Failure Report2010

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2010

FailureReportLearning from our mistakes

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Our Values:

dream big& work hard

We strive to make the impossible possible through a combination of imagination, hard work, innovation, passion and awillingness to take risks. It is this determination that allowed EWB to publicly state at our conference in 2004 that we wishedto see an end to t ied aid by the end of the decade. It was the perseverance of our leaders that collected signatures and talkedto Canadians about this relatively unknown issue, and it was our 2008 national conference when thousands of people inMontreal symbolically untied Africa. Later that year Canada announced that it would untie all foreign aid spending.

Photo Paul Blond/EWB


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failurereport Foreword

...Engineers Without Borders(EWB) Canada continues its bold

leadership on this practice, byhighlighting several mistakes andfailures made throughout the yearand analyzing how they have learnedand improved.

Live and learn is a famil-iar saying, but its importancestems largely from whatgoes unmentioned: failure.In fact, the primary use ofthis saying is to acknowl-edge that everyone makesmistakes and encountersfailure. The important thing

is to learn and improve fromthese experiences.

Indeed, learning and fail-ing are both lifelong experi-ences. But whereas mostinstitutions and individualsstrive to be continuous learn-ers, they strive equally hardto avoid failure and rarelyacknowledge when it occurs.

This approach is wrong andproblematic. The lessonslearned from failure and mis-takes are often the most im-portant, and they commonlyhave relevance and valueto others. This is particularlytrue in the complex arena ofinternational development,where problems do not have

a single or clear solution,and where there are somany potential risks andchallenges.

With the 3rd Edition of itsFailure Report, EngineersWithout Borders (EWB)Canada continues its boldleadership on this practice,by highlighting severalmistakes and failures madethroughout the year and ana-lyzing how they have learned

and improved. EWB Canadais doing incredible work inCanada and on the groundin Africa through the jointpower of its staff, volunteers,and chapter members. Butwith a mission of tacklingthe roots cause of povertyand achieving catalytic orsystemic change, mistakes

and occasional failure areunavoidable. Some of thestories in this report reecta failure of insight or of un-

derstanding how to work ina foreign land, while severalothers reect organizationalor project managementmistakes. In all cases, it isimpressive that individualsare publicly acknowledgingfailure and in many casesconfessing to individual

blame for mistakes so thatothers can learn.

These stories have sig-nicant value for other EWBstaff and volunteers, as wellas similar institutions andindividuals working on devel-opment around the world. Iam optimistic that this goodexample will strengthen the

global dialogue on how tolearn from failure to achievethe greatest impact for thosewe are looking to serve.

William H. Gates Sr.

Co-Chair,Bill & Melinda Gates

Foundation

United States of

America


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Our Values:

address

root causesfor impact

We start by clearly dening the impact that we want to help bring about, and thenthink through the complexity of social change so that our actions target root causes.Owen Scott and our Access to Water Team performed such evaluations when theyfocused their attention on the 40% of water points across rural Malawi that werenon-functional. What they found was a broken system contributing to the severelack of water, not a broken seal on a pump. Together with Malawis districts, EWBis bringing data to the decision making process to help inform where new wells aredrilled and where others are simply rehabilitated at a much lower cost.


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table of contentsabout EWB

Introduction

1. Near term success, long term failureOwen Scott, Malawi (page 8)

2. Its not about the tool,its about the processLuisa Celis, Ghana (page 10)

3. Serving the customerMark Hemsworth,Zambia (page 12)

4. Personal failures as a change agentBen Best, Ghana (page 14)

5. Improving our ACTJames Haga, Canadians Programs (page 16)

6. Bring EWB to WorkEli Angen, Canadians Programs (page 18)

7. Failure in distributed innovationJon Fishbein, Canadians Programs (page 20)

8. Leading effective teamsErica Barnes, Canadians Programs (page 22)

9. Organisational PrioritiesParker Mitchell, George Roter, Management

(page 24)

Special Contribution:

Failing to learn from FailureIan Smillie (page 28)

Published January 2011, Toronto, Canada

ngineers Without Borders Ca-nada is movement of engineersdriven to create meaningful and

lasting opportunities for Africansby tackling the root causes of whypoverty persists. EWB envisions aworld where the next generation ofAfricans will have the same opportu-nities as Canadians today.

In Africa, EWB works in theagriculture, rural infrastructure,

and water and sanitation sectorsto build the capacity for bottom-upinnovation in African organizations,which allows these institutions toprototype, pilot and scale successfulprograms.

In Canada over 2,000 activevolunteers and 40,000 members at35 chapters country-wide work to

on three key areas: drive changesin three key areas: Advocating forimproved Canadian policies towardsAfrica, Helping Engineering Pro-fession serve global society, andengaging Canadians to connect andcontribute to Africa.

e

Contents

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the 2010 Failure Report

t started small. A simple idea made real with the courage to take action. No permissionwas given at first, but the value it demonstrated, demanded it. It has grown from bottom

up, gaining support and taking on improvements over time. And its still evolving. Tangi-bly, the EWB Failure Report is a collection of stories. Fundamentally, it is an example of the

process of innovation and learning we would like to see across international development.

iWelcome to the 2010

Failure ReportThis year we share with younine stories from acrossEngineers Without Borders(EWB) from African Pro-grams, Canadian Programs,and management.

We considered introdu-cing this report by offeringthemes that could provide a

direction for learning. Thereare important ones: theallure of simple solutionsthat come at the cost ofaddressing root issues; theneed to be patient and readyto change; and building ourinternal capacity required tomanage the complexity ofour work at multiple levels.

But well leave that foryou to think about. Instead,lets start by remember-ing the very foundation ofthis report; key values thathave underpinned EWBsprogress in the last tenyears. That is, to be effec-tive change agents, weneed to remain humble and

continuously learn, commitourselves to self-reection,be open about our mistakes,

and have the courage totake action, especially afterfailure. We also need totake individual responsibil-ity for creating a culture inwhich failure is accepted andcelebrated. Its the only waywe can progress, innovateand learn. The contributorsto this report have demon-

strated this and we hopethat the stories serve as areminder for each of us todo the same, not just once ayear, but every day.

With that in mind, we hopethat you will do two thingswhen reading this report:

First, ask yourself: Howam I going to apply these

lessons? If you are in EWB:what does this mean for meat my chapter? In Ghana?At my workplace? If you arecreating change elsewhere:How can I apply these le-ssons, in my organization, inmy context? What is relevantor similar to situations Ivefaced?

Second is to go back andread the 2008 and 2009reports. Did we learn from

them, or are we making thesame mistakes again? Ifso, why and what needs tochange? What about in yourwork, as you reect on thepast: Are you making thesame mistakes again?

We close this report witha special contribution fromIan Smillie, author and

lifelong change agent. Heshares a reection from hisexperiences decades ago,reminding us that not only dowe have ten years of learn-ing to support us, there arein fact, decades of learningout there. Our challenge forthe future will be to remaincommitted to learning as

we take action. As Ian likesto say: If we knew how toend poverty, we would havedone it a long time ago.

Keep Doing It For Dorothy.

6

The 2010 Failure Report Team,

Ben, Erica, Wayne, Jon, Ka-Hay


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We learn by being open open to new ideas from anywhere and anyone, and open about our mistakes. It starts withAnnual General Meetings that run late into the night at which members hold the board and leadership accountable, andextends to our staff and volunteers openly sharing and reecting on their mistakes in their work. This humbleness, pairedwith a commitment to ask, grow and innovate, drives a humble entrepreneurship that is unmatched.

Our Values:

strive for

humilty


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not to do data collection atall. The water infrastructuremonitoring system inMachinga had, in effect,been proven unsustainable.

Upon reection, I canthink of two major failuresfrom this story:

1. Prioritizing tangibleactivities as outcomes.

Success is hard to nd some-times in development workand can have a serious effecton how we think about it. Forme, success quickly becameabout having the district staffcollect data it was tangible,concrete, and simple. Su-ccess wasnt about the districtofce valuing the program orabout behavior change. Thisall but guaranteed that myown priorities and the actualpriorities of the district wouldeventually become mis-aligned.

2. Using distorting nan-cial incentives to achieve an

outcome.

This is a classic pitfall indevelopment, and one that Iwalked right into. Once I hadan outcome in mind - datacollection - it became easy

to organize the NGO fundingneeded to make it happen.But using nancial means toachieve my outcome (almostbribery in a way) quicklyeroded the foundation ofactual relevance that wouldbe necessary for long-termsustainability of our program.

Since the experience inMachinga, Ive been takingan almost opposite approach.These days, when we workwith districts, we bring noexternal funding, even for theinitial surveys. If districts want

to work with us to help improvetheir planning and informationmanagement, they are reponsi-ble for rst funding a full roundof data collection without anyassistance from us or our NGOpartner. This serves as almost

a prioriproof that the workwere doing together is: (a) actually relevant to thedistrict (or else why would theyfund it?),

(b) actually nancially sus-tainable.

This has led to districtgovernments being much moreinvested in the work were do-ing together, and is sowing theseeds for sustainability muchbetter than our old approach.

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...By pushing our own tools we were partici-pating in the same game.

Near the end of a fourmonth pilot, we startedto consider scale up of adata system enhancementservice with the two tools

as key components. Theoverarching hypothesis wasthat our system was betterthan any other existing datasystem at the local govern-ment level in Ghana.

We had opportunity tointroduce our tools to dis-tricts across Ghana througha National Level driven

training. During this timewe were challenged by adevelopment partner to stepback and ask, is our systemreally the best solution fordistricts? It made us realizethat different donors and

government agencies havebeen driving their own solu-tions to data managementand crowding districts withan overwhelming number

of tools such that none areactually used effectively.By pushing our own toolswe were participating in thesame game. Furthermorewe had failed to explore thewhole system in depth - whathad been tried in the past,what other players in theeld were doing and what

were emerging trends atnational level. This was ahumbling realization thatmade us question our ap-proach.

We decided to shift ourservice to local govern-ments and our messaging tonational, regional and localgovernment level stakehold-ers from we have the toolthat works to here is aprocess for developing andenhancing data systemsto facilitate evidence base

n the summer of 2010, G&RI engaged in a program with the Danish funded Local Service

Delivery and Governance Program, the Northern Regional Coordinating Council, and six

districts in Northern Ghana to enhance district data systems to facilitate evidence basedplanning and decision making processes.

Our team dedicated the summer to learning within and across the six districts to developdata management tools in collaboration with local government staff. One of these tools was

a project monitoring Excel database that aligned with an Access database introduced by adevelopment partner at the regional level. The second tool was an indicator database that

gathered information across district departments.

i

Its not about the toolsits about the process

Luisa [email protected]

AfricanPrograms Staff

Governance and

Rural Infrastruc-

ture (G&RI)

Ghana

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decision making. An impor-tant element of this processis understanding the existingdata management tools aswell as the needs and the

capacity at the district level.Based on this understandingthe appropriate tool(s) canbeselected and enhanced.Furthermore, critical to thesustainability and effective-ness of data managementtools are the processes

for maintaining them andutilizing them for decisionmaking.

Beyond a space forlearning, this experience did

have some adverse conse-quences for our team. Ourapproach and messaging inpromoting our tool strainedour relationship with a keynational level partner with aconsistent mandate and ap-proach to our own.

...we turned to rein-venting the wheel ratherthan learning from and

building upon what wasthere.

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...We delivered a planing machine toa happy customer in a few weeks, butit would be another 4 months beforethey could start using it.

Customer Service

since my EWB placement with Forest Fruits Zambia three years ago, I have learned aboutthe realities of business in rural Zambia. Among the top challenge is access to productiveequipment. In Sept 2009, I decided to pilot Rent to Own (RtO), a micro-leasing business for

rural Zambia. The big idea is to work with business people looking to expand operations, butlack capital to buy new equipment.

A Zambian colleague andI rst experimented with 4pieces of equipment withgreat success. Our initialcustomers completed a busi-ness plan, paid commitmentand rental fees on time andmaintained the equipment ingood condition. We expand-

ed to 6 new districts and 35customers by establishing anagent system where a localresident becomes a RtOagent responsible for as-sessing the credit worthinessof each applicant on behalfof RtO. The same agentcollects the monthly paymentand is paid a commission

once all collections are com-pleted. The agent model alsoworked well: agents wereprotable, the business wascovering costs, and mostimportantly, our clients wereable to grow their farms andbusinesses.

In May of 2010 we beganworking with successfulowners of a small carpen-try business in Mufumbwedistrict 1000 km from thecapital city. They had beenrunning the business for 20years, had demonstratedhigh ambition to mechanize

operations and were look-ing to purchase a planingmachine. Their business de-mand was high with securedgovernment orders, rawtimber supply was plentifuland three-phase power wasavailable to run a machine.We delivered a planing ma-chine to a happy customer

in a few weeks, but it wouldbe another 4 months beforethey could start using it.

An Experiment Expands our mistakeMark [email protected]

African ProgramsStaffAgriculture ValueChains Rent to

Own

Zambia

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The most painful part of this mistake was that our trust withour client eroded fast. To this day we are still rebuilding this trust.

During installation, the agentincorrectly connected themachine to electricity andupon usage, one of thecritical components wasdestroyed, rendering themachine useless. It was amassive headache: spareparts and expertise to repair

it were only available in Lu-saka, the customer demand-ed a new replacement, and Inow owned a $2000 piece of

junk. But we persisted, andafter four months, two at-tempts and $500, the plaineris now functioning and thebusiness is growing.

We dont expect business

to go smoothly and from thisexperience we learned thefollowing:

Need to invest incapacity

We made an incorrect as-sumption that our target cus-tomers would know enoughto set up and operate theequipment they needed. Thisnow seems obvious sincebroken equipment is scat-

tered across Zambia due topoor quality and poor usage/maintenance. In addition toagents, we have now hired afull time technician to installand train each customer onhow to properly operate andmaintain the equipment.

Growing one step at atime is key to prevent-

ing huge mistakes.

Our incremental expansionallowed us to minimize the

risk of wrong assumptions.

Long-term relationshipwith customers helps

to align incentives, thisempowers them.

To me the most importantthing is aligning incentives.When we give a customera piece of equipment worth$1000, and theyve only paid

$150 in advance, its easyto see how we both want towork together.

We need to work closely

with our customers,selling them stuff isnt

enough.

Building and maintaining

trust is critical to success-ful business relationships.The most painful part of thismistake was that our trustwith our client eroded fastand furthermore is that trustwith our agent was compro-mised. To this day we arestill rebuilding this trust.

Heres is where we failed

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....I hope thatsome of theselessons willhelp futureAPS and theirmanagers deal

with some ofthe personalfailures that arepossible whenworking indevelopment.

i n March of 2010 I beganmy placement at a DistrictAgriculture Develop-ment Unit (DADU) withinthe Ministry of Food andAgriculture (MoFA). I was

taking over from a colleaguewho transitioned out of thedistrict two months before.My objectives were to setup and support systems thatwould allow the DADU toeffectively and sustainablyrun the Agriculture as a Busi-ness Program (AAB) that mycolleague had introduced

over her placement, as wellas to explore new initia-tives focused on betteringmanagement capacity withDADU ofces.

I ran into several chal-lenges pushing AAB towardssustainability in the DADU,most notably an extremelyunderstaffed ofce when I

arrived, and an appointedcoordinator for the programthat was often enthusiasticin conversation but failedto take action after the fact.As I explored managementinitiatives I would learn moreabout the environment I wasworking in and constantly

come up with what I thoughtwere better and betterideas without committingto focused implementationon any of them. UltimatelyI had too many projects on

my plate, too few successesand low motivation. Finally Itook on gap-lling roles thatplayed to my strengths withtechnology, taking up furthertime that was not directlyrelated to my objectives butprovided short term motiva-tion.

Although there were many

factors outside of my controlthat made my placementdifcult, there are sev-eral specic mistakes that Imade. My biggest mistakewas getting stuck in analysisparalysis instead of havinga bias towards action. AsI was learned about howthe DADU operated, I could

have been testing smallmanagement improvements,even if there was limitedenthusiasm at rst. Smallwins earlier on would haveincreased my motivationlevels and strengthened myrelationships with partners.Secondly, I did not strategi-

cally use my gap-lling roles toleverage my actual goals, andwas happy with merely savingdistrict ofcers time.

While I take full responsibilityfor the failures outlined aboveI believe it is still important toshare these failures and lessonslearned. The rst would be to nar-row my focus and set up specicaccountabilities. I wanted to drivea lot of change in a lot of areasbut that meant too many smallprojects and too much work. Thismeant my manager couldnt holdme accountable to deliverables

as there was simply too muchwork to do. An overowing sched-ule is a reality, so in future I mustprioritize the difcult and impor-tant work instead of being contentin getting work done. There willalways be enough low risk workto do to ll the time but this is notwhat creates change. Secondly,gap-lling (especially in areas

where unique value is provided)is tempting but it should also beused strategically to further themain placement objectives. Ihope that some of these lessonswill help future APS and theirmanagers deal with some of thepersonal failures that are possiblewhen working in development.

Ben [email protected]

African ProgramsStaffAgribusiness

Ghana

personal failuresas a change agent

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Our Values:

ask tough

questions

Everyday across Canada and rural Africa, EWBers are asking questions that nobodyelse is. From questioning data collection techniques and technologies for mapping ac-cess to water in rural Malawi, or holding our government accountable to making aid aseffective as possible. EWB is constantly asking questions of itself and our colleaguesto ensure that we have disproportionate impact on our stakeholders.

Photo: Duncan McNicholl/EWB


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....But support fora set of principlesalone does not cre-ate change in thesystem; we needed

to follow-up on thisgeneral support witha far more focusedask.

improving our actA lesson in advocacy

lIn June of 2010, with Can-ada hosting both the G8and G20 Summits, EWBs

advocacy team launched theACT Campaign to advocatethat the Government ofCanada make our foreign aidmore Accountable, Creativeand Transparent (ACT).

The raison dtre of ACTcampaign was to shift thepolitical dialogue from thetired debate of how muchmoney Canada should al-locate towards aid to howCanada can strengthen thequality and effectiveness ofexisting aid resources.

ACT promoted ambitious

recommendations for howCanada should improveits approach to interna-tional development. Theserecommendations rangedfrom establishing a newIndependent Commissionfor Aid Impact (tasked with

assessing the value and ef-fectiveness of Canadas aidinvestments), to the creationof a venture-focused Innova-tion Fund (investment fundfocused on helping to scalepromising developmentideas).

The campaign started

out well. Advocacy mem-bers across Canada wereequipped with core mes-sages and did a great jobpromoting ACT. They metwith over 100 Members ofParliament (MP) and heldover 200 MP meetings. Thiseffort helped EWB strength-en our engagement with

Canadas political represen-tatives and built a network ofsupport for ACT from MPsacross the country.

We were happy with thisprogress, but we failed in thenext step. After we created agreat broad-based campaign

that generated widespreadpolitical support, we were tooslow in turning that generalsupport for our principles intotangible and specic actionthat could be practicallyimplemented.

James [email protected]

Director of

Advocacy

Canadian

Programs

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... we were too slow in turning that general support for ourprinciples into tangible and specific action.

Since we were trying to inu-ence decision makers, ourrst goal was to build rapportand provide a compellingcase for our ideas. We didthis exceptionally well byproviding clear rationale be-hind our recommendations.We increased the develop-ment knowledge of manypoliticians and generatedsupport for ACT in principle;again, this was very good.But support for a set of prin-ciples alone does not createchange in the system; weneeded to follow-up on thisgeneral support with a farmore focused ask.

The campaign began withve specic recommenda-tions which allowed us tobuild broad-based support.It also helped us understandwhich of the recommenda-tions resonated the mostpolitically. However, ve

recommendations created acumbersome path to policychange. Since political capi-tal can only be applied toselect areas at one time,by not focusing our weightbehind one tangible recom-mendation, we limited thepolicy-change potential ofthe campaign. The breadth

of our policy recommenda-tions was too broad andoffered an easy way out forpoliticians who could providetheir support in principle, butcould sense that our agendawas too broad to result inreal changes.

In mid-November, westarted to internalize thislesson and changed ourapproach accordingly. Wedecided to build on the workof ACT and advocate thatthe Government of Canadasign on to the InternationalAid Transparency Initiative.While this doesnt mean thatweve stopped engagingMPs about broader develop-ment issues we havent we have begun to be farmore selective in the policychange were asking politi-cians to support.

What happenned in more detail Adjusting our approach

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bring ewb to workTheory of Mobilization

The BETW campaigninvolved three key compo-nents based on the followingassumptions: that volunteersacross Canada were eagerto drive engagement if itwas easy for them; having a

time bound, unifying eventwould encourage greaterparticipation; mid-July wouldallow for student interns tosettle into their jobs and beable to have more inuencewithin their workplace; anda web-based communityof volunteers would helpmaintain motivation. To roll

this out, we developed astandard presentation andsupport material for all EWBmembers to use and adaptto local context, designatedthe third week in July as

the national BETW week andlaunched an on-line trackingsystem to help manage demandacross the country. A major goalwas to deliver 200 presentationsnationally through this mobiliza-tion strategy.

This is what we were able toachieve with BETW:

. 51 presentations delivered(25% of target).

. 103 people actively signedup on website, 75 presenterscommitted to deliver presenta-tions, 28 presentations deliv-ered.

.68 presentations were re-

quested through a broad email23 were delivered, 26 had nofollow up and 19 were outsideour geographical reach.

n the last 10 years, EWB has achieved considerable success in public outreach:

speaking to 1,000,000 Canadians, and reaching over 125,000 youth through presenta-

tions. Our reach into the professional community, however, has lagged far behind 60presentations annually, averaging 14 attendees per presentation; we were confident that we

could grow this outreach considerably, and worked to create Bring EWB to Work (BETW) a national level campaign directly targeting the professional engineering community.

iEli [email protected]

ProgramLeader,Corporate andProfessionalEngagementCanadianPrograms

...While the total51 presentations

were on par withour previous an-nual numbers, theturnout for BETWwas dismal.

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...We applied these lessons and achieved our targets at the next nationallevel outreach: Solving Problems that Matter.

While the total 51 presenta-tions were on par with ourprevious annual numbers,the turnout for BETW wasdismal. One of the majorreasons for this is that I didnot establish a clear road-map of what this nationallevel mobilization would looklike and did not have specicenough milestones to helpme gauge progress and agconcerns early. While I wasable to course correct, thelack of the higher level mile-stones and measures wouldhave alerted me earlier toareas that if addressed in atimely manner, could havesignicantly improved ournumbers.

Timing July was a poor timefor workplace engagementgiven vacation schedules.

No regional representativeThis limited our follow up andpersonal touch required forengagement.

No follow up 75 pre-

sentations committed werenever delivered. We werenot diligent in ensuring followthrough.

We applied these lessons andachieved our targets at thenext national level outreach:Solving Problems that Matter.We developed a higher levelstrategy which allowed us toreact quickly to what was hap-pening during the campaignand ensure progress wason track. Additional lessons

learned and applied were:

Know and work with youraudiences timing: Timeevents for when it has the mostpotential to reach your targetaudience. Consider vacationschedules

Identify regional represen-

tatives BETW didnt haveregional representatives, buthigh personal interaction candrive up involvement.

Ensure accountability Thinkabout appropriate ways to en-sure commitments are carriedout this is where personalinteraction can be valuable.

Failure/Lessons Other failures or incorrectassumptions were

Improving action

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By the end ofthe fall, teammembers hadlow interest in

the team and wedisbanded it withlittle being done.

iIn the Spring of 2009,Engineers Without Borders(EWB) proposed EWB 2.0,

a new model to encourageEWB members across theorganisation to innovate onideas and offer a new wayof getting involved in theorganization. This involvedsome Canadian Programsto create distributed teams teams comprised of EWBvolunteers from acrossthe country, focused on anational program area, butindependently taking ac-tion. I proposed the idea ofa distributed team for EWBsGlobal engineering with thefollowing model: I would workfrom the National Ofce onhigh level curriculum changeswith university Deans andadministrators, chapterswould work with professors in

the classroom to implementspecic curriculum changesand a separate InnovationTeam would focus on identi-fying new projects to supportour change from a differentangle.

Over the summer, wedened the mandate of theGE Innovation Team as

analysing the GE programand nd innovative newways to support the overallGE program objective. Iopened applications to EWBmembers and the team wascreated from the best andmost energetic applications.We hosted an introductorycall with the team to clarity

the mandate of the teamand set the expectationsthat we should have anaction plan for a project wewanted to implement by the

end of the summer. I also setthe expectation that for theremaining calls that I wouldserve as a resource for theteam rather than lead it (toencourage their ownership).The team also walked awayfrom the call with deliverablesaimed at generating ideas fora potential project. However,

over the course of two morecalls, we still had limited ideasin August. To ensure wecould meet our original goal, Iproposed an idea and tried torally the team around it. Theteam decided to move forwardwith my idea, however overthe next few months, little wasdone to implement it. By the

end of the fall, team membershad low interest in the teamand we disbanded it with littlebeing done.

JonathanFishbein

[email protected]

Director-CurriculumEnhancement &Global EngineersCanadianPrograms

a failurein Distributed Innovation

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My concern was the team would lose ownership if I imposed goals, andassumed that the team would ultimately choose their own specific goals.

The failure was in managingdistributed actions. I learnedthe importance of clearlydening a problem and havinga tangible goal to achieve. Myconcern was the team wouldlose ownership if I imposedgoals, and assumed that theteam would ultimately choosetheir own specic goals. Of

course, this did not happensince lack of initial framingand moderate knowledgewith the program did not setthem up to do this. Also, therewas no leader for this team tomanage progress and monitorteam health. For this, I didntencourage a team leader tostep up explicitly, and instead,

assumed that one wouldemerge on its own.

The key lesson for mewas that added structurein goals and roles does notlead to a loss of ownershipin the team, especially if thatstructure is made explicit asthe team is forming. A teamleader properly supportedcould hold the team account-able, focus the teams actions

and own the teams results.Similarly, a specic challengecan help distributed teamsfunction better and succeedas it offers a tangible issue tofocus around and measureprogress against. If this teamhad a more focused mandate,(e.g. structuring our existingcurriculum resources in a

progression of classes) thenit would have been easier to

focus the work of the team,check-in on the teams prog-ress and get outputs that wereimmediately impactful to theGlobal Engineering program.In EWBs Canadian Programs,I am starting to look at eachof our distributed teams andasking the specic problemthis team will solve this year for

EWB.

the Failure

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....I failed tofully recognizethis early in theyear and didnot adequatelyassess the indi-

vidual skills, orprovide appro-priate support.

i n the spring of 2009, theMcMaster Chapter cametogether to do a vision-ing exercise for the 2009/10school year. The vision wasexciting and robust. How-ever, it became clear thatachieving the many goalswe had set for ourselveswould require a new chapterorganizational structure thatallowed for greater involve-ment by more people anddesigned to achieve moreoutcomes.

The new structure wasdeveloped by the vision-ing team and led to a largeexecutive of 10 directorswith specic programresponsibilities reporting tothe president. Under the 10program directors were 2-3key individuals with respon-sibility for specic activities.All of these individuals wereinvited to attend executive

meetings. We shifted the fo-cus of the weekly executivemeetings to monitoring andreporting on program ac-tivities rather than planning.This left time for the execu-tive to discuss and problemsolve broader issues andgenerate new ideas for thechapter.

Overall, this organiza-tional structure worked welland the chapter had a verysuccessful year. However,we found that some pro-grams were more success-ful than others in achievingtheir goals. Analysis andreection showed that thisstructure was highly depen-dent on the abilities of theprogram directors. In par-ticular, an ability to engageand maintain the motivationof team members appearedto be a major predictor ofsuccess. Where this did notoccur, we lost the participa-tion of the team members atboth the program and execu-tive level.

As president of the chap-ter, I failed to fully recognizethis early in the year anddid not adequately as-sess the individual skills, orprovide appropriate support.

I assumed that within thisdecentralized structure thatthese highly motivated andknowledgeable individualshad the leadership skills tofully engage their team andcarry out the program activi-ties.

So what - Implications forthe future

Having a structure in whichform follows function is usefulwhen an organization wantsto achieve numerous clearlydened goals and objectives.

However, decentralizingresponsibility for key orga-nizational objectives placessignicant responsibility on theorganizational leader to haveappropriate skills and sup-port to be successful. I wouldrecommend implementing aseries of workshops that focuson identifying and assessing

individual skills in programleadership. This informationcan then be used to tailorfurther learning opportunitiesto meet group and individualneeds. In the future, it mayalso be useful to establishmentoring relationships be-tween executive members asa learning tool and to ensure

that this work is not only theresponsibility of the president.

Erica [email protected]

Former PresidentMcMaster Chapter

Leadingeffective teams

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All change begins within us. We commit to per-sonal growth through regular self-assessmentand have the courage to ask for feedback.Leadership is a path not taken lightly withinEWB, yet one which many people step-up toeach year. Together EWB is building a genera-tion of aware and passionate leaders who areopen to feedback, committed to thoughtfulnessand ready for action.

Photo: Paul Blond/EWB.

Our Values:

courageously

commit


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....this nextyear would beessential forthe leaders ofEWB to unifythe organisation

and solidify thechanges thathappened.

o n a nice winter day inDecember 2009, we setout north of Toronto for a2-day Co-CEO offsite. Ourgoal was straightforward:

Reect on our progress in2009, and have a conversa-tion about the organizationsdirection and our own priori-ties for 2010.

The previous 12-monthsinvolved signicant changein EWB. We got rid of ouroutdated mission; paredback ambitious plans be-

cause of the global reces-sion; articulated 4 outcomesareas to focus our work;had over 200 people acrossthe organization developa set of beliefs and valuesto guide our decisions andculture; and began creatinga new organizational model,EWB2.0, that gave more

people more responsibility toinnovate and drive forwarddifferent parts of the organi-zation. All of this while stillevolving our programs anddelivering impact in Canadaand in Africa.

We were both pretty wornout. And we hadnt syn-chronized our thoughts andideas as much as we shouldhave over the preceding few

months, which meant beingon a different page from oneanother on many dimensionsof EWB. Further, we knew thatthis next year was going to becritical: All the business bookswe read and experts we talkedwith about change manage-ment suggested that this nextyear would be essential for the

leaders of EWB to unify theorganization and solidify thechanges that happened.Thepressure was on.

We had originally meantfor this to be an offsite withour newly minted 3-personmanagement team, but ourlast-minute planning meantthat Brenna Donoghue (the

third member of the manage-ment team) couldnt make it.We decided the conversa-tion couldnt wait and that wecould bring her up to speedlater.

What transpired/happened?

Coming out of our Co-CEOoffsite, we developed a seriesof themes and priorities that we

believed would be important forthe organization, the nationalofce, and the managementteam in 2010. These wereareas of focus that we believedwould facilitate the next stageof growth and maturation ofEWB, and allow us to deliverstronger impact over the com-ing 12-months.

We brought Brenna into theconversation and then sharedthe themes with all EWB staffduring our twice-yearly planningoffsite at the end of January,asking them to help esh outthe details and what successwould look like. At this point,we also decided not to bring abroader group of EWBers into

the discussion that insteadthese themes would merelyguide the behind-the-sceneswork of the EWB staff for thenext year.

Parker MitchellGeorge Roter

Co- CEO

EWB Canada

Organisational Priorities

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failurereport

One member of the management team was made accountable for each of these areas, and overallgoals, objectives and workplans were created for each one (by the management team member). Staffwere brought in to work on some of these areas directly and explicitly, and others times it was moreimplicit. Progress on the 3-4-5 was updated at each monthly management team and ofce staff meeting.

By the end of February, these themes were refined into the 3-4-5.

Three Organizational Priorities Driving a creative fundraising and resource acquisition mentality throughout the

organization

EWB2.0 continuing to develop the distributed model and improve organizational unity.

Ensuring, at all levels, we identify more concrete goals and metrics and hold ourselvesaccountable to them.

Four National Office Focus Areas Improving National Ofce staff performance, support, development, management

capacity and organizational processes.

Improving the articulation of our African programs in a sophisticated way for the restof the sector.

Improving the explanation of EWB for a variety of stakeholders. More consciously and rigorously managing and developing our leadership pipeline

across the organization.

Five Management Team Focus Area Fundraising.

Human Resources bringing on management experience. Role modeling good management practice.

Ensuring delivery of MyEWB2.0.

Developing a strategic plan for Canadian Programs.

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Fr

1. While we made a decisionin the fall of 2009 to operate

less as a Co-CEO tandemand more as a managementteam, we reverted to pasthabits when the pressurewas on. This had repercus-sions in developing andleading the 3-4-5, as well asin other areas throughout theyear.

In 2011, we have a new

organizational reality of asingle CEO. George will be

focusing on changing howmajor issues are considered

and decisions made the

focus will move to a more ro-bust management team, with

the CEO as a first amongequals.

2. We failed to take the timeto help the core leadersin EWB staff and morebroadly leaders at chapters,city networks, distributedteams, etc go through thesame reection and planningprocess that we did. Thismeant the 3-4-5 was given to

people, rather than internal-ized and felt to be the priori-

ties for the coming year.Already we have taken stepsto correct this by holding a

Vision Week in December

2010, and setting up signifi-cant conversations about the

next year and beyond duringour National Conference.

This will be continued throughMarch 2011, with the focus

on deeply engaging manypeople in EWB in thinkingabout what our organizational

priorities and plans should be,and what we need to do to

achieve them.

3. We failed to work withEWBs managers to incor-porate the 3-4-5 directly into

staff member workplans andpriorities. It is important todraw a direct connectionbetween actions and plansat all levels, so that there is abroad sense of contributionand responsibility.

We will be working on con-

necting each persons plan to

team plans and to the broader

priorities of the organiza-

tion. During our monthly staffmeetings, we will spend time

connecting and recognizingpeoples contributions to the

overall organizational focus

areas.

4. Rigorous, disciplined pro-cess is important for ensuringfocus and having honest con-

versations about progress.We will be giving a single

management team memberresponsibility to develop and

drive improved organizationalprocesses around planning

and accountability.

5. There were probably toomany areas of focus this

diluted resources and overallperformance was lower.

We will aim to simplify our pri-

orities and plans this year (and

for our 5-year strategic vision),even if that means de-prioritiz-

ing important areas or develop-ing priorities and focus areas

over shorter time horizons.

There are a number of lessons we take from this and implications for the future:

Organisational Priorities

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We know that true change will require a movement of socially-minded leaders. Wesupport and invest in each other to build this movement together. During the summerof 2010, EWB worked with the planning ofcers and government works engineers ofnorthern Ghana to enhance data management systems in six districts. The result ofthe three day training was improved evidence-based planning and decision making.EWB also invests in the next generation of leaders in Malawi with an annual leader-ship conference to build capacity in the water sector, and across Canada, with thou-

sands of hours of leadership development training and opportunities each year.

Photo: Daniel Olsen/EWB.

Our Values:

invest in

people

Failing to Learn from Failure


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n 1972, shortly after the liberation war, I was sent by CARE to Bangladesh, a thumb-

print of a country in a vast continent as Tahmima Anam has so eloquently described it. Iwas to work on a self-help housing cooperative project. We provided plans, material andtechnical assistance to help people build their own low-cost, cyclone-resistant houses. Weimported thousands of tons of cement and enough corrugated tin sheets to cover a dozenfootball elds. The project was massive, but it failed. The houses were constructed, but thecooperatives which were arguably the most important component because they aimed togenerate funds for longer-term agricultural development and employment failed miserably.We had a large ofce in Dhaka then known as Dacca lots of jeeps and trucks and speed-boats, and many international staff with energy and commitment to spare. Our only problemwas that we had almost no idea what we were doing.

While I was in Dhaka ordering freighters full of cement from Thailand, a tiny organizationwas forming on the other side of town, and in the rural areas of faraway Sylhet to the north.I recall meeting Fazle Hasan Abed at least once in 1972 or 1973, and I remember peoplespeaking about BRAC with a kind of awe. Their attitude did not ow from anything remarkableBRAC was doing at the time everything was remarkable in those terrible postwar years.What caught peoples attention was the fact that BRAC was a Bangladeshi development orga-nization something that few outsiders had ever heard of, much less conceived.

Over the years I have been privileged to return to Bangladesh many times, often to workwith BRAC on a project design or an evaluation or a report. I have never visited and found thesame organization twice. On each visit there is always something new ten thousand more

schools; a dairy; a university; a functional cure for tuberculosis. In 2007 BRACs micronancelending topped a billion dollars. A billion. The amazing thing about all of BRACs achievementsis that they have been accomplished in one of the most hostile climates in the world hostilein every sense of the word: meteorologically speaking, economically and politically. And nowBRAC is taking its lessons to other Asian countries and Africa.

i

My 2009 book, Freedom From Want; The Remarkable Story of BRAC,started with the story of a development failure in which I waspersonally involved:

Ian Smillieauthor

Change agent

Failing to Learn from Failure

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report

The CARE housing projectfailed because we werein a hurry, we were over-condent, we didnt haveadequate cultural or historicalknowledge, and we didntdo the homework that mighthave told us in advance whatwe were going to learn thehard way. BRAC too wasforced to learn sometimesfrom study, sometimes fromexperimentation, sometimesfrom failure. Unlike thoseof us who moved on fromBangladesh to other things,however, BRAC stayed. Itremembered what it learnedand it applied the lessonsin ways that allowed it toexpand and to become what

is arguably one of the mosteffective development organi-zations in the world today.

The development busi-

ness is largely unchartedterritory. If we knew how toend poverty, we would havedone it a long time ago. Andyet the enterprise is notori-ously risk-averse; donorsdemand results and punishfailure. The developmentchallenge is not to avoid therisk that comes with chartingnew paths. It is not to denyfailure. It is to learn, to re-member, and to apply whatis being remembered. Thatis the difference betweeninformation of which wehave so much today andknowledge, of which weseem to have far too little.

...It is to learn, to

remember, and to applywhat is being remem-bered. That is the differ-ence between informa-tion of which we haveso much today and

knowledge, of whichwe seem to have far toolittle.

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Acknowledgements


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Acknowledgements

30

We wish to acknowledge Nick Jiminez for his humility and vision in publishing the rst Failure Report in 2009,

Jean-Franois Soublire and Erin Antcliffe for publishing the second edition, and to all who have submitted stories for

their mistakes, learned and improved from them.

Special thank you to the translation team who have worked tirelessly to translate this report into French: Ghislaine

Lavertu, Isabelle Cote-Laurin, Pascal Genest-Richard,Caroline Bakmazjian, Matei Butnarasu,Annie Pelletier, BernardVigier, Anna Hopkins, Catherine Habel, Emmanuel Charbit, Andre Dagenais, Brian Dusting, Madavine Tom.


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Our Bottom Line: We Put Dorothy First

This is Dorothy Nthala. Both she and her husbandBvekelani work tirelessly on their maize crop in Tchale,Malawi in the hopes of selling the maize they grow at themarket to earn an income and build a stronger future fortheir family. We put Dorothy rst. We strive to do whatshe would advise us to. We help bring her voice into therooms where she needs to be heard. We stay indepen-dent to stay true to her interests. You might be wonder-ing why she is such an important person. Just ask anyEWBer what Dorothy means to them.

Photo: Anna-Marie Silvester/EWB

Get the whole picture. Detailed program reports are available at:

Fr CpAp Os


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failure

report

2010

Learning from our mistakes

366 Adelaide Street West Suite 601Toronto, Ontario M5V 1R9 CANADA

Telephone: 1.416.481.3696

Toll Free: 1.866.481.3696Fax: 416.352.5360Email: [email protected]

Charitable Registration Number: 89980-1815-RR0001

www.ewb.ca/publications

www.ewb.ca

Fr CpAp Os

Failure Report2010

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