Case No.: G.R. No. 178524Case Title: Panfilo Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Phils. And/or Neil LindsayDate Promulgated: June 8, 2006 SC Division: Second DivisionPonente: Carpio-Morales, J Student/Researcher: Gojar, Judy Charisse

FACTS: Panfilo Macasero works as Carbon Dioxide Bulk Tank Escort for Southern Industrial Gases, Philippines(SIGP). He was severed from his job for the reason that his services were no longer needed. Macasero filed a case of illegal dismissal against SIGP before the Labor Arbiter (LA) who ruled that he is considered a regular employee but was not illegally dismissed and that he is entitled to separation pay equivalent to 1 month for every year of service plus 13th month pay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the LA but modified the computation for the separation pay. The Court of Appeals (CA) also affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Is Macasero illegally dismissed and is entitled to separation pay?

LAW: Article 279 of the Labor Code

RULING: While both labor tribunals and the appellate court held that Macasero failed to prove the fact of his dismissal, they oddly ordered the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in light of SIGP company’s "firm stance that Macasero was not its employee vis a vis the unflinching assertion of Macasero that he was which does not create a fertile ground for reinstatement." It goes without saying that the award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof.

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.

The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longerpractical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awardedif the employee decides not to be reinstated.

OPINION: To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was for a just cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. As a complementary principle, the employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the validity of the dismissal.

Case No.: G.R. No. 179174Case Title: Reynaldo Madrigalejos v. Geminlou Trucking Service, et alDate Promulgated: December 24, 2008 SC Division: Second DivisionPonente: Carpio-Morales, J Student/Researcher: Gojar, Judy Charisse

FACTS: Reynaldo Madrigalejos was hired by Geminilou Trucking Service Liberty Galotera as a truck driver to haul and deliver products of San Miguel Pure Foods Company, Inc. Madrigalejos claimed that he was requested by Geminilou Trucking Service Liberty Galoteraet al.to sign a contract entitled ´Kasunduan Sa Pag-Upa ng Serbisyo which he refused as he found it to alter his status as a regular employee to merely contractual, and it contained a waiver of benefits that had accrued since he started working for respondents.

Claiming that he was terminated by not signing the Kasunduan, Madrigalejos filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NRLC) a complaint for constructive dismissal against Geminilou Trucking Service Liberty Galotera et al Geminilou Trucking Service Liberty Galotera et al. denied dismissing Madrigalejos from his employment, explaining that he unilaterally decided to stop reporting for work, following the filing by a fellow driver of a complaint against him for allegedly attacking his fellow driver with a knife.

The Labor Arbiter declared that Madrigalejos had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the Decision ruling that there was no termination of employment. The appellate court denied petitioner’s appeal finding that even assuming that Madrigalejos was required but refused to sign the Kasunduan, his refusal does not purse adequately support the charge of dismissal. The appellate court added that while technical rules on evidence are not strictly followed in the NLRC, a charge of dismissal must still be supported by substantial evidence at the very least, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

ISSUE: Does the employer bears the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to report for work?

LAW: Article 282 of the Labor Code

RULING: The Court's examination of the records reveals that the factual findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the appellate court, are supported by substantial evidence, hence, there is no cogent reason for the Court to modify or reverse the same.

Constructive dismissal is a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his job under the circumstances.

In the present case, the records on hand show that the lone piece of evidence submitted by petitioner to substantiate his claim of constructive dismissal is an unsigned copy of the Kasunduan.

OPINION: Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.

Case No.: G.R. No. 179174Case Title: Reynaldo Madrigalejos v. Geminlou Trucking Service, et alDate Promulgated: December 24, 2008 SC Division: Second DivisionPonente: Carpio-Morales, J Student/Researcher: Gojar, Judy Charisse

FACTS: Majurine L. Mauricio (Majurine) started working as an Administrative Assistant in the Legal Department of the Manila Banking Corporation as a probationary employee. As a pre-employment requirement, the bank directed the submission by Mauricio of some required documents. However, she failed to do so. She was advised that the processing of her regularization as employee would be held in abeyance. The bank gave her extension dates twice with information that her failure to do so would cause the termination of her employment. Despite the deadline given her, she still failed to comply with the requirements.

Mauricio, informed the bank that she could not secure a clearance from her previous employer, the Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (MBLIC), a sister company of the bank, as she had a pending case with it. She requested that any action relative to her employment be held in abeyance as she was still following up the early resolution of the case. In response, the bank denied her request. Thus, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salary, and moral and exemplary damages against the bank before the Labor Arbiter, but such was dismissed.

On Mauricio’s appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). On the bank’s Motion for Reconsideration, however, the NLRC, reinstated into to the Decision of the LA. Mauricio thereupon challenged via Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its original Decision and reinstated in Toto Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

LAW: Article 279 of the Labor Code

RULING: There is nothing radical and highly questionable with the NLRC reversing its original decision if supported with substantial evidence. Respecting Mauricio·s contention that in its earlier Decision, the NLRC already passed upon the arguments raised by respondents in their Motion for Reconsideration before it, Mauricio herself provides the answer when she quotes in her present petition what she terms as the trenchant observation of the High Court.

In her petition, while Mauricio quotes at length the September 24, 2001 original decision of the NLRC, she fails to explain why the NLRC should not have reversed it and why the Court of Appeals should not have sustained the reversal. And what error of law should be reviewed by this Court, Mauricio likewise fails to point out.

OPINION: Thee court has the power to alter or modify or even set aside its own decisions at anytime before the decision becomes final. A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. Once again, We would like to emphasize that a decision which has become final and executory cannot be lawfully altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same especially where the alteration or modification is material or substantial as in this case. To the extent of being repetitious, We reiterate that a trial court or a labor arbiter can no longer change or modify a decision of this Tribunal which had long become final and executory. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final judgment. Any amendment or alteration made

which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.