Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963
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Transcript of Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963
8/14/2019 Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963
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The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Erkenntnislehre by Viktor KraftReview by: P. K. FeyerabendThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, No. 52 (Feb., 1963), pp. 319-323Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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8/14/2019 Feyerabend, Paul - Erkenntnislehre by Viktor Kraft, 1963
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Erkenntnislehre.By Viktor Kraft.
Springer-Verlag,Vienna, I96o. Pp. v + 375.
IN his latest book ProfessorKraftattempts to give a systematicpresentationof the theory of knowledge in its presentstateof development' (iii). One
of the main reasons or this enterprise ies in the fact that the new develop-ments in philosophywhich startedwith the Vienna Circle 'have not been
taken into accountby the German books on the theory of knowledge'
(iii). Americanbooks, on the other hand 'use great precisionin derivingtheoremsfrom presuppositionswhich postulatewhat would seem to be in
need of investigation. ... In thisway the problemsareput aside,theyarenot
dealtwith. But it is the taskof epistemologyto proceedto the foundations
and to clarifythem' (iv).ProfessorKraft startsaccordinglywith an investigation of the natureof
knowledge and of the manner in which the essential characteristicsof
knowledge can be determined. Thisinvestigation s a masterpieceof clarity
andincisive
argumentandit should be read
by anyoneintendingto take
upa
problem of epistemology or of the philosophy of science. The main thesis
of this chapter s that' the idea of knowledge can be arrivedat only on the
basis of stipulationsand its validity is a matter of agreement (with these
stipulations) (28). The theory of knowledge is therefore'very different
from the factualsciences; it does not deal with somethingexistingin realitybut putsforth aimsand normsfor our intellectualactivity' (32). It suggestsan idealwhich we use to criticiseor to praisetheories, statements,points of
view which are announced together with the claim that they represent
knowledge (23). It 'is supposedto be the basisfor a criticism of actualtheorizingandnot an activitywhich merely describes uchtheorizing (24).
This is radically different from both the traditionalviews (of which
Platonism, phenomenology, transcendental dealism, and inductive meta-
physicsarediscussed) ndfromwhat is implicitin manyphilosophicalnvesti-
gations of today. In its early days logical positivismwas bold enough to
oppose even the sciencesand to demandthat they be changed radicallyand
freed from their metaphysical ngredients. This was an unreasonabledeal,no doubt, but being an ideal t provided a motor for changeandfor critical
examinationof the existing theories. It also led to the constructionof newtheories (the elementary quantum theory is an example). And it is quiteclearthat modem science tselfcould not have come into being without such
a motor. At its beginning it was very different ndeed,both as regards ts
content and as regardsthe methods used for its augmentation,from the
319
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existingbodyof doctrine-Aristotelianhysics. Thosewho built it com-
paredthe existing things with an ideal and found them wanting. It is for
this reasonthat they were capableof changingthe whole outlook of theirage, the attitude towards religion included. Such radical optimism is
hardlyfound today. Especiallywithin philosophy properthe realisationof
the limitations of the early doctrines of the Vienna Circle as well as the
generalcommotion createdby the progressof the scienceshave led to a most
submissive attitude towards the actual form of the sciences and later even
towardsthe opinions inherent n the naturallanguages. Such an attitude s
todayalsoexhibited owardssubjectswhich arestillin their nfantilestage.Theyarenot criticised n the basisof a perhapsomewhat trict dealand
thereby ivena chance o improve, heyareratheraid o possess ' logicoftheirown' accordingowhichtheymustbejudged;whichmeans, fcourse,thatthey are notjudgedat all. An analysisike the one carriedout byProfessorKraft n the firstchapter f this book shouldconvinceeveryonethatsucha procedures neitherpossible, ordesirable.It is notpossible s
any investigationnto the actualform of some enterprise roceedsbyselection(clearly oteverymoveof a scientist anandshouldberecordednddescribedy thephilosophyf science) nd, hereby, yimplicit eferenceoanideal(9). Andit is not desirable s we shouldbe clearaboutourpre-ferences ather han ntroduce hem n anunderhandashion.
It is unfortunatehatProfessorKraftdoesnot follow up this excellent
descriptionf the naturef epistemology yanequally leardevelopmentfthenormsadopted, f thereasonsor theadoption f thesenorms,as well as
by a detailedargument howinghow his positionon various ssues sinfluenced y thesenorms. Thiswould have beena revolutionarynder-
taking ndeed,the first construction f a purelynormativeepistemology.As it is therearemany ssuesn thebook which are discussedn thetradi-
tional ashion. However hosecaseswhere hereferenceo norms s madeexplicithowverywellthepowerof thenew modeofthinking. Anexample(and heonlyexample shallbe ableto discussn thepresent eview) s the
wayinwhichProfessor raft reats heproblem finduction,heproblem ftheexistence f materialobjects, ndtheproblemof the existence f otherminds.
ProfessorKraftargues eryconvincinglyhattheproblemof inductionis stillwithout a solution. He discusseswith excellent easonshe inade-
quacies f theprobabilisticheories, otablyof the theories f Reichenbach
and Carnap themainobjections gainst he latterareinapplicability,oproblems f physics,of the formalsystemsused(233f.) aswell as the factthat n a world with infinitelymany ndividualsany general tatement as
probabilityeroon the basisof finiteevidence232);instance-confirmationfor which a finitevalue is obtained s rejectedwith the remark hat thesciencescannotdo without laws which are needed for the purposeof
320
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explanation.)The conclusionof the discussions that the step beyond
experimentalesults anbe madeonlywith thehelpof hypothesesor which
littleor no initialjustifications given. A pointof view that is usedforprovidingknowledgeaboutreality s a systemof suchhypotheses243).And' what sregardeds nductionsnothingbuttheprocess f introducinghypotheses n thebasisof (theknown)facts..... Inductionstherefore ota new andspecificmethodofjustification.Theredoesnot existanyvalidmethodofjustificationesidesdeduction'(253).
In the Anglo-Americaniterature his doctrinehas becomeassociatedwith thenameof ProfessorKarlPopper f theLondonSchoolof Economics.Itis therefore otunimportanto pointout thatKrafthasdeveloped is own
ideasindependently,nd earlier[in his GrundformenerWissenschaftlichenMethodenhichwaspublishedntheyear1925 tenyearsbefore hepublica-tionof the German ditionof theLogicofScientificiscovery)n Vol. 203 ofthe SitzungsberichteerOesterreichischenkademieerWissenschaften;his
essaydealsboth with the natural ciencesand the socialsciences;it stilldeservescarefulstudyby anyoneinterested n the philosophyof these
subjects. Popperhimself eferso Kraftasone of hispredecessors.]Thereare alsodifferencesetweenKraft'spointof view and thatof Popper. An
examples his attitude owards heproblemof observation.According o
Poppertest-statements('basic-statements) are aboutobservable elationsbetweenmacroscopic bjects. They aremotivatedby experience, ut not
justifiedy it. Theirinterpretations 'materialistic'. Accordingo Kraft,however,the 'hypothesisof a world of objectswhich exists outside he
realityof ourexperiencesanonlybe testedon thebasisof experience;..the reasons thatallother actsalreadynvolvethehypothesiso be tested'
(294).Now theimportanthing s that or Kraft est-statementsrenot about
singleperceptions,r
sensations-this s the positionwhich has been soeffectively riticisedby Popper-but about'perceptions,nsofar stheyaremembers f acontextregulated ylaws (293),oraboutbundlesofperceptions.
It is worthwhileo look a littlemore nto the theorybehind his inter-
pretation f the test statements.Two domains reassumed,he domainof
reallyexistingobjects, ndthedomainof perceptions.Perceptionsrenot
sensations;without theknowledgeadded o thesense-data e wouldnot
possess nyperceptionf materialobjects (285). Nor areperceptionsartsof realobjects:' what s given n experiencesnottheobject .. itself. ..
Thisobject s essentiallynperceivable(291). Whatwe meet n theworldof experiencesresigns or the objects Anzeichen).But-and now comestheimportanttep-thesesignsarenolongerdentifiedwitheither ensations,or withsingle erceptions.Whatrepresentsmaterialobject and, orthatmatter,whatrepresentsomebody lse'smind) n thedomainof experienceis a bundleof perceptionslawfully connected and it is to this bundle that
32I
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observationsentencesrefer. The chargeof psychologismis therebysuccess-
fullyavoided.
Howevert mightnow beobjectedhat hephysical bjects ostulatednadditiono theirrepresentativesn theplaneof observation recompletelysuperfluous.Thetheoryhasgreat imilarity ithKant's ointofview. Thedomainof experience orrespondso Kant'sdomainof phenomena r tohis 'nature' whichis just phenomena onnectedby laws. And the real
objects eemto be verysimilar o the Dingansichof Kant: theyarenotaccessibleo directobservation,hey are postulatedn additionto the
perceptionsnd heyseem o bealtogetherseless. Thisobjection verlooksthe very importantdifference etweenKraft'stheoryand the theoryof
Kantwhichmay be summarisedn the followingtwo important oints:first,Kraftestablishes connection etween hepostulatedealobjects nd
experiencewhichallowshim to controlproperties f the formerby refer-
enceto thelatter;theseconddifferenceies n the factthatmethodological,normative onsiderationsregivenfor theacceptancef thehypothesis f
real thingsand of other minds. This must now be explainedn some
detail.Asin thecaseof theproblem f inductionKraftpointsoutthatalmostall
procedures
f the sciences ndof commonsense(observationndmeasure-
ment ncluded)nvolvehypothesesuchas thehypothesisf theexistence fmaterialhingsand the hypothesis f the existenceof otherminds. He
makes t veryclear hat hese wo ideasarehypotheses,hattheyareunjusti-fiedconjecturesorwhichno foundationanbegiven. This sdone,partly,
by a detailed xaminationndrefutationf traditionalndmore modern'
arguments ttempting o provethem in one way or another. He also
argues ery convincinglyhat heonlyalternativeo the use of thesehypo-theses s solipsism. n thishe is much more straightforwardhan many
philosophersavebeenwho wanted o havetheircakeandeat
it,i.e. who
watedto drop'metaphysical'deassuchas the ideaof the realityof the
externalworld,andwhohoped hat hiscouldbe donewithoutendingupin absurdity.I thinkProfessorKrafthasexhibitedheirmethods erywell.
We thereforeeem o be leftwitharather ncomfortablehoice-solipsism,or a body of doctrine or opinion)which usesunjustifiedonjecturess
essentialarts. Is therea wayoutof thisdilemma?
There s,andthe solutionspurelymethodological,r normative. It is
alsovery simpleand containswo demands nly. First, hat our ideasbe
testable.Thisdemandnvitesus to connectouthypotheses iththedomainof experience. Second,hatour deasbecapable f givinganexplanationf
knownphenomena.Thisdemand pecifieshe connectionwithexperiencein detailandalsoputsrestrictionspontheideas o be used: the ideasmust
not beadhoc,heymustberichern content hanwhat heywant to explain,that stheymustestablishonnectionsn thedomain fexperience hichare
322
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eithermorestrict,or morecomplex, hanthe connections lready nown.
It alsoresultsn theirtranscendingxperience-for f the entitiespostulated
forexplanationompletely oincidewith laws n the domainof experience,thentheyareadhocwithrespecto theseawsand hereforeolongercapableof giving a satisfactoryxplanation.The hypothesis f the existenceofmaterial bjectss therefore ot only an essentialpart of our thinking, nthe sciencesndwithincommon ense, partwithoutwhichmuch pparentlyvaluableknowledgewould simplycollapse-this,too, is shown in greatdetailbyProfessor raft-it is alsocapablef support.Thesupports notbyproof, orby 'induction' it is by methodological rgumentationhat s byreferenceo someof thenormswhich constitute urepistemology. This
establishes decideddifference etweenKraft'sheoryof two worlds,andKant's.
I have dweltat lengthon thisparticulartemin order o showhow anormative pistemologyan takecareof traditionalproblemsorwhichno
satisfactoryolution s asyetavailable. I shall hereforeave o omit a moredetaileddiscussion f the remainingpartsof the book which dealwith
language,ogic, the ideaof truth,physicalaws,reality,microphysics,ndthe theoryof probability. And in any case it would have been quiteimpossibleo giveahalf-way atisfactoryccount f a bookwhich s so rich
in content ndat thesame imewrittennsucha tersestyle. Letme mentiononlyone furtherpoint. Manycontemporaryhilosophersresoconvincedof therevolutionaryharacterf theirenterprisehattheybelieve heycan
safelyneglecteverythinghathappened efore, ay, 900ooorperhaps 889,the birth-dateof Wittgenstein).Wittgensteinhimself has broughta
completelyunhistoricalatmospherento philosophy. Although dealingwithproblemswhichhaveafirm oundationnthehistoryof philosophy ehaspresentedheseproblemsn a fashion hatsuggestedhattheyhadjustbeenbornandwere
completelynrelatedo whatever lsehadbeen
thoughtbefore(exceptperhapshe TractatusndRussell'sPrincipia).Kraft'sbookshowsthe advantage ained rom an acquaintanceith the philosophicaltradition. It is to be recommendedo anyserious tudent f epistemologyand of thatrecentbastard-childf epistemology,hephilosophy f science.
P. K. FEYERABEND
Toward eunionnPhilosophy.By MortonWhite.
University ress,London:Cumberledge, arvard,956.Pp.xv + 308.
THmtitleof ProfessorWhite'sstudygivesexpressiono hisconcernaboutthe growthof ' compartmentalisationof philosophynto special ubjects,and indicatesan attemptat re-establishingommunication etweenthevariouscompartments.The principal im of his enquirys to showthat
323
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