CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, digestedRepublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-30138 May 30, 1972 MUNICIPALITY OF LA CARLOTA, petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES FELICIDAD BALTAZAR AND VICENTE GAN, respondents. Fortunato E. Tiongson, Jr. & Cesar P. Manalo for petitioner. Cesar J. Nessia for respondents. FERNANDO, J.:p It is not a unique situation that confronts the Court. It had happened in the past, and there is no assurance that it will not occur again in the future, that a municipal corporation did, within the meaning of the constitutional provision on eminent domain, 1 take private property without paying the just compensation, the requisite condemnation proceedings not even having been instituted. This Court, however, in an appropriate suit, has invariably seen to it that there be compliance with what the Constitution requires. In such a case, the crucial question is as of what date the value of the property in question is to be appraised. The answer supplied by Alfonso v. Pasay City 2 is that the owner is entitled to how much it was worth at the time of the taking. Such principle is decisive of the present petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Since there was a failure on its part to abide by such an authoritative pronouncement, we must reverse. The antecedents of the present litigation were set forth in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1966 thus: "On appeal Civil No. 7208 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental instituted by Felicidad Baltazar, et al., against the Municipality of La Carlota for compensation of expropriated real property in which after filing of the complaint on 14 January 1964, amended afterwards, answer on 3 December 1964 and trial on the merits on various dates from 21 April 1966 to 11 July 1966, there was promulgated decision disposing: Por tanto, se dicta sentencia en esta causa condenando a la demanda Municipio de La Carlota (hoy Ciudad de La Carlota) a pagar a los demandantes la suma de treinta y tres mil quinientos sesenta pesos (P33,560.00) con sus intereses legales desde la presentacion de la demanda hasta su cumpleto pago, y a pagar las costas del presente juicio. Se ordena a los demandantes para que, previo pago por la demandada de la referida cantidad de 'P33,560.00, otorquen a favor de dicha demandada la escritura de traspaso de los Lotes Nos. 314-B y 314-C-1 de la Medicion Catastral de La Carlota. Asi se ordena. Ciudad de Bacolod, Septiembre 30, 1966. (Sgd.) [Eduardo D. Enriquez] Juez.' p. 36, Amended R.A.; which defendant has taken here on the errors assigned in its brief; ... ." 3 There was, according to such decision, "no debate that plaintiffs are the true and absolute owners of Lot No. 314 of the Cadastral Survey of La Carlota; now as shown in the plan, ...,

the municipal cemetery of La Carlota, adjoins the same on three (3) sides; according to plaintiffs, they came to find out after a survey executed sometime in 1963 that it had encroached without their knowledge and consent upon their property occupying what according to the relocation plan, appear to be Lot 314-B with an area of 1,243 square meters and Lot 314-C-1 with an area of 435 square meters or a total of 1,678 square meters; so that because of it, they asked for compensation from the municipality but this was ignored and what the municipality tried to do was to secure a 'possible donation' from the plaintiffs according to its resolution, ...; therefore plaintiffs filed this case, as has been said, for the value of the de facto expropriation with damages claiming therefor the sum of P40 per square meter; But in its defense, the Municipality of La Carlota contended that there had been previously executed many years back a donation of the property and further that the price of P40 was too much; Well then, plaintiffs, during the trial of the case, having submitted oral and documentary proofs and as well the defendant, trial Judge discarded the claim of pretended donation by plaintiff's predecessor in interest and condemned defendant to pay at P20 per square meter; it is because of this that defendant has come here ... ." 4 As it was viewed by the decision under review, the errors assigned could "be reduced to the simple question of what under the evidence should be the measure" 5 of compensation to which plaintiffs were entitled. In reaching its conclusion, the decision emphasized what it considered to be the "unlawful invasion and occupancy" of land belonging to the spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, now respondents. Then reference was made to the ruling in Province of Rizal v. Araullo 6 thus: "The property is to be considered in its condition and situation at the time it is taken, and not as enhanced by the purpose for which it was taken. The fundamental doctrine that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation requires that the owner shall receive the market value of his property at the time of taking, unaffected by any subsequent change in the condition of the property." 7 Nonetheless, it did not decide to apply such doctrine under th rationalization that what should not be overlooked "is that the reason for the rule is because eminent domain is nothing less than a forced legal sale, therefore, the price to be paid by expropriation must be the price, the just price at the time it legally expropriated, not any enhanced price afterwards; putting it in another way, since the sale is forced upon the owner by expropriator who alleged a right to forcibly buy in eminent domain, where expropriator filed the complaint and gets judgment, the Courts having recognized its right to expropriate, will condemn it to pay the price at the time when its right was recognized to have existed, i.e., the price at the time the complaint was filed, see Rule 67, sec. 4; but an illegal usurpation without benefit of judicial proceedings is different; ..." 8 Under such a view, it was to be expected that what the lower court did would receive the approval of the Court of Appeals. So it turned out, the dispositive portion of the decision being tersely worded, "affirmed with costs." 9 It is from such a judgment that the petition for review was elevated to this Court and given due course by us. As was made clear at the outset, the authoritative doctrine in Alfonso v. Pasay City 10 calls for a reversal. It is the value as of the time of the taking that should have been the measure of the just compensation to which under the Constitution respondent spouses are entitled. 1. It would not be amiss then to inquire further into the Alfonso case. The relevant facts follow: "This is a case where a registered owner of a parcel of land has lost possession way back in 1925 because it was taken by a municipal corporation (Municipality of Pasay) for road purposes. It was never paid for, and so the ownership thereof remained in the name of the registered owner. No annotation on said title was made as to any right, say easement of right of way, which the City of Pasay might have acquired over the land. There is some doubt as to whether Estanislao Alfonso ever made demands for the

payment of his property which was taken away from him without the benefit of either expropriation proceedings or a negotiated sale. However, there is reason to believe that Alfonso has made such demands as any owner of a valuable registered property would do, but as usually the case, perhaps the demands were either ignored or action thereon was postponed and perhaps forgotten with the changes of administration in Pasay that occurred since 1925 up to 1954 when Alfonso finally brought the present action to recover either the possession of the parcel or its value." 11 After noting that as such registered owner, plaintiff Alfonso could bring action to recover possession at any time but that the restoration thereof by the City of Pasay would be "neither convenient nor feasible," 12 it was the conclusion of the Court that the only relief available "is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could and should have done years ago since 1925." 13 The decisive question, according to Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, is the price to be paid. After referring to plaintiff's claim to the effect that he was entitled to the then market value, his opinion continues, "the rule is that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government. According to the stipulation of facts, the value of the land in 1925 was Pl.25 per square meter. So, for the area of 719.92 square meters, the value will be said area multiplied by Pl.25. Inasmuch as the City of Pasay has not been paying rent for the use of the land since 1925, thereby causing damages in favor of the owner, said damages may be assessed in the form or legal interest on the price since 1925, up to the time when payment is made by the City of Pasay." 14 Nor does it make any difference just because the use to which the land was devoted in Alfonso was for a road, while here, a cemetery is involved. While in the leading case of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 15 it was merely assumed that a cemetery is devoted to a public use, there can be no doubt now as to its being so impressed with such a character. 16 There is no valid reason then to deviate in any whit or form from the Alfonso ruling. As we decided then, so do we now. 2. There is all the more reason to adhere to the Alfonso doctrine considering that when it was enunciated in 1960, this Court did not blaze a new trail but did travel a well-worn path. The Court of Appeals itself noted that as early as 1933 in Province of Rizal v. Araullo, there was the categorical pronouncement "that the owner shall receive the market value of this property at the time of the taking ... ." In 1954 came Republic v. Lara, 17 where there was a reiteration of the view that where the actual taking or occupation did precede the filing of the complaint for exappropriation, it was the former date, not that of the filing of the proceeding that should be the basis for the determination of the amount to be awarded the owner as to the compensation due him. There being an apparent conflict between such a principle and the provision in the Rules of Court 18 as to the time that is decisive in ascertaining compensation due the owner, the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 19 clarified matters thus: "It is apparent from the foregoing that, when plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint, and that the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, section 3, directing that compensation 'be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint,' would never be operative. As intimated in Republic v. Lara ..., said provision contemplates 'normal circumstances,' under which 'the complaint coincides or even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff.' In fact, the complaint, normally, precedes, and does not coincide with such taking of the property, for 'upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter' plaintiff can not, over the

defendant's objection and the institution of the proceedings generally indicates an issue between the parties take possession of said property without an order of the court fixing provisionally its value and without depositing the same (Rule 69, section 3, Rules of Court)." 20 It is thus apparent how far the Court of Appeals was not at all mindful of what has so long and so consistently been announced by this Court. 3. Even if the question presented were novel, our conclusion would not be any different. With the expanding role of government, including all its branches and subdivisions, municipal corporations not excepted, reliance on the power of eminent domain far from diminishing will continue to manifest itself. This is an assertion confirmed by history. Outside of the aforesaid City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 21 there were only four other reported cases dealing with condemnation proceedings by local governments, 22 before World War II. It was not so after liberation. At least fifteen decisions have dealt with exercise of such power by such units. 23 Nor is it to be wondered at. Things that were formerly of private concern have, under this era of fostering social and economic rights, assumed a public aspect. Such being the case, the entry of government, whether national or local, in such field cannot legitimately be resisted. What is more appropriate then than that an attribute inherent in government, whether national or local, of expropriation, like taxation and the police power, would be utilized. This is the more so, considering that it is now a well-settled doctrine that public use can be identified with public purpose, public interest and public convenience. 24 It is of course to be expected that the procedural steps set forth in the Rules of Court will be strictly followed by municipal corporations. In the event however that such is not the case, as did happen in this instance, the Alfonso ruling certainly affords an equitable solution. The expropriation stands, and the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness. The Court of Appeals, as well as the lower court, should not have decided then the case as they did. There can be no affirmance of what was done. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of December 23, 1966 is reversed and a new judgment entered awarding respondent-spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, the amount due them computed as of the time of the taking, with legal interest from said date until the sum is paid in full by petitioner, now La Carlota City. The case is remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the fixing of such money judgment in accordance with this decision. Without pronouncement as to costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Teehankee, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur. Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., reserve their vote. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011 40 Phil. 349 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain) FACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part of a private cemetery devoted for public use to make an extension of Rizal Avenue. Defendants contend that expropriation is not necessary because it will disturb the remains of the dead. Moreover, adjoining and adjacent lots were offered to the city free of charge for the planned public improvement. ISSUE: Whether or not a private property devoted for public use can still be expropriated. HELD: Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation. In the case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need of converting the cemetery.

Case: Objects of ExpropriationRP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digestedPosted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation. HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Full Text: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiff-appellant.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendant-appellant. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the plaintiff and the defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805, of their respective complaint and counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction theretofore issued against the defendant on the interconnection of telephone facilities owned and operated by said parties. The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts: 1awphil.t SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the following powers and duties: (a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio-telegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter be established to provide telecommunication service in places requiring such service; (b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; (c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by said system; (d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the international telecommunication service in agreement with other countries desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and (e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the International Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handled in the international service, and those that may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and adhered to by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 1 The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. 2 The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radiotelegraphic communications services (Act 3180). 3 Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls

collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other. 4 On 2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1958. 5 Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. 7 One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. 8 The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. 10 Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former. On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. 11 Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. 12 On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. 15 At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications. 17 Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu of oral argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3 % (1/3) as its share in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted by either party. On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance of telephone connections by the defendant company would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an order for the defendant: (1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone communication between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries until further order of this Court. On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with counterclaims. It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. Both parties appealed. Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action of the trial court in dismissing the part of its complaint seeking to compel the defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it, because the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and of its refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor. We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just

compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau. A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the prayer is no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just. And since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at one that defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from plaintiff for the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition. This view we have taken of the true nature of the Republic's petition necessarily results in overruling the plea of defendant-appellant PLDT that the court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission. That body, under the law, has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of private property under the sovereign right of eminent domain. Furthermore, while the defendant telephone company is a public utility corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation (Section 1, Republic Act No. 51) and the determination of state policy is not vested in the Commission (Utilities Com. vs. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574; 124 N.E. 373). Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in not holding that

the Bureau of Telecommunications was not empowered to engage in commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said defendant was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously leased to the Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting both assertions. Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it from serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724). The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its contract, are, likewise, untenable. First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides: SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: (Act 3436) And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216). The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines. ..., but there is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration. This position finds approval in State ex rel. vs. Cadwaller, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650, and is stated in the elaborate and learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as follows: "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so

that the public acquires an interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it may not be disregarded" citing Mahan v. Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich. 242, 93 N.W. 629, and the reasons upon which it is in part made to rest are referred to in the same opinion, as follows: "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit." Allnut v. Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527. The doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law. (Clinton-Dunn Tel. Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636, 638). It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service agreed upon. The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves to the Government the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of its telegraph system thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall have the right to place additional crossarms and wires on the poles of the grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the Director of Posts and the grantee; the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin crossarm attachment and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said section could not refer to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes. As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more than one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we see no point in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, we see no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of communication. In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes "parasitically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it is wellknown that defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just compensation for the services rendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved, the objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,

including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur. Case: Where Expropriation Suit is Filed Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000

Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco PastorOn June 24, 2011 Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129 In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation. What are the two phases of expropriation cases? The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of

the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . . It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Barangay San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000Facts: In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,ew000. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation. What are the two phases of expropriation cases? The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Where expropriation suit is filed?

Full Text: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000 BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner, vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the March 29, 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Branch 58) in Civil Case No. CEB-21978, in which it dismissed a Complaint for eminent domain. It ruled as follows: Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby granted on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Orders dated February 19, 1999 and February 26, 1999, as well as the Writ of Possession issued by virtue of the latter Order are hereby recalled for being without force and effect. Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the RTC denying reconsideration.

The Facts Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that [e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court. Assailed RTC Ruling The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise: The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is located. The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real, property is included in a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, Real actions are those affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on, real property. . . . Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. In a Resolution dated July 28, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999. In a subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition. Issue In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this Court: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos? This Courts Ruling The Petition is meritorious. Main Issue: Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that involve title to or possession of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs. We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise: A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901). In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . . It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents. We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land. Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules. To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs. Case: Taking Definition and scope Requisites of Taking Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digestedPosted by Pius HYPERLINK "http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/"Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking) FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,

and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Requisites of taking

Republic vs. Fajardo

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170740 May 25, 2007 JULITA P. TAN, Petitioner, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, Respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (Thirteenth Division, Special Division of Five) dated July 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84667. The undisputed facts of the case are: Julita P. Tan, petitioner herein, is the registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 7,161 square meters located at the southern bank of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City. Her ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78188 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. She acquired this property from the San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) as shown by a document denominated "Irrevocable and Exclusive Special Power of Attorney" dated April 6, 2001, whereby she assumed SADCs "obligation of paying all imposable taxes due said land." In consideration of such assumption and "for value" she "stepped into the shoes" of SADC "free to exercise such rights and prerogatives as owner of the subject property, including the right to collect and demand payment for the sale and/or use of the subject land or any portion thereof, by and from any person or entity." The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation, organized and existing pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 representing in this case the Republic of the Philippines, herein respondent. Among the properties PEA manages is the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road (Coastal Road), also known as the R-1 Expressway. Prior to the transfer of the property to petitioner by SADC, or on March 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter the latters property, then covered by TCT No. 439101, for the purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA also proposed to SADC to start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latters property. On April 11, 1985, SADC replied authorizing PEA to enter the property, subject to the condition that the latter should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. PEA then directed its contractor, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, to enter the property and begin the necessary engineering works on the Coastal Road. In a letter dated May 28, 1985, PEA requested SADC either to donate or sell the property to the government. On October 22, 1985, SADC replied by offering to sell the property to PEA. SADCs asking price was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house and other improvements

thereon that were destroyed during the construction of the Coastal Road. On January 7, 1987, PEA informed SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but only the 1,131 square meter portion above sea level. PEA then asked SADC to submit proofs of ownership and costs of the improvements which were demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the parties. However, for the past twenty (20) years, they failed to reach an agreement. On October 2, 2000, SADC asked PEA to pay compensation equivalent to the current zonal value plus interest of ten percent (10%) per annum and a monthly rental of P10,000.00, also with the same interest. These sums, according to SADC, could be considered just compensation for the governments use of the property since 1985 until September 2000 and thereafter. The following month, PEA inquired from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) District 53, Alabang, Muntinlupa City the zonal value of the SADC property. It submitted to the BIR the appraisal reports prepared by two (2) independent licensed appraisers. On April 6, 2001, petitioner Julita Tan acquired the property from SADC.1a\^/phi1.net On July 12, 2001, the BIR sent a letter to PEA stating that the zonal value of the property is P2,900.00 per square meter, with the caveat that the said assessment is subject to review and approval by higher tax authorities. On October 9, 2001, the BIR informed PEA that the current zonal value of the property is P20,000.00 per square meter. In the meantime, the construction of the Coastal Road was completed. PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with the Toll Regulatory Board and the UEM-MARA Philippine Corporation for the toll operation of the Coastal Road, as shown by the Certificate of the Secretary of the Toll Regulatory Board dated May 13, 2003.2 PEA has been collecting toll fees from the road users in the average amount of P1,039,404.85 per day, as shown by a document denominated "Traffic Count of the Year 2002.3 Despite its collection of huge toll fees, PEA continuously refuses to pay petitioner any compensation. On October 22, 2001, petitioner, in her desperation, wrote PEA expressing her willingness to be compensated through a land swapping arrangement. She proposed that PEAs Fishermans Wharf be given to her in exchange for her property. On August 6, 2002, the PEA Board approved the exchange of a portion of petitioners lot consisting of 4,719 square meters for PEAs Lot 12 with an area of 2,360 square meters. The parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement wherein PEA agreed to execute a Deed of Exchange by way of compensation for petitioners property affected by the Coastal Road. However, on June 18, 2003, PEA withdrew from the land swapping agreement.1a\^/phi1.net Instead, on September 22, 2003, it filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pias City a complaint for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0220. PEA alleged therein, among others, that its liability for just compensation is based on the zonal value of the land at the time of the taking in 1985. Thus, it is liable for only P852,993.51 for the 4,719 square meter portion. In her answer, petitioner claimed that PEA should pay for the whole area consisting of 7,161 square meters at P20,000.00 per square meter, the zonal value set by the BIR pursuant to Republic Act No. 8974.4 She then prayed that she be paid P143,200,000.00 plus interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, aside from the P10,000.00 monthly rental with 12% interest per annum for the occupancy and use of the property since April 1985 up to the present. On October 20, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to order PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal valuation of the BIR. This was opposed by PEA. On December 16, 2003, the trial court issued the following Order5:

WHEREFORE, finding merit to the "Motion To Order the Plaintiff to Immediately Pay Defendant Her Expropriated Property," dated October 20, 2003, the same is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, plaintiff, through PEA, is hereby ordered to immediately pay defendant the sum of P94,380,000.00 (ninety-four million, three hundred eighty thousand pesos) representing the just compensation for the 4,719 square meters of defendants property covered by TCT No. 78188 of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias based on P20,000.00 per square meter zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. SO ORDERED. PEA timely filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order 6 dated April 14, 2004. PEA then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. On July 6, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED while that of mandamus is hereby DENIED (sic). Accordingly, the assailed Orders, dated December 16, 2003 and April 14, 2004, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent is hereby ordered to DESIST from enforcing the assailed Orders. SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, the present petition anchored on these twin issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining PEAs petition for certiorari and prohibition and in dismissing that for mandamus; and in holding that the just compensation for petitioners property should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in 1985 when petitioner entered the subject property.1awphi1.nt The first issue involves the nature of the two Orders of the trial court dated December 16, 2003 and April 14, 2004. The Order of December 16, 2003 directed PEA to pay petitioner just compensation in the sum of P94,380,000.00. The Order of April 14, 2004 denied PEAs motion for reconsideration. Are these orders final or interlocutory? Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, partly provides: SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: xxx (c) an interlocutory order. xxx A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.7 Under Rule 67 of the same Rules, there are two (2) stages in a condemnation proceeding:8 (1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, with condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose

described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of expropriation is final.9 An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the court on the merits.10 The order of expropriation would also be a final one for after its issuance, no objection to the right of condemnation shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal.11 (2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before the court and findings of the commissioners would likewise be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done by the court regarding this issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation. The trial courts Orders in Civil Case No. 03-0220 required PEA to pay petitioner P94,380,000.00 representing the just compensation for her 4,719 square meter lot based on the BIR zonal valuation of P20,000.00 per square meter. Clearly, the Orders are final, hence, appealable. However, instead of appealing from the said Orders within the reglementary period, PEA resorted to certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. It is basic that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, as in this case. On the second issue, Section 9, Article III of the Constitution specifically mandates that "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." In City of Manila v. Estrada,12 we held that "compensation" means "an equivalent for the value of land (property) taken." The use of the word "just" is "to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample." Thus, Estrada defined just compensation as "a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained." This definition has been reiterated in Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez[13] and Province of Tayabas v. Perez.14 Then in Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsahan,15 we held that "to be exactly just, the compensation should be estimated at the time of the taking." Subsequently, in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi,16 we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The Court of Appeals, in its challenged Decision, held that PEAs taking of petitioners property occurred in 1985. Even if PEA requested permission to enter the subject property and petitioner granted such request on condition that PEA should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00, "it does not change the fact that there was taking of the property for public use." Consequently, the compensation should be computed on the basis of the zonal value of the property at that time (1985) which was P2,900.00 per square meter per letter dated July 12, 2001 of the BIR to PEA. The Court of Appeals is wrong. PEAs entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous owner, was not for the purpose of expropriating the property. Records show and as stressed by Mr. Justice Renato C. Dacudao of the Court of Appeals in his Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA to enter the land on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a letter dated May 28, 1985, requested SADC to donate or sell the land to the government. On October 22, 1985, SADC responded, offering to sell the land to PEA for P1,288,980.00, plus P400,000.00 representing the value of the improvements destroyed by PEA when it entered the property. However, since 1985 up to the present, no agreement has been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner who acquired the property from the latter. While PEA has been earning huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for the use of her property in violation of her right as an owner. The above circumstances clearly show that when PEA entered petitioners land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of expropriating it. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC requesting to

donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed, there was no intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject property. Why did it ask permission from SADC to enter the property? Thereafter, why did it request SADC to donate or sell the land to the government? It could have simply exercised its power of eminent domain. Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides, among others, that upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. It bears reiterating that in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi,17 we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. We have made it clear that there was no taking of the property in 1985 by PEA for purposes of expropriation. As shown by the records, PEA filed with the RTC its petition for expropriation on September 22, 2003. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent, through PEA, upon the filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter. In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not dismissing PEAs petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; and (2) in ruling that PEAs taking of the property occurred in 1985 and that the compensation should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in that year. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 6, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84667 is REVERSED. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 202, Las Pias City is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson (On leave) RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Asscociate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice C E RT I F I CAT I O N Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Case: City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.

The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, , and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. Case: Deprivation of Use Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee. Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants. REYES, J. B. L., J.: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-

appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3) Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. We find that the appealed conviction can not stand. A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance