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Tracking Trends in Ethiopia´s Civil Society Sector

Federal Regional Interface in Government/CSO relations in Ethiopia

FINAL REPORT

A research conducted by Atos Consulting

30th July 2012

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Contents

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................i

Acronyms and abbreviations ..............................................................................................................i

Diagrams and Tables .........................................................................................................................i

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. ii

1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 6

1.1. Objectives............................................................................................................................ 7

1.2. Research Approach ............................................................................................................. 7

1.3. Research Methods ............................................................................................................... 8

1.4. Report structure ................................................................................................................... 8

2. Background and context of CSO regulation ....................................................... 9

2.1. Regulatory Context .............................................................................................................. 9

2.2. Institutional framework for CSO regulation ......................................................................... 11

3. Intergovernmental relations (IGR) context ....................................................... 14

3.1. Federal states and decentralisation .................................................................................... 14

3.2. Relevance of IGR .............................................................................................................. 16

3.3. IGR and functional “unbundling” ......................................................................................... 17

3.4. Unbundling CSO Regulation .............................................................................................. 17

4. Functional review ......................................................................................... 19

4.1. Registration and licensing of organisations......................................................................... 19

4.2. Supervision of organisations .............................................................................................. 21

4.3. Support Function ............................................................................................................... 22

4.4. Regulation of operations: i. project appraisal ...................................................................... 22

4.5. Regulation of operations: ii. project monitoring and evaluation............................................ 27

4.6. Coordination - Government-CSO relations ......................................................................... 29

5. Summary of Findings ................................................................................... 31

6. Recommendations ....................................................................................... 37

6.1. Other recommendations .................................................................................................... 38

Annex 1 Terms of Reference ................................................................................... 40

Annex 2 Profile of the civil society sector in study regions ............................................ 44

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Acknowledgements

The researchers for this report are Professor Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher and Habtu Gebre Hiwot. The TECS team (Ann Condy, Yeraswork Admassie and Gemechu Desta) provided extensive supervisory and editing support. Special advice on IGR was provided by Shawn Houlihan.

The authors and TECS project would like to thank all the government, donor and CSO institutions and individuals which contributed to this report, and the DAG Civil Society Sector Group for their comments.

Acronyms and abbreviations

CSA Charities and Societies Agency

CSO Civil Society Organisation

CSSG Civil Society Sector Group

GO Government

GOE Government of Ethiopia

GTP Growth and Transformation Plan

IGR Intergovernmental relations

NGO Non governmental organisation

Diagrams and Tables

Table 1: Functions and Powers of the Charities and Societies Agency - p 10

Diagram 1: Institutional Map of Regulatory Bodies - p 12

Diagram 2: Illustrative Map of Regulatory Functions - p 18

Diagram 3: Process for Registration and Licensing Function – p 19

Diagram 4: Process Flow Chart for Project Appraisal Process, Federal Level - p 24

Diagram 5: Process Flow Chart for Project Appraisal Process, Regional Level - p 25

Table 2: Summary of Findings - pp 31-36

Table 3: Number and type of charities and societies in the study region - p 43

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Executive Summary

Introduction and Research Objectives

The Charities and Societies Proclamation P621/2009 brought about the first comprehensive legislation on the regulation of an important sector in Ethiopia. Since the Charities and Societies Agency was set up in 2009, it has already achieved considerable progress. However, the Agency itself is aware that it faces many challenges. It has limited manpower and financial resources. It has no institutional presence in the regions and at lower levels. It has not yet developed systems and processes in support of all the functions it is expected to carry out.

This TECS research on CSOs and the federal-regional interface is timely for two main reasons. Firstly, as the Agency considers how to make best use of its resources, the findings provide an opportunity to reflect on the roles and responsibilities it should take on vis-à-vis the regions. Secondly, Ethiopia is engaged in an ongoing policy dialogue on intergovernmental relations (IGR), and specifically the extent to which certain functions, roles and responsibilities can or should be deconcentrated, delegated or devolved to the regions (as defined in the main report). Thus, this research shows how Ethiopia can develop a case study on the design of IGR for CSO regulation in a federal system.

The main objective of this study was to understand the current regulatory framework of charities and societies at federal and regional levels, and to propose a process through which government and civil society stakeholders can devise an efficient and effective regulatory framework, and one which is appropriate for Ethiopia‟s federal state. Overall, this will serve to make the CSO sector efficient, effective and responsible, thus providing the best possible contributions to Ethiopia‟s development as called for in the GTP.

Approach and methodology

The research approach involved empirical data gathering from a sample of regions, using qualitative methods, to understand the current regulatory framework and its operation on the ground. The framework was analysed using functional analysis, complemented by intergovernmental relations (IGR) analysis.

Four regions, namely Addis Ababa, Oromiya, Tigray, and Benishangul were purposively selected for the study. Qualitative data were collected from pertinent regional and federal institutions, which work closely with the CSOs. Senior policy makers and experts on IGR were interviewed. Twenty four different types of CSOs - six foreign charities; seven Ethiopian resident charities, seven consortia and mass based societies - were consulted to gain their views, insights and opinions. In addition, secondary information was collected from documents containing policy statements, CSOs rules and regulations, and regional guidelines.

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) context

In all federal-decentralized systems, including Ethiopia, the management of “vertical” coordination between different levels of government is a major issue. In the Ethiopia context there are two major and related forces that should drive consideration of the vertical IGR interface for all public sector activities: 1) The federal constitution, which calls for significant powers to regional state

governments; and

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2) The related but broader decentralization processes (including to the local levels) that has been a priority for the GOE for several years and continues in the GTP period.

Different forms of decentralization - deconcentration, delegation and devolution - may be applicable depending on interpretation and evolution of federal constitutional arrangements, and of policy preferences related to decentralization.

Ethiopia‟s federal constitution envisions strong, relatively autonomous regional states but with strong roles for the federal government in making policy and setting standards in many key sectors. However, the constitution is not detailed in terms of IGR, and a comprehensive legal, policy, and institutional framework is not in place, though it is expected within the GTP period. Thus, there is naturally still much room for consideration and debate about how CSO regulatory functions are delineated relative to the powers of the federal versus regional governments. In the absence of a legal framework, we suggest that the IGR of CSO regulation be treated as a process which can provide valuable inputs in the future development of a framework for other sectors.

IGR and functional unbundling

The regulation of the CSO sector is a major public administration function, which comprises a series of sub-functions, namely: registration and licensing; supervision of CSOs; regulation of CSO projects; and coordination. The key findings from our empirical research sought to “unbundle” these sub-functions. This unbundling sought to establish at what level the sub functions actually takes place (if at all), and whether the current situation appears to represents a rational (clear, efficient, effective) division of roles and responsibilities between federal and regional level. Major findings were:

Registration and Licensing: The registration and licensing process is heavily centralized. Many CSOs and regional government bodies maintain that if more organizations (especially Ethiopian resident charities and societies operating in only one region) were registered at the regions, this would reduce costs, enable CSOs to receive services from close proximity, and ensure close supervision by regional bodies. The 2008 BPR reform resulted in Ethiopian societies being registered under different sector bureaux, but the practice was never backed up by legal frameworks.

Supervision of CSOs: Supervision of CSOs should be one of the key functions for both the Agency and regions, but it is not adequately executed at either level. Therefore it is not clear to what extent CSOs observe governance rules and regulations. On the other hand, purely with regard to supervision of the 30:70 guideline, there appears to be duplication at regional level, since both lead agencies and sector bureaux claim responsibility.

Support function: This lies within the mandates of the Agency and regions. CSOs acknowledge that they receive most of the support specified in project agreements, though delays and centralization of support act as constraints. Certain critical support (e.g. land, co-financing) is difficult to secure. This is considered to impair project effectiveness.

Project appraisal: This is one of the most important functions for both the CSOs and the government, and is key to ensuring technically sound and effective projects, and thus developmental impact of CSOs generally. However, it is not clear what the purpose, roles and responsibilities of government should be vis-à-vis donors. The function

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appears to be characterized by inefficiencies, including lengthy procedures, lack of standards and uniform procedures, and bypassing of some sectors. However, the regions generally have guidelines prepared with the participation of CSOs, which should allow for greater effectiveness.

Project monitoring and evaluation: Despite the fact that the Agency and regional bodies believe this is an important function, it is not regularly and effectively carried out. The main capacity constraints are said to be manpower, technical knowledge, logistics and budget. However, clarity over purpose, roles and responsibilities between donors and government at different levels could alleviate capacity constraints.

Coordination: Coordination between CSOs and governments bodies at regional level takes place but is still under-developed at federal level. BoFEDs (as lead government offices in CSO affairs) and CSO consortia have led the regional initiatives. The forms and strength of collaboration varies among regions. Oromiya has strengthened collaboration by developing frameworks, which also extend below regional level. The Tigray and Benishangul experiences in CSO-GO collaboration focus more on sectoral activities and initiatives. In Tigray, spaces have been created for CSOs to participate in government decision making bodies.

Recommendations

Purposely, given the complex political and technical features of this matter, we make few substantive recommendations. Rather we propose a process for developing a framework of vertical interface for CSO regulation. The following is an indicative outline for a process to develop this framework, which could be modified following further discussion with the CSSG, the CSA and other stakeholders. For each step, we put forward some suggestions for participation, purpose, and outputs. The main components of this process would include the following: 1) IGR Workshop

Participation -- Senior influential officials and experts. As the Ministry of Federal Affairs has responsibility for the CSA as well as for developing the broader IGR framework (under the GTP), they may play a lead role in this process. The group should not be large and at this point should include only individuals with recognized expertise, which include experts from the House of Federation, the Constitutional Inquiry Commission, MOFED, MOJ, a selection of regional bureaus, and academia. It may include 1-2 international experts in IGR.

Output -- A review and written guidance on IGR issues that should be considered with respect to CSO regulation and, secondarily, how this process can eventually relate to other processes for developing a comprehensive policy and legal framework for IGR (as called for in the GTP).

2) Action training on IGR, decentralization functional analysis

Participation -- This would include mainly CSA staff but also some Steering Committee members and other government and non-government stakeholders, including at the federal and regional levels.

Output -- As part of the training process, the workshop would develop a preliminary taxonomy of functions and identification of issues and options to consider for functional assignment and IGR needs (systems, structures, etc.).

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3) Workshop on streamlining relevant laws, regulations and guidelines Participation – This would include relevant senior CSA staff, MOJ, selected or all

BoJs, some sectoral ministries, recognized IGR experts (legal, fiscal and planning) within government and academia, and CSO representatives.

Output – A template for regional laws that can be adapted by regions, accompanied with analysis of federal-regional interface implications and possible options for variations by regions; similar draft regulations and/or guidelines; a better understanding (documented) of the potential future variations on laws and practices as systems and other capacities are further developed. (Harmonization may be a priority here, as would be discussed in the workshop(s).)

4) Policy Document and Action Plan that sets out the long-term plan, as well as a detailed time frame for establishing systems, building capacities, passing laws, etc.

Participation – This would be mainly by CSA staff, approved through the appropriate channels and with consultations (major issues would be fed from the above 1-3 processes which would carefully include planning considerations built into all those processes).

Output – A brief policy document that complements the Proclamation as well as setting a clear vision about intergovernmental interface for CSO regulation and how it relates to other policy priorities such as federalism, decentralization, IGR, development, etc. A timeline for all components.

We include a number of specific recommendations, where it seems that there is a strong case for making some changes in the roles and responsibilities between federal and regional authorities regarding CSO regulatory functions. These are:

5) Registration and licencing: regions could undertake more delegated functions for CSOs operating in their regions, while federal government maintains close supervision.

6) Supervision of organisations: there is a need to eliminate a duplication of CSO account reviewing. Regions could undertake more delegated functions for review of accounts, while federal government maintains close supervision and final authority.

7) Support function: There is a need to streamline federal and regional roles and responsibilities, and perhaps delegate more responsibilities to regions. The federal government could set standards for delivery time. Regional capacity and systems need to be addressed.

8) Project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation: There is a clear need to clarify the purpose of this function at federal and regional levels, and vis-à-vis donor agencies. For greater effectiveness, it would be better to focus appraisal, monitoring and evaluation at regional level or lower, while government maintains some degree of supervision. Regional capacity would need to be addressed to take on greater responsibilities.

9) Coordination: A high level policy makers‟ bi-annual meeting of major federal and regional government actors and CSOs should take place, to ensure better functioning and efficient new allocations of roles and responsibilities.

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1. Introduction

The Charities and Societies Proclamation P621/2009 brought about the first comprehensive legislation on the regulation of an important sector in Ethiopia. This legislation also established an Agency for regulating charities and societies.1

The regulation of this sector is important because significant funds are channelled through charities and societies in order for them to support economic and social development, and national development priorities contained in key policy frameworks such as the Growth and Transformation Plan. Good regulation can enable the sector to flourish by encouraging accountability, transparency and by providing timely information to ensure sector operations are aligned with national priorities.

Since the Agency was set up in 2009, it has already achieved considerable progress. It has set up an office, recruited and trained staff, acquired necessary equipment, put in place a system of registration and licensing, and started to produce guidelines which provide detail to several rules laid out in the Proclamation. The TECS project itself has built capacity in financial audit, management and communications, and project cycle management, and has supported the Agency in developing a database of all registered organisations. The Agency‟s 2011 Progress Report highlights the various achievements it has effected in a relatively short space of time.

However, the Agency itself is aware that it faces many challenges. It has limited manpower and financial resources. It has no institutional presence in the regions and at lower levels. It has not yet developed systems and processes in support of all the functions it is expected to carry out.

The TECS research on CSOs and the federal-regional interface is timely for three reasons. Firstly, as the Agency considers how to make best use of its resources, the findings provide an opportunity to reflect on the roles and responsibilities it should take on vis-à-vis the regions. Some tasks might be carried out more efficiently or effectively at regional level. This implies, however, the need to consider the appropriate interface necessary between federal and regional levels to ensure a satisfactory regulatory framework.

Secondly, Ethiopia is engaged in an ongoing policy dialogue on federalism, specifically, the extent to which certain functions, roles and responsibilities can be deconcentrated, delegated or devolved to the regions. This research provides a case study for federalism, by suggesting how key stakeholders could take the research findings and decide how best to structure functions, roles and responsibilities between the federal and regional levels.

A regulatory framework also requires a legal framework. Since the Proclamation came into effect, regions are expected to produce legislation on charities and societies, which is in line with the federal Proclamation. Some variation is permitted in regional legislation, in recognition of different local needs and circumstances. To date, no regional legislation has been finalised. Regional versions of the legislation are at the early stages of preparation and drafting. However, the Regional Bureaux of Finance and Economic Development (BoFEDs) have developed guidelines for collaboration with CSOs operating in their regions.

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Proclamation 9621/2009 regulates only a sub-sector of civil society. Other organisations including faith and community groups

are not obliged to register. Trade unions and micro-finance institutions are regulated under other proclamations.

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Thirdly, in the absence of a comprehensive regulatory and legislative framework, it is challenging for charities and societies to engage with government. Where there is duplication in carrying out functions, charities and societies waste time seeking approval from different government bodies. Where there are different rules set up by the Agency, by lead regional coordinating bodies and by regional sectors, it is difficult to understand what a charity or society must do to comply with the rules. Finally, if rules are made without a good appreciation of how the sector operates, they may inadvertently make it impossible to operate. Thus, effective consultation and coordination mechanisms are important for charities and societies and government.

1.1. Objectives

The general objective of this study was to understand the current regulatory framework of charities and societies at federal and regional levels, and propose a process through which government and civil society stakeholders can agree on a more efficient and effective regulatory framework, and one which is appropriate for a federal state.

In order to understand the current regulatory framework, the research explored the regulatory functions, roles and responsibilities of government institutions at federal and regional levels; institutional capacities; lines of communication and coordination between regional and federal institutions; and major regional commonalities and divergences, challenges and shortcomings regarding the federal-regional relations/interface.

1.2. Research Approach

The research approach involved empirical data gathering from a sample of regions, using qualitative methods, to understand the current regulatory framework. The framework was analysed using functional analysis.

Functions are the main groupings of activities undertaken by Executive branches of government, for instance, policy making, standard setting, regulation, supervision and oversight, monitoring and coordination.

Functional analysis is concerned with eliminating inefficiencies in government (for instance, eliminating duplication across different ministries or agencies, vertically or horizontally) and in achieving greater effectiveness and a clear line of accountability.

The concern with effectiveness includes providing a service which is satisfactory to clients, from the point of view of speed, transparency and equity, among other criteria. This is clearly of interest to charities and societies. Similarly, the Agency recognises it is important to provide a good service to its client in its current Strategic Plan. In the Ethiopian context, this functional analysis has some analogies with business process re-engineering (BPR), although it starts with the need to establish appropriate business processes.

The functional analysis was complemented by Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) analysis. This means that the functional relations were further reviewed taking into account federalism principles, to which the Government of Ethiopia has agreed. The degree of devolution of power and authority raises the question of inter-governmental relations in Ethiopia as a federal state. This work shed light on the division of powers, and related constitutional issues: to what extent is it appropriate that regions have a different policy

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and legal framework for CSOs? What latitude do they have, if they have to interpret and implement federal laws and policies on CSOs according to their individual state preferences? How should the Agency work with regional bureaux of justice and finance and economic development, when it is not the counterpart federal ministry or agency of either bureau?

Our approach to recommendations in this study has been to propose a dialogue process through which key stakeholders can come together to seek consensus on a more rational, efficient, effective and IGR-responsive regulatory framework.

1.3. Research Methods

This study used qualitative methods for the empirical data gathering. Four regions, namely Addis Ababa, Oromiya, Tigray, and Benishangul were purposively selected for the study. Oromiya and Addis Ababa were selected because they contain the greatest number of CSOs in the country. Tigray was selected because it has the highest number of regional CSOs while Benishangul was selected to represent the emerging regions where there is typically less investment in CSO activities as well as more limited overall administrative capacity.

Qualitative data were collected from pertinent regional and federal institutions, which work closely with the CSOs with the help of in-depth interview checklist. Senior policy makers and experts on IGR were interviewed. The federal and regional government institutions consulted include the Charities Agency, federal sector ministries, regional BoFEDS and regional sector bureaus. Twenty four different types of CSOs - six foreign charities; seven Ethiopian resident charities, seven consortia and mass based societies - were consulted to gain their views, insights and opinions. (See appendix 2 for complete list of institutions consulted.)

In addition, secondary information was collected from documents containing policy statements, CSO rules and regulations, and regional guidelines. Relevant studies, reports and papers on CSOs and international literature on CSO engagement in a federal country were also consulted.

1.4. Report structure

The rest of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the background and context of CSO regulation in Ethiopia. Section 3 analyses the intergovernmental relations (IGR) context and links the general issue of IGR in federal states with the case study of IGR principles applied to CSO regulation. Section 4 sets out the functional analysis of CSO regulation, based on the empirical findings from the four regions visited and key documents reviewed. Section 5 provides a summarized table of these findings together with suggestions for how roles and responsibilities on CSO regulation between federal and regional levels could be modified to support IGR principles as well as efficiency and effectiveness. Section 6 sets out recommendations for adopting a process for developing a framework of vertical interface for CSO regulation.

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2. Background and context of CSO regulation

2.1. Regulatory Context

The earliest regulation of CSOs by the incumbent government was made in the mid 1990s when it issued a directive known as „Guidelines for NGO Operations‟. The guideline was aimed at classifying groups and providing direction on the priority areas of NGOs programming (Clark, 2000). Following this, the NGO sector itself adopted a Code of Conduct for NGOs in 1999, as an attempt to introduce a mechanism for self-regulation, monitoring and evaluation of their operation.

Prior to 1995, the mandate for regulating NGO operations rested with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). Registration was carried out by the DPPC while the DPPC and Bureaux for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (BDPPC) at the regional level were charged with the operational aspects. Each separate project activity by an NGO required a specific agreement with the appropriate line bureau at the regional level. After 1995, the Ministry of Justice took on this mandate and function. Since 2009, the Charities and Societies Agency under the Ministry of Federal Affairs took charge of overseeing the formation and mode of operation of NGOs/CSOs.

The Agency was established by Proclamation No 621/2009, which provided for the registration and regulation of Charities and Societies. The Proclamation classifies CSOs into three categories on the basis of their origin, membership and sources of funding. Accordingly CSOs are classified as Ethiopian, Ethiopian resident and foreign/international Charities and Societies. The Proclamation is applicable to all charities and societies except Ethiopian charities and societies, which operate in just one state (excluding Addis Ababa and Dire-Dawa).

2.1.1. Federal mandate

The Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621/2009 provides the Agency with its mandate to engage in regulation of civil society. P621/2009 specifies the powers and functions of the Agency. The functions are broadly “regulatory” functions (see Table 1 below for a full list of sub functions and powers). In order to act as an effective regulator, the Agency needs to gather information on the sector, communicate with its stakeholders (charities and societies), register and licence organisations, supervise the operations of charities and societies, and make any necessary recommendations to the supervising Ministry regarding any policy changes that might be required. In this respect therefore, the Agency‟s main function is regulation and its sub-functions2 are:

Sub-functions requiring interface with external (charity and society) stakeholders

Registration and licensing

Monitoring (information gathering/sharing)

2

While we use the term “sub function” in this report, we understand that the Agency and other government bodies use the term

“core functions”. The Agency’s core functions at times cluster together more than one “sub function” as in the case of the

Agency’s Registration core function, which includes supervision, support, project appraisal and monitoring.

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Enabling support

Advisory

Supervision

Sub-functions requiring interface with internal (government) stakeholders

Revenue generation from service fees such as registration

Internal support functions (including human resources, finance, planning)

Table 1: Functions and powers of the Charities and Societies Agency

P621/2009, Article 6/1

a. Licensing, registering and supervising Charities and Societies in accordance with the Proclamation (registration and licensing)

b. Encouraging Charities and Societies to have better administration (supervision);

c. Collecting, analyzing and disseminating information that relate to its powers and functions (monitoring):

d. Publishing and distributing information about the registration of Charities and Societies in the Gazette (registration and licensing);

e. Organizing consultative forum for government organs and Charities and Societies (coordination);

f. Making proposals to the Ministry on matters relating to meetings its objectives (advisory function);

g. Taking decision in cooperation with the concerned Sector Administration, on the application of Charities and Societies for registration and licenses (registration and licensing function)

h. Exercising the powers of registration and authentication of documents with regard to Charitable Endowments and Charitable Trusts (registration and licensing);

i. Collecting fees for the services it renders in accordance with the rate to be approved by the Government (revenue generating function);

j. Owning property, entering into contract, suing and being sued in its own name (internal support function);

k. Delegating when it deems necessary, the powers and functions given to it by this Proclamation (power); and

l. Carrying out such other activities necessary for the attainment of its objectives.

The Proclamation also recognises relevant federal executive organs assigned by the ministries as Charities and Societies Sector Administrators (Proclamation P621/2009, Articles 66 and 67). The sector administrators are given the mandates of providing support to the Agency, evaluating and recommending on Charities and Societies programs and projects, supervising and controlling operational activities of Charities and Societies and make arrangements with Charities for common goals.

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2.1.2. Regional mandate

Regions derive their mandate for coordinating and regulation of CSOs from a number of sources. First, the constitution of the Federal Republic states that those activities not exclusively given to the federal government or specified as joint activities are the mandates of regions. As a result, the involvement of regions in registering Ethiopian Charities and Societies could be understood to be within such legal provision. The second ground is the authority regions have to lead and guide their own development and the consequent need to coordinate and align CSO activities with regional policies and strategies. Some argue that this mandate should enable regions to register and supervise all CSOs operating in their region, rather than merely Ethiopian charities and societies, which operate only in their region.

However, regions do not yet have a legal framework that guides CSOs and sectors. Instead, regions have developed guidelines specifying the technical procedures and the operations of GO-CSO relations. Though useful, these guidelines are not legally binding and they do not create a legal ground for supervising CSO operations and management at regional levels.

On a practical point, the Charities and Societies Agency, does not have a structure of its own that reaches the grass-root levels. Distance between the grass-root CSOs and the Agency is therefore an impediment to monitoring CSOs effectively.

The issue of regional mandate to regulate and supervise CSOs also needs to be understood vis à vis the roles of woredas and zones. At present, the involvement of woredas, zones and sub-cities in the appraisal and evaluation of CSO activities varies between regions. In no study regions are woredas involved in regulating the operation of NGOs. Zones and sub-cities in Oromiya and Addis Ababa are given some more specific mandates depending on the project costs of the CSOs. The lack or weak involvement of woredas in all cases is a concern because they are the operational milieux for CSOs both at the initiation and implementation stages of projects. NGOs engage with the communities and woreda officials for purposes of identifying problems, beneficiary selection and carrying out of operations. As a result, woredas have the necessary information and access to enable them to follow the day-to-day activities of CSOs. There is, however, a tendency on the part of regional government not to devolve this power to woredas. At present, woredas do have the right to play a part in monitoring, but in fact this happens rarely since monitoring itself is not carried regularly. However, they are key players in problem identification and they make the final decisions on CSO project priorities implemented within their localities.

2.2. Institutional framework for CSO regulation

The current institutional map of institutions involved in regulating CSOs at federal and regional levels is shown in Diagram 1 on the following page.

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Diagram 1: Institutional Map

Key Issues

Lack of clear institutional engagement with CSOs by regional level: Different institutional structures at regional level coordinate CSOs, depending on the number of CSOs. Oromiya has a NGO Affairs Core Process; Addis Ababa has a Charities Support and Monitoring Coordinator; Benishangul has a CSO Case Team inside the Planning and Budgeting Core Process.

Lack of adequate staff in regions to carry out regulatory functions: Planning departments of many sector bureaux are most directly involved in CSO coordination, but there are no focal persons assigned to work on CSO projects and programs. Project units in these planning departments are responsible for both government and non-government projects. They are seriously under-staffed. As a result, not many of the expected regulatory functions are carried by the regions.

Weak institutional interface between federal and regional administration: The decentralized structure of the country recognizes the autonomy of regions. Regions are

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not implementing agencies of the centre. All the sector bureaux interviewed state they have no relation with federal line ministries in regulating and coordinating CSOs operating in their own region. Additionally, the Board of the Agency (its decision making body) has no representation of regional government among its members.

Examples of weak institutional interface

The Bureaux of Education in regions have no direct line of communication with the Ministry of Education in the processes of project appraisal and evaluation. The Ministry receives no report or copy of the CSOs operating in the region from regional bureaux. Similarly, the communication between BoFEDs and the Federal Charities Agency at best can be characterized as instances of updating each other rather than concerted and regular lines of communication

Weak coordination between federal and regional administration: As a result of weak communication, there is poor coordination between the federal and regional levels. The Agency sends copies of licences and operational agreements of all those CSOs working in respective regions which have currently secured licenses to BoFEDs while BoFEDs send copies of project agreement signed in the region. There is no other established and institutionalized line of communication between them.

View of a CSO in Tigray:

“The government sector Bureaux are interested and pre-occupied with the government programs and projects and give little attention to Non-Government activities and projects. As a result, sector bureaux allocate little or no time or resources for CSO projects. The government needs to be pro-active and take the initiative to follow up on CSOs.”

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3. Intergovernmental relations (IGR) context

3.1. Federal states and decentralisation

In all federal-decentralized systems, including Ethiopia, the management of “vertical” coordination between different levels of government creates an additional set of issues and complexities. Without due attention to this vertical coordination the effective and efficient management of CSO regulation is at risk: there will be increased potential for unwanted gaps in the system, for inefficient overlaps or redundant processes, unclear accountabilities, missed objectives or benchmarks, undue time lags, etc. In this section we look at vertical intergovernmental interface within the broader context of Ethiopia‟s federal system and trends in GOE decentralization policies to explore (a) how these broader factors are relevant to designing a framework for federal-regional interface with respect to CSO regulation and (b) how the development of such a framework may be relevant and useful as a case study for the future development of a comprehensive policy and legal framework for intergovernmental relations (IGR) as is called for in the GTP (see GTP Volume 2: Policy Matrix, Table 12, page 24, November 2012). Very briefly, first principles of decentralized governance guide us toward a range of potential benefits attained from bringing government closer to the people, including greater responsiveness to local preference, accountability to the citizen, innovation, democratic development and equality (ensuring a fairer share of political and economic resources to local groups and regions). Decentralization is a large and complex body of theory and practice. While the term itself suggests that it is all about decentralizing per se -- i.e. from the centre to lower levels - this should not be our understanding. For example, economies of scale, “spillover” effects or inter-regional equity considerations often suggest the centralization of some functions. In addition, many of the potential benefits of decentralized governance entail a risk of the opposite happening, with classic examples being, e.g.: local elites capturing all the benefits of decentralized power and public spending or decentralization creating more opportunities for corruption that local communities are powerless to stop. Indeed, decentralization is not a zero-sum, either/or matter but more often a mix of roles for different levels of government. The challenge is to find the right balance of roles for all levels of government, which will vary by different sectors (e.g., the answers for defense and security issues will be different to that for basic health services). Thus, nothing in this report should be read as an argument for more or less centralization or decentralization of a particular function; rather, it is about how to develop a framework for deciding the assignment of functions and then designing the system of intergovernmental relations to support those decisions. In the Ethiopian context there are two major and related forces that should drive consideration of the vertical interface for all public sector activities:

The federal constitution which calls for significant powers to regional state governments (discussed more below);

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The related but broader decentralization processes (including now to the local levels) that has been a priority for the GOE for several years and continues in the GTP period.

Clearly, the main driving force for federalism since 1991 has been to reverse the injustices, conflicts and impoverishment that resulted from decades of over-centralization of power and resources. However, the constitutional design and a major, if not defining, thrust of government development policy of the past two decades has reflected a very strong preference towards decentralization and a wish to capture the potential benefits – and minimize the potential downsides – of decentralization enumerated above. Thus, any consideration of vertical relations between levels of government for CSO regulation should have as a starting point the objective of enhancing and certainly not undermining this fundamental thrust of Ethiopia’s development. Also relevant to our consideration of the vertical interface between levels of governmental for CSO regulation is that there are different forms of decentralization that may be applicable depending on interpretation and evolution of federal constitutional arrangements, and of policy preferences related to decentralization. In a given sector, a mix of all three of the following forms of decentralization may be relevant and can be useful in making policy decisions:

Deconcentration – This is considered a relatively “weak” form of decentralization in which functions are carried out by central government bodies but in their offices outside the capital. In our case deconcentration would entail the Charities & Societies Agency setting up offices in other cities and assigning some - though not necessarily all - functions to the field offices.

Delegation -- This is when one level of government “delegates” a function, usually to a lower level, but retains the actual power and thus a relatively strong supervisory function over the lower level for that function and often with relatively strict conditions. In our case, as an example only, the CSA may delegate regional bureau to review and approve projects, but the latter would be accountable to the former; furthermore, the former would be able to reverse the delegation easily and unilaterally.

Devolution – In this case, the lower level of government will be given significant autonomy for decision making and this authority is established with a legal framework, which in federal systems is enshrined in the constitution.

For CSO regulation in Ethiopia, all three types of decentralization noted above should be considered, and a systematic design would likely entail a mix of especially the latter two. Furthermore, we could expect the system to evolve dynamically over time as the political, policy and capacity contexts evolve.

We understand that this potentially raises some contentious issues: Should functional analysis of CSO regulation err on side of centralization or decentralization, of federal or state governments‟ jurisdiction? However, we suggest that this dilemma need not be an issue for concern. At this juncture, where formal IGR is still evolving on a de facto basis,

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there are easy options, for the time being, to simply “delegate”, either upward or downward, on a practical basis, a function, accepting that at some time in the future there may be debate over interpreting it as rightfully a federal or regional power. This approach will allow for CSO regulation to be used as a practical on-the-ground learning experience to feed into policy development and the future comprehensive IGR framework.

3.2. Relevance of IGR

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) are often referred to as one of the six basic features of a federal system. In federal systems, IGR encompasses any interaction between two or more levels within the same country. Though IGR can include “horizontal” relations between two governments at the same level (e.g., regarding cross-border issues between two states), it usually refers to “vertical” relations between two or more levels of government (i.e., federal-provincial-local relations), which is our interest here. It also refers to the overall system that evolves over time, which is made up be a myriad of forces including, on the one hand, day-to-day informal, non-legally binding conventions and, on the other hand, a very complex web of purpose-specific or broad legal, financial and administrative agreements, planning and budgeting systems, legislation, periodic meetings of experts and policy or law makers, court decisions, etc. These all combine to determine day-to-day management arrangements for a sector or function, but also the underlying context by which governments interact. Together, these arrangements characterize the type of relationships, the “borders” of autonomy and cooperation between levels. It is widely agreed that, formally at least, IGR is the most underdeveloped component of Ethiopia's federal system; although it is clear that a significant amount of de facto IGR has emerged over the past several years. The GTP sets as a priority the creation of a comprehensive legal, policy and institutional framework for IGR (see GTP Policy Matrix Table 12, p. 24). In the absence of such a clear ex ante defined framework it is to be expected that the issue of vertical coordination, with respect to CSO regulation among other areas, would not be clear in the first instance.

Ethiopia‟s federal constitution envisions strong, relatively autonomous regional states but with strong roles for the federal government in making policy and setting standards in many key sectors. The respective roles of each level are set out, in very broad terms, mainly but not exclusively in articles 51 and 52. However, the constitution is not detailed in terms of IGR, and as already noted a comprehensive legal, policy, and institutional framework is expected within the GTP. Thus, there is still much room for debate about how CSO regulatory functions are delineated relative to the powers of the federal versus regional states.

In the absence of the legal framework, we suggest that the IGR of CSO regulation be treated as a process which can provide valuable inputs in the future development of a framework for other sectors.

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3.3. IGR and functional “unbundling”

In order to respect federal constitutional arrangements, and to achieve objectives of decentralization governance generally, unbundling of functional areas (e.g., primary vs. higher education) and functions in that (sub) sector (e.g., curriculum design vs. hiring teachers) is a starting point. For each function within a sector there may be roles for different levels of government. Generically these are which level of government undertakes the following for each identified functions:

policy making (who sets the main policy guidelines -- e.g., universal free primary education);

standards setting (who sets – e.g., national standard tests that are required versus jurisdictions being free to vary);

finances (who directly finances, capital and operational);

delivery (who actually provides – who runs the school or clinic);

regulation (who sets relevant regulation – e.g., state may build roads but under federal government sets environmental regulations)‟

monitoring and evaluation (what roles and authorities or sanctions for different levels, and citizens/communities).

This allows us to develop a matrix of roles and responsibilities assigned for different levels of government for each of the “unbundled” functions that make up the governance and management of a sector, and then identify the IGR systems that are required to make the system work efficiently. Decisions for filling in the matrix should reflect the country‟s federal constitution and its vision with respect to the objectives and first principles for decentralized governance.

3.4. Unbundling CSO Regulation

With respect to CSO regulation, this research project has started the process of a possible functional analysis of this “sector”, and it has made empirical observations of the experience to-date, attitudes and expectations on-the-ground, and made some preliminary and only illustrative (not recommended) observations about how to clarify or improve the vertical working relationships The "map" in Diagram 2 below illustrates a possible taxonomy of functions and sub functions of CSO regulation, based on the Charities and Societies Proclamation as well as some generic support functions one would expect to be required. It is presented here for illustrative purposes and it is recommended that the CSA and some of its close partners work together further to arrive at their agreed "map".The point is that an unbundling of functions allows us to look at more opportunities to meet the sometimes competing or conflicting objectives for centralizing or decentralizing. Once we suggest different roles for each level of government in a given sub-function, we can then suggest the types of instruments for intergovernmental relations that would make the system work effectively - what structures, reporting or planning systems, intergovernmental agreements, etc.

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However, we do suggest that a degree of “over” centralization of some functions within the CSO regulation “sector” could undermine other policy objectives related to Ethiopia‟s federal decentralization. For example, if a charity or society is mainly accountable in great detail to a central government body (i.e., the Agency or a line Ministry), it could undermine the sense of accountability is should rather have with lower levels of government and/or the communities they serve. Similarly, when it comes to some functions, the capacity to supervise etc. may be or should be placed and developed at a lower level. For example, when it comes to appraising a water project, both the technical expertise and the political accountability will be (or should be) in the relevant regional, zonal and local offices. These important broader governance considerations should not be undermined by the CSO regulatory system.

Diagram 2: Illustrative map of CSO regulatory functions

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4. Functional review

This section analyses functional issues relating to both the regulation of CS organisations and their projects, based on empirical research findings from the four regions visited. The aim of this section is to „unbundle‟ functions: to establish at what level the function actually takes place if at all, and whether it appears to represent a rational (clear, efficient, effective) division of roles and responsibilities between federal and regional level, according to a range of stakeholders interviewed and documents reviewed.

4.1. Registration and licensing3 of organisations

4.1.1. Outline of function

Charities and societies are required by law to register in order to operate legally in the country and acquire legal personality, rights and duties (P621, article 65, no. 2). Most categories of charities and societies are obliged to register at federal level, at the Charities and Societies Agency. Ethiopian charities and societies operating in only one region must register at the region. The federal and regional processes of registration are set out in Diagram 3 below.

Diagram 3: Process for Registration and Licensing Function

3

Registration and licensing are treated as one overarching function although registration could be considered as a process, which

is part of the licensing function.

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4.1.2. Key issues and concerns

Centralisation of registration and licensing function: The classification of charities and societies as Ethiopian, Resident and Foreign and the obligation for the latter categories especially to register at federal level results in the centralisation of the registration and licensing function. In practice, there are few Ethiopian charities which register at regional level. Some regional based charities, which are obliged to travel to Addis Ababa to register, complain of high travel costs incurred, time wasted and delays in communication and approvals. Many CSOs and most interviewed government functionaries believe that all CSOs, apart from foreign charities working in more than one region, should be able to register at regional level on the grounds that: i) this is in line with their regional mandate; ii) it allows efficient delivery of services; and iii) it supports close supervision of CSOs.

View of a CSO from Oromiya:

“The Agency can be responsible for international CSOs (whose entry point should be the federal level) while the region should be responsible for local CSOs. The reason is that CSOs need to get legitimacy from a closer authority. Moreover according to the federal law, ministries are responsible to setting policies while regional bureaus are responsible for operations. Similar structure needs to be implemented concerning the CSOs as well.”

Inconsistency between regional practice and federal rules: In Oromiya region, some charities and societies are registered with the Bureau of Justice, which is in accordance to the law that existed prior to the issuing of the P621/2009. In addition, the regional government proclamation which defines the roles and functions of the executives also assigns the mandates of registering, licensing and following associations and charities to the Bureau of Justice except foreign charities. It was noted that some projects approved at federal level have been rejected at regional level, and vice versa.

Lack of uniformity in the registration of societies: Local rights based societies such as Associations of the Disabled, Association of the Elderly, Association of the HIV/AIDS Positive are registered by the Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs in Tigray, while they are registered with the Bureau of Justice in Benishangul and Oromiya. Similarly, most mass based societies are registered by the Bureaux of Justice in Tigray, Benishangul and Oromiya. Despite this, women and youth associations in Tigray are registered with the Agency mainly because they source more than 10 % of their funding from donors and they operate in more than one region.

Some regional bodies involved in registration have no legal mandate: The 2008 Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) Reform considered that it was inefficient for the Bureau of Justice to register all associations. As a result, different sectors were then given the mandates of registering associations and societies that come within the purview of their field of operation. For instance, BoLSA registered associations and charities that were associated with the elderly, the disabled, and children since these fall within the ambits of its operation. These mandates, however, have no legal basis, which leaves other bureaus such as BoLSA with no firm and binding legal frameworks.

Inconsistent practices regarding the need to prove funding in order to register:

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Whereas the Agency requires CSOs to produce either promissory notes from donors or financial bank statements amounting to 10% of any project cost, this rises to 30% in Oromiya. The Oromiya practice is challenging for CSOs: many can only secure funding once they have been granted a licence.

4.2. Supervision of organisations

4.2.1. Outline of Function

Supervision of charities and societies is listed as one of the Agency‟s functions in P621/2009, article 6 (a). The supervisory function of regional authorities is set out in various regional guidelines. The overall purpose of supervision is to ensure compliance within regulations and rules. In principle, the supervisory function relates to the majority of the rules as set out in P621, for instance articles relating to: types of activities permitted/ type of charity; charitable endowments‟ Boards of Management structure and powers; structure, administration, powers and liability of trusts and trustees; rights and obligations of beneficiaries; rights of beneficiaries; powers and functions of General Assemblies; meetings of General Assemblies; powers and functions of auditors; obligations regarding accounts and reports.


The supervisory function is barely carried out: The Agency has not to date been able to involve itself fully in pro-active supervision of CSOs, either by assigning its own supervisors or by delegating supervision to the regional governments. The main exception to this is the Agency auditing of CSO annual accounts. As a result, it is not clear whether CSOs are operating in line with the CSO Proclamation in matters such as internal governance, financial utilization, etc. This function is also not well executed by the regional authorities.

Duplication of function: It appears that both lead bureaux and sector bureaux check whether CSOs conform to the 30/70 financial requirements of the Charities Proclamation and the regional distribution of projects. This appears to result from a lack of clear guidelines on such matters, and is not surprising given the 30:70 guideline is new. Additionally, some CSOs complain they are questioned or advised differently on the 30:70 guideline by all regions where they operate.

Devolution of function: There have been various initiatives by CSOs over the last 20 years to establish a Code of Conduct. Codes of Conduct are essentially self regulation mechanisms for charities and societies. One option for the Agency and regional bodies to consider is whether to seek a consensus on the elements and regulatory mechanism for such a Code. This could increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the function. The role of the Agency and regional bodies could be one of providing “hands off” oversight upon receipt of Code of Conduct reports.

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4.3. Support Function


The Agency has a support function with regard to CSOs. P621 describes one of its three objectives is “to enable and encourage charities and societies to develop and achieve their purposes in accordance with the law” (article 5, 1). Similarly regional bodies also provide support to Charities and Societies as described in their regional guidelines.

The main types of support provided to each CSO are those that are indicated in their respective project agreement documents and are necessary for the implementation of the project. These include the provision of support letters in order to enable CSOs to qualify for project competition or to receive duty free privileges. Support letters for duty free privileges are written to the Ministry of Inland Revenues specifying the nature of privileges sought. Other support includes expatriate work permit request letters, permits to engage in income generating activities and public collection, letters to open bank accounts, document authentication, letters to receive code 35 car plate numbers, approving auditors, etc. The Agency‟s Progress Reports list a total of 20 services, which they provide for charities and societies. Regional governments also write support letters to be submitted to the Agency. The Oromiya NGO core process provides letters for CSOs to secure work permits for expatriates, bank accounts and plate numbers for cars and motorcycles. In addition regional institutions also serve as entry points for woreda and local operations of the CSOs.


Support function is weakly carried out in regions: CSOs acknowledge they are most likely to receive support actually outlined in project agreements but less likely to receive other support they may require once they begin implementation, such as access to land. In particular, local charities/societies may require support in fund raising and resourcing through different mechanisms such as subcontracting of activities etc. Various CSOs - including national level consortia - have argued that duty free privileges take ages to acquire and sometimes budgets earmarked for vehicle purchase can expire while they wait.

Centralisation of certain support creates delays: CSOs complain that those registered in Addis Ababa need to obtain approval in the selection of a suitable auditor from the Agency. The distance and cost of travel result in delays in getting approval.

Other support is difficult to obtain which undermines project effectiveness: critical support such as land and finance are difficult to secure in practice.

4.4. Regulation of operations: i. project appraisal

The regulation of operations acts as the main point of interface between government agencies and CSOs. This is why it is critical for all parties that this function is carried out

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efficiently, effectively and fairly.


Project appraisal is undertaken both at federal and regional levels. The Agency claims that it has responsibilities regarding project appraisal, although this is not specifically set out in its list of functions in article 6. It is possibly an implied function through its supervisory function (6, 1 (a)) and its information gathering, analysis and dissemination functions (6, 1, (c) and (d)).

At regional level, BoFEDs are responsible for supervising all projects including their appraisal, monitoring and evaluations. This is defined in the institutional roles of BoFEDs in each region.

The main objectives of project appraisal in general are to establish the appropriateness and relevance of the project from a legal, policy, social and equity perspective. The appraisal is also expected to assess project conformity with the P621, regional policies, the number of beneficiaries and their selection process, location of projects etc. Line ministries and bureaux are meant to carry out technical appraisal. In practice, the focus is limited to appraising geographical areas of engagement and financial allocations (according to the 30:70 guideline).

The process of project appraisal is outlined below in Diagram 4 (at federal level) and Diagram 5 (at regional level) through the use of flow charts.

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Diagram 4: Process flow chart for project appraisal at federal level

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Diagram 5: Process flow chart for project appraisal at regional level

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Different appraisal procedures result in lack of consistency and transparency: A different procedure appears to apply for CSOs which operate in partnership with regional government. For instance, the charity IntraHealth in Tigray works within the government structure. The Tigray Health Bureau submits projects to IntraHealth on the basis of which a memorandum of understanding is signed. On the other hand, projects carried out by the Women‟s Association in Tigray do not undergo appraisal by bureaux since the donor organisations have already received prior agreement with those bureaux.

Inconsistent practices in signing agreements, resulting in poor information flow: Among CSOs registered at the Agency, some sign project agreements with the Agency while others sign these with regional governments. This practice can result in confusion and a poor flow of information between federal and regional levels.

Technical appraisal may be overlooked, resulting in technically weak projects: In some instances, the project appraisal stage may not involve a sector bureau. For instance in Benishangul region, representatives of the water and energy sector bureaux complained that some water and energy related projects are approval by the regional BoFED without the knowledge of the bureau‟s plan preparation and M & E core process. This risks a danger of approving projects that may not be technically feasible or sound. It also indicates the lack of communication and coordination between BoFEDs and sector bureaus.

The purpose of the project appraisal function and relative responsibilities of government and donors have not yet been established: Donor organisations usually require extensive project appraisal, in order to satisfy country, sector and financial management criteria. The purpose of government appraisal at federal and regional levels should be different - for instance, ensuring adherence to regulatory guidelines and regional planning – rather than a duplication of effort.

Guidelines usually include CSO input at regional level, which can help avoid duplication: At regional level, regulation of operation including project appraisal is supported by guidelines in most of the study regions, except Tigray. Guidelines are usually prepared with the participation of CSOs, though in Benishangul some CSOs were unaware that the guideline existed. At federal level, there has not yet been dialogue between the Agency and CSOs in the development of appraisal procedures.

Standards may not be followed in project appraisal: CSOs in Oromiya claim sector bureaux do not follow standards for project appraisal as set out in the NGO Guideline.

Procedures are said to be lengthy and inefficient: The project appraisal procedure can be time consuming and inefficient. Many CSOs take on the task of collecting comments from each sector in person, modifying projects according to comments and then re-submitting documents for signature. CSOs say that, at times, the process can take up to 20-30 days (up to 2 months according to BoFED in Benishangul) and project documents can also be lost in the process. Lead bureaux have some sympathies with these concerns, though the Addis Ababa Education Bureau claims it provides comments in 2 days. CSO projects may undergo dual (repeated) review processes at federal and regional levels.

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Donor influence is said to result in poor resource allocation: BoFEDs in Oromiya and Benishangul regions believe CSOs are heavily influenced by their donors and prepare projects according to the needs of donors rather than paying attention to regional development needs. They claim that this results in a concentration of CSOs in accessible and infrastructure rich areas. Similarly, sector bureaux state that CSOs do not focus on their sectoral priorities, for instance prioritising asset building and capital formation rather than training and awareness raising.

View from CSO Core Process in Oromiya BoFED

“BoFED usually insists that CSOs should go down to the woreda level and discuss with the people about their projects. Usually, however, project ideas are given to CSOs by donors. Sometimes donors chose even woredas for CSOs. BoFED however raises the issue of equitable distribution with the CSOs and convince them to comply with the regional needs.”

On the other hand, lack of information is said to be the cause of poor resource allocation: in contrast to the above view from regional government, CSOs claim that key information to guide their choice of operations and location is not made available to them. CSOs require information from regional bureaux, such as gaps in different fields of operation, sectoral policies and standards, regulations and operating procedures, if they are to be in line with regional and sectoral planning.

4.5. Regulation of operations: ii. project monitoring and evaluation


The Agency states it is mandated to undertake project monitoring and evaluation, through its supervision. Lead agencies and sector bureaux at regional level maintain that project monitoring and evaluation is a critical component of their effort to regulate operations.

The function of project monitoring and evaluation in Addis Ababa and Oromiya has devolved to zones for projects that are budgeted at less than 2 million birr and operate in one zone/sub-city. Devolution does not occur in Tigray and Benishangul regions.


Monitoring is generally not carried out: At federal level, neither the Agency nor line ministries currently carry out M&E on a regular basis. The Agency is currently designing a rationale and procedures for doing so. At regional level, proper and regular monitoring of projects is not carried out, according to sector offices and CSOs, though lead

Regional responsibility for project appraisal

The Oromiya charities guideline specifies that one of the tasks of BoFED is to propose priority geographical areas, sectors, social groups and activities where the involvement of CSOs in the region is highly required. Similarly, sector offices are required to provide CSOs with sectoral development policies and project standards.

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organisations (usually BoFEDs) claim that they undertake joint monitoring and supervision occasionally.

Evaluations may be subject to delays, leading to planning challenges: One CSO in Addis Ababa waited 3 months for the technical evaluation of its project to be carried out, which created problems in its relations with the donor organisation. Sector bureaux sometimes take part in final term evaluations.

Capacity constraints are the main reason for poor execution of the function: problems pertaining to manpower and technical knowledge are major reasons for failure to monitor projects properly. Additionally, all government offices mention lack of adequate logistics and budgets to carry out their supervisory functions.

Examples of capacity constraints

The Bureau of Education in Tigray region has only two staff members in its project office responsible for the supervision and follow-up of government, private sector and CSO education projects. In the Oromiya region, the plan and budget core process of the Education Bureau has 20 staff members, of which only two have responsibilities for project appraisal.

The purpose of this function and relative responsibilities of government and donors have not yet been established: As with project appraisal, it is important to clarify what purpose is behind federal government vis-à-vis regional government monitoring and evaluation, to avoid duplication of effort, given resource constraints.

CSO monitoring reports are not always shared with regional government: Some regional sector offices claim CSOs do not send monitoring reports. However, CSO reports are more likely to be shared with the regional coordinating body, and it is not clear whether the BoFEDs are responsible for sharing these reports with sector bureaux and requesting feedback or whether CSOs are required to send such reports both to the BoFED and the relevant sector bureau.

Examples of CSO reporting not shared with Bureaux

The Bureau of Women‟s Affairs in Tigray claims it received reports for only 3 out of 30 projects approved in a two year period. The Bureau of Water, Mining and Energy in Benishangul complained that they receive few plans and reports; they understand that these reports are sent to BoFED.

Reporting does not result in feedback, change or improvements to projects, and is therefore ineffective: CSOs claim they submit consolidated annual activity and financial reports to the Agency, to BoFEDs and to sector bureaux. BoFEDs and sector bureaux receive quarterly physical and financial reports plus annual financial and activity reports. There is, however, invariably no feedback given to the CSOs, and CSO activities are not included in the sectors‟ planning reports.

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4.6. Coordination - Government-CSO relations

The CSO-GO relationship is critical to enhancing the operation of both CSOs and government bodies, to create symbiosis and to open the space for CSOs. Some of the dimensions of this function include involvement in partnership formation, consultation and participation in decision-making.

Federal Level

Over the years, there have been several initiatives to coordinate and communicate between Government and CSOs. Since the Proclamation came into effect, there have been some occasional dialogue and consultation initiatives. A meeting of Government, CSOs and donors, sponsored by CCRDA and assisted by the Institute for Science and Sustainable Development (ISSD) took place in December 2010. There were some ad hoc consultations over specific guidelines in late 2011. Since early 2012, the creation of a Charities and Societies Sector Working Group holds the potential for regular dialogue between Government, CSOs and development partners.

Regional Level

The study found out that in almost all the study regions, there are attempts to create institutions to facilitate the CSO–GO relations. These are mostly mediated by CSO consortia and the lead government organizations, namely the BoFEDs.

Among the study regions, the Oromiya experience is relatively advanced in this respect. The relationship can be described as a strong consultative relationship, enhancing the enabling environment for civil society.

CSO-Government relationship in Oromiya

The regional government and the CSOs prepared a Collaboration and Partnership Agreement (CPA) document in 2010. The purpose of the agreement is to create a favourable environment for Government and NGOs to partner. Additionally, a steering committee comprised of 7 government sectors working with CSOs and 6 NGOs (3 international and 3 national) was formed. The committee meets quarterly and discusses issues that arise with NGO program implementation, problems of CSOs and enabling environment, equity issues in NGO distribution, issues that might arise with regard to sector offices, best practices, experience exchange etc. The steering committee has an apex body comprised of CRDA, NeCSO and BoFED that meets every week or every two weeks. The region has also established zonal GO-NGO fora that are conducted in eight locations.

The relationship in Tigray is one of joint decision-making on sector matters. CSOs are actually members of regional bodies that are established around specific issues. They also engage on wider issues, such as consultation on regulatory matters and mainstream policy, such as the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP).

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CSO-Government relationship in Tigray

CSOs are members of the regional Council on HIV/AIDS whose members include the Health Bureau, HAPCO, regional sectors, religious institutions and CSOs. Similarly, there is a regional health consultative committee comprised of 12 organizations both from Bureau of Health and CSOs that meets regularly every two weeks. The committee has also seven technical committees on different health issues and prepares its own plan on the basis of the regional health plan.

Besides specific sectoral issues, CSOs in the region have held three consultative meetings on the GTP and two on NGO regulations.

CSO participation on councils is seen at all levels. The consortium ASCOT is represented in the regional Council by one participant while there are five participants from the CSO sector in Mekele city Council. Similarly, the woreda CSO network is represented in each woreda Council and members of the CCCs are represented in kebele Councils. This is supported with manuals and forms that are funded by the European Union. ASCOT representatives believe networks have gained understanding and confidence to discuss development issues in Council meeting.

Benishangul shares some commonalities with Tigray in terms of consultation over sector issues. Two sector specific consortia exist, which engage in consultation with the regional government: the Food Security and Economic Growth Consortium and the Benishangul Development Consortium. The former is led by Save the Children while the latter is led by Tikuret le Gumuz Association.

Benishangul and Addis Ababa have a lesser degree of partnership and consultation with the regional government to develop an enabling environment than we found in Oromiya. Steering committees and GO-NGO fora have been established, but they meet infrequently in Benishangul (the forum met only once prior to 2011) and are new in Addis Ababa (set up 2 years ago, comprising 4 government representatives and 5 Charities representatives).

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5. Summary of Findings

This section summarises the findings and analysis, based on sections three and four above.

Table 2: Summary of Findings

Functions and sub-functions

Federal/regional mandate

Description Analysis/Issues Indicative Examples of possible changes/ roles and responsibilities

Regulation of Organisations

Registration and Licensing

Agency – P621/2009 (“licence, register”): most Ch/So

Regional – regional guidelines: only Eth Ch/So in one region

Agency: clear process

Regions: different rules per region

Function highly centralised

Regions: registration of So lacks uniformity; some registering bodies lack legal framework

Regions: Inconsistent practice: need to prove funding prior to registration

Costly for Ch/So to travel to Addis to register

Question of effectiveness

Note: some Ch/So say regions more restrictive than Agency

Regions and Ch/So favour more categories registering at regions (Resident Ch/So in one region)

Variation by regions may be considered, but need to be clear and easy for CSOs and government sector partners to follow

Regions could undertake (be delegated) more functions for CSOs operating in their region (even if operating in others as well), while federal govt. maintains close supervision

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and final authority. Simple IGR reporting systems would allow for benefits of a d-c system (relationships and tasks done at lower levels) combined with meeting central government‟s legal requirements.

Supervision of organisations

Agency – P621 (“supervise Ch/So” – many articles)

Regions – regional guidelines

Agency: function barely carried out; focus on audit of Ch/So accounts

Regions: similar

Duplication of activity: review of Ch/So accounts (accounts of Ch/Sos in several regions may be reviewed by Agency, BoFEDs and sector bureaux in several regions)

Ineffective supervision of internal governance of Ch/Sos [Note: do donors wish to raise this issue?]

Need to eliminate duplication over review of accounts

Scope for Ch/So to play role in promoting Code of Conduct.

Regions could undertake (delegated) more functions for CSOs operating in their region (even if operating in others as well), while federal govt. maintains close supervision and final authority.

CSA may make it a priority to provide guidelines agreed by the regions and the latter implement.

Support Agency – P621

(“enable and encourage Ch/Sos …

Agency: provides many services

Regions: support letters to Agency

Agency and regions tend to provide support as set out in project agreements

Ch/So less likely to receive support

Streamline Fed/reg roles and responsibilities – can more activities be delegated to regions?

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achieve purpose”)

Regions – regional guidelines

(e.g. securing work permits, bank accounts, vehicle plates)

during implementation, e.g. access to land, co-financing.

Ch/So complain of very lengthy procedures; can result in permissions arriving too late

Ch/So say centralisation of function inefficient and adds to delays

Regions could be free and encouraged to undertake their own activities, reporting to CSA for information purposes and sharing best practices, etc. via info exchanges provided by the CSA.

Fed may set some standards for delivery time

Capacity/systems need to be addressed

Regulation of Operations

Project Appraisal

Agency – P621 (Agency role not specific, but powers/functions delegated to sector admin)

Regions – guidelines (BoFEDs)

Agency – appraisal procedures not yet designed (may request technical appraisal from line ministries)

Regions – have guidelines but not always adhered

Inconsistent practices in signing (fed/reg levels)

Technical appraisal often over-looked

Purpose of Govt appraisal not clear (vis-à-vis donor role)

Ch/So say procedures very lengthy/ inefficient

Regions say: donor influence results in poor resource allocation

Ch/So say: lack of information from regions makes it impossible to respond to regional priorities

Clear need to clarify purpose of project appraisal (fed/reg)

For effectiveness, may be better to focus appraisal at regions or even lower, to align with regional priorities, and to ensure technical and political accountability is in correct place. Reporting systems would allow fed govt to maintain some degree of supervision and

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information sharing function.

Consider better streamlining of CSO project management by government within the regular governmental systems rather than treating in a separate “stove pipe”. This would provide large part of the CSA‟s needs without duplication of effort or competing systems, as well as stronger accountability and support to government and communities‟ priorities.

Regional capacity needs to be addressed but this should be the priority rather than using precious human and financial resources at the centre.

Project Monitoring and

Agency – P621 (Agency role not

Agency – M&E procedures not yet

Purpose of Govt M&E not clear (vis-à-vis donor role)

Clear need to clarify purpose of project M&E

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Evaluation specific, but powers/functions delegated to sector admin)

Regions – guidelines (BoFED and line ministry roles)

AA and Oromiya devolve responsibility to zones (projects > 2m birr/ 1 zone)

designed

Regions – no regular M&E; BoFEDs may undertake joint monitoring with Ch/Sos.

Delays when evaluations carried out

Regions – severe capacity constraints: manpower, technical knowledge, logistics, budget

Sector bureaux say: Ch/So do not share their monitoring reports

Ch/Sos say: they report regularly to BoFED but reporting does not result in feedback; inclusion of their operations in regional plans (therefore ineffective)

(fed/reg)

Same comments as for project appraisal noted above.

Coordination Agency – P621

(“organise consultative forum”)

Regions –guidelines

Agency - Efforts to promote regular consultation starting through the Charities and Societies Sector Working Group

Regions – different examples from institutionalised consultation (Oromiya), joint decision making on sector areas

Some Ch/So in regions satisfied with partnership with regions; others less so

Challenge to progress coordination/ consultation at federal level

Challenge to create interface between federal and regions on CSOs (no institutional link between Agency and Bureaux in regions)

A high level policy makers‟ (bi)annual meeting of CSO reps and major federal and regional government actors. The detailed ToR could be developed in one of the workshops described under the recommendations section.

This should be developed to work in parallel with sectoral planning and budgeting systems so that roles of different levels of government are consistent and CSOs

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(Tigray) to lesser consultation (Benishangul, AA)

treated analogous to a contractor.

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6. Recommendations

Purposely, given the complex political and technical features of this matter, we make few specific substantive recommendations. Rather we propose a process for developing a framework of vertical interface for CSO regulation. The following is an indicative outline for steps, a process, to develop this framework, which could be modified following further discussion with the CSSG and then the CSA and other stakeholders. For each step, we put forward some suggestions for participation, purpose, and outputs. The main components of this process would include the following: 2) IGR Workshop

Participation -- Senior influential officials and experts. As the Ministry of Federal Affairs has responsibility for the CSA as well as for developing the broader IGR framework (under the GTP), they may play a lead role in this process. The group should not be large and at this point should include only individuals with recognized expertise, which include experts from the House of Federation, the Constitutional Inquiry Commission, MOFED, MOJ, a selection of regional bureaus, and academia. It may include 1-2 international experts in IGR (especially for the administrative aspects as Ethiopia has considerable depth in the legal aspects).

Output -- A review and written guidance on IGR issues that should be considered with respect to CSO regulation and, secondarily, how this process can eventually relate to other processes for developing a comprehensive policy and legal framework for IGR (as called for in the GTP).

2) Action training on IGR, decentralization functional analysis

Participation -- This would include mainly CSA staff but also some Steering Committee members and other government and non-government stakeholders, including at the federal and regional levels.

Output -- As part of the training process, the workshop would to develop a preliminary taxonomy of functions and identification of issues and options to consider for functional assignment and IGR needs (systems, structures, etc.).

3) Workshop on streamlining relevant laws, regulations and guidelines

Participation – This would include relevant senior CSA staff, MOJ, selected or all BoJs, some sectoral ministries, recognized IGR experts (legal, fiscal, planning) within government and academia, and CSO representatives.

Output – A template for regional laws that can be adapted by regions, accompanied with analysis of federal-regional interface implications and possible options for variations by regions; similar draft regulations and/or guidelines; a better understanding (documented) of the potential future variations on laws and practices as systems and other capacities are further developed. (Harmonization may be a priority here, as would be discussed in the workshop(s).)

4) Policy Document and Action Plan that sets out the long-term plan, as well as a detailed time frame for establishing systems, building capacities, passing laws, etc.

Participation – This would be done mainly by CSA staff, approved through the appropriate channels and with consultations (major issues would be fed from the

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above 1-3 processes which would carefully include planning considerations built into all those processes).

Output – A brief policy document that complements the Proclamation as well as setting a clear vision about intergovernmental interface for CSO regulation and how it relates to other policy priorities such as federalism, decentralization, IGR, development, etc. A timeline for all components.

6.1. Other recommendations

We have included a number of specific recommendations, where it seems that there is a strong case for making some changes in the roles and responsibilities between federal and regional authorities. These are:

5) Registration and licencing: regions could undertake more delegated functions for CSOs operating in their regions, while federal government maintains close supervision.

6) Supervision of organisations: there is a need to eliminate a duplication of CSO account reviewing. Regions could undertake more delegated functions for review of accounts, while federal government maintains close supervision and final authority.

7) Support function: There is a need to streamline federal and regional roles and responsibilities, and perhaps delegate more responsibilities to regions. The federal government could set standards for delivery time. Regional capacity and systems need to be addressed.

8) Project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation: There is a clear need to clarify the purpose of this function at federal and regional levels, and vis-à-vis donor agencies. For greater effectiveness, it would be better to focus appraisal, monitoring and evaluation at regional level or lower, while government maintains some degree of supervision. Regional capacity would need to be addressed to take on greater responsibilities.

9) Coordination: A high level policy makers‟ bi-annual meeting of major federal and regional government actors and CSOs should take place, to ensure better functioning and efficient new allocations of roles and responsibilities.

10) A study of comparative practice would contribute directly to the framework of workshops outlined in recommendations 1-4 above. Policy makers may benefit from a more systematic study of relevant international practices related to CSO regulation and how different levels of government coordinate the function. It is very important to collect the right information about actual practices and their context, which is not readily available in any existing literature source. Therefore, probably after action #2 above is completed, some form of well designed desk-based research will be required as follows:

Develop a template of very specific questions about which policy makers would

benefit from international experience. This would probably include the basic legal arrangements but also the actual administrative practices of intergovernmental coordination, the underlying policy objectives and other relevant contextual factors, and how CSO regulation relates to managing development projects. These must be

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very carefully formulated to ask the right questions about actual practices and context in order to be useful.

Commission 3-4 papers to be written according to the template by 3-4 different authors from carefully selected countries, preferably those with some form of federal system (e.g., India, South Africa). These would be coordinated -- for careful selection of the international writers and quality control generally – by a national researcher, possibly supported by an international expert (preferably one also involved in steps 1-2 above).

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Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Interface between the Charities and Societies Agency and the Regions

TECS Research Project

Background

At the High Level Forum between the Government and donor representatives, it was agreed that joint periodic reviews of the impact of the Federal Proclamation on Charities and Societies (PCS) should take place. In order to establish a robust evidence based and constructive dialogue, it was decided to develop a project that will follow on the developments of the sector and enhance Implementation of the Proclamation. As a result, a Joint Project Memorandum was prepared by the Civil Society Sector Group (CSSG) of the Development Assistant Group (DAG) to be the basis for the Tracking Trends in Ethiopia‟s Civil Society (TECS) project. Atos Consulting has been contracted by DFID, to carry out the TECS project. A key concern was that, depending on how the Proclamation is interpreted and applied, whether it will foster the expected enabling environment which would allow a constructive role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Government‟s recently developed Growth and Transformation plan (GTP), poverty reduction, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and democratization processes. Hence, the purpose of TECS is to create a conducive and enabling environment through supporting research, dialogue and publication on emerging issues and trends in Ethiopian civil society sector, including those arising from the implementation of the Proclamation on Charities and Societies.

The main TECS outputs are: (a) Effective research to provide policy relevant and high quality information and analysis of the development and changes within the civil society sector (b) Effective dialogue exists between government, civil society and development partners on the development of the civil society sector, and (c) Dissemination and communication mechanisms supported and established on the development of the civil society sector.

Atos Consulting carried out an inception phase from November 2010 to January 2011, in order to design the key activities for the implementation phase of TECS. Accordingly, it has identified six major areas of research. These terms of reference relate to one of these projects, namely: Interface between the Charities and Societies Agency and the Regions.

Introduction

Since the Proclamation on Charities and Societies (No. 621/2009) came into effect, regions are expected to produce legislation on charities and societies, which is in line with the federal Proclamation. Some variation is permitted in regional legislation, in recognition of different local needs and circumstances. To date, no regional legislation has been finalised. Regional versions of the legislation are at the early stages of preparation and drafting.

However, the Regional Bureaux of Finance and Economic Development (BoFEDs) have developed guidelines for collaboration with CSOs operating in their regions. Draft documents are available for both Hawassa and Oromiya regions.

The introduction of the Proclamation to the federal-regional structure has created a number of challenges for CSOs as well as government bureaux which are responsible for carrying out regulatory functions and duties. The Agency has carried out some consultative forums with the regions in order to address these challenges. Regional governments are likewise engaging in dialogue with CSOs. But a number of challenges persist and issues remain unaddressed. These are summarised below.

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Policy elements

The role that regions would like to play, and are best suited to playing, in regulating CSOs has both policy and functional analysis elements, which are interrelated. While this TECS research focuses mainly on the functional analysis, questions about policy and authority need to be addressed in order to reach agreement on the proper separation and coordination of functions between the federal and regional levels of government.

On the policy level, the degree of devolution of power and authority raises the question of inter-governmental relations in Ethiopia as a federal state. This work will shed light on the division of powers, and related constitutional issues: to what extent is it appropriate that regions have a different policy and legal framework for CSOs? What latitude do they have, if they have to interpret and implement federal laws and policies on CSOs according to their individual state preferences? How should the Agency work with regional bureaux of justice and finance and economic development, when it is not the counterpart federal ministry or agency of either bureau?

An analysis of the inter-governmental policy and legal aspects of CSO regulation will lead to the development of initial „next steps‟, as part of a process to seek consensus on a way forward.

Functional analysis

On the functional analysis side, there are questions about how the federal and regional levels of government should coordinate and establish suitable roles and responsibilities on CSO regulation. In the Ethiopian context, this functional analysis has some analogies with business process re-engineering (BPR), although it starts with the need to establish appropriate business processes.

Functional analysis is concerned with eliminating inefficiencies in government (for instance, eliminating duplication across different ministries or agencies, vertically or horizontally) and in achieving greater effectiveness and a clean line of accountability.

The concern with effectiveness includes providing a service which is satisfactory to clients, from the point of view of speed, transparency and equity, among other criteria. This is clearly of interest to CSOs. Similarly, the Agency recognises it is important to provide a good service to its clients, the CSOs, in its current Strategic Plan.

The current situation in the regions varies to some extent, but tends to include the following elements: Regional Bureaux of Justice are responsible for drafting legislation. Regional Bureaux of Finance and Economic Development (BoFEDs) are responsible for coordination, appraising of project proposals at the regional level, and contributing to the development of new legislation through the role they play in government-NGO fora, where ideas on the regional laws have been discussed in some regions in early 2011.

A number of functional issues need further clarification or a clearer division of roles and responsibilities.

Emerging Issues

Registration issues: Registration includes the registration and/or licensing of CSOs themselves and the approval of projects. For Ethiopian charities, registration generally takes place at regional level, although those that operate in multiple regions need to register at the federal level with the Agency. For foreign and resident charities, registration takes place at the Agency. However, it does not always appear to be clear to civil society organisations where they should register.

Appraisal of project proposals: CSO project appraisals are generally conducted in order to check if the projects are in line with CSO stated objectives (as set out during registration) and whether they are in line with the administrative/operational financing requirements. At the federal level, this is carried out by the federal line ministries, if the proposals are for only one sector, e.g. water or education. If the proposal is multi-sectoral, appraisal is carried out by the Agency. For regional projects, there are cases of a two-tier appraisal system in operation (one at the Agency and one at regional BoFED level). This is a case in point in SNNPR. Regions further delegate responsibilities to zones or woredas for licensing or registration based on the budget ceiling of the projects. These layers of appraisal can result in a lack of coherence across different levels of government to CSOs.

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Project audit reports: for CSOs licensed at the Agency, financial audit reports will be submitted to both the BoFED and the Agency. There needs to be close coordination between these organisations to ensure coherence. CSOs can receive different comments and feedback from the Agency and BoFEDs, for which action has to be taken.

Coordination issues: Where charities are registered at federal level, there are instances of these charities by-passing the regional level and at times even the zonal level to work directly with woredas or local communities. The Oromiya BoFED has identified such practices in the region. In principle, BoFEDs need to know the activities of the CSOs in their respective regions because they have a responsibility for their coordination. Organisational structures also pose challenges for coordination. The Agency itself and the Ministry for Federal Affairs have no direct organisational structures at regional level. The regions have two structures (Bureaux of Justice and BoFEDs), which have separate mandates for dealing with governance and operational issues respectively. Neither of these bureaux is directly accountable to the Agency.

Monitoring issues: Monitoring of CSOs and of projects appears to be taking place at both federal and regional levels. There might be a case for having all project monitoring and evaluation take place at regional level, given this is closer to the operations of most organisations. However, the Agency still needs to maintain a role in coordinating information on their monitoring activities, given its overall responsibilities for monitoring civil society.

Objectives

The research will seek answers to the following questions:

What is the actual situation regarding the division of functions and tasks between the federal and regional levels (principally the BoFEDs and Bureaux of Justice)? Functions are taken to be core regulatory functions: registration, licensing, coordination, project appraisals, organisational audits, and monitoring.

Are there any inefficiencies, inconsistencies or duplications of functions; or gaps where certain functions are not being carried out? What is recommended to make regulatory services more efficient?

Are there sufficient capacity and resources to carry out functions at regional level? Given resource and capacity constraints at federal level, what recommendations can be made to improve capacity and resources in the regions?

What information flows exist between federal and regional levels? What kind of information is required to improve understanding and coordination between these levels?

How satisfactory is the service provided to CSOs (according to the main categories of CSOs laid out in the Proclamation) – and what could be done to improve the service?

There appear to be separate initiatives to date for government and CSOs to have dialogue at federal and regional levels. There may be some dialogue between federal and regional governments. What scope is there for including CSOs in federal-regional dialogue on the civil society environment and policy? What sort of vertical and horizontal working relationships should be established?

What are the prospects for regional governments to identify regional policies on CSOs? What approaches should be followed?

What implications and recommendations do the above findings have for enhancing inter-governmental relations in the Ethiopian federal context?

The research will be conducted with two primary objectives: i) to make recommendations to federal and regional government on a more efficient and effective service, based on better functional coordination and dialogue between government and CSO stakeholders, and ii.) to make recommendations for how services to CSOs can be more streamlined, equitable and transparent.

A secondary objective is to provide a case study to policy makers concerned with inter-governmental relations on how functions might be „unbundled‟ between the federal, regional and even sub-regional

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levels of government, to the greater satisfaction of government and civil society partners, and their clients.

Methodology

The researchers will use the following methodology for the research:

A detailed review of the Proclamation and review regional guidelines on ´´Terms of Collaboration Between the Regions and CSOs/NGOs``

Canvassing international best experience from countries which have similar federal structure, CSOs engagement and development challenges like that of Ethiopia.

Key informants interviews with the management heads of regional government administration councils, BoFEDS, BoJs, other regional level government bureaux and a sample of CSOs which represent all the categories as delineated by the proclamation

Interview with the federal charities and society agency management, MoFA, MoFED, advisors at the prime minister‟s office and other sectoral ministries

Take a sample of three regions of which one is an emerging region among the list

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Annex 2 Profile of the civil society sector in study regions

Most CSOs in the study region were Ethiopian Residents, Foreign Charities and Ethiopian Charities and Societies. Despite this, the study could not easily trace Ethiopian Charities in the study sites namely Mekele, Assosa, and Addis Ababa. The study has noted that there are only a few Ethiopian Charities in the whole country as most CSOs take the status of Ethiopian residents in order to access foreign resources. The Foreign Charities found in regions are branch offices with their head offices in Addis Ababa and they are mostly involved in the operation and implementation of activities in the region. International charities have a higher budget outlay. For instance in Oromiya region, for which data are readily available, the international NGOs form 32.3% of the total number but their budget forms 47.7% of the total NGO budgets in the region, an indication of their major role in the regional development efforts.

The CSO sector in all regions are mostly engaged in HIV/AIDS, children welfare, education, livelihood, etc., with some CSOs undertaking integrated activities. Within each region, CSOs vary in their availability and number. For example, in the Oromiya region, a report by the CSO core affairs of Oromiya indicated that out of the 18 zones, 12 zones contain districts that range between 2 to 9 with no NGO intervention. Uneven distribution is also reported in Benishangul and Tigray regions.

Table 3: Number and Types of Charities in the study regions.

No. Region Adoption Foreign Charity

Consortia Ethiopian Charity

Ethiopian Residents Charity

Ethiopian Residents Society

Ethiopian Society

Foreign Charity

1 Addis Abeba 4 26 57 590 171 182 91

2 Benishangul -Gumuz

- 1 12 121 36 34 37

3 Oromiya 4 27 40 467 127 98 98

4 Tigray 2 21 19 202 62 90 60

Consortia have been established in different regions. In Tigray, a consortium under the name of Alliance of Civil Society of Tigray (ACSOT) was established five years ago with 74 members. Currently, ACSOT is primarily an association of Ethiopian Resident Charities with 34 voting members. Foreign and local charities are associate members but receive full benefits from the Association. ACSOT has established networks of CSOs in 34 out of 46 woredas in the region. Most of these CSOs are local societies such as women association, youth association, farmers association, association of the HIV/AIDS positives, association of the disabled etc. At kebele level there are Community Care Coalitions (CCCs) that are established by the Government as coalition between representatives of local societies and kebele administration.

In Oromiya region, the Network of Civil Society Organization in Oromiya (NeCSO) has 31 member organisations and is registered with the Bureau of Justice of the region. It was established two years ago and has the objective of capacity building and facilitating the GO-NGO interaction. The Association has limited members and is not operational below regional level.

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In Benishangul, there are some consortia which have recently been established. Currently, there are some associations based on specific themes.

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