Field Studies of French and Raven's Bases of Power ...€¦ · French and Raven's (1959)...

Psychological Bulletin1985, Vol. 97, No. 3,387-411

Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-2909/85/S00.75

Field Studies of French and Raven's Bases of Power: Critique,Reanalysis, and Suggestions for Future Research

Philip M. PodsakoffDepartment of Administrative

and Behavioral StudiesIndiana University

Chester A. SchriesheimManagement Department

University of Florida

Among the most widely used conceptualizations of social power is the five-foldtypology developed by French and Raven in 1959, and numerous field studieshave used this conceptualization over the past few decades. Unfortunately,however, a majority of them suffer from severe methodological shortcomings thatmake their interpretation problematic at best. In this article, we discuss theseproblems and present a reanalysis of the literature, which strongly suggests thatat least some of our knowledge about the five bases of power is methodologicallysuspect. Following this, we also present and discuss suggestions for improvingfuture research in this domain.

Social power and influence processes haveoccupied a central place in psychologicaltheories over the past few decades, perhapsmost notably in the areas of industrial/organizational and social psychology. Un-doubtedly, among the most popular andwidely accepted conceptualizations of socialpower is the five-fold typology developed byFrench and Raven in 1959. In fact, despiterecent criticisms that have been advancedagainst this conceptualization (e.g., Kipnis &Schmidt, 1983; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkin-son, 1980), the French and Raven typologyis widely used. For example, a survey of theauthors' bookshelves disclosed that it wasincluded in every survey textbook in theareas of organizational behavior and socialpsychology!

An examination of the research literaturealso discloses that numerous studies haveused French and Raven's typology. However,only field studies seem to have used explicitand complete operationalizations of theFrench and Raven framework. Although ex-perimental studies often mention the Frenchand Raven power bases, such studies eitherinvestigate only a subset of the five power

The helpful comments of Jack M. Feldman and JohnO. Summers are gratefully acknowledged.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Philip M.Podsakoff, Department of Administrative and BehavioralStudies, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University,Bloomington, Indiana 47405.

bases, or they do not examine the effects ofthe power bases on subordinate outcomevariables. Thus, experimental research in thisdomain is not comparable with the fieldresearch and, being more limited in scopeand applicability to organizational settings, isnot reviewed here.

A close examination of those field studiesthat have examined the effects of the Frenchand Raven power bases, however, surprisinglycontradicts research from field studies in ahighly related area: the effects of supervisoryor leader reward and punishment behavioron subordinate performance, satisfaction, andother outcomes (PodsakofF & Schriesheim,1984). Briefly, the majority of these laterstudies (cf. Greene, 1976; Hunt & Schuler,1976; Podsakoff & Todor, in press; Podsakoff,Todor, Grover, & Huber, 1984; Podsakoff,Todor, & Skov, 1982; Sims, 1977; Sims &Szilagyi, 1975; Szilagyi, 1980a, 1980b) indi-cate that a positive relation exists betweenleader reward behavior and subordinate out-come variables, whereas field studies usingthe French and Raven (1959) frameworkgenerally show supervisory reward behaviorto be unrelated, or negatively related, tosubordinate outcome variables (e.g., Bach-man, 1968; Bachman, Bowers, & Marcus,1968; Bachman, Smith, & Slesinger, 1966;Burke & Wilcox, 1971; Cope, 1972; Martin&Hunt, 1980;Slocum, 1970; Wieland, 1969).Yukl (1981), summarizing a more limited setof studies using the French and Raven typol-

387

388 PHILIP M. PODSAKOFF AND CHESTER A. SCHRIESHEIM

ogy than we reviewed,1 concluded that "theresults for use of reward power were quiteinconsistent, with no clear trend across stud-ies" (p. 39), and that "the lack of clearassociation between use of reward power andleader effectiveness is inconsistent with thefindings of some other research on leadershipand motivation" (p. 42).

Discovery of these contradictory findings,as well as our later reading of the Yukl (1981)review, prompted us to reexamine the empir-ical evidence from the field studies that usedthe French and Raven typology. Interestingly,this reanalysis led us to the conclusion thatmuch of the research that purportedly testsFrench and Raven's (1959) conceptualizationof social power suffers from severe method-ological shortcomings, and the seeming dis-crepancy in findings between this researchand related research in the leadership domainmay be more apparent than real.

The first part of our review outlines theFrench and Raven typology and discusses theinstruments that have been used to measurethe five power bases in field research. Thefindings of those studies that used these in-struments are then reviewed. Next, method-ological problems inherent in most of thesestudies are discussed, and a reanalysis of theresearch findings is presented. Following this,improved techniques for the measurementand assessment of the effects of social powerare discussed. Several general concerns thatshould be considered in future research inthe area of social power are also addressed.

Theoretical Definitions and Scale Content

In their original article, French and Raven(1959) identified five bases of power whichan agent, O, can exert over a person, P.These bases of power were reward power,coercive power, legitimate power, expertpower, and referent power. The theoreticaldefinitions of each power base are given inTable 1. Not given in this table is a sixthtype of influence—informational influence—which was also discussed by French andRaven but not classified as one of the primarybases of power.

With the exception of one study (Warren,1968), three instruments (or slight modifica-tions of these instruments) have been used to

measure French and Raven's bases of powerin field settings. The first and perhaps themost prominent of these scales, was developedby Bachman et al. (1966). The other twomeasures—one developed by Student (1968)and the other by Thamhain and Gemmill(1974)—represent slightly modified versionsof this original scale. Each of these scales isalso presented in Table 1. Likert or otherinterval-type response categories have usuallynot been used with these measures. Instead,the scale items are typically presented torespondents as a set, and each respondentrank orders the scale items according to howdescriptive they are of the reasons for com-plying with directives or suggestions from thesupervisor.

After perusing Table 1, it is evident thatthere are many similarities between the scalesdeveloped by Bachman et al. (1966), Student(1968), and Thamhain and Gemmill (1974);perhaps the greatest similarity is betweenBachman et al.'s and Student's scales. Acloser examination of this table, however, alsoindicates a major problem with these scales,which have been used to assess social power.When we compared them with French andRaven's (1959) theoretical definitions, it isobvious that each scale has questionable con-tent validity. For example, French and Raven's(1959) definition seems to suggest that rewardpower stems from <7s ability to control legit-imate, valent rewards for P. However, Bach-man et al.'s and Student's operationalizationsof this power base imply that rewards aregenerally used by O in an illegitimate manneras a form of payoff to P for complying withO's requests. Additionally, it can be seen fromTable 1 that all three reward power scalesuse very limited conceptualizations of re-

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' Yukl (1981) reviewed 11 of the 18 studies discussedin this article. Yukl omitted 4 that were published priorto his writing (Bachman et al., 1968; Burke & Wilcox,1971; Cope, 1972; Wieland, 1969), and 3 studies werepublished subsequently (Busch, 1980; Cobb, 1980; Martin& Hunt, 1980). Although noting this inconsistency, wealso note that Yukl did not attempt to draw any majorsubstantive conclusions from the literature, nor did hedo more than suggest that "the possibility of biasedresults in the power usage literature . . . might be dueto respondent 'attribution bias' " (p. 42), causing thenoted inconsistency in obtained results.

BASES OF POWER 389

Table 1Comparison of Various Operationalizations of French and Raven's (1959) Power Bases

Study Power base description

French & Raven(1959)

Bachman et al.(1966)

Student (1968)

Thamhain &Gemmill(1974)"

Reward power

Reward power is denned as power whose basis is the ability to reward. The strengthof the reward power of O/P increases with the magnitude of the rewards which Pperceives that O can mediate for him. Reward power depends on O's ability toadminister positive valences and to remove or decrease negative valences. Thestrength of reward power also depends upon the probability that O can mediatethe reward, as perceived by P. (p. 156)

"He can give special help and benefits to those who cooperate with him." (p. 130)

"I comply with my supervisor's directives because he can give special help andbenefits to those who cooperate with him. (p. 190)

"I feel he can influence my salary." (p. 218)



Student (1968)

Thamhain &Gemmill(1974)a

Coercive/punishment power

Coercive power is similar to reward power in that it also involves O's ability tomanipulate the attainment of valences. Coercive power of O/P stems from theexpectation on the part of P that he will be punished by O if he fails to conformto the influence attempt. Thus, negative valences will exist in given regions of P'slife space, corresponding to the threatened punishment by O. The strength ofcoercive power depends on the magnitude of the negative valence of thethreatened punishment multiplied by the perceived probability that P can avoidthe punishment by conformity (i.e., the probability of punishment fornonconformity minus the probability of punishment for conformity), (p. 157)

"He can apply pressure or penalize those who do not cooperate." (p. 130)

"I comply with my supervisor's directives because he can penalize or make thingsdifficult for those who do not cooperate with him." (p. 190)

"If feel he can apply pressure or penalize me in some way." (p. 219)

Legitimate power

French & Raven Legitimate power of O/P is here defined as that power which stems from(1959) internalized values in P which dictate that O has a legitimate right to influence

P and that P has an obligation to accept this influence. We note that legitimatepower is very similar to the notion of legitimacy of authority which has longbeen explored by sociologists, particularly by Weber and more recently byGoldhammer and Shils. However, legitimate power is not always a role relation:

(table continued)


Table 1 (continued)



Student (1968)


Legitimate power

P may accept an induction from O simply because he previously promised tohelp O, and he values his word too much to break the promise. In all cases, thenotion of legitimacy involves some sort of code or standard, accepted by theindividual, by virtue of which the external agent can assert his power, (p. 159)

"He has a legitimate right, considering his position, to expect that his suggestionswill be carried out." (p. 130)

"I comply with my supervisor's directives because he has a right, considering hisposition, to expect subordinates to do what he wants." (p. 190)

•'I feel he has the formal authority." (p. 218)



Student (1968)


Expert power

The strength of the expert power of O/P varies with the extent of the knowledge orperception that P attributes to O within a given area. Probably P evaluates O'sexpertness in relation to personal knowledge as well as against an absolutestandard, (p. 163)

"I respect his competence and good judgment about things with which he is moreexperienced than I." (p. 130)

"I comply with my supervisor's directives because I respect his experience andgood judgement, (p. 190)

"I respect him and place confidence in his special knowledge and advice." (p. 219)

Referent power

French & Raven The referent power of O/P has its basis in the identification of P with O. By(1959) identification, we mean a feeling of oneness of P with O, or a desire for such an

identity. If O is a person toward whom P is highly attracted P will have a desireto become closely associated with O. If O is an attractive group, P will have afeeling of membership or desire to join. If P is already closely associated with Ohe will want to maintain this relationship. P's identification with O can beestablished or maintained if P behaves, believes, and perceives as O does . . . toinfluence P, even though P may be unaware of this referent power. The strongerthe identification of P with O the greater the referent power of O/P. (p. 161-162)

Bachman et al. "I admire him for his personal qualities, and want to act in a way that merits his(1966) respect and admiration."

(P. 130)Student (1968) "I comply with my supervisor's directives because he is a 'nice guy' and I don't

want to hurt him." (p. 190)

BASES OF POWER 391

Table 1 (continued)



Referent power

"He has established a personal friendship with me." (p. 219)

Note. O = agent; P = person.a This instrument included additional items not considered here. These other items either did not directlyassess the French and Raven power bases or subsequent research has not used them. There are twoadditional items that relate to reward power but, consistent with Yukl (1981), these items were notreported here, because Thamhain and Gemill (1974) treated these scales separately.

wards. Bachman et al. and Student measuredonly help and benefits, whereas Thamhainand Gemmill assessed only salary. As shownin Table 1, French and Raven used a broadconceptualization of reward power, and itseems unlikely that any of the three opera-tionalizations adequately tap the content do-main of the reward power construct. Becausecontent validity depends on the inclusion ofan adequate sample of a construct's theoret-ical domain, as well as the exclusion ofextraneous content (Nunnally, 1978), it seemsthat all three reward power scales have ques-tionable content validity, at best.

We are not the first to recognize the poten-tial problems with these measures of rewardpower. Indeed, in the initial article in whichthey first reported the results using theirreward power scale, Bachman et al. (1966)noted that:

The negative relationship between the use of rewardpower and our measures of effectiveness requires furtherexplanation. We stated earlier that reward power mightbe associated with supportive or ego-enhancing practicesof management . . . However, it may be that manyemployees are ambivalent about the use of reward powerby their supervisor. It may be well to reward someonefor a job well done, but rewards may also be perceivedas bribes, pay-offs, favoritism and the like. The phraseused in the present study, "He can give special help andbenefits to those who cooperate with him" may haveimplied the latter type of reward, (p. 135)

However, despite this recognition of a seriousshortcoming in their reward power scale,neither Bachman (Bachman, 1968; Bachmanet al., 1968) nor other, subsequent, researchershave revised the scale to include more theo-retically valid item content.

Similar content validity problems exist forthe other power measures as well. All threecoercive power measures displayed in Table1 suggest that a leader can apply pressure orpenalize those individuals who do not coop-erate. These items, however, are ambiguousas to whether or not the leader's request isconsidered legitimate by the subordinate. Thisis highly problematic as there is a substantialamount of evidence indicating that whenpunishment is administered appropriately(i.e., contingent upon poor performance) andin concert with the use of contingent rewards,such punishment is positively related fo sub-ordinate performance and satisfaction. How-ever, when punishment is inappropriatelyadministered (not contingent upon per-formance), the relation is negative or nonsig-nificant (cf. Podsakoff et al., 1984; Podsakoffet al., 1982). These findings, then, suggestthat appropriateness or legitimacy must beaddressed in coercive power scales. Whencoercive power or punishment is perceived asappropriate, it is likely to have functionaleffects; when it is inappropriate, it has no or


negative effects. The operationalizations ofcoercive power presented in Table 1, however,do not make it clear as to whether this powerbase is used for legitimate or appropriatereasons (e.g., poor performance) or for ille-gitimate reasons (e.g., the use of coercivetechniques when a subordinate refuses to dosomething the supervisor requests but whichis against company policy). Thus, these scalesallow for too much interpretation by respon-dents and have poor item content. Addition-ally, as with the reward power scales, thecoercive power scales use a very narrow op-erationalization of the broad French andRaven conceptualization. Therefore, they donot seem to tap adequately the content do-main of this construct.

Examination of the three operationaliza-tions of legitimate power also discloses thislater problem: a very narrow operationaliza-tion of a broad construct. French and Raven(1959) clearly noted that legitimate powerinvolves more than just position power or"authority" (see the definition in Table 1).However, all three legitimate power scales useonly very narrow item content. The expertpower measures suifer from a similar problem.Here, all three scales assess competence basedupon experience and judgment. Other expertsources, such as training and access to knowl-edge (technical and other), are not assessed.Finally, similar questions regarding contentvalidity can be raised with respect to Student's(1968) and Thamhain and Gemmill's (1974)measures of referent power. French and Ra-ven's (1959) definition of referent power sug-gests that a crucial component of this powerbase is an identification or feeling of onenessof P with O. Although the measures of Stu-dent and Thamhain and Gemmill suggestthat P likes or is friendly with O, they do notappear to capture the same intensity of iden-tification as suggested by French and Raven.

Review of the Literature

The brief discussion just presented stronglysuggests that there are severe problems withthe way in which French and Raven's fivebases of power have been operationalized,and more is said concerning the issue of

content validity later. The previous analysisof scale item content, however, shows thatthe three major power base measures arevery similar operationalizations and, hence,that empirical results obtained from their useshould be additive and comparable. Table 2provides a summary of the existing researchon the effects of the five power bases; itconsolidates what is known and serves asbackground for further discussion and cri-tique.2 The following discussion summarizesTable 2 by presenting results according todependent or criterion variables used. Somenotable features of a few of the studies arealso discussed to provide additional back-ground information where needed. Addition-ally, it should be noted that, with a fewexceptions, there are three characteristicscommon to all of the studies presented inTable 2. First, the majority of these studiesused single-item operationalizations of eachof French and Raven's bases of power. Second,with the exception of studies by Bachman etal. (1968; Samples 3 and 4), Busch (1980),Cobb (1980), Hammer (1978), Martin andHunt (1980), and Warren (1968), all haveused the rank-order scale format that wasmentioned earlier.3 Finally, the majority ofthese studies used grouped, averaged, or ag-gregated data rather than individual-level datafor their analyses (see Table 2 for specifics).The importance of each characteristic is dis-cussed later.

Performance RelationAs shown in Table 2, seven studies inves-

tigated relations between French and Raven's

2 Because of space constraints, a narrative summaryof these results is not provided herein. Copies of anarrative summary are available from the authors uponrequest.

'It should perhaps be noted that Sheridan and Vre-denburgh (1978) used a pair-comparison modification ofBachman et al.'s (1966) scales. As discussed by Guilford(1954), rank-order responses can be considered as specialcases of pair comparisons, where transitivity is forcedupon the respondents. For this reason, the Sheridan andVredenburgh (1978) study may be considered as havingused a variant of the Bachman et al. (1966) rank-orderscales, and our subsequent consideration of this studytreats it as one that used a rank-order response format.

BASES OF POWER 393

bases of power and subordinate performance.Six of them (Bachman et al., 1966; Ivancevich& Donnelly, 1970; Student, 1968; Slocum,1970; Thamhain & Gemmill, 1974; Sheridan& Vredenburgh, 1978) used rank-order powerscales; Bachman et al. (1968; Samples 3 and4) used single-item Likert scales.

The power-performance results summa-rized in Table 2 suggest that reward powertends to be negatively related or unrelated toperformance, as are coercive and legitimatepower. Expert and referent power, in contrast,tend to be positively related or unrelated.These relations appear to hold regardless ofwhether the performance criterion is a super-visor-provided rating or a more objectiveindicator. However, it should be noted thatthe one Likert-type scale study in this domain(Bachman et al., 1968) produced results thatare more supportive of reward and coercivepower as having more positive or less negativerelations with subordinate performance. Thisis suggestive of measurement format effects,which we consider in greater depth later inthis review.

Satisfaction With Supervision

Six studies (Bachman, 1968; Bachman etal., 1968; Bachman et al., 1966; Burke &Wilcox, 1971; Busch, 1980; Slocum, 1970)examined relations between the French andRaven power bases and subordinate satisfac-tion with supervision. The results of thesestudies are clear and unambiguous with re-spect to expert and referent power, whereonly positive relations have been obtained,and with respect to coercive power, whererelations have been either negative or nonsig-nificant. The results for reward and legitimatepower, however, are not as clear-cut. All buttwo of the reported relations for reward powerhave been negative or nonsignificant. However,the only two studies that used Likert-typescales (Bachman et al., 1968; Busch, 1980)obtained the two positive results. Similarly,the majority of the legitimate power-supervi-sory satisfaction relations reported to dateare negative or nonsignificant. However, thetwo Likert-scale studies reported only positive

or nonsignificant results. Thus, it seems safeto draw conclusions about the relations be-tween coercive, expert, and referent powerand supervisory satisfaction, but not aboutreward and legitimate power. Scale formateffects may, in fact, produce distorted results.

Job and Other Satisfactions

Eight of the studies shown in Table 2examined relations between various nonsu-pervisory satisfactions and the five Frenchand Raven (1959) power bases. Job-satisfac-tion relations were explored by Bachman(1968), Slocum (1970), Burke and Wilcox(1971), Cope (1972), Dunne, Stahl, and Mel-hart (1978), and Martin and Hunt (1980).Overall organizational satisfaction relationswere examined by Bachman et al. (1968;Sample 5), Slocum (1970), and Burke andWilcox (1971). Finally, Ivancevich (1970) ex-amined relations for satisfaction with freedomand pay, and Burke and Wilcox (1971) studiedclimate for growth and helping relations.Only one of these studies (Martin & Hunt,1980) used a nonranking scale format tomeasure the five bases of power.

In general, the results presented in Table2 show that reward power is not significantlycorrelated with nonsupervisory satisfactions(20 of the 25 correlations are nonsignificant),although Bachman (1968) obtained some (2)negative relations, and Ivancevich (1970) ob-tained a few (3) positive ones. A similar trendexists for legitimate power, where most (21of 25) relations are nonsignificant, and thereis one negative (Burke & Wilcox, 1971) andthree positive (Cope, 1972; Ivancevich, 1970;Martin & Hunt, 1980) relations among fourstudies.

The obtained relations turn a bit morepronounced for coercive and referent power.For coercive power, most of the obtainedrelations (18 of 25) are nonsignificant, butone positive and some (6) negative relationswere found in two studies (Burke & Wilcox,1971; Slocum, 1970). For referent power,most (18 of 25) of the relations were nonsig-nificant, but some (7) were positive in fourdifferent studies (Burke & Wilcox, 1971;

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Dunne et al., 1978; Ivancevich, 1970; Martin& Hunt, 1980). Finally, the results becameabout evenly divided between nonsignificant(11 of 25) and positive (14 of 25) for expertpower; all but one study (Bachman et al.,1968; Sample 5) reported at least one positivecorrelation.

Behavioral and Attitudinal Withdrawaland Commitment

Withdrawal behavor. Student (1968) andIvancevich and Donnelly (1970) explored re-lations among the five power bases and ab-sence and turnover of subordinates usingrank-order scales. Student (1968) found norelations among the five power bases andbetween unexcused absences and turnover.However, expert and referent power werenegatively correlated with excused absencesfor his sample of production workers. Theseresults were replicated exactly by Ivancevichand Donnelly (1970) for the same three de-pendent variables and a sample of salespeople,except that a negative correlation was alsofound between unexcused absences and ref-erent power. These results, then, suggest thatexpert and referent power may be negativelyassociated with employee withdrawal behav-iors, and that the three other power basesseem generally unrelated.

Withdrawal attitudes and intent. Threestudies (Bachman, 1968; Busch, 1980; Martin& Hunt, 1980) explored relations betweenthe five bases of power and employee with-drawal attitudes and intent to leave theirorganizations. Bachman (1968) and Martinand Hunt (1980) obtained largely nonsignif-icant results, suggesting a lack of relationsbetween power bases and withdrawal attitudesand intent. Busch (1980), however, reportedsome significant relations, using Likert-formatscales in his study of three companies. Legit-imate power had a negative relation withintent to leave the organization in one com-pany, referent power had a negative relationin two companies, and expert power hadnegative relations in all three companies.Overall, these results seem to suggest thatreward, coercive, and legitimate power aregenerally unrelated to withdrawal attitudesand intent, but that referent and expert powersometimes are negatively related.


Support of supervisor and work commit-ment. Thambain and Gemmill (1974) andDunne et al. (1978) examined relations be-tween managers' influence methods and thesame three dependent variables: the degreeof support the managers received from theirsubordinates, the degree to which the subor-dinates were willing to disagree with themanagers, and the degree to which the sub-ordinates felt involved in their jobs and workprojects. Both used rank-order scales andobtained similar results. Only expert powerhad moderately consistent (positive) relationswith the three criterion variables. Reward,coercive, legitimate and referent power wereeither totally or largely unrelated.

Conformity and Influence

Warren (1968) examined relations betweenthe five French and Raven bases of powerand subordinate conformity and attitude so-cialization, whereas Cobb (1980) studiedFrench and Raven's bases of power in relationto informal upward and lateral influence.Overall, the results of these two studies suggestthat reward, legitimate, expert, and referentpower have generally positive relations withconformity and influence, and that coercivepower has no relations with lateral or upwardinfluence but a positive association with con-formity in general. Additionally, none of thefive power bases seem to have significantnegative relations with conformity and influ-ence; this is something one would expect,given that power is an influence process aimedat obtaining conformity on the part of oneor more others.

Goal and Role Clarity

Using rank-order scales, Wieland (1969)examined relations between social power basesand goal clarity. He found that a dean's useof reward, coercive, and legitimate power wasnegatively related to faculty members' per-ceptions of goal clarity, whereas expert andreferent power were positively related. Addi-tionally, faculty use of reward and coercivepower was negatively related to goal clarity,whereas expert power was positively related.

If one assumes that goal clarity is a sub-component of role clarity, then Busch (1980),using Likert-type scales, obtained somewhatconflicting results. Reward power was nonsig-nificantly related to role clarity in all threecompanies examined, and legitimate powerhad positive relations in two companies.However, the results for coercive, expert, andreferent power did not depart markedly fromthose of Wieland (1969).

Overall, these results thus suggest that ex-pert and referent power may be generallyassociated with task-related clarity for sub-ordinates, and that legitimate power appearsto be either negatively related or unrelated.The results for reward and legitimate power,however, are not so clear, because scale formateffects (or other study differences) may haveaffected these studies' results. In the case ofreward power, it seems safe to say that theresults suggest a negative or nonsignificantrelation with subordinate task-related clarity,but no such statement can be made forlegitimate power (with positive, negative, andnonsignificant relations obtained).

Miscellaneous Criterion Variables

Sheridan and Vredenburgh (1978) exam-ined relations between the five bases of powerand job tension. Coercive power was positivelyassociated with tension, and expert powerwas negatively related. Neither reward, legit-imate, or referent power obtained significantcorrelations.

Hammer (1978) assessed relations betweensupervisory use of power and local construc-tion union strength. Union strength was mea-sured by two indexes: (a) the relative wagerate of a local union compared with otherunions, and (b) the percentage of constructionworkers in each local's geographical area whobelonged to the union. Reward and referentpower were negatively related to relative wagerate, whereas legitimate power was positivelyrelated. Only expert power was found to berelated to union density (negatively).

Power Base Importance forSubordinate Compliance

Before summarizing all of the researchresults presented previously and in Table 2,

BASES OF POWER 401

it seems worthwhile briefly to note again thatmany of these studies asked subordinates torank order the five power bases according towhich was most important (1) and which wasleast important (5) in securing their compli-ance or cooperation with requests from theirsupervisors. The results of these studies, re-ported across 10 studies and 12 samples orsubsamples, were all markedly consistent.

All of the studies produced rankings of 1or 2 for both legitimate and expert power,except for the Dunne et al. (1978) projectmanager subsample, which produced a rank-ing of 3 for legitimate power (yielding meanrankings of 1.5 and 1.6 for expert and legiti-mate power, respectively). Referent powerreceived rankings of 3 and 4, except for theDunne et al. (1978) project manager samplewhere a rank of 2 was obtained (mean rankfor referent power across the 12 samples/subsamples was 3.3). Finally, reward powerreceived an equal number of rankings of 3,4, and 5 (producing an overall mean rankingof 4.0), whereas coercive power received eightrankings of 5, three of 4, and one of 3(yielding a mean ranking of 4.6). Thus, theseresults clearly show that subordinates consis-tently report that expert and legitimate powerare the strongest reasons for their complyingwith supervisory requests, that referent poweris intermediate as a reason, that reward poweris a relatively weak reason, and that coercivepower is the least important reason why theyreport complying with supervisory requests.

Summary of Empirical Findings

Overall, the field studies of social powerdiscussed previously and summarized in Table2 appear to have yielded fairly consistentfindings. In general, the results seem to suggestthat expert and referent power are generallypositively related to functional subordinatecriterion variables (e.g., subordinate perfor-mance, satisfaction with supervision, job sat-isfaction) or, at the least, are unrelated. How-ever, reward, coercive, and legitimate powerare generally negatively related, or are unre-lated, to these same criterion variables. Thereare, however, several problems with thesestudies, one of which has been mentioned

several times (possible scale format effects),making the drawing of any firm conclusionshighly questionable. These problems—alongwith a reanalysis of these studies, whichproduces some very different conclusions—are considered in the following section.

Critique and Reanalysis of the Literature

Domain Sampling Adequacy

One problem with the literature previouslysummarized should be apparent from ourearlier discussion concerning the content va-lidity of the various scales that have beenused to operationalize French and Raven's(1959) bases of power. As noted earlier, vir-tually all of these scales use very narrowoperationalizations of theoretically broadconcepts, and several items on some of thescales seem to imply extraneous content orbe unnecessarily vague and open to differentinterpretations by different respondents. This,of course, raises the question of whether thesestudies speak directly to the French andRaven conceptualizations, and it must benoted that improved measurement is clearlyneeded if we are able to say anything withconfidence concerning the impact of the fivepower bases on subordinate outcome vari-ables.

A second and related problem with thesocial power scales reported in Table 1 andused in the studies of Table 2 is that themajority are composed of one item each.The problems raised by the use of single-item scales are numerous and have been dulynoted by many researchers (cf. Churchill,1979; Cobb, 1980; Jacoby, 1978; Nunnally,1978; Peter, 1979; Ryan & Bonfield, 1975).First, the use of one-item scales generallyassumes that (a) the single item used tomeasure a construct is its best operationaliza-tion, (b) the construct to be measured isfactorially simple (i.e., not complex), and (c)all of the respondents interpret the item inthe same manner. All of these assumptionsappear quite tenuous in the current context,particularly because of the ambiguity thatexists in some of the items and because theoperationalizations seem too narrow when


compared with the original descriptions pro-vided by French and Raven (1959). Thisconclusion is also supported by a number offactor-analytic studies of leader reward andpunishment behaviors (e.g., Podsakoff et al.,1984;Reitz, 1971; Sims, 1977), which suggestthat reward and coercive power are not uni-dimensional (see Podsakoff & Schriesheim,1984, for a review). Second, it is not possibleto assess the internal consistency reliabilityof single-item scales. However, such measuresare generally considered unreliable becausethey do not permit measurement errors tocancel out against each other (cf. Peter, 1979;Ryan & Bonfield, 1975). Because Schwab(1980) and others noted that estimates ofinternal consistency are a necessary prereq-uisite for establishing the empirical constructvalidity of a measure, the inability to obtainthese estimates is especially troublesome. Fi-nally, Nunnally (1978) noted that a lack ofreliability in measurement may attenuate orobscure relations between variables. This sug-gests that the use of one-item scales may havelessened the obtained relations between thefive measures of social power and the varioussubordinate criterion variables. Formulas de-signed to permit corrections for unreliabilityattenuation do, of course, exist (cf. Nunnally,1978, pp. 219-220). Unfortunately, however,the application of these formulas is oftenquestionable (Nunnally, 1978), and in anycase these formulas require estimates of scalereliabilities before they can be used.

Response Bias Potential

Another problem with the measures usedin the studies summarized previously is thatno attempt has been made to assess the rolethat social desirability or attribution biasmight play in respondents' replies to thesescales. Crowne and Marlowe (1964) describedsocial desirability biases as the result of "aneed for social approval and acceptance bymeans of culturally acceptable and appropri-ate behaviors" (p. 109). Recently, severalauthors (e.g., Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Ed-wards, 1970; Ganster, Hennessey, & Luthans,1983; Schriesheim & Kerr, 1974, 1977; Tho-

mas & Kilmann, 1975) noted that in thesame way an individual's needs for socialapproval and acceptance may elicit idealizedself-descriptions, these needs may also bias arespondent's answers to other items that areperceived as having more or less social desir-ability. This concern would appear to beparticularly relevant in the case of the poweroperationalizations shown in Table 1. It ap-pears logical that most respondents wouldnot readily admit that they do what theirsupervisor requests primarily because theyreceive more bribes or payoffs or are able toavoid being punished. Such responses wouldprobably not be seen as very socially desirable.Alternatively, it appears logical for respondentsto say that they comply with their supervisor'srequests because the supervisor is an expert,is competent, or is a nice person. Such re-sponses would be viewed as socially desirablebecause, in large part, they make it appearas though the respondent is rational andethical and responds to others under normsof reciprocity. These social desirability expec-tations are fully met by the importance rank-ings discussed earlier and summarized inTable 2. As mentioned, legitimate and expertpower were consistently ranked as the mostimportant power sources (reasons subordi-nates gave for complying with their supervi-sors' requests) in the 10 studies and 12 sam-ples/subsamples that presented such infor-mation. Reward and coercive power, incontrast, were consistently ranked least im-portant.

The problem with the power measures'susceptibility to social desirability responsebias is further magnified by the fact thatmany of the criterion measures used in thesestudies (e.g., satisfaction) may also be affectedby this bias. (It is more socially acceptable todescribe oneself as "satisfied" than as "dis-satisfied.") Thus, spurious power-outcomecorrelations may be generated by social de-sirability for some dependent variables. Also,as Yukl (1981) suggested, it is possible thatrespondents who are more satisfied are alsomore likely to attribute their satisfaction tothe use of "socially desirable" power basesby their supervisors, resulting in spuriousrelations due to attributional biases.

BASES OF POWER 403

Inappropriate Measurement Referent

It was mentioned earlier, but not dweltupon, that all of the extant measures of thefive French and Raven power bases ask re-pondents to describe (by ranking or rating)why they comply with requests from theirsupervisors. These instructions thus causerespondents to use an attributional referent(why I comply) in completing such measures,rather than a behavioral referent (how mysupervisor acts). Such a procedure mightenhance the social desirability effects previ-ously suggested. In any event, it makes theinterpretation of data collected by it difficult.Such data are usually interpreted as thoughthey were subordinate perceptions of super-visory behavior, but clearly they are not. Weare unsure of how such data are best inter-preted, and this is clearly not a satisfactorysituation. In any event, such a descriptionreferent makes the use of compliance-relateddependent variables redundant. Other attitu-dinal dependent variables (such as satisfactionwith supervision) may also be, at least partly,redundant with such attributionally anchoredmeasures.

Data-Analytic Shortcomings

A further problem with drawing inferencesfrom the results reported in Table 2 is thatthe majority of these studies used groupedscores to analyze the relations between socialpower and subordinate criterion variables. Inthis form of analysis, the scores of the sub-ordinates of each supervisor are added to-gether and then divided by the number ofindividuals who comprise the group or unit.Several researchers (cf. Dansereau, Alutto,Markham, & Dumas, 1982; Dansereau &Dumas, 1977) noted that the use of thistechnique assumes that the leader respondsto all subordinates in a similar manner, whichis a highly tenuous assumption. Moreover,another problem with this averaging processis that it may actually serve to mask or washout important relations that do exist. Aver-aging is also questionable, due to the natureof some of the dependent variables used in

some of the studies (e.g., job satisfaction),because the conceptual interpretation of suchaveraged measures is unclear at best. Finally,averaging is particularly unsound when rank-order data are involved, and such averagingmay be methodologically indefensible (Nun-nally, 1978).

Another data-analytic problem encounteredin attempting to interpret the results of theextant field studies of French and Raven's(1959) conceptualizations of social powerdeals with the fact that, in general, no at-tempts have been made in these studies todetermine the independent contribution ofeach power base on subordinate criterionvariables. Reitz (1971), Collins and Raven(1969), Bass (1981), Yukl (1981), Shetty(1978), and others noted that many of thebases of power identified by French andRaven may not be perceived as totally inde-pendent of each other and, may, in fact, berelated. For example:

Personal power sources like referent and expert are likelyto be correlated empirically, that is, lodged in the samepeople. In the same way, the position holder with powerto reward is also likely to have the power to punish. Theposition will give some degree of legitimacy as well. Bydefinition, formal hierarchies are a structure of legitimate,reward, and coercive power relationships. (Bass, 1981, p.178)

Similarly, a leader who possesses referentpower may also be seen as possessing expertpower, because we are attracted to the leaderand attribute expertise to those individualswe like. As a result of these and other possibleinterdependencies, it is impossible to drawany conclusions about the independent effectsof each of the five power bases, because noneof the studies reported in Table 2 attemptedto partial out the effects of any of the otherpower bases when one particular power basewas under examination. This simply meansthat all of the obtained research results re-ported to date may be confounded by inter-dependencies among the five power bases; wemay know nothing about their independenteffects.

The previous discussion should not betaken to indicate that only the independenteffects of social power need to be examined


more carefully. Joint power effects have alsobeen neglected in French and Raven fieldstudies, and these would appear to be ofsome importance. For example, in a labora-tory setting Michener and Burt (1975) foundthat compliance of group members wasgreater when the leader had both coerciveand legitimate power. Bass (1981), summariz-ing research on interactive coercive and legit-imate power effects, noted that "legitimacycoupled with coercion will increase the publicand private acceptance of coercive demands"(p. 184) Similar joint effects might be expectedbetween a number of the French and Ravenbases of power, and future researchers wouldbe well advised to explore such possible ef-fects.

Scale Format Effects and Reanalysisof the Literature

The final problem apparent with the liter-ature previously summarized (and the problemmost amenable to post hoc treatment) involvesthe response formats used to measure thebases of social power. As shown in Table 2,the majority of studies conducted to date haveused a ranking procedure to assess the super-visors' bases of power. In this procedure,respondents are asked to rank order the reasonswhy they comply with the requests of theirsupervisors. One interesting aspect of thisranking procedure is that it produces ipsativemeasures that are not independent of eachother (Guilford, 1954). Any single base ofpower can only be given prominence at theexpense of the other bases. As a result, theranking procedure tends to force negativeempirical relations among the power bases,and this precludes interpreting results straight-forwardly. The ranking procedure also tendsto force the lower ranked power bases to berelated to the criterion variables in the oppositedirection of the higher ranked power bases.This problem has been acknowledged by sev-eral researchers, including Bachman et al.(1966), who noted that:

Some caution must be exercised in interpreting correla-tions with the bases of power. The ranking method usedin obtaining the data makes it impossible [italics added]for all five bases of power to be correlated in the samedirection with any single criterion variable. Thus, it maybe that positive correlations with expert and referent

power are responsible for negative correlations with theother bases of power, (p. 133)

Surprisingly, despite the fact that other authors(cf. Alderfer, 1972; Bachman, 1968; Bachmanet al., 1968; Beer, 1966) provided similarcautions about the use of rank-order scales,the fact that this procedure was used in somany of the studies previously reviewed sug-gests that these warnings have largely goneunheeded.

It was noted earlier that results from Likert-type scale measures have differed markedlyfrom those obtained from rank-format scales.In an attempt to explore possible scale formateffects more systematically, the results of allstudies that used rank-order scales were com-pared with those that used Likert-scales tomeasure the five bases of power. This analysiswas conducted by comparing the number ofresults that indicated positive, negative, andnonsignificant relations between each of thebases of social power and subordinate crite-rion variables, for the ranked and Likert-scale studies separately. The studies consideredto have used the ranking technique werethose conducted by Bachman (1968), Bach-man et al. (1968; Sample 5), Bachman et al.(1966), Burke and Wilcox (1971), Cope(1972), Dunne et al. (1978), Ivancevich(1970), Ivancevich and Donnelly (1970), Slo-cum (1970), Sheridan and Vredenburgh(1978), Student (1968), Thamhain and Gem-mill (1974), and Wieland (1969).4 The studiesconsidered to have used Likert-scale formatsincluded those by Bachman et al. (1968;

4 Ambiguities in the articles by Ivancevich (1970),Ivancevich and Donnelly (1970), and Slocum (1970)make it difficult to determine whether ranking or ratingscales were used. Ivancevich and Donnelly (1970), however,explicitly indicated they had salespersons rank theirmanagers on the bases of power (p. 544); Ivancevich(1970) presented methodology and discussion sectionssimilar to that of Ivancevich and Donnelly, leading tothe reasonable inference that he used rank order scalesas well. Although Slocum (1970) indicated he had re-spondents rate their supervisors, his theoretical argumentsabout his measures (p. 486) are the same as thoseprovided by Bachman et al. (1966) for the rankingprocedure, therefore suggesting that he also used rank-order measurement. These three studies were treated asrank order studies; treating them as rating studies doesnot substantially alter the conclusions reached in the textor provided in Table 3.

BASES OF POWER 405

Table 3Comparison of Results From Field Studies of Social Power Using the Ranking TechniqueWith Those Using Likert-Format Scales

Reward power' Coercive powerb Legitimate power" Expert powerd Referent power"

Procedure + 0 - Total + 0 - Total + 0 - Total + 0 - Total + 0 - Total

Rankingtechnique

Likert format5 51 85 14 0

6419

146

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6419

2 54 88 11 0

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X2(2) = 5.61, p < .07. b X

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Samples 3 and 4); Busch (1980), Cobb (1980),and Martin and Hunt (1980). Neither theHammer (1978) nor the Warren (1968) stud-ies were included in the analysis, because itwas difficult to determine which scaling for-mat these authors had used. Also, in ouranalysis, if both individual and grouped datawere reported for a particular study, only thegrouped data were used. This was done be-cause using both individual and groupedresults would produce redundant and non-independent data, and most of the studiesreported only grouped data. Finally, becausemost of the studies used only measures ofsupervisory power (and not measures of sub-ordinate power), only supervisory power re-sults were considered. To maintain some con-sistency across the examined results, positiverelations were considered not only instancesin which the bases of power are positivelyrelated to functional subordinate outcomes,but also when negative relations were obtainedwith dysfunctional or undesirable subordinateoutcomes (e.g., unexcused absences, acci-dents).

In our analysis, 64 variables could berelated to each of the power bases for theranked-scale studies, whereas 19 variablescould be related to the power bases in theLikert-scaled studies. The results of our anal-ysis are summarized in Table 3. As shown,although the results for coercive and referentpower are similar regardless of the measure-ment method used, the results for reward,legitimate, and expert power are significantlyinfluenced by the scaling procedure used. Ingeneral, these results suggest that the effectsof reward, legitimate, and expert power onsubordinate criterion variables are less nega-

tive or more positive than would be indicatedby just the ranking studies alone (or bycombining the Likert-scale and ranking stud-ies together).

The prior analysis is admittedly crude, andit does not take into account some of theproblems in and differences among the socialpower studies that were discussed, as well asdifferences in the criterion variables. It does,however, support pur general concern aboutmeasurement in the study of French andRaven's (1959) bases of social power. Inaddition, it suggests that the studies that useda ranking procedure should be interpretedwith considerable caution.

Future Directions and Needed Research

Over the past few decades, French andRaven's (1959) conceptualization of socialpower has played a major role in the literatureof social and industrial psychology. Despitethis, however, it is probably fair to say thatgiven the methodological problems in mostof the field studies of power, our knowledgeregarding relations between the bases of socialpower and subordinate criterion variables isfar from complete. Before such knowledgecan be acquired, several improvements inresearch in this area are necessary. In theremainder of this article, we discuss theseneeded improvements in some detail.

Issues in Self-Report Research

Our review up to this point had indicatedthe need for several methodological improve-ments in future field research on French andRaven's five bases of power. First, if self-report questionnaires continue to be used,


additional attention must be focused on thedevelopment of more adequate measures.Much of the extant research on the bases ofsocial power has been undertaken withoutmuch apparent concern for either the validityor reliability of the measures used. The useof single-item scales with questionable contentvalidity and scaling procedures (and withlargely unknown psychometric properties suchas reliability) has severely limited our under-standing of the relations between the basesof social power and subordinate criterionvariables.

There is, of course, no absolute set of rulesthat specifies the steps one must take todevelop a valid multiitem measure of a con-struct. Churchill (1979), however, providedan excellent description of a paradigm de-signed to improve construct development.Although this paradigm was originally in-tended to improve construct development inthe field of marketing, it appears equallyapplicable in other content domains as well.We believe that obvious improvements in ourunderstanding of the relations between socialpower and subordinate criterion variableswould result if the sequence suggested byChurchill (1979) were used to develop moreadequate measures of the bases of socialpower.

Second, and related to the prior discussion,the use of the ipsative ranking procedure toassess the bases of social power must bediscouraged in future research. It is surprisingto the present authors that even though Bach-man and his colleagues (Bachman, 1968;Bachman et al., 1968; Bachman et al., 1966)repeatedly noted the potential problems ofthis scaling procedure, it has been used ex-tensively in subsequent research. As noted,the use of this scaling procedure producestwo major difficulties. First, it results in scalesthat are not methodologically independent ofeach other. Second, it tends to force negativecorrelations to occur between some of themeasures of social power and subordinatecriterion variables. These problems can beavoided in future research that uses question-naires to measure social power through theuse of Likert-type scales.

Third, and related to the two points pre-viously noted, future scales developed andused to measure French and Raven's bases

of power should not use an attributionalreferent but a behavioral one. This wouldreduce scale potential for confounding bysocial desirability and attributional biases. Itwould also make the interpretation of resultsmore straightforward (and less tautological).Such a measurement approach should alsomake scale validation easier, because the ref-erent would be closer to an observable (itwould be perceived) behavior. Experimentalmanipulation and measurement validationby experimental procedures (e.g., Stogdill,1969) would therefore be more feasible. Thiswould not eliminate the problems generatedby measuring power by paper-and-pencilmeasures (more is said concerning this later).Instead, as it facilitates validation, it would,necessarily, reduce the severity of such prob-lems.

Fourth, future research efforts should at-tempt to assess the independent contributionof each of the power bases to the varianceexplained in subordinate criterion variables.It is not very likely that respondents perceivethe bases of social power to be totally inde-pendent. Thus, even when the ranking pro-cedure is not used, there appears to be aneed to use partial correlation or multipleregression data analyses in studies of socialpower.

Fifth, future research needs to concentrateat the individual rather than the group levelof analysis. The minority of studies reportedin this review analyzed relations betweensocial power and subordinate criterion vari-ables at the individual level. The majorityused grouped analyses or a combination ofindividual and grouped analysis. As noted,averaging or grouping the data from a partic-ular supervisor's subordinates assumes thatthe supervisor responds in a similar fashionor uses the same bases of power to influenceeach surordinate. In view of evidence thatsupervisors respond differently to differenttypes of subordinate characteristics or behav-iors (cf. Barrow, 1976; Lanzetta & Hannah,1969; Lowin & Craig, 1968; Podsakoff, 1982;Taynor & Deaux, 1975), this assumption isquestionable.

Averaging or grouping subordinate respon-ses may also wash out or mask differencesthat actually exist. Related to this is the factthat using grouped or averaged scores reduces

BASES OF POWER 407

the size of the sample and therefore the powerof the statistical tests that may be performed.(It also violates a basic tenet that researchersshould use as much of the data at theirdisposal as is possible.) Finally, grouped scoresare influenced by outliers or group memberswho have extreme scores on the constructsbeing measured. These extreme scores maydistort the nature of the relations obtained,particularly when the group is small. Becauseof these problems inherent to grouping scores,individual analyses appear more advisable infuture tests of French and Raven's (1959)bases of social power.

Use of Observational Measurement

In addition to the problems noted previ-ously, greater attention needs to be given toother types of field research methodologiesthat may be used in the analysis of socialpower. Our preceding discussion of neededmethodological improvements has focusedon field studies conducted with self-reportquestionnaires, because the studies reportedin this review used this type of researchstrategy exclusively. Unfortunately, this typeof research has several major problems as-sociated with it. First, recent research indicatesthat there are numerous biases that may influ-ence subordinates' self-reported descriptionsof their supervisors, including social desirabilityand leniency (Schriesheim, 198la, 1981b;Schriesheim & Kerr, 1974, 1977; Schriesheim,Kinicki, & Schriesheim, 1979; Yukl & Nem-eroff, 1979), halo effects (Schriesheim & Kerr,1974, 1977), and implicit attitudinal or be-havioral theories (Eden & Leviatan, 1975;Lord, Binning, Rush, & Thomas, 1978; Gioia& Sims, 1983; Phillips & Lord, 1981; Rush,Phillips, & Lord, 1981; Rush, Thomas, &Lord, 1977; Weiss & Adler, 1981). This makesthe interpretation of findings from these stud-ies somewhat problematic. Second, in thistype of study the description of the supervi-sor's bases of power, as well as many of thesubordinate criterion variables (e.g., supervi-sory satisfaction, role clarity), are often ob-tained from the same respondents. Thus, inaddition to the possibility that the supervisor'sbases of power have an effect on employeeattitudes, there is the possibility that samesource or general method variance accounts

for a substantial proportion of the obtainedrelations between these bases of power andsubordinate criterion variables.

Recognition of these problems suggests theneed for other field research strategies thatare not as susceptible to respondent biases asself-report measures. Among the strategiesthat appear to be the most promising is theuse of observational procedures (Davis &Luthans, 1979; Yukl, 1981). Several recentstudies have been reported in which theobservation of supervisors in organizationshas taken place (e.g., Alban-Metcalfe, 1984;Bussom, Larson, & Vicars, 1982; Bussom,Larson, Vicars, & Ness, 1981; Larson, Busson,& Vicars, 1981; Luthans & Lockwood, 1984;Martinko & Gardner, 1984;Mintzberg, 1973).Although the studies differ somewhat in focus,most share in common (a) the direct obser-vation of supervisors in their natural workenvironments and (b) the recording of thesupervisors' behaviors, either through empir-ically derived categories or a narrative de-scription of the behaviors observed.

An examination of the studies that haveused some form of behavioral observationsuggests that there are several advantages thatmay be obtained from the use of these typesof methods in research on social power. First,observational studies conducted in organiza-tions permit the researcher to observe thesupervisor in situ and therefore see behaviorsthat might not otherwise be picked up in thequestionnaires generally used to assess a su-pervisor's social power. In short, behavioralobservation involves directly observing man-agers, rather than using indirect measures ofbehaviors that are believed or expected to berelevant and displayed. Additionally, obser-vational studies may allow the examinationof more intense or extreme levels of socialpower than can be examined in the usualcontent-limited surveys that are typically used.Also, observational research is not as likelyto impose the researcher's theories and con-ceptualizations on the subjects as are self-report questionnaires (cf. Bussom et al., 1981;Larson et al., 1981; Luthans & Lockwood,1984). Thus, the data obtained from suchstudies is often richer and more isomorphicwith the phenomenon under investigation.This is because observation can assess vari-ables beyond those that may be included on


even the largest questionnaire, and becauseobservation may not artificially restrict themeasured intensity levels of the variablesunder investigation.

Recent research by Luthans and Lockwood(1984) also suggests that greater validity maybe obtained with observational proceduresthan with more traditional paper-and-pencilquestionnaires. Finally, because the lag timebetween the observation of behavior and itsactual recording is shorter than that whichoccurs in questionnaires, observational pro-cedures may be less susceptible to selectiverecall and halo biases than are self-reportmeasures (cf. Luthans & Lockwood, 1984).

Lest we be misunderstood, it bears notingthat the use of observational strategies tostudy power is not without its problems (forreviews of such problems, see Bussom et al.,1982; Bussom et al., 1981; Martinko & Gard-ner, 1984). Such an approach also does notpreclude the use of self-report questionnaires.Indeed, as noted by Luthans and Lockwood(1984), questionnaires and observationalmethods should be used to complement, notreplace, each other:An obvious need for future study would be to make acomparison between questionnaire and observation methodsthat have directly comparable categories. If there is dem-onstrated support for ... validity . . . then the morepractical and easy-to-use questionnaire method should beused as an important, but not an only, data-gatheringtechnique . . . The same is true of the observationalsystem. By using both questionnaires and observationaltechniques, a network of concordance among multiplemethods of measurement can result. Such a multiple-methods approach seems to be the most feasible way ofobtaining a reliable and valid measure of extremely complex. . . behavior. (Luthans & Lockwood, 1984, p. 141)

Thus, the use of questionnaires and obser-vational studies in a complementary manneris likely to have a greater impact on ourunderstanding of social power processes thaneither technique used to the exclusion of theother.

Other Concerns

In addition to the issues previously dis-cussed, there are at least four other concernsthat need to be addressed in future researchin the area of social power. First, additionalattention needs to be paid to the relevanceof the criterion variables used in social powerstudies. For example, Yukl (1981) noted thata supervisor's use of social power should be

expected to have its most direct effect onsubordinates' attitudinal commitment andbehavioral compliance, and it should influ-ence only subordinate performance and sat-isfaction indirectly through these linkages.Despite this, subordinate compliance andcommitment have been incorporated in onlya few of the studies reported in the presentreview.

Second, more attention also needs to bedirected to the samples used in future powerstudies. Despite the fact that the characteris-tics of the samples used in much of the powerresearch vary considerably, there has beenrelatively little consideration of the effectsthat these sample differences might have onthe types of power available for the supervisorsto use. For example, supervisors in civilservice or government agencies may have todepend primarily on their legitimate poweror referent power because the use of rewardor coercive power may be blocked, and be-cause the supervisor may have appointeeswith more specific expertise. In contrast, thesame type of job in a private, profit-makingorganization may offer the supervisor severaltypes of power bases. Clearly, supervisorsfaced with the two different situations previ-ously described might be expected to behavequite differently and, as a result, may havesubstantially different effects on subordinateoutcome variables. Yet, we have surprisinglylittle research on the effects that sample dif-ferences might produce.

Third, we should note that, with the ex-ception of a few longitudinal criterion vari-ables (e.g., turnover), none of the field studiessummarized in this review allow researcherseven to tentatively suggest cause and effectrelations. Thus, without belaboring the point,it seems obvious that future field researchshould begin to address issues of causality,by conducting longitudinal and field-experi-mental studies.

Finally, we should note that virtually allof the research summarized herein did notattempt to develop or test theory concerningsocial power, but was directed at correlatingthe five French and Raven power bases withvarious dependent variables. Moderator vari-ables, situational contingencies, and so onwere hardly mentioned, much less concep-tually treated and empirically explored. Al-though the focus of this article has not been

BASES OF POWER 409

in the theory domain, it seems worthwhile tonote that theory development appears to becritically necessary to guide and integratefuture research.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has not beento attack studies of French and Raven's (1959)bases of social power or to imply that addi-tional studies of social power are not needed.On the contrary. On the basis of this review,it might be argued that an adequate exami-nation of the French and Raven (1959) con-ceptualization has yet to be conducted, andthat much more research is badly needed inthis domain. Although the French and Ravenframework remains highly popular, the exist-ing research does not support drawing con-fident conclusions about such things as rela-tions between the five power bases and sub-ordinate outcome variables. This situation isunacceptable, and it warrants and demandsimmediate attention to address the problemsnoted in this review.

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Correction to Snarey

In the article "Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical Review of KohlbergianResearch," by John R. Snarey (Psychological Bulletin, 1985, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 202-232), the subheadingsin Table 5 are incorrect and should be reversed. The first subheading should read "Countries for WhichStudies Did Not Report Significant Differences," and the second subheading should read "Countries forWhich Studies Did Report Statistically Significant Differences."

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