C 0 M M EN T / RE P LY

Feminism and Phenomenology: A Reply to Silvia Stoller

SHANNON SULLIVAN

Responding to Silvia Stoller’s comments on “Domination and Dialogue in Mer- leau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception” (Sullivan 1997), I argue that while phenomenology has much to offer feminism, feminists should be wary of Merleau- Ponty’s notion of projective intentionality because of the ethical solipsism that it tends to involve. I also take the opportunity to clarify the concept of hypothetical construc- tion introduced in the earlier paper, in particular the t r ans fmt ive relationship that it has to pre-refkctive experience.

The heart of the concern expressed in Silvia Stoller’s comments on my paper “Domination and Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Per- ception” (Sullivan 1997) is that I inveigh against the possibility of any sort of positive relationship between feminism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology when, according to Stoller, the latter has much to offer the former. Because 1 do think that many, but not all forms/characteristics of phenomenology are valuable for feminist theory, I shall begin my reply to Stoller by discussing briefly my stance on both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in particular and phenomenology in general. This broad-level discussion will lead constructive- ly into the detail of Stoller’s remarks.

There are many characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ac- count of human existence that are important both for feminism and philoso- phy at large. They include the primacy given to bodily existence; the attention paid to the pre-reflective aspects of human life, including its indeterminacy

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and ambiguity; the importance of situation and situatedness for understanding our engagement with/in the world; and the crucial role that habit plays in corporeal existence. Perhaps the most important characteristic of all to add to this list is Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on lived experience, since in many ways that notion encompasses all of the other characteristics that I have briefly mentioned here.

Importantly, however, one characteristic of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol- ogy that I very deliberately did not include in my list is his concept of pro- jective intentionality. This exclusion relates to the ambiguity in my above claim that many, but not all of the “form~/characteri~tics” of phenomenology are beneficial to feminism. By “characteristics” of phenomenology, I mean the features of a particular phenomenological philosophy, and by “forms” of phe- nomenology, I mean the various different phenomenological accounts of hu- man existence themselves. Different forms of phenomenology may include different characteristics in their descriptions of human existence (as well as have many characteristics in common). My point here is that not all phenom- enological philosophies are the same and thus that not all phenomenological philosophies are equally valuable to feminism. There are forms of phenom- enology that, because of some of the particular characteristics they include, are problematic from a feminist point of view, and thus other forms of phenom- enology are preferable to them. I do not intend to catalogue here all the dif- ferences between various forms of phenomenology. Rather, I wish to note that while Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (as well as that of some others, such as Husserl) includes the concept of intentionality as a projective directedness from the self (however conceived) out to the world, not all phenomenological philosophy does or need do so. A phenomenology that focuses upon embodi- ment, pre-reflectivity, situation, habit, and lived experience, but that is not based upon projective intentionality as is that of Merleau-Ponty, is the kind of phenomenology that best can help feminism to accomplish its aims.’

The problem with projective intentionality as a description of human existence, as I argued in my earlier paper, is that it tends to construe one’s beingin-the-world as an activity of projecting one’s intentions, values, and meanings onto objects and others in one’s world. Projective intentionality is too unidirectional, as it were, not allowing sufficiently for a “two-way,” co- constitutive back-and-forth between my world and me-what I would call a transactional account of human existence. If I were to attempt to represent it pictorially, it would be an arrow always starting with me and arching itself outward into the world, but never the other way around. In this way, the de- scription of human existence provided by the notion of projective intention- ality tends toward solipsism, focusing always on the meaning and value of my intentional arc and thus preventing me from noticing that of others. Impor- tantly, by solipsism, I mean something like what we might call an ethical, rath-

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er than a metaphysical solipsism. Projective intentionality does not necessar- ily assume literally that only one self exists (although it may, and arguably some accounts of projective intentionality do). But as a descriptive model of human existence, it does tend to operate with the assumption that the beliefs, values, desires, intentions, etc. of only one (my) self are of any importance. In its ac- count of projection, intentionality connotes just such an ethical solipsism.

Now, as is well known, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology was meant to counter precisely the sort of ethically (as well as metaphysically) solipsistic, domineering picture that I have just painted. Merleau-Ponty often insists that “[mly life must have a significance which I do not constitute; there must strict- ly speaking be an intersubjectivity” (Merleau-Ponty 1962,448). And indeed, characteristics of his phenomenology, such as its emphasis upon embodiment and situation, lend themselves to an account of human life as always already part of a world of shared meaning that is not the making of any one person’s intentions. Nevertheless, for all its hard work explaining the ways in which the world is intersubjectively constituted, because of its problematic inheritance of Husserl’s notion of intentionality Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology still re- tains the notion of a solitary self (now in the form of the body, rather than the transcendental ego) whose own projection is its primary preoccupation.

I have another concern about Merleau-Ponty’s account of intentionality, a concern which is related to-perhaps even tends to follow from( ?)-the problem of projection that I have just indicated. In Merleau-Ponty’s explana- tion of the way in which intentionality is bodily, Merleau-Ponty assumes too easily and quickly that the generality of human bodies, i.e., the similarities found in human bodily structures, allows one to understand the meaning of another’s intentions as communicated in their bodily gestures. While I now think that the tone of my earlier paper was a bit strong in its rejection of similarities between or generalities shared by bodies, I continue to hold the main concern expressed by that rejection, which is that “the body” should not be used as a shortcut to an (assumed) commonality between people. That the structures of human bodies sometimes can provide a shared meaning to the world (for instance, the hand with its extended digits and opposable thumb makes some objects graspable to all those with similar hands and, we should add, similar habits of using them [Merleau-Ponty 1962,3531) does not mean that all or even many aspects of the world are had in common. Nor does it mean that we should overestimate the usefulness of any bodily commonalities or shared structures since they are never encountered apart from the different cultural contexts, and thus the different meanings, that help constitute them. That is, bodies cannot be appealed to as some sort of foundational “given” that easily solves the problem of communicating across our differences. Neglecting this fact, as Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the anonymous or impersonal body tends to do, can lead feminists (and others) to overlook the different ways in

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which others take up their world and the different meanings that their bodily gestures have as a result.

It is here that I think that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology lends itself to domination rather than to openness to the differences of others. I acknowledge (and thus agree with Stoller on this point) that Merleau-Ponty often demon- strates that he is aware and even insists that others may not be like me. As I quoted him in my earlier paper, Merleau-Ponty at times realizes that another “may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him” (Sullivan 1997,8; Merleau-Ponty 1962,361). But he also, at times, claims that the generality of the anonymous or impersonal body means that “my body which perceives the body of another . . . discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world” (1962,354). While we indeed sometimes may find intentions like our own in the bodily movements and gestures of another, we should not begin with the assumption that similar bodily structures will provide such a discovery. To do so is to risk projecting oneself onto others in a domineering way that prevents one from recognizing and appreciating anything different from oneself.

My account of hypothetical construction is meant to counter this overbear- ing, ethically solipsistic model of engagement with the world that results from projective intentionality. Hypothetical construction is a way of re-educating one’s pre-reflective bodily habits, if needed, such that they are open to rather than ignorant of the needs, desires, values, perspectives, etc., of others. In contrast to a model of engagement with my world through projection of my- self onto it, the result of hypothetical construction is a model of engagement in which I offer my initial understanding of the world to another(s) as a con- tribution to be checked, modified, replaced, etc., as part of a joint, transac- tional process of giving meaning to our world. Thus I say “hypothetical” because my initial contribution is offered as a hypothesis-i.e., as a fallible, provisional offering that serves as an invitation to response from another- and “construction” (building-with) because the building of the meaning world that my (or another’s) hypothesis begins is part of a process that can only occur with the contributions of others. In the language of my earlier paper (though I probably would not retain the term “intentionality” in any form today be- cause of its inevitable connotations of projection), hypothetical construction is meant to transform a projective intentionality, when it exists, into a con- structive intentionality. This is not to say that human existence necessarily or primarily is projective-on precisely this point, I disagree with Merleau-Ponty -but rather that when it is projective, human existence can and should be transformed such that it is transactionally constructive instead.

As Stoller points out, I claim that hypothetical construction is “a conscious, interpretative activity” (Sullivan 1997, lo), which is why Stoller charges that hypothetical construction presupposes (and thus neglects) the very thing that

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Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is about-i.e., the pre-predicative, pre-re- flective, subconscious elements of lived, bodily experience. While I do not agree that hypothetical construction ignores pre-reflective experience, I ac- knowledge that some of my language used to describe the process of hypothet- ical construction-i.e., the language of reading, text, dialogue-can be mis- leading on this point. Although it was meant metaphorically, such language could make hypothetical construction sound like it relates only to reflective, rather than also to pre- or non-reflective experience. Furthermore and in a different way, my use of the term “hypothetical construction” could have been confusing to readers when I at one point treated it as a synonym for “con- structive intentionality,” making “hypothetical construction” represent both a reflective process and the non-reflective result of that process (see my rede- scription of Schneider’s sexual encounter [Sullivan 1997, 161). Thus Stoller’s concerns about the relationship between hypothetical construction and pre- reflective experience are helpful in revealing ways in which my earlier account needs clarification and further elaboration.

Hypothetical construction does indeed take up the conscious, reflective aspects of human existence, but precisely as they can be made to bear upon the subconscious, non-reflective dimensions of our lives. Hypothetical construc- tion is about restyling one’s bodily gestures and habits, if need be, so that at the level of pre-reflective habit, one no longer engages with the world in the mode of projection onto it, but rather in the mode of co-constitutive transaction with it. Hypothetical construction is and must be a conscious process if or to the extent that one’s subconscious mode ofbeing in the world is projective and thus is in need of transformation. In other words, if one wants to change the pre-reflective way( s) in which one engages with the world-and, furthermore, if one wants to try to have some sort of say in how one changes, rather than merely leave such change up to happenstance-conscious reflection needs to be brought to bear on one’s pre-reflective habits. With such conscious reflec- tion-and with a lot of time and with no guarantees of success-one’s pre- reflective habits might be altered such that one no longer need rely upon con- scious attempts to re-educate them into a more open, transactional attitude toward others. To use Merleau-Ponty’s language, it is only by beginning at the level of the “intentionality of act” that we can ever hope to make deliberate changes to the level of “operative intentionality” (1962, xviii). This is not to privilege the former (i.e., the voluntary and conscious) at the expense of the latter (i.e., the non-voluntary and non-conscious), nor is it to claim that the self is primarily a conscious, self-reflective (and certainly not an autonomous) being. Again, nor is it to claim that humans are fundamentally projective beings whose projection just so happens to be capable of subsequent modifi- cation. Rather, it is to provide, as Merleau-Ponty did not, an account of how we might transform our pre-reflective, habitual lived experience if it is in need

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of change. And from a feminist point of view, a pre-reflective, projective mode of engagement with the world is in much need of change. Whatever we call it (and for the sake of clarity, it probably should not be called hypothetical con- struction), the result of such transformation should be a transactional mode of being-in-the-world that is more open to others than projection allows.

Feminism and phenomenology have a great deal to offer one another; on this point, Stoller and I are in agreement. Feminists, however, should be wary of adopting uncritically Merleau-Ponty’s account of projective intentional- ity since it tends to legitimate the too-easy assumption of similarities between people and the imposition of one person’s intentions upon those of others. Feminism needs a form of phenomenology that makes ample room for all the different ways that different people transact with their world. If Merleau- Ponty’s philosophy cannot adequately make such room, then its use has limits that should not be overlooked in feminist efforts to build a fruitful relationship with phenomenology.

NOTES

I would like to thank Phillip McReynolds for his insightful comments on an earlier version of this essay.

1. While I would not want to claim that his is the only philosophy that can do so, John Dewey’s pragmatism provides feminism with the kind of phenomenology that I have in mind here (see Dewey 1988).

REFERENCES

Dewey, John. 1988. Human nature and conduct. Vol. 14 of The middle works, 1899- J 924, ed. lo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. The phenomenology of perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press.

Sullivan, Shannon. 1997. Domination and dialogue in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenol- ogy ofperception. Hypatia 12 (1): 1-19.