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Afghanistan: US Exit Strategy 1

AFGHANISTAN: USEXIT STRATEGYOPERAT I O N MO SHT ARAK , RECO NCI L I AT I O N AND REI NT EG RAT I O N

EDI T O RDR NOOR UL HA Q

A SSI ST ANT EDI T O RMU H A M M A D NA W A Z K HA N


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CONTENTS

Preface v1. Timeline: Afghanistan in Crisis 12. Text of the London Conference Communiqu 33. The US Finding Itself on the Horns of a Dilemma 154. Operation Moshtarak: At a Glance 185. Battle for Marjah: The Taliban Stronghold 196. Altering Afghanistan's Balance of Power 217. The Mullah and the Marjah Campaign 268. Making Peace with Taliban a Possibility 289. Destination Kandahar: Marching Towards

End-Game 31

10. The Changing Face of Afghan Crisis 3411. The Next Battles for Marjah 3612. Its Time to Talk to Taliban: UN Envoy 3813. We Do Not Learn from History 4014. New Developments in Afghanistan 4315. Pakistan will be Privy to Talks with Taliban: Karzai 4416. Karzais Visit to Islamabad 4717. Five Myths About the War in Afghanistan 4818. India in Afghanistan Doesnt Serve US Interests 5119.

Peace with the Taliban 55

20. Pashtuns are Not Terrorists 5821. Talks Not an Option Yet 6122. Kandahar Offensive to Focus on Good Governance 6423. President Obama in Kabul 6724. Kabuls Move for Talks with Top Taliban Upsets US 6825. Obama Presses Karzai for Cooperation 7126. Solution for Afghanistan 7427. US Forces Set Sights on Taliban Bastion of Kandahar 7628. US Campaign to Reform Kandahar is Rife with Pitfalls 8129. Pakistan has Role in Afghan Reconciliation: US 8330. Churchills Choice for Afghanistan 85


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31. A Flawed Strategy 8732. Pakistan Seen as a Key to Afghan Conundrum 9033. Using Afghan Culture to Devise an Exit 9334. A Hint of Victory 9535.

How to Save Afghanistan from Karzai 100

36. The Kandahar Gambit 103IPRI Publications 106


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PREFACE

For the last over three decades (1979-2010) Afghanistan has been in a state

of turmoil the fight against Soviet forces, the civil war and the present

insurgency against the Karzai administration, NATO and the US forces.The US mission in Afghanistan is to disrupt and dismantle, defeat and

destroy al-Qaeda and its extremist allies.1 The Afghan strategy was

discussed by the international community on January 28, 2010 in

London. They re-affirmed the goals of greater Afghan Leadership,

increased Regional Cooperation and more effective International

Partnership. In pursuance of their mission and the strategy the US-led

NATOs International Security Assistance Forces (Isaf) has launched

Operation Moshtarak2, i.e., a joint counter insurgency operation in the

stronghold of Taliban. The objective is reconciliation with the moderateTaliban and their reintegration in the administration to form a broad-

based national government for peace and stability. This would require

further induction, training, organizing and arming the Afghan forces to

take over the security duties effectively before the withdrawal of the US-

led NATO forces from Afghanistan.

The Factfile contains the text of the London Conference,

followed by some relevant articles on Operation Moshtarak and the US

exit strategy appearing in the national and international print and

electronic media from February 8 till April 7, 2010.

April 30, 2010 Noor ul Haq

1 Joshua Partlow & Scott Wilson, Obama Presses Karzai for Cooperation,Washington Post, March 29, 2010.

2 Moshtarak in the local language means together.


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T IMELINE: A FGHANISTAN IN CRISIS

1979: The then Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. In the years that

follow Moscow will rule Kabul by proxy while the US, Pakistan, China,

Iran and Saudi Arabia extend their support to anti-communist Muslim

fighters, the Mujahideen, who oppose the Soviets.19881989: The Soviet Union withdraws. More than 15,000 Soviet

soldiers have died in the conflict.

1992: Led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, Mujahideen forces remove the

Soviet-backed government, but in the years that follow rivalry between

different groups of fighters reduce Kabul to rubble and effectively plunge

Afghanistan into civil conflict.

1994: Mullah Mohammed Omar, a Muslim cleric, sets up Taliban

movement of Islamic students who take up arms to end the chaos in

Afghanistan. They capture Kandahar and advance on Kabul.

1996: The Taliban takes Kabul and hangs Mohammad Najibullah,the then president. The year also sees the return to Afghanistan of Osama

bin Laden, al-Qaeda's leader who fought with Mujahideen groups against

the Soviet occupation.

1998: The US launches missiles at suspected bin Laden bases in the

country in retaliation for the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and

Tanzania.

1999: The UN imposes an air embargo and freezes Taliban assets in

an attempt to force them to hand over bin Laden for trial.

2001: Taliban rule in Afghanistan, based on their strict

interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, has become increasingly

proscriptive, restricting women and religious minorities, banning satellite

TV and destroying some 2,000-year-old Buddhist statues in the cliffs

above Bamiyan.

In September, the Taliban's rival Ahmed Shah Massoud, a senior

commander of the so-called Northern Alliance, is wounded in a suicide

attack and later dies of his wounds.

Attacks on the United States on September 11 leads George Bush,

then US president, to demand the Taliban hand over bin Laden. They

refuse unless evidence of his involvement is presented.

In October, US and British forces begin bombing Afghanistan and

within weeks mount an invasion. Later Hamid Karzai, an Afghan triballeader, will be chosen to head an interim administration.

2002: The first contingent of international peacekeeping forces


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takes up its duties. Months later Haji Abdul Qadir, the Afghan vice-

president, is assassinated in Kabul. Karzai escapes a separate assassination

attempt in his hometown of Kandahar.

2003: Despite frequent incidents of violence, Donald Rumsfeld,

then US defence secretary, claims that most of Afghanistan is secure and

that US-led forces had moved from major combat operations tostabilisation and reconstruction projects.

The year also sees Nato take control of security in Kabul. It is the

organisations first security operation outside of Europe.

2004: Afghanistan adopts a new constitution and Karzai is elected

president. Meanwhile, the Taliban begins to regroup and mounts a

sustained campaign of attacks.

2005: Afghanistan holds it first parliamentary elections in more

than 30 years, but Taliban attacks continue to grow in intensity.

2006: Western forces and their Afghan allies mount Operation

Mountain Thrust against Taliban fighters. Scores die in the fighting.Later in the year, Nato takes over responsibility for security across

the country. Meanwhile, civilian casualties have been mounting and when

a US military vehicle crashes, killing several civilians, widespread anti-US

protests erupt.

2007: Nato and Afghan forces launch Operation Achilles, reported

as their largest offensive to date and in May Mullah Dadullah, the

Taliban's chief military commander, is killed. The UN reports opium

production in Afghanistan, much of which is thought to fund the

Taliban, has reached record levels.

2008: A Taliban operation frees hundreds of its fighters from

Kandahar prison. Weeks later a suicide attack on the Indian embassy inKabul ramps up regional tensions as India accuses the Pakistani

intelligence agency of involvement. Pakistan denies the allegations.

Towards the end of the year, US President Bush sends and

additional 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan. Germany also boosts its troop

numbers and extends its mission in the country.

2009: The election of Barack Obama, the US president, had

prompted hopes of a new approach to Afghanistan, but Taliban attacks

make the year the bloodiest yet for international troops.

Meanwhile, Afghans go to the polls to elect a new president and

while the Taliban largely fails to act on its threats to attack voters, theelection is beset by massive fraud. Karzai wins a runoff vote after

Abdullah Abdullah, his main rival, withdraws.


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In December, Obama agrees to a request by his generals to boost

US troop levels in Afghanistan. He supplies 30,000 troops, bringing the

total number of US troops in the country to 100,000, but he also

announces that the US will begin withdrawing its forces by 2011.

2010: While Karzai struggles to get his cabinet nominees approved

by parliament, Taliban fighters carry out co-ordinated attacks in thecapital.

Delegates gather in London for a conference on future strategy in

Afghanistan, including a proposal to negotiate with Taliban supporters

and persuade them to lay down their arms in return for money and jobs.

In February, US-led Nato troops launch Operation Mushtarak on the

biggest Taliban-held town in the south of the country.

Aljazeera, January 28, 2010.

http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/01/201012855829544554.html

A FGHANISTAN: THE L ONDON CONFERENCE 28 J A NUA RY 2010

COMMUNIQU

Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International

Partnership

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the

international community met today in London to renew their mutual

commitment towards helping Afghanistan emerge as a secure,

prosperous, and democratic nation. Todays Conference represents adecisive step towards greater Afghan leadership to secure, stabilise and

develop Afghanistan. The international community underlined its

support for the Government of Afghanistan and its security,

development and governance.

2. At the London Conference, President Hamid Karzai built on

commitments set out in his inauguration speech, which articulated clear

priorities for stabilising and developing Afghanistan.

3. The international community pledged to maintain its long-term

commitment to Afghanistan, as previously set out in the 2001 Bonn

Agreement, in the 2002 Tokyo Conference, the 2006 AfghanistanCompact, the 2008 Paris Declaration and the 2009 The Hague

Conference Declaration. The international community re-affirmed its


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support for the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions upholding the

security, stability and prosperity of Afghanistan and in particular the role

of the UN itself in achieving this goal.

4. Conference Participants emphasised that the Afghan Government and

the international community are entering into a new phase on the way to

full Afghan ownership. Conference Participants re-affirmed the goals ofgreater Afghan Leadership, increased Regional Cooperation and more

effective International Partnership. Together we are committed to make

intensive efforts to ensure that the Afghan Government is increasingly

able to meet the needs of its people through developing its own

institutions and resources.

5. The London Conference will be followed by a conference in Kabul

later this year, hosted by the Afghan Government, where it intends to

take forward its programme with concrete plans for delivery for the

Afghan people. These should be based on democratic accountability,

equality, human rights, gender equality, good governance and moreeffective provision of government services, economic growth, as well as a

common desire to live in peace under the Afghan Constitution. We

remain convinced that together we will succeed.

6. The challenges in Afghanistan particularly in political, economic,

development and security areas are significant and inter-related. It is in

our shared interest to overcome them and we re-affirmed our

commitment to doing so. The nature of international engagement in

Afghanistan continues to evolve, in favour of increasingly supporting

Afghan leadership in the areas of security, development, governance and

economic assistance.

Security

7. Conference Participants expressed gratitude to Afghan citizens, Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF), and to those nations whose citizens

and military personnel have served in Afghanistan. Conference

Participants expressed their sorrow for all those who have made the

ultimate sacrifice for a secure and stable Afghanistan. Conference

Participants also thanked those countries that have provided transit and

related facilities to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the

ANSF.

8. Conference Participants reiterated their resolve to combat terrorism, in

particular al-Qaeda, and commended Afghan efforts to this end.

Conference Participants condemned in the strongest terms all attacks by


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the Taliban and their extremist allies, including Improvised Explosive

Devices, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians, and Afghan

and international forces. These attacks undermine stabilisation,

reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.

9. Conference Participants noted that most civilian casualties are caused

by insurgent attacks. Conference Participants welcomed thedetermination by ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government and

ANSF, to continue to do their utmost to protect and further reduce the

risk to civilians and jointly to investigate civilian casualties.

10. Conference Participants welcomed the progress made by the Afghan

security forces as they increasingly take responsibility for military

operations. Conference Participants also welcomed the Government of

Afghanistans stated goal of the ANSF taking the lead and conducting the

majority of operations in the insecure areas of Afghanistan within three

years and taking responsibility for physical security within five years. To

help realise this, the international community committed to continue toimprove the capability and effectiveness of the ANSF. Conference

Participants also committed to providing the necessary support to the

phased growth and expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and

Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to reach 171,600 and 134,000

personnel by October 2011, as approved by the Joint Coordination and

Monitoring Board (JCMB) on 20 January 2010. The international

community also showed its full support for the continued development

and implementation of the National Police Strategy. Beyond this, the

Government of Afghanistan and the international community will decide

if this is sufficient, based on the prevailing security situation and long

term sustainability.11. Conference Participants welcomed the decision by the North Atlantic

Council, in close consultation with non-North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO) ISAF partners, in full agreement with the

Government of Afghanistan and in accordance with United Nations

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1890, to develop, by the Kabul

Conference, a plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead province

by province, including the conditions on which transition will be based.

Further to this, Conference Participants welcomed the shared

commitment to create the conditions to allow for transition as rapidly as

possible. This is with a view to a number of provinces transitioning toANSF lead, providing conditions are met, by late 2010/early 2011, with

ISAF moving to a supporting role within those provinces. Conference


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Participants welcomed the intention to establish a process among the

Government of Afghanistan, ISAF and other key international partners

to assess progress and monitor in areas other than security that influence

transition.

12. Conference Participants welcomed:

ISAFs increased focus on partnering ANSF and the principle thatAfghan forces should progressively assume the leading role in all

stages of operations;

the Government of Afghanistans determination to assumegreater responsibility for detentions, in keeping with the growth

of Afghan capacity, in accordance with international standards

and applicable national and international law;

the contribution the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan(NTM-A) is making towards the growth and expansion of the

ANSF and urged the international community to meet

outstanding requirements for trainers and mentoring teams, andto continue efforts in this respect;

the contribution made by EUPOL to monitoring, mentoring andadvising the Ministry of Interior and supporting national and

provincial level Afghan-led police reform and urged partners to

reinforce and provide logistical support to EUPOL, especially in

the provinces;

bilateral support to the ANSF from a range of countries andurged the international community to coordinate closely in this

work with the NTM-A and EUPOL, including through the

International Police Coordination Board (IPCB);

the Government of Afghanistans commitment to continuedevelopment of a National Security Strategy with the support of

the international community; and

the Government of Afghanistans commitment to devise andimplement a National Security Policy, which is to be presented at

the Kabul Conference and which outlines the security

infrastructure and roles and responsibilities of the different

security agencies.

13. In the context of a comprehensive, Afghan-led approach, Conference

Participants reinforced the need for an effective and enduring framework

to create and consolidate a stable and secure environment in whichAfghan men and women of all backgrounds and perspectives can

contribute to the reconstruction of their country. In this context,


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Conference Participants welcomed the plans of the Government of

Afghanistan to offer an honourable place in society to those willing to

renounce violence, participate in the free and open society and respect the

principles that are enshrined in the Afghan constitution, cut ties with al-

Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and pursue their political goals

peacefully.14. Conference Participants welcomed:

the Government of Afghanistans commitment to reinvigorateAfghan-led reintegration efforts by developing and implementing

an effective, inclusive, transparent and sustainable national Peace

and Reintegration Programme;

plans to convene a Grand Peace Jirga before the KabulConference; and

the international communitys commitment to establish a Peaceand Reintegration Trust Fund to finance the Afghan-led Peace

and Reintegration Programme. Conference Participantswelcomed pledges to the Trust Fund and encouraged all those

who wish to support peace-building and stabilisation efforts in

Afghanistan to contribute to this important initiative.

15. Conference Participants recognised the seriousness of the

humanitarian situation in different areas of the country, particularly food

insecurity. Conference Participants invited the international community

to support the 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan.

Development and Governance

16. Afghanistan faces formidable development challenges, which requiresustained, long-term support from the international community. A better

coordinated and resourced civilian effort is critical to overcoming these

challenges. Economic growth, respect for Rule of Law and human rights

alongside creation of employment opportunities, and good governance

for all Afghans are also critical to counter the appeal of the insurgency, as

well as being vital to greater stability in Afghanistan.

17. The international community noted the progress that the Afghan

Government has made on economic development, including reaching the

completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,

which will provide Afghanistan with up to $1.6 billion in debt relief from

major creditors. This takes total debt relief to around $11 billion.

Conference Participants agreed that the priority, as established by the

Government of Afghanistan, is accelerated progress on agriculture,


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human resources development and infrastructure, and to ensure these are

underpinned by expanded capacity and structural reforms. Conference

Participants looked forward to the new economic development plan, and

to the start of discussions on a new Afghan-led IMF programme and to

continued IMF in-country engagement.

18. Conference Participants welcomed the Government of Afghanistanscommitment to assume increasing financial responsibility for its own

affairs, and underlined that critical reforms were needed to maximise

domestic earnings, with a view to attaining fiscal sustainability over time,

including:

increasing tax and customs revenues; restructuring public enterprises in order to ensure greater

accountability and efficiency; and

pursuing the Road Map of the 2007 Enabling EnvironmentConference as reflected in the ANDS;

continuing regulatory reforms including implementation of thenew mining regulations and bearing in mind Afghanistans

current commitments under the Extractive Industries

Transparency Initiative.

19. Conference Participants welcomed:

the Government of Afghanistans plans for more coherent andbetter coordinated development. This involves aligning key

ministries into development and governance clusters and refining

the Afghan National Development Strategy development

priorities, in particular infrastructure, rural development, human

resources development, agriculture and the main areas of

governance. It also involves developing a work plan, whichshould be completed by the Kabul Conference;

Conference Participants supported the ambition of theGovernment of Afghanistan whereby donors increase the

proportion of development aid delivered through the

Government of Afghanistan to 50% in the next two years,

including through multi donor trust funds that support the

Government budget e.g. the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust

Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. But

this support is conditional on the Governments progress in

further strengthening public financial management systems,reducing corruption, improving budget execution, developing a

financing strategy and Government capacity towards the goal.


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Conference Participants confirmed their intention to establish a

detailed roadmap with the Government of Afghanistan, before

the Kabul Conference, and to provide technical assistance to help

develop the Governments capacity to achieve its goal;

The Government of Afghanistans plans to implement budgetaryreforms, to increase budget execution rates and to take steps toimprove domestic revenue collection in parallel with enhancing

anti-corruption practices and institutions with the aim of

achieving fiscal sustainability.

20. Conference Participants welcomed the Government of Afghanistans

commitment to develop an overall plan for more effective and

accountable national civilian institutions, including the civil service. They

welcomed the Government of Afghanistans decision to approve the Sub-

National Governance Policy and prepare implementing legislation in

advance of the Kabul Conference. Conference Participants committed to

support the enhancement of sub-national governance through theGovernment of Afghanistans single framework of priority programmes.

To facilitate its implementation, the Government of Afghanistan intends

to publish the criteria for administrative boundaries. Conference

Participants welcomed commitments made by the Government of

Afghanistan and urged the international community to provide additional

support to train 12,000 sub-national civil servants in core administrative

functions in support of provincial and district governors by the end of

2011.

21. Conference Participants acknowledge the Government of

Afghanistans increasing efforts to implement the National Justice

Programme with a view to making more transparent, fair, and accessibleprovision of justice available to all Afghans equally.

22. Conference Participants commended the Government of

Afghanistans commitment to improve access to justice and respect for

human rights, including through its Justice and Human Rights

Programme, political and financial support for the Afghanistan

Independent Human Rights Commission, and the adoption and

implementation of a new national policy as soon as possible on relations

between the formal justice system and dispute resolution councils. The

Government of Afghanistan reiterated its commitment to protect and

promote the human rights of all Afghan citizens and to make Afghanistana place where men and women enjoy security, equal rights, and equal

opportunities in all spheres of life. Conference Participants also


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committed to strengthening the role of civil society.

23. Conference Participants welcomed the Government of Afghanistans

whole-of-government approach to fighting corruption, and its ongoing

work to mount a concerted effort to tackle the key drivers of corruption,

through development of clear and objective benchmarks and

implementation plans, in advance of the Kabul Conference, including butnot limited to:

empowering an independent High Office of Oversight toinvestigate and sanction corrupt officials, and lead the fight

against corruption, through decree within one month;

during 2010, establishing a statutory basis for related anti-corruption bodies, including the Major Crimes Task Force and

the Anti-Corruption Tribunal, guaranteeing their long-term

independence;

enhancing the effectiveness of the senior civil serviceappointments and vetting process and revising the civil servicecode. This will include, by the time of the Kabul Conference,

identifying the top level civil service appointments;

the intention of the President to issue a decree prohibiting closerelatives of Ministers, Ministerial advisers, Members of

Parliament, Governors and some Deputy Ministers from serving

in customs and revenue collection departments throughout

government;

as a priority during 2010, adopting comprehensive legislationagenda to make Afghan laws consistent with the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption, including the Anti-Corruption

Penal Code, to expand provisions related to asset declaration; and inviting Afghan and other eminent experts to participate in an

independent Ad Hoc Monitoring and Evaluation Mission which

will make its first monitoring visit to Afghanistan within three

months, develop clear and objective benchmarks for progress and

prepare periodic reports on national and international activity for

the Afghan President, Parliament and people, as well as the

international community.

24. Conference Participants committed to helping the Government of

Afghanistans anti-corruption efforts by providing assistance to the new

institutions and committed to increase the transparency and effectivenessof its own aid in line with the June 2008 Paris Conference Declaration

and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. In particular,


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Conference Participants agreed to:

work with the proposed anti-corruption bodies to review existingprocedures and investigate instances of corruption that involve

internationals; and

work with the Government to improve procurement processes,including establishing additional measures to ensure due diligencein international contracting procedures.

25. Conference Participants noted the decision by the Afghan

Independent Election Commission to postpone Parliamentary elections

until 18 September in accordance with the Afghan Constitution and

electoral law. In this regard, Conference Participants welcomed the

Government of Afghanistans commitment to ensuring the integrity of

the 2010 Parliamentary elections and to preventing any irregularities and

misconduct. Conference Participants also welcomed the Government of

Afghanistans commitment to work closely with the UN to build on the

lessons learned from the 2009 elections to deliver improvements to theelectoral process in 2010 and beyond.

26. The international community welcomed the Government of

Afghanistans commitment to implement the National Action Plan for

Women of Afghanistan and to implement the Elimination of Violence

Against Women Law. Conference Participants welcomed the

Government of Afghanistans commitment to strengthen the

participation of women in all Afghan governance institutions including

elected and appointed bodies and the civil service.

27. Conference Participants emphasised the pernicious links between the

narcotics trade, the insurgency and other criminal activity, including

corruption and human trafficking. Conference Participants thereforewelcomed:

the recent progress the Government of Afghanistan has madeincluding the 22% reduction in poppy cultivation last year and

increase in the number of poppy free provinces from 6 in 2006 to

20 in 2009;

the undertaking by the Government of Afghanistan to update theNational Drugs Control Strategy during 2010, which will include

targeted programmes of agricultural development and the

reduction of poppy cultivation;

the ongoing support of United Nations Office on Drugs andCrime (UNODC) and the International community to support

the Government of Afghanistan to counter this trade;


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the continuation of the Paris-Moscow process in counter-actingillegal production, consumption and trafficking of narcotics and

the elimination of poppy crops, drug laboratories and stores.

Also the interception of drug convoys as well as the continuation

of consultations on the marking of pre-cursors and greater

bilateral regional cooperation; and the contribution to multilateral anti-narcotics efforts by the Plan

of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Members,

adopted in March 2009 by the Special Conference on Afghanistan

in Moscow.

Regional Cooperation/International Architecture

28. Conference Participants reaffirmed their support for a stable, secure

and democratic Afghanistan, acknowledged Afghanistans potential role

as a land-bridge between South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and

the Far East and renewed their pledge to work together actively to thisend. Conference Participants underscored that regionally-owned and

steered initiatives stood the best chance of success and welcomed a

number of recent initiatives that showed the need for neighbouring and

regional partners to work constructively together. In this context

Conference Participants noted the recent Istanbul Regional Summit on

Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia and its Statement.

This regional co-operation includes reaffirming the principles of the

Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration of 2002, and working actively

for:

Afghan sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity; Non-intervention in Afghanistans internal affairs and mutual

non-interference;

Afghan-led peace, reintegration and reconciliation efforts; Ending support wherever it occurs on each others territory for

illegally-armed groups, parallel structures and illegal financing

directed towards destabilising Afghanistan or individual

neighbours;

Combating terrorism including but not limited to increasedintelligence- sharing, dismantling the logistical, financial and

ideological support for terrorist networks and tackling the causes

of radicalisation;


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Development of trans-regional trade and transit; including workon infrastructure and progress on energy, power transmission

lines and transport infrastructure, including railway networks;

Conducive conditions for the return of Afghan refugees; and Trans-regional co-operation against the narcotics trade. Supporting people-to-people contact, including interaction and

exchanges between the civil society, academia, media and private

sector.

29. Conference Participants welcomed the fact that Afghanistan and its

regional partners would have opportunities in 2010 to develop and co-

ordinate contributions to advance these principles. Conference

Participants noted the value of a more coherent and structured approach

to individual initiatives. In this respect, Conference Participants

welcomed the fact that Afghanistan has invited the relevant regional

bodies (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Regional

Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, ShanghaiCooperation Organisation and Economic Cooperation Organisation in

accordance with their respective mandates) and others including the

Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to develop as soon as

possible a co-ordinated plan for Afghanistans regional engagement.

Conference Participants invited the countries, regional organisations and

fora concerned to offer regular updates, including at the Kabul

Conference.

30. Emphasising the theme of enriching regional cooperation, Conference

Participants welcomed the contribution made by specific bilateral and

regional projects including that of the OIC on education and tackling

radicalisation, the OSCE and the Afghanistan-Pakistan CooperationWorkshop (Dubai Process) on border management. Conference

Participants were grateful for the information given by several countries

on bilateral initiatives including the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and

Transit Agreement, on which they welcomed progress achieved and

looked forward to a timely conclusion, and the Indonesian programmes

for capacity building including technical cooperation in the fields of

education, health, agriculture, poverty reduction, renewable energy and

small and medium enterprises.

31. Conference Participants recalled that the international community

was engaged in Afghanistan in support of the Government ofAfghanistan. Until such time as the Government of Afghanistan is able to

assume the responsibility, Conference Participants noted with


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appreciation that UNAMA continues to be the primary international

organisation for coordinating international support in line with the

UNSCR 1868. Conference Participants welcomed:

the Afghan Governments presentation of clear priorities; the international communitys commitment to more effective and

properly resourced civilian engagement to support the AfghanGovernment in order to improve the impact of international

civilian assistance;

the international communitys commitment to align its assistancemore closely with Afghan priorities, in keeping with Paris

Principles on aid effectiveness, thereby increasing Afghan

government capacity;

the international communitys intention to work closely withUNAMA to reinvigorate civilian delivery;

the appointment of a new NATO Senior Civilian Representative;and

the decision of the EU to strengthen its presence in Kabul underone single representative.

32. Conference Participants welcomed the decision by the UN Secretary

General to appoint Staffan di Mistura; the decision by the NATO

Secretary General to appoint Mark Sedwill; and the forthcoming

appointment from the European Union (EU) High Representative; and

looked forward to their taking up their jobs in the first few months of

2010. Conference Participants invited them to work closely together to

ensure closer coordination in Kabul. Furthermore while noting recent

improvements in the functioning of the JCMB, Conference Participants

invited the co-chairs of the JCMB to recommend to its membersadditional measures to make the JCMB ever more effective.

33. Conference Participants took the opportunity to thank the

incumbents: UN SRSG Kai Eide, NATO SCR Fernando Gentilini and

EUSR Ettore Sequi and EC Head of Delegation Hansjrg Kretschmer for

their invaluable work and commitment to Afghanistan.

34. We look forward to reviewing mutual progress on commitments at

the Kabul Conference later this year.

Communiqu, UK & Afghanistan,http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/communique/

(accessed January 30, 2010)


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THE US F INDING ITSELF ON THE HORNS OF A D I LEMMA INA FGHANISTAN

The new reintegration US plan hinges on winning over moderate Taliban

which in their view form 70% of total fighters. Their supposed successwith some of the former Taliban officials who had worked under Mullah

Omar has led them to believe that with their help they would be able to

wean away the majority and isolate hardcore Taliban. $1.5 billion has

been pledged to woo the reconcilable. Only the reconcilable who will

renounce militancy, surrender arms and cut off links with al-Qaeda and

Mullah Omar led hardliners would stand qualified. This kind of effort

was made in the past as well in which Saudi leadership was asked to play a

role to bring the reconcilable closer to Karzai regime. Meeting of some of

the Taliban leaders with Saudi officials, such as Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil,

M. Musa Hotal, Abdul Hakim Munib, Faiz M. Faizan and Shams-us-Safa,

led to a misplaced belief that a breakthrough had been achieved. (The fivehave now been removed from the blacklist of UNSC). However, owing

to impractical preconditions, Saudi initiative fizzled out. Saudis desired

detachment of Taliban from al-Qaeda rather than dividing the Taliban.

Karzai on several occasions expressed his eagerness to meet Omar and

proposed a meeting at any venue suiting him or at Kabul assuring him

full security. His overtures were brushed aside since he is seen by Taliban

Shura as an American puppet whose writ doesnt extend beyond his

palace and whose security is dependent upon American guards.

During the recent London conference held on 28 January to find a

solution to Afghan tangle, Karzai made an offer to negotiate with theTaliban and to re-integrate them. He once again sought Saudi mediation.

In response to the preconditions put forth by the participants, Taliban

Shura put forward its own points. These are: release of all Taliban

prisoners languishing in different jails; clearance of all 144 Taliban

officials from the blacklist of UNSC and canceling induction of

additional troops. They have not addressed Karzai for they know he is

powerless.

The US is finding itself on the horns of a dilemma. It knows it will

not be able to defeat Taliban and al-Qaeda comprehensively in the

foreseeable future but is desperate to achieve some sort of moral if not

physical victory and return home in next 2-3 years timeframe honorably.

It also knows that Karzai led regime propped up by Washington through

fraudulent election and Afghan security forces are not in a position to


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16 IPRI Factfile

handle the situation independently after the withdrawal of coalition

forces. It acknowledges that the Taliban are a force to reckon with; they

can neither be wished away nor can their return to power blocked. Eight

years of sustained efforts have failed to weaken their fighting ability, their

resolve and unity. Taliban-al-Qaeda nexus remain intact. Afghan Shura

led by Mullah Omar continues to hold undiminished sway over theTaliban movement.

Mullah Omar and his Shura operate from unknown location (s)

since November 2001. None has seen him or any of his top confidantes

despite the man hunt. Unlike mixed reports about Osama bin Laden

whether he is dead or alive, no news of his death have ever been

circulated which implies he is functional. Afghans have seen the real faces

of their rulers and none among them ever caught their imaginations and

inspired them. Mullah Omar stands tall among the whole lot because of

his personal conduct based on justice, honesty and piety, and the way he

restored stability, security and social order during his five-year rule undertrying conditions. The up righteous and principled stand that he took to

protect his guest under the tradition of Pasthunwali upgraded his esteem

and respect in the eyes of Afghans sky high. Even leaders of TTP have

sworn allegiance to him and see him as Ameer-ul-Momineen. His

resilience to withstand the onslaught of US led allied forces and his

leadership qualities to recapture lost ground and restore the Taliban

movement further boosted his image. He is now seen by the Afghan

Pashtuns as the only hope to rid the country from foreign occupation and

to once again regain stability.

While the popularity of Mullah Omar has not dented, Americans

have lost their image and credibility due to their barbaric and unjustpractices. Casualties of occupation troops have begun to accelerate from

2009 onwards and territory is fast slipping out of their hands as more and

more territory is coming under the influence of Taliban. Low morale,

depression and homesickness among ISAF soldiers coupled with

vociferous demands from USA and western countries to wind up the

fruitless war are other factors which are haunting US leaders. Successes

achieved by Pak Army suffering from paucity of resources as compared

with US-NATO forces enjoying all tactical, operational, technical and

logistical advantages also disturb them since it is now becoming

increasingly difficult to hide their failures by blaming Pakistan. USeagerness to negotiate with the Taliban makes its position difficult to

restrain Pakistan from maintaining contacts with them. In the face of


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belligerent and uncompromising attitude of Indian leaders towards

Pakistan and exposure of its clandestine activities in Balochistan, FATA

and Swat, US can no longer press Pakistan to render its eastern border

naked and shift bulk of forces towards western border where Pak Army

has stabilized the situation to quite an extent and the TTP is in disarray.

Since the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been demonized so extensively, ithas become difficult to negotiate with any of the two entities with an

open and free mind. Neither the US can afford to abandon in haste as it

had done in 1990 since it would open the gates for the Taliban to retake

power without much ado, thereby rendering their massive investments

and human losses end in smoke. This for sure would ignite furor in USA

and western countries and demand for a probe and accountability would

intensify. Anti-Americanism would peak in the western world as well.

Return of Taliban to power would give heart to Islamic movements

raging in several Muslim countries and future of secular governments

supported by USA would become wobbly.The stakes being too high, the US would therefore not opt for the

safest option of talking to Taliban without preconditions but would opt

for next best to divide Taliban, isolate hardcore Taliban and al-Qaeda,

launch ruthless operations against strongholds of Taliban in southern and

southeastern Afghanistan to regain lost space and then negotiate from

position of strength. Efforts to entice reconcilable Pashtuns and Taliban

have already begun with the help of few former officials of Mullah Omar

regime. Shinwari tribe in Nangahar province has been approached and

some headway made. $500 million has been placed at the disposal of

Karzai to buy off loyalties of moderates.

US leadership must listen to the voice of American people whowant US soldiers to return to their homes. It is regrettable that instead of

respecting their sentiments, Gen McChrystal is feverishly planning a

massive offensive in Helmand next week amidst snowfall forcing the

unfortunate residents of the province to leave their homes and hearths in

inclement weather. Having suffered big reverses in July offensive in

Helmand, he is desperate to build up his badly bruised image at the cost

of people of Afghanistan and his troops. It implies the US is refusing to

learn from history and is bent upon winning over Afghan Pashtuns

through policy of shock and awe. Taliban have not got over awed and

have vowed to fight back with all their strength. It is however to be seenwhether the Taliban would like to get involved in pitched battles against

overwhelming numerical and technological superiority of coalition


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18 IPRI Factfile

forces. Moreover, while the US is pushed for time the other side is not

and would like to buy time. The US should strive to leave behind good

memories and not scars by sheathing the stick and using carrots only.

Asif Haroon Raja, February 8, 2010.http://www.markthetruth.com/afghanistan/333-the-us-finding-itself-on-

the-horns-of-a-dilemma-in-afghanistan.html

OPERATION MOSHTARAK : A T A GLA NCE

The joint command at Nato's International Security Assistance Force

(Isaf) has launched what it calls an "Afghan-led counter-insurgency

operation", sending 15,000 troops into key areas of Helmand province to

fight the Taliban.

The Taliban has a fraction of that number of forces, claiming 2,000

fighters are ready to fight back.

Codenamed Operation Moshtarak (meaning "together" in the localDari language), the latest offensive's first objective is to secure control of

the town of Marjah, southwest of Helmand's provincial capital Lashkar

Gah. Marjah is known to be the heart of the region's opium's cultivation

and drug trade.

To the north, troops are also fighting in the district of Nad Ali, the

scene of recent, smaller clashes between Nato forces and Taliban fighters.

The forces involved in Operation Moshtarak are:

Afghans comprise about 60 per cent of the total force, althoughmost are in support roles. This includes members of the Afghan

National Army, border police and Afghan Gendarmerie. 1,500 Afghan army troops are fighting. 3,500 US marines are also being deployed. 2,000 British soldiers will be taking part as well, as are forces

from Denmark, Estonia and Canada.

The US is calling this assault a prototype for a new kind of military

operation, in which the goal is to capture the area with a minimum

amount of violence.

And for the first time Nato and Afghan officials have readied a

large number of Afghan administrators as well as an Afghan governor to

run Marjah as soon as the fighting ends.More than 1,000 local police are also standing by.

Aljazeera, February 13, 2010.http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/02/201021343536129252.html


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B ATTLE FOR MA R J A H: THE TA L I B A N STRONGHOLD

A massive build-up is afoot for the battle of Marjah, which is the

strong-hold of Taliban in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. About

fifteen thousand ground troops, reinforced by twenty thousand Afghan

Army and police force will launch the offensive, supported by the entireUS-NATO air power in Afghanistan. The objective is to inflict a

crushing defeat on the Taliban, at Marjah, which is considered a bastion

of Taliban power, and set the momentum for their defeat in other areas,

thus restoring government control over the territories of Afghanistan.

Indeed, it is a very ambitious plan against the Taliban, who control

thirty provinces, out of thirty four and rule the country-side. The surge

of 30,000 American troops to be completed by August this year is

expected to accomplish the task of restoring government control over

Afghanistan.

The Google picture of Marjah and the surrounding areas, gives abetter explanation of the impending battle: Marjah which lies about 15

KM west of Lashkargah the provincial capital of Helmand is a plain

sandy area with scattered mud huts, and a green belt to the south and the

west, fed by the Helmand River. The green belt is sparsely populated

with about 6-7000 people. The area is open, not at all suited for positional

defence, nor for hit and run operations of the Taliban. In the vast open

areas, the coalition air power and the mobile armoured troops would be

able to drastically limit Taliban movement and their operational

effectiveness. What kind of resistance, therefore the coalition forces are

expecting for which the massive build-up, is taking place?

Taliban are well-versed in this game of fighting in the desert regions

of South and the rugged mountains, for the last thirty years. They are the

die-hard freedom fighters, motivated, self-assured and confident of victory

against the occupation forces. Time is on their side. Their strategy for the

battle of Marjah therefore can be easily envisaged: They would rather

hold Marjah lightly, with a maximum of 2-3000 die-hard fighters, who

would fight to the last man, killing as many of coalition forces, as

possible. The use of strong and dispersed defenses, reinforced by IEDs

Omar Bombs and booby traps, would cause attrition on the attacking

troops. Under-ground defensive net-work, on the pattern of Hezbollahs

defenses against Israelis in the 2006 war, would add to the strength of theresistance.

The bulk of the Taliban fighting force in Helmand area is estimated


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20 IPRI Factfile

at 10-12000, which is likely to operate around the combat zone of Marjah,

to carryout interdiction of supply lines, logistics, support bases and may

engage the coalition forces from several directions. While the battle of

Marjah rages, which will be long and bloody, the Taliban operating in

other provinces, under their control will intensify their activities against

the occupation forces, causing dispersion and greater attrition. The storyof total defeat of the British Army of 1898, will not be repeated because,

the air power of the coalition forces will save the day. A stalemate will

occur. The result of this battle as well as the war in Afghanistan is the real

contest between two opposing will. The coalition forces are demoralized

and defeated, fighting a war which has no ideal and no moral justification.

Whereas the Taliban are fighting for the freedom of their homeland, with

faith in themselves and belief in the Divine Intervention, which has

helped them defeat the mightiest of the mighty, during the last thirty

years. In fact, the Asymmetric Warfare, waged by the Shadow Army of

Taliban has determined the contours of the emerging global order, byputting limits to the expanding menace of global hegemony, primacy and

pre-eminence. Maulana Jalaluddin Roomis prediction indeed has come

true: The Giants come forward from Afghanistan and influence the

world.

In May 2003, when Afghanistan was occupied by the coalition

forces, Jalaluddin Haqqani declared: We have decided to fight, till we are

free. We will never submit to the demands of the occupation forces,

because our national ethos and traditions do not allow that. Freedom is

our goal and our destiny. Win we will, Insha Allah. A common friend,

who has just returned from Afghanistan, told me: I found them, so

much at ease with themselves. So cool, calm, perceptive and committedto their cause and total surrender to the will of Allah They say the time

is on their side, whereas, it is running-out for the oppressors in

Afghanistan.

It is obvious that the outcome of the battle of Marjah would be a

stalemate and the heavy casualties, the coalition forces are likely to suffer.

In no way it would help the peace process in Afghanistan. Sagacity

demands that the USA and their coalition partners show greater sincerity

of purpose for peace and give up the idea of use of force for gains, at this

belated stage, when the Taliban enjoy clear ascendancy over the

occupation forces, and with each passing day, more and more tribals arejoining them. Attempts are being made to separate the al-Qaeda from the

Taliban who would not abandon them. If they could, they would have


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handed-over Osama to the Americans nine years back and saved

themselves from the ravages of war. There are no good and bad Taliban

either. They are all the same, and follow Mullah Omar. No amount of

money can buy-them-of either, because they are not a saleable

commodity. Let us therefore accept the reality and initiate the peace

process in real unrest.Special modalities, therefore, are needed for bringing peace in

Afghanistan and to ensure an honourable way out, for USA and its allies,

and a smooth transition to the civil order, without triggering bigger

chaotic conditions. There are terrifying prospects of defeat in

Afghanistan hence the need for a comprehensive strategy and an exit

strategy, which is the only viable option, to be supported by an

aggressive political and diplomatic policy for peace in Afghanistan. The

steps, therefore, that needs to be taken are:

The occupation forces must give a time-frame for withdrawal and

declare a cease-fire. Start dialogue with the Taliban and NorthernAlliance, to form the Loe Jirga, to decide the main issues, such as the

formation of the Interim government, for a period of three years, which

will be responsible for holding the Census to determine who is who, for

the impending elections; framing of a new Constitution; rebuilding of

Institutions; massive reconstruction of the infrastructure and re-creating

ethnic balance, which remains disturbed since the Bonn Conference of

2001 and holding of general elections in the year 2013 and finally transfer

power to the elected government.

The centres of power Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban must be

taken into cognizance, as the main arbiters of peace and the immediate

neighbours Iran and China must also be on board.

Gen Mirza Aslam Beg,PakistanDaily,February 15, 2010.http://www.daily.pk/battle-for-marjeh-the-taliban-strong-hold-16083/

A LTERING A FGHANISTAN' S B A LA NCE OF POWER

Marines along with foreign and Afghan forces began a major offensive in

the city of Marjah in Afghanistan's Helmand Province on Saturday, with

the goal of regaining control from the Taliban and establishing a

government there. CFR national security expert Max Boot, who was in

the province in October as the offensive was being planned, says successin Marjah will mean being able to extend the area of control in "a kind of

spreading ink stain, which is a classic aim of counterinsurgency warfare."


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22 IPRI Factfile

He also says Colombia's success in controlling its drug trade suggests it's

possible to sharply reduce opium production in Helmand Province.

What is this major operation, the largest since President Obama

took office, aiming to accomplish?

They are trying to take out probably the biggest remaining Taliban

stronghold in Helmand Province, which has been a safe haven not only

for insurgents but also for drug dealers--and the two, of course, are

connected. I was on the ground in Nawa, which is only five to ten miles

south of Marjah. A couple of thousand Marines had gone into Nawa last

summer and had established control by the time I arrived in October. It

was actually safe to walk around the town without body armor, which is

not something I'd recommend trying in most of Helmand Province.

But the Marines in Nawa talked about Marjah being a sort of black

hole that exerted a dark influence over Nawa and everything else in the

vicinity. And as long as Marjah remained a Taliban stronghold, it would

be hard to make progress in other parts of Helmand Province. The

Marines were very aware that they needed to reach a critical mass of

troops so that they not only would be able to go into Marjah but also to

hold it once they were in there. That's the point of the whole operation--

to have enough American and Afghan troops so that they can not only

do the clearing but also the hold and build part of the operation.

They needed some of the thirty thousand surge troops that

President Obama authorized on December 1, as well as Afghan troops

that have been sent from other parts of Afghanistan. They finally got to

this critical mass and decided to go into Marjah.The goal of the operation is not primarily to kill a bunch of bad

guys. If that had been the goal they would have disguised the operation so

that it would have been more of a surprise. But what they did was to

publicize it well in advance. That gave civilians a chance to get out of the

line of fire, but it also let the Taliban escape if they wanted to. The

attitude of the military planners was that they didn't care if the Taliban

escaped. They wanted to grab hold of the populated area and keep it from

being used as a Taliban stronghold in the future. The key now is to hold

on to it.

They did a lot in the planning process to make sure that not onlythe combat operation was successful. General Stanley McChrystal [U.S.

commander in Afghanistan] got President Hamid Karzai to sign off on


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the operation, which he has not done with a lot of military operations in

the past. They have what they call a "government in a box" ready to

come in to govern and not just fight. They have a district governor and a

district government ready to come in; they have several thousand Afghan

policemen ready to come in. That will be essential to turning around

Marjah and expanding the area of control.Right now what we have in Helmand Province is a lot of insurgent

activity in the countryside and a few areas of government control in

places like Nawa or Lashkgar Gah, the provincial capital, and soon to be

followed by Marjah, areas where substantial numbers of coalition troops

will have gone in and held, and now the task will be to expand those areas

of control into a kind of spreading ink stain, which is a classic aim of

counterinsurgency warfare. The allies will be trying to bring the ink

stains together. You will have quite a large area where hopefully the

insurgents will be excluded in the future.

How does Helmand Province relate to the fight against al-

Qaeda and the Taliban?

Helmand is one of the two critical provinces in southern Afghanistan

along with Kandahar. Those two predominantly Pashtun provinces are

traditionally the heart of the Taliban movement. Helmand is particularly

important because it is the largest opium-producing region in the world,

and that finances the Taliban insurgency. In the planning that General

McChrystal and his staff have done, their main emphasis has been to take

control of Helmand and Kandahar.

This is going to be a major step towards accomplishing that inHelmand Province. There is still a lot of fighting to be done in Helmand

and there is still the issue of Kandahar and Kandahar City, where

coalition troops have been having a hard fight on the periphery trying to

exclude the Taliban from the city itself. That is all part of the integrated

campaign plan to take control of some of these areas where the Taliban

insurgency has flourished--to deny them to the Taliban in the future. The

enemy that our troops are fighting there is primarily Taliban, not al-

Qaeda. There aren't that many al-Qaeda troops in Afghanistan, per se.

But these groups are closely linked. You have the Pakistan Taliban and

various other Islamist groups which have a refuge in Pakistan and all ofwhich are cooperating to some degree to push foreign troops out and to

overthrow the democratic government in Kabul.


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24 IPRI Factfile

One critic I heard on television was concerned Marines would

bring in Afghan forces and administrators who would not be

from the local area, which would breed resentment. Whats

your sense of that?

The allied commanders are pretty well aware of this. The people who aregoverning down south are Pashtuns, as is President Karzai. The fight in

the south is really a fight among Pashtuns. There is no question that there

are a number of other ethnic groups--Tajiks, Hazaris, Uzbeks, and

others--who are represented in the Afghan army. Overall, the Afghan

army is pretty well balanced ethnically. This hasn't been a huge issue. In

fact, one of the interesting aspects of the fight in Afghanistan is that there

hasn't been a lot of the sectarian fighting like you saw in Iraq where

Sunnis and Shiites were at each other's throats. The bigger issue is not the

ethnicity of the troops or the government officials involved. The bigger

issue is corruption and the competence of those involved.

Is the goal of wiping out the narcotics traffic here a reasonable

one?

"Wiping it out" isn't going to happen any time soon. But reducing it is

reasonable. I've just been in Colombia, which is another area where

you've got a flourishing narcotics economy and a flourishing insurgency,

which is piggy-backing off the narcotics economy. Ten years ago, the

situation in Colombia seemed hopeless. It looked like it was going to be a

failed narco-state. There has been a rapid reduction in the amount of coca

which is grown and exported out of Colombia. So the historical evidencesuggests that it's not impossible to root out or dramatically and reduce

local drug production. But it can't be done in isolation.

What works is that you have to establish 24/7 control on the

ground. If you do that, then you start to shift the incentives and all of a

sudden the farmers find that it doesn't pay to grow poppies, that other

crops might make more sense. And if you can get roads open again and

prevent the insurgents from mining the roads, farmers will be able to get

other crops to market. One of the big attractions to the farmers in

growing poppies is that the Taliban will come and pick it up and deliver

it for them so they don't have to worry about transportation, which is

very difficult in southern Afghanistan. If you can make the

transportation network safe and secure--if you can impose a baseline of

security 24/7 in the villages--all of a sudden you will find a lot fewer


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people wanting to grow opium.

Youve pointed out that President Obama has never called for a

victory in this fight in Afghanistan. Will there be pressure on

him to do so if the Marines clear this whole area?

I dont think hes going to change now. But the fact that hes not talking

about winning but in fact he seems to hold out the withdrawal of our

troops as being the highest goal of American strategy makes it harder for

the troops to achieve their job. The only way theyre going to truly take

out the Taliban is if they create the impression in the minds of ordinary

Afghans that it is a better bet in the long term to side with the

government and its NATO allies than it is to side with the Taliban. The

only way to do that is to convince them in the long term that we and our

Afghan allies will be there to protect them. If youre the president of the

United States and youre talking about withdrawal in the summer of 2011

that undercuts the message that the troops on the ground are trying to

convey of permanent and lasting security. It doesnt make the mission

impossible but it makes it more difficult.

When you were in Nawa, did you find that after chasing out

the Taliban, many of the Taliban came over to the government

side? Is that a goal of this operation?

There hasn't been a huge amount of that. What tended to happen in

Nawa was that the Taliban would just lie low. When you talk about the

Taliban, there are many varieties of Taliban. There are some hardcorefighters, but many of them are just farmers who get paid for planting

bombs and who go off and deal with their crops. At some point they may

plant bombs or carry an AK-47 for a few weeks, but a lot of the Taliban

are part-time fighters.

What happens in places like Nawa is that a lot of the part-timers

who might have been willing to go out and plant bombs for the Taliban a

few months before, once they have two thousand U.S. Marines sitting on

top of them, suddenly decide that's not a wise thing to do, and just go to

ground. They don't necessarily join the government, and that's fine. You

don't necessarily want them to join the government, but if they cease and

desist from undertaking insurgent activities, that's perfectly acceptable.

NATO and the Afghan government have announced an elaborate

program, spending hundreds of millions of dollars to reintegrate former


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26 IPRI Factfile

Taliban fighters into Afghan society. That's an important program to

have, but it's not going to reap real benefits until you change the military

balance on the ground. You have to create incentives for ordinary

Taliban to say it's more dangerous to stay with the Taliban than it would

be to go with the government.

For an example of what you might see happen, go back to the fallof 2001 when we came in right after 9/11 and all of a sudden many, many

fighters switched from the Taliban to the government because they

thought that American intervention was this irresistible force and they

had to get on the right side of it. A lot of that momentum has been

dissipated in the last few years. The goal of the surge now is to regain that

momentum and convince a lot of the ordinary foot soldier Taliban to

give up the fight. Thats a realistic expectation but again, we haven't

reached that tipping point yet.

In a way, this battle for Marjah will be a test case, right?I don't think anybody imagines that we will win the war in Marjah. It's

one step in a long road toward creating the kind of environment where

you create security and change the balance of power on the ground. And

once you do that, then you dont have to kill or lock up most of the

Taliban. A lot of them will just give up or switch sides--and that's the

ultimate goal.

Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatricks interview to Council on Forigen Relations,February 15, 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/21437/

THE MULLA H A ND THE MA R J A H CA M P A I GN

Good news from Pakistan is rare. So it was a particular relief to hear of

the capture in Karachi of the Talibans top military commander, Mullah

Abdul Ghani Baradar. The joint raid by American and Pakistani

intelligence forces is a sign that President Obamas investment in better

relations with Pakistan is bearing fruit. It is also a reminder of how much

more could be done if the Pakistanis fully committed to the fight against

the extremists.

Like most Americans, we are also closely watching the news fromAfghanistan, as United States, NATO and Afghan troops battle to gain

control of Marjah, a Taliban stronghold in Helmand Province. The

campaign is the first real test of Mr. Obamas top commander in


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Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and his ambitious

counterinsurgency strategy.

By Monday, three days into the assault, American commanders said

at least half of the estimated 400 Taliban fighters in Marjah had been

killed or had fled. But as General McChrystal has rightly made clear,

what matters most is what happens after the fighting ends to win andkeep the allegiance of Marjahs residents.

Afghanistans government has failed to provide security and even

the most basic services to the residents of Marjah and most of the rest of

Afghanistan. That fact, more than any, has pushed Afghans back into the

arms of the Taliban. Once the fighting ends, General McChrystals plan is

to install a functioning government in Marjah.

President Hamid Karzai has appointed a new district governor who

is expected to move in soon. About 400 Afghan police officers will be

brought in to patrol until a local force can be recruited and trained. Plans

for projects to create jobs and provide services have been drawn up.American and British diplomats are ready to set up an office in Marjah to

help them move forward.

The goal is then to replicate the Marjah experience in Taliban

strongholds across the country. It is an ambitious strategy that will need

the sustained attention of Washington and other NATO allies and the

solid backing of Mr. Karzai.

Many important details of Mullah Baradars capture are still secret,

including why Pakistan decided to cooperate now in seizing him. What is

clear is that the Pakistani Army and intelligence service which helped

create and nurture the Afghan Taliban can deliver bad guys when they

want to.Neither Mullah Baradars capture nor the Marjah campaign is likely

to break the Talibans will to fight. But we hope that the mounting

pressure will make some members start questioning their allegiance.

General McChrystal and Afghan leaders have been drafting a plan to offer

jobs and other incentives to persuade insurgents to put down their

weapons and renounce the Talibans brutality and medieval ideas.

Guaranteeing their security from reprisals from their former comrades

or their neighbors will be essential.

It is also unlikely that the Talibans hard-core leaders will ever want

to reconcile with Kabul. Or if they do, their price will be far too high.Frankly, we are concerned about President Karzais overly eager

determination to hold a tribal council on reintegrating Taliban leaders,


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28 IPRI Factfile

including the chief, Mullah Muhammad Omar. As president, Mr. Karzai

has the right to try. But for the sake of his own people, he must make

clear that the government will not cede an inch, especially when it comes

to education for women and girls.

Editorial, New York Times, February 17, 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/opinion/18thur1.html

MA K I NG PEACE WITH TA L I B A N A POSSIBIL ITY?

Going by what transpired in the London Moot of January 28, 2010, the

Afghan premiership and its western allies have commonly fathomed that

negotiated settlement with the fanatically purist Talibs is indeed the

cooperative path out of the morass after nine years of often directionless

drift. Centrality of the message is that a concerted act may wave over

Afghanistan, making the insurgents to wither away with pledges

reintegrating them back in the social and political fabrics by offeringsecurity, vocational training, jobs and amnesty for past crimes. Among

the high profile Talib cock-ups, the US, however, is in favour of engaging

mid- and low-level militants, 70 percent of whom are believed to fight for

money and reasons other than ideological and may lay down arms if

given a viable alternative.

Fragmenting the Taliban on good and bad standards, the good

probably refers to a newer generation that might be more willing to cut

deals with foreign forces than the older generation, which partnered with

the likes of Osama bin Laden. It is being believed that the disenchanted

folks can be accommodated in the political mainstream if they renounceviolence and sever links with al-Qaeda. Then there is the perennial talk of

wooing moderate Taliban over to the governments side. However, the

hurdles lie ahead must be brought to light: How to identify the modes of

reconciling the Pastun dissidents? Will the new Strategy work? Did the

London summit on Afghanistan signal a bold new approach or offer a

blueprint for the US-led coalitions exit strategy? It is also no secret that

the west wants out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible. The success is

thus oscillatory and it is yet to be seen whether the US-led west could

win by this process of discriminatory chicaneries, subtly fomenting

discord among Pashtun Taliban in order to achieve the good objective.

It is clear that neither the Taliban nor ISAF are currently in aposition to win the war in Afghanistan. What is more significant though

is that the militants enjoy the upper hand right now, not the Afghan


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government and its international allies. Obviously, the maxima has been

factored out by realizations on part of both the US-led NATO forces and

the combatants, leading the former cartographers to understand that

success in untangling the Afghan knot is impossible at the crossroads,

likewise the latter stewardship does not feel winning the global

battleground that had already witnessed motleys of the Great Gameplayed there in different eras. In this dual-tracked compromising path

way, the west is relying solely on the past imperialistic game of dissecting

the Pashtun Taliban by providing incentives package of politico-socio

engineering and financial backing to war weary leaders and foot soldiers,

assuming that concessionary modus-vivendi could win over the brawling

ideological concord.

Antithetically, the Taliban is waiting out for the cut and run

channel, previously exercised by the mighty US in Vietnam. With the

wests possible admission that the best it can get in Afghanistan is a

stalemate followed by the foreign forces withdrawal, coercive violencemay reappear at some later stage where the defected Afghan segments

may join hands with the war-lords. If that happens, Afghanistan and the

region as a whole could be back to square one. Washington formula is

calculating on the possibility of talks with the battle fatigued sections of

Taliban coupled by a surge in allied forces offensive against those

unwilling to come to the negotiation table. But the question arises: can

the Taliban be so shaky in a years time that can be dictated to from a

position of strength?

The London conference is the sixth in the series of the long-term

commitments and pledges to Afghanistan, as previously set out in the

2001 Bonn Agreement, in the 2002 Tokyo Conference, the 2006Afghanistan Compact, the 2008 Paris Declaration and the 2009 The

Hague Conference Declaration. The London communiqu dangled the

prospect of a longed-for peace. Once again the international community

re-affirmed its support for the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions

upholding the security, stability and prosperity of Afghanistan and in

particular the role of the UN itself in achieving this goal. In the

meantime, three strategic reviewed has been taken by President Obama.

The solely reason behind is that 2009 had highly been a bad time for the

US army causalities that increased even than the last year. The Afghan

fraudulent election has also challenged the credibility of the UN andWashington. Then the US-European public pressure is also demanding

social-civilian engineering rather than troop surge. Last week moot is


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30 IPRI Factfile

merely the continuity of previous pledges and hopes.

Two new developments took place in this conference. Firstly, the

Karzais sponsored reintegration plan and secondly the committed

increase in donors proportion of development aid to 50 percent to be

delivered through the government of Afghanistan in the next two years.

But this support is conditional on the governments progress in furtherstrengthening public financial management systems, reducing corruption,

improving budgetary execution, developing a financing strategy and

governments capacity towards the goal.

The London meeting backed the Afghan President Hamid Karzais

plan to reintegrate Taliban - willing to cut ties with al-Qaida, to eschew

violence and other terrorist groups and pursue their political goals

peacefully - and offer an honourable social status in a free and open

society that respect the principles enshrined in the Afghan constitution.

International allies will pledge at least $500 million for the reconciliation

fund officially known as the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund, anddubbed as the Taliban Trust Fund by some. London confirmed the

best, the allies now hope for is an orderly and honourable retreat,

scattering alms as they leave.

The strategic community realized that some political element is

missing in their Afghan paradigm, therefore they include civilian surge as

an important component of the Afghan strategy. US Secretary of state

Hillary Clinton had also acknowledged that most modern conflicts didnt

end with a victory on the field of battle and therefore political and

development work was essential.

Analyzing the shift in policy towards accommodation, critics

predict if political and softer strategy initiatives are subject to the kineticmeasures then durable peace in Afghanistan will be a remote dream. The

decision makers have wrong perception that they can divide the Taliban

through money. This reintegration plan excludes the core combatant

leadership in the engagement of political reconciliation. Nothing could be

clearer than the fact that there is an ever-widening divide in the

perception, interests and understanding of the situation amongst the

various stakeholders in Afghanistan. The regional states have their eyes

on maximizing benefits as the US reviews cutting its losses and bailing

out of Kabul.

Despite the international backing to the Karzais sponsoredreintegration plan, dichotomy is tangible between Kabul and

Washington, where the latter assumes that it is up to the Afghan


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government to decide which Taliban leaders could be integrated, but final

decisions be chalked out in consultation with the US-multilateral

architectures. This influential factor can undermine the true sprit of

reintegration plan. There are some who believe that an agreement could

have been reached only if the US was not in such a hurry to attack in the

beginning.Afghanistan - the Heart of Asia and a land-bridge between the

South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Far East - is in the sate

of doldrums since nine years, facing the shock and awe approach that

envisaged the US-led allies using military power against an essentially

primitive enemy to obtain its submission. Now the legitimacy of the

Afghan authorities and international community will depend on their

ability to establish a truly representative government through full

inclusion of all the Afghan stakeholders in the political process for the

lasting peace and stability not only in Afghanistan but also in the region.

Forming splinter coteries among the Taliban on good and bad lines canonly further deepen the prevalent ethnic rifts, thus threatening the

national integrity, solidarity and regional peace.

Mohammed Nawaz Khan,London Post, February 18, 2010.http://www.thelondonpost.net/mnk18FEB10.html

DESTINATION K A NDA HA R: MARCHING TOWARDSEND-GA ME?

The largest US-led joint military offensive in the Helmand Province of

Afghanistan, code named Moshtarak is nearing its end. The assault wascentered on the town of Marjah which comprise family compounds that

are spread over miles of arid, deserted terrain.

The unique aspect of this offensive has been the way that the

civilians were taken into confidence. For nearly a month leading up to

the operation, residents of Marjah were psychologically briefed to leave

their homes for provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. One could see thousands

and thousands of air dropped leaflets that littered around carrying the

massage and warning that if they dont leave Marjah, then they must at

least stay indoors after dark. A number of meetings were held wherein

Afghan and NATO military Commanders briefed the village elders on

what was to come and how best to stay safe. A number of spaces were

earmarked also for the families in schools, camps and other public spaces

in Lashkar Gah, should any family decide to vacate its home and shift in


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32 IPRI Factfile

there for safety reasons.

The Taliban were not observed to have offered much of the

expected resistance except in pockets to the assault, probably the terrain

defied the hit and run concept of the Taliban strategy. For the time being

the Taliban might have changed their places or mixed with the

population to avoid their capture. The fact that the allied forces did notface any strong resistance, except a few skirmishes that also took lives, the

offensive proved to be a near walk over in Marjah. This, however, does

not indicate that the Taliban are no more present in the area and as such,

one is likely to see off and on attacks on the foreign forces in and around

Marjah. A stalemate in the ground situation, therefore, is what we are

going to see for some time. The Taliban are the diehard freedom fighters,

motivated, self-assured and confident of victory against the occupation

forces. Time is on their side and they remain in a defiant mood against

the presence of foreigners in their homeland. While the efforts are afoot

by the Karzai government to pacify the Taliban and bring them in thepolitical mainstream, like the one reported in Maldives prior the London

Conference, the Helmand offensive tantamount to a tangent with what

had been decided in the London Conference. The offensive also runs

contrary to the statement of US Defence Secretarys acceptance of

Taliban as part of Afghan political spectrum.

Why Helmands Marjah town was chosen for the assault? Was it

that it is considered strategically important district? There are many

theories that have come up on the same. Some opine that the provinces

geographic location gives the province a strategic importance as the US

and the allies want to establish a base there to over look the Iranian

military activities and Chinese growing influence in the Indian ocean andtheir use of Pakistani port of Gwadar. As per one of the Taliban

Commander Mullah Akhund, The British forces are bringing a large

amount of equipment to the area and have started extracting Uranium

there and British transport planes land and take off from this area several

times every day. Then there are people who say that the real reason for

the Helmand offensive was that the Taliban present here were considered

more vulnerable as compared to the ones in the areas bordering North

Waziristan. Then there is a school of thought that says that it tantamount

to ethnic cleansing of Pashtuns from Helmand. The Afghan National

Army comprise 3 to 5 percent of the people from south, mostly Darispeakers, rather than Pashtuns. Though 42 percent of Afghan population

is of Pashtuns yet less than 30 percent of them form part of the ANA.


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Compared with the Tajiks who form 25 percent of the population in

Afghanistan, 41 percent of them form part of the Afghan National Army.

So there are apprehensions amongst Afghans that Operation Moshtarak

and beyond would sow the seeds of civil war once the foreign troops are

pulled out.

Once Marjah is cleared of Taliban, the western strategy would be tohold it out and start the rebuilding process. There is likely hood

[likelihood] that many of the Taliban would cross over into Pakistans

Baluchistan province from the porous borders linking Dalbandin and

Chaghi. Though on more than one occasion assurances have been given

to the Pakistani authorities by the NATO and ISAF commanders that

measures would be taken to ensure that no cross over movement into

Pakistani areas takes place. It is imperative that Pakistans

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