-TENNESSE VALLFEY AUTMfftY

13 AS 9:i v1,tS

Lttat W- JMS F. OsiMyl, Bega1 Administrator 101 Mrietta Street, t Sidts 2900 Lt3006a faga 30~30

EUM WMNA PLIN 0T2 UI 1AM 2 - aFUATDI C=DITXO a=D IN pv=D ammi - i-~- /8I2.42 ME0-5-391/82.49 - VDIL WPM Mill "bJit dsfielMOy M2 Lnitially nYputed to UC-OX3 Insmswtm It. W. Cklmm an U1y 18, 1962 In eardeam wit 10 CF1 50.55(e) as = M sM. Interts ureparts re *Atted On Jaims 1796"2; Februawy 2,

JMS 17t Supteebe 13, mld 08oMW 27, 1963. fteloai Is oar final ieport.

AD 4iseinui wMt CW-011 rnupWtm PM1 Frerickwe on Jammay 24, M496 a - mbittml date of thrab 16, 1984 =a estoblimabi rar thils top= t.

If y kwe any quisetioin, plasm got in tomob with 1. v. aatll at

TOT truly yow,

T3M VELZ!LU AUIT!

L. N. Mlls,at mp Wme le Limosifg

Get We. R11iada C. DeTdomg# Diwetm (b1olomu'.)

U.S. moits legrIulstoy Cmassion WSWagigolo D.C. 2055

ftem is Canter (ftolow,.) Iagtituts or lamar P..sr Operations 1100 Cirola 75 Farkisyl, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Qswgia 30339

OPVCTAL COPY.

1"3-TVA SOT" ANNIVERSARY A An Equal Opportunely Employer

* * S

WTr MI IwaCLR PLAUT o 1 MD 2 OralamSw COBITIX" U3D PIPms asMw St

mCP l Cl 821 5 M-50-390/82-52, IND.,-391/82-49

10 C~ 9.55(e) rDmL W

OrASUtioM of Defieiamcv

the QOlity sermuame Criteria of 10 CF 50, Appendix b, setion XVI, states, 'Perds s *all be idetiflable and retriavabl.' Also, section II states, amurwes shall be established f the idmtiftcation and control of deign nterfhee and fbr coordiaation mon participating design w mnieatlon.* Thems ures shall inlude the establ•sumnt of procedure aes partSoipating design rgaiations for the review, approval, relesa, diatrisution, and rleviion of doemmts Involving design interftes.

bTe opertIng conditions used in piping amlysis are based upon data provided fim different organisatios. The therml and aisic design baisa oureea data is not in all oams iddmtiflable as being curren, valid data ad in mos cases, is not available. Original operational nade data fr piping system within th anuxiavy building wsre not idemmtut. Origina operational od data fbr inside containment ar oontaline in CB %par't 76-2. go -gin g procedure aisted

to entrol revisions to this data, i.e., assurane that the anlysis is utill valid fbr current oprating conditions.

Also, piping amlysis has bee done by peronal service contractors dao hare asum d that the dta previously shbm on the piping iommris is stil valid. They have signed off on the amlysis haklist without verifying that it is stil current and valid data.

b3afetr IAieatons

Th:' condition could reult in afety-related piping systes not being qmlifled to AMl Code requirents. Should the piping for these systam fail during a seism c event, there could be adverse effects to the safe operation of the plant.

Corective Action

A sampling prograa as undertake to determine if operating conditions used for Matts Bar rigorous piping aalyses yield conservative results. The guidelines for the sapling progras is set forth in TVA'* Division of bineering Design (0 DMI) Special Eginesring Procedure (RP) 82-15. The operational odes data wre omapiled in aeoardanw with Mechanical Design Gulde DG-M5 .11. TVA conducted the sampling survey as follows:

t.* Taty risarouly amlyed problem ws slected.

a. Kltf pers t at the problem selected were comn to units 1 asd 2, unit 1 sabo, mait 2 opposite hond, or unit i only.

b. Twty pOemet of the problem aelested wse frm unit 2 only.

e. There ma ona problem fam eah of the sytem Which had rigor'sly amlyied piping. At least tuo problem eak fr the remtor building and auillary building urt ioen. Ohe problem s fthr the setital raw eooling u ter (SZCS) pp station ad the control building me chsem.

Atamsoh t 1 is a detailed listing o the problem cbhom in the pretlU my mplig progrm. opwatioal mod• I re gnerated

and ~mop d to those ued in the amlysis. The difrit'nes in the am aporatloa l mode data and the aalysis data ave been evaluatd

on a pam-ftil basis. Deisions wur baed on a sinering udgmts uing the guidelines at fbrth in El DES-U 82-15 or by ramlyzing the piping system using I oaputer test runs with new opertional mdes data. Qalfiatiion of the flanges, mnoles, and upports us consida d in TiA's evaluation of the efTet of operatioml odes on the piping system. I any proble ailed the smping prram, another aWple s made of that system. This second randam ise couisted of the larger of 10 problem or 25 perent of the problem for that system. If an additional failure as found, a 100-percnt rewie of that systes us done. bst system operatioal modes data are siilar in natur. Therefore, it us juged that if a failure oeurred, sLmilar discreraies were more likely to ocur within that particular piping syste

ULtachmt 1 lists the results of the prblem in the original sampling progma. The pipe tresss for the test runs wre within ASB Code allombles, Of the original saple, only two flanges U the safety injestion system proble (13-63-05) exceeded the allombles. 93-63-05A ws ombined with problem r3-7-1A, which as ramlyzed nder enineering obnge notice (CI) 3608. The correct operating odes were Incorporated during the reanlysis. The pipe tresses wre held within A• Code allombles and all flanges and nozzles met the clloubles. Plant ndifloations due to changes in support desin wereo de under EC 3608. Support redesign ad construction modiflcations were mde in conjunction with the resolution of ICR MI CEB 8221 (BD-50-390,39 1/83-03).

A second randoa asple of 10 problem in the safety injection system s selected and new operational modes gne-fvt. These 10 problem

passed the samling progra. Attachamt 2 lists the results of the expendd maple of safety injection system problem. The pipe stresses for the test runs wre within A1E Code alloables. The flanges, nousles, and supports wre evaluated aid qualified.

~i a MW's dm1..i m1 oinsirmtiosa M. m sagu uivesinitgnt i'mawe - f. dnt asmatiaml mdq atk O"ert~omi

Ewe WS fb' fual" omstalmt =2a m'gimuy tabslatei In Ca ftput. 76-2. ailtkqwh the iaftmtias to the G'IgIml lsme ms owvwtv CO bstw 76-2 ma wnt, .pat ft.' dmoea in qeamtouml messm. Sim* thue msa i'uqufret to dinmt apeatlomi wess &ta In fte swIllwy Yeid vg, mr. lain~ the MS reps ma ast thwat to be uaneinsw. =S BMW 76- ma, thmebi'e 9 n loqer

W taIt the p:IpbW minims as a marc. of aunment qeamtlml mie aist. %=I"t of the =qaft rqip m cmbii that thum ma as

tothe mtfbt of plant design &a to the powIsbla dams of USM ftp.' 76-2. CU Wepm't 76-2 baa mv bu vi.Ud. A esmitawt mopurb wIll be miertaks In the review aw dointstlo. fbi' all Opmstim I181MOMs fbi' M. ThIs will be In the ft.. of a mse TWA d6Mmt, AmionblWis Lu eanisme with TWA$* Oslity LAsrame Frs#%Mm, W& ULU be plop=ze to dusm all W operutiomi miss. TIb" do bstloim will be GuONPltI bY JeazaY 31, Mg6. Untl. this

4mt is IaOMWO PATjyt cpesmtii =des U~LU he verifted by US dusip Projut sytem 40giaMs throah thm squadubeek p esedare befte aw reamlysa is pefrf'ni.

IcTOMMRY I uM i IIMaR I nFLr ous 1 L 2 ina•iLT.MiL. Fr'eM PK IKE

MiiNB | aMWU0lM.TSL I•aM Dtae DIMBt KOD

amtiary rtinte

axirmy boilUr system

Mator coolant sytem

Elh-pWryws, fin protection

Servie air syste

urdtlol aud oalume ontrol

Safty Injeotion

Iesmttial raw cooling water

talyss Ppoblem o.

a 0600M8-6-01

a.d W-3-03

S0600200-07-01

ad r3-12-01A

a 0600200-13-05

a 53-26-23

a 53-33-10A

a,d 0600250-08-13

b,d i3-63-05

a "3-67-O~A a,d 13-67-s6A oe 3-67-15A

Ismtric

06200-06-01

7WH27-201

47oo-a8

47W t-at R7131-a2

471A65-29

479t -aIG

4792-200

0600250-08-13

47W35-202

37V106-30 47WM50-28 47W50-233

Compoant cooling mtr a 113-70-34 47i6-232 Cotaint spray a 13-72-02A 4~ 37-200

mlsiLdu best rmaol ytem a 13-7T-031 47W32-206

Spet ftl pit ooling a W3-78-08A 47W•54-05

Upper bhd injation a 060025r-15-02 0600250-15-02

Radiation anitoring a,d 13-90-061 twf6u-07

e omondwa d s13-61-11 4T762-100 M rAC a 13-30-13 47V9'S-100

(a) Evluation oanpl1ted and cceptable (b) Ivaluatlon ompleted and unamceptable (o) No disormpanoy (d) Coputer amlysis perforwd to evaluate results of no~ operating odes

lot that safety injection is the only saple that has an expaned mple

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C- ,

!. *

A~gCIIr 2 SrImI mm mmII wIjr

Smi air so= "IIsIM ISI PlB" FOIR ICK WGATHM

-EVA

aalyld Problm 5.

a -3-63-t

a 3-63-3A1

*a,d 33-63-7A

ad 060200-09-01

06o200-09-03

0600200-09-C5

060020-09-07

0600200-9-09

0600200-09-11

S"*Ml

saftw Dkiestim

a,d 0600250-09-02 47135-221 10

Yvklttion opleteld d seoptable IvaluatiOn oa eted d ta uoptabl

Cobputer mlyss perftbrmd to evaluate rewlts of nw aprating modes

Iraomtri PDralm Bo.

47R35-W0 39

,4735-25 5

"71R35-a6 26 "7t35-M7 16

47035-a068 3 47m35-209 6 47135-210 R6

47R35-260 BO 4T•35-261 No

47M35-219 R1

49735-217 R4 47m35-259 RO

0600200-09-07

0600200-09-09

47135-228 31 r7135-25• 31

3905

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