DEFINING CONCEPTS OF 5 TH GENERATION WARFARE

BY

MAJOR ISHTIAQ UR RASHID

DEFINING CONCEPTS OF 5 TH GENERATION WARFARE

“If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer "using

armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's will," but rather are "using all

means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and

lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."

(Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, PLA)1

1. Introduction . Technology today has benefited mankind more then

science itself and is becoming increasingly dazzling and uncontrollable. As all

fields of life have been revolutionized by the technology, much deeper effects

have been left on warfare and conduct of war. The technologically defined gap

between conduct of war by two belligerents is evident from Gulf War and US

invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. As difference in war technology increases, the

methods to tackle each other have increased manifold. Resultantly, an

ambiguous and uncertain, though comparatively less lethal, phenomenon of

waging war emerges; which is commonly described as Fifth Generation Warfare

(5th GW).

2. Some see the Fifth Generation as a product of new technologies, such as

nanotechnology. Others define it as the state's struggle to maintain its monopoly

on war and social organization in the face of Fourth Generation challengers. One

correspondent defined it as terrorist acts done by one group in such a manner

1 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. (PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House. Beijing, February 1999), P.7

1

that they are blamed on another, something traditionally known as "pseudo-

operations." 2

3. Information warfare, electronic warfare, high-tech warfare, media,

economic sanctions and ties, terrorism etc, etc are so diverse aspect of modern

warfare that one really confuses its kind, type and sensitivity. 9/11 was another

such incident which has brought generational shift in warfare. Whoever is first to

recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive

advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change

opens itself to catastrophic defeat3.

4. Aim . To carryout an analysis of recent happening in the world confirming

various definitions and concepts of 5GW spelled by various think tanks, with a

view to determine future trends in warfare.

5. Scope . The paper will though refer all generations of warfare and its

genesis; an exclusive analysis will be carried out of recent world happenings in

21st century.

2 William S. Lind, Fifth Generation Warfare, Discussion [online available] http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_020304,00.htm 3William S. Lind and Colonel Nightingale, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation (US Marine Corps Gazette, February 1989) [available online] http://twm.co.nz/4thgenwar.htm

2

PART IEVOLUTION OF WARFARE

6. Genesis of Warfare 4 . Thinking about future of war requires careful

reflection on its past. The modern fascination with cutting edge technology and

its undeniable impact of war often obscures our view of war’s other dimensions.

Historians have widely noticed the social, political and economic factors in

shaping the evolution of conflict. Cultural and intellectual changes have played a

powerful role as thinking about the future have influenced the way we speculate

about war so much that we often use them.

7. Defining Generations of Warfare . If we look into historical

prospective we observe that the generational evolution in warfare was so abrupt

in one hand like advent of muskets or nuclear weapons and so smooth on the

other hand like terrorism. Thus global academia also differs widely in defining

border lines of these generational shifts. Above all some elements of one may

carry over to other generation.

a. First Generation . First generation warfare reflects tactics of the

era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. 

These tactics were developed partially in response to technological

factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to

generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social

conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary

armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training

levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the

4 Major Ajmal Nadeem, Next Generation of Warfare. (The Citadal No1/2010), P.21-22

3

replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of

first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently

encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield5.

b. Second Generation . Second generation warfare was a response

to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun,

and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and

they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to

prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line

advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change

from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire;

second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim,

"the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower

replaced massed manpower. While ideas played a role in the

development of second generation tactics (particularly the idea of

lateral dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change.6.

c. Second Generation . Third generation warfare was also a

response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the

driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a

contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World

War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on

maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first

truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and

5 Ibid.6 Ibid.

4

collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close

with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited

penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.  While the

basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end

of 1918, the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought

about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That

shift was blitzkrieg7.

d. Fourth Generation . This is perhaps the shortest era and can

be easily defined as transitional in nature. Where states took on

non-state actors or vice versa. A non-national or transnational

base, such as an ideology or religion; highly sophisticated

psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the

media, are key characteristics of this generation. In-fact, as W.S.

Lind and Colonel Nightingale predicted, it is idea of poor and low-

tech nations / groups fighting against technology of westernized

and developed nations.

e. Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks—political,

economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political

decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or

too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of

insurgency8.

7 Ibid.8 Colonel T. X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, (Military Review May-June 2007), P.14

5

8. While concluding above discussion one can safely say that first three

generations were technology or its anti-dote driven state VS state affairs. The

fourth generation saw active participation of non-state actors and other less lethal

means of combat. However, as this threatened civilian targets while bypassing

military it has urged for more rapid response and thus transform itself quickly.

9. Transition to next Generation 9 . Current events suggest that there

are a number of ongoing major developments in 4GW: a strategic shift, an

organizational shift, and a shift in type of participants.

a. Strategic Shift 10 . Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted

from military campaigns supported by information operations to

strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and

terrorist operations.

b. Organizational Shift 11 . The emergence of civil war as a part of

insurgency is based on the major organizational shift that has

occurred since Mao formulated his concept. It reflects the

continuous, worldwide shift from hierarchical to networked

organizations. While the Chinese and Vietnamese insurgencies

were hierarchies that reflected both the social organizations of

those societies and the dominant business and military

organizations of the time, recent insurgencies have been networked

coalitions of the willing.

9 Ibid, P.1410 Ibid, P.1511 Ibid, P.15-16

6

c. Shift in Participants 12 . Even within a single country, the highly

diverse armed groups that make up a modern insurgency have

widely differing motivations. These motivations can be reactionary,

opportunistic and ideological as well.

10. Fifth Generation Warfare . Evolution of 4th GW was comparatively

quick and has been the dominant form of warfare for many years, it’s time for 5 th

GW to make an appearance. We should be able to get some idea of what this

new form of war will be by examining how political, social, and economic systems

have changed since 4th GW became dominant. To deal with the numerous

changes in 4th GW, we will have to find new ways to provide that essential

security while building the political coalitions. First we must define what 5 th GW

will look like, here are some explanations from different military thinkers:-

a. Fifth-generation warfare will result from the continued shift of

political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be

marked by the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and

the explosion of biotechnology. 5GW will truly be a nets-and-jets

war: networks will distribute the key information, provide a source

for the necessary equipment and material, and constitute a field

from which to recruit volunteers; the jets will provide for worldwide,

inexpensive, effective dissemination of the weapons.13

b. Mark my post: this century is all about biology, rising food demand -

and thus dependencies exacerbated by climate change (see the

12 Ibid, P.16-1713 Ibid, P. 23

7

buying-up of arable land in Africa by Arab and Asian nations), and

thus biological terror comes to the fore. Forget about energy nets,

because they all go far more localized with smart grids, co-located

generation/distribution, etc. It's food that will be the most vulnerable

global network in the future14.

c. Things would be bad enough with just fourth generation opponents

but as the research on global guerrillas has borne out, a new more

dangerous generation is forming: potentially a 5th generation of

warfare. Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated

in cauldron of Iraq, just as the basis for 3rd generation of warfare

was proved out in the Spanish Civil war15.

d. Welcome to 5G warfare. There's a war going on in America today:

an information war, being waged digitally. It's not physically violent

— but it's culturally, socially, and economically violent. And its

ultimate goal is that of any war: political defeat. 4G war was

network against state. Think Al-Qaeda vs America. 5G war is

network against network, market against market, community

against community.16

14 http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/06/08/the-future-of-5th-generation-warfare-follow-the-food/#ixzz1aaS2mITi15 W.B.Lind, THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) [online available] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/the_changing_fa.html 16 Umair Haqque, Ten Rules of 5th GW,( Havard Business Review August, 2009), [online available] http://blogs.hbr.org/haque/2009/08/obamas_war_and_how_to_win_it.html

8

PART II21 ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT

“Military institutions and the manner in which they employ violence

depended on the economic, social and political conditions of their respective

states.”

Clausewitz17

11. The Gulf War . Everyone who has lived through the last decade of

the 20th century will have a profound sense of the changes in the world. We don't

believe that there is anyone who would claim that there has been any decade in

history in which the changes have been greater than those of this decade.

Naturally, the causes behind the enormous changes are too numerous to

mention, but there are only a few reasons that people bring up repeatedly. One

of those is the Gulf War. A war which changed the world ultimately changed war

itself. From this point on, war will no longer be what it was originally. Which is to

say that, if in the days to come mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it

can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we are familiar?18

12. The Century’s Trigger . No doubts, 9/11 can be called as an event that

triggers most of the happenings in the world in new century. It brought a

revolutionized change in global politics, economics, and relations and even in

definition and conduct of warfare. This event can also be defined as evolution

stage of fifth generation warfare from fourth one. In 1989, W.S Lind and his fellow

writers predicted; “We are not suggesting terrorism is the fourth generation. It is 17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1989), P6.18 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. (PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House. Beijing, February 1999), P.1

9

not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective. However,

what do we see if we combine terrorism with some of the new technology we

have discussed? For example, that effectiveness might the terrorist have if his

car bomb were a product of genetic engineering rather than high explosives?”19

13. Ingredients of 5 th GW . While we take a look at global developments

and military academia, it is obvious that elements of older generations of warfare

may continue in refined, modified, or original shape in new evolving generations.

This should not be surprising that countries those lack the political, social, and

economic systems to support new forms of war will continue to use the older

forms. Yet a new generation must also evolve and, given the fact that 4 th GW has

been the dominant form of warfare for over 50 years, it’s time for 5 th GW to make

an appearance. We should be able to get some idea of what this new form of war

will be by examining how political, social, and economic systems have changed

since 4th GW became dominant.20 Some prominent features of this generation

are:-

a. Participants . There have been major changes in who fights

wars. The trend has been and continues to be downward from

nation-states using huge, uniformed armies to small groups of like-

minded people with no formal organization who simply choose to

fight. We have slid so far away from national armies that often it is

impossible to differentiate fighters from simple criminal elements.

Many of the former are, in fact, criminal elements–either they use

19 W.S. Lind and others; The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation20 Colonel T. X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, (Military Review May-June 2007), P.20

10

crime to support their cause or they use their cause to legitimize

their crime.21

b. Communication . we have seen a steady increase in the power

of information. Insurgent groups have seized on the improving

information grid to execute the strategic communications

campaigns that are central to their victories. The content and

delivery of information has accordingly shifted from the mass

propaganda of Mao to highly tailored campaigns enabled by the

new methods of communication and new social patterns.

Insurgents have been quick to exploit such powerful communication

tools as the cell phone and the Internet for recruiting, training,

communicating, educating, and controlling new members. They

have shifted from mass mobilization to targeted individual

mobilization.22

c. Network Economics . As the economic of investors,

corporations and states has evolved into an interlinked complex

network; the clash of their interest is likely. This clash is not likely

to stage a physical and expensive show down; rather a cheaper

and discreet attack is more likely.

d. Cyber Wars . Today’s growing non-kinetic threats emerge from the

virtual, digital world of the Internet and social media. Consider the

potency of the data that Google houses. It has better data

21 Ibid. P 2122 Ibid. P.21

11

concerning the virtual world than the U.S. intelligence community

does.23 Anwar Awlaki, a Yemni leader of Al Qaeda is a great

example inthis regard. He demonstrated how effectively cyber

media could be used to radicalize susceptible audiences.

e. Shift in Social Sector . A major shift can be observed in

formation of communities. People are changing allegiance from

nations to causes, a trend dramatically accelerated by Internet

connectivity. In fact, many people are much more engaged in their

online causes than in their real-world communities.

f. Open Source Warfare . This is an ability to decentralize beyond the

limits of a single group (way beyond cell structures) using new

development and coordination methodologies. This new structure

doesn't only radically expand the number of potential participants, it

shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of viability.

This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new

entrants can appear anywhere. In London, Madrid, Berlin, and New

York.24

g. Systems Disruption . A method of sabotage that goes beyond the

simple destruction of physical infrastructure. This method of

warfare, which can burst onto the scene as a black swan, uses

network dynamics (a new form of leveraged manoeuvre) to

undermine and reorder global systems. It is through this

23 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/decades-terrorist-threat-5849 24 W.B.Lind, THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) [online available] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/the_changing_fa.html

12

Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that new environments

favourable to opposition forces are built (often due to a descent into

primary loyalties and pressure from global markets).25

h. Virtual States . Unlike the guerrilla movements of the past, many of

the 5th GW forces we are fighting today have found a way to

integrate their activities with global "crime." No longer are guerrilla

movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reigns of the

state or merely proxies for states. A new form of economic

sustenance has been found. This black globalization is already vast

and gains momentum through weakening and disruption of states.

This military/economic integration creates a virtuous feedback loop

that allows groups to gain greater degrees of independence and

financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.26

i. Another New Player: Private Military Companies . A largely

overlooked development in warfare is the exceptional increase in

the use of private military companies (PMCs). These organizations

have always been around, but during the last two decades they

have become central to the way the United States wages war.

There has been very little consideration given to how PMCs might

impact international relations in general and war in particular. While

US has focused on the monetary and political cost-cutting benefits

25 Ibid26 Ibid

13

of PMCs, other nations are discovering creative ways to use them

to avoid normal international constraints on the use of force.27

j. HAARP Technology . High Frequency Active Auroral

Research Program (HAARP) is a scientific endeavour [by US]

aimed at studying the properties and behaviour of the ionosphere,

with particular emphasis on being able to understand and use it to

enhance communications and surveillance systems for both civilian

and defence purposes. The HAARP antenna array consists of 180

antennas on a total land area of about 35 acres. The array, along

with its integrated transmitters, has a total radiated power capability

of about 3,600 kilowatts.28 Many scientists have researched and

displayed that this programme is making unprecedented changes in

climate and practically is a directed energy weapon.

k. Food as Weapon . Arab uprisings are clearly evident that food

prices and availability of food is going to be a major point of conflict

among communities and nations. Everybody thinks that the future

is going to see fights over energy, when it's far more likely to be

primarily over food.29 It is rightly said that next war in Indo-Pak

scenario would be on water disputes.

27 Colonel T. X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, (Military Review May-June 2007), P.2528 http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/gen.html 29 Thomas, P.M Barnett; the Future of Fifth Generation Warfare: Follow the Food [online] http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/06/08/the-future-of-5th-generation-warfare-follow-the-food/#ixzz1aaSAnMyG

14

PART III5GW IN PAKISTAN

14. Environments for Pakistan . India, US, Afghanistan, NATO, Kashmir,

War on terror, fundamentalists, sectarian divide, nuclear proliferation, derailed

economy, corruption, food and energy crisis, natural disasters, bad governance,

water crisis, sub-nationals, Raymond Davis, Osama operation, and off late NATO

attack on Salala check post. What else complexities are needed to define a

nation right into the most complicated war of the world. Present day challenges

for Pakistan are unprecedented among the nations. Pakistan is combating

against own allies of one front on another front. Are we in a 5th GW?

15. Challenges Ahead . The realization of this emerging/evolving

dimension of warfare can not be seen at any tier, whether political, economic, or

military. One argument could be that it does not matter whether it is 4 th GW or 5th

GW we should be adequate in our response. True even if we don’t name this

phenomenon as 5th GW, response to all emerging sit is warranted before hand.

We will take a look that today, our nation is confronted with what all specific and

non specific challenges:-

a. War on Terror vs National Interest . Former President Pervez

Musharraf has said that decision to join US-led war on terror was

taken in the larger interest of country and Pakistan would have

been ruined if it had chosen not to side with the United States post-

9/11 attacks. “I did not change our national policy merely on a

phone call, instead the decision was a ‘very thoughtful’ one,” he

15

added.30 The question arises, whether we are not ruined even after

taking that deliberate decision. Imran Khan, crickter turned

politician said, "The danger with America's war on terror in

Afghanistan was always that Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country of

170 million people, could be destabilised in the process, and that is

what's happening”31.

b. Water War . Per capita water availability in Pakistan has

decreased from 5,000 cubic meters per annum 1951 to 1,10032.

India is working on ‘Water Bomb’ strategy to strangle Pakistan

economically. Bhagliar dam has deprived Pakistan from 321,000

acres feet of water and adversely affected some 13 millions acres

of land around Ravi and Chenab rivers. It has become a defense

security concern as a number of canals, drains and artificial

distributaries used for irrigation are crucial during war time.33

c. Natural Disasters ? Pakistan has recently seen few great natural

disasters in a row. Earthquake followed by floods ruined the

economy of war torn country. Many believe that HAAPR is

responsible for this sudden, unpredicted and unprecedented

change in climate. “We have investigated this matter and concluded

that HAARP is being used in Pakistan and of course how can we

30 http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=94878 31 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/cricket/international/pakistan/6711498/Imran-Khan-on-how-the-war-on-terror-is-damaging-Pakistan.html 32 Water and Health Related issues in Pakistan, A special report published by: Freshwater & Toxics Program, WWF – Pakistan, P.133 Tufail Ahmed, Water Disputes between India and Pakistan, IPRI fact file 127 Pakistan water Concerns, IPRI Oct 2010. P.6

16

ignore India’s Baglihar & Kabul’s Sarobi Dams contribution in this

perfect plan! This Flood Disaster is More Manmade than Natural.

The choice of starting point was perfect.”34

d. Economy of War . During the last 10 years the direct and indirect

cost of war on terror incurred by Pakistan amounted to $ 67.93

billion or Rs.5037 billion. The events that transpired after 9/11 in

Afghanistan worsened the security environment in the country. As a

result, the western countries including the United States continued

to impose travel ban for their citizen (investor, importers etc.) to visit

Pakistan. This has affected Pakistan’s exports, prevented the

inflows of foreign investment, affected the pace of privatization

program, slowed the overall economic activity, reduced import

demand, reduced tax collection, expenditure over-run on additional

security spending, domestic tourism industry suffered badly,

destruction of physical infrastructure (military and civil) massive

surge in security related spending; migration of thousands of

people from war affected areas and the associated rise in

expenditure to support internally displaced persons.35

34 http://www.pakalertpress.com/2010/08/06/pakistan-flood-photos-haarp-fingerprints-found-allover/ 35 Cost of War on Terror for Pakistan Economy; Economic Survey 2010-11 by Ministry of Finance, Govt of Pakistan P 219.

17

PART IV

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. Realization . As we have seen that global environment, after Gulf War

and 9/11 has taken a dramatic change. Whether it is implementation of her New

World Order by world’s sole superpower or efforts to maintain their hegemony

over global economy by developed nations; an era of new warfare has begun. It

is imperative for the Government, scholars, economists, strategists, and above

all for military men to understand the change and adapt accordingly.

17. Response . In case, right realization is there it will bring out right

response. This evolving generation of warfare demands something extra then

routine strategic and military planning and preparation:-

a. National Strategy . Evolution of national strategy must take place

side by side with evaluating trends in warfare. National institutions Figure 1 : Feedback / Response Mechanism for Evolving National Strategy

18

like National Security Council (NSC) and Defence Cabinet

Committee must evolve a mechanism which should provide

constant feed back to these institutions. Independent think tanks

like Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and Islamabad

Strategic Studies Institute (ISSI) are best suited for the task.

Suggested feed back and response mechanism is shown in figure

1.

b. Speed of Information . Communication infrastructure and tools

should allow transmission of faster information: as close to real-

time as possible. A country should develop all modern and primitive

modes of communication to build a strategic economy. A forum be

formed to produce inter-ministerial level coordination in this field.

c. Strategic Economy . Economic infrastructure should be able

to defend itself against global recessions, enemies’ sabotage and

natural disasters. Economy should ensure continuous supply of

food and energy, as both will ensure sound economy in turn. It is

recommended that DCC or NSC should also consider such matters

as vital for country’s defence and must suggest policy guidelines to

all institutes, govt. departments and private sector as well.

d. Poly-Resource Ability . Resources of a nation must not only be

available in abundance but also be able to replace it with each

other. For example, if country is in shortage of food, its military or

19

diplomatic resource should be able to ensure uninterrupted supply

from other nations.

e. Information Control . Media policy and instrument has to be

designed that it should ensure national interest and also appear as

free and unbiased. As major chunk of this war is information

warfare, media and its use has to be given due importance.

f. Adaptable Military Muscle . Last but not the least, military

muscle should be strong, flexible enough to absorb and respond to

evolving trends in warfare.

18. Military Response . As discussed above, military muscle must be robust

and strong enough to respond to emerging threats. There is a large debate

among defence circles about conventional and unconventional responses. It is

immaterial, whether threat is conventional or unconventional we have to respond.

Rather it is suggested that today 5th GW threats are conventions of the day and

more focus be placed on these.

19. Conclusion . Drawing on changes in the political, economic, social, and

technical fields, 1GW culminated in the massed-manpower armies of the

Napoleonic era. In the same way, 2GW used the evolution to an industrial society

to make firepower the dominant form of war. Next, 3GW took advantage of the

political, economic, and social shifts from an industrial to a mechanical era to

make mechanized warfare dominant. Fourth-generation warfare uses all the

shifts from a mechanical to an information/electronic society to maximize the

power of insurgency. It continues to evolve along with our society as a whole,

20

thus making 4th GW increasingly dangerous and difficult for Western nations to

deal with.

20. Fifth-generation warfare will result from the continued shift of political and

social loyalties to causes rather than nations. It will be marked by the increasing

power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of biotechnology. 5GW

will truly be a nets-and-jets war. Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and

implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a

nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic

defeat.

21