LEGAL ETHICS

I. PRACTICE OF LAW

1. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 [1991] DOCTRINE: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions FACTS:

-­‐ Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC but Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

-­‐ The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

-­‐ Cayetano filed the petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

-­‐ The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUES: Whether or not Monsod is qualified, based on the qualification of 10 years of practice of law, to be the chairman of COMELEC? HELD: Yes, he is qualified, petition dismissed. RATIO:

-­‐ The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.

-­‐ The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).

-­‐ Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.

-­‐ In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

-­‐ Moreover, Monsod is deemed to have fulfilled the requirement, for the court cited definitions of what is the practice of law (see below)

PRACTICE OF LAW

- Black defines "practice of law" as: “The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)”

- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650)

- The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263) Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)

- Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

2. Khan v. Simbillo 409 SCRA 299 August 10, 2003

FACTS:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.”

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Similar advertisements were published in August 2 and 6,

2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5 of the Philippine Star.

Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

Simbillo admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. He prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Simbillo guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. IBP denied a subsequent urgent motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not Simbillo is guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Sec. 37 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

RATIO:

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to

public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

Simbillo himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

NOTES:

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of Marriage. In assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

For solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. The use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are ok. The use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon.

3. Bernardo v. Mejia 531 SCRA 639 August 31, 2007 FACTS: Petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already 71 years old and barred from the practice of law for 15 years.

1. 23 Jan 1987: Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses

a. Misappropriating and converting to his personal use the money entrusted to Mejia for the payment of real estate taxes of Bernardo’s 2 properties in Valle Verde amounting to P27,710.00 and P40,000.00, respectively.

b. Falsification of certain documents, to wit: (1) a special power of attorney; (2) a deed of sale dated ; and (3) a deed of assignment

c. Issuing a bouncing check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.

2. 29 Jul 1992: SC En Banc found Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT .

3. 01 Jun 1999: Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law.

4. 06 Jul 1999, SC En Banc issued DENIED the petition for reinstatement. 5. 23 Jan 2007: (around 15 years after disbarment) Mejia filed the present petition for

review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys? YES, finally REINSTATED! HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED. RATIO: 1. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in

the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law.

2. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law.

3. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

4. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejia’s name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of 71 he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.

5. After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it “El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.”

6. The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.

Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse.

7. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

8. We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

4. Arce v. PNB 62 Phil 569 (1935)

Facts:

- The services of attorney Arce were contracted. - The records of the case further shows that in pursuance of such employment,

Attorney Arce prepared a petition praying for the appointment of a guardian of the incapacitated person, carried on this petition to a successful conclusion after a hearing in court, conducted certain negotiations with the banks, made the necessary investigation and attended to other matters.

- The guardian of the person of the incapacitated offered to pay P200. - Said amount was thereafter increased to P400 before the CFI of Manila. Atty

Arce appealed and prayed that he be allowed the sum of P5000. Issue: WON the trial court was overly strict in arriving at an amount which would adequately compensate Attorney Arce for his legal work? Held:

- Yes. o The law is a profession not a business. Lawyers are officers of the

courts. However, professional men are entitled to have and recover from their clients a reasonable compensation for their services rendered with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer.

o The standing of the members of the bar is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining had between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the market before a sale is made.

The court ruled that Attorney Arce is entitled to P1000 for his services.

5. Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot 74 Phil. 749 (1944) FACTS:

-­‐ Bayot (a lawyer) published an advertisement in a Sunday newspaper saying: Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay

or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

-­‐ He denied publishing it, but admitted it eventually and sought clemency from the Court.

ISSUE: -­‐ WON this is a violation of legal ethics

HELD:

-­‐ YES. But because of plea of clemency, he’s only reprimanded.

RATIO: -­‐ It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by

the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public.

-­‐ Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.

6. Ledesma v. Climaco 57 SCRA 473 June 28, 1974

Emergency Recit: Ledesma was the counsel de oficio of two accused who were not mentioned in the case. During the pendency of the criminal case, Ledesma was appointed as Commission on Election Registrar, which required much of his time according to him. He filed a motion to withdraw from being counsel de oficio. ISSUE: W/on he could withdraw. ANS: NOPE. It is part of the condition of being a member of the bar. Two, he could still be a counsel even though he is appointed as registrar since the court could see no valid reason why he could not. As said in the case, there is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time FACTS: (Petitioner-Ledesma; Respondent-Judge Climaco) -Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental on October 13, 1964 -he commenced to discharge his duties. -At the time of his appointment, he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. -Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense ISSUE: W/on Ledesma has the right to withdraw as counsel de oficio HELD: No RATIO: -Ledesma ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore

-There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio - There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time NOTE: importance of having counsel de oficio is in line with due process given to an accused in a criminal case as stated in our Constitution

7. In re: Tagorda 53 Phil. 37 (1929) EMERGENCY RECIT Tagorda is an attorney and a notary public. In a general election he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which shows that he is an attorney and a notary public. It was used as an advertisement of his services. Additionally, he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio asking the lieutenant to disseminate the information regarding his services and his willingness to accept people asking for said services. The issue is whether or not Tagorda solicited cases at law for the purpose of gain. The answer is in the affirmative. Act No. 2828 provides a ground for disbarment. It is stated in the said act that “[T]he practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” FACTS

Tagorda is a practicing attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabel. In the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which shows that he is a notary public. Additionally there’s a note that reads:

“As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.”

Additionally, he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio. An excerpt from the letter reads:

“I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.”

ISSUE Whether or not Tagorda solicited cases at law for the purpose of gain. (YES) HELD Judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

RATIO Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. Said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons of Professionals Ethics: Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — “XXX Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — “XXX It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. XXX”

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

8. People v. Daban G.R. No. 31429 January 21, 1972 FACTS: Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip, started as counsel de parte of appellant Daban. He filed a motion for extension of time of 30 days within which to file appellant's brief. It was granted. So were subsequent motions for extension respectively filed. Then, on May 25, 1971, after having obtained 13 extensions in all, he filed a motion asking that in view of the father of appellant being unable to raise money for printing expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel de parte and be appointed as counsel de oficio instead to enable him to file a typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he had by then finished. SC granted his prayer to be appointed counsel de oficio, but required him to file a mimeographed rather than a typewritten brief. However, Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio, kept on filing motions for postponement, four in number, likewise granted by SC. All in all, he had 17 extensions. Still there was no appellant's brief. SC required Atty. Demaisip to explain, within 10 days from notice hereof, why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Atty. Demaisip responded that the escape of the prisoner automatically makes the appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered abandoned. It is his prayer, therefore, that the above be considered a satisfactory explanation.

ISSUE: WON Demaisip committed gross neglect of his duty. (YES) HELD: WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court, respondent Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby suspended from the practice of the law in all courts of the Philippines, except for the sole purpose of filing the brief for appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this Court within a period of twenty days from receipt of this resolution. RATIO: Atty. Demaisip had assured this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he were not careless of the truth, then there was no excuse why prior to June 15, 1971 he was unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It is not to be ignored either that as of that date he had already secured thirteen extensions, ordinarily many more than any counsel is entitled to but nonetheless granted him, because the sentence imposed was one of death. Section 9 of Rule 122: The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The penalty imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment being one of death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision. The mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent Demaisip, by such gross neglect of duty, notwithstanding the many extensions granted him, was recreant to the trust reposed in him as counsel de oficio. The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill his responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as counsel de parte or a counsel de oficio, he was indeed truly remiss in the discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he cannot evade. It is by such notorious conduct of neglect and indifference on the part of counsel that a court's docket becomes unnecessarily clogged. His transgression is indisputable; what remains is the imposition of an appropriate penalty. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled. If for any reason, he fails to do so — a matter which may be susceptible of explanation but not of justification — he should know that he is to be held accountable.

9. In re: CUNANAN 94 Phil. 543 (1954)

DOCTRINE

1. In our judicial system, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

2. Article VIII Sec 13 provides that the SC shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. While Congress may repeal, modify or supplement existing rules on the matter, this power does not relieve the Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to the courts.

QUICK FACTS

• The SC, due to variety of reasons, used different passing averages to the Bar on different years.

YEAR PASSING GRADE

1946 72

1947 69

1948 70

1949 74

1950 – 1953 75

• Aggrieved, many lobbied in Congress which resulted in Senate Bill No. 12 which pegged the passing at 70%. This was not approved.

• On second try, Senate Bill No. 371 pushed through and became RA 972 or the Bar Flunkers Act which stated that

1. All who garnered a score of 70% since 1946 should be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar.

2. All scores with fractions of half or more shall be rounded to the next whole number

• Appeals were filed in the SC for the application of such law. • Court set hearing for the petitions for admission with the intention to determine

if RA 972 is constitutional or not ISSUE: W/N RA 972 is constitutional resulting to the admittance of 1,069 previous bar flunkers into the Bar HELD:

1. The law is unconstitutional being outside the legislative powers of Congress to enact

2. It establishes arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles 3. The purpose of the law and its effects violate the Constitution or its basic

principles

RATIO

1. The reasoning of Sen. David (proponent of the bill) is “ The reason for relaxing the standard 75% passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.”

2. The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.

3. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially those inadequately prepared individuals is to create a serious social danger.

4. This law has no precedent in its favour. Judiciaries in other countries have all declared similar laws as without force and effect.

5. The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.

6. The disputed law is not a legislation, it is a judgment revoking those promulgated by the Courts during the years regarding the status of the appeals.While these judgments on the appeals may be revoked on justifiable reasons, it is not the legislative nor the executive who can do so, it is only the Courts that may do so. That the law further mandates rounding off of scores show that it is the Court’s judgment which is being amended and correct.

7. To apply such law only to those who failed in the years provided is not justified being an unexplained and arbitrary classification of unsuccessful candidates.

NOTES SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14, Rule No. 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71% per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72% in the in the 1953 bar examinations; 73% in the 1954 bar examinations; 74% in the 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however , That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number. SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject in any bar examination after July 04, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. RESOLUTION 1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect. 2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive,

is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution. Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.

10. Phil. Lawyers Association v.Agrava 105 Phil 173

Emergency recit: Director of patents wants to prescribe an additional examination for lawyers before they could practice before the patents office. This is questioned. The director says that the law on patents is patterned after the US patent law and US law allows the Director of Patents there to prescribe additional Examinations. SC: There is such additional examination in the US because their patent law expressly allows such. Our patent laws are silent on which. Therefore, lawyers who the SC licensed to practice law before before any tribunal (inlcuding the patents office) can practice law there. If we were to allow the additional examination, then other bureaus of the govt would then be allowed to prescribe the same, which for sure is not contemplated by the legislature.

Facts:

Director of Phil. Patent Office issued a circular requiring lawyers to take an examination before they could practice law before the patents office. Non-lawyers could also take the exam and they could prosecute patent cases if they pass. Phil Lawyers Assoc questions this.

Arguments of director:

-the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . .

-that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which

-that the action taken by the Director is in accordance with the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination.

Issue: WON the director of patents can prescribe the examination as a prerequisite to practice law before the patents office.NO

Ratio:The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.

the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself. Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of the US law, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code also authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau—same as the above provision. Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

11. In re: Sycip, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)

EMERGENCY RECIT: The firms Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo, and Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes asks the SC if they can continue on with using the names of deceased partners in their firm name. The Court denied the motion, and uphold their ruling in the Deen case where the similar question was raised. The Court said that the practice of law cannot be considered to be a trade, where trade names are a source of good will. The legal profession, as distinguished from a business, (1) is a duty of

public service, (2) dealing with the administration of justice involving sincerity, integrity and reliability, (3) with the highest fiduciary relationship with the client, and (4) a relationship with fellow lawyers characterized by candor, fairness and unwillingness to resort to unfair business practice. Moreover, there is no custom which allows or permits the use of trade names in professional partnerships, such as a law practice. In sum, the practice of law is a public service, for the administration of justice according to law. There is no expectation of reward. FACTS: Atty. Alexander Sycip a, partner in the law firm Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo, died on May 5, 1975. Meanwhile, Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, a partner in the law firm Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes, died on February 14, 1976. Both firms filed a petition before the SC praying that they be allowed to continue with using the names of Sycip and Ozaeta in their respective firms though both partners are already dead. Though the Court in the Deen case and the RD of Manila v China Bank already held that law firms cannot use the name of a deceased partner in the firm name, both parties ask the Court to reconsider their decision in those cases. ISSUES: Whether or not the firms Sycip and Ozaeta can continue with using the names of dead partners in the firm name with the following arguments:

(1) A partnership is allowed to use the name of a deceased partner in the firm name, and even under Art. 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the usage of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name will not make that partner liable.

(2) There is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name."

(3) Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association allows the use of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name when permissible by local custom.

(4) There is no deception involved in the use of the name since the death of the partners were widely publicized, Sycip and Ozaeta/Romulo will notify all law directories of the death of the partners and the letterheads of the companies contain details of when deceased partners were connected with the firm.

(5) No local custom prohibits the use of a deceased partners name in a professional firm.

(6) US Courts and other courts around the world have recognized the continued use of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name.

HELD: NO. In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such. RATIO:

(1) Both Art. 1815 and 1825 of the Civil Code expressly prohibits a firm name bearing the name of a deceased partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm

particularly where they are non-lawyers. Not only that, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the heirs of the deceased partner receiving money from the clients and from being held liable for firm’s debts. Also, the public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. A new lawyer can just join an old firm and can just ride on the firm name’s reputation.

(2) Art. 1840, which the firms are citing, is under the Chapter on Dissolution and Winding Up. First, what the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. It is only a temporary situation. Second, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership (i.e. law firms, partnerships of physicians), with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. These partnerships have no good will to distribute.

(3) As for the trade name, law firms are not partnerships for business. It is not created for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. This is because the practice of law is not a ‘profession.’ A profession (accdg to Dean Pound) is a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." Thus, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: (the practice of law is) a. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money. b. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. c. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. d. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients

(4) There is no local custom which permits a firm name from continuing to bear the name of a deceased partner. In the Philippines, names of people who appear in the firm name are the more active/senior members of the firm. There is still the possibility of deception—that a person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

(5) US courts have allowed the use of the deceased partner’s name in the firm name because the practice was sanctioned by custom as was held in Mendelsohn v Equitable Life Assurance. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. There is no such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Also, the Court in the Deen case already laid down a rule that prohibits firm names from using the name of a deceased partner. Thus, customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

“The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." The practice of law is that it is practiced in the spirit of public service. The lawyer does not compete with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward,. This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit.”

II. ATTORNEY AT LAW

1. Cui v. Cui 11 SCRA 755 (1964) FACTS:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. The administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 Jesus wrote a letter to Antonio demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with, Jesus filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to

the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be applied, the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The Court a quo decided in favor of Jesus. The phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that as used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.

This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by Antonio and Romulo.

ISSUES:

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado."

[Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.]

HELD: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

RATIO:

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers.

(Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the Jesus is not entitled, as against Antonio, to the office of administrator.

But it is argued that although Antonio is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Antonio was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission.

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications.

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When Antonio was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

NOTES:

Not really for ethics. Just in case maam asks re Romulo, the intervenor who also vies for the position of administrator

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. Romulo contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

2. Villegas v. Legaspi 113 SCRA 39 (1982)

- The case involves the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter “Sec. 11.

No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction.” FACTS: L-53869

- In 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Villegas against the Cruz spouses and Cania, Jr.

- Cruz & Cania, hired as cousel Legaspi a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu.

- Villegas "challenged" the appearance of Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of first instance.

- Judge Dulay issued an Order inhibiting himself thus transferred to judge burgos, who denied the disqualification.

- Hence, this recourse to certiorari and Prohibition. - A TRO was issued enjoining respondent Court from acting in Civil

L-51928

- Reyes filed a case against N. V. Excelsior-De Maas and Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C Acero, on the ground that, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes).

- Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. - This appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article

VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.

ISSUE: The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance. HELD: Yes, they are prohibited in entering as counsel. RATIO:

- Under Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, Section 11 now reads: “No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction” vs 1935, barred from appearing as counsel before any court inferior to a collegiate court of appellate jurisdiction.

- What is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction.

- "Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction". - "Counsel" means "an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or management

of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public officer, or public body".

- Thus, "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another.

- THUS, there should be no question that both Assemblyman Legaspi & Fernandez appeared as counsel for their respective respondents. ISSUE: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi and Fernandez, respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction? HELD: NO, they are of general jurisdiction. RATIO:

- By law, CFI are Courts of general original jurisdiction. However, under the same statute, their jurisdiction is stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate.

- They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal judges of provincial capatals or City Judges pursuants to the authority granted under the last paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act.

- It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. - By the deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both the original and amended

Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the previous prohibition. Thus, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.

- HOWEVER the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.

- Also, the intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments could not appear before Courts of First Instance.

- The scope of the prohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from "appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction."

- The objective of the prohibition is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

3. Bacoro v. Court of Appeals 37 SCRA 36 (1971) Facts: Bacarro is the registered owner of a lot in the barrio of Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. He alleged that on Sept. 16, 1964 he was compelled by Judge of Baungon, Imbatug, Bukidnon to appear before him at his office. He was supposedly coerced and forced under threat of prosecution and loss of his lot to execute a deed of reconveyance of one-half of the said lot to Mrs.Gaerlan. Bacarro filed a complaint against Mrs. Gaerlan for the annulment of deed of reconveyance, with damages and other incidental reliefs. Mrs. Gaerlan in her answer with counterclaim, filed by Atty. Salcedo, admitted the execution of the contested deed of reconveyance before the municipal judge. However, she alleged that the subject matter of said deed is part of a bigger lot of over 15,000 sq. meters, which, long before the war had been entrusted to Bacarro’s father. Upon the latter’s death, the brothers partitioned it. She stated that the brothers registered the land through fraud and grave abuse of confidence. However, through her and her daughter’s pleas the brothers executed freely and voluntarily the said deed of reconveyance. On Sept 13, 1966, Attys. Luminarias and Caballero entered their appearance, in collaboration with Atty. Tommy C. Pacana, with a request that henceforth they be furnished notices and other processes incident to the case. The court then directed the attorneys of Bacarro in pursuant to the defense’s manifestation to make the proper amendment to his complaint within ten days and furnish a copy of the document to Atty. Salcedo, failure of which would merit dismissal. After the lapse of the period, Mrs. Gaerlan filed a written manifestation that Bacarro had not complied with the said order. Consequently, Judge Teves issued an order of the same date dismissing the complaint. On or about October 25, 1966, Atty. Caballero filed a “motion for consideration and/or new trial” from said order after duly relieving his previous counsel. This was denied by the judge and the copy of which was served upon Atty. Pacana but notice of said order was not received by Atty. Caballero until March 15, 1967, on which date he filed the corresponding notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. Mrs. Gaerlan objected to the approval of said record on appeal, on the ground, that the period to appeal should be reckoned when copy of the order of the same date was served upon Atty. Pacana. Issue: Whether or not Bacarro's period to appeal from the order of Judge Teves, denying his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, began to run when copy of said order was served upon Bacarro's original counsel, Atty. Pacana, or when notice of said order was served upon Atty. Caballero. Whether Bacarro could — as regard the Court and Mrs. Gaerlan — validly dispense with

the services of Atty. Pacana, without securing his consent, or without proof that he had been notified of petitioner's aforementioned motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, or without any notice thereof. Held: The Court holds that respondent Judge Teves had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in refusing to approve Bacarro's record on appeal and in dismissing his appeal, and that the Court of Appeals had, likewise, erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner herein. The resolution of the Court of Appeals complained of should be, as it is hereby reversed, and orders of Judge Teves, dated April 15 and May 27, 1967, are, in turn, annulled. Judge Teves is directed to give due course to Bacarro's appeal in said civil case, with costs against respondent Vivencia Velez Vda. de Gaerlan. Writ granted. RATIO Atty. Caballero did not substitute Atty. Tommy C. Pacana, but became one of the attorneys for Bacarro "in collaboration with Atty. Pacana." Neither did Atty. Caballero substitute or try to substitute the latter on October 5, 1966, when Bacarro's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, of that date, was filed. Atty. Caballero was Bacarro's counsel since September 13, 1966. The statement in said motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of October 25, 1966, to the effect that, through Atty. Caballero, Bacarro, "after duly relieving his previous counsel, "moved," for the reconsideration of the order of ... September 27, 1966, and/or for new trial," had the effect of retaining Caballero, or continuing his services, as counsel for Bacarro, and dropping Atty. Pacana as such counsel. A client may at any time dismiss his attorney ..." without prejudice, of course, to such rights as the latter may have against the former. Independently of such rights, if any, the relations between Atty. Pacana and Bacarro, as attorney and client, ceased, therefore, from the filing of said motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, insofar as the Court is concerned, and from the receipt of copy by Atty. Salcedo, insofar as Mrs. Gaerlan was concerned. Although the rule laid down in U.S. vs. Borromeo was quoted with approval in Olivares and Colegio de San Jose v. Leola, et al., the decision in the latter case explicitly adverted to the fact that the record thereof failed to show that the party concerned "had dispensed with the services" of its original counsel. Bacarros's aforesaid motion for reconsideration and/or new trial positively stated, not only to at he had relieved his previous counsel, but, also, that this had been "duly" done, indicating that the matter had been taken up with Atty. Pacana. There is nothing in the record to indicate the contrary or that Atty. Pacana still claims to represent or to be entitled to represent Bacarro herein.

4. Rustia v. CFI 44 Phil. 62 (1922)

EMERGENCY RECIT SPOUSES PROCUNA contracted the services of Atty. RUSTIA for a certain civil case. The contract fixed RUSTIA’s fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise

the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer RUSTIA. In the civil case, where RUSTIA was counsel, CFI-Batangas ruled favourably for the SPOUSES PROCUNA, awarding them with the right to collect from MAGSOMBOL 602 pieces of cloth or Php3,250, in case of default. When MAGSOMBOL appealed, SPOUSES PROCUNA manifested in the court, without the aid of RUSTIA (counsel), that SPOUSES PROCUNA and MAGSOMBOL actually went into a compromise agreement already, wherein SPOUSES PROCUNA will only receive P800. CFI-Batangas approved and dismissed the case. RUSTIA found out about it later on. ISSUE: WON RUSTIA was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case? NOT ENTITLED. Client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. COMPLETE DIGEST FACTS: Petition for a writ of CERTIORARI, the RUSTIA alleging that the respondent Judge of the CFI exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the parties but without the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff RUSTIA in the case.

1. 31 July 1921: the Justo and Rosa Porcuna (SPOUSES PROCUNA) by means of a written contract, retained RUSTIA to represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in CFI-Batangas and in which Rosa (wife) was the plaintiff and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant.

2. The contract fixed RUSTIA’s fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer RUSTIA.

3. After trial, RUSTIA then being the SPOUSES PORCUNA’s attorney of record, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of SPOUSES PORCUNA ordering the defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250.

4. 14 January 1922: Eulalia Magsombol appealed and presented a bill of exceptions, which was approved.

5. Thereafter, SPOUSES PORCUNA presented the following motion in the CFI without any further intervention of their attorney. They aver:

a. That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already settled this case with the herein defendant. In the compromise, they agreed that SPOUSES PORCUNA should be paid P800 in two installments.

b. That SPOUSES PORCUNA recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the P800 and that this is the total amount the defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and WE HAVE NO RIGHT WHATEVER TO ANY OTHER AMOUNT THAN THE AFOREMENTIONED.

c. SPOUSES PORCUNA respectfully request the dismissal of this case 6. Hence, CFI dismissed the action without notice to counsel RUSTIA for the plaintiff

spouses. 7. RUSTIA alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922.

RUSTIA filed the present petition for a writ of CERTIORARI, which SC denied. 8. RUSTIA’s contention:

a. that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case

b. that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it.

ISSUES: IMPORTANT: WON RU

1. STIA was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case? NO 2. WON lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it?

But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court.

HELD: DENIED. The petition for a writ of CERTIORARI was therefore properly denied. RATIO: For issue 1:

1. Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.

2. Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of the sum recovered in case of success, this does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit.

3. In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. RUSTIA’s contingent interest in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.

For Issue 2

4. As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true upon such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case. A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the agreement.

RUSTIA might have protected his interests by entering an attorney’s lien under section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. US v. Laranja 21 Phil. 500 (1912) FACTS:

-­‐ Appellant Calixto Laranja and four or five companions went to the house of one Candoy on the night of November 8, 1910

-­‐ sometime after these men arrived at this house on the night, they, together with the people living in said house, began singing and drinking

-­‐ a quarrel and fight ensued which resulted in the death of Candoy and Ando -­‐ Subsequently thereto, criminal complaints were filed in the Court of First

Instance against this appellant and one Iyon, charging them with the crime of homicide.

-­‐ Iyon was tried first.

-­‐ When the case against the Laranja was called, a certain agreement with reference to admitting the testimony taken in the case against Iyon was entered into by counsel for the defendant and the provincial fiscal.  

-­‐ This agreement, as stated by the trial court, was as follows: Counsel DE OFICIO, Mr. Lozano, stated that with the sworn statement of the defendant in addition to the evidence taken in the case No. 1889, that he would submit the case, He said, and it was within the knowledge of the court, that he had been present all during the trial assisting the fiscal in the case against Iyon and that Calixto had been present and heard all the testimony in the case against Iyon, and that he was willing for the record in the case against Iyon to be used in the trial of this case. The fiscal agreed to this, and the defendant, after being sworn, went upon the stand.

-­‐ The case was submitted upon the testimony of the Laranja and that taken in the case against Iyon.

-­‐ Counsel for the defendant (not the counsel de oficio Mr. Lozano) now insists that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony taken in the Iyon case based on the case of US v. Pobre

-­‐ In the other hand, the Attorney-General insists that no such error was committed for the reason, as he says, that the defendant waived his right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses against him, based on a number of cases cited.

-­‐ In the case relied upon by counsel DE OFICIO for the defendant, the fiscal and counsel for the accused in that case (US v. Pobre) agreed that the internal-revenue agent and his companions would testify confirming the complaint in all of its parts; that the witnesses for the defense would declare that the alleged opium referred to in the complaint was ashes of the said drug, and that if the said article was found in the house of the accused, it was because the Chinaman Quin-quio, who was authorized to have it in his possession, had left it there and that the neighbors of the accused would declare that he was not in the habit of smoking opium. Upon this agreement the case was submitted to the court and the accused found guilty and sentenced accordingly.

-­‐ Additional facts: o Iyon killed Ando.

o Calixto, the appellant, killed Candoy. o Candoy, who was killed first, was the father of Iyon. o Ando was a brother-in-law of Calixto. o The trouble which resulted in the death of these two men arose in the

house of Candoy. o Ando and his brother-in-law and their companions were in Candoy’s

house on the night of the trouble by invitation.  -­‐ In the case under consideration we not only have before us, as we have said,

the testimony of the defendant himself but also of the evidence taken in the case against Iyon, and furthermore, there is in this record, as above quoted, an express waiver on the part of the defendant through his attorney of his constitutional right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

-­‐ That a defendant in criminal prosecution may waive the benefit of the constitutional privilege of being confronted with the benefit of the constitutional privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him is, we think, well settled.

-­‐ Again, the evidence complained of was admitted by the court on the express stipulation and agreement of the parties made in open court. Its admission thereupon became an established fact. Its admissibility ceased to be a question. It could not be raised here any more than it could in the court below. The only question remaining relative to such evidence is its probative force and value

-­‐ The record in the Iyon case was admitted as evidence on the express stipulation of the parties. The court below had no discretion.

-­‐ If the judgment appealed from is to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, it must be upon the ground of the disqualification of the attorney de oficio who represented the appellant in the court below. If the attorney was in fact disqualified, this disqualification would not effect the legality of any particular step in the proceedings alone, but would touch equally every part of the case from its inception to its close.

-­‐ If an attorney is disqualified, it is presumed that he can not properly advise the accused as to his rights; or as to how he should plead; or present testimony of his own; or sum up the case finally to the court; or do anything in the conduct of the case from beginning to end.

Issue: Whether or not the attorney changed or had an opportunity to change his position; that is, was his position when he was assisting the prosecution in the case against Iyon inconsistent or could it have been made so with of his being attorney for this defendant? HELD: Lozano is disqualified! RATIO:

-­‐ The attorney's position in assisting the prosecution in the case against Iyon was that of showing that Iyon was the guilty party and that the killing of Ando was not justifiable.

-­‐ In defending Calixto (the defendant), it was the duty of attorney to show, if it could be done, that Candoy was the aggressor and not Calixto. The testimony which was used to convict Iyon was incorporated by stipulation of the parties bodily into the case against this appellant. In addition, the defendant himself testified. This constitutes the evidence in the present case

-­‐ An analysis of the testimony taken in the Iyon case shows that there was in fact nothing in that testimony presented by the prosecution upon which a conviction

of this appellant could be based. It was the testimony of the defense in that case, which convicted this appellant (Calixto).

-­‐ The record in the Iyon case shows that there was no attempt on the part of Attorney Lozano to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the defendant in that case from the viewpoint of the defense in the case at bar.

-­‐ The first time that the theory of the appellant was squarely before the court was when he himself took the stand.

-­‐ The record does not disclose whether Mr. Lozano was appointed to represent this appellant before or after the trial of Iyon. If he was appointed before that trial, he did not, as we have said, develop by cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses in that case against Iyon the theory of self-defense which was the plea of this defendant.

-­‐ Had the attorney attempted to develop the theory of self-defense of Calixto, the court might have held that that would have been improper in the case against Iyon. Again, if the lawyer had been appointed before the trial of Iyon, he could have consulted (and we do not know whether he did or not) with Calixto and obtained from him all the facts about how the killing occurred, and the defense of this appellant. If the attorney was appointed after the Iyon case was closed, he would have had no reason, of course, for developing the testimony in the case against Iyon which would have aided the defense of the appellant. Viewed from any standpoint, there was an opportunity for the attorney to have acted in double capacity. The appearance of such injustice to clients must be avoided.

-­‐ -­‐ He should have called the attention of the trial court to these facts, and the

court would then no doubt have relieved him as attorney de oficio for the appellant.

-­‐ Public policy prohibits him from defending the appellant under these circumstances; the reason for this prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of confidence and trust in the very highest degree.

-­‐ An attorney becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause. He learns from his client the weak points of the case as well as the strong ones.

-­‐ Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with great care. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists.

-­‐ The members of the profession must have the fullest confidence of their clients. If it may be abused, the profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. The good of the profession as well as the safety of the clients demands a strict recognition and enforcement of the rules governing the relation of attorney and client.

6. Ledesma v. Climaco 57 SCRA 473 (1974) FACTS:

-­‐ Climaco (judge) denied granting the motion filed by Ledesma to withdraw as counsel de oficio because of the latter’s appointment as Election Registrar of the COMELEC. This is a petition for certiorari.

-­‐ However, the facts show that Ledesma was already counsel de parte—but in order to not frustrate the ends of justice, he was appointed as counsel de oficio for 3 people. [Spoilers: petition fails]

o Ledesma already asked for 8 postponements of the criminal case.

o So… Criminal case (de parte) -> appointed as de oficio -> appointed as COMELEC -> asked to withdraw as de oficio.

ISSUES:

-­‐ WON there was grave abuse of discretion on part of Climaco in denying the motion filed.

HELD: -­‐ NONE.

RATIO:

-­‐ In the wise words of the court: if respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory.

-­‐ The Court even cites In re Robles Lahesa: “This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases.”

o “Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”

For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. III. AUTHORITY TO ADMIT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1. In re: Del Rosario 52 SCRA 399 (1928) Emergency RECIT (Uber digest): You can read the original. (one page lang) Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar. HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct. HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination. BUT SHOULDN’T THE SUPREME COURT JUST ALLOW DEL ROSARIO TO TAKE THE BAR EXAMS AGAIN? No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The

standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. DIGEST: FACTS:

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating.

Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices dissenting.

Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario.

Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence

ISSUE: W/on the recommendation of the fiscal has merit

HELD: YES

-The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate.

While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar

2. In re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 245 (1975) EMERGENCY RECIT (Internet) FACTS: Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.

1. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.

2. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.

3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).

4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. RULING: The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court. He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees. Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license. MORE COMPLETE DIGEST FACTS An administrative proceeding was made by the SC in order to disbar Lanuevo, Galang, and 5 bar examiners for their acts during the 1971 Bar Examinations. Galang was an examinee who took 7 exams before the 1971 Bar Exams and failed. Also, the Supreme Court found out, through an NBI investigation, that Galang had a pending criminal case due to slight physical injuries he inflicted on his law school classmate. This fact wasn’t stated by Galang despite the requirement under the rules that he disclose this information in his bar application.

Through a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Exams, Landicho invited the attention of the Court to the fact that the grade of one examinee was raised by around 7 points. This was done through Bar Confidant Lanuevo’s schemes. It was submitted that Lanuevo tricked each of the examiners (one at a time) to persuade them to reconsider and reevaluate the exam booklets of Galang. He told the examiners that it’s SOP of the SC to give back the exam booklets of those with extremely high/low grades to the examiners in order to have them reevaluate.

One reason that Lanuevo provided as to why he noticed the booklet of Galang was that he was that the number 27 is special to him. When he was in the military, he was saved from a bombing conducted on November 27, 1941. Also, he was discharged from the army on February 27, 1946. He got married on February 27, 1947. Also, their youngest child was born on February 27, 1957. While checking notebooks, he came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number “954” so he opened the notebook. The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

ISSUE

- Whether or not Lanuevo and Galang should be disbarred. - Whether or not the 5 examiners should be disciplined.

HELD

- YES - NO

RATIO Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law. The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison office, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court. Also, after the results of the bar exam were released, Lanuevo gained unexplainable income and also went on sick leave in order to take a vacation. With regard to Galang, Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation, we are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever. 3. In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562 (1970) FACTS: In the civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. He moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. The plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for the reason that the motion for reconsideration does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Atty. Almacen then appealed SC by certiorari. SC refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. He reiterated and disclosed to the press (Manila Times) the contents of the aforementioned petition. Atty. Almacen's statement that ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." ISSUE: WON Almacen is guilty of acts unbecoming of a lawyer. (YES) HELD: ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. RATIO: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that ”An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. By constitutional mandate, the SC has the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against the Court. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in the Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is the Court's view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave the Court no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. 4. In re: Guarina 34 Phil. 1927 (1913) Doctrine

1. A law created by the Legislature shall not amend, modify, or deprive the powers granted to the Supreme Court by the Organic Act 0f 1902 (similar to the Constitution)

2. It is the duty of the courts, in construing a statute enacted by the Congress, not to give it a construction repugnant to the Constitution for any act of the legislative repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law.

3. In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. (Black on Interpretation of Laws)

EMERGENCY RECIT

• Guarina is the provincial fiscal of Batanes who has failed the law exam before (Score:71)

• The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions in the Philippines was amended. • In it is a controversial provision that says “Provided, That any person who, prior

to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of … provincial fiscal,… may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.”

• Guarina applied for the application of the law in his situation. • The SC ruled that to construe the word “may”, as used in the provision, as

mandatory/peremptory, instead of merely permissive in character, would result in a conflict between the Organic Act of the Phils., which granted the discretion of admission to the Bar to the Supreme Court, and the amended Law.

• The Organic Act (an act in the same level as the Constitution) takes precedence over an amended law.

FACTS • Sec. 2 of Act No. 1597 (1907) provided that “any person who, prior to the

passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of:

- Justice of the Supreme Court - Judge of the CFI - Judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration - Attorney General - Assistant Attorney in the Office of the Attorney-General - Prosecuting Attorney for the City of Manila - City Attorney of Manila - Assistant City Attorney of Manila - Provincial Fiscal - Attorney for the Moro Province - Assistant Attorney for the Moro Province may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.”

• Mario Guarina is the provincial fiscal of Batanes. He has failed the prescribed exam before garnering only a score of 71.

• He sought admission to the bar under the abovementioned provision citing the well-settled rules in statutory construction that “the word may should be read - shall - where such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator” and that “where power is given to public officers… whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory” and that the “intent of the Legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and absolute duty.”

Note: PEREMPTORY – no other choice

ISSUE: W/N the petition for admission of Guarina should be approved based on a construction of the provision given a mandatory effect HELD: No. RATIO

1. The amended law is precluded by the provisions of the Act of Congress called the Organic Law of 1902 (Act No 136) which confer to the Supreme Court the powers to govern all courts in addition to those who practice law.

2. Any act by the Legislative, which is a mere creature of the Organic Law, prescribing, defining, or limiting the power conferred by the Organic Law to the Supreme Court is, to that extent, invalid and void as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

3. The Commission that amended the Code of Civil Procedure only possessed the power to modify the provision requiring the holding of examinations under general rules/ prescribing the mode of procedure for the Courts to ascertain the qualifications of candidates and had NO AUTHORITY to deprive the Supreme Court of its power to deny admission to any candidate who fails to satisfy it that he/she possess the necessary qualifications for admission to the Bar.

4. The provision must be interpreted as merely permissive in character

NOTES: In the various other applications of this statute to other applicants, the Supreme Court considered the fact that such appointments were made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. Furthermore, the statute was applied to applicants who were practicing attorneys prior to their date of appointment. Guarina was never a practicing attorney prior to his date of appointment. This was interpreted by the courts as proof of his deficiency. BUT: The courts said that since he only failed by 4 points, and that he has held the Office of Governor of Sorsogon with such marked ability that he was retained by the Chief Executive in government service by appointing him as provincial fiscal, he may avail of a SPECIAL exam to prove to the courts his competence. 5. In re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978) Emergency recit: SC removed Edillon from bar bec. He did not pay his dues. He questions the propriety of the removal on constitutional grounds. SC: whatever rights might he enjoy is subject to the police power of the state bec. the practice of law is impressed with public interest. The law that says that he must be removed must he not pay his dues is but a regulation of the practice of law.Besides, the constitution grants the SC the plenary power to regulate the profession, so it can remove him.

Facts:SC through the resolution of IBP removed atty Edillon from the roll of attorneys for

stubbornly refusing to pay his membership dues.

the law: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

the respondent's arguments: -the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.

-The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issue: is it right to remove a lawyer from the roll of attorney if he does not pay his dues?

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the

administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

1. it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate)? Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. amounts to a deprivation of property without due process? Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

6. In re: Garcia 112 Phil. 884 (1961) EMERGENCY RECIT: Garcia is a Filipino who graduated law and practiced law in Spain. He is now applying for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without an examination citing the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State. The Court denied his petition stating that the said treaty is inapplicable as it only governs Spaniards who wants

to practice in the Philippines and Filipinos who wants to practice in Spain. Garcia does not fall in either circumstance. More importantly, only the judiciary can promulgate rules for the admission to the bar and the executive cannot encroach on the judiciary’s right to do so. FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his petition, he avers that he is a Filipino citizen(Negros Occidental), and born of Filipino parentage. He finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain, and was approved, selected and qualified by the “Institute de Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course as “Licenciado En Derecho”. Thereafter, he practiced the law profession in Spain. ISSUES: W/N he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition on the following grounds: (1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, which the petitioner invokes, are inapplicable. (2) Article I of the Treaty provides that the nationals of both countries shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. (3) The said Treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. RATIO: (1) The said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. But he is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. (2) The privileges provided in the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession. Sec 1, 2, 9, and 16 of Rule 127 require that he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations. (3) The Executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the SC to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. 7. In re: Cunanan 94 Phil 543 (1954) FACTS:

Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying

degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-

FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71% in the 1952 bar examinations; 72% in the in the 1953; 73% in the 1954 bar examinations; 74% in the 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions

(1) Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or

mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation due to the recent liberation from Japanese occupation.

ISSUES:

W/N RA 927 is a valid law

HELD:

The eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

RATIO:

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.

The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those

inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

1. Usurpation of the function of the Judicial Department.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications

required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide.

"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties.

It is an inherent power of the judicial department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part

of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as

other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

2. Class Legislation

For a law to be valid, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all.

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as

they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

8. Beltran vs. Abad, 121 SCRA 217 (1983) FACTS:

-­‐ March 1983, Abad was fined 500 php for unauthorized practice of law. -­‐ May 1983, Atty. Beltran wanted to circularize that Abad is not authorized to

practice law. o Abad opposed the motion, of course.

-­‐ In the report of the Clerk of Court, Abad was still practicing law. He was fined 12,000 this time. TWO LAWYERS WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE PRACTICING WITH HIM: Atty. Maravilla & Jacobe.

SOBRANG IGSI LANG NG CASE NA ITO. ITO LANG TALAGA NANGYARI SA BANDANG HULI: Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P12,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty (20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with more severely. The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been authorized to practice law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false testimony against the respondent. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

9. Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Binalbaga Isabela Sugar Co., 42 SCRA 302 (1971) Doctrine: The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. Facts: This is a petition for review of an order and the en banc resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case 1 granting Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case. PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case 1. After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of Entila and Tenazas. Said decision became final. Thereafter, Cipriano Cid & Associates (counsel of record for complainants) filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Entila and Tenazas in return filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages. On the same day, Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records of Case 1 show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by Muning. Thereafter the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case. (10% = Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates, 10% = Muning and 5% Atty. Pacis. Issue: W/N a non-lawyer may recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? Held: No. Applicable to the issue is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations which held that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract. Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875, “In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel..”, is no justification for a person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations to be entitled to attorney's fees. It shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence. The representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. Sec. 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, “Compensation of attorney's agreement as to

fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services..”, imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Entila and Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot therefore recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. The orders under review are set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Muning. 10. In re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 (1948)

EMERGENCY DIGEST

SC adjudged the newsman Parazo in contempt of court for refusing to divulge the source of his story regarding the leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examination. It was contended by Parazo that under Republic Act No. 53, he could only be compelled to reveal the source of his information when the revelation is demanded by the interest of the State. Parazo argued that "Interest of the State" meant "Security of the State". The Court rejected Parazo's argument as it held that the two (2) terms are not synonymous, the first being broader that the second. SC found that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information.

COMPLETE DIGEST

FACTS:

1. The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948.

2. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff."

3. For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full:

Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning. These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city. The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations. The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.

4. The SC cited Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.

5. 18 Sept 1948: During the investigation, Mr. Parazo admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed.

6. The investigators repeatedly appealed to Mr. Parazo urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the SC may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.

7. SC Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly.

8. Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation.

9. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state.

10. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say — that only when National Security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not unanimous.

ISSUE: WON the phrase interest of the state means and refers only to the security of the state? NO. HELD: In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information. Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. RATIO:

1. In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, SC examined the record of the proceedings in the Senate. SC noticed from the records of the deliberations and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the State" (interes del Estado).

2. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it

extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

3. We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subject of the said Bar Examinations.

4. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner.

5. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.

6. If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute.

7. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty.

8. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand.

9. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.

10. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken.

11. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

12. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.

Note: The ruling in this case did not sit well with Congress. Hence, on June 15, 1956, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1477 which amended Republic Act No. 53 by changing the Phrase "Interest of the State" to "Security of State".

11. Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584 (1991) FACTS:

-­‐ This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.

-­‐ The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. 2. Conduct unbecoming of public official. 3. Dishonesty. 4. Extortion. 5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. 6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. -­‐ As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to

register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.

-­‐ Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.

-­‐ Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

-­‐ On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.

-­‐ The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.

-­‐ Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements.  

-­‐ Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.

-­‐ On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter

-­‐ On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]).

-­‐ In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable.  

-­‐ Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

-­‐ Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

-­‐ Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.

-­‐ In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.

-­‐ NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

-­‐ After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

-­‐ Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.

-­‐ As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service  

-­‐ Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent. ISSUE:

1. whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. HELD: YES! Atty. Renomeron should be disbarred. RATIO:

-­‐ his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer -­‐ The lawyer's oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or

malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action

-­‐ The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).  

-­‐ ust as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest"

-­‐ his Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling"

-­‐ The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law He should therefore be disbarred. DECISION: petition granted. 12. In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22 (1973) FACTS:

-­‐ Per curiam. Petition in Admin case 526 to integrate the Bar of the Philippines. o In 1970, surveys have shown strong sentiment to create the

Integrated Bar. o Sept. 1971, P.Marcos signed RA 6397 or An Act Providing for the

Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor. § It provides: the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to

effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively

-­‐ This resolution answers the constitutionality of the Integrated Bar. ISSUES:

-­‐ Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

-­‐ Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? -­‐ Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD/RATIO:

-­‐ (1st issue) YES!! under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar.

-­‐ (2nd issue) YES!! What’s questioned here is: The lawyer’s constitutional rights of [1] freedom of association, [2] freedom of speech, [3] the nature of the dues exacted from him.

o All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

o A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.

o Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because … it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.

-­‐ (3rd issue) YES!! The US of A, Canada, Great Britain have already integrated their bars. It yielded better discipline, meaningful participation, eliminated unauthorized practice and a more cohesive profession.

o What the detractors say is that Govt authority will dominate the Bar… NOPE. In the 50 yrs of existence of the integrated Bar of these 3 countries, these evils have yet to surface.

o 96% of 15,000 interviewed lawyers are in favor of integrating. -­‐ THUS, THE INTEGRATED BAR WAS INTEGRATED.

13. Tejan vs. Cusi, Jr., 57 SCRA 154 (1974) Emergency Recit: Atty Tejan was the counsel of Calongo. He filed a petition with the RTC of Judge Cusi seeking the issuance of a new transfer of certificate title because it was lost in favor of Calongo. Judge Cusi sent a letter to Tejan requiring him to answer why he filed such petition knowing that the TCT was submitted to the court. An administrative case was filed by Judge Cusi. Atty Tejan filed a petition questioning the authority of Judge Cusi to hear and determine the administrative case. Two reasons were given by Tejan: one, suspension and removal of a lawyer are in the jurisdiction of SC. Two, there was conflict of interest since the judge was the one who filed. HELD: the law provides that suspension is within the authority of RTC and CA. Secondly, SC says that the court may act upon its motion FACTS: -An administrative case was filed by respondent judge Cusi for disciplinary reasons -Prior to that, Tajan he was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false

-The letter of Judge said that Atty Tejan prepared a petition asking for the issuance of a new transfer of certificate of title in favor of Vicente Calongo because said TCT was lost. It was alleged that Atty Tejan sought for the issuance of a new transfer of certificate of title even though he knew for a fact that that the owner's duplicate copy has always been in the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon. Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 -Judge Cusi was not satisfied with the answer - respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner - Atty Tejan filed a petition prohibiting Judge Cusi to hear and determine the case - Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of the Philippine Bar. ISSUE: W/on RTC Judge Cusi could hear and determine the case HELD: YES RATIO: 1. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.

- SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

2. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. 1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice 14. In re: Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940) Doctrine: The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a

fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. Facts: This is an administrative case against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging him with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him. It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of Atty. Santiago, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. Atty. Santiago assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. Atty. Santiago prepared a document in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of the document by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, “Would there be no trouble?” Upon hearing it the Atty. Santiago stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: “I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid.” For this transaction, Atty. Santiago tried to collect P50. Relying on the validity of the document, Ernesto Baniquit contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Roque Santiago is guilty of malpractice Held: The respondent did not deny the preparation of the document, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation. There is no doubt that the contract executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. The respondent Roque

Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. 15. Marcos vs. Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 246 (1951) EMERGENCY RECIT: Marcos and Concordia, members of Congress, filed petition for mandamus against AFP Chief of Staff to allow them to be counsels in the Court-Martial. SC held that the Court-Martial is a court within the provision of Constitution prohibiting a member of Congress from appearing as counsel in any court. FACTS: These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by Marcos and Concordia against the respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully Marcos and Concordia from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows: SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . .. ISSUE: WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners. (YES) HELD: Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners. RATIO: The words "any court" include the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution. The words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial.

In construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial. A court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty. That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex. 16. Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293 (1983) DOCTRINE

1. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

2. An attorney who is in public service is allowed to represent a client only upon authorization of his superior.

3. A government employee who appeared as counsel for a close family friend in an isolated case cannot be considered as engaged in the private practice of law.

4. The purpose of disbarment is not punishment of depriving a lawyer his source of livelihood but to protect the administration of justice by requiring those who exercise this function to be competent, honourable, and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

QUICK FACTS

• Noriega filed complaint for disbarment against Atty. Emmanuel Sison (a regular and permanent employee of the SEC) for:

1. failing to comply with the strictly observed civil service rule on prohibition of government employees in practicing their professions

2. misrepresentation by using a different name (Atty Manuel Sison) to circumvent the law

• Atty. Sison countered saying: 1. He has written authorization from SEC Associate Commissioner Sulit to

represent Juan Sacquing, a close family friend and defendant in a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court case in Manila

2. He has always signed the minutes using his full name. At one instance, he even noted the clerk’s mistake in the minutes about his full and correct name!

3. The notices sent to 605 EDSA, Cubao, QC was where Sacquing’s parents operated a printing office who in turn gave it to Sacquing.

4. He used the nickname Manuel interchangeably with his real name without any fraudulent purpose. Other people knew him as well as Manuel.

5. Noriega was merely a disgruntled loser in a SEC case where he sat as a Hearing Officer

ISSUE: W/N a case Sison is guilty of violating the government prohibition as to warrant his disbarment HELD: No violation of the Civil Service rules and regulations was committed since Sison was authorized by his superior to represent a family friend. Furthermore, since Noriega states, in the end, that the unauthorized use of another name is the basis of his complaint, where no bad faith or malice was found by the court to have motivated Sison to use Manuel Sison vs Emmanuel Sison in the pleading, the case should be dismissed. RATIO:

1. Since every attorney is an officer of the court, there is a degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession side by side with its pecuniary value.

2. In a disbarment proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proof to show clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof and mere preponderant evidence is not sufficient to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

17. Tan Sen Hoo vs. Dela Fuente, 90 Phil. 605 (1951) Case is in Spanish. This is as much as my Spanish allows me:

Tan Ko Lok, a chinese cit., was awarded a stall in the Sampaloc Market. (Note that public market stalls were only reserved for Filipinos.) It was given to him bec. there were no Filipinos applying for the same. (The law allows this.) The license to hold the stall was 1 year. It expired so they were removed from their stalls by the Mayor. So now they question such removal.

Issue: Is the removal valid? Yes.

Ratio: The law limiting the use of the stalls exclusive to locals is valid. Many US laws limiting certain professions and industries to locals are held to be not violative of the 14th Amendment.

Where there is no attorney or competent person available, a court appoints a foreign

lawyer to handle the defense of an accused, that is no reason for the foreign lawyer to later claim the privilege of exercising the profession to Philippine courts as of strict right . The appellants, who obtained a license to occupy a position in a public market in the absence of Filipinos should realize that the grant of the stall was a mere courtesy and not because they are entitled to it.

The nationalization of public markets has been definitely established upon approval of the Constitution.Public markets are public services or utilities. . . . Under the Constitution, the operation of all public services are reserved to Filipino Citizens Associations and to corporations or sixty per centum of the capital of Which Belongs to Filipino Citizens.

Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand, at least, as much official supervision and monitoring as the commodities sold and distributed in other public utilities. They Affect the life and health of the people, the safeguarding of which is one of the basic obligations of a constituted government. Official monitoring and supervision can be more effectively exercised if public market stalls are occupied by Citizens Rather Than by aliens.

A public market though it stands on a private land or erected with private funds retains its character as public market. A market is a "public market" when it is dedicated to the service of the General Public and is operated under government monitoring and supervision as a public utility, Whether it be owned by the government or any instrumentality thereof or by any private individual.

Chinese contends that occupying a stall is like occupying a taxicab--"A foreigner wouldn't be prohibited to ride a taxicab, would he?" This is misplaced. A passenger of a taxi is a buyer while such is not so to a lessee of a stall. A stall operator performs public service, no such service is performed by a taxicab passenger.

18. In re: Du Fresne, 20 Pil. 488 (1911) EMERGENCY RECIT: Du Fresne, an acting assistant prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila) is appealing a decision of the Court that denied him the privilege of admission to the bar without taking the examination. The Court denied his request stating that Sec. 2 of Act 1597 only grants that privilege to those who were actually appointed to the job, and not to those merely filling in temporarily. People appointed to the positions undergo a process where their qualifications are determined and are found to be necessary for admission to the bar. Also, Sec. 15 of Act 1698 which was the basis of Du Fresne’s temporary appointment does not grant the appointee all the rights and privileges enjoyed by a real appointee. FACTS: Ernest Du Fresne was appointed as an acting (e.g. temporary) assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila by virtue of Sec. 15 of Act 1698. A few months later, he applied to the Court for the license to practice law in the courts of the Philippines without taking an examination, using as basis Sec. 2 of Act 1597. Under Sec. 2, those who before the passing of Act 1598 have held the position of assistant prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila (among others) under the authority of the US may be licensed to practice law without taking an examination upon motion to the Court. The Court denied his application and Du Fresne now appeals the decision. ISSUES: Whether or not Du Fresne could practice law in the Philippines without taking an examination by virtue of Sec 2 of Act 1597

HELD: NO. The application should be, and is, denied. RATIO: Du Fresne was only appointed as an acting assistant prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila. Sec 2 gives the privilege of not undergoing an examination to those who have held the position. This means that the person who was appointed to the position had sufficient learning and proficiency in the law to entitle them to admission to the bar without examination. The legislators also believe that since the appointments under Sec. 2 were made either by the President of the US (by and with advice of the Senate) or the Governor General of the Philippines (by and with advice of the Philippine Commission) means that the appointees’ qualifications were duly inquired by the appointing bodies and they have been found to have the qualifications necessary for admission to the bar. As a mere appointee by virtue of Sec. 15 of Act 1698, Du Fresne was only appointed for a temporary position to fill in for an absent or disabled assistant attorney. There is no such obligation to those who have the authority to temporarily appoint to look well to the qualifications as a lawyer of the employee thus designated, as there is upon the Chief Executive to look well to the qualifications of a regular appointee to such an office; and it is easy to imagine cases where an employee not learned in the law, or at most with some knowledge and experience in a single branch of the law such a criminal practice and procedure, might properly be designated temporarily to perform the duties of an assistant attorney in one or other of those offices, although under normal circumstances he would not be appointed to the position. Not only that, Du Fresne’s reliance of Sec. 15 is also misplaced as the Act itself shows no intention on the part of the legislators to grant acting appointees the rights and privileges granted to the official whose duties he is designated temporarily, except only, of course, such rights and privileges as are necessarily incident to the actual performance of the duties of the absent or disabled official. NOTES:

• Act 1597 amended the Act which proves for the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings.

• Sec 2 of Act 1597: Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows: 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, Assistant attorney for the city of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

• Sec 15 of Act 1698: In case of temporary absence or disability of any subordinate officer or employee in any Bureau or Office, the chief of such

Bureau or Office may designate any other subordinate officer or employee in his Bureau or Office temporarily to perform the duties of the officer or employee who is thus absent or disabled, and it shall be the duty of the person is designated to perform the duties so assigned to him without additional compensation.

19. People of the Philppines vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 (1965) Emergency Recit: FACTS: The Chief of Police of Laguna charged Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace. Villanueva was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The Chief of Police was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule, who entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.

The appearance of City Atty Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for Villanueva, invoking the case of Aquino v Blanco, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel argues that the JP Court, in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule, is a violation of the above ruling.

JP Court- sustained the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Counsel for Villanueva appealed to the CFI of Laguna, which upheld the validity of Atty Fule’s appearance. The reasons of the court were:

1. In cases of malicious mischief, there being no reservation for the civil action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Therefore, Atty Fule had the right to intervene as private counsel.

2. Atty Fule is a relative of the chief of police. Therefore, his appearance is considered that as an agent or friend of the Chief of Police. It does not appear that his appearance was compensated, or that it was in a professional capacity.

Counsel for Villanueva again appealed.

ISSUES: W/N Fule’s position as the city attorney prohibited him from being the counsel for the Chief of Police (plaintiff). [Is Fule’s appearance considered private practice?]

HELD: The decision appealed from is affirmed. In favor of City Atty Fule.

RATIO: We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.

The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

NOTES: Rule in issue:

Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients."

20. Lichauco vs. Alejandrino, 21 Phil. 58 (1911) FACTS:

- Alejandrino borrowed from Laochangco the sum of P6,000. - Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco liquidated the amount due under the said contract,

there was still due under the said contract the sum of P4,115.75. - On the same day, Alejandrino borrowed from Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25,

making a total amount due of 4,350 pesos. - All of the children of the said Mariano Alejandrino, except the defendant herein, Ana

Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by the terms of which they obligated themselves to pay to the plaintiffs the balance due from their father, Mariano Alejandrino.

- The amount due on the said contract was again liquidated and it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid on the said contract, the sum of P4,465.

- Lichauco claim that the amount due on the contract together with the interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth part of said sum, or the sum of P1,657.75.

- However, Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented and she did not agree to pay 12 per cent interest

- Lichauco commenced an action against for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent

- Judge Llorente, , rendered in favor of the Lichauco for the sum of P610.22 Philippine currency, with interest at 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if Alejandrino failed to pay the said amount, the Lichauco were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth part of the land mortgaged

- Lichauco appeals to this court. Issues: 1. Whether or not Alejandrino is liable to pay part of the debt?

2. Whether or not Lichauco has authority to represent his co-heirs. HELD:

1. Yes, however without interest 2. NO.

RATIO: ALEJANDRINO IS LIABLE TO PAY WITHOUT INTEREST

- The appellate court held that there is no proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon Alejandrino for the payment of her aliquot part of the balance.

- THUS, She was not liable to pay interest or her aliquot part of the said amount. But she was liable for the payment of one-sixth part of said amount by virtue of her having accepted her proportional part of the property involved and covered by the original contract between LICHAUCO HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT HIS CO-HEIRS

- Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in representation of his co-heirs. - BUT the co-heirs have no knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino Lichauco

shows no authority for representing his co-heirs except the mere allegation in the title of his complaint

- In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court personally nor by the a duly authorized member of the bar. Therefore they are not in court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present casewould in no way be binding upon them.

- The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all of the interested parties were present, and for that reason we have discussed the case upon its merits, believing that the parties would deem further litigation unnecessary, once being informed of the views of this court upon the facts presented. DECSION: Judgment in the lower court is set aside, unless the coheirs of Faustino Lichauco, appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of the Province or Pampanga 21. Rustia vs. CFI of Batangas, 44 Phil. 62 (1922)

EMERGENCY RECIT

SPOUSES PROCUNA contracted the services of Atty. RUSTIA for a certain civil case. The contract fixed RUSTIA’s fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer RUSTIA. In the civil case, where RUSTIA was counsel, CFI-Batangas ruled favourably for the SPOUSES PROCUNA, awarding them with the right to collect from MAGSOMBOL 602 pieces of cloth or Php3,250, in case of default. When MAGSOMBOL appealed, SPOUSES PROCUNA manifested in the court, without the aid of RUSTIA (counsel), that SPOUSES PROCUNA and MAGSOMBOL actually went into a compromise agreement already, wherein SPOUSES PROCUNA will only receive P800. CFI-Batangas approved and dismissed the case. RUSTIA found out about it later on. ISSUE: WON RUSTIA was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case?

NOT ENTITLED. Client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.

COMPLETE DIGEST

FACTS: Petition for a writ of CERTIORARI, the RUSTIA alleging that the respondent Judge of the CFI exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing a pending action at the instance of the parties but without the intervention of the attorney for the plaintiff RUSTIA in the case.

9. 31 July 1921: the Justo and Rosa Porcuna (SPOUSES PROCUNA) by means of a written contract, retained RUSTIA to represent them as their lawyer in case No. 1435 then pending in CFI-Batangas and in which Rosa (wife) was the plaintiff and one Eulalia Magsombol was the defendant.

10. The contract fixed RUSTIA’s fee at P200 in advance with an additional contigent fee of P1,300. It was also provided in the contract that Justo Porcuna should not compromise the claim against the defendant in the case without express consent of his lawyer RUSTIA.

11. After trial, RUSTIA then being the SPOUSES PORCUNA’s attorney of record, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of SPOUSES PORCUNA ordering the defendant Eulalia Magsombol to return to them 602 pieces of cloth or in default thereof to pay to them the sum of P3,250.

12. 14 January 1922: Eulalia Magsombol appealed and presented a bill of exceptions, which was approved.

13. Thereafter, SPOUSES PORCUNA presented the following motion in the CFI without any further intervention of their attorney. They aver:

a. That, through Mr. Miguel Olgado, they already settled this case with the herein defendant. In the compromise, they agreed that SPOUSES PORCUNA should be paid P800 in two installments.

b. That SPOUSES PORCUNA recognize not to have any further rights in this case than to the P800 and that this is the total amount the defendant Eulalia Magsombol should pay us, and WE HAVE NO RIGHT WHATEVER TO ANY OTHER AMOUNT THAN THE AFOREMENTIONED.

c. SPOUSES PORCUNA respectfully request the dismissal of this case 14. Hence, CFI dismissed the action without notice to counsel RUSTIA for the plaintiff

spouses. 15. RUSTIA alleges that he did not discover the dismissal of the action until April 4, 1922.

RUSTIA filed the present petition for a writ of CERTIORARI, which SC denied. 16. RUSTIA’s contention:

a. that he, as attorney of record, was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case

b. that after the approval of the bill of exceptions the lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it.

ISSUES:

3. IMPORTANT: WON RUSTIA was entitled to notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case? NO

4. WON lower court had lost jurisdiction of the case and had no power to dismiss it? But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court.

HELD: DENIED. The petition for a writ of CERTIORARI was therefore properly denied. RATIO: For issue 1:

5. Both at the common law and under section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.

6. Though there is a valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a large proportion of the sum recovered in case of success, this does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action that it prevents plaintiff from compromising the suit.

7. In the present instance the clients did nothing that they did not have a perfect right to do. By appearing personally and presenting a motion they impliedly dismissed their lawyer. RUSTIA’s contingent interest in the judgment rendered did not appear of record. Neither as a party in interest nor as an attorney was he therefore entitled to notice of the motion.

For Issue 2

8. As to the second proposition that the court below could not dismiss the case after the bill of exceptions had been approved, it is very true upon such approval the lower court loses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the issues in the case. But there is nothing to prevent all of the parties by agreement to withdraw the bill of exceptions with the consent of said court and resubmit the case to the jurisdiction of the court. That was all that was done in this case. A valid agreement between the parties to a case is the law of the case in everything covered by the agreement.

9. RUSTIA might have protected his interests by entering an attorney’s lien under section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

22. U.S. vs. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912) EMERGENCY RECIT

GO-LENG was convicted of a violation of law prohibiting opium. GO-LENG pleaded NOT GUILTY without presence of counsel and so GO-LENG himself examined the witnesses. GO-LENG never asked for suspension even though he didn’t have an attorney.

GO-LENG was thereafter convicted. NOW, Counsel for GO-LENG alleges that the trial court erred in obliging GO-LENG to stand trial without the assistance of an attorney. SC: Accused persons are undoubtedly entitled to appoint an attorney to defend them at trial, or to have one appointed DE OFICIO, should they ask for one and not possess the necessary means to employ an attorney of their own. But it devolves exclusively upon them to avail themselves of this right. It is evident that GO-LENG herein preferred to defend himself personally in the Court of First Instance and, therefore, he can not be heard to complain that he was not assisted by any attorney in the proceedings there had. COMPLETE DIGEST

FACTS: GO-LENG appeals from a judgment convicting him of a violation of Act No. 1761 [An ACT gradually to restrict and regulate the sale and use of opium pending the ultimate prohibition...except for medicinal purposes], wherein he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, a fine of P300, and, in default of such payment, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment

1. It is a fact which we find to be sufficiently proven that on the date mentioned in the complaint, an internal-revenue agent went to GO-LENG’s house and found in various places therein two little cans and a small horn jar, all containing opium; another small tin with about 50 grams of opium ashes; scales for weighing opium; a pan for cooking the said drug, and two small lamps such as are used in smoking opium.

2. Counsel for the GO-LENG alleges that the trial court obliged GO-LENG to stand trial without the assistance of an attorney, and refused to allow his request for time to procure such counsel for his defense

3. However, nowhere in the record does it appear that any postponement was requested by GO-LENG for securing counsel. That part of the record in which reference is made to this point reads as follows:

The above-mentioned case was called for rehearing on this date, there being present GO-LENG, not represented by counsel, and the fiscal representing the United States. On GO-LENG’s being asked whether he could afford to employ a lawyer, he replied in the affirmative, but said that he had been unable to come to an agreement with one as to the amount he should pay him for his services. This court being of the opinion that GO-LENG is not entitled to the appointment of counsel DE OFICIO, and, declining to recognize the fact of his not having reached an agreement with his attorney in the matter of his fees as a proper excuse for postponing the hearing of this case, orders the reading of the complaint.

4. The reason of the court for not postponing the hearing is set forth in another part of the record and is as follows: The court sees no reason whatever for postponing this case, and still less for showing any consideration to GO-LENG because he is not represented by counsel, since he does not belong to the class of poor people who are entitled to the appointment of counsel DE OFICIO. If he can not come to an agreement with Mr. Sotto as to the amount of the latter’s fees for defending him, the court is not called upon to take the matter into consideration as a ground for postponement and other similar delays.

5. By order of the court the complaint was duly read to GO-LENG: the latter acknowledged notification thereof and replied by pleading not guilty.

6. Neither on that occasion, nor before, nor afterwards, nor, in short, at any time during the progress of the trial, did GO-LENG request the postponement or suspension of the same or raise any objection or protest of any sort against the continuance of the trial. Far from so doing, the record shows that during the presentation of the evidence he crossed-examined the witness, notwithstanding that he was advised by the court of his right not to testify unless he desired to do so of his own free will and consent.

ISSUE: WON the fact that the trial court obliged the defendant to stand trial without the assistance of an attorney, and refused to allow his request for time to procure such counsel for his defense, is an error that affects the essential rights of the defendant? NO ERROR DAW!! RATIO:

1. Accused persons are undoubtedly entitled to appoint an attorney to defend them at trial, or to have one appointed DE OFICIO, should they ask for one and not possess the necessary means to employ an attorney of their own. But it devolves exclusively upon them to avail themselves of this right.

2. It is one which they are perfectly entitled to waive and they may defend themselves in person. The law expressly authorizes them, as it could not but do, to defend themselves in person, without the assistance of counsel. (Sec. 15, General Orders, No. 58.)

3. It is understood, of course, that they waive their right to be assisted by counsel when they not only do not appoint or request one, but voluntarily submit to trial, and especially when they actually exercise therein the right of defense by cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution and by introducing evidence in their own behalf, as was done in the present case.

4. It is evident that GO-LENG herein preferred to defend himself personally in the Court of First Instance and, therefore, he can not be heard to complain that he was not assisted by any attorney in the proceedings there had. When an accused person in a criminal case chooses to defend himself in person, none of his rights are infringed by the fact that the action was prosecuted without the intervention of an attorney in his behalf. In such a case the attendance of the latter is no wise necessary for the legality and perfect propriety of the proceedings.

23. Hydro Resources vs. Pagaliluan, 172 SCRA 399 (1989) FACTS:

-­‐ This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision ordering herein petitioner, Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation to reinstate Rogelio A. Abanto his former position without loss of seniority rights, to pay him 12 months backwages in the amount of P18,000.00 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,800.00.

-­‐ On October 24, 1978, Hydro Resources hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00.

-­‐ On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.

-­‐ On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against Hydro Resources for illegal dismissal.

-­‐ The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. -­‐ This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal -­‐ Hence, this present petition -­‐ Hydro Resources questions the jurisdiction of the public respondents considering

the alleged absence of an employer-employee relationship. -­‐ The petitioner contends that its relationship with Aban is that of a client with his

lawyer. It is its position that "(a) lawyer as long as he is acting as such, as long as he is performing acts constituting practice of law, can never be considered an employee. His relationship with those to whom he renders services, as such lawyer, can never be governed by the labor laws.

ISSUE: 1. whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the

petitioner corporation and Aban 2. WON NLRC has jurisdiction to hear this case

HELD: Hydro Resources LOST! RATIO:

1. Yes , there was an employee-employer relationship • A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee

of a private corporation or even of the government. • It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its

in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees.

• At the same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals.

• This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or

absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor.

• Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment paper. The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well.  

• Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation.

2. Yes, NLRC has jurisdiction.

24. Beltran vs. Abad, 132 SCRA 452 (1984) FACTS:

- Mr. Abad was charged by Atty. Beltran, president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar

- Mr. Abad explains that: - Mr. Abad said that in 1979, prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of

the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,...

- Atty. Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included the ABAD as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar.

- Mr. Abad said that he was made to sign his Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Mendoza told him that Chief Justice, the Honorable Fernando wants to talk to him about the Reply of Mr. Uy (Deceased) to his Answer to his (UY) Complaint. BUT The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *

- Abad filed his Reply to Mr. Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

- The Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar.

- Believing that with Abad’s signing of the Lawyer's Oath and his Reply to Mr. Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

- Thereafter, Abad was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .

ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstances prove that he is deemed admitted to the Philippine Bar?

Held: Such instances, do not prove that he deemed admitted to the BAR. RATIO:

- Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter.

- He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

25. In re: Sotto, 38 Phil. 532 (1918) Emergency Recit: There were complaints filed against Sotto for unprofessional conduct. Complaints were in line with the transactions entered into by Sotto as a lawyer and an article about a judge. First, there was a contract of sale wherein he was the counsel of the seller. His client wanted to rescind the sale. To make this happen, he threatened the buyer if he did not sign the contract an estafa case would be charged against him and that Sotto would publish in a newspaper an article saying that the buyer is an impostor even though there was no valid basis to do so. Second, there was an extrajudicial settlement between a couple. Sotto became the counsel of the husband. They agreed that Sotto would be paid a certain amount. There was a disagreement hence the husband refused to pay. The husband sent a letter to Sotto telling him about the marital problems he had with his wife to settle the difference between him and his wife. If this letter would be published, it would greatly incriminate the husband. Again, he gave a threat by saying that he would publish the letter if the husband does not pay. Third, another contract of sale. The sale was about a land. Here, the seller and buyer wanted to have the contract of sale notarized by Sotto. Since Sotto was asking for an exorbitant fee, they said to Sotto that they would just come back the next day, but they did not. They have the document notarized by another notary public. Peeved about what happened, Sotto threatened the buyer that if the latter would not go to Sotto’s office there would be “fatal consequences” though there were none. The buyer agreed to pay the fee for notarization which was being sought by Sotto. Moreover, Sotto told him that the former would be the counsel for the removal of the lessee residing in the subject land. Subsequently, a case was filed against the buyer by Sotto on behalf of the seller. (labo ni Sotto: may conflict of interest. Hindi naman pwede siya yung counsel ng plaintiff and defendant) And finally, (whooo. Haba…) he wrote a libelous article against a judge. HELD: DISBAR NA YANG WALANG KWENTANG ABUGAGO! No morals which a lawyer should have. -Complaints were filed against Sotto for unprofessional conduct

- there were four charges which are based on 4 distinct transaction/acts of Sotto (medyo complikado yung facts ng mga transactions.

1st transaction: the contract of sale between Natalie Enriquez and Sy Juco

-Sotto became Enriquez’s counsel

-Enriquez wanted to rescind the sale for reason not mentioned in the case

- As SyJuco was reluctant to rescind the contract, the respondent, Vicente Sotto, intimidated and threatened him, telling him that unless he signed such document the

respondent would procure his discharge from the office of notary public which he then hold, would file charges of estafa against him, as a result of which, he would enter Bilibid prison, and further that the respondent would publish in all the newspapers an article to the effect that SyJuco was an impostor. - Because of the threats, Sy Juco acceded to the Sotto’s demand and executed document rescinding the contract in question even though he knew that the allegations were false -Eventually, Sotto published an article maligning SyJuco -NOTE: the threats of Sotto were false 2nd transaction: Extrajudicial settlement regarding the differences between Jose Tartajada and Amada Mastres -Tartajada engaged in the services of Sotto -Taratjada agreed to pay P2,000 -Tortajada sent him on June 30, 1917, a letter in which he described in detailed the proud, haughty, stingy, and despotic character of his wife and the insults, humiliation, maltreatment, and remorse that he had suffered at her hand – all of which, if published, would surely injure the reputation of both spouses and expose them to public ridicule -there was disagreement. Hence, Tartajada refused to pay Sotto -there was anonymous letter (later, it was found out that it came from sotto). It says: “Attorney Sotto says that as you are looking for trouble, he had decided this morning to present a complaint against you, in which are reproduced all – absolutely all – of your letters, and, if you compel him, he will cause the complaint together with the photographic facsimiles of all the letters to be published in ‘The Independnet’ and in all the local papers so that the public may know you and your motives.” 3rd transaction: Enriquez and Dagala’s agreement that the former will sell to the latter a property -Dagala and Enriquez agreed regarding the sale of the property of the latter -They went to Sotto so that the contract of sale shall be notarized -the two were reluctant to reveal who Enriquez’s buyer is because Sotto might ask for an exorbitant price for his service. Dagala said that he was only an accessory in the agreement -Since Sotto was asking too much (P500), they decided to have the document notarized by another notary public which demanded a fee lower than Sotto. (NOTE: they told Sotto that they would come back the next day which they did not) -Sotto irritated for what happened threatened Dagala. One of Sotto’s letters said: ““Come immediately to my office if you want to avoid the fatal consequences of what you have just done” . -, Dagala went to the office of the respondent, afraid of the “fatal consequences” which the latter covertly threatened in his letter - Here the respondent told Dagala that he had acted improperly in not coming to the former’s office on the day agreed upon, that the former had lost the sum of P500 which the other purchaser promised to pay for drafting the document, that he needed money, and that he would cause trouble unless Dagala should pay him the P500 he had lost, and guarantee with the property acquired by his wife the debt of P2,000 which Natalia Enriquez owed Sotto - Moreover, since the subject property was being leased, Sotto told Dagala that he be the latter’s counsel for the removal of the lessee -Several days later, that is, on or about October 16, 1917, the respondent appeared at the office of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila and acting as attorney for Natalia Enriquez asked that an information for estafa be filed against the Dagala spouses upon the ground that these persons had defrauded Natalia Enriquez in the sale of the property heretofore referred to.

-NOTE: Sotto was the counsel of Dagala as well! (Conflict of interest!) 4th Charge: relates to certain malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the judicial integrity of the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, a judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which appeared in articles published under the heading “Sin Malicia” in the issues of “The Independent” dated respectively October 13, 20 and 27, 1917. The occasion which called forth these libelous effusions from Sotto’s pen was that Judge Del Rosario had lately imposed upon him as fine of P500 in a prosecution for criminal libel. The publication of this matter was a manifest violation of the oath which the respondent had taken to conduct himself with fidelity to the courts. ISSUE: w/on Sotto should be disbarred HELD: YES RATIO: - The simple narrative of the facts connected with charges 1, 3, and 4 (the three transactions), given above, suffices to show that the respondent has been decidedly lacking in fidelity to his clients and from motives of private gain has grossly abused the honorable profession of which he is a member. In each of these transactions his conduct was reprehensible and unprofessional in a high degree and evinces a moral obtuseness incompatible with the office of attorney. For purposes of extortion and blackmail he availed himself of his de facto power as the responsible director of a newspaper to blacken the reputation of his refractory clients or others who refused to submit to his demands. In this he proved himself not only unworthy of membership in the legal profession but unfit even for the responsible position of editor of a newspaper. -One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interest of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. In view of the repeated acts of gross misconduct above specified, on the part of the respondent Vicente Sotto, and by virtue of the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said Vicente Sotto is hereby removed from the office of attorney and incapacitated from hereafter exercising the legal profession. The certificate heretofore issued to him authorizing him to exercise said profession is accordingly annulled, and let the surrender thereof to the clerk of this court be required within five days after this decision becomes effective. The costs will be taxed in accordance with section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 26. Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 (1967) FACTS

Quingwa filed a complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Puno denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. Puno denied having sexual intercourse with Quingwa at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. It was discovered that Quingwa and Puno were engaged to be married. Puno asked Quingwa to a movie but on the way they stopped by the Silver Moon Hotel for refreshments. Puno proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married. They signed the registry book as Mr. and Mrs. Puno. Puno then shoved complainant inside the room and once inside, the door was locked from the outside. Puno had sex with Quingwa. However, after a few months, Puno did not make good on his promise to marry. Quingwa then gave birth to a child. That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint. Quingwa is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. ISSUE W/N Puno should be disbarred. HELD YES RATIO One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

“... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.”

27. Diao vs. Martinez, 7 SCRA 475 (1963)

Facts: After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his 3rd year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. Issue: whether or not Diao’s name can be erased from the roll of attorneys? YES Held: The Court held serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the 2nd charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within 30 days.