Family Code 3nd Exam

91 What Constitutes ACP?all properties acquired before and during marriageMunoz, Jr. v. Carlos 08/25/2010

Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M. Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte Francisco (Michele).The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone,[15] in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.[16]To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco. On its face, the title shows that the registered owner of the property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to Michele. This describes the civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the property was acquired.

A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's personal obligation. Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.

The court cited BA Finance v. CA in ruling that the present case is similar, that Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo, rented a house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrais own benefit, they even entered in the lease agreement and purported themselves as husband and wife.

To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[31]In justifying the levy against the property, the RTC went over the Compromise Agreement as embodied in the Partial Decision dated November 29, 2000. Oddly, the RTC ruled that there was no effective transfer of ownership to the siblings Cleodia and Ceamantha Francisco. In the same breath, the RTC astonishingly ruled that Michele is now the owner of the property inasmuch as Cleodualdo already waived his rights over the property. The Compromise Agreement must not be read piece-meal but in its entirety. It is provided therein, thus:

92 What are excluded from the community property? Gratuitous title, personal or exclusive use, acquired during previous marriage with legitimate descendants

93- Presumption of Inclusion94- Charges and Obligations- support, debt and obligations, d & o without consent if benefited, TaLiCE including major and minor repairs, education, ante-nuptial debts/illegitimate children/quasi-delict/ are considered advances, litigation expenses. If community property is insufficient, spouses are solidarily liable subject to reimbursement at the time of liquidation95- Game of Chance96- Administration and enjoyment; disposition Joint administration and enjoyment of both spouses, in case of disagreement, husband prevails subject to recourse to the court for relief by the wife within 5 years.Art. 116 Conjugal partnership propertyArticle 121 (2) Charges upon and obligation of the conjugal partnership (00,06)Ayala Investments vs. CA286 SCRA 272

Philippine Blooming Milles (PBM) obtained a loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. Ching and PBMs VP executed security agreements making them jointly answerable for PBMs indebtedness. AIDC sued PBM for failure to pay and RTC rendered judgment ordering Ching and PBM to pay principal amount with interest. Lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal, hence the sheriff served the notices to levy 3 conjugal properties of the spouses.

Private respondents filed a case of injunction alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss having the sale consummated, alleging that it rendered the issue moot. However, 2 of the properties were named to Encarnacion Ching presented evidence while the creditor did not, and the RTC declared the sale on execution null and void.

Article 121 of the Family Code provides that The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.

A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of stocks might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into are not only incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify the transaction as one for the benefit of the suretys family.-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family Code) are those benefits derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.

CARLOS vs. ABELARDO 380 SCRA 361-May the husband notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent in obtaining a loan be held solidarily liable for such together with the wife?While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by the wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot that became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS423 SCRA 357Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together with 2 other persons executed a continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos. PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching then moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?

Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of CityCorp Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of guaranty or suretyship.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.

It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of the top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that Alfredos career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).

Francisco v. Gonzales 565 S 638

Article 124 Administration of the conjugal partnership property (00)

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO453 SCRA 283Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City and had it titled in the name of the husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners secured by the house and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed the security. For failure to redeem, Homeowners consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the husband died and the wife found out about the mortgage, foreclosure and consolidation. Claiming absence of knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed an action to annul the mortgage, certificate of sale, etc. Homeowners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the property is the exclusive property of the husband having been titled in the husbands name alone. That assuming that the property is conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the co-owner may alienate, assign or mortgage and even substitute another person in its enjoyment but the effect of the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family as the proceeds thereof were used to fund the husbands subdivision projects.

Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle squarely applies to the instant case. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between the spouses. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of Marcelino and Miguela even in a suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership lies with the creditor claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family is without adequate proof. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.

GUIANG vs. CA 291 SCRA 372-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. Such contract is void as one of the essential elements of a contract is absent.- Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of events is clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a complaint for trespassing against Corpuz, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement. The settlement however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that Corpuz would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA 313 SCRA 493-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court applied Art. 173 of the Civil Code.-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for annulment within 10 years from execution of the contract and during the subsistence of the marriage.

MANALO vs. CAMAISA 374 SCRA 361-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wifes written consent?Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and Makati properties of spouses Camaisa. During the negotiations for the sale of the parcels of land both spouses were present and that Manalo and Mr. Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of the payment, and a down payment was made but the wife of the vendor refused to sign the contracts to sell. Having been aware of the transactions Manalo argues that Norma Camaisa had consented to the transaction. And if she unjustly refused to affix her signature to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.

Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The properties, subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give the same if warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.

HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES 410 SCRA 97If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent?

-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wifes consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal partnership is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient. These are the considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition as void if done without the conjoint consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouses inability, the authority of the court (footnote).

PELAYO vs. PEREZ459 SCRA 475In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale, conveyed to Perez 2 parcels of land situated in Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayos wife, signed only on the 3rd page in the space provided for witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration of the deed with the office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum was denied. Perez thereupon asked Lorenza to sign the 1st and 2nd pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he instituted an action for specific performance.

SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.

BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)

Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost. Erlindas property however, was insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The husband questioned the levy and the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the conjugal property was improper.

SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.

Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE 604 SCRA 120 (October 16, 2009).

In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to the land that was acquired by Pedro while still single. They then introduced improvements on the property. In 1991, Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of her objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the house and the 2 lots without Mary Anns consent.

SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code is void if done a.) without the consent (written) of both the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one spouses inability the authority of the court.

If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the contract implementing the decision to institute the case.

HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ,SR. vs. MINGOA, SR., et. al. 608 SCRA 394 (December 18, 2009)Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by way of salary deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses. It bears a restriction of any unauthorized sale to 3rd persons within a certain period. The heirs learned, after Hernandez death in 1983 that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of respondents. Apparently, Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of his right to purchase, Hernandez sold to Dolores Camisura his rights in 1963. To circumvent the prohibition, the spouses Hernandez executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to enable Dolores to sell the lot to Plaridel Mingoa without the need of requiring Hernandez to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold the property to his daughter Melanie, then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergias signature on the SPA was falsified. The forgery is so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. Petitioners now contend that the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence null and void under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration of the non-existence of a contract under Article 1410 does not prescribe.SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves conjugal property. The events occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it states: The wife, may during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction necessarily barred her form questioning the sale of the subject property to 3rd persons.

FUENTES vs. ROCA 618 SCRA 702 April 21, 2010Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses by way of an agreement to sell. The vendees were to give a down payment with the balance to be paid as soon as Tarciano clears the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked on the requirements including Rosarios consent to the sale. He alleged that Rosario signed the affidavit of consent in Manila but he notarized it in Zamboanga City. Tarciano then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.

When Tarciano and Rosario died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since Rosario did not give consent to the sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.

SC: Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.

The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land.

While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on January 11, 1989, a few months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the FC provides that without the other spouses consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.

The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husbands sale of conjugal land. But Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is lost forever?

No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As Lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

EFREN PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE GR# 164201 December 10, 2012Melecia together with other accused were found guilty of the crime of murder. They were also adjudged jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs damages and civil indemnity. To satisfy the award, the properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia were levied upon.

They moved for the quashal of the writ of execution, claiming that rhe levied properties were conjugal assets, and not the paraphernal assets of Melecia. The heirs did not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insisted though, that it was the absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia because of Article 256 of the Family Code in relation to Article 105 of the same Code as none of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the properties.

SC: While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and , therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the FC does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to the marriage.

Post-modification of such settlements can take place only where (1) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon the decree of legal separation; (2) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (3) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that the spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (4) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (5) the spouses jointly filed a petition for voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of the circumstances exists in the case at bar.

What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This means they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate properties . Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the FC took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.