FIDO & TEE: Simpler, Stronger,...

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1 FIDO & TEE: Simpler, Stronger, Authentication Rob Coombs - Security Marketing Director

Transcript of FIDO & TEE: Simpler, Stronger,...

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FIDO & TEE:

Simpler, Stronger, Authentication

Rob Coombs - Security Marketing Director

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Introduction

Four Compartment Security Model

Emerging Trends

Trusted Apps

FIDO – Moving beyond passwords

Summary

Agenda

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Two lenses to look at Security & Trust with:

Protection against threats

Delivering better user experiences

Computational Trust builds on strong authentication

of users and devices

Security & Trust

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PC Era Authentication: Pockets Full of Hardware

TLS

DN

SSEC

SSO

CVC

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Applying Lessons to Modern Mobile Security

Hypervisor (with hardware

support) separating large pieces of

code

Small, certifiable Trusted Execution

Environment inside Application

processor isolated using ARM

TrustZone® technology protecting

against software attacks

Secure Element for tamper proof

security

Hypervisor

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TrustZone Based Trusted Execution Environment

Hardware root of trust

A basis for system integrity

Integrity through Trusted Boot

Secure peripheral access

Screen, keypad , fingerprint sensor etc.

Secure application execution

Technology called TrustZone®

Trust established outwards

With normal world apps

With internet/cloud apps

Mobile devices with integrated HW security

ARM Trusted Firmware

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Standardized EL3 Runtime Firmware

For all 64-bit ARMv8-A systems

Reducing porting and integration work

For SoC and Trusted OS developers

Reusable, reference implementations

PSCI

SMC Calling Convention

Configuration of ARM hardware

Running on ARMv8-A FVPs and Juno

… and on partner’s silicon

ARM Trusted Firmware for 64-bit ARMv8-A The Basics…

ARM Trusted FirmwareEL3

SoC/platform port

Normal World OSEL1/EL2

Trusted OSSecure-EL1

Trusted OS Dispatcher

TOS

spec

ific

p

roto

col a

nd

m

ech

anis

m

Trusted AppSecure-EL0

AppEL0

TOS driver

TOS library

TOS specific protocol via SMC

via

ioct

l

Porting interface between Trusted

Firmware and SoC/platform

Interface between Trusted Firmware and Trusted OS Dispatcher

ARM Trusted Firmware

Trusted OS supplier

SoC supplier

OS/hypervisor supplier

Trusted App supplier

Internal TOS interface

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Reference boot flows

For 64-bit ARMv8-A systems

Open Source at GitHub

BSD License

Contributors welcome

We just released v1.0

Lots of partners using it

ARM Trusted Firmware for 64-bit ARMv8-A

BL31

EL3 Runtime Firmware

EL2 Execution

Secure-EL1 Execution

SCP Execution

Key

EL3 Execution

BL33

Non-Trusted

Firmware

(e.g. U-Boot,

EDK2)

BL1AP Boot ROM

BL2Trusted Boot

Firmware

BL32

Secure-EL1 Payload

BL0SCP Boot

ROM

BL30

SCP Runtime

Firmware

Platform Boot

Initialization

System &

Power Control

Trusted Board

Boot

Trusted Board

Boot

PSCI

World Switch

Library

SMCCC

Trusted OS Kernel

S-EL1 Payload

Dispatch

Trusted World Normal World

SCP Application Processor (AP)

2nd level Boot

Loader (BL2)

loads all 3rd level

images

1st level Boot

Loader (BL1)

loads 2nd level

image

Loading

RESET RESET

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Security Profiles

Invasive HW Attacks • Well resourced and funded

• Unlimited time, money & equipment.

Non-invasive HW Attacks • Physical access to device – JTAG, Bus Probing,

IO Pins, etc.

Software Attacks • Malware & Viruses

• Social engineering

Cost/Effort

To Attack

Cost/Effort

to Secure

TrustZone based TEE

SmartCards / HSMs

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4 Compartment Model – Hierarchy of Trust

Secure

Domain Tamper Proof, Physically Isolated, EAL Certified

SecurCore™

SEE

Secure Element

Smartcard

SIM & TPM

Trusted

Domain

TrustZone®

TEE

Secure Firmware

Device Management

Key Management

Trusted Applications executing from a Trusted

Execution Environment

Protected

Domain

Hypervisor

HYP

Protected Video Path

BYOD

System Management

Virtual Machines and bus masters isolated by a

Hypervisor

Rich

Domain User Apps

Rich OS Android or other OS

Privileged

Supervisor Mode

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Use Cases: Content Protection

TRUSTED MEDIA PROTECTION PLATFORM v1

Processor Cluster (1 to 8 CPUs)

Trusted

SRAM

DDR

DISPLAY

HDMI

Display

FLASH

Non-

Trusted

CPUs

AUDIO DECODER

SoC

Firmwares

TEE addition for the TZMPv1 Protection Platform

VIDEO

AUDIO

HDCP

VIDEO DECODER

MALI V500

Trusted

Boot

ROM

TEE GPU

APPS

Trusted

Peripherals

Efuse

CRYPTO

RICH OS

Trusted World (ARM TrustZone hardware extension)

Protected World (ARM NSAID hardware extension)

Non-Trusted World

USER

RichOS

INTERCONNECT

NSAID=

DISPLAY

NSAID=

VIDEO

NSAID=

AUDIO

DISPLAY Engines Firmware

Data Structures

Frame Buffers

TZASC

400

Configuration

*Non-Secure Access ID

DRM & Keys protected by TEE

Hardware isolated video path

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Use Cases: MDM & Enterprise

KERNEL LEVEL

TRUSTZONE™ SYSTEM-ON-CHIP

LOGO

LOGO IN BLACK

LOGO COLOR VERSIONS

LOGO ON BLACK

TOUCHSCREEN DEVICE

DISPLAY

HARDWARE LEVEL

APP LEVEL

SE ANDROID

KNOX FRAMEWORK

SANDBOX

‹t -b a se TEE

SECURE BOOT

PERIPHERAL LEVEL

‹ Hardware Iso la tion ‹ Microke rne l Sep ara tion ‹ Managed Dom ains

fo r Tru ste d App lica tion s ‹ Privile ge d Pe riphe ra l Acce ss

TRUSTED APPLICATION

VPN IDENTITY

ISOLATED PERIPHERAL

CONNECTION

(Trusted Execution Environment)

Trusted Boot

Integrity Management (TIMA)

MDM

Business Apps…

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Use Cases: Payment

Authentication & Keys

protected by TEE

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3 New whitepapers from

Apple, Samsung and

Microsoft give good insight

into modern mobile

security practice

Build on principles of:

H/W roots of trust

Trusted Boot

Isolation

Least Privilege

Modern Practice

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Agenda

Introduction

Four Compartment Security Model

Emerging Trends

Trusted Apps

FIDO – Moving beyond passwords

Summary

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Trusted App Concept - Trustonic Example

OPERATING SYSTEM TRUSTONIC TEE

TRUSTZONE™ SYSTEM-ON-CHIP

LOGO

LOGO IN BLACK

LOGO COLOR VERSIONS

LOGO ON BLACK

SMART CONNECTED DEVICE

PAYMENT

TRUSTONIC enables d e vice s with a ro o t-o f-tru s t a n d Tru s te d Exe cu tio n En viro n m e n t (TEE) a t m a n u fa ctu re a n d se lls ACCESS to se rvice p ro vid e rs in n e e d o f TRUST.

ENTERPRISE

PAYMENTS COMMERCE

MOVIES SERVICES

Trusted Apps installed by OEM or

OTA (After market provisioning)

Access provided on demand as

service providers need to use TEE

enabled features

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Connecting Trusted Device Supply with Service Provision

TRUSTED APP MANAGER

CHIP MAKER

DEVICE MAKER

SECURITY DEVELOPERS

SERVICE PROVIDERS

‹t -b a se TEE

‹t -kp h Ke y Ge n

LOGO

LOGO IN BLACK

LOGO COLOR VERSIONS

LOGO ON BLACK

‹t -d e v SDK

‹t -s e k OTA

TRUSTED APPS

APP STORE APPS

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FIDO User Experiences

Show a

biometric

Transaction

Detail Done

Login &

Password

Insert Dongle, Press

button

Done

SECOND FACTOR EXPERIENCE (U2F standards)

PASSWORDLESS EXPERIENCE (UAF standards)

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FIDO UAF* Functionality

Discovery of authenticators on the client

Registration

Authentication

Transaction Confirmation

*Universal Authentication Framework

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How does FIDO UAF work?

FIDO SERVER

FIDO Authenticators

Verification

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User Side

Plugin SDK

FIDO Client

Authenticator Abstraction

Authenticators Authenticators

Private Keys

Authentication Keys

Attestation Key

Authenticators

Relying Party

Web Application

FIDO UAF Server

Attestation Manager

Crypto Policy Rules

Authentication Keys

Attestation Key

Public Keys

Registration, Authentication &

Transaction Confirmation

UAF

Protocol

FIDO - Universal Authentication Framework

Ideal for TrustZone

based TEE

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First FIDO Deployment already live…

Customers can use their finger to pay with PayPal from their

new Samsung Galaxy S5 because the FIDO Ready™ software

on the device securely communicates between the fingerprint

sensor on their device and PayPal’s service in the cloud. The

only information the device shares with PayPal is a

unique cryptographic “public key” that allows PayPal to

verify the identity of the customer without having to store

any biometric information on PayPal’s servers.

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FIDO Implementation Using TrustZone based TEE

Crypto Layer

Trusted

Application

Authentication

FIDO Client

& APIs

ARM Trusted Firmware

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FIDO is rapidly building momentum to transform authentication

Creates a delightful consumer experience

Provides stronger authentication to Relying Parties

Well thought out Privacy Principles

TrustZone based TEE is a perfect fit as an implementation strategy

Confidentiality, Integrity and Trusted Peripherals

Can be extended to interface to Secure Element if required

Please study FIDO & TEE!

Summary