Filed Complaint

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIAM J. HENRICHS, )

MYRON S. ALEXANDER, )

ROBERT PELUSO, JOSEPH RIZZO, )

Individually and on behalf of all other )

persons similarly situated, )

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

) Civil Action No.:

ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING )

AND STANDARDS BOARD, ) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

VALERIE L. SALMONS, PATRICK ) FOR DECLARATORY,

HARTSHORN, JOHN H. SCHLAF, ) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND

TIM BECKER, TIMOTHY NUGENT ) DAMAGES

LAUREL LUNT PRUSSING, )

RICHARD WATSON, BRENT FISCHER, )

TIM GLEASON, DARRYL STROUD, PAUL D. )

WILLIAMS, JAN W. NOBLE, LISA MADIGAN, )

GARRY McCARTHY, THOMAS DART, SEAN )

M. COX, DOROTHY BROWN, MICHAEL )

SCHLOSSER, LEO SCHMITZ, DONALD )

STOLWORTHY, )

Defendants. )

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

NOW COME the Plaintiffs, WILLIAM J. HENRICHS (“HENRICHS”), MYRON S.

ALEXANDER (“ALEXANDER”), ROBERT PELUSO (“PELUSO”), and JOSEPH RIZZO

(“RIZZO”), individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (collectively

“Plaintiffs”), by and through their attorneys, Attorney Consumer Counseling, for any and all

damages associated with the Defendants, ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND

STANDARDS BOARD, VALERIE L. SALMONS, PATRICK HARTSHORN, JOHN H.

SCHLAF, TIM BECKER, TIMOTHY NUGENT,LAUREL LUNT PRUSSING, RICHARD

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Case: 1:15-cv-10265 Document #: 1 Filed: 11/12/15 of 30 PageID #:1

WATSON, BRENT FISCHER, TIM GLEASON, DARRYL STROUD, PAUL D. WILLIAMS,

JAN W. NOBLE, LISA MADIGAN, GARRY McCARTHY, THOMAS DART, SEAN M.

COX, DOROTHY BROWN, MICHAEL SCHLOSSER, LEO SCHMITZ, DONALD

STOLWORTHY (collectively “DEFENDANTS” or “Defendants”), negligent or intentional

failure and refusal to acknowledge the Plaintiffs as law enforcement officers under Illinois law

that they separated from their employment in good standing; that they were authorized by law to

engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the

incarceration of any person for, any violation of law and had statutory powers of arrest or

apprehension; that before such separation, each of the Plaintiffs served as a law enforcement

officer for an aggregate of 10 years or more; that during the most recent 12-month period, each

Plaintiff has met, at their expense, the standards for qualification in firearms training for active

law enforcement officers, as determined by the former agency of the individual, the State in

which the individual resides or, if the State has not established such standards, either a law

enforcement agency within the State in which the individual resides or the standards used by a

certified firearms instructor that is qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active

duty officers within that State; that each Plaintiff has not been officially found by a qualified

medical professional employed by the agency to be unqualified for reasons relating to mental

health and as a result would not be issued appropriate photographic identification; that each

Plaintiff not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or

substance; and that each Plaintiff is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm; and

to provide proper and accurate documents pursuant to lawful request by IROCC to confirm the

foregoing, and in support thereof states as follows:

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INTRODUCTION

1. This is a class action, brought by retired Cook County Sheriff officers who have applied

for a concealed carry permit under the Illinois Retired Officer Concealed Carry Program.

The Plaintiffs claim that the DEFENDANTS by and through the Illinois Retired Officer

Concealed Carry Program negligently or intentionally failed and refused to acknowledge

the Plaintiffs as law enforcement officers under Illinois law; that they separated from

their employment in good standing; that they were authorized by law to engage in or

supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration

of any person for, any violation of law and had statutory powers of arrest or

apprehension; that before such separation, each of the Plaintiffs served as a law

enforcement officer for an aggregate of 10 years or more; that during the most recent 12-

month period, each Plaintiff has met, at their expense, the standards for qualification in

firearms training for active law enforcement officers, as determined by the former agency

of the individual, the State in which the individual resides or, if the State has not

established such standards, either a law enforcement agency within the State in which the

individual resides or the standards used by a certified firearms instructor that is qualified

to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty officers within that State; that each

Plaintiff has not been officially found by a qualified medical professional employed by

the agency to be unqualified for reasons relating to mental health and as a result would

not be issued appropriate photographic identification; that each Plaintiff not under the

influence of alcohol or another intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and that

each Plaintiff is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a firearm; and to provide

proper and accurate documents pursuant to lawful request by IROCC to confirm the

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foregoing (collectively “Defendant Conduct”). The Plaintiffs also seek any and all

damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This action seeks to vindicate rights protected by the Second, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution

and 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201

and 2202.

3. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367, over any

related state law claims (e.g., 50 ILCS 705, § 1, et seq.; 50 ILCS 710 § 1, et seq., 20 Ill.

Adm. Code 1720.200, et seq. (collectively “Illinois law”)).

4. Venue lies with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (b) (1)-(2), because some of the

defendants reside in this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claim occurred in this district.

PARTIES

5. The Plaintiff, HENRICHS, is an individual who resides in Cook County, Illinois.

6. The class that HENRICHS represents is composed of qualified retired Cook County

Sheriff Officers who: (a) applied for and provided all required documents pursuant to the

Illinois Retired Officer Concealed Carry Program so as to obtain a concealed carry

license pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A §§ 926C; (b) were denied a concealed carry license

predicated upon Defendant Conduct so as to deprive the Plaintiffs of property rights to

which they were entitled.

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7. The Plaintiff, ALEXANDER, is an individual who resides in Cook County, Illinois.

8. The class that ALEXANDER represents is composed of qualified retired Cook County

Sheriff Officers who: (a) provided all required documents pursuant to the Illinois Retired

Officer Concealed Carry Program so as to obtain a concealed carry license pursuant to 18

U.S.C.A §§ 926C; (b) were denied a concealed carry license predicated upon Defendant

Conduct so as to deprive the Plaintiffs of property rights to which they were entitled.

9. The Plaintiff, PELUSO, is an individual who resides in Cook County, Illinois.

10. The class that PELUSO represents is composed of qualified retired Cook County

Sheriff Officers who: (a) provided all required documents pursuant to the Illinois Retired

Officer Concealed Carry Program so as to obtain a concealed carry license pursuant to 18



11. The Plaintiff, RIZZO, is an individual who resides in Cook County, Illinois.

12. The class that RIZZO represents is composed of qualified retired Cook County Sheriff

Officers who: (a) provided all required documents pursuant to the Illinois Retired Officer

Concealed Carry Program so as to obtain a concealed carry license pursuant to 18



13. The Plaintiffs sue the DEFENDANTS on behalf of all others similarly situated (“class”)

because:

A. The persons in the class are so numerous, consisting of approximately 186 retired

officers or more that the joinder of all such persons is impracticable and the disposition

of their claims in a class action rather than in individual actions will benefit the parties

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and the court;

B. There are questions of law or fact common to the class;

C. The claims or defenses of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the

class; and

D. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

14. A class action in these proceedings is proper because:

A. prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create

a risk of adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical

matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to

the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability

to protect their interests;

B. DEFENDANTS have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to

the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is

appropriate respecting the class as a whole; and

C. the Court will find that questions of law or fact common to class members

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a

class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicating the controversy.

15. ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND STANDARDS BOARD

(“BOARD” or “Board”) is the state agency mandated to promote and maintain a high

level of professional standards for law enforcement and correctional officers. Its purpose

is to promote and protect citizens’ health, safety and welfare by encouraging

municipalities, counties, park districts, State-controlled universities, colleges, public

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community colleges, and other local governmental agencies of this State and

participating State agencies in their efforts to upgrade and maintain a high level of

training and standards for law enforcement. The BOARD’S responsibilities include, but

are not limited to, the following: (a) developing and providing quality training and

education; (b) setting law enforcement standards; (c) aiding in the establishment of

adequate training facilities; (d) providing financial assistance; and in this instance to

confirm information regarding applications by retired officers to assist in the

determination of eligibility for applicants to carry a concealed weapon.

16. On information and belief, the BOARD consists of the following DEFENDANTS:

A. CHAIRMAN VALERIE L. SALMONS;

B. VICE CHAIRMAN SHERIFF PAT HARTSHORN;

C. JOHN H. SCHLAF;

D. TIM BECKER;

E. MAYOR TIMOTHY NUGENT;

F. MAYOR LAUREL LUNT PRUSSING;

G. SHERIFF RICHARD WATSON;

H. SHERIFF BRENT FISCHER;

I. CITY MANAGER TIM GLEASON;

J. DARRYL STROUD;

K. PAUL D. WILLIAMS;

L. CHIEF JAN W. NOBLE;

M. STATUTORY MEMBER ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN;

N. STATUTORY MEMBER SUPERINTENDENT GARRY McCARTHY;

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O. STATUTORY MEMBER SHERIFF TOM DART;

P. STATUTORY MEMBER SEAN M. COX;

Q. STATUTORY MEMBER DOROTHY BROWN;

R. STATUTORY MEMBER DIRECTOR MICHAEL SCHLOSSER;

S. STATUTORY MEMBER DIRECTOR LEO SCHMITZ; and

T. STATUTORY MEMBER DIRECTOR DONALD STOLWORTHY, a

copy of the BOARD member list is attached hereto and made a part hereof

as Exhibit “A.”

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

17. July 22, 2004, Congress passed and the President signed the Law Enforcement Officers

Safety Act of 2004 (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-277, 118 Stat. 865 (2004), codified at 18

U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.

18. Under Federal statute 18 U.S.C.A §§ 926C, qualified retired law enforcement officers are

permitted to carry concealed guns nationwide.

19. Federal statute 18 U.S.C.A §§ 926C, however, requires a specific state identification and

a specific state certification. See 18 U.S.C.A §§ 926C (d)(1)(2)(A)(B)(I)(II).

20. The Illinois Retired Officer Concealed Carry Program (“IROCC”) is a not-for-profit

program that exists under the authority of the BOARD and exists solely to process

Illinois Retired Officer Concealed Carry applications pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A §§ 926C

for the retired law enforcement officers residing in Illinois.

21. At all relevant times herein, the Plaintiffs had a property interest in their IROCC

concealed carry cards.

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PREVIOUS LAWSUIT

22. On October 31, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of Mandamus (“State

Complaint”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Case No. 2014 CH 17707.

23. The State Complaint requested that the DEFENDANTS grant or deny the Plaintiffs’

application for a concealed carry license under the IROCC program.

24. On October 7, 2015, almost 18 months after applications were made, the Plaintiffs’

applications were denied, almost 17 months after the applications were to have been

ruled on pursuant to the dictate of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Admin. Code

1720.270 (b)). See Exhibits “B” to “E.”

25. Subsequent to the filing of this Complaint, the State Complaint will be voluntarily

dismissed.

WILLIAM J. HENRICHS

26. On January 10, 2014, HENRICHS applied for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program.

27. On October 7, 2015, HENRICHS’ application for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program was denied. See Exhibit “B.”

MYRON S. ALEXANDER

28. On June 23, 2014, ALEXANDER applied for a renewal concealed carry license under the

IROCC program.

29. On October 7, 2015, ALEXANDER’S application for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program was denied. See Exhibit “C.”

ROBERT PELUSO

30. In 2013, PELUSO applied for a concealed carry license under the IROCC program.

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31. On October 7, 2015, PELUSO’S application for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program was denied. See Exhibit “D.”

JOSEPH RIZZO

32. On or about April of 2013, RIZZO applied for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program (“APR 2013 Application”).

33. On or about October of 2013, RIZZO applied for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program (“OCT 2013 Application”).

34. On October 7, 2015, PELUSO’S application for a concealed carry license under the

IROCC program was denied. See Exhibit “E.”

35. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the DEFENDANTS, the Plaintiffs suffered

extreme distress, anguish, emotional and psychological trauma and injury to their

reputation.

36. The actions of the DEFENDANTS and each of them violated the following clearly

established and well settled Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

37. At all relevant times, the DEFENDANTS and each of them intentionally and with

conscious disregard to the Plaintiffs rights acted under color of federal law, 18 U.S.C. §

926C, when they reflected Defendant Conduct set forth above and failed and refused to

properly provide and verify requirements of the Act for Plaintiffs.

38. At all relevant times, the DEFENDANTS and each of them intentionally and with

conscious disregard to the Plaintiffs rights acted under color of Illinois law when they

reflected Defendant Conduct and failed and refused to properly provide and verify the

requirements of the Act for Plaintiffs.

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39. At all relevant times, the DEFENDANTS and each of them were acting under color of

Illinois law and under the color of their authority either as members of the BOARD or in

their individual capacity as sheriff or provider of prior employment information.

40. Under the common law, the sheriff was the keeper of the king’s peace and had the

common-law power to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace.

41. The sheriff also has a number of statutory duties which includes but is not limited to the

following: (a) custodian of the courthouse and the jail; (b) charged with the duty to

serve, execute and return warrants, process, orders and judgments; and (c) conservator of

the peace in his county.

42. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS and each of them knew or should have

known that the sheriff also has a number of statutory duties which includes but is not

limited to the following: (a) custodian of the courthouse and the jail; (b) charged with

the duty to serve, execute and return warrants, process, orders and judgments; and (c)

conservator of the peace in his county.

43. According to state statutes and the common law, the sheriff has crime prevention and law

enforcement duties similar to or mirroring those of local city police officers.


known that the sheriff has crime prevention and law enforcement duties similar to or

mirroring those of local city police officers.

45. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, the Plaintiffs acted as Sheriff Deputies

pursuant to Illinois state statutes.

46. Sheriff’s Deputies have the same crime prevention and law enforcement duties as does

the Sheriff.

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known that the Plaintiffs acted as Sheriff Deputies pursuant to Illinois law and Illinois

state statutes.

48. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, the Plaintiffs were duly appointed and

qualified to perform any and all duties of the Sheriff pursuant to Illinois law and Illinois

state statutes.


known that the Plaintiffs were duly appointed and qualified to perform any and all duties

of the Sheriff pursuant to Illinois law and Illinois state statutes.

50. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs took the

Deputy Sheriff’s oath of office.


known that the Plaintiffs took the Deputy Sheriff’s oath of office.

52. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were

appointed as Sheriff Deputies.


known that the Plaintiffs were appointed as Sheriff Deputies.

54. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were

sworn as Deputy Sheriffs and were bound to perform the duties of the Sheriff’s office.


known that the Plaintiffs were sworn as Deputy Sheriffs and were bound to perform the

duties of the Sheriff’s office.

56. At all relevant times prior to their retirement, the Plaintiffs had the duty to prevent crime

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and keep the peace and order in their county, and they had authority to arrest offenders

and bring them to the proper court.


known that the Plaintiffs had the duty to prevent crime and keep the peace and order in

their county, and they had authority to arrest offenders and bring them to the proper

court.


known that none of the named Plaintiffs was the subject of any disciplinary action when

he retired and all of them retired in good standing.


known that none of the Plaintiffs are prohibited by federal or state law from carrying a

firearm.

60. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS and each of them maintain and allege

that the Plaintiffs were not law enforcement officers or fulfilled the requirements of the

Act and Illinois law.

61. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS and each of them knew that the

Plaintiffs were law enforcement officers but failed and refused to verify the Plaintiffs’

status as law enforcement officers or the fact that they fulfilled the requirements of the

Act and Illinois law.

62. At all relevant times herein, the Defendant THOMAS DART knew that the Plaintiffs

were law enforcement officers but failed and refused to verify the Plaintiffs’ status as law

enforcement officers or that the Plaintiffs were each compliant with the requirements of

the Act, all for and in pursuit of his own political agenda.

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63. At all relevant times herein, it has been the policy and practice of the Defendant

THOMAS DART to fail and refuse to verify the Plaintiffs’, and all others similarly

situated, law enforcement officer status and qualifications, despite their compliance with

the Act and Illinois law.

64. The Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for Defendant THOMAS DART’S

unconstitutional practices.

65. The Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for DEFENDANTS’ unconstitutional

practices.

66. The Plaintiffs, therefore, require preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to protect

the Plaintiffs’ rights as well as the rights of others similarly situated under the Second,

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.

COUNT I

42 USC § 1983 against THOMAS DART, INDIVIDUALLY

(DUE PROCESS)

67. The Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 66 as if

fully set forth herein.

68. The Defendant THOMAS DART exercised power as the Plaintiffs’ former employer by

virtue of state law when he failed as former employer to verify that the Plaintiffs were

law enforcement officers when asked by the individual(s) processing Plaintiffs’ IROCC

applications, as well as to properly verify other information regarding Plaintiffs’ status in

fulfilling the requirements of the Act and Illinois law.

69. The Defendant THOMAS DART was personally involved in and responsible for the

deliberate submission of false information to IROCC and the BOARD in that:

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a. He created internal Sheriff department policy and customs that deny certain

Sheriff Deputies the right to be deemed law enforcement officers, or to reflect

information showing Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Act and Illinois law, under

which certain Sheriff Deputies would be deprived the right to carry a concealed

firearm under the IROCC program pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§

926B and 926C;

b. He was deliberately indifferent to his subordinates’ acts that violated the

constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and had actual and constructive knowledge that

it was highly likely that these constitutional violations would occur as a result of

his actions, orders, policies, practices and omissions;

70. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S acts and omissions proximately caused the Plaintiff’s

deprivation of their IROCC concealed carry cards because said Defendant or his

subordinates informed IROCC that the Plaintiffs were not law enforcement officers

despite Illinois law stating otherwise and provided other improper or incorrect

information that would inaccurately confirm that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements

of the Act and Illinois law.

71. The Defendant THOMAS DART maintained and continues to maintain an internal policy

or custom to deny certain Sheriff’s Deputies were, or met the definition of, law

enforcement officer and provided other improper or incorrect information that would

inaccurately confirm that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of the Act and Illinois

law.

72. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S policy or custom was the moving force behind the

Plaintiffs ultimate deprivation of information necessary for Plaintiffs to obtain their

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IROCC concealed carry cards.

73. At all relevant times herein, the Defendant THOMAS DART has exercised sole and

exclusive policy making decisions regarding which particular Sheriff Deputy qualify as

law enforcement officers or to provide information so as to allow Plaintiffs accurate

information to be received pursuant to a request from the Board.

74. At all relevant times herein, the Defendant THOMAS DART knew or should have

known that all Cook County Deputy Sheriff Officers are law enforcement officers under

Illinois law.

75. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions described herein violate the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits any person acting

under color of U.S. law from engaging in or allowing the arbitrary and unjustified denial

of property or property rights

76. The provision of accurate information reflecting the results of their employment as a law

enforcement officer, which Plaintiffs have earned by virtue of their employment is a

property right which has been earned by them.

77. In his conduct as set forth in this Complaint, the Defendant THOMAS DART acted

under color of federal law.

78. The Defendant THOMAS DART had actual and constructive knowledge that his

subordinates were violating the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs, and had actual and

constructive knowledge that it was highly likely that these constitutional violations would

occur as a result of his actions, orders, policies, practices or omissions.

79. Despite this knowledge, the Defendant THOMAS DART acted with reckless and

deliberate indifference to his subordinates’ unconstitutional actions and took no steps to

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cure such unconstitutional actions.

80. Through the Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions and failures to act, the Defendant

THOMAS DART expressly and tacitly authorized his subordinates’ unlawful conduct.

81. The Defendant THOMAS DART has the power to formulate policies regarding retired

Deputy Sheriffs and exercised that power to generate illegal practices, namely the failure

and refusal to verify the Plaintiffs’ employment status as law enforcement officers, as

well as to verify when information pertaining to Plaintiffs under his control, which

information was properly requested by the Board.

82. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions, orders, authorizations, approvals and

omissions caused the Sheriff’s office to provide false and misleading information to the

BOARD.

83. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions, orders, authorizations, approvals and

omissions caused or resulted in the issuance of the Plaintiffs’ denial letters [See Exhibits

“B” to “E”] in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments

and gives rise to a cause of action for damages directly under the Constitution.

84. At all relevant times herein, the Defendant THOMAS DART acting under the color of

Illinois law and Federal law and with conscious disregard of the truth failed and

continues to refuse to verify the Plaintiffs’ law enforcement officer status and compliance

with the requirements of the Act and Illinois law requested by the Board, so as to deprive

the Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, with the ability to obtain a concealed carry

card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.

85. The actions of the Defendant THOMAS DART, as described herein, were taken under

color of Illinois law in direct violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and are therefore

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actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

86. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S current and continuing failure to verify that the

Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, are law enforcement officers and compliance

with the requirements of the Act and Illinois law requested by the Board, which

constitutes a denial of their due process rights.

87. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions, the

Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer injury, including without limitation,

serious psychological and emotional harm, mental anguish, distress, humiliation and

indignity.

88. As a direct result of the Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions, the Plaintiffs have

suffered direct and immediate violations of their constitutional rights and are therefore

entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, to redress and remedy

the violations, and to prevent irreparable harm and future violations of their rights and the

rights of others.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, WILLIAM J. HENRICHS, MYRON S. ALEXANDER,

ROBERT PELUSO, JOSEPH RIZZO, individually and on behalf of all class members similarly

situated, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment against the Defendant

THOMAS DART individually awarding the following:

A. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 finding that the

Defendant THOMAS DART acted under the color of Illinois law and Federal law when he failed

and continues to refuse, as a former employer, to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class

members were law enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’

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rights under the Second and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42

U.S.C. § 1983;

B. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 finding that the

Defendant THOMAS DART was required to verify that the Plaintiffs and the other class

members were law enforcement officers pursuant to the Act and Illinois law;

C. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 finding that the

Defendant THOMAS DART violated the Plaintiffs and class members’ rights when he failed


members were law enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members

rights under the Second and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42

U.S.C. § 1983;

D. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 finding that the

Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions were unconstitutional when he failed and continues to

refuse, as a former employer, to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law

enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the

Second and Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

E. A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant THOMAS

DART from exceeding the limits of his authority under Illinois law and federal law;

F. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, plus interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988;

G. An award all reasonable damages in favor of the Plaintiffs and class members and

against the Defendant THOMAS DART in an amount to be determined at trial;

H. An award of punitive damages for each and every constitutional violation so as to

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prevent future constitutional violations; and

I. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II

42 USC § 1983 against THOMAS DART, INDIVIDUALLY

(EQUAL PROTECTION)



90. There is no rational basis for the Defendant THOMAS DART’S treating Plaintiffs

differently than other current Sheriffs Deputies; such treatment being irrational and

arbitrary.

91. The Defendant THOMAS DART’S differing treatment of the Plaintiffs violated their

right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.



situated, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment against the Defendant

THOMAS DART individually awarding the following:


Defendant THOMAS DART acted under the color of Illinois law and Federal law when he failed


members were law enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’

rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

42 U.S.C. § 1983;

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Defendant THOMAS DART was required to verify that the Plaintiffs and the other class

members were law enforcement officers pursuant to the Act and Illinois law;


Defendant THOMAS DART violated the Plaintiffs and class members’ rights when he failed


members were law enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members

rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

42 U.S.C. § 1983;


Defendant THOMAS DART’S actions were unconstitutional when he failed and continues to

refuse, as a former employer, to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law


Second and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. §

1983;

E. A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendant THOMAS

DART from exceeding the limits of his authority under Illinois law and federal law;


§ 1988;


against the Defendant THOMAS DART in an amount to be determined at trial;



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COUNT III

42 USC § 1983 against DEFENDANTS, INDIVIDUALLY

(DUE PROCESS)



93. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS acting under the color of Illinois law

and Federal law and with conscious disregard of the truth failed and continue to refuse to

verify the Plaintiffs’ law enforcement officer status and compliance with the

requirements of the Act and Illinois law requested by the Board, so as to deprive the

Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, with the ability to obtain a concealed carry

card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.

94. The DEFENDANTS current and continuing failure to verify that the Plaintiffs, and all

others similarly situated, are law enforcement officers and compliance with the

requirements of the Act and Illinois law as requested by the Board, constitutes a denial of

their due process rights.



situated, respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter judgment against the

DEFENDANTS and each of them awarding the following:


DEFENDANTS acted under the color of Illinois law and Federal law when they failed and

continue to refuse to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law enforcement

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officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the Second and

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;


DEFENDANTS were required to verify that the Plaintiffs and the other class members were law

enforcement officers pursuant to the Act and Illinois law;


DEFENDANTS violated the Plaintiffs and class members’ rights when they failed and continue

to refuse to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law enforcement officers in

violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members rights under the Second and Fifth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;


DEFENDANTS actions were unconstitutional when they failed and continue to refuse to verify

that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law enforcement officers in violation of the

Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the Second and Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

E. A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the DEFENDANTS and each

of them from exceeding the limits of their authority under Illinois law and federal law;


§ 1988;


against the DEFENDANTS and each of them in an amount to be determined at

trial;


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COUNT IV

42 USC § 1983 against all individual DEFENDANTS

(EQUAL PROTECTION)

95. The Plaintiff repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 94 as if


96. There is no rational basis for the Defendants’ treating Plaintiffs differently than other

current Sheriffs Deputies; such treatment being irrational and arbitrary.

97. The Defendants differing treatment of the Plaintiffs violated their right to Equal

Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.






DEFENDANTS acted under the color of Illinois law and Federal law when they failed and

continue to refuse to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law enforcement

officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the Second and

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;


DEFENDANTS were required to verify that the Plaintiffs and the other class members were law

enforcement officers pursuant to the Act and Illinois law;

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DEFENDANTS violated the Plaintiffs and class members’ rights when they failed and continue


violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members rights under the Second and Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;


DEFENDANTS’ actions were unconstitutional when they failed and continue to refuse to verify

that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law enforcement officers in violation of the

Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

E. A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the DEFENDANTS from

exceeding the limits of their authority under Illinois law and federal law;


§ 1988;


against the DEFENDANTS in an amount to be determined at trial;




COUNT V

CONSPIRACY

42 USC § 1983 against DEFENDANTS, INDIVIDUALLY


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99. On information and belief, the DEFENDANTS and each of them entered into an explicit

or tacit agreement among themselves to deprive the Plaintiffs with the ability to obtain an

IROCC concealed carry card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B

and 926C.

100. On information and belief, the DEFENDANTS and each of them entered into an

explicit or tacit agreement among themselves to affirm, verify and accept that the

Plaintiffs were not law enforcement officers so as to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining

an IROCC concealed carry card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§

926B and 926C.

101. One of the members of the Board, Michael Schlosser, is the Director of the Police

Training Institute.

102. In such position, Michael Schlosser:

a. Knew that the information provided by the Plaintiffs with the standards for

qualification in firearms training for active law enforcement officers, as

determined by the former agency of the individual, were known by Michael

Schlosser to be sufficient under the terms of the Act or Illinois law; or

b. Should have known that the information provided by the Plaintiffs with the

standards for qualification in firearms training for active law enforcement

officers, as determined by the former agency of the individual, were known by

Michael Schlosser to be sufficient under the terms of the Act or Illinois law.

103. The knowledge of Michael Schlosser set forth above, was information that he did

give or should have given to the Board in connection with the applications of the

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Plaintiffs.

104. The members of the Board with their collective knowledge, knew, or should have

known, that the applications submitted by each of the Plaintiffs met the requirements of

the Act and Illinois law.

105. Each of the members of the Board with knowledge that they had or could have

had, either:

a. Knew that the information in the applications submitted by Plaintiffs were

sufficient to grant the IROCC applications; or

b. Should have known that the information in the applications submitted by

Plaintiffs were sufficient to grant the applications.

106. The Board members, individually and collectively agreed to confirm any action

taken by the Sheriff or agency purportedly confirming information of the applying

Plaintiff, even though the Board member knew that the information as given was more

likely than not, or known to be untrue.

107. The denial of the applications of the Plaintiffs was an act in furtherance of the

conspiracy to deprive the Plaintiffs of their property rights under color of Illinois law and

Federal law.

108. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS and each of them knew or

should have known that the Plaintiffs were law enforcement officers under Illinois

law and Federal law and that the Plaintiffs met the requirements of the Act and

Illinois law.

109. At all relevant times herein, the DEFENDANTS and each of them knew or should

have known that their actions as set forth herein violated the Plaintiffs’ rights as set forth

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herein.

110. Despite this knowledge, the DEFENDANTS comported with the conspiracy of

which each were part and each of them engaged in a course of conduct to not only ignore

Federal law and Illinois law, but also specifically act so as to ultimately deprive the

Plaintiffs with the ability to obtain verification of their law enforcement officer status so

as to obtain an IROCC concealed carry card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18

U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C.

111. As a result of the DEFENDANTS acts and omissions as set forth herein the

Plaintiffs have suffered direct and immediate violations of their constitutional rights and

are therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees,

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 65 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, to redress

and remedy the violations, and to prevent irreparable harm and future violations of their

rights and the rights of others.






DEFENDANTS and each of them engaged in a conspiracy with each other to not only ignore

Illinois law but also specifically act so as to ultimately deprive the Plaintiffs with the ability to

obtain verification of their law enforcement officer status so as to obtain an IROCC concealed

carry card permit pursuant to and in furtherance of 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C;


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DEFENDANTS and each of them acted under the color of Illinois law and Federal law when

they conspired to refuse to verify that the Plaintiffs and other class members were law


Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983;


DEFENDANTS and each of them had an independent duty to verify that the Plaintiffs and the

other class members were law enforcement officers pursuant to the Act and Illinois law;


DEFENDANTS violated the Plaintiffs and class members’ rights when they engaged in a

conspiracy and thereby refused, pursuant to said conspiracy, to verify that the Plaintiffs and

other class members were law enforcement officers in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class

members rights under the Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

E. A declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2201 and 2202 finding that the

DEFENDANTS’ actions as set forth herein were unconstitutional when they failed and continue


violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and class members’ rights under the Second, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

F. A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the DEFENDANTS from

exceeding the limits of their authority under Illinois law and federal law;

G. An award of attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, plus interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988;

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H. An award all reasonable damages in favor of the Plaintiffs and class members and

against the DEFENDANTS in an amount to be determined at trial;

I. An award of punitive damages for each and every constitutional violation so as to


J. Such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

The Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, hereby demand a trial by a jury on all

claims otherwise triable by jury asserted in the complaint.

Dated: November 12, 2015.

Lucy Kirschinger Respectfully submitted,

Attorney Consumer Counseling WILLIAM J. HENRICHS, MYRON S.

155 N. Michigan Avenue ALEXANDER, ROBERT PELUSO,

Suite 301 JOSEPH RIZZO, individually

Chicago, IL 60601 and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,

(312) 729-5253 Direct

(312) 641-2233 Office

(773) 732-6433 Cell

[email protected]

ARDC No. 6272957 By: /s/ Lucy Kirschinger

One of Their Attorneys

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Filed Complaint

Documents

Transcript of Filed Complaint