

Choba

33

Total 128 185 124

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2.3. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS Due to the dynamic situation in which SFCG Nigeria operates, as well as the potentially life

threatening nature of the issues involved, it was essential that the evaluation team adhered to

strict ethical and security guidelines. The evaluation team has extensive experience conducting

evaluation and monitoring activities in Nigeria across multiple donor funded projects. Therefore,

the evaluation team adhered to SFCG Nigeria Code of Conduct (C&C) guidelines at all times.

More specifically, the team ensured adherence to the outlined ethical considerations below:

● Independence: The evaluation stud was external, and measures were taken to prevent bias.

● Representativeness: Evaluation study strived to include a wide range of beneficiaries/ stakeholders across target intervention states in the Niger-delta.

● Gender Sensitiveness: Evaluation study was gender sensitive and assessed the intended or unintended effects of the project on gender relations.

● Conflict Sensitivity: Evaluation study was conflict sensitive and also, where possible, tried to assess the intended or unintended effects of the project on any conflict triggers.

● Informed Consent: To ensure that the study adhered to established ethical guidelines,

participation was voluntary for all respondents. Respondents were informed of the purpose

of the final evaluation study, and given the option to opt in or out of interviews. Only

participants who freely gave their consent to be part of the study were interviewed. In

addition, no data was collected from respondents less than 18 years of age. ● Do No Harm: In conducting assessment activities, the evaluation team maintained a

robust understanding of the impact of aid on existing Niger-Delta crisis, especially its

interactions with security operatives and government stakeholders, with technical

guidance provided by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Nigeria to limit or prevent any

unintended negative effects.

2.4. EVALUATION DATA COLLECTION

2.4.1. DESK STUDY An evaluation protocol was developed by the lead evaluator to provide the road map for the

conduct of the final external evaluation study. Leading from this, the evaluation team finalized a

robust approach through the careful review of the SFCG Nigeria’s projects background

documents. The team conducted a series of desktop reviews of SFCG Nigeria’s primary and

secondary data sources i.e. internal and external documents.

● Review of relevant project documents such as approved project description and log frame.

● Review project quarterly and annual progress reports (i.e. monitoring reports etc.) and

findings from beneficiary feedback mechanisms.

● Review and use of the available routine and evaluation data.

2.4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW The evaluation team conducted a literature review to curate current knowledge including

substantive findings, as well as theoretical and methodological contributions to the evaluation

questions. The literature review put forward a theoretical basis for each study objective outlined

in the Terms of Reference (ToR) document. Refer to Annex for Literature Review narrative.

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2.4.3. TELEPHONE SURVEYS To further supplement the deployment of approved evaluation questionnaires on remote platforms

(i.e. ODK platform), the evaluation team made alternative arrangements for data collection due to

the ongoing #ENDSARS protests and imposed curfew situations across Nigeria and especially in

the Niger Delta region. Research assistants were provided with call credit to make calls to

identified beneficiaries (identified from sampled list of target respondents) to remotely administer

the evaluation questionnaires. During the call, the evaluation questionnaire also updated

responses on printed hard copies of evaluation forms, to avoid making mistakes prior to uploading

daily data to the ODK platform. Refer to Section 2.7 for Risk Mitigation Plan (RMP) and Annex

for Risk Mitigation Strategy (RMS).

TABLE 4. COMPLETED EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRES

States

Program Staff Questionnaires

(PSQ)

Community Beneficiary

Questionnaires (CBQ)

Government Stakeholder

Questionnaires (GSQ)

Total

Bayelsa 1 128 72 201

Delta 2 185 15 202

Rivers 2 124 77 203

Total 5 437 164 606

2.5. KEY DEMOGRAPHICS This section provides a breakdown of demographic profiles of completed evaluation interviews

for each respondent category (i.e. stakeholders, beneficiaries, and program staff) for remote data

collection activities in Baylesa, Delta and Rivers. The breakdown of interviewed respondents is

highlighted in Table 6 below.

TABLE 5. KEY DEMOGRAPHICS (GENDER)

Questionnaires

Bayelsa Delta Rivers

Male Female Male Female Male Female

PSQ 1 0 1 1 2 0

CBQ 119 9 161 24 111 13

GSQ 50 22 5 10 53 24

Sub-Total 170 31 167 35 166 37

Total 201 202 203

TABLE 6. KEY DEMOGRAPHICS (GOVERNMENT RESPONDENTS)

Respondent Category

2 Delta

Bayelsa

Rivers

Total

Community Leader 8 20 22 50

LGA Officials 1 10 16 27

Local Actors 1 11 25 37

2

20

Security Agency Personnel 2 19 9 30

State Government Official 3 12 5 20

Total 15 72 77 164

2.6. DEVELOPMENT OF RISK MITIGATION PLAN By triangulating different feedback sources from respondents, the evaluation team was able

pinpoint relevant information to answer each Evaluation Question (EQ). The evaluation team also

adopted a Data Quality Assurance (DQA) checklist showing definition standards i.e. used to

complement the Risk Mitigation Strategy (RMS) to address encountered challenges during

remote data collection and field deployment of the evaluation team to each intervention state in

the Niger Delta. Analyzed data was reviewed to highlight pivot points and create a bridge between

program implementation and decision-making.

Prior to the commencement of field data collection, the evaluation team developed a Risk

Mitigation Plan (RMP) itemizing potential challenges and risks associated with data quality for

field activities. This ensured timely reporting and effective assessment of remote data collection

by respective evaluators. The RMP highlighted respective mitigation strategies and probability

ratings for each identified risk. For this reason, the RMP consisted of two sections: i.e. Risk Rating

Scale (RRS); and Risk Mitigation Strategy (RMS). The RRS assigned corresponding risk ratings

captured in the RMP. The impact of each identified risk was scaled according to the probability of

its occurrence across a four-code color scheme (i.e., low, medium, high, and critical). During data

collection, the evaluation team conducted daily reviews of the RMP to accommodate changes to

identified data collection risks. Refer to Risk Rating Scale (RRS) Annex for Risk Mitigation

Strategy.

2.7. MAJOR LIMITATIONS

2.7.1. CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED A number of challenges were encountered during the conduct of the final evaluation study. These were addressed by the evaluation team:

● Low response among female beneficiaries: Non-responsiveness of female beneficiaries (i.e. interview respondents) was evident across all intervention states. With the adoption of telephone interviews for remote data collection, it was challenging

FIGURE 2. RISK RATING SCALE (RRS)

21

receiving responses from female respondents less willing to discuss issues of peacebuilding or conflict. The deployment of telephone interview surveys was meant to ease such concerns amongst interviewed respondents especially with the repeated assurances of confidentiality and limited collection of Personal Identifiable Information (PIIs) for all respondents.

● Relocated beneficiaries: A common challenge for development projects in Nigeria is the relocation of program beneficiaries. This situation was further exacerbated by the COVID - 19 lockdown and follow-on #ENDSARS influenced the relocation of program beneficiaries. The evaluation team had to pay close attention to the relocation of beneficiaries, especially when analyzing Local Government Area (LGA) specific data across each intervention state.

● Physical distancing measures: Due to the corona pandemic, the evaluation team had to take robust measures to ensure the personal safety of the research assistants. Therefore, the team sought to facilitate engagements with sampled beneficiaries and government stakeholders to follow-up on the status of conducted telephone surveys.

2.7.2. DATA CLEANING To check for data entry errors, the Data Management Evaluator (DME) periodically reviewed a sample of uploaded data questionnaires and checked to see if individual entries were entered correctly. The DME handled additional data cleaning processes i.e.

● Missing data: Scanning through the uploaded field data, the DME examined uploaded evaluation questionnaires to search for missing data; which occurred whenever a respondent declined to answer a question, or skipped entry of a response.

● Inconsistent data: The DME looked at each generated survey data, to ascertain the consistency of recorded responses. For example, a respondent might say that they never participated in any project activity and then go on to report that certain project activities were most useful. The DME also took steps to reconcile such inconsistencies by referencing the isolated questionnaires, if possible develop a rule about sorting such dataset i.e. noting which response to accept.

SECTION 3. DATA ANALYSIS, QUALITY AND

RESULTS

3.1. DATA ANALYSIS PLAN The evaluation matrix served as the foundation for an overall data analysis plan, guided by each

EQ. Finalized evaluation questionnaires had embedded probing questions identified in the

evaluation matrix and sequenced to ensure collated responses for each respondent group

(through telephone interviews) was used to triangulate findings to update contribution analysis

narrative. For example, the evaluation harvested feedback from SFCG Nigeria staff on completed

project activities and progress milestones; while simultaneously retrieving same information from

target beneficiaries. The evaluation team conducted an initial desk review (i.e. content analysis)

of SFCG Nigeria project documents, supported by a follow-on literature review to curate current

knowledge including substantive findings, as well as theoretical and methodological contributions

to the evaluation questions. Collated data was then analyzed (descriptive and qualitative

comparative analysis) to determine the extent to which consolidated responses could be linked

22

to overall evaluation findings. Thereafter, all evaluation findings (visuals, data, and narrative

contents) were used to explain SFCG Nigeria program outcomes for each EQ.

3.2. QUALITATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS Data analysis was conducted using updated remote online survey questionnaires (deployed via

telephone survey interviews) for each respondent group to provide a contextual analysis of

collated respondent feedback, draw lessons learnt, identify challenges and proffer

recommendations. By triangulating different feedback sources from respondents, the evaluation

team was able to pinpoint relevant responses per respondent group i.e. to answer each study

question. Upon completion of remote data collection (telephone surveys), the Data Management

Evaluator (DME) finalized quality control review, and extracted clean dataset for onward analysis

and reporting. The evaluation team worked to ensure the collated evaluation data was cleaned,

summarized and ready for use in informing and supporting the narrative report. Particular

emphasis was given to identifying the differences in responses between men and women; as the

qualitative/descriptive analysis was sex disaggregated.

3.3. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS The final evaluation study tested the project Theory of Change (ToC) using the Qualitative

Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology approach. QCA is a method for understanding how

causal factors (or “conditions”) combine to produce a given outcome. QCA merged in-depth

knowledge of cases with quantitative Boolean algebra in order to reduce a complex array of

diverse cases into a logically simple and robust solution. Set theory provided the theoretical bases

for QCA i.e. cases were conceived and evaluated in terms of their membership (or non-

membership) in various sets, represented numerically with membership scores ranging from 0

(fully out of the set) to 1 (fully in). The QCA methodology employed two parameters of fit:

consistency and coverage. High consistency scores indicated that a certain factor (or combination

of factors) frequently resulted in a given outcome. In set theoretic terms, the outcome would be a

subset of the causal factor, signaling a “necessary” relationship: the outcome is not possible

without the causal factor, but the factor alone is insufficient to produce the outcome.

Therefore, high coverage scores indicated that many cases with a shared outcome were

represented by a certain factor (or combination of factors). In set theoretic terms, the factor would

be a subset of the outcome, signaling a “sufficient” relationship: the outcome would have occurred

if the factor was present, but the outcome can occur without the factor. QCA methodology

therefore sought to identify combinations of factors that are consistent with the outcome, while

also having a robust representation (or coverage) among available cases. In other words, QCA

identified which factors were strongly linked to the outcome (“necessary”), and which factors are

most effective in producing the outcome (“sufficient”), and which combination of factors, all

together, made the difference for success, and under what circumstances.

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SECTION 4. KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS

4.1. RELEVANCE

4.1.1. PROJECT STRATEGIES AND PARTNERSHIPS Among community beneficiaries, a number of successful project strategies were identified in each

intervention state. For example, in each intervention state, the project was successful in providing

an opportunity for peaceful dialogues, addressed drivers of community-conflict; which in the eyes

of community beneficiaries reduced conflict in target communities/ Local Government Areas

(LGAs). The promotion of community led-initiative was more successful in Bayelsa than any other

intervention state. This is because of the nature and drivers of conflict in Bayelsa state are mainly

localized across riverine communities i.e. community led initiatives are more successful with

localized conflicts. Hence, beneficiaries readily embraced communal dialogues which offered a

sense of purpose; since community members were central to the decision making process. It

therefore was not surprising that the facilitation of CSO-led initiatives and support received from

government –led initiatives were regarded by community beneficiaries as the least relevant.

FIGURE 3. IMPLEMENTED PROJECT STRATEGIES

Based on SFCG monitoring reports, activities of the CSAD and LPC have been well received in

the community. This is because their activities helped restore trust and peace in the community

as there is now a sense of assurance for possible progress with the actions of CSAD and LPC.

For example, conflict resolution processes in the communities were usually seen as a very costly

process, one which an average person could not afford. Through the CSAD, community members

can now afford and are now confident of the conflict resolution process. Before, the process of

registering a case for fair hearing in Sogho in Khana LGA, Rivers State and Aladja in Udu LGA,

Delta State was expensive as members are required to pay before their cases are heard and

attended to. This process is now made affordable and fair to all through the intervention of the

CSAD in the community. Community members appealed for SFCG not to exit completely but to

continue to give funding support till they are able to stand on their own. Promoting continued

collaborations between local actors and CSO/NGO as well as government agencies would be

critical in promoting peace and countering conflict across intervention states.

24

4.1.2. ACHIEVING PROJECT RESULTS The program achieved a number of notable results through the implementation phase. This

section outlines evaluation findings

4.1.2.1. PARTNERSHIPS THAT ENABLED PEACEFUL DIALOGUE

A review of beneficiary feedback on project achievements indicated that there were a number of core partnerships that enabled peaceful dialogues among target intervention communities across the three (3) states. Specifically, partnerships with NGOs/CSOs, government officials, religious leaders and youth networks were most relevant in promoting an avenue for peaceful dialogues. For example, community and CSO/NGO partnerships also facilitated strategic partnerships that promoted peaceful dialogue across intervention states. For example, SFCG monitoring reports show that the project promoted inclusive engagement of community groups including marginalized groups in key decisions making and implementation processes. Women also championed the dialogue between Aladja and Ogbe-Ijoh communities in Delta. This formed the foundation for sustainable peace relations between these communities. FIGURE 4. PARTNERSHIPS THAT ENABLED PEACEFUL DIALOGUE

It is important to note that government partnerships with security agencies were more active in Delta and Bayelsa states and less so in Rivers State. In spite of numerous attempts to secure meetings with the Nigerian Army and other armed forces, the project was not successful in securing such partnerships. However, the project did engage members of different security agencies i.e. the Nigeria Police, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the Department of State Security (DSS) in Rivers. Beyond these groups, the project also engaged other stakeholders (i.e. academia, media groups, government agencies etc.) in promoting peaceful dialogue. For example, several media stations such as the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) zonal Network Port Harcourt, The Rivers State Television (RSTV), Wave FM, Todays FM all aired project programs. The Academia were central to securing positive outcomes, Dr. Steve Wordu, Assoc. Prof of Sociology from the University of Port Harcourt (UNIPORT) actively engaged in regional activities where he presented papers; alongside Prof. Ngerebo of River State University. The National

25

Orientation Agency (NOA) State Director and all the LGA directors of NOA participated in project activities. All of these stakeholders routinely participated in project-led radio dialogues to make their contribution. Therefore, the project was successful in engaging other government actors to promote peaceful dialogues. By engaging trusted voices in academia, the project leveraged the public clot of these resource persons to lean credibility to disseminated messages of peace and further enhanced acceptance. This is not uncommon across the Niger Delta; with a rich history of vocal social justice crusaders. 4.1.2.2. COUNTERING VIOLENT CONFLICTS

The project successfully countered violent conflicts in each intervention state through the

promotion of community and traditional leaders dialogue sessions i.e. by sustaining dialogues

with religious leaders, mass media information strategies, use of cultural influencers, economic

empowerment schemes, establishment of vigilante groups as well as adopting law enforcement

strategies supported by limited military action. This highlights the importance of community

structures in addressing violent conflicts in the Niger-Delta; thereby showcasing the importance

to retaining as well as expanding community engagement platforms. The evaluation findings

highlighted the following intervention strategies were less relevant in countering violent conflicts

in the Niger Delta i.e. school based interventions, role modeling by youth leaders, use of cultural

influencers and focal networks, adoption of diplomatic actions.

FIGURE 5. EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING VIOLENT CONFLICTS

For example, SFCG monitoring reports show that sampled respondents in Koko community made

references to Search’s past project “Tomorrow is a New Day Project” and its connection to

“Deepening the Peace project” in consolidating the peace architecture in the area. However, more

emphasis was made on the dialogue platforms in curbing cultism in Sogho, Khana LGA in Rivers

and Aladja, Udu LGA in Delta.

26

This was because cultism had been a major driver of conflict in these communities in the past. Therefore, the project actively engaged youth groups to counter violent conflicts. For example, the youth in Koko community led the drive for peace within their community; and this resulted in a violence free election and peaceful power handover in the youth council election recently conducted in the community, unlike previous elections that were violent. Interestingly, the use of cultural influencers and mass media information campaigns were more prominent in Delta; as respondents had a more cultural leaning mindset than beneficiaries in Bayelsa and Rivers States.

4.2. EFFECTIVENESS

4.2.1. EXTENT OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS When assessing the contribution of implemented strategies to project achievements, interviewed

respondents stated that facilitated CSO-led initiatives and supported government led initiatives

were least effective in contributing to project achievements across all intervention states;

especially in Rivers state. The extent of project achievements was most apparent in the

addressing drivers of community conflicts via the promotion of community led-initiatives coupled

with a reduction in communal conflict. The success of implemented project strategies to secure

positive achievements were extensive in Delta and Bayelsa across all three response categories.

Responses from interviewed beneficiaries in Rivers, highlight the need to intensify project

interventions to leverage existing opportunities for peaceful dialogues and community led-

initiatives among citizens and local authorities (i.e. government officials and security operatives).

FIGURE 6. CONTRIBUTION OF IMPLEMENTED STRATEGIES TO PROJECT

ACHIEVEMENTS

From the collated survey responses, 398 respondents across the three states revealed that

community-led initiatives, capacity building sessions and community dialogue were positively

received by target beneficiaries i.e. regarded as most effective.

4.2.2. SECURING POSITIVE OUTCOMES The effectiveness of project activities in securing positive outcomes across intervention state was

also examined by the final external evaluation study. Analyzed evaluation data from community

27

beneficiaries, capacity building sessions and community dialogues were most effective in

securing positive outcomes by the project. Interestingly, while community dialogues were most

effective in securing positive outcomes in Delta state compared to Bayelsa and Rivers; capacity

building sessions were not as effective in Delta i.e. more effective in Bayelsa and Rivers. For

example, in Delta state, beneficiaries believed that community-led initiatives and community

dialogue were most effective in securing positive outcomes than capacity building. They stated

that during these activities, they had the opportunity to express their opinions, which informed

onward decision making in a transparent manner with balanced representation by all parties.

FIGURE 7. PROJECT ACTIVITIES MOST EFFECTIVE IN SECURING POSITIVE

OUTCOMES

The least effective project activities in securing positive outcomes were government and CSO-led

initiatives across all three (3) intervention states. While community-led initiatives were moderately

effectively in securing positive outcomes by the project. This was because target beneficiaries

regarded community dialogue as viable and objective means for resolving disputes among

themselves; rather than looking to formal justice options (i.e. judiciary court cases) for pressing

concerns. These dialogues offered a safe space to strengthen social ties and build trust among

community members

4.3. IMPACT

4.3.1. PROJECT ATTRIBUTION Interestingly, initial findings from the rapid conflict assessment study conducted by SFCG in 2019,

showed identified three (3) main reasons why target beneficiaries justified violent conflict i.e. to

protect one’s livelihood, to protect the environment and in response to an oppressive regime. This

highlighted the lack of suitable engagement dialogue platforms as well as an inherent lack of

government responsiveness to the needs of communities, and therefore necessitated a desire to

use violence as a means of amplifying their voices to be heard. The impact of community

dialogues in mitigating conflict and improving governance engagements was significant in all three

(3) intervention states; especially in Delta and Bayelsa.

28

The evaluation findings showed that target communities in rural areas which received support

from the project, effectively employed local dispute resolution options to mitigate community crisis;

and remained open to dialogues in Delta and Bayelsa compared to River States. As residents of

urban areas were more inclined to promote self-help measures to address instances of poor

governance and glaring lack of service provision. Unlike rural areas, where communities relied

heavily on government support to bring about any meaningful development.

FIGURE 8. PROJECT ACTIVITIES THAT IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND MITIGATED

CONFLICT

Therefore, urban interventions should ideally leverage media platforms to capture the attention of

target beneficiaries and highlight notable issues of interest to urban populace. In the view of

community beneficiaries, the organization of capacity building sessions and the facilitation of

community-led initiatives were complimentary in improving governance engagements by

providing credible avenues for dialogue to mitigate potential conflict across intervention

communities. Although, other implemented project activities did contribute to improving a sense

of government responsiveness among target beneficiaries; such activities (i.e. community-led

initiatives, CSO-led initiatives and government-led initiatives) were not as significant in mitigating

conflict based on collated respondent feedback.

This was because target beneficiaries relied extensively on community dialogues to express their

concerns and advocate for common solutions to potential conflict situations to avoid violence.

Community beneficiaries remain open to exploring local dispute resolution by showing a

willingness to dialogue.

4.4. SUSTAINABILITY

4.4.1. CREATING LINKAGES BETWEEN CITIZENS AND LOCAL

AUTHORITIES The rapid conflict study (SFCG 2019) highlighted the nature of prevailing conflict dynamics across

target communities/states in the Niger Delta. The study findings revealed that predominantly,

cultists and politicians were reported to be most involved in perpetuating acts of violence across

29

all three states, with reports of politicians paying these cultists to intimidate their opponents

through killings, kidnapping and ballot box snatching. These cultists are in turn protected from the

law by political “godfathers”.

Following these, security forces (most prevalent in Bayelsa state), militants, ex militants (most

prevalent in Bayelsa state), and multinational companies (MNCs) (most prevalent in Delta state)

were also mentioned. To address this conflict dynamics challenge, the project significantly

involved key stakeholders in all three (3) intervention states.

FIGURE 9. INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS IN PROJECT ACTIVITIES

This resulted in reduced conflict between farmers and herdsmen, as well as conflict among community members in oil producing areas. This was most evident in Delta state, where community dialogues served as the prominent means of addressing potential conflict situations; as generally speaking respondents stated that they regarded such platforms as being credible and offered a non-threatening space to freely express their concerns without fear of intimidation by state and non-state actors alike. The project was successful in creating linkages between citizens and local authorities, by providing capacity building opportunities for different actors in each intervention state. Government actors and communities readily partnered on measures to promote peaceful resolution of conflict through sustained dialogue and advocacy engagements.

4.4.2. STRENGTHENED CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS Interviewed government respondents confirmed that the project contributed in no small measure in strengthening their capacity through their active involvement in project activities (figure 9). Specifically, interviewed government actors noted that their strengthened capacity enabled government actors to engage more with local actors and community members to address drivers of community conflict, as well as improved their ability to provide opportunities for government/community-led initiatives; due mainly to the creation of safe spaces for peaceful dialogue across intervention communities.

30

This also led to the increased participation of government stakeholders’ in dispute resolution across all target communities; as well as engaging in dialogues with community and traditional rulers. These actions by government stakeholders were most effective in countering violent extremism; as government actors showed a willingness to enter partnerships that enabled local communities get involved in peaceful dialogues and promote communal-centered dispute resolution action. FIGURE 10. STRENGTHENED CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS

4.4.3. ADDRESSING DRIVERS OF CONFLICT Initial assessment findings from the rapid conflict study in 2019 identified five (5) key driving

factors of violent conflict in the intervention states by interviewed respondents i.e. unemployment

(83.2%), poverty (56.8%), lack of government response to citizen’s needs (41.8%), no/poor

education (37.7%), and no/low participation of youths in decision making (28.8%). The final

evaluation findings identified the lack of employment opportunities (Delta), poor education (Delta),

prevailing poverty (Bayelsa) and human rights abuses (Delta) as the key drivers of conflict across

intervention states in the Niger Delta. Further study of collated responses from interviewed

beneficiaries highlighted unique drivers of conflict peculiar to Rivers State i.e. religious

fundamentalism, a sense of despair and hopelessness, lack of government responsiveness,

limited sense of freedom and stereotyping.

FIGURE 11. DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

31

As an oil producing state with significant a population of sector dependent service providers and

employee dependents, the global crash in oil prices was evident on the minds of interviewed

respondents; who were concerned by the implications of continued shortfalls in production

capacities/production/revenue generation on their daily incomes; which were solely tied to the oil

and gas industry. This was exacerbated by the strict enforcement of COVID - 19 lockdown

protocols in Rivers State by the Executive Governor, Barr. Wike Nyemson; in an attempt to curb

the spread of COVID in the state.

These collective drivers have a

more psycho-social

dimension; not unrelated to the

COVID - 19 pandemic

situation; as more households

struggle with mental health

issues emanating from a

series of national events e.g.

aggressive lockdown/stay at

house measures, citizens

uprising through the

#ENDSARS protests and a

double dip recession affecting

the Oil and Gas industry which

dominates livelihoods sources

in the Niger Delta; but most

glaring in Rivers State.

For example, in a press release by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Secretary to the

Government of the Federation (SGF) and Chairman of the Presidential Task Force (PTF) on

TABLE 9. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANDING

DIALOGUE SPACES IN THE NIGER DELTA

32

COVID - 19, Boss Mustapha, raised the alarm on in Abuja during the joint national briefing of the

taskforce; expressed worry over the mental state of health of the survivors of COVID - 19 in the

country.3

SECTION 5. EVALUATION CONCLUSION AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. CONCLUSION

5.1.1. EXPANDING SPACE FOR DIALOGUES A recurring recommendation from the rapid conflict assessment study in 2019, highlighted by

community members was the need for public enlightenment about the need for peace, through

the mass media, community radio, and community communication channels. The program clearly

increased the participation of target groups in addressing governance and resource issues driving

conflict in the Niger Delta. This led to the expansion of existing spaces for dialogues through the

active engagement of multiple groups i.e. CSOs/NGOs, security agencies, government officials,

women, religious and youth leaders, as well as community leaders.

Evaluation findings show an increased participation of community and religious leaders; as well

as local actors (women, youth, media, security actors and CSO/CBO/NGOs) in issues related to

governance and resource conflict; which consequently strengthened community level dispute

resolution processes and engagement by target beneficiaries across intervention states i.e. promotion of community led initiatives.

FIGURE 12. PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE AND RESOURCE ISSUES DRIVING

CONFLICT

3 Government Raises Alarm Over Mental Health of COVID - 19 Survivors

Nigeria: Govt Raises Alarm Over Mental Health of COVID - 19 Survivors - allAfrica.com

33

There remain significant opportunities to continue the expansion of existing spaces for dialogues

across intervention states and communities for different actor led initiatives. For example, future

project activities should focus on building up alternative spaces for dialogues among non-

traditional actors e.g. traders, media practitioners and teachers i.e. school centered activities. The

impact of the COVID – 19 cannot be fully measured in present terms, as hitherto established

norms and life patterns have been disrupted beyond all spheres of life globally. What is therefore

required, is a new way of communicating and advocating for change beyond current dialogue

options. For example, the #ENDSARS protest highlighted the significant reach and credible

mobilization drive achievable by social media platforms.

Exploring such tech-enabled dialogue options would certainly amplify the voices of community

actors and beneficiaries alike, as increasingly state and federal governments tend to respond

actively to citizen’s concerns when there is a critical mass of emerging narratives on any issue.

Importantly, the recent #ENDSARS protests that swept through Nigeria and started in Delta State;

show the increased importance for expanding spaces for dialogues among community and

government actors. By expanding the participation of target beneficiaries in engaging in

governance and resource issues, the project also addressed the drivers of conflict in the Niger

Delta.

5.1.2. ADOPTING COMMUNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION OPTIONS AND EMERGING

FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Initial findings from the rapid assessment study conducted by SFCG in 2019, showed that

although there remains a prevalence of certain types of violent conflicts in the Niger Delta (e.g.

cultism, political power, and conflicts over resources or livelihoods, conflict over territorial

boundaries and political power); community members are more willing to utilize community

centered mechanisms to resolve disputes.

FIGURE 13. EMERGING FORMS OF VIOLENCE

34

Interviewed respondents mentioned that the

program assisted in building the capacity of

community members to reduce conflict and

violence by actively advocating peaceful resolution

alternatives. For example, community members

were successful in resolving conflict in Apam

community where two factions had had clashed

repeatedly. There is also an emergence of new

forms of violent conflict (e.g. sexual and domestic

violence; ethnic conflicts); which was exacerbated

by adopted lockdown measures instituted by

Federal and State governments in response to the

COVID - 19 pandemic. This extended to a rise in

hate crimes, militancy/insurgency acts, religious

sect motivated actions and acts of terrorism. However, community structures were able to address

these emerging conflicts because the project built the capacity of community local actors to

resolve conflict and mitigate violence. The community members also agreed to live peacefully

and engage in peaceful dialogue, by nominating leaders to represent their interests during town

hall forums, and organized round table discussions.

5.1.3. COMPLETED PROJECT ACTIVITIES The project prioritized the conduct of community dialogues which was crucial in addressing the

drivers of conflict as well as fostering robust engagement through community-led initiatives.

However, future design iterations should look at developing new project activities focused on CSO

and government led initiatives to supplement other activities centered on community dialogues

and capacity building sessions. The lack of trust in government actors (due to poor

responsiveness to community needs and concerns) needs to be addressed by bridging

communal and governance agencies/actors; as community actors retain a negative perception of

government. The creation of safe spaces and conduct of community centered dialogues platforms

strengthened the social fabric among local actors across the intervention states.

Beneficiary Quotes

A respondent in Rivers State stated

that “SFCG is like a household name in

Okirika, it has enhanced peace.”

Another respondent in Aniocha North LGA of Delta State stated that “conflict had reduced between farmers and herdsmen.” Respondents in Bayelsa stated that

“cultism related violence had declined

drastically in communities since the

commencement of the program”.

35

FIGURE 14. COMPLETED PROJECT ACTIVITIES

5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION The following recommendations are proposed for future implementation i.e.

● Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)/Community Engagements need to be improved

across all three (3) intervention states i.e. promote community centered engagements that

amplify local voices and sustain dialogue among a diverse group of participants. The

evaluation findings show that beneficiaries rely on communal support systems for

dialogue; because of the lack of trust in government actors. Therefore, any follow-on

project design will benefit from the conduct of a state specific Political Economy Analysis

(PEA) study as a baseline assessment to uncover underlying power dynamics, mitigating

factors and influential actors that have the potential to positively/negatively affect the

effectiveness of proposed project activities i.e. government/CSO/Community led

initiatives.

● Linking up with established governance mechanisms should be prioritized for follow-

on project design should consider identifying possible links with established governance

mechanisms like the Open Governance Platform (OGP) to provide an elevated platform

for amplifying the voices of community and CSO actors. An established PEA action plan

will put forward notable engagement platforms that can be leveraged to sustain project

outcomes (sustainability) and also ensure collaborative support for community actors.

● Capacity building sessions should be more targeted to specific needs of beneficiaries

in each intervention state to sustain positive outcomes and foster community ownership.

Any proposed intervention should build on existing activities conducted by Local Project

Committees (LPCs) and Information Resource Centers (IRCs) in each intervention

community by conducting a capacity assessment study viz-a-viz a community needs

assessment; to ensure proposed sessions are contextual relevant and meet the

expectations of target beneficiaries.

36

● Increase involvement of stakeholders: It is imperative that the next phase of project

implementation involves the development of an engagement plan for different

stakeholders i.e. government, CSO and communities to further strengthen linkages

between citizens and local authorities. This also offers a unique learning opportunity for

the project; through the conduct of quarterly collaboration mapping studies by the MEL

team to ascertain the changing space for engagement of key actors through strategic

engagements facilitated through deliberate project activities. Overtime, the project could

then learn from successful advocacy efforts to increase stakeholder engagements that

strengthen linkages between citizens (target beneficiaries) and local authorities.

● Promoting strategic partnerships: Evaluation findings show that although the project

successfully leveraged certain partnerships (i.e. CSOs/NGOs, government officials) to

facilitate peaceful dialogues; these partnerships were less active in Rivers State; as

beneficiaries relied on community actors. More effort should be made to strengthen these

partnerships in Rivers State; while also supplementing established relationships in Delta

and Bayelsa State. The project should look to engage other actors in more collaborative

activities (i.e. military operatives, media, and academia) especially with community actors

in Rivers and Bayelsa states. ● Addressing emerging forms of violence: The global COVID - 19 pandemic led to

increased domestic and sexual violence across intervention communities; as more

households experienced significant loss of economic livelihoods and net household

incomes; with multiple recessions occurring in the fiscal year of 2020 for the Nigerian

economy that remains heavily dependent on the Oil and Gas industry centered in the Niger

Delta. Follow-on project activities would have to develop creative measures to address

these emerging forms of violence e.g. hate crimes, militancy/insurgency acts, religious

sect motivated actions and acts of terrorism.

37

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. EVALUATION WORK PLAN This section provides information on proposed evaluation work plan per assessment task.

1.1. PROPOSED EVALUATION WORK PLAN

38

ANNEX 2. LITERATURE REVIEW The armed conflict between militias and government forces in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has

spanned for more than two decades, defying all solutions. A disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration (DDR) program was established in August 2015 in effort to end the violence and has

remained in place. It is a radically different approach from past approaches that displayed zero

tolerance to all political challenges to oil production or the allocation of oil profits. Yet, few studies

have attempted to understand the dynamics within the country that are responsible for the design

and implementation of this broad policy shift or to understand whether and how the current

initiative is able to end the conflict and institute peace beyond the short term. This study, therefore,

is important because it provides a critical perspective that anticipates and explains emerging

issues with the Niger Delta Amnesty Program, which have implications for DDR adaptation and

implementation all over the world. Ultimately, the research demonstrates how the DDR program

both transforms the Niger Delta conflict and becomes embroiled in intense controversies not

only about the mechanism for transforming the targeted population but also whether and how the

program incorporates youth and women who are being deprioritized by the program.

2.1. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) describes a cluster of post-conflict

interventions that is focused on collecting arms, neutralizing combatants, reintegrating legitimate

ex-combatants into the armed forces or civilian life, and preventing a return to armed conflict

(Ajibola, 2015). The violence in the region is a result of many related factors, especially

what Ajibola, (2015) ) calls the “resource curse” debacle, which describes a rentier culture where

resource-rich countries like Nigeria condition themselves (or are conditioned) to depend

exclusively on rents and royalties from a natural resource such as oil as a result of which they

lose (or withhold) the initiative to govern responsibly, including failing to initiate programs for the

economic and social development of their countries or people. Ajibola, (2015) suggests that the

resource curse has inspired violence in the delta through its “repression” and “modernization”

effects. In terms of the former, the Nigerian government through its direct control of huge oil assets

is able to bankroll excessive military expenditures that are deployed aggressively against

opposition to oil excavation or the warped distribution of oil revenue, inspiring defiance among a

segment of the population. In terms of the modernization effect, oil revenue/profit forces the state

and its corporate allies to focus on energy sector jobs to the detriment of other sectors, especially

agriculture thereby making poverty, unemployment, and food insufficiency mobilizing logics of cult

gangs and politicians, leading to large scale violence.

Thus, oil and gas wealth has become a curse in Nigeria due to the social, economic, and political

instability as well as policy failures they engender (Robinson, 2016). The issue of resource curse

also encapsulates the tension between environmental security, resources, politics, and violence

in the delta. Generally, interest in the environment and conflict concatenates around two

antiquated ideas: demographically induced scarcity and environmental agency. Since the 1990s,

there has been a dramatic increase in interest in the environment as a source of political conflict

and as the Cold War security problematic (Ajibola, 2015). Finally, ethnicity, particularly the

mobilization of ethnic identity has frequently added fuel to the delta conflict. Studies by (Ajibola,

2015) suggest a relationship between Nigeria’s post-colonial political structure and the Niger

39

Delta violence. The studies highlight the role that a large (and expanding) federal government,

severely weakened states, over-indulged ethnic majorities, and marginalized ethnic minorities

play in the delta conflict. For example, Mamdani suggests that cultural indigeneity has become

the basis of ethnicity and identifies the multiple ways by which ethnicity is invented and reinvented

within the arena of oil politics, often leading to conflict. M. Watts et al. suggest that local forms of

community and the mobilization of ethnic identity within these communities have been critical

components of the social relations of oil extraction. The way that these relations are forged,

negotiated, and reconfigured (including land use and reform, customary laws, territoriality, contact

with oil companies, and forms of identification: ethnicity, gender, age, chieftaincy, and clanship)

and particularly linkages to forms of traditional authority and locally specific forms of capitalist

development, have played important roles in the delta’s conflict landscape. The above factors as

well as others produced a new type of resistance movement in the delta. Whereas in the past,

resistance to oil production took the form of ideological struggle, aimed at both deconstructing

and reconstructing mainstream ideas about the state, the delta’s people and resources, and the

logics of oil wealth appropriation and distribution; the new resistance movement is existentialist,

showcasing not just the visceral antipathy of the people toward the governance motions of the

state but also the location of militias, their sponsors, and members in the entrenched, convoluted

rent-seeking distributional coalitions that privilege individuals and groups that are proximate to

the political state.

Unlike the past resistance that was led by intellectuals like the late Kenule Saro-Wiwa, the Ogoni

playwright and activist who was judicially murdered by the Sani Abacha military junta, and which

targeted the state, oil majors, and the broader system of mercantile capitalism, the new resistance

is led by cult gangs in alliance with politicians and target the state, oil majors, rival cult gangs, and

anyone who poses a threat to their clandestine interests. Irrespective of who the target of the new

resistance is, the armed struggle produced, within relatively brief compass, countless deaths as

well as unquantifiable economic and social losses (Okonofua, 2013). The government of

President Yar’Adua believed that the continued deployment of soldiers and reliance on force to

subdue opposition to the prevailing oil regime, including the system of production (that

indiscriminately pollutes the delta ecology), allocation of oil mining rights (that discriminates

against delta communities), and distribution of oil revenues and profits (that increased the visceral

hate for oil majors and the government among local people), would be ineffectual. In place of

force, the government established a comprehensive system of dialogue, rehabilitation, and

development. Specifically, the Niger Delta by encouraging militias to surrender their arms and

weapons, break the links between fighters and their militias, reintegrate fighters into civil society

by providing them with appropriate social skills, provide direly needed but sorely lacking social

and economic infrastructure for the entire region, and restore full oil production activities in the

Niger Delta to avoid the looming national economic disaster. There are several reasons why this

approach is important. First, research in social psychology and anthropology shows congruence

between reintegration success and several factors, including exposure to violence and gender

(Rohner, 2016). In particular, most efforts to engage the Niger Delta violence have been largely

partisan, sensational, emotional, and lacking in empirical and theoretical depth; making it almost

impossible to contextualize both the violence or to give the issues theoretical nuance.

40

Second, while selective amnesties are used indiscriminately to form terms of peace settlements

and to keep societies racked by armed conflict from slipping back into conflict (Rohner, 2016),

there is great skepticism about their performance in the broader scheme of things, especially

given the potential for uneven, short term, and/or unsystematic funding and engagement of these

programs. Because of these concerns, there is clearly the need for a thoughtful examination of

what elements operating within or outside of the program contributed to the observed outcomes,

which can provide lessons that may support or improve the implementation of this or similar

programs. Finally, the violence, which appeared to abate immediately following the

implementation, has steadily resurfaced, especially in the offshore and many believe that with the

outcome of Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election, which did not favor Goodluck Jonathan, the

incumbent who is from the region, the violence will resurface on a grand scale. It has, with the

Niger Delta Avengers blowing up pipelines and sabotaging oil assets, critically impacting the

country’s oil output. Yet, the (Niger Delta Amnesty Program) NDAP was conceptualized and

idealized as the long-term solution for the delta “problem” that will survive any presidential

administration. In addition, managers of the program as well as top officials of the Nigerian

government have been enthusiastically celebrating the “wonderful” successes of the program,

which others, especially opponents of the Jonathan government criticize as a huge drain on the

country’s resources and incapable of delivering the type of outcomes attributed to it. Considering

the above, but especially the vast contributions of time, money, and resources invested by the

Nigerian government and other stakeholders in efforts to entrench long-standing peace in the

delta, this study is tremendously important as it offers a means to understand how and where the

investments are being applied as well as whether or not the intervention is achieving the impact

in the community that the government and other stakeholders desire.

2.2. ORIGIN OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY PROGRAM (NDAP) The Niger Delta region, the heart of Nigeria’s oil production activities, is one of the most diverse

regions in the world in terms of human, animal, and plant life (Okonofua, 2013). The region covers

a distance of about 270 miles along the Atlantic Coast and stretches for about 120 miles inland,

and is described as the largest wetland in Africa and the second largest in the world after the

Mississippi. The region also contains the largest oil deposits in Africa and some of the highest

quality oil in the world. It is the delta’s oil, which indubitably has unprecedented economic and

geo-strategic significance and value (M. Watts et al., 2014) and associated relationships,

especially being the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Hoeffler, et al , 2016) that dominated

discussions about the region, at least, until the early 2000s. Since 1956 when oil was first

discovered in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, a small rural community in Bayelsa state, an

estimated US$1 trillion has been generated from oil exports not including the many billions

generated clandestinely from the illegal trade in stolen crude (Okonofua, 2013). Yet, the region is

one of the most polluted in the world with daily oil spills, the size of the Exxon-Valdez oil disaster

in the United States as well as effluent deliberately discharged into the environment, polluting the

delta’s ecology and killing fauna, fish species, and land animals and dramatically reducing the

region’s limited stock of arable land. This situation has dislocated millions of local peoples from

the local industry (typically farming and fishing) and displaced millions more who are forced to

migrate to cities where they have limited skills and resources to survive.

41

Thrust correspondingly into artificial dependent and unproductive relationships in urban shanties

and hyper ghettoized neighborhoods, millions of the delta’s people, who are some of the poorest

people in the world, have developed low self-worth and fatalistic attitudes that lend themselves to

the violent defiance of constituted authority. On some occasions, the defiance has acted out as

manipulative violence against social objects, especially persons in identical conditions of

miserable poverty. Thus, it is the unremitting economic, political, social, and environmental

marginality of the people that is the veneer for the militia violence in the Niger Delta. The fight,

arguably over control of oil resources, lucrative oil contracts, illicit patronages, and

correspondingly stupendous wealth, has come to replace the delta’s significance as an oil-bearing

region in global headlines and in discussions about the region. Between 2002 and 2009, the Delta

became what was calls a “zone of violence,” which describes a gradual but precipitous slide into

what the U.S. State Department calls “political chaos.” Hoeffler, et al (2016) argue that the chaos

strikes at the heart of Nigeria’s political future; a future blighted by unmitigated environmental

disaster, dilapidated infrastructure, unremitting poverty and disease, huge debt burden, and

legacy of mismanagement and corruption. The human costs of the conflict, including loss of life,

socio-economic disparity, rising gender inequality, educational decline, high levels of poverty and

disease, and many less tangible costs, have been very high. Also, because of the violence, an

estimated 750,000 barrels of crude oil out of the nation’s daily supply of 2.2 million barrels were

shut in, and more than 300,000 bpd (or barrels per day) were deliberately discharged into the

environment, further depleting the fragile ecosystem of the Niger Delta.

It was ostensibly to cut the oil losses and the corresponding steep decline in revenue that the

Nigerian government, under the leadership of late President Shehu Musa Yar’Adua inaugurated

the NDAP. The president’s move may have been nothing more than a pacifist strategy designed

only to guarantee access to the delta oil wells, shore up oil revenues, and mitigate some of the

human costs of the conflict, and not toward any meaningful long-term solution to the violence. In

exchange for a surrender of arms and a pledge to end the fighting, combatants were to receive

amnesty (or freedom from prosecution), rehabilitation, and reintegration into civilian society. In

addition, the government was to institute an elaborate program of political and social reforms and

economic reconstruction, a huge departure from its prior zero tolerance policy to all legitimate or

illegitimate challenges to the authority of the political state. The government’s reversal of its policy

of non-negotiation, which may have been informed by mounting evidence (Hoeffler, et al , 2016

) that traditional approaches and instruments for dealing with intra-state armed conflicts are

inadequate or too ill-suited to effectively address the multifaceted causes of these conflicts,

especially in deeply divided states like Nigeria, is certainly refreshing, but opens up debate about

what specific interventions may now be applied successfully to reverse the delta violence.

2.3 THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

INTERVENTIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF PEACEBUILDING Although many organizations, including multilateral and bilateral agencies, continue to prioritize

democracy and governance as key to long-term stability in Africa, many shorter term mechanisms

for conflict prevention and peacebuilding are assuming growing importance (Colletta, et al, 2014).

Selective amnesties, smart sanctions, and interventions such as DDR are increasingly being used

to form terms for peace, to keep post-conflict societies from slipping back into conflict, and to

stimulate economic growth and development (Colletta, et al, 2014). Paradoxically, as investments

42

in such conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives are growing, there are increasing doubts

about whether they are capable of achieving the outcomes desired or the successes attributed to

them. For example, critics claim that DDR programs are too often narrowly conceived, inflexible,

technocratic, bureaucratic, and detached from the political transition or broader recovery and

reconstruction strategies (Colletta, et al, 2014). From a political economy perspective, DDR

encapsulates the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of the security and development sectors of

a state. Because of this, Nigeria’s adoption of DDR to solve the perennial Niger Delta violence

ought to stimulate discourse about the policy priorities of the Nigerian government and particularly

its political class or governing elites toward genuinely addressing the structural challenges of the

delta. If according to Colletta, et al, (2014),

DDR is at the heart of neo-liberal forms of power and governance, how is the Nigerian government

using the NDAP to alter the conflict dynamics of the delta, including providing visibility for a

government that is mostly absent except when extracting rent or as part of a “broader ‘Weberian’

project of securing the legitimate control of force” from combatants on behalf of the state (Colletta,

et al, 2014, p. 2). Contemporary DDR approaches typically consist of a series of carefully

designed and phased activities aimed at creating a suitable environment that would encourage

stability and development. Advocates of DDR believe that the three components of the program

(disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) interlock and are mutually reinforcing activities.

Disarmament has been defined as the collection of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light

and heavy weapons from combatants and at times from civilians with the goal of reducing the

number of weapons in circulation (Nillson, 2005; United Nations [UN], 1999). Because the

relinquishing of weapons, which are typically tied to the identity of the combatant is often traumatic

for combatants, the disarmament process is first and foremost a confidence-building exercise

(Colletta, et al, 2014).

Reintegration, which is defined as the political, economic, and social integration of ex-combatants,

their families, and primary support network into civil society (Berdala, 2006), is a critically

important component of DDR interventions and takes several forms: political integration (in which

ex-combatants, their families, and support structure become part of the decision-making process

of their communities); economic integration (in which ex-combatants, their families, and support

system are enabled to develop their livelihoods); social integration (in which local communities

accept ex-combatants, their families, and primary support system as members of the

community). Berdala, (2006) argues that the challenges accompanying reintegration into either

category are immense. Depending on the context, the process is often heavily politicized and the

absorptive capacities of communities for civilian reintegration are often greatly limited (Berdala,

2006). Conventional DDR, therefore, envisions a continuum that extends from a narrow minimalist

(establishing security) to a broad maximalist (incorporating development) perspective (Berdala,

2006). The minimalist approach, according to Berdala, (2006), is “focused on expedience, where

the program aspires less to creating a lasting impact on the lives of ex-combatants and more to

time-limited gains” (p. 23) such as removing weapons, cantoning ex-combatants, and generally

fulfilling the terms of peace agreements. Although the broad strategic goals of the minimalist

approach include reducing the likelihood that war will occur, the micro objectives focus on de-

linking the command and control of armed groups.

43

But despite the great enthusiasm about DDR, especially its utility in conflict prevention or post-

conflict intervention, a body of critical literature that questions and challenges core DDR

assumptions is emerging (Berdala, 2006). A major concern is that DDR glosses over the

complexity of conflict and programs or interventions are artificially grafted onto volatile conflict

and post-conflict societies. Case studies Berdala, (2006), for example, demonstrate the genuine

risks that accompany the imposition of DDR interventions from the top, especially if they are

divorced from the political, social, and economic context in which violence or conflict is embedded.

Berdala, (2006) suggests that DDR is “too often resorted to in a knee-jerk fashion and launched

in such a way that it is isolated from the broader clutch of processes associated with governance,

state consolidation and economic recovery” (p. 3).

2.4. THE CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA Apart from this, critics also quarrel with the conceptual dimensions of certain aspects of DDR,

especially the aspect that concerns the reintegration of former combatants (Berdala, 2006). They

contend that generic approaches to reintegration are inadequate for dealing with the

heterogeneous and differentiated motivations of armed groups, which is why combatant-centric

approaches to reintegration, like the NDAP, misfire completely. Thus, these critics who specifically

target the rational choice models and monetary incentives, such as payments to combatants that

dominate the field, argue that DDR investments should be directed, instead, to more inclusive or

area-based programs that focus on employment, infrastructural development, and economic

growth. Several arguments have been advanced as to why conflict is rampant in the oil-producing

areas of the Niger Delta. A key factor is linked to oil being exploited in the region. The devastation

wreaked on the environment by the oil producing communities, a major grievance of the people

whose livelihood is threatened by oil exploitation, has been reflected in the various studies on

these communities (Iwayemi,2013; International Crisis Group, 2016). In particular, Onosode,

(2013) examined the general oil and gas exploitation-induced conflicts in the Niger Delta, their

intensity and the growth of environmental concern, all of which are linked to the politics of resource

ownership, its mode of appropriation and its use. He noted that the critical issues of environmental

pollution, resource rampage and degradation, and socio-economic, cultural and psychological

dislocation in the Delta have constantly raised both local and international interest.

Several arguments have been advanced as to why conflict is rampant in the oil-producing areas

of the Niger Delta. A key factor is linked to oil being exploited in the region. The devastation

wreaked on the environment by the oil producing communities, a major grievance of the people

whose livelihood is threatened by oil exploitation, has been reflected in the various studies on

these communities (Iwayemi,2013; International Crisis Group, 2016). In particular, Onosode,

(2013) examined the general oil and gas exploitation-induced conflicts in the Niger Delta, their

intensity and the growth of environmental concern, all of which are linked to the politics of resource

ownership, its mode of appropriation and its use. He noted that the critical issues of environmental

pollution, resource rampage and degradation, and socio-economic, cultural and psychological

dislocation in the Delta have constantly raised both local and international interest. The findings

of the research generally suggest that the prospects of producing areas have been affected by

both the character of modifications introduced in revenue sharing and the management and

implementation of the proportion allotted to derivation for the producing areas over the years.

Also, the plight of the oil minorities has become a global concern. Indeed, the study raised critical

44

issues on the challenges facing the oil-producing areas. However, there is a need for further

empirical investigations on the issue of governance and the development of the oil-producing

states of the Niger Delta. It has been argued that the struggle by the local communities is primarily

directed towards securing increased local participation in the oil business and adequate access

to the oil revenues (Ogbogbo, 2014). Various ethnic militias have emerged in the oil-producing

areas of the Niger Delta to challenge the activities of the oil companies. The objective of these

groups is the economic and political emancipation of the Niger Delta, largely through ownership

and control of its petroleum resources. Some of these groups or militias have produced charters,

declarations, agendas and resolutions to express their demands. These began with the Ogoni Bill

of rights in 1990, followed by the Kaiama Declaration by the Niger Delta youths, the Oron Bill of

rights by the Oron people of Akwa-Ibom State and the Warri accord by the Itsekiri people of Delta

State. All these charters and declarations contained various demands.

2.4.1. COMMUNAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA In the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta states, the negative impact of oil production has

severely affected the traditional means of livelihood of the people and created a propensity for

conflict and violence. This area has witnessed both violent intra and inter-communal or ethnic

conflicts and clashes with oil companies in which the core issues involved have not been resolved.

Among the oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta is that between the Ijaw in Nembe/Kalabari,

Basambiri/Ogbolomari, and Okpoma/ Brass in Bayelsa state. In Ondo state, there is the Ilaje/ Ijaw

conflict. Also, inter-ethnic conflict was witnessed between Ogoni/Adoni, Ogoni/Okrika in Rivers

State (Environmental Rights Action, 2012). These clashes are usually caused by conflicts over

ownership of land where oil wells are located, and claims to oil company compensation and

contracts. The violent intercommunal and inter-ethnic conflicts have led to more loss of lives and

property than conflict within community or ethnic groups and between community and the oil

companies or government. Incessant conflict in the oil-producing areas has taken a toll on the

people, particularly the women and children who have been internally displaced: the psychosocial

impact on them is enormous (Obi, 2008; Isumonah, 2009). The consequences of the violent

conflict may range from disruption of children’s education because of insecurity and displacement

and the inability to cater for the children as a result of disruption of economic activities, to exposure

to trauma and diseases. The internal displacement caused by the violent conflict has resulted in

loss of livelihood in the form of physical, financial, human, social and economic assets (Ojo, 2012).

The result of the state management of the economy of conflict has taken an enormous toll on the

region in terms of loss of life and property, livelihood as well as physical infrastructures. The state

security agencies have been accused of wanton recklessness, ruthlessness, brutality and

excessive force.

2.4.2. SECURITY AND CIVILIAN RELATIONS The state security agencies have been known to attack and indiscriminately shoot in towns and

villages, burn property and raze communities. They also kill, torture, flog and rape civilians and

protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2009). People in the communities have been forced to flee,

thereby creating and swelling internal displacements. For a long time, oil companies hid behind

the shield of security agencies rather than institute a regime of corporate responsibility and

sensitivity to host communities. It is alleged that some of the oil companies purchase arms, as

well as provide logistics and support for state security agencies in their repression and brutality

45

against community members (Onojowo, 2011). The conflict among the Niger Delta communities

includes cultism, political power, and conflicts over resources or livelihoods across the three

states. In addition to these, conflict over territorial boundaries was found to be prevalent in Delta

state. The conflicts by state, cultism was found to be the main manifestation of conflict in Bayelsa

state, conflict over territorial boundaries in Delta state, and conflict over political power and

leadership in Rivers state. Other manifestations of violent conflict mentioned were the spillover

effects of the Biafra agitators from Onitsha, conflicts between farmers and herders over grazing

land and livelihoods, most prevalent in Delta state, and conflicts between citizens and state

institutions over employment of citizens (SFCG, 2019). The key drivers of conflict identified in

Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers include unemployment, poverty, lack of government response to

citizen’s need, lack of education and low youth participation in decision making within the states

(SFCG, 2019).

Some Dialogue platforms include military crackdowns, an amnesty for fighters, establishing

interventionist development agencies (the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs), enacting legislation,

increasing the allocation of public revenues, and appointing some elites from the region to key

positions (Aghedo, 2015). It is widely criticized for its overreliance on military responses that have

been counterproductive in radicalizing non-state actors (Aghedo, 2015), and for rewarding

violence and incentivizing kidnapping through the amnesty program (Aghedo, 2015). While the

1999 amnesty effectively froze the conflict in a ‘no war, no peace’ situation, it did not build a

sustainable peace (Aghedo, 2015). Also as a form of dialogue is the cooperation among the

governors of the core states of the Niger Delta (Bayelsa, Delta and River States) who strategically

positioned themselves at the centre of the country’s oil complex (Onuoha, 2009). In addition to

their agreements with the elites at the federal government level, they put in place a parallel

structure that integrates local leaders and social pressure groups (feeding on ethnic emancipation

claims and youth exclusion) that provides the network for the illicit tapping and selling of crude oil

(Onubogu, 2017). Repeated clashes between nomadic pastoralist (transhumant) and farming

communities are one of the most pressing axes of conflict in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s

north and middle belt regions.33 While tensions between these communities have a long history

in these regions, the scale and frequency of violent outbreaks between the groups have recently

risen, threatening to inflame ethnic and religious antagonisms (Onubogu, 2017). In 2016 alone,

an estimated 2500 people were killed in such clashes (ICG, 2017). Indeed, several studies have

indicated that this conflict caused more casualties in 2016 than did the Boko Haram Insurgency

in northeast Nigeria (Onubogu, 2019). These clashes have additionally led to the displacement

of at least 62,000 people, most of them women and children, in the hardest hit states of Kaduna,

Benue and Plateau (ICG, 2017). These humanitarian costs are also mirrored by economic ones:

Nigeria Federal Government has lost an estimated $13.7 billion in its annual takings whilst the

worst hit states have lost 47 percent of their internally generated revenue due to the conflict

(Mercy Corps, 2015). This is a situation which requires urgent attention given its present scale

and likely future impacts. The following sections provide an analytical review of a number of

key factors which have helped cause and exacerbate this conflict.

46

2.5 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INSURGENCY AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY Finally, critics and practitioners worry that DDR lacks clear benchmarks or metrics to determine

success. Berdala, (2006) argues that while this is also true of other development interventions

initiated by multilateral and bilateral contributors in complex environments, the “fact that DDR

deals specifically with weapons and armed groups suggests an extra layer of caution is

warranted”. This extra layer of caution is warranted more so in the Nigerian context, where the

intervention was imposed from the top with little or no contribution from below and considering

the multiple ambiguities associated with its conceptualization, implementation, and management.

This situation has severely devastated the economic life of people especially in the south-south

and northern parts of Nigeria. For instance, in some areas, commercial banks have reviewed their

operational hours to begin from 9:00am to 12:00 noon, as against the normal operational period

of 8:00am to 4:00pm. This is a part of efforts by these banks to safeguard their business premises

(Mohammed, 2012). Under this new operational arrangement, bank customers, especially

traders, find it very difficult to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to the limited banking

operational hours. Alternatively, these helpless traders have no choice than to hide their money

in their shops. That is why there are rising cases of shop-breaking and burglary in the affected

areas. The growing insurgency and militancy, which led to the massive relocation of businessmen

to a more peaceful environment, has had a negative impact on the activities of the Niger Delta. In

the year 2016, there was a resumption in militant activities, justified by perpetrators as a vote of

no confidence in the current administration to address their developmental needs. The following

year saw a lull in militant activities aimed at the state and oil and gas industry. This followed efforts

by the Vice President and other parts of the State to enter dialogue with key groups, including the

Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), to deliver a plan for peace and development in the region (the

Niger Delta New Vision initiative). PANDEF was formed to speak for the South-South people, not

just to solve a specific problem. PANDEF speaks for the Niger Delta, including liaison with the

agitators in the creeks and has a guiding constitution.

2.6. CONCLUSION The NDAP was instituted at a time of great social, political, and economic ferment and trepidation.

Since its inception, the program has had a measured impact on the violence, helping to bring

about the fragile peace existing in the region today. The peace is fragile because while the NDAP

drastically reduced the onshore violence in the delta, the violence shifted to the offshore where

oil assets are daily being sabotaged by former fighters and fighters who refused to enter the

program including new parties that entered the violence after the adoption of the NDAP,

particularly after the 2015 presidential election. This study validates the little success achieved by

the NDAP but shows that the potential for violence to return is high. If violence returns, many

former fighters who are presently participating in the NDAP will get involved, especially the more

inexperienced former fighters, women, unemployed former fighters, and those who benefited more from waging than engaging the NDAP-induced peace. Whilst headline-grabbing pipeline

sabotage and similar incidents have been avoided with the intervention of so many non-

governmental organizations, other forms of violence have remained common - for example, the

past two decades have seen cultism – a movement mutated from university fraternities – become

increasingly involved in armed criminal activities and militancy, including artisanal oil refining and

47

political violence. The militarized policing of communities, and the military’s response to recent

low-level militant activity, has conversely become a significant source of violence and intimidation.

Lastly, communal conflicts over land, high levels of crime and gender-based violence are an

everyday occurrence.

The escalation of violence in the Niger Delta, apart from the loss of hundreds of human lives, has

led to the disruption of oil production and a huge loss in export earnings, to the tune of 800,000

barrels per day, which is the equivalent of 40% of Nigeria’s total oil production of about 2.6 million

barrels per day. Estimating the exact human cost of the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta is

extremely difficult. The official estimate of the financial loss is put at about $3.5 billion annually

(Human Rights Watch, 2002; Oduniyi, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2006). Given that Nigeria

spends $2 billion annually to service its external debt, it follows that a resolution of the Niger Delta

conflict would save the country more than what it needs to service its external debt. In fact, the

country would have an additional $1.5 billion to pursue its developmental programs and quickly

transform the Niger Delta. The destabilizing effect of the Niger Delta conflict on the oil industry

made the government of Obasanjo grant amnesty to the militant leaders and their supporters. The

government reportedly made payments of more than $1,000 for each rifle and $10,000 for each

machine gun handed over to the government. However, the ensuing peace was negative. After

some months, there were renewed hostilities by the militants. Even the recent amnesty program

of the present government has not brought any significant change to the prevailing situation in

the Niger Delta. Rather, the militants are already accusing the government of insincerity in tackling

the intractable conflict and the developmental challenges confronting the people of the region. A

cohesive, engaging and ultimately successful Niger Delta peace process, which is urgently

needed, would be a significant achievement for the government.

The alternative is to risk a spiraling insurgency that is still in its early stages but shows signs of

strengthening. Although it is difficult to predict the outcome, some analysts have characterized

the conflict as a separatist insurgency in its initial stages. International analysts have warned of

the possibility that an upsurge of violence could result in a one to two-year shutdown of oil

operations in the Delta. Government conflict management strategies which involve the use of

force to repress protests by the oil-bearing communities have been grossly ineffective. The oil

multinationals have contributed to the conflict by creating a condition where violence is the only

means of obtaining benefits and good corporate governance. The oil companies’ management of

the ensuing hostility and resistance has tended to engender more violence and illegal

appropriation of benefits. Oil multinationals have seen the ineffectiveness of the use of force and

now support a new partnership of all stakeholders in the petroleum industry. They have shifted

emphasis from community assistance to community development.

48

ANNEX 3. EVALUATION MATRIX THEME ONE: RELEVANCE

Evaluation Questions Sub-Evaluation Questions Probing Questions Respondent Category

What project strategies were implemented across intervention communities?

SFCG NG Staff

Did these strategies meet or align to the project design? If Yes, How? If No, Why?

SFCG NG Staff

How relevant were the project strategies, activities and partnerships to the specific context and objectives of the project?

What participatory approaches were adopted to ensure that these strategies aligned with implementation context?

SFCG NG Staff

How were the key stakeholders engaged?

SFCG NG Staff

What activities were (are) implemented to contribute to the objective of this project?

SFCG NG Staff

Were the project implementation strategies and activities relevant to the project objectives? If Yes, How? If No, Why?

SFCG NG Staff

To what extent did the project design address identified problems?

Can you rate the contribution of the implemented strategies in meeting the objectives of the project?

Beneficiaries/Key stakeholders

Did the project’s strategies contribute to the achieved results? If Yes, How? If No, Why?

SFCG NG Staff

Describe how this project’s strategies and activities have contributed to the results achieved by this project

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

How relevant were the project strategies, activities and partnerships to the result of the project?

How did the project strategies contribute to resolving conflicts in the communities?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Highlight results that this project achieved?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Have you participated in conflict resolution dialogue in your community or as a key stakeholder?

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

To what extent are the results of this project attributable to this project’s activities and strategies?

What efforts were made to engage communities and key stakeholders who benefitted from this project?

SFCG NG Staff

49

Did you benefit from this project’s engagement with stakeholders in the community on issues of conflict?

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

THEME TWO: IMPACT

Evaluation Questions Sub-Evaluation Questions Probing Questions Respondent Category

Looking back, what has changed because of this project’s activities?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What change have you observed in the community that can be linked to the activities implemented by this project?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

To what extent can changes (intended/unintended, positive/negative) be attributed to the program?

How successful were the strategies implemented in achieving project objectives

What project activities did this project conduct in the community? List

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Have the activities conducted by the project resulted in any form of changes in the community? (intended/unintended, positive/negative)

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Are you better informed about topics on conflict and peace in your community? If Yes, How? If No, Why?

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What efforts have you put to strengthen the capacities of these groups (women, youth groups and government actors) to address issues of resource conflict and governance in the communities?

SFCG NG Staff

What particular features of the program have made a difference in the governance and resource issue conflict in the communities?

To what extent has this project worked with local partners and actors to address issues of governance and resource conflict?

How has the project contributed in strengthening your capacity?

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Are the factors that affected the project? If Yes, What Factors? If No, Why?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

How did conflict context impact on this project?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What is the influence of other factors and conflict context on the impact of the project?

What factors were most influential in addressing the impact of conflict on project outcomes?

How did this project mitigate the factors that affected the impact of the project?

SFCG NG Staff

What factors and conflict context affected your access to project activities?

Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

How can these factors be mitigated? Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

50

THEME THREE: EFFECTIVENESS

Evaluation Questions Sub-Evaluation Questions Probing Questions Respondent Category

To what extent were the objectives of the intervention achieved?

Were the objectives achieved?

How were communities and beneficiaries engaged to solve issues of governance, conflict and resource control?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What project activities or approaches were most effective in securing positive outcomes and why?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

Which project activities or approaches were not effective and why not?

SFCG NG Staff Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What strategies have contributed in achieving objectives of the project?

SFCG NG Staff

How did you integrate stakeholders and communities into your project intervention strategies?

SFCG NG Staff

What components of the intervention have been more successful and what components proved to be more challenging?

What key lessons can be leveraged from the project during implementation?

What challenges did you encounter during the implementation of the project? How were these mitigated

SFCG NG Staff

Do you think the activities implemented by this project has been successful? Yes or No

SFCG NG Staff

What are the factors that have contributed to the success of these interventions?

SFCG NG Staff

What components of the interventions were most successful?

SFCG NG Staff

What components of your interventions

were more challenging to implement? SFCG NG Staff

THEME FOUR: SUSTAINABILITY

Evaluation Questions Sub-Evaluation Questions Probing Questions Respondent Category

What affected the participation of local actors and partners in addressing issues of conflict and resource control in intervention communities?

SFCG NG Staff/Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

To what extent are the benefits of the program likely to persist after donor funding ceased?

To what extent are any results likely to be sustained after the project ends?

What additional support is needed to sustain existing local actors, civil society organizations, women and youth groups?

SFCG NG Staff/Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What are the existing priority conflict, governance and resource control capacity building needs of intervention communities?

SFCG NG Staff/Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What best practices were employed by the project to achieve project results?

SFCG NG

51

What are the major factors that are influencing the sustainability of the program?

What revisions should be adopted to amplify project achievements?

What design options /intervention alternatives should be considered for future project iterations?

SFCG NG

What project activities improved governance and mitigated resource conflict in target communities?

SFCG NG Staff/Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

What linked activities were most effective in addressing drivers of conflict across intervention communities?

SFCG NG

If the project has contributed to strengthening the linkage between the citizens and local authorities to address the drivers of conflict, how sustainable are these linkages?

What activity linkages can be leveraged to maximize the effect of the project?

How can activity linkages between citizens and local authorities be strengthened to address the drivers of conflict?

SFCG NG

How adequate was the level of involvement and coordination among key actors during project implementation?

Were key actors (NGOs, local actors, women, and youth stakeholders) actively involved in project coordination effects? If so, how? If not, why?

SFCG NG Staff/Stakeholders/Beneficiaries

52

ANNEX 4. EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRES

ANNEX 4.1. PROGRAM STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE (PSQ) PROGRAM STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE (PSQ)

Questionnaire

Code :

(PSQ/State/LGA/00

_)

Time

Start

Date of Interview:

Time

End

Field Visit Location

(Community):

Consent

Are you willing to participate in the interview?

Yes or No

“It is a pleasure to meet you. My name is [Insert Name]. I/We are here to collect your views on

the implementation of the Deepening Peace in the Niger-Delta Program. We work as part of an

independent evaluation team engaged by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Nigeria that is

working to obtain information on behalf of the Project’s sponsors. The interview is estimated to

last 35 minutes. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. It is your choice

whether to participate or not. There is no right, or wrong answers and you can refuse to answer

any question and can terminate this interview at any time. Non-participation will not affect the

services/benefits that you usually get. We will not ask personal questions, only about the activities

conducted by SFCG Nigeria. Information collected will be kept in a secure location, and only be

used to inform better service delivery. However, even if information you provide is used in the

report, this does not mean that the issues raised will lead to immediate changes in the future.

No Harm Principle

Evaluators will adhere to these three Protection Principles:

● Evaluators will not further expose people to physical hazards, violence or other

rights abuses.

● Evaluators will not undermine any beneficiary’s capacity for self-protection.

● Evaluators will manage sensitive information in a way that does not jeopardize

the security of the informants or those who may be identifiable from the

information.

Photos shall ONLY be taken when instructed. Please note that children should not be

photographed, nor can they provide informed consent.

53

SECTION ONE DEMOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SN Questions Response Options

1 Gender Choose relevant option

1 = Male 2 = Female

2 Respondent Category Choose relevant option

1 = Program Management 2 = M&E 3 = Admin 4 = Others

SECTION TWO RELEVANCE

SN Questions Response Options

3 What project strategies/activities

were implemented across

intervention communities?

Insert Response

4 Did these strategies meet or align

to the project design?

Insert Response

If Yes, How? If No, Why?

5 What participatory approaches

were adopted to ensure that these

strategies aligned with

implementation context?

Insert Response

6 How were the key stakeholders

engaged?

Insert Response

7 Were the project implementation

strategies and activities relevant to

the project objectives?

Insert Response

If Yes, How? If No, Why?

8 Did the project’s strategies

contribute to the achieved

results?

Insert Response

If Yes, How? If No, Why?

9 Describe how this project’s

strategies and activities have

contributed to the results

achieved by this project

Insert Response

10 How did the project strategies

contribute to resolving conflicts in

the communities?

Insert Response

11 Highlight results that this project

achieved?

Insert Response

54

12 What efforts were made to

engage communities and key

stakeholders who benefitted from

this project?

Insert Response

13 What partnerships enabled the active engagement of communities in peaceful dialogue in addressing governance and resource issues driving conflict?

Select all options that apply 1 = With Cooperation 2 = With Government 3 = With NGOs/CBOs 4 = With Community and Traditional Leaders 5 = With Religious Leaders 6 = With Academia (Universities and Colleges) 7 = With Media (Electronic and Print) 8 = With Youth Networks 9 = With Military Operatives 10 = Others (specify)

SECTION THREE IMPACT

SN Questions Response Options

14 Looking back, what has changed

because of this project’s

activities?

Insert response

If Yes, What?

If No, Why?

15 What change have you observed

in the community that can be

linked to the activities

implemented by this project?

Insert response

16 What project activities did this

project conduct across target

communities?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

17 Did the activities conducted by

the project resulted in any

intended or unintended changes

in the community?

Insert response

18 Did the activities conducted by

the project resulted in any positive

or negative changes in the

community?

Insert response

19 How did conflict context impact on

this project?

Insert response

55

20 How did this project mitigate the

factors that affected the impact of

the project?

Insert response

SECTION 4 EFFECTIVENESS

SN Questions Response Options

21 How were communities and

beneficiaries engaged to solve

issues of governance, conflict and

resource control?

Insert response

22 What project activities or

approaches were most effective in

securing positive outcomes and

why?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives

6 = Others

23 What strategies have contributed

in achieving objectives of the

project?

Select all options that apply 1 = Addressed drivers of community conflict 2 = Reduced Conflict in the community 3 = Promoted Community Led Initiatives 4 = Provided Opportunities for Peaceful Dialogue 5 = Supported Government Led Initiatives 6 = Facilitated CSO Led Initiatives

24 How did you integrate

stakeholders and communities

into your project intervention

strategies?

Insert response

25 What challenges did you

encounter during the

implementation of the project?

How were these mitigated

Insert response

26 Do you think the activities

implemented by this project has

been successful?

Insert response

If Yes, how were implemented activities successful?

If No, Why were implemented activities not successful?

27 What are the factors that have

contributed to the success of

these interventions?

Insert response

28 What components of the

interventions were most

successful?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives

56

5 = Community led initiatives

6 = Others

29 What components of your

interventions were more

challenging to implement?

Insert response

SECTION FIVE SUSTAINABILITY

SN Questions Response Options

30 What affected the participation of

local actors and partners in

addressing issues of conflict and

resource control in intervention

communities?

Insert response

31 What additional support is needed

to sustain existing local actors,

civil society organizations and

youth groups?

Insert response

32 What are the existing priority

conflict, governance and resource

control capacity building needs of

intervention communities?

Insert response

33 What best practices were

employed by the project to

achieve project results?

Insert response

34 What design options /intervention

alternatives should be considered

for future project iterations?

Insert response

35 What project activities improved

governance and mitigated

resource conflict in target

communities?

Insert response

36 What linked activities were most

effective in addressing drivers of

conflict across intervention

communities?

Insert response

37 How can activity linkages

between citizens and local

authorities be strengthened to

address the drivers of conflict?

Insert response

38 Were key actors (NGOs, local

actors, stakeholders) actively

Insert response

57

involved in project coordination

effects?

If so, how? If not, why?

ANNEX 4.2. COMMUNITY BENEFICIARY

QUESTIONNAIRE (CBQ) COMMUNITY BENEFICIARY QUESTIONNAIRE (CBQ)

Questionnaire Code :

(CBQ/State/LGA/00_)

Time

Start

Date of Interview:

Time

End

Field Visit Location

(Community):

Consent

Are you willing to participate in the interview?

Yes or No

“It is a pleasure to meet you. My name is [Insert Name]. I/We are here to collect your views on

the implementation of the Deepening Peace in the Niger-Delta Program. We work as part of an

independent evaluation team engaged by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Nigeria that is

working to obtain information on behalf of the Project’s sponsors. The interview is estimated to

last 35 minutes. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. It is your choice

whether to participate or not. There is no right, or wrong answers and you can refuse to answer

any question and can terminate this interview at any time. Non-participation will not affect the

services/benefits that you usually get. We will not ask personal questions, only about the activities

conducted by SFCG Nigeria. Information collected will be kept in a secure location, and only be

used to inform better service delivery. However, even if information you provide is used in the

report, this does not mean that the issues raised will lead to immediate changes in the future.

No Harm Principle

Evaluators will adhere to these three Protection Principles:

● Evaluators will not further expose people to physical hazards, violence or

other rights abuses.

● Evaluators will not undermine any beneficiary’s capacity for self-protection.

● Evaluators will manage sensitive information in a way that does not jeopardize

the security of the informants or those who may be identifiable from the

information.

58

Photos shall ONLY be taken when instructed. Please note that children should not be

photographed, nor can they provide informed consent.

SECTION ONE DEMOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SN Questions Response Options

1 Gender Choose relevant option

1 = Male

2 = Female

2 Respondent Category Choose relevant option

1 = Beneficiary 2 = Youth Leader 3 = Women Leader 4 = Local Project Committee (LPC) 5 = Information Resource Center (IRC) 6 = Civil Society Organization (CSO) 7 = People living with Disabilities (PLWD) 8 = Others

SECTION TWO RELEVANCE

SN Questions Response Options

3 Who do you think should be involved in discussing issues related to governance and resource issues driving conflict in your community/state/the Niger Delta?

Select all options that apply 1 = Community leaders 2 = Religious leaders 3 = Teachers 4 = Media Person 5 = Youth Leaders 6 = Women Leaders 7 = Government Officials 8 = Security Agencies 9 = CBO/NGO/INGOs 10 = Traders/Business People

4 If there is violent conflict in your locality, what does it look like? (Multiple answers possible)

Select all options that apply 1 = Ethic or Sect Conflict 2 = Religious Sects 3 = Territorial Boundaries Clashes 4 = Political /Leadership Clashes 5 = Military/Insurgency 6 = Acts of Terrorism 7 = Hate Crime 8 = Cultism 9 = Mob Violence 10 = Piracy on Waterways 11= Domestic Abuse 12 = Sexual Violence 13 = Others (Pls. Specify)

59

5 What would you say are the prevalent types of conflicts in your communities/state in the last year?

Select all options that apply 1= Cultism 2 = Community/territorial boundary clashes 3= Political power/community leadership 4 = Social unrest e.g. #ENDSARS 5 = Farmers/Herdsmen Clashes 6 = Domestic Violence

6 Did you participate in any of these

project activities?

Select all options that apply 1 = Community Led Initiatives 2 = Peace Dialogues 3 = Government Led Initiatives 4 = CSO Led Initiatives

7

Can you identify the contribution of

the implemented strategies in

meeting the objectives of the

project?

Select all options that apply 1 = Addressed drivers of community conflict 2 = Reduced Conflict in the community 3 = Promoted Community Led Initiatives 4 = Provided Opportunities for Peaceful Dialogue 5 = Supported Government Led Initiatives 6 = Facilitated CSO Led Initiatives

8 In your opinion, what are the

drivers of violent conflict in your

locality? (Multiple answers

possible)

Select all options that apply 1 = Loss of Vice 2 = Loss of Self Esteem 3 = Unemployment/Lack of Opportunities 4 = Lack or Poor Education 5 = Low or Poor Participation of Youths in Decision Making 6 = Social Isolation/Lack of Family Ties 7 = Poverty 8 = Human Rights Abuse 9 = Religious Fundamentalism 10 = Lack of Personal Purpose 11 = Lack of Government Responsiveness to Citizen’s Needs 12 = Marginalization and Discrimination 13 = Lack of Freedom 14 = Despair/Hopelessness 15 = Stereotyping 16 = Others (pls. specify)

9 In your opinion, which actions do you think have been most effective in countering violent conflict in your locality?

Select all options that apply 1 = Military Actions 2 = Establishment of Vigilante Groups 3 = Economic Empowerment 4 = Law Enforcement Strategies 5 = School Based Interventions to Counter Extremist Ideologies 6 = Role Modeling by Youth Leaders 7 = Mass Media Information Campaigns 8 = Use of Cultural Influencers 9 = Dialogues with Religious Leaders 10 = Dialogues with Community and Traditional Leaders 11 = Use of Focal Networks to Counter Violent Ideologies 12 = Diplomatic Actions 13 = Others (pls. specify)

60

10 What partnerships do you think were necessary to enable communities to be involved in peaceful dialogue addressing governance and resource issues driving conflict?

Select all options that apply 1 = With Cooperation 2 = With Government 3 = With NGOs/CBOs 4 = With Community and Traditional Leaders 5 = With Religious Leaders 6 = With Academia (Universities and Colleges) 7 = With Media (Electronic and Print) 8 = With Youth Networks 9 = With Military Operatives 10 = Others (specify)

11 Have you participated in conflict resolution dialogue in your community or as a key stakeholder? If 10 = Yes (Answer Q12) If 10 = No (Skip to Q 13)

Insert response

1 = Yes 2 = No

12 How did the project strategies

contribute to resolving conflicts in

the communities?

Insert response

13 Are you aware of any organized

dialogue in your community?

Insert response

1 = Yes 2 = No

14 Why have you not participated in

dialogue process or conflict

resolution activity?

Insert response

15 What do you think was the main

achievement of conducted

dialogues in your community?

Insert response

16 Can you highlight any major

results/achievement achieved by

the project in your community?

Insert response

SECTION THREE IMPACT

SN Questions Response Options

17 Looking back, what has changed

because of this project’s

activities?

Insert response

If Yes, What?

If No, Why?

18 What change have you observed

in the community that can be

linked to the activities

implemented by this project?

Insert response

61

19 What project activities did this

project conduct in the community?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

21 Did the activities result in any

intended or unintended changes

in the community?

Insert response

22 Did the activities result in any

positive or negative changes in

the community?

Insert response

23 Are you better informed about

topics on conflict and peace in

your community?

Insert response

If Yes, How? If No, Why?

24 How has the project contributed in

strengthening your capacity?

Insert response

25 Are there factors that affected the

project?

Insert response

If Yes, What Factors? If No, click.

26 How did the prevailing or

changing conflict context impact

on this project?

Insert response

27 How can these factors be

mitigated?

Insert response

SECTION 4 EFFECTIVENESS

SN Questions Response Options

28 How were communities and

beneficiaries engaged to solve

issues of governance, conflict and

resource control?

Insert response

29 What project activities or

approaches were most effective in

securing positive outcomes and

why?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

SECTION FIVE SUSTAINABILITY

62

SN Questions Response Options

26 Was the participation of local

actors, community members and

partners in addressing issues of

conflict and resource control

hindered or limited?

Insert response

If Yes, Why? (Go to Q26)

If No (Go to Q27)

27 What affected the participation of

local actors and partners in

addressing issues of conflict and

resource control in intervention

communities?

Insert response

28 What additional support is needed

to sustain existing local actors,

civil society organizations, women

and youth groups to participate in

addressing issues of conflict and

resource control?

Insert response

29 What are the existing priority

conflict, governance and resource

control capacity building needs of

intervention communities?

Insert response

30 What project activities improved

governance and mitigated

resource conflict in target

communities?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

31 Were key actors (NGOs, local

actors, stakeholders) actively

involved in project coordination

effects?

Insert response

If Yes, how were local community members and NGOs

involved?

If No, why were they not involved?

ANNEX 4.3. GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDER

QUESTIONNAIRE (GSQ) GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE (GSQ)

63

Questionnaire Code

:

(GSQ/State/LGA/00_)

Time

Start

Date of Interview:

Time

End

Field Visit Location

(Community):

Consent

Are you willing to participate in the interview?

Yes or No

“It is a pleasure to meet you. My name is [Insert Name]. I/We are here to collect your views on

the implementation of the Deepening Peace in the Niger-Delta Program. We work as part of an

independent evaluation team engaged by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Nigeria that is

working to obtain information on behalf of the Project’s sponsors. The interview is estimated to

last 35 minutes. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. It is your choice

whether to participate or not. There is no right, or wrong answers and you can refuse to answer

any question and can terminate this interview at any time. Non-participation will not affect the

services/benefits that you usually get. We will not ask personal questions, only about the activities

conducted by SFCG Nigeria. Information collected will be kept in a secure location, and only be

used to inform better service delivery. However, even if information you provide is used in the

report, this does not mean that the issues raised will lead to immediate changes in the future.

No Harm Principle

Evaluators will adhere to these three Protection Principles:

1. Evaluators will not further expose people to physical hazards, violence or other

rights abuses.

2. Evaluators will not undermine any beneficiary’s capacity for self-protection.

3. Evaluators will manage sensitive information in a way that does not jeopardize

the security of the informants or those who may be identifiable from the

information.

Photos shall ONLY be taken when instructed. Please note that children should not be

photographed, nor can they provide informed consent.

SECTION ONE DEMOGRAPHIC AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SN Questions Response Options

1 Gender Choose relevant option

1 = Male

64

2 = Female

2 Respondent Category Choose relevant option

1 = LGA Official 2 = State Govt. Official 3 = Security Agency 4 = Community Leader 5 = Local Actor/NGO/FBO/CBO 6 = Others

SECTION TWO RELEVANCE

SN Questions Response Options

3 Who do you think should be involved in discussing issues related to governance and resource issues driving conflict in your community/state/the Niger Delta?

Select all options that apply 1 = Community leaders 2 = Religious leaders 3 = Teachers 4 = Media Person 5 = Youth Leaders 6 = Women Leaders 7 = Government Officials 8 = Security Agencies 9 = CBO/NGO/INGOs 10 = Traders/Business People

4 If there is violent conflict in your locality, what does it look like? (Multiple answers possible)

Select all options that apply 1 = Ethic or Sect Conflict 2 = Religious Sects 3 = Territorial Boundaries Clashes 4 = Political /Leadership Clashes 5 = Military/Insurgency 6 = Acts of Terrorism 7 = Hate Crime 8 = Cultism 9 = Mob Violence 10 = Piracy on Waterways 11= Domestic Abuse 12 = Sexual Violence 13 = Others (Pls. Specify)

5 What would you say are the prevalent types of conflicts in your communities/state in the last year?

Select all options that apply 1= Cultism 2 = Community/territorial boundary clashes 3= Political power/community leadership 4 = Social unrest e.g. #ENDSARS 5 = Farmers/Herdsmen Clashes 6 = Domestic Violence

6 Can you identify the contribution of

the implemented strategies in

meeting the objectives of the

project?

Select all options that apply 1 = Addressed drivers of community conflict 2 = Reduced Conflict in the community 3 = Promoted Community Led Initiatives 4 = Provided Opportunities for Peaceful Dialogue 5 = Supported Government Led Initiatives 6 = Facilitated CSO Led Initiatives

65

7 In your opinion, what are the

drivers of violent conflict in your

locality? (Multiple answers

possible)

Select all options that apply 1 = Loss of Vice 2 = Loss of Self Esteem 3 = Unemployment/Lack of Opportunities 4 = Lack or Poor Education 5 = Low or Poor Participation of Youths in Decision Making 6 = Social Isolation/Lack of Family Ties 7 = Poverty 8 = Human Rights Abuse 9 = Religious Fundamentalism 10 = Lack of Personal Purpose 11 = Lack of Government Responsiveness to Citizen’s Needs 12 = Marginalization and Discrimination 13 = Lack of Freedom 14 = Despair/Hopelessness 15 = Stereotyping 16 = Others (pls. specify)

8 In your opinion, which actions do you think have been most effective in countering violent conflict in your locality?

Select all options that apply 1 = Military Actions 2 = Establishment of Vigilante Groups 3 = Economic Empowerment 4 = Law Enforcement Strategies 5 = School Based Interventions to Counter Extremist Ideologies 6 = Role Modeling by Youth Leaders 7 = Mass Media Information Campaigns 8 = Use of Cultural Influencers 9 = Dialogues with Religious Leaders 10 = Dialogues with Community and Traditional Leaders 11 = Use of Focal Networks to Counter Violent Ideologies 12 = Diplomatic Actions 13 = Others (pls. specify)

9 What partnerships do you think have enabled communities to be involved in peaceful dialogue addressing governance and resource issues driving conflict?

Select all options that apply 1 = With Cooperation 2 = With Government 3 = With NGOs/CBOs 4 = With Community and Traditional Leaders 5 = With Religious Leaders 6 = With Academia (Universities and Colleges) 7 = With Media (Electronic and Print) 8 = With Youth Networks 9 = With Military Operatives 10 = Others (specify)

10 Have you participated in conflict resolution dialogue in your community or as a key stakeholder? If 10 = Yes (Answer Q11) If 10 = No (Skip to Q 12)

Insert response

1 = Yes 2 = No

66

SECTION THREE IMPACT

SN Questions Response Options

11 Looking back, what has changed

because of this project’s

activities?

Insert response

If Yes, What?

If No, Why?

12 What change have you observed

in the community that can be

linked to the activities

implemented by this project?

Insert response

13 What project activities did this

project conduct in the community?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

14 Did the activities conducted by

the project resulted in any

intended or unintended changes

in the community?

Insert response

15 Did the activities conducted by

the project resulted in any positive

or negative changes in the

community?

Insert response

16 Are you better informed about

topics on conflict and peace in

your community?

Insert response

If Yes, How?

If No, Why?

17 How has the project contributed in

strengthening your capacity?

Insert response

18 Are there factors that affected the

project?

Insert response

If Yes, What Factors?

If No, click.

19 How did the prevailing or

changing conflict context impact

on this project?

Insert response

20 How can these factors be

mitigated?

Insert response

67

SECTION 4 EFFECTIVENESS

SN Questions Response Options

21 How were communities and

beneficiaries engaged to solve

issues of governance, conflict and

resource control?

Insert response

22 What project activities or

approaches were most effective in

securing positive outcomes and

why?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

SECTION FIVE SUSTAINABILITY

SN Questions Response Options

23 Was the participation of local

actors, community members and

partners in addressing issues of

conflict and resource control

hindered or limited?

Insert response

If Yes, Why? (Go to Q22)

If No (Go to Q23)

24 What affected the participation of

local actors and partners in

addressing issues of conflict and

resource control in intervention

communities?

Insert response

25 What additional supports are

needed to sustain existing local

actors, women, civil society

organizations and youth groups to

participate in addressing issues of

conflict and resource control?

Insert response

26 What are the existing priority

conflict, governance and resource

control capacity building needs of

intervention communities?

Insert response

27 What project activities improved

governance and mitigated

resource conflict in target

communities?

Select all options that apply 1= Community dialogue 2 = Capacity building sessions 3 = Government led initiatives 4 = CSO led initiatives 5 = Community led initiatives 6 = Others

68

28 Were key actors (NGOs, local

actors, stakeholders) actively

involved in project coordination

effects?

Insert response

If Yes, how were local community members and NGOs

involved?

If No, why were they not involved?

ANNEX 5. EVALUATION STAFFING AND MANAGEMENT

5.1. STAFFING PLAN

5.1.1. ONE-TEAM PARTNERSHIP APPROACH The Evaluation Team Leader (ETL) was supported by suitably qualified evaluators at different

stages of the end line evaluation study. The technical team will also include two Investigative

Evaluators (IEs) providing field based supervisory functions during data collection across all

sampled Local Government Areas (LGAs) to support technical oversight of field data collection in

Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta. Throughout the evaluation process, the team was tasked to deliver on

specific final evaluation study

deliverables. This management

approach ensured comprehensive

professional review and technical

oversight across board. Field

deployment of research assistant for

data collection was conducted

simultaneously across all intervention

states, with supervision functions

handled by both Investigative

Evaluators (IEs). The Data

Management Evaluator (DME)

provided routine remote data

management support.

5.2. TEAM STRUCTURE

5.2.1. EVALUATION TEAM LEADER (ETL) ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES The ETL served as the evaluation manager/team leader leading and managing all formative technical review of SFCG NG task order deliverable and remained the primary liaison with SFCG NG staff. He had the primary responsibility for ensuring the quality and timely delivery of all evaluation task(s) and oversaw, supported and coordinated the work between the Investigative Evaluator (IEs) and engaged research assistants. With guidance from SFCG NG, the ETL finalized all evaluation tasks deliverable including field visit plans, data risk analysis protocols and led the technical development of the final evaluation study report.

FIGURE. EVALUATION TEAM

STRUCTURE

69

5.2.2. INVESTIGATIVE EVALUATORS (IEs) ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES Both Investigative Evaluators (IEs) conducted technical review of SFCG NG documents as well

as supported remote data collection via interviews with identified respondent/stakeholder groups.

The IEs also conducted primary data quality assurance during field data collection and contributed

to the development of the final evaluation study report.

5.2.3. DATA MANAGEMENT EVALUATOR (DME) ROLE AND

RESPONSIBILITIES The DME assisted in analyzing quantitative/qualitative data from the field data collection activities.

This extended to the development of different statistical data analysis options for preparing

reports by the ETL, with a focus on incorporating effective data visualizations in those reports.

70

ANNEX 6. RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY (RMS) Potential Risk Mitigation Strategy Risk Rating

Security

In the Niger-delta region of Nigeria, security preparedness requires a daily assessment of

violence, threats and road closings. Few roads in the region are safe for consistent travel and cell

phone and internet connections can be unreliable. The evaluation team took strict preventive

safety measures e.g. maintaining contact and maintaining a diary of security emergency contacts.

The evaluation team also collaborated with SFCG NG security contacts and local security agencies

for assistance during field deployment. The ongoing #ENDSARS protest which was started in Delta

state, remained a major concern for local logistics, and the evaluation team explored alternative

remote based data collection options to navigate inherent challenges across the target intervention

states (Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers).

Critical

Data Reliability

To address this concern, the technical evaluators (i.e. Investigative Evaluators and Data

Management Evaluator) conducted primary data quality assessment of collated data, and provided

daily direct support to research assistants during remote data collection e.g. clarifying response

options, isolating questionnaires with missing variables as well as receiving constant updates on

completed questionnaires. The evaluation team engaged trained data collectors by SFCG NG,

who are resident in sampled LGAs and remain knowledgeable of the German Cooperation

deepening the peace project. This also eliminates the need to conduct rigorous training for field

data collectors within the restricted timeframe for the evaluation study.

Low

COVID - 19

The Coronavirus pandemic has had far reaching impacts on all facets of life; and until a viable

vaccine is available all necessary precaution must be taken. To this end, the evaluation team

ensured adherence to social distancing protocols by the World Health Organization (WHO) during

the conduct of evaluation activities and tasks. Coupled with the prevailing insecurity in the Niger

Delta due to the #ENDSARS protest fallout with security operatives tightening up intra-state

movement, the evaluation team opted for the conduct of telephone interviews for remote data

collection. This measure basically eliminated COID-19 social distancing concerns for research

assistants during the data collection phase of evaluation activities.

Critic1al

Use of Primary

and Secondary

Data

The triangulation of data was driven by the evaluation team using primary data provided by the

project (i.e. desk study) and secondary data derived supplementary resource materials (i.e. deep

dive literature review) as well as referenced all suitable data sources.

Low

Data Validity

The Risk Mitigation Plan (RMP) served as a guide field data collection and documentation. When

necessary, the evaluation team conducted random follow-on calls to interviewed respondents to

clarify certain answers/responses curated by the research assistants. This proactive measure

ensured that the evaluation team maintained updated data quality worksheets to ensure effective

data assurance and cleaning.

Critical

Privacy Concerns

As a component of protection against security and privacy concerns, the evaluation team adhered

to “Do No Harm” protocols during all data collection activities. This includes securing informed

consent as well as minimizing collection of personally identifiable information (PII).

Medium

Culture and

Language Barrier

The evaluation team member possesses extensive professional experience in the Niger Delta local

language skills. Also, the evaluation team leveraged established networks of trained research

assistants previously engaged by SFCG Nigeria in the Niger Delta. This ensured that engaged

research assistants required limited training on developed tools and protocols; as they were

conversant with assigned locations for data collection i.e. in most cases selected research

Low

71

assistants were residing in project locations across the intervention states. and The lead evaluator

will ensure language challenges are minimized and will conform to existing culturally sensitive

issues during the conduct of field data collection activities.

Logistics

The evaluation team coordinated field activities leveraging on SFCG NG established networks and

resources to facilitate effective logistics planning. Each respondent interviewed was selected from

the consolidated beneficiary database provided by SFCG Nigeria. This ensured that the majority of respondents (i.e. target beneficiaries) were easily reached and also conversant with the

objectives of the Deepening the Peace in the Niger Delta program implemented by SFCG Nigeria.

Medium

Non-response

Data collection and survey instructions were developed to guide research assistants on replacing

target respondents in the sample list with replacements from a separate buffer sample list. This

ensured representativeness of the final sampled population for the evaluation study,

Medium

72

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Awojobi C.O; Bassey, C. O.; Asune, J. B (2014). Conflict and Instability in the Niger Delta. The

Warri Case. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Aghedo, I. (2015). Winning the war, losing the peace: Amnesty and the challenges of post-conflict

peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48(3), 267-280.

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Environmental Rights Action, (2012) “The Emperor has no clothes”. Report of Proceedings of the

Conference on the People of the Niger Delta and the 1999 Consortium. Port Harcourt, Nov. 24

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006:2016). A Framework for Lasting Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations. New York: IPA.

Isumonah, A. O. (2009). Oil, Resource Conflicts and the Post Conflict Transition in the Niger Delta

Region: Beyond the Amnesty Benin: CPED.

Iwayemi, B. (2013). Environmental Issues and the Challenges of the Niger Delta: Perspectives

from the Niger Delta. Environmental Survey Process. Yaba: The CIBN Press Limited.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2017) Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly

Conflict Crisis Group Africa Report N°252. ICG. Brussels, Belgium.

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Oduniyi, A. (2003). Crisis of Resistance: Crime and Violence in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

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Onojowo, C. B. (2011). Interrogating A Crisis of Corporate Governance and Its Interface with

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Onubogu, O, (2017). Testimony before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. United States

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Ojo, E. (2012). Towards Accelerated Development and Peace Building in the Post Amnesty Niger

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Squash Club, Asaba 24 November. Obi O. H. (2008). Resolving the Niger Delta Conflict: A Critical

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Ogbogbo, W.S (2014). Globalization and Nigeria’s Oil Industry Implications for Local Politics”. In:

A. B. ADIGUN [et al.] (eds.). Nigeria’s Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance. Ibadan:

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Onosode, E. (2013). Environmental Issues and the Challenges of the Niger Delta: Perspectives

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Mercy Corps (2015) The Economic Costs of Conflict in Nigeria: Effects of Farmer-Pastoralist

Conflict in Nigeria’s Middle Belt on State, Sector, and National Economies. Mercy Corps

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Mohammed, Y. (2012). Encounters of Insurgent Associations with the State in the Oil Rich Niger

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Muzan, S. (2014) Amnesty: Rumblings in the creeks. http://thenationonlineng.net/news February

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