Fallibilism _ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

29/7/2015 Fallibilism|InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy

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FallibilismFallibilismistheepistemologicalthesisthatnobelief(theory,view,thesis,andsoon)caneverberationallysupportedorjustifiedinaconclusiveway.Always,thereremainsapossibledoubtas to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to sciences bestentrenchedclaimsandtopeoplesbestlovedcommonsenseviews.Someepistemologistshavetakenfallibilismtoimplyskepticism,accordingtowhichnoneofthoseclaimsorviewsareeverwelljustifiedorknowledge.Infact,though,itisfallibilistepistemologists(whichistosay,themajorityofepistemologists)whotendnot tobeskepticsabouttheexistenceofknowledgeorjustifiedbelief.Generally, those epistemologists see themselves as thinkingaboutknowledgeand justification in a comparatively realistic way by recognizing the fallibilist realities ofhumancognitivecapacities,evenwhileaccommodatingthosefallibilitieswithinatheorythatallowsperpetuallyfalliblepeopletohaveknowledgeandjustifiedbeliefs.Still,althoughthatistheaimofmostepistemologists,thequestionarisesofwhetherit isacoherentaim.Aretheypursuing a coherent way of thinking about knowledge and justification? Much currentphilosophical debate is centered upon that question. Epistemologists generally seek tounderstand knowledge and justification in a way that permits fallibilism to be describing abenigntruthabouthowwecangainknowledgeandjustifiedbeliefs.Onewayofencapsulatingthatprojectisbyaskingwhetheritispossibleforapersonevertohavefallibleknowledgeandjustification.

TableofContents1. Introduction2. FormulatingFallibilism:Preliminaries3. FormulatingFallibilism:AThesisaboutJustification4. FormulatingFallibilism:NecessaryTruths5. EmpiricalEvidenceofFallibility6. PhilosophicalSourcesofFallibilism:Hume7. PhilosophicalSourcesofFallibilism:Descartes8. ImplicationsofFallibilism:NoKnowledge?



9. ImplicationsofFallibilism:KnowingFallibly?10. ImplicationsofFallibilism:NoJustification?11. ReferencesandFurtherReading

1.IntroductionThe term fallibilism comes from the nineteenth century American philosopher CharlesSandersPeirce,althoughthebasicideabehindthetermlongpredateshim.Accordingtothatbasic idea, no beliefs (or opinions or views or theses, and so on) are so well justified orsupportedbygoodevidenceoraptcircumstancesthattheycouldnotbefalse.Fallibilismtellsus that there isno conclusive justificationandno rational certainty for anyof ourbeliefs ortheses.Thatisfallibilisminitsstrongestform,beingappliedtoallbeliefswithoutexception.Inprinciple,itisalsopossibletobearestrictedfallibilist,acceptingafallibilismonlyaboutsomenarrowerclassofbeliefs.Forexample,wemightbefallibilistsaboutwhateverbeliefswegainthroughtheuseofoursensesevenwhileremainingconvincedthatwepossesstheabilitytoreasoninwaysthatcan,atleastsometimes,manifestinfallibility.Thus,onespecialcaseofthispossible selectivity would have us being fallibilists about empirical science even whileexemptingmathematical reasoning from that verdict. For simplicity, though (and because itrepresents the thinking of most epistemologists), in what follows I will generally discussfallibilism in its unrestricted form. (The exception will be section 6, where a particularlysignificant,butseeminglynarrower,formoffallibilismwillbepresented.)

Fallibilismisanepistemologicallypivotalthesis,andourinitialprioritymustbetoformulateitcarefully.Almostallcontemporaryepistemologistswillsaythattheyarefallibilists.Yetthevastmajority of them also wish not to be skeptics. They would rather not be committed toembracingprinciplesabout thenatureofknowledgeand justificationwhich commit them todenyingthattherecanbeanyknowledgeor justifiedbelief.Thisdesirecoexists,nonetheless,withthebelief that fallibility is rampant.Manyepistemologicaldebates, it transpires, canbeunderstoodintermsofhowtheytrytobalancetheseepistemologicallycentraldesires.So,canwe find a precise philosophical understandingof ourselves asbeingperpetually fallible eventhoughreassuringlyrationaland,forthemostpart,knowledgeable?

2.FormulatingFallibilism:PreliminariesAninitialstatementoffallibilismmightbethis:

Allbeliefsarefallible.(Nobeliefisinfallible.)



Butwhat,exactly,isthatsaying?Herearethreeclaimsitisnotmaking.

(1)Falliblepeople.Itisnotsayingjustthatallbelieversallpeoplearefallible.Apersonassuch is fallible if, at least sometimes, he is capable of forming false beliefs. But that iscompatiblewiththepersonsoftenonsomeotheroccasionsbelievinginfallibly.Andthatisnotastateofaffairswhichiscompatiblewithfallibilism.

(2)Actually false beliefs. Nor is fallibilism the thesis that in fact all beliefs are false. Thatpossibility is allowed but it is not required by fallibilism. Hence, it is false to portrayfallibilismascommentatorsonscience,inparticular,sometimesdointheseterms:

Allscientificbeliefsarefalse.Thisincludesallscientifictheories,ofcourse.(Afterall,evenscientifictheoriesareonlytheories.Sotheyarefallibleandthereforefalse.)

Regardlessofwhetherornotthatisacorrectclaimaboutscientificbeliefsandtheories,itisnotanaccurateportrayalofwhatfallibilismmeanstosay.Thekeyterminfallibilism,aswehavesofarformulatedit,isfallible.Andthisconveysthroughitsuseofibleonlysomekindofpossibilityoffalsity,ratherthanthedefinitepresenceofactualfalsity.

(3)Contingenttruths.TakethebeliefthattherearecurrentlyatleastonethousandkangaroosaliveinAustralia.Thatbeliefistrue,althoughitneednothavebeen.Itcouldhavebeenfalseinthattheworldneednothavebeensuchastomakeittrue.So,thebeliefisonlycontingentlytrue(asphilosopherssay).Bydefinition,anycontingenttruthcouldhavefailedtobetrue.Butevenifweweretoacceptthatalltruthsareonlycontingentlytrue,wewouldnotbecommittedtofallibilism.Therecognitionthatcontingenttruthsexistisnotwhatunderliesfallibilism.Theclaimthatanycontingenttruthcouldinsteadhavebeenfalseisnotthefallibilistclaim,becausefallibilism is not a thesis about truths in themselves. Instead, it is about our attempts inthemselves toacceptorbelieve truths. Itconcernsakindof fundamental limitation firstandforemostuponourpowersofrationalthoughtandrepresentation.Andalthoughatruthsbeingcontingentmeansthatitdidnothavetobetrue,thisdoesnotmeanthatitwill,oreventhatitcan, be altering its truthvalue (by becoming false) in such a way as to deceive you. Forinstance,thetruththattherearenowmorethanonethousandkangaroosaliveinAustraliaisnotmadefalseevenbytherebeingonlyfivekangaroosaliveinAustraliaintwodaystimefromnow.

3. Formulating Fallibilism: A Thesis aboutJustification



Givensection2sdetails,abetter(androutine)expressionoffallibilismisthis:

F:Allbeliefsareonly,atbest,falliblyjustified.

Fsmain virtue, as a formulation of fallibilism, is its locating the culprit fallibility as arisingwithin the putative justification that is present on behalf of a given belief. The kind ofjustification in question is called "epistemic justification" by epistemologists. And thesuggestedformulation,F,offallibilismissayingthatthereisneverconclusivejustificationforthetruthofagivenbelief.

There are competing epistemological theories of what, exactly, epistemic justification is.Roughlyspeaking,though,itiswhateverwouldmakeabeliefmore,ratherthanless,rationallywell supported or established. This sort of rationality is meant to be truthdirected. Forexample (as Conee and Feldman 2004 would argue), whenever some evidence is providingepistemicsupportjustificationforabelief, this isamatterof itssupportingthetruthofthatbelief.Inthatsense,theevidenceprovidesgoodreasontoadoptthebelieftoadoptitastrue.Or (to takeanotherexample, suchaswouldbeapprovedofby thekindof theory fromGoldman1979)abelievermighthaveformedherbeliefwithinsomecircumstanceorinsomewaythatregardlessofwhethershecannoticethismakesherbelieflikelytobetrue.(Andwhenarethesekindsofjustificatorysupportpresent?Inparticular,aretheyonlyeverpresentif theyareguaranteeing that thebeliefbeingsupported is true?Areanyactually falsebeliefsever justified? Section 10 will focus on the question of whether fallible justification is everpresent,eitherfortrueorforfalsebeliefs.)

Just as there are competing interpretations of the nature of epistemic justification,epistemologistsexercisecare inhowtheyreadF.Perhapsthemostnaturalreadingof itsaysthat no one is ever so situated even when possessing evidence in favor of the truth of aparticularbeliefthat,ifsheweretoberationalinthesenseofrespectingandunderstandingand responding just to that evidence, she couldnot proceed to doubt that the belief is true.Moregenerally,theideabehindFisthat,nomatterhowgoodonesjustificationisinsupportof a particular beliefs being true, that justification is never so good as to be conclusive leavingnoroomforanyonewhomightberationallyattendingtothatjustificationnottohavethebeliefitissupporting.Atanystage,accordingtoF,doubtcouldsensibly(insomerelevantsenseofsensibly)ariseastothetruthoftheparticularbelief.

Often,therefore,thiskindofpossibledoubtiscalledarationaldoubt.Thisisnottosaythat,necessarily, themost rational reaction is tobeswayedby thedoubt,accepting itasdecisivewhetheroneshouldreact like that isaseparate issue,probablydeserving tobedecidedonly



aftersomesubtleargument.Thetermrationaldoubtismeantonlytodistinguishthissortofactualorpossibledoubt fromapatently irrationaloneadoubt that ispsychologically,butnot even prima facie rationally, available. Howmight a doubt that is not even prima facierationalarise?Hereisonepossibleway.Imagineapersonwhoisattendingtoevidenceforthetruthofaparticularbelief,yetwhorefusestoacceptthebeliefsbeingtrue.Supposethatthisrefusal is due either (i) to hermisunderstanding the evidence or (ii) to some psychologicalquirksuchasagenerallackofrespectforevidenceatallorsuchasmereobstinacy(withouthersupplying counterreasons disputing the truth or power of the evidence). There is noaccountingforwhysomepeoplewillinfactdoubtagivenbelief:psychologically,doubtcouldbeanoptioneveninthefaceofrationallyconclusiveevidence.Nevertheless,fallibilismisnotathesisaboutthatpsychologicaloption.Theoptionitdescribesconcernsrationality.Fallibilismisaboutwhatitclaimstobetheeverpresentavailabilityofrationaldoubt.

Accordingly,onepossiblewayofmisinterpretingFwould involveconfusing theconceptofarationaldoubtwiththatofasubjectivelyfeltdoubtor,maybemoregenerally,apsychologicallypresent doubt. Rational doubts need not be psychologically actual doubts, just aspsychologicallyactualonesneednotberational.Intheory,apersonmighthaveorfeelsomedoubtastowhetheraparticularclaimistruesomedoubtwhichsheshouldnothaveorfeel.(Perhapsshe ismisevaluating thestrengthof theevidenceshehas insupportof thatclaim.)Equally, someonemight have or feel no doubt as to the truth of a belief he haswhenheshould have or feel some such doubt. (Perhaps he, too, ismisevaluating the strength of theevidencehehasinsupportofhisbelief.)Ineithercase,thewayinwhichthepersonisinfactreactingbyhaving,orbynothaving,anactualdoubtdoesnotdeterminewhetherhisorher evidence is in fact providing rationally conclusive support. That is because a particularreactionofdoubtingorofnotdoubtingmightnotbeasjustifiedorrationalinitselfasispossible.(Byanalogy,wemaykeepinmindthecaseunfortunately,alltoocommonakindofcaseofabrutaltyrantwhoclaims,sincerely,tohaveaclearconscienceattheendofhislife.Themoralityofhisactionsismoreobviouslytobeexplicatedintermsofwhathisconscienceshouldbetellinghimratherthanofwhatitistellinghim.)Ineffect,Fissayingthatnomatterwhatevidenceyouhave,nomatterhowcarefullyyouhaveaccumulatedit,andnomatterhowrationally you use and evaluate it, you can never thereby have conclusive justification for abeliefwhichyouwishtosupportviaallthatevidence.Equally,Fissayingthatnomatterwhatcircumstanceyouoccupy,andnomatterhowyouareformingaparticularbelief,noguaranteeis thereby being provided of your belief being true. In those respects (according to F), anyjustification you have is fallible and it will remain so, nomatterwhat you dowith it, nomatterhowassiduouslyyouattendtoit,nomatterwhatthecircumstancesareinwhichyouareoperating. The problem will also remain, no matter how you might supplement or try toimprove your evidence or circumstances.Any possible addition or alteration that youmight



makewill continue leaving open at least a possibility one towhich a careful and rationalthinkerwouldinprinciplerespondrespectfullyifsheweretonoticeitofyourbeliefsbeingfalse.

Inthatway,fallibilismasathesisaboutjustificationtravelsmoredeeplyintothehumancognitiveconditionthanitwoulddoifitwereapointmerelyaboutlogic,say.Itisnotsayingthat no belief is ever supported by evidencewhose content logically entails the first beliefscontent.Anexampleofthatsituationwouldbeprovidedbyapersonshaving,asevidence,thebelief that he is a living, breathing Superman fromwhich he infers that he is alive. Theevidencescontent(Iamaliving,breathingSuperman)doeslogicallyentailthetruthoftheinferredcontent(Iamalive).(Thisattributionoflogicalvalidityorentailmentmeansfromstandard deductive logic that it is impossible for the first content to be true without thesecondonealsobeingtrue.)Butthejustificationbeingsuppliedisfallible,becauseobviously the person will have, at best, inconclusive justification for thinking that he is a living,breathing Superman in the first place. The putative justification is the belief (about beingSuperman) and its history, not only its content and the associated logical relations. Yetfallibilismsaysthat,evenwhenallsuchfurtherfeaturesaretakenintoaccount,somepotentialwillremainforrationaldoubttobepresent.

4.FormulatingFallibilism:NecessaryTruthsNevertheless,amodificationofF(insection3)isrequired,itseems,iffallibilismistoapplytobeliefs likemathematicalonesor tobeliefs reporting thesesofpure logic, for instance.Mostphilosopherswouldacceptthatitispossibletobefallibleinholdingsuchabeliefandthatthisisso,evengiventhatthereisasenseinwhichsuchabelief,whentrue,couldnoteverbefalse.Thus,perhapsmathematicalbelieving is a fallibleprocess, able to lead to falsebeliefs.Perhaps this is so, even ifmathematical truths themselvesnever just happen to be truenever depending upon changeable surrounding circumstances for their truth, hence neverbeingsusceptibletobeingrenderedfalsebysomechangeinthosesurroundingcircumstances.How should we modify F, therefore, so as to understand the way in which fallibility cannonetheless be present in such a case? More generally, how should we modify F, so as tounderstandtheprospectofapersoneverhavingfalliblebeliefs(letaloneonlyfallibleones)inwhatphilosopherscallnecessarytruths?

Bydefinition,any truthwhich isnotcontingent isnecessary.Theclassofnecessary truths istheclassofpropositionsorcontentswhich,necessarily,aretrue.Theycouldnothavefailedtobe true. And that class will generally be thought to contain maybe most significantly mathematical truths. Consider, then, the belief that 2 + 2 = 4. In itself (almost every



philosopher will concur), there is no possibility of that beliefs being false.However, if it isimpossible for that belief to be false, then there is also no possible evidence on the basis ofwhichincomingtobelievethat2+2=4apersoncouldbeformingafalsebelief.Inthisway,nobeliefthat2+2=4couldbemerelyfalliblyjustifiedatleastasthisphenomenonhasbeenportrayedinF.Yetitisclearorsomostepistemologistswillaverthatmathematicalbelievingcanbefallible.Indeed,iffallibilismistrue,allmathematicalbeliefswillbesubjecttosomesortoffallibility:evenmathematicalbeliefswould,atbest,beonlyfalliblyjustified.How,therefore,isthistobeunderstood?

Here is one suggestion F* which modifies F by drawing upon some standardepistemologicalthinking.TheaiminmovingfromFtoF*wouldbetoallowforthepossibilityofhavingafalliblebeliefinanecessarytruth:

F*:Allbeliefs are, atbest, only fallibly justified. (Andabelief is fallibly justifiedwhenevenifthebelief,consideredinitself,couldnotbefalsethejustificationforitexemplifiesor reflects some more general way or process of thinking or forming beliefs, a way orprocesswhichisitselffallibleduetoitscapacitytoresultinfalsebeliefs.)

Sections5and7willdescribeafewpossiblereasonsforafallibilisttoregardyourbeliefthat2+ 2 = 4 as being fallible. In themeantime, we need only note schematically how F* wouldaccommodatethosepossiblereasons.Thebasicapproachwouldbeasfollows.Althoughyourbelief that2+2=4 cannotbe false (once it ispresent), your supposed justification for it isfallible.This couldbe so in a fewways.For a start,maybeyouaremerely repeatingby rotesomethingyouwere toldmanyyearsagobya somewhatunreliableschool teacher. (Imaginethe teacher having been poor at making accurate claims within most other areas ofmathematics.Evenwithrespecttotheelementsofmathematicsaboutwhichshewasaccurate,shemighthavebeenmerelyrepeatingbyrotewhatshehadbeentoldbyherownearlyandsimilarlyunreliableteachers.)Thefallibilityofmemoryisalsorelevant:overtheyears,oneforgetsmuch.Still,yourcurrentbeliefthat2+2=4seemsaccurate.Anditneednotbepresentonlybecauseofyourfalliblememoryofwhatyourfallibleteachertoldyou.Supposethatyouarenowverysophisticatedinyourmathematicalthinking:inparticular,yourjustificationforyourbeliefthat2+2=4ispurelymathematicalincontent.Thatjustificationinvolvescleverrepresentation,viapreciselydefinedsymbols,ofabstractideas.Nevertheless,evensuchpurelymathematicalreasoningcanmisleadyou(nomatterthatithasnotdonesoonthisoccasion).Reallyproving that2+2=4 isquitedifficultandwhenpeopleareseeking tograspand toimplement such proofs, human fallibility may readily intrude. Actual attempts to establishmathematicaltruthsneednotalwaysleadtoaccurateortruebeliefs.



Atanyrate,thatishowafallibilistmightwellanalyzethecase.

5.EmpiricalEvidenceofFallibilityHowcanweascertainwhichofourwaysofthinkingarefallible?Bothordinaryobservationandsophisticatedempiricalresearchareusuallyregardedasabletohelpushere,byrevealingsomeofthemeansbywhichfallibilityentersourcognitive lives.Iwill listseveralof theseeminglyfalliblemeansofbeliefformationandbeliefmaintenancethathavebeennoticed.

(1)Misusingevidence.Apparently,peopleoftenmisevaluatethestrengthoftheirevidence.Bytakingittobestrongerorweakersupportthaninfactitisforthetruthofaparticularbelief,apersoncouldeasilybeledtoadoptorretainafalse,ratherthantrue,belief.Indeed,therearemanypossiblewaysnottouseevidenceproperly.Forexample,peopledonotalwaysnotice,letalone compare and resolve, conflicting pieces of evidence. Theymight overlook some of theevidenceavailabletothem.Therecanbeinattentiontodetailsoftheirevidence.Andsoforth.

(2)Unreliable senses. How many of us have wholly reliable always accurate senses?Shortsightedness is not so rare. The same is true of longsightedness. People can have poorhearing,nottomentionlessthanperfectlydiscerningsensesofsmell,taste,andsoon.Sensoryillusionsandhallucinationsaffectus,too.Theroadseemstorippleundertheheatofthesunthe stick appears to bend as it enters the glass ofwater and so forth. In such caseswewillthink,uponreflection,thatwhatweseemtosenseissomethingweonlyseemtosense.

(3)Unreliablememory.At times,people suffer lapsesofmemory and they can realize this,experiencingblanksastheyendeavortorecallsomething.Theycanalsofeelasthoughtheyarerememberingsomething,whenactuallythisfeelingisinaccurate.(Afalsememoryislikethat.Theeventwhichapersonseemstorecall,forinstance,neveractuallyhappened.)

(4)Reasoning fallaciously. To reason in a logically invalidway is to reason in awaywhich,evengiventhetruthofonespremisesorevidence,can leadto falsity. It is therebytoreasonfallibly.Doweoften reason like that?Seemingly, yes.Of course,oftenweandothers realizethatwearedoingso.Andweandthoseothersmightgenerallybesatisfiedwithouradmittedlyfalliblereasoning.(Butshouldweeverregarditwithsatisfaction?Section10willconsiderthiskindofquestion.)Therearetimes,though,whenweandothersdonotnoticethefallibilityinourreasoning.Onthoseoccasions,wearewithoutrealizingthisaboutourselvesreasoningfallaciously.Thatis,wearereasoninginwayswhicharelogicallyinvalidbutwhichmostpeoplemistakenly,albeitroutinely,regardasbeinglogicallyvalid.



(5)Intelligencelimitations.Iseachofussointelligentasnevertomakemistakeswhichamoreintelligentpersonwouldbe less likely (allelsebeingequal) tomake?Presumablynoneofusescape that limitation. Do we notice people making mistakes due to their exercising (andperhapspossessing)lessintelligencethanwasneedednottomakethosemistakes?Weappeartodoso.Sometimes(oftentoolate),weobservethisinourselves,too.

(6)Representationallimitations.Weuselanguageandthoughttorepresentordescriberealityhopefully,todothisaccurately.Butpeoplehaveoften,webelieve,mademistakesabouttheworldaroundthembecauseofinadequaciesintheirrepresentationalordescriptiveresources.For example, they can have been applyingmisleading and clumsily constructed conceptsoneswhichcouldwellbereplacedwithinanimprovedscience.(Andthissortofproblematleast to judgeby the apparent inescapability of disputes among its practitionersmightbeevenmoreacutewithinsuchareasofthoughtasphilosophy.)

(7)Situational limitations. It is notuncommon forpeople tomakemistakes of fact becausethey have biases or prejudices that impede their ability to perceive or represent or reflectaccurately upon those facts. Such mistakes may be made when people are manifesting aninsufficiently developed awareness of pertinent aspects of theworld.Maybe a persons earlyupbringing,andhowshehassubsequentlylivedherlife,hasnotexposedhertoaparticularlywiderangeofideas.Perhapsshehasnotencounteredwhatare,asithappens,moreaccurateideasorprinciplesthantheonessheisapplyinginherattemptstounderstandtheworld.Allofthismightwellpreventherevennoticingsomerelevantaspectsoftheworld.(WhenbothIandadoctorgazeatanXray,onlyoneofusnoticesmuchofmedicalrelevance.)

That listof realisticallypossible sourcesof fallibilityphilosopherswill suspectcouldbecontinuedindefinitely.Anditsscopeisdisturbinglyexpansive.Thus,evenwhenyoudonotfeelasthoughabeliefofyourshasbeenformedormaintainedinsomewaythatmanifestsanyofthose failings, you could be mistaken about that. This is a factual matter or so mostphilosopherswillsay.Onanygivenoccasion,itisanempiricalquestionastowhetherinfactyouarebeingfallibleinoneofthoseways.(Notably,it isnotsimplyamatterofwhetheryouare feeling fallible.) Accordingly, many epistemologists have paid attention to pertinentempiricalresearchbypsychiatrists,neurologists,biologists,anthropologists,andthelike,intoactual limitations upon human cognitive powers. Data uncovered so far have unveiled theexistenceofmuchfallibility.(See,forexample,NisbettandRoss1980Kahneman,Slovic,andTversky1982.)

Some epistemologists have found this to be worrying in itself. Still, has enough fallibilitytherebybeenuncoveredtojustifyanacceptanceoffallibilism?(Rememberthatfallibilism,in



itsmostgeneralform,isthethesisthatallofourbeliefsarefallible.)This,too,isatleastpartlyan empirical question. It is the question of just how fallible people are as a group and,naturally,ofjusthowmuchagivenindividualevermanagestotranscendsuchlimitationsuponpeople in general.How fallibly, as it happens, do people ever form andmaintain beliefs? Iseverysingleoneofusfallibleenoughtorendereverysingleoneofourbeliefsfallible?

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to use personal observations and empirical research toanswerthosequestionsconclusively.(Andfallibilismwoulddenythatthisispossibleanyway.)For presumably such fallibilities would also afflict people as observers and as scientificinquirers. Hence, this would occur even when theorists let alone casual observers areinvestigating those fallibilities. The history of science reveals that many scientific theorieswhichwereatone timeconsidered tobe truehave subsequentlybeensupplanted,with latertheoriesdeemingtheearlieronestohavebeenfalse.

Is science therefore especially fallible as awayof formingbeliefs about theworld?That is amatterofsomephilosophicaldispute.Empiricalscienceisperformedbyfalliblepeople,ofteninvolving much fallible coordination among themselves. It relies on the fallible process ofobservation.Anditcangeneratequitecomplicatedtheoriesandbeliefswiththatcomplexityaffordingscopeformarkedfallibility.Yetinspiteofthesesourcesoffallibilitynestlingwithinit(whenitisconceivedofasamethod),sciencemightwell(whenitisconceivedofasabodyoftheses and doctrines) encompass the most cognitively impressive store of knowledge thathumanshaveeveramassed.Evenifnotallofitstheoriesandbeliefsaretrue(andthereforenotall of them are knowledge), a significant percentage of them seem to have a strong case forbeingknowledge.Is thatcompatiblewithsciences fallibility,evenits inherent fallibility,asamethod?Orarenoneofitstheoriesandbeliefsknowledge,simplybecause(aslaterscientistswillrealize)someofthemarenot?Alternatively,arenoneofthemknowledge,becausenoneofthemareconclusivelyjustified?Thatdependsonwhatkindofknowledgescientificknowledgewouldbe.This isasubtlematter,askingus first toconsider ingeneralwhether therecanbeinconclusivelyjustifiedknowledgeatall.Section9willindicatehowepistemologistsmighttakea step towards answering that question. It will do so by discussing the idea of fallibleknowledge.(Andsection10willcommentonscienceandfalliblejustification.)

6.PhilosophicalSourcesofFallibilism:HumeSection5indicatedsomeempiricalgroundsonwhichfallibilismmightbethoughttobetrue.Epistemologists have also provided nonempirical arguments for fallibilism, both in itsstrongestformandinimportantbutweakerforms.Thissectionandthenextwillpresenttwoofthosearguments.



One of them comes from the eighteenthcentury Scottish philosopher DavidHumes classicinventionofwhatisnowcalledinductiveskepticism.(Forasuccinctversionofhisargument,seehis1902[1748],sec.IV.Forsomesenseofthephilosophicalandhistoricaldimensionsofthat notion, see Buckle 2001: part 2, ch. 4.) At the core of his skeptical argument was animportantevenifpossiblynotwhollygeneral fallibilism. Humes argument showed, at thevery least, the inescapable fallibility of an extremely significant kind of belief any beliefwhich either is or couldbe an inductive extrapolation fromobservationaldata.According toHume,nobeliefsaboutwhatisyettobeobserved(byaparticularpersonorsomegroup)canbeinfalliblyestablishedonthebasisofwhathasbeenobserved(bythatpersonorthatgroup).Consideranyuseofpresentandpastobservations,perhapstoderiveandat leasttosupport,some view that aims to describe aspects of the world that have not yet been observed.(Standard examples include peoples seeking to justify the belief that the sun will risetomorrow, by using past observations of it having risen, and peoplesmany observations ofblack ravens supposedly justifying the belief that all ravens are black.) Hume noticed thatobservationscanneverprovideconclusiveassuranceaproofthattheworldisnotabouttochangefromwhatithasthusfarbeenobservedtobelike.EvenifallobservedFshavebeenGs,say,thisdoesnotentailthatany,letaloneall,ofthecurrentlyunobservedFsarealsoGs.Nosuch guarantee can be given by the past observations. And this is so, nomatter howmanyobservationsofFshavebeenmade(shortofhavingobservedallofthem,whilerealizingthatthishasoccurred).

Hume presents his argument as one that uncovers a limitation upon the power or reach ofreasonthatis,uponhowmuchcanberevealedtousbyreasonassuch.Possibly,thisisinpartbecausethatisthenontrivialaspectofhisargument.Overall,hisargumentisdescribingalimitationupon thepoweror reachbothof reasonandofobservationuponhow far thesefacultiesorcapacitiescantakeustowardsprovingthetruthofvariousbeliefswhich,inevitably,we find ourselves having. But that limitation reflects both a point that is nontrivially true(about reason) and one that is trivially true (about observation).Hume combines those twopoints(asfollows)toattainhisfallibilism.(1)Itistriviallytruethatanyobservationsthathavebeenmadeatandbeforeagiventimehavenotbeenofwhat,atthattime,isyettobeobserved.(2)Itistrue(althoughnottriviallyso)thatourpowersofreasonfacealimitationoftheirown,one that leaves them unable to overcome (1)s limitation upon observation. Our capacity toreasonourpowerssimplyofreflectionmustconcedethat,regardlessofhoweverunlikelythismightseematthetime,theunobservedFscouldbedifferentinarelevantwayfromthosethat have been observed. Hence, in particular, whatever powers of reason wemight use inseeking tomovebeyondourobservationswill beunable to eliminate thepossibility that thepresentlyunobservedFsarequitedifferent(asregardsbeingGs) fromtheFsthathavebeenobserved.Ourpowersofreasonmustconcedeagain,evenifthisseemsunlikelyatthetime



that continued observations of Fs might be about to begin giving results that are quitedifferenttowhatsuchobservationshavepreviouslyrevealedaboutFsbeingGs.Obviously,thepastobservationsofFs(allofwhich,wearesupposing,wereGs)donottellusthatthisislikelytooccur,letalonethatitisabouttodoso.But,crucially,purereasontellsusthatitcouldbeabouttooccur.(3)Consequently,ifwecombine(1)and(2),wereachthisresult:

NeitherobservationnorreasoncanrevealwithrationalcertaintyanythingaboutthenatureofanyoftheFsthatarepresentlyunobserved.

Inotherwords,thereisalwaysalogicalgapbetweentheobservationsofFsthathavebeenmade(eitherbysomeindividualoragroup)andanyconclusionregardingFsthathavenotyetbeenobserved(byeitherthatindividualorthatgroup).

Ourappreciationof thatgapsexistence ismadespecificevendramaticby theHumeanthought that the world could be about to change in the relevant respect. We thus see thatfallibilitycannotbeexcludedfromanyjustificationwhichwemightthinkispresentforabeliefthateitherisorcouldbeanextrapolationfromsomeobservations.Suchabeliefcouldbeaboutthefuture(Thesunwillrisetomorrow),thepresentlyunobservedpast(Dinosaursusedtolivehere),populations (The cats in thisneighborhoodarevicious), and soon.Beliefs likethatarepivotalinourmentallives,itseems.

Indeed, as some philosophers argue, they can be allbutubiquitous even surprisingly so.Whenyoubelievethatyouareseeingacat,isthisanextrapolationfromobservations?Atfirstglance,itseemsstraightforwardlyobservationalitself.Yetmaybeitisanextrapolationinalessobvious way. Perhaps it is an extrapolation from both your present sensory experience andsimilaronesthatyouhavehadinthepast.Perhapsitisimplicitlyapredictionthattheobjectinfrontofyouisnotabouttobeginlookingandactinglikeadog,andthatitwillcontinuelookingandactinglikeacat.(Isthispartofwhatitmeanstosaythattheobjectisacatagenuinefleshandbloodphysicalobjectcat?)Areevensimpleobservationalbeliefsthereforeconcealedorsubtleextrapolations?Iftheyaretobejustified,willthisneedtobeinductivejustification?

If so, the Humean verdict (when formulated in contemporary epistemological language)remains that, even at best, such beliefs are only fallibly justified. Any justification for themwouldneedtobeobservationsfromwhichtheymighthavebeenextrapolated(evenif infactthisisnot,psychologicallyspeaking,howtheywerereached).Andnosuchjustificationcouldeverrationallyeliminatethepossibilitythatanygroupofapparentlysupportiveobservationsismisleadingas towhat theworldwouldbe foundtobe like if furtherobservationswere tobemade.



That is Humes inductive fallibilism a fallibilism about all actual or possible inductiveextrapolations fromobservations.Many interpretersbelieve thathisargumentestablishedoratleastthatHumemeantittoestablishmorethanakindoffallibilism.Thisiswhyitisgenerally called an argument for inductive skepticism, not just for inductive fallibilism. (OnHumestransitionfromfallibilismtoskepticism,seeStove1973.)Accordingly,hisconclusionissometimes presented more starkly, as saying that observations never rationally show orestablishor supportor justifyatallanyextrapolationsbeyondobservationaldata,evenonesthatpurportonlytodescribealikelihoodofsomeobservedpatternsbeingperpetuated.Atitsmost combative, his conclusion might be said and sometimes is, especially by nonphilosopherstorevealthatpredictionsarerationallyuselessoruntenable,orthatanybeliefsgoing beyond observational reports are, rationally speaking, nothing more than guesses.Whether or not that skeptical thesis is true depends, for a start, uponwhether there canbesuch a thing as fallible justification or whether, once fallibility is present, justificationdeparts.Section10willconsiderthatissue.

Inanycase,Humesfallibilismisgenerallyconsideredbyphilosophers(forinstance,seeQuine1969 Miller 1994: 213 Howson 2000: ch. 1) to have struck a serious blow against theotherwise beguiling picture of science as delivering conclusive knowledge of the innercontinuingworkingsoftheworld.ItisnotuncommonforpeopletoreacttothisinterpretationofHumes resultby inferring that thereforesciencewith its relianceuponobservationsasdata,withwhich it supports its predictions andmore general principles and positsneverreallygivesusknowledgeofaworldbeyond thoseobservations.Theappropriatenessof thatskepticalinferencedependsonwhetherornottherecanbesuchathingasfallibleknowledgeorwhether,oncefallibilityispresent,knowledgedeparts.Section9willconsiderthatissue.

7.PhilosophicalSourcesofFallibilism:DescartesDoesHumesreasoning(describedinsection6)supportfallibilisminitsmostgeneralform?Itdoes, if all beliefs depend for their justification upon extrapolations from observationalexperience.Andsection6alsoindicatedbrieflyhowtherecanbemorebeliefslikethatthanwemight realize. Nevertheless, the usual philosophical reading of Humes argument does notassumethattheargumentshowsthatallbeliefsaretobesupportedeitherfalliblyornotatall.We should therefore pay attention to another equally famous philosophical argument, onewhoseconclusionisdefinitelythatnobeliefsatallareconclusivelyjustified.

ThisargumentcomestousfromtheseventeenthcenturyFrenchphilosopherRenDescartes.In his seminalMeditations onFirst Philosophy (1911 [1641]), Descartes endedMeditation Iskeptically,denyinghimselfallknowledge.Howwasthatskepticalconclusionderived?Itwas



baseduponafallibilismawhollygeneralfallibilism.AndhisargumentforthatfallibilismtheEvilGenius(orEvilDemon)argument,asitisoftencalledmaybepresentedinthisway:

Anybeliefsyouhaveaboutwell,anythingcouldbepresentwithinyoumerelybecausesomeevilgeniusordemonhasinstalledthemthere.Andtheymighthavebeeninstalledsoastodeceiveyou:maybeanyorallofthemarefalse.Admittedly,youdonotfeelasifthishashappenedwithinyou.Nonetheless, itcouldhavedoneso.Notethat theevilgenius isnotsimplysomeotherperson,evenanespeciallycleverone.Rather,itwouldbeGodlikeinpertinent powers although malevolent in accompanying intent mysteriously able toimplantanyfalsebeliefswithinyousothattheirpresencewill feelnaturaltoyou, leavingyouunawarethatanyofyourbeliefsarebedeviledbythisuntowardcausalorigin.Youwillnevernoticetheevilgeniussmachinations.Allwillseemnormaltoyouwithinyourmind.Itwillfeeljustasitwouldifyouwereobservingandthinkingcarefullyandinsightfully.

Is that state of affairs possible? Indeed it is (saidDescartes, andmost epistemologists havesinceagreedwithhimaboutthat).Moreover, if it isalwayspresentasapossibility, thenonepressingpartof ityourbeingmistakenisalwayspresentasapossibility.This isalwayspresent,asapossibilityafflictingeachofyourbeliefs.Whatistrueofyouinthisrespect,too,istrue of everyone. The evil genius could bemanipulating all of ourminds.Hence, any beliefcouldbefalse,nomatterwhohasitandnomatterhowmuchevidencetheyhaveonitsbehalf.Eventheevidence,afterall,couldhavebeeninstalledandcontrolledbyanevilgenius.

Interestingly,thereferencetoanevilgeniusassuch,provocativethoughitis,wasnotessentialeven to Descartes own reasoning. InMeditation I, he had already immediately prior tooutliningtheEvilGeniusargumentpresentedasufficientlyfallibilistworry.Itconcernedthepossibilityofhishavingbeenformedorcreatedinsomewaywhateverwaythatmightbewhich would leave him perpetually fallible. He wanted to believe that God was his creator.However(hewondered),wouldGodcreatehimasabeingwhoconstantlymakesmistakes,orwhoisatleastalwaysliabletodoso?Godwouldbepowerfulenoughtodothis.But(Descartesalsothought)surelyGodwouldhavehadnoreasontoallowhimtomakeevensomemistakes.YetmanifestlyDescartesdoesmakethem.So(heinferred),hecouldnottakeforgrantedatthisearlystageofhisinquiry(asitisportrayedinhisMeditations)thathehasactuallybeenformedorcreatedbyaperfectGod.Theevidenceofhisfallibilityopensthedoortothepossibilitythathe does not have that causal background. So (he continues), maybe his causal origins aresomethinglessthanperfect,asofcoursetheywouldbeifanythinglessthanaperfectGodwereinvolved in them. In that event, however, he is evenmore likely tomakemistakes than hewould be if God was his creator. In one way or the other, therefore (concludes Descartes),fallibility is unavoidable for him: no belief of his is immune from the possibility of beingmistaken. Thus, fallibilism is thrust upon Descartes by this reasoning. (He realizes,



nonetheless, that it is subtle reasoning. He might not retain it in his thinking. He mightoverlookhis fallibility, if he is notmentally vigilant.Hence, heproceeds todescribe the evilgeniuspossibility tohimself,asagraphicwayofholdingthefallibilismfast inhismind.TheEvilGeniusargumentis,ineffect,aphilosophicalmnemonicforhim.)

Descarteshimself didnot remain a fallibilist.Hebelieved that (inhisMeditation II)hehadfound a convincing answer to that fallibilist argument. This answer was his Cogito, one ofphilosophysemblematicmoments,anditaroseviathefollowingreasoning.Descartesthoughtthatifeverinfactheisbeingdeceivedbyanevilgenius,atleasthewilltherebybeinexistenceat these moments. (It is impossible to be an object of deception without existing.) Thedeceptionwouldbeinflicteduponhimwhileheexistsasathinkerspecifically,assomeonethinkingwhatever false thoughtsarebeingcontrolledwithinhimby theevilgenius.But thisentails(reasonedDescartes)thatthereisakindofthoughtaboutwhichhecannotbedeceived,evenbyanevilgenius.Becausehecanknowthatheishavingaparticularthought,hecanknowthat he exists at that time. And so he thought, I think, therefore I am. (This is the usualtranslation into English of the Cogito, ergo sum from Latin. The latter version is fromDescartesDiscourse onMethod.) He would thereby know that much, at any rate (inferredDescartes).Heneednotandatthispointinhisinquiryhedoesnotthinkthathecanknowwhich,ifany,ofhisbeliefsaboutthewiderworldaretrue.Nonetheless,hehasknowledgeofhisinnerworldknowledgeofhisownthinking.Hewouldknownotonlythatheisthinking,but even what it is that he is thinking. These beliefs about his mental life are conclusivelysupported,too,becauseashehasjustarguedtheyarebeyondtherelevantreachofanyevilgenius.Noevilgeniuscangivehimthesethoughts(thatheisthinkingandhenceexisting)andtherebybedeceivinghim.

ButmostsubsequentepistemologistshavebeenmoreswayedbythefallibilismemergingfromtheEvilGeniusargumentthanbyDescartesreplytothatargument.(Foradiscussionoftheseissues in Descartes project, see Curley 1978 Wilson 1978.) One common epistemologicalobjectiontohisuseoftheCogitoisasfollows:HowcouldDescarteshaveknownthatitwasheinparticularwhowasthinking?Shouldnthehaverestedcontentwiththemorecautiousandthereforelessdubitablethought,Thereissomethinkingoccurringinsteadofinferringtheless cautious and therefore more dubitable thought, I am thinking? That objection wasproposedbyGeorgLichtenberg in theeighteenthcentury. (Foracriticismof it, seeWilliams1978:ch.3.)Anadvocateofitmightcalluponsuchreasoningasthis:

In order to know that it is his own thinking, as against just some thinking or other,Descarteshastoknowalreadyonindependentgroundsthatheexists.However,inthateventhewouldnotknowofhisexisting,onlythroughhisknowingofthethinkingactually



occurring:hewouldhavesomeothersourceofknowledgeofhisexistence.YethisCogitohad been relied upon by himbecause hewas assuming that his knowing of the thinkingactuallyoccurringwas(inthefaceoftheimaginedevilgenius)theonlywayforhimtoknowofhisexistence.

Thatreasoningwouldclaimtogiveusthefollowingresults.(1)Descartesdoesnotknowthatheisthinkingbecausehewouldhavetoknowalreadythatheexists(inordertobethesubjectof the thinkingwhich isnoticed), andbecausehe canknow thathe exists only if he alreadyknowsthatheisthinking(thelatterknowledgebeingallthatisclaimedtobeinvulnerabletotheEvilGeniusargument).(2)Similarly,Descartesdoesnotknowthatheexistsbecausehewouldhavetoknowalreadythatheisthinking(thisbeingallthatisclaimedtobeinvulnerableto theevil geniusargument), andbecausehecouldknow thathe is thinkingonlybyalreadyknowing that he exists (thereby being able to be the subject of the thinking that is beingnoticed). (3) And once we combine those two results, (1) and (2), what do we find? TheobjectionsconclusionisthatDescartesknowsofhisthinkingandofhisexistenceallatonceornot at all. In short, he is not entitledas a knower to the therefore inhis I think,thereforeIexist.

ThatisonepossibleobjectiontotheCogito.Still,evenifitsucceedsonitsownterms,itleavesopenthefollowingquestion.CanDescarteshaveallofthatknowledgetheknowledgeofhisthinkingandtheknowledgeofhisexistenceallatonce?Thisdependsonwhether,oncehehasdoubtedasstronglyandwidelyashehasdone,hecanhaveknowledgeevenofwhatisinhis ownmind. In themidtwentieth century, the Austrian philosopherLudwigWittgensteinmountedadeepchallengetoanythingliketheCogitoasawayofgroundingourthoughtandknowledge.WasDescarteslegitimatelyusingwordsatallsoastoformclearlyknownthoughts,suchasIamthinking?Howcouldheknowwhattheseevenmean,unlessheisapplyingsomeunderstood language? And Wittgenstein argued that no one could genuinely be thinkingthoughtswhich arenotdependinguponan immersion in a public language, presumably alanguage shared by other speakers, certainly one already built up over time. Inwhich case,Descarteswouldbemistakeninbelievingthat,evenifthepossibilityofanevilgeniusimperilsallofhisotherknowledge,hecould retain theknowledgeofhisown thinking.Foreven thatthinkingwouldhaveitscontentonlybyusingtermsborrowedfromapubliclanguage.Hence,Descartes would have to be presupposing some knowledge of that public world, evenwhensupposedlyretreatingtotheinnercomfortandsecurityofknowingjustwhatheisthinking.(ItshouldbenotedthatWittgensteinhimselfdidnotgenerallydirecthisreasoninghisPrivateLanguage argument, as it came to be called specifically against Descartes by name. ForWittgensteinsreasoning,seehis1978[1953]secs.243315,348412.)



Ofcourse,eveniftheCogitodoesinfactsucceed,epistemologistsallbutuniteindenyingthatsuch conclusiveness would be available for many or perhaps any other beliefs.Accordingly, we would still confront an allbutuniversal fallibilism, with Descartes havingprovidedaneasyway to rememberourallbutinescapable fallibility. Inanycase, it remainspossiblethattheCogitodoesnotsucceed,andthatinsteadtheevilgeniusargumentshowsthatno belief is ever conclusively justified. Descartes argument is not the only one for such afallibilism.Butmostepistemologistsstillrefertoitroutinelyandwithsomerespect,asbeingaparadigmargumentforthemostgeneralformoffallibilism.

8.ImplicationsofFallibilism:NoKnowledge?Ifwewere toaccept that fallibilismis true, towhatelsewouldwetherebybecommitted?Inparticular, what further philosophical views must we hold (all else being equal) if we holdfallibilism?

Probably themostsignificant idea thatarises, inresponse to thatquestion, is thesuggestionthat any fallibilist about justification has to be a skeptic about the existence of knowledge.(There is also the proposal that she must be a skeptic about the existence of justification.Section 10 will discuss that proposal.) This potential implication has made fallibilismparticularly interesting to many philosophers. Should we accept the skeptical thesis thatbecause(asfallibilistsclaim)nooneiseverholdingabeliefinfallibly,nooneeverhasabeliefwhichamountstobeingknowledge?Inthissectionandthenext,wewillconsiderthatquestion first (in this section) by examininghowonemight argue for the skeptical thesis, next (insection9)byseeinghowonemightargueagainstit.

Thathypothesizedskepticisreasoningalongtheselines:

1. Anybelief,ifitistobeknowledge,needstobeconclusivelyjustified.2. Nobeliefisconclusivelyjustified.[Fallibilismtellusthis.]3. Hence,nobeliefisknowledge.[Thisfollowsfrom1plus2.]

Fallibilismgivesus2deductivelogicgivesus3(asfollowingfrom1and2)andinthissectionwearenotaskingwhetherfallibilismistrue.(Weareassumingforthesakeofargumentthatit is.)So,ourimmediatechallengeistoaskwhether1 istrue.Is itacorrectthesisaboutknowledge?Doesknowledgerequireinfallibility(as1claimsitdoes)?Therestofthissectionwillevaluatewhatareprobablythetwomostcommonlyencounteredargumentsfortheclaimthatknowledgeisindeedlikethat.



(1)Impossibility.Manypeoplesaythisaboutknowledge:

Ifyouhaveknowledgeofsomeaspectoftheworld,itisimpossibleforyoutobemistakenaboutthataspect.(Anexample:Ifyouknowthatitsadog,youcantbemistakenaboutitsbeingone.)

We may call that the Impossibility of Mistake thesis. Its advocates might infer, from theconjunctionofitwithfallibilism,thatnooneeverhasanyknowledge.Theirreasoningwouldbelikethis:

Becausenooneeverhasconclusive justification forabelief,mistakesarealwayspossiblewithinonesbeliefs.Hence,nobeliefsattaintherankofknowledge.(Wewouldjustthinkmistakenlythatoftenknowledgeispresent.)

But almost all epistemologists would regard that sort of inference as reflecting amisunderstanding of what the Impossibility of Mistake thesis is actually saying. Morespecifically, they will say that there is a misunderstanding of how the term impossible isbeingusedinthatthesis.HerearetwopossibleclaimsthattheImpossibilityofMistakethesiscouldbethoughttobemaking:

Anyinstanceofknowledgeisindeed,itmustbedirectedatwhatistrue.(Knowledgeentailstruth.)

Any instance of knowledge has as its contentwhat, in itself, could not possibly be false.(Knowledgeentailsnecessarytruth.)

ThefirstofthosetwointerpretationsoftheImpossibilityofMistakethesissaysthatknowledge,in itself,has tobeknowledgeofwhat is true.The secondof the twopossible interpretationssays that knowledge is ofwhat, in itself, has to be true. The two claimswill be correlativelydifferentinwhattheyimply.

Epistemologists will insist that the first possible interpretation (which could be called theNecessarily,KnowledgeIsofWhatIsTruethesis)ismanifestlytruebutthatitdoesnotjointogetherwithfallibilismtoentailskepticism.Recall(from(2)insection2)thatfallibilismdoesnotdenythat therecanbe truthsamongourclaimsandthoughts. Itdeniesonly thatweareeverconclusivelyjustifiedinanyspecificclaimorthoughtastowhichclaimsorthoughtsaretrue. So,while theNecessarily,Knowledge Is ofWhat IsTrue thesis entails that any caseofknowledgewouldbeknowledgeofatruth,fallibilismbecauseitdoesnotdenythattherearetruthsdoesnotentailthatthereisnoknowledge.



Epistemologistswillalsodenythatthesecondpossibleinterpretation(whichmaybecalledtheKnowledgeIsofWhatIsNecessarilyTruethesis),evenif it is true,entailsskepticism.Recall(this time from (3) in section 2) that fallibilism is not a thesiswhichdenies that knowledgecould ever be of contingent truths. So, while the Knowledge Is ofWhat IsNecessarily Truethesisentailsthatanycaseofknowledgewouldbeknowledgeofanecessarytruth,fallibilismbecause it does not, in itself, deny that there is knowledge of contingent truths does notentail that there isnoknowledge. (Butmost epistemologists, incidentally,will deny that theKnowledge IsofWhat IsNecessarilyTrue thesis is true.Theybelieve that if there canbeknowledgeatalltherecanbeknowledgeofcontingenttruths,notonlyofnecessaryones.)

(2)Linguisticoddity.Anotherway inwhichpeople are sometimes led todeny that awhollygeneral fallibilism is compatiblewith people ever having knowledge is by their reflecting onsomesupposedlinguisticinfelicities.Imaginesayingorthinkingsomethinglikethis:

Iknowthatstrue,eventhoughIcouldbemistakenaboutitsbeingtrue.(Anexample:Iknowthatitsraining,eventhoughIcouldbemistakeninthinkingthatitis.)

Thatisindeedanoddwaytospeakorthink.LetusrefertoitasTheSelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaim. Should we infer, from that claims being so linguistically odd, that no instance ofknowledge can allow the possibility (corresponding to the could in The SelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaim)ofbeingmistaken?Wouldthisimplytheincompatibilityoffallibilismwithanyoneseverhavingknowledge?Doesthisshowthat,wheneveronesevidenceinsupportofabeliefdoesnotprovideaconclusiveproof,thebelieffailstobeknowledge?

Few epistemologists will think so. They are yet to agree on what, exactly, the oddity of asentencelikeTheSelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaimreflects.(Veryroughly:thereissomeoddityinthatclaimsexpressedmixtureofconfidenceandcaution.)Butfewofthembelievethattheoddityhowever,ultimately,itistobeunderstoodwillimplythatknowledgecannoteverbefallible.Theirusualviewisthattheodditywillbefoundtoresideonlyinthetalkingorthethinking in someones actively using any such sentence. And this could be so (theycontinue)without the sentences also actually being false, evenwhen it is being used. Somesentenceswhich clearly are internally logically consistent andhencewhich in some sensecouldbetruecannotbeusedwithoutasimilarlinguisticodditybeingmanifested.Trysaying,for example, Its raining, but I dont believe that it is. As the twentieth century Englishphilosopher G. E. Moore remarked (and his observation has come to be called MooresParadox),somethingisamissinanyutteranceofthatkindofsentence.(FormoreonMooresParadox, see Sorensen 1988, ch. 1 Baldwin 1990: 22632.) This particular sentence Itsraining,but Idontbelieve that it is ismanifestlyodd, seemingly ina similarway toany



utteranceofTheSelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaim.Yetthisdoesnotentailthesentencesbeingfalse.Foreachhalfofitcouldwellbetrueandtheycouldbetruetogether.Thefactthatitisraining is logically consistentwith the speakers not believing that it is. (She could be quiteunawareoftheweatheratthetime.)So,thesentencecouldbetruewithinitself,nomatterthatitcannotsensiblybeuttered,say.Thatis,itscontentwhatitreportscouldbetrue,evenifit cannot sensibly be asserted as a case of reporting in livingandbreathing speech orthought.

Andthesameistrue(epistemologistswillgenerallyconcur)ofTheSelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaim,theanalogoussentenceaboutknowledgeandthepossibilityofbeingmistaken.Aretheycorrectaboutthat?Thenextsectionengageswiththatquestion.

9.ImplicationsofFallibilism:KnowingFallibly?Thequestionwithwhichsection8endedamountstothis:isitpossiblefortheretobefallibleknowledge?IfTheSelfDoubtingKnowledgeClaimcouldeverbetrue,thiswouldbebecauseatleast some beliefs are capable of being knowledge even when there is an accompanyingpossibilityoftheirbeingmistaken.Anysuchbelief,itseems,wouldtherebybebothknowledgeandfallible.

Many epistemologists, probably the majority, wish to accept that there can be fallibleknowledge(althoughtheydonotalwayscallitthis).Fewofthemareskepticsaboutknowledge:almostallepistemologistsbelievethateveryonehasmuchknowledge.Butwhatdotheybelieveabout thenature of such knowledge?When an epistemologist attributes knowledge,whatmorefullyisbeingattributed?Ingeneral,epistemologistsalsoacceptthat(forreasonssuchas those outlined in sections 5 through 7) knowledge is rarely, if ever, based upon infalliblejustification: they believe that there is little, if any, infallible justification. Hence, mostepistemologists, it seems, accept that when people do gain knowledge, this usually, maybealways,involvesfallibility.

Epistemologistsgenerallyregardthisfallibilistapproachasmorelikelytogeneratearealisticconceptionofknowledge,too.Theiraimistobetolerantofthecognitivefallibilitiesthatpeoplehaveas inquirers,whileneverthelessaccordingpeopleknowledge(usuallyagreatdealof it).Theknowledgewouldthereforebegainedinspiteofthefallibility.And,significantly,itwouldbe a kind of knowledge which somehow reflects and incorporates the fallibility. Indeed, itwould thereby be fallible knowledge. (It would not be infallible knowledge coexisting withfallibility existing only elsewhere in peoples thinking.) With this strategy in mind, then,epistemologistswhoarefallibiliststendnottoembraceskepticism.



Nor (if section8 is right) should theydo so.That section reported (i) the two reasonsmostcommonlythoughttoshowthatfallibilityinonessupportforabeliefisnotgoodenoughifthebelief is to be knowledge, along with (ii) the explanations of why (according to mostepistemologists) thosereasonsmentioned in (i)arenotgoodenoughtoentail their intendedresult.Given(ii),therefore,(i)willatleastfailtogiveusinfalliblejustificationforthinkingthatfallibleknowledgeisnotpossible.Accordingly,perhapssuchknowledgeispossible.Butifitis,thenwhatformwouldittake?

Almostallepistemologistswilladoptthisgenericconceptionofit:

Any instanceof fallible knowledge is a truebeliefwhich is at least fallibly (and less thaninfallibly)justified.

(AndrememberthatF*,insection4,gaveussomesenseofwhatfalliblejustificationis.)LetuscallthistheFallibleKnowledgeThesis.Itisanapplication,tofallibleknowledgeinparticular,ofwhatiscommonlycalledtheJustifiedTrueBeliefAnalysisofKnowledge.(Foranoverviewof that sort of analysis, seeHetherington 1996.) As stated, the Fallible Knowledge Thesis isquitegeneral,inthatitsaysalmostnothingaboutwhatspecificformsthejustificationwithinknowledge might take all that it does require is that the justification would provide onlyfalliblesupport.

Nonetheless, generic though it is, thequestion still arisesofwhether theFallibleKnowledgeThesisiseversatisfiable, letaloneactuallysatisfied.Andthatquestionreadily leads intothismorespecificone:Canatruebeliefeverbeknowledgewithouthavingitstruthentailedbythejustification which is contributing to making the belief knowledge? (Sometimes this talk ofjustificationisreplacedbyreferencestowarrant,wherethisdesignatesthejustificationand/oranythingelsethatisbeingsaidtobeneededifaparticulartruebeliefistobeknowledge.Forthatuseofthetermwarrant,seePlantinga1993.)Section8hasdisposedofsomeobjectionstotherebeinganyfallibleknowledgeandthepreviousparagraphhasgesturedathowviathe JustifiedTrueBelief Analysis onemight conceive of fallible knowledge. Nonetheless,there couldbe residual resistance toaccepting that there canbe fallibleknowledge like that.Undoubtedly,somepeoplewillthink,Therejustseemstobesomethingwrongwithallowingabelieforclaimtobeknowledgewhenitcouldbemistaken.

That residual resistance is not clearly decisive, though. It could well owe its existence to afailure to distinguish between two significantly different kinds of question. The first askswhether a particular belief, given the justification supporting it, is true (and thereby fallibleknowledge).Theotherquestionaskswhether,given that beliefs being true, there is enough



supportingjustificationinorderforittobe(fallible)knowledge.Theformerquestionisraisedfromwithinaparticularinquiryintothetruthofaparticularbelief.Thelatterquestionarisesfromoutsidethatinquiryintothatbeliefsbeingtrue(evenifthisquestionisarisingwithinanotherinquiry,perhapsanepistemologicalone).Thereisnoepistemologicallystandardwayofdesignatingtherelevantdifferencebetweenthosekindsofquestion.Perhapsthefollowingisahelpfulwaytoclarifythatdifference.

(1)Thenotnecessarilyepistemologicalquestionastowhetherabeliefistrue.Imaginetryingtoascertainwhethersomeactualorpotentialbelieforclaimistrue.Youaskyourself,say,DoIknowwhetherIpassedthatexam?Supposethatyouhavegoodfalliblygoodevidenceinfavor of your having passed the exam. (You studied well. You concentrated hard. You feltconfident. Your earliermarks in similar examshavebeen good.)Andnow suppose that yourecalltheJustifiedTrueBeliefAnalysis.Youapplyittoyourcase.Whatdoesittellyou?Ittellsyoujustthat ifyouractualorpossiblebelief(namely,thebeliefthatyoupassedtheexam)istrue, thengivenyourhaving falliblygoodevidencesupporting thebeliefthebelief isorwould be knowledge, albeit fallible knowledge. But does this reasoning tell youwhether thebeliefisknowledge?Itdoesnot.Allthatyouhavebeengivenisthisconditionalresult:Ifyourbeliefistrue,then(giventhejustificationyouhaveinsupportofit)thebeliefisalsoknowledge.Youhavenomeansotherthanyourjustification,though,ofdeterminingwhetherthebeliefistrueandbecausethejustificationisfallible,itgivesyounoguaranteeofthebeliefsbeingtrue(andtherebyofbeingknowledge).Moreover,iffallibilismistrue,thenanyjustificationwhichyoumighthave,nomatterhowextensiveordetaileditis,wouldnotsaveyoufromthatplight.Thus (given fallibilism), you are trapped in the situation of being able to reach, at best, thefollowing conclusion: Because my evidence provides fallible justification for my belief, thebeliefisfallibleknowledgeifitistrue.Atwhichpoint,mostprobably,youwillwonder,Isittrue?ThatswhatIstilldontknow.(Ihavenootherwayofknowingittobetrue.)Andsorightthereandthenyouaredenyingthatyourbeliefisknowledge,becauseyouaredenyingthat you know it to be true. The fallibility in your justification leaves you dissatisfied, as aninquirerintothetruthofaparticularbelief,attheideaofallowingthatitcouldbeknowledge,evenfallibleknowledge.Whenstillinquiringintothetruthofaparticularbelief,itisnaturalforyou todeny that (even if,as ithappens, thebelief is true)yourhaving fallible justification isenoughtomakethebeliefknowledge.

(2)Theepistemologicalquestionastowhetherabeliefisknowledge.Buttheepistemologistsquestion(askedatthestartofthissection)astowhethertherecanbefallibleknowledgeisnotaskedfromthesortofinquirersperspectivedescribedin(1).Theepistemologistisnotaskingwhether yourparticular belief is true (while noting the justification youhave for the belief).Thatisthequestionyouarerestrictedtoasking,whenyouareproceedingastheinquirerin(1).



Theepistemologicalquestionissubtlydifferent.Itdoesnotimagineafalliblyjustifiedbeliefbeforeasking,withoutmakinganyactualorhypotheticalcommitmentastothebeliefstruth,whetherthebeliefisknowledge.Rather,theepistemologistsquestionconsiderstheconceptualcombinationofthebeliefplusthejustificationforitplusthebeliefsbeingtruewhichistosay,thewholepackagethat,inthiscase,isdeemedbytheJustifiedTrueBeliefAnalysistobeknowledgebeforeproceedingtoaskwhetherthisentiretyisaninstanceofknowledge.Toputthat observation more simply, this epistemological question asks whether a belief which isfalliblyjustified,andwhichistrue,is(fallible)knowledge.Thisisthequestionofwhetheryourbelief isknowledge,given (evenifonly forargumentssake)that itis true. In (1), your focuswasdifferenttothat.Inwonderingwhetheryouhadpassedtheexam,youwereaskingwhetherthebeliefistrue:youwerestillleavingopentheissueofwhetherornotthebeliefistrue.And,asyourealized,yourfalliblejustificationwasalsoleavingopenthatquestion.Forit leftopenthepossibilityofthebeliefsfalsity.

Consequently,from(1),itisobviouswhyaninquirermightwantinfallibilityinherjustificationforabeliefs truth. Infallibilitywouldmeanhernothaving to leaveopen thequestionof thebeliefstruth.Withoutinfallibility,thepossibilityisleftopenbyherjustification(whichisheronly indication of whether her belief is true) of her belief being false and hence notknowledge. (This is so, even if we demand that, in order for an inquirers belief to beknowledge, she has to know that it is. That demand is called the KKthesis (with its mostinfluentialanalysisanddefensecomingfromHintikka1962:ch.5)becauseoneshavingapieceofknowledge is taken torequireonesKnowing thatonehas thatKnowledge.Yetevensatisfying that demand does not remove the rational doubt described in (1). If the extraknowledge the knowledge of the initial beliefs being knowledge is not required to beinfallible itself, then scope for doubt will remain as to whether the initial belief really isknowledge.) But if we can either (i) know or (ii) suppose (for the sake of another kind ofinquiry) that the belief is true, then we may switch our perspective, so as to be asking adifferentquestion.Thatiswhattheepistemologistisdoingin(2),byadoptingthelatter,(ii),ofthesetwooptions.Shesupposes,forthesakeofargument,thatthebeliefistruethenshecanask,Wouldthebeliefsbeingbothtrueandfalliblyjustifiedsufficeforittobeknowledge?Shecandothiswithoutknowingatall,letaloneinfallibly,whetherthebeliefistrue.(Shewillalsonotknowinfallibly,atleastnotviathisquestioning,whetherthebeliefisknowledge.Yetwhatelseistobeexpectediffallibilismistrue?)

Itisalsoobvious,from(1),whyaninquirermightwantinfallibilityinherjustification,insofaras she is wondering whether to say or claim that some actual or potential belief of hers isknowledge.Nonetheless,thisdoesnotentailherneedingsuchjustificationifherbeliefistobeknowledge. Remember from (2) in section 8 that whether one has a specific piece of



knowledge could be quite a differentmatter to whether onemay properly claim to have it.Similarly,most epistemologistswill adviseusnot to confusewhatmakes a belief knowledgewithwhatrationallyassuressomeonethatherbeliefisknowledge.Forexample,itispossibleaccording to fallibilist epistemologists in general for a person to have some fallibleknowledge,evenifshedoesnotknowinfalliblywhichofherbeliefsattainthatstatus.

This section began by asking the epistemological question of whether there can be fallibleknowledge.Andwithourhavingseeninthissections(2)whatthatquestionisactuallyasking,alongwithinthissections(1)whatitisnotasking,weshouldendthesectionbyacknowledging that, in asking that epistemological question, we need not be creditingepistemological observers with having a special insight into whether, in general, peoplesbeliefsaretrue.Thequestionofwhetherthosebeliefsaretrueisnotthequestionbeingposedbytheepistemologicalobserver.Sheisaskingwhetheraparticularbeliefisknowledge,given(even ifonly forargumentssake) that it is trueand fallibly justified.She isasking this fromaboveoroutsidethevariouslower levelor innerattempts toknowwhether thegivenbeliefsaretrue.Theother(lowerlevel)inquirers,incontrast,areaskingwhethertheirfalliblyjustifiedbeliefsaretrue.Thereisfallibilityineachofthoseprocessesofquestioningtheyjusthappentohavesomewhatdifferentsubjectmattersandmethods.

WeshouldnotleaveadiscussionoftheFallibleKnowledgeThesiswithoutobservingthat,evenif it is correct in its general thrust, epistemologists have faced severe challenges in theirattemptstocompleteitsdetailstomakeitmorepreciseandlessgeneric.Overthepastfortyor so years, there have beenmany such attempts. But these have encountered one problemafteranother,mostlyasepistemologistshavestruggledtosolvewhatisoftencalledtheGettierProblem.

Averybriefwordonthatproblemisinorderhere.Ithasbecometheepistemologicalchallengeofdefiningknowledgeprecisely,soastounderstandallactualorpossiblecasesofknowledgewhere one of the projects guiding assumptions has been that it is possible for instances ofknowledge to involve justification which supplies only fallible support. In other words, theprojecthasstriventofindapreciseanalysisofwhattheFallibleKnowledgeThesiswoulddeemto be fallible knowledge and, unfortunately, the Gettier Problem is generally thought byepistemologists still to be awaiting a definitive solution. Such a solution would determinewholly and exactly how fallible a particular justified true belief can be, and inwhat specificways it can be fallible, without that justified true belief failing to be knowledge. In themeantime(whileawaitingthatsortofsolution),epistemologistsinclinetowardsacceptingtheJustifiedTrueBeliefAnalysisrepresentedhereintheFallibleKnowledgeThesisasbeingatleastapproximatelycorrect.Certainlyinpractice,mostepistemologiststreattheanalysisas



being correct enough so that it functionswell as givingus a concept of knowledge that isadequatetowhateverdemandswewouldplaceuponaconceptofknowledgewithinmostofthecontextswhereweneedaconceptofknowledgeatall.Suchepistemologiststakethedifficultiesthat have been encountered in the attempts to ascertain exactly how a fallibly justified truebelief canmanage to be knowledge as beingdifficulties ofmere (andmaybe less important)detail,notonesof insuperableandvitalprinciple.Thoseepistemologiststendtoassumethateventually theneededdetailswill emerge, that thesewillbeagreeduponbyepistemologists,andhencethatthebasicideabehindtheFallibleKnowledgeThesiswillfinallyanddefinitivelybevindicated.(Formoreonthehistoryofthatepistemologicalproject,seeShope1983.)

Butagain,thatdefinitivevindicationisyettobeachieved.And,ofcourse,itwillnoteventuateifweshouldbeansweringNotothequestion(discussedearlierinthissection)ofwhetheratruebeliefwhichislessthaninfalliblyjustifiedisabletobeknowledge.Whenthereisfallibilityinthejustificationforaparticulartruebelief,isthisfactalreadysufficienttopreventthatbelieffrombeing knowledge? Few epistemologistswish to believe so.Whatwe have found in thissectionisthattheyareatleastnotobviouslymistakeninthatoptimisticinterpretation.

10.ImplicationsofFallibilism:NoJustification?Sometimesepistemologistsbelievethatfallibilismopensthedooruponanevenmorestrikingworrythantheonediscussedinsection9(namely,thepossibilityoftherebeingnoknowledge,due to the impossibility of knowledges ever being fallible). Sometimes they infer, from thepresence of fallibility, that even justification (let alone knowledge) is absent. That is, oncefallibility enters, even justification all justification departs. Consequently, thoseepistemologists once they accept that a universal fallibilism obtains are skeptics evenabouttheexistenceofjustification.(Foranexampleofsuchanapproach,seeMiller1994:ch.3.)

Howwouldthatinterpretationoftheimpactoffallibilismbearticulated?Ineffect,theideaisthat if evidence, say, is to provide even good (let alone very good or excellent or perfect)guidanceastowhichbeliefsaretrue,itisnotallowedtobefallible.Nojustificationworthyofthenameisabletobemerelyfallible.Andfromthatviewpoint,ofcourse,skepticismbeckonsinsofarasnooneisevercapableofhavinganyinfalliblejustification.Iffallibilityisrampant,yetinfallibilityisrequiredifevidenceorthelikeisevertobesupplyingrealjustification,thennorealjustificationiseversupplied.Inshort,nobeliefsareeverjustified.

That is a wholly general skepticism about justification, emerging from a wholly generalfallibilism. A possible example of that form of skepticism would be the one with which



Descartes ended hisMeditation I. Cartesian evil genius skepticism would say that, becausethereisalwaysthepossibilityofDescartesevilgenius(insection7)controllingourminds,anyevidence or reasoning that one ever has could be a result just of the evil geniuss hiddenintrusionintoonesmind.Theevilgeniusbymakingeverythingwithinonesmindfalseandmisleadingcouldrenderfalseallofonesevidence,alongwithallofonesideasastowhatisgood reasoning. None of ones evidence, and none of ones beliefs as to how to use thatevidence,wouldbetrue.However,iftherewerenotruthanywhereinonesthinking(withoneneverrealizingthis),thennocomponentsofonesthinkingwouldbetruthindicativeortruthconducive. No part of ones thinking would ever lead one to have an accurate belief.Continually,onewouldbothbeginandendwithfalsity.Andtherearemanyepistemologistsinwhoseestimationthiswouldmeanthatnopartofonesthinkingiseverreallyjustifyingsomeotherpartofonesthinking.Forjustificationisusuallysupposedtohavesomerelevantlinktotruth.Andpresumablytherewouldbenosuchlink,ifeverysingleelementinonesthinkingismisleading as would be the case if an evil genius was at work. Is that possible, then?Moreover,isitsodramaticapossibilitythatifweareforeverunabletoprovethatitisabsent,thenourmindswillnevercontainrealjustificationforevensomeofourbeliefs?

A potentially less general skepticism about justification would be a Humean inductiveskepticism(mentionedinsection6).Thethinkingbehindthissortofskepticisminfersfromthe inherent fallibility of any inductive extrapolations that could be made from someobservationsthatnosuchextrapolationiseverevensomewhatrationalorjustifying.Again,the skeptical interpretation of Humean inductive fallibilism is that, given that all possibleextrapolations fromobservations are fallible, neither logic nor any other formof reason canfavoroneparticularextrapolationoveranother.Thefallibilismimpliesthatthere is fallibilitywithin any extrapolation: none are immune.And thewouldbe skeptic infers from this that,once there is such widespread fallibility, there may as well be a complete absence of anypretence at rationality. The fallibility will be inescapable, even as we seek to defend therationality of one extrapolation over another. Why is that? Well, we could mount such adefense only by pointing to one sort of extrapolations possessing a better past record ofpredictive success, say.Butwewouldbepointing to thatbetterpast record,only inorder toinfer that such an extrapolation is more trustworthy on the present occasion. And thatinferencewoulditselfbeaninductiveextrapolation.It,too,isthereforefallible.Accordingly,iftherewaspreviouslyaneedtoovercomeinductivefallibility(withthisneedbeingthereasonforconsultingthepastrecordsofsuccess in the firstplace), thenthereremainssuchaneed,even after past records of success have been consulted. In this way, it is the fallibilitysinescapabilitythatgeneratestheskepticism.

Yet, as we noted earlier, most epistemologists would wish to evade or undermine skeptical



arguments such as those ones arguments that seek to convert a kind of fallibilism into acorresponding skepticism. Howmight this nonskeptical maneuver be achieved? There hasbeenaplethoraofattempts, toomany tomentionhere. (Forone survey, seeRescher 1980.)Moreover,noconsensushasdevelopedonhowtoescapeskepticalargumentslikethese.Thatissueisbeyondthescopeofthisarticle.

Whatmayusefully(evenifgenerically)bedescribedhere,however,isafundamentalchoiceasto how to interpret the force of fallibilism within our cognitive lives. Any response to theskepticalchallengeswillmakethatchoice(evenifusuallyimplicitlyandinsomemorespecificway).Thebasicchoicewillbebetweenthefollowingtwounderlyingpicturesofwhatawhollygeneralfallibilismwouldtellusaboutourselves:

(A)Theinescapablefallibilityofonescognitiveeffortswouldbeliketheinescapablelimitswhatever,precisely,theseareupononesbodilymuscles.Theselimitwhatonesbodyis capableofwhilenonethelessbeingpartofhow it achieveswhatever itdoesachieve.Inescapable fallibility would thus be like a background limitation always present,sometimesasourceof frustration,butrarelyadanger.Whenusedappropriately,musclesstrengthen themselves in accomplishedyet limitedways.Would the constantpresenceoffallibilitybelikea(fallibly)selfcorrectingmechanism?

(B) Inescapable fallibilitywould be like a debilitating illnesswhich feedsupon itself. Itwould become evermore dangerous, as its impact is compounded by repeated use. Thiswouldbadly lower thequalityofones thinking. (Foramodelof thatprocess,noticehoweasily instances of minor fallibility can interact so as to lead to major fallibility. Forexample,asequenceinwhichoneslightlyfalliblepieceofevidenceafteranotherisusedassupport for thenext can endupproviding veryweakoverly fallible support: [80%probabilification X 80%probabilification X 80%probabilification X 80%probabilification]

Howarewetochoosebetween(A)and(B)betweentheLimitedMusclesmodeloffallibilismandtheDebilitatingIllnessmodelofit?

Becausemostepistemologistsarenonskeptics, theyfavor(A)theLimitedMusclesmodel.Thisisnottoinsistthatthinkinginan(A)influencedwayisboundtosucceedagainstskepticalarguments.Thepointrightnowissimplythatthiswayofthinkingisonepossiblegoalforanepistemologist. It is the goal of finding some means of successfully understanding anddefendinganinstanceoftheLimitedMusclesmodel.Whatisdescribedbythatmodelwouldbesuchatheoristsdesiredwaytoconceive,ifthisispossible,ofthegeneralideaofinescapablefallibility.Shewillseektoconceiveofinescapablefallibilityasbeingmanageable,evenuseful.Hence,theLimitedMusclesmodelisaframeworkwhichinextremelygeneraltermsshe



willhopeallowshertounderstandinmorespecifictermsthenatureandsignificanceoffallibilism.PerhapsthemostinfluentialmodernexampleofthisapproachwasQuines(1969),centered upon a famousmetaphor fromNeurath (1959 [1932/33], sec. 201). Thatmetaphorportrayshumancognitiveeffortsasakintoaboat,afloatatsea.Theboathasitsownsortsoffallibility. It is subject to stresses and cracks.Andhowworrying is that?Must theboat sinkwhenever thoseweaknessesmanifest themselves?No, because that is not howboats usuallyfunction. Ingeneral, repairs canbemade.Thismayoccurevenwhile theboat is still at sea.Structurally, it is strong enough to support repairs to itself, even as it continuesbeingused,evenwhilemaking progress towards its destination.Neurath regarded cognitive progress asbeinglikethatasdidQuine,whofurtherdevelopedNeurathsmodel.OnwhatQuinecalledhis "naturalized" conception of epistemology (a conception that many subsequent thinkershavesoughttomakemoredetailedandtoapplymorewidely),humanobservationandreasonmake cognitive progress in spite of their fallibility. They do so, evenwhen discovering theirown fallibility finding their own stresses and cracks.Must they then sink, floundering infutility?No.Theycontinuebeingused,oftenwhilerepairingtheirownstressesandcracksreliablycorrectingtheirowndeliverancesandpredictions.Section5askedwhetherscienceisanespecially falliblemethod.Aswasalsonoted, though,scienceprovides impressiveresults.Indeed,itwasQuinesfavoredexampleoflargescalecognitiveprogress.Howcanthatoccur?How can scientific claims including somany striking ones be justified, in spite of thefallibility that remains?Maybe science is like a ship that carries within it some skilled andimaginativeartisans(carpenters,welders,electricians,andthelike).Notonlycanitsurviveitcanbecomemoregrandandcapablewhenbeing repairedat sea. (Evenso, is suchcognitiveprogress best described in probabilistic terms? On that possibility, implied by Humeanfallibilism,seeHowson2000.)

Naturally,incontrasttothatoptimisticmodelforthinkingaboutfalliblejustification,skepticswill prefer (B) the Debilitating Illnessmodel.We have examined (in sections 6 and 7) acoupleofspecificwaysinwhichtheymighttrytoinstantiatethatgeneralmodel.Wehavealsoseen(insections8through10)somereasonswhythoseskepticsmightnotberight.Perhapstheyoverstatetheforceoffallibilisminferringtoomuchfromthefactsoffallibility.Inanycase,thepresentpointisthatskeptics(likenonskeptics)seekspecificargumentsinpursuitofa successful articulation and defense of an underlying picture of inescapable fallibility. Bothskeptics and nonskeptics thereby search for an understanding of fallibilisms nature andsignificance. They simply reach for opposed conceptions of what fallibilism implies aboutpeoplesabilitytoobserveandtoreasonjustifiably.

So,thereisasubstantialchoicetobemadeandeachofusmakesit,moreorlesscarefullyandconsciously, when reflecting upon these topics. Which of those two basic interpretive



directions, then, should we follow? The intellectual implications of this difficult choice areexhilaratinglydeep.

11.ReferencesandFurtherReadingBaldwin,T.G.E.Moore.London:Routledge,1990.22632.

OnMooresparadox.

Buckle, S. Humes Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An Enquiry Concerning HumanUnderstanding.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001.Part2,chapter4.

OnHumesfamousskepticalreasoninginhisfirstEnquiry.

Conee,E.andFeldman,R.Evidentialism:EssaysinEpistemology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004.Atraditional(andpopular)approachtounderstandingthenatureofepistemicjustification.

Curley,E.M.DescartesagainsttheSkeptics.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1978.OnDescartesskepticaldoubting.

Descartes,R.ThePhilosophicalWorksofDescartes,Vol.I,(eds.andtrans.)E.S.HaldaneandG.R.T.Ross.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1911[1641].

ContainsboththeDiscourseandtheMeditations.TheseincludeboththeEvilGeniusargumentandtheCogito.

Feldman,R.FallibilismandKnowingThatOneKnows.ThePhilosophicalReview90(1981):26682.Onthenatureandavailabilityoffallibleknowledge.

Goldman,A.I.WhatisJustifiedBelief?InG.S.Pappas(ed.),JustificationandKnowledge:NewStudiesinEpistemology.Dordrecht:D.Reidel,1979.

Aninfluentialanalysisofthenatureofepistemicjustification.

Hetherington,S.KnowledgePuzzles:AnIntroduction toEpistemology.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1996.

Includes an overview ofmany of the commonly noticed difficulties posed by the Gettier problem for ourattainingafullunderstandingoffallibleknowledge.

Hetherington,S.KnowingFallibly.JournalofPhilosophy96(1999):56587.Describesthegenusofwhichfallibleknowledgeisaspecies.

Hetherington,S.FallibilismandKnowingThatOneIsNotDreaming.CanadianJournalofPhilosophy32(2002):83102.

Showshowfallibilismneednotleadtoskepticismaboutknowledge.

Hintikka,J.KnowledgeandBelief:AnIntroductiontotheLogicoftheTwoNotionsIthaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1962.ch.5.

OntheKKthesisthatis,onknowingthatoneknows.

Howson,C.HumesProblem:InductionandtheJustificationofBelief.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000.

AtechnicallydetailedresponsetoHumesfallibilistchallengetothepossibilityofinductivelyjustifiedbelief.

Hume,D.AnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding,inHumesEnquiries,(ed.)L.A.SelbyBigge,2ndedn.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1902[1748].

This includes, in section IV, themost generally cited version of Humes inductive fallibilism and inductiveskepticism.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (eds.). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982.

Onempiricalevidenceofpeoplescognitivefallibilities.



Merricks,T.MoreonWarrantsEntailingTruth.PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch57(1997):62731.

Arguesagainstthepossibilityoftherebeingfallibleknowledge.

Miller,D.CriticalRationalism:ARestatementandDefence.Chicago:OpenCourt,1994.Discussesmany ideas (including a skepticism about epistemic justification) thatmight arise if fallibilism istrue.

Morton,A.AGuidethroughtheTheoryofKnowledge,3rdedn.Malden,Mass.:Blackwell,2003.ch.5.Onthebasicidea,plussomepossibleforms,offallibilism.

Nagel,T.TheViewfromNowhere.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1986.SeeespeciallychaptersIandV.Discussestheinterplayofdifferentperspectives(innerandouterones)thatapersonmightseekuponherself,especiallyasgreaterobjectivity issought.(Thisbearsuponsection9sdistinctionbetweentwopossiblekindsofquestionthatcanbeaskedaboutwhetheraparticularbeliefisfallibleknowledge.)

Neurath,O.ProtocolSentences,inA.J.Ayer(ed.),LogicalPositivism.Glencoe,Ill.:TheFreePress,1959[1932/33].

Includesthefamousboatatseametaphor.

Nisbett,R.andRoss,L.HumanInference:StrategiesandShortcomingsofSocialJudgment.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1980.

Onempiricalevidenceofpeoplescognitivefallibilities.

Peirce,C.S.CollectedPapers, (eds.)C.HartshorneandP.Weiss.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,193160.

See,forexample,1.120,and1.141through1.175,forsomeofPeircesoriginatingarticulationoftheconceptoffallibilismassuch.

Plantinga,A.Warrant:TheCurrentDebate.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.Ananalysisofsomeproposalsastowhatwarrantmightbewithin(fallible)knowledge.

Quine,W.V.EpistemologyNaturalized,inOntologicalRelativityandOtherEssays.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1969.

Aboldandprominentstatementoftheprogramofnaturalizedepistemology,tryingtounderstandfallibilityasapartof,ratherthanathreatto,thejustifiedusesofobservationandreason.

Reed,B.HowtoThinkaboutFallibilism.PhilosophicalStudies107(2002):14357.Anattempttodefinefallibleknowledge.

Rescher,N.Scepticism:ACriticalReappraisal.Oxford:Blackwell,1980.Onfallibilismandmanyassociatedskepticalissuesaboutknowledgeandjustification.

Shope,R.K.TheAnalysisofKnowing:ADecadeofResearchPrinceton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1983.PresentsmuchoftheearlierhistoryofattemptstosolvetheGettierproblemandtherebytodefinefallibleknowledge.

Sorensen,R.A.Blindspots.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1988.ch.1.AphilosophicalanalysisofthekindsofthoughtorsentencethatconstituteMooresparadox.

Stove,D.C.ProbabilityandHumesInductiveScepticism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1973.ExplainshowHumesinductivefallibilismgiveswaytohisinductiveskepticism.

Williams,B.Descartes:TheProjectofPureEnquiry.Hassocks:TheHarvesterPress,1978.AnalysisofDescartesskepticaldoubts.

Wilson,M.D.Descartes.London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1978.IncludesanaccountofDescartesskepticalendeavors.

Wittgenstein,L.PhilosophicalInvestigations,(trans.)G.E.M.Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell,1978[1953].Sections243315,348412.

Presentstheprivatelanguageargument(againstthepossibilityofanyonesbeingabletothinkinalanguage



whichonlytheycouldunderstand).

AuthorInformationStephenHetheringtonEmail:[email protected]

Fallibilism _ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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