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Working Paper 071 www.future-agricultures.org

WorkingPaper

Warming to Change?

Climate Policy and

AgriculturalDevelopment in Ethiopia

Leulseged Yirgu, Alan Nicol and Shweta Srinivasan

July 2013


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Table of Contents

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................... 3

1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4

2 Climate change policy and agriculture in Ethiopia .......................................................................... 4

2.1 Agriculture sector background ................... ..................... .................... .................... .................... ..................... ................ 4

2.2 Policy context ................... .................... ..................... .................... .................... .................... ..................... .................... ......... 5

3 Policy narratives ................................................................................................................................ 6

3.1 Climate-smarter agriculture? ..................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ..................... ................. 7

3.2 Intensication and commercialisation .................. .................... ................................... .................... .................... .......... 7

3.3 Pastoralist transormation .................. .................... .................... .................... ..................... .................... .................... ....... 8

4 Key actors, institutions and networks .............................................................................................. 9

5 Financing challenges ........................................................................................................................ 11

6 Conclusion: Wider political economic drivers are shaping responses ............................................. 13

7 References ....................................................................................................................................... 14

Annexes .................................................................................................................................................. 16

Annex 1: List of interviewees ................................................................................................................... 16

Annex 2: Key national policies ................................................................................................................. 17

Annex 3: Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... 18


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Abstract

This paper addresses how policy responses to climate change are shaping the agricultural sector in Ethiopia, andtheir signicance or the countrys uture development. The paper highlights the multiple policy and institutionalresponses, including those that all under a new policy direction o green economic development, with a ocus ondevelopment o a low-carbon economy by 2025. Under this broad banner, emerging policy narratives centre on

achieving climate smart agriculture, establishing more intensied and commercial approaches and, in the livestocksector, seeking major transormations in pastoralism within the countrys lowland periphery. At the same time, anumber o structural gaps are emerging, including the success with which climate policy is being integrated acrossdiferent natural resource sectors, rom water and land management to rural aforestation.

Important political-economic considerations are shown to be driving some o the emerging challenges, asEthiopia struggles to nd ways o engaging a rapidly-growing economically active population. The paper suggeststhat externally-driven policy processes are crowding out more coherent analyses o key national-level resourcemanagement and development issues, and that a rush or climate nance may crowd out important local knowledgeand experience rom below that can better inorm policy responses. Without adequately addressing multiplechallenges acing smallholder armers in many parts o the overcrowded highlands, question marks continue tosurround the capacity o the country to achieve real agricultural transormation under the ambitious Growth andTransormation Plan.


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1 Introduction

This paper aims to shed light on Ethiopias emergingpolicy responses to climate change and their implicationsor the countrys agricultural sector and developmentstrategies. Ethiopia is Aricas second largest country

by population, currently numbering some 90 millionand with an annual growth rate o 3.2%. From 1990to 2010, the population expanded by over two-thirds,representing an additional 33 million people (Funk etal., 2012). This rapid expansion is driving much o thesubstantial GDP growth witnessed in recent years. Morethan three quarters o the population in Ethiopia live inrural areas, contributing some 45% o GDP, most o thecountrys ood crop production, and 90% o the exportvalue (World Bank, 2011).

Ethiopias rapidly growing population relies on aragile natural resource base or livelihood security. Inrecent decades, the countrys arming systems havebeen subject to critical rainall variability leading touctuations in production and, in some years, severeood crises in parts o the country. Some suggest thatthe impacts o droughts on the economy are equivalentto the annual overseas development assistance received(Oxam International, 2009). Current scientic evidencesuggests that global climate change will lead to greaterrainall variability (World Bank, 2011), which will urtherimpede the countrys arming sector. Arguably, policyresponses to this situation will be very signicant to thecountrys uture development.

Against this background, the paper analyses the keypolicy narratives on climate change and agriculture, thekey actors, institutions and networks that surround these,as well as nancing challenges. While we have increasingknowledge o the changing risks associated with climatechange and potential policy responses, less is knownabout how policy processes on climate change areplaying out in reality at national levels. The purpose o thepaper is to contribute to a better understanding o howclimate change as a new policy issue enters Ethiopiaspolicy processes, and their implications or agriculturaldevelopment. The analysis draws on Keeley and Scoones

(2003) ramework or understanding policy processes,which highlights the dynamic interactions betweennarratives and discourses, actors and networks, andpolitics and interests. The paper is based on documentreview as well as interviews with government agriculturalstaf, research institutions and academics, donor agencyrepresentatives, the media, as well as NGO and othercivil society representatives (see Annex 1). The studywas carried out under the Climate Change Theme othe Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC)1.

The next section gives an introduction to the policycontext on climate change and agriculture in Ethiopia,ollowed by an analysis o the key policy narratives(section 3), actors, institutions and networks (section4), and nancial challenges (section 5). Section 6 oferssome conclusions and reections on the way orward.

2 Climate change policy and

agriculture in Ethiopia

2.1 Agriculture sector background

The agricultural sector in Ethiopia delivers some 80%o employment within predominantly rain-ed systems(Deressa and Ringler, 2008). Economic irrigation potentialis estimated to be some 2.7 million hectares (World Bank,2009), but less than 14% o this potential is currentlyutilised (World Bank, 2010). Future irrigation expansionis constrained by actors such as low levels o technologyand the cost o energy. Some key government initiativesnow ocus on improving small-scale irrigation expansionat a household level.

Structurally, in many parts o northern Ethiopia,agriculture is afected by declining arm size. Units oland divided up by each generation are declining, in manycases to plots that are insucient in size to support oodsecurity (Belay and Manig, 2004). On these small plots,typically 0.5 ha or less, many smallholders are trapped inlow productivity. They are orced to convert already lowlevels o assets (e.g. livestock) into cash (Gebreselassieet al., 2006). As a result, many highland armers havelittle capacity even i willing to engage in agriculturalintensication (ibid).

Coupled with lack o land, variability andunpredictability in rainall persists, which is a key reason

or Ethiopia now ranking as one o the countries at mostextreme risk rom the efects o climate change2. Some50% o Ethiopias land area is arid or semi-arid, and largelyrepresent the lowland areas o the country, either kolaor bereha. In such areas, the coecient o inter-annualrainall variability around the mean is as high as 30%(Bewket, 2007). Per capita cereal production is alreadylow at about 150 kg per person per year (Funk et al., 2012)and since the 1980s, Ethiopia has had a structural ooddecit (Gebreselassie, 2006).

Each year some 7 to 12 million individuals in Ethiopiarequire direct ood assistance or ood and cash transers

under the Productive Saety Nets Programme (DFID,2011). PSNP rewards employment in communitypublic works programmes, many o which aim toimprove environmental productivity. Cash transershelp armers smooth over income peaks and troughs,and environmental works enhance uture environmentalproductivity including soil and water conservation.The government has embarked on a massive soil andwater conservation programme, with arm householdscontributing some 60 days each year or completion.

Ethiopias livestock sector is vast the 10th largest inthe world. Livestock and livestock products contributean estimated 16% o national GDP (SOS Sahel, no date).However, in recent years a complex set o actors increased rainall variability, rising temperatures, invasivespecies, conlict and overgrazing are orcing hugechanges within pastoral communities. The government


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is responding with a range o approaches, includingemphasising (controversially) greater sedentarisation3.

2.2 Policy context4

Under the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia

was at the oreront o Aricas climate policy development.Established under his leadership, the country embarkedon a Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) initiative, akey plank in the wider and even more ambitious Growthand Transormation Plan, GTP (MoFED, 2010). This planseeks to enable an economic transormation to middleincome status by 2025. The CRGE is receiving substantialsupport rom UKAid, South Korea, Japan and the UNDP.Core aspects o the GTP are capacity development 5and improving access to markets, including supportingco-operatives and agribusinesses. It also seeks to improverural inrastructure, including provision o roads, irrigationschemes and market acilities such as grain stores and

rerigeration (DFID, 2011).

Core investment approaches are being led by theAgricultural Transormation Agency (ATA) set up underthe Ministry o Agriculture with unding rom the BMGF.ATA is responsible or developing policy approaches insupport o GTP and envisages a shit rom lower- tohigher-value agricultural production, anticipating thatsuch a shit will be central to uture national economicsuccess. The Agricultural Growth Programme (AGP) setup across our regions with a budget o $280m aimsto increase productivity and access to markets, and

includes a ocus on increased engagement by womenand youth (World Bank, 2011). A major ocus on strongerarmer organisations and service providers, better ruralinrastructure, including more eicient value chains,soil and water conservation, as well as programmemonitoring and evaluation seeks to reduce exposureto environmental risk and to strengthen resilience tolivestock and crop losses during dry periods (ibid). Theambition level is high and the intent is to acceleratechange.

The ATA conronts a reality o increasing ambienttemperatures by some 0.3 degrees Celsius per decade

since the 1990s (NMA, 2007) causing shiting boundariesin the agro-ecological zoning o the country. This willintensiy. According to Conway and Schipper (2011)climate change scenarios speciic to Ethiopia haveprojected mean annual temperature across the countryincreasing by between 1.4 and 2.9C by the 2050s.Projections regarding rainall are less certain, but suggestthe possibility o more requent and intense patterns oextreme weather (World Bank, 2010). Implications orthe agricultural sector are not immediately conclusive,particularly because o the major uncertainty surroundingspecic seasonal and monthly shits in diferent regionso the country, which can be critical or smallholder

productivity and ood security.

At the national level, World Bank (2010) states suggeststhat climate change may reduce Ethiopias GDP comparedto a baseline scenario by 2-6% by 2015, and by up to 10%

by 2045. Reerencing the same source, the CRGE statesthat climate change will reduce Ethiopias GDP growthby between 0.5 and 2.5% per year unless efective stepsare taken to build resilience (FDRE, 2011). Much o thisimpact route will be efects in the agricultural sector.

A long-term trend analysis (mid-1970s to 2000s)concluded amongst other things, that continued rapidpopulation growth and the expansion o arming andpastoralism under a drier, warmer climate regime coulddramatically increase the number o at-risk people inEthiopia during the next 20 years, although many areaso Ethiopia would maintain moist climate conditions, andagricultural development in these areas could help ofsetrainall declines and reduced production in other areas(Funk et al., 2012).

For planners the challenge is predicting impacts onEthiopias complex agro-ecological zones. Potential

impacts include changing growing seasons (movementupslope o tef production, or instance), and reducedcapacity or Arabica coee (in particular orest/wildcofee6) production in some areas in the south. Highlandarmers are already sufering losses in barley production,and, in Shewa Robit, ormerly a sorghum belt, there is botha loss in nutrition or highlanders and o biodiversity7.

Changing temperature regimes will afect not onlygrowing seasons, but also the prevalence o natural peststhat attack key cash crops. These impacts are anticipatedto have very signicant implications or the livelihoodso the poorest armers. Some reports suggest that there

is already expansion in crop diseases, including thoseafecting the critical ood staple enset (or alse banana)in southern Ethiopia. Crop weather insurance is beingconsidered one important mechanism to encouragearmers to invest more, but will only work in conjunctionwith other inputs that help in mitigating environmentalasset degradation. It is argued, or instance, that orestcover has declined rom 30% to around 3% in the past30 years (DFID, 2011).

The complexity o this nature at the interace oscientic knowledge and arming systems requires close

institutional collaboration and inter-sectoral planning, inparticular between key agencies such as the EPA, NMAand universities, according to inormants at the NMA.Currently, major human responses to inter-annual rainallvariability include seasonal and inter-annual migration,alternative livelihoods when conditions are conducive,and the adoption o coping strategies.

These strategies are, however, constrained bypopulation density and the ethnic ederal systemestablished over the last two decades. Constraints onsocial mobility could be crucial in determining utureadaptive capacity in Ethiopia. At the same time, current

land-use policy in rural areas, whilst increasing landaccess through certiication o usuruct rights, doesnot enable individual households to dispose o thiskey assets and liquey the value o their land holdingsto invest elsewhere in education, business or other


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activities. Land ownership remains vested in the State,and the State is clinging to this asset.

The map below illustrates the complex nature oEthiopias agro-ecological zones, with higher elevationrained armland rom which radiate out and down to

the lowlands some 12 major rivers, including the Nileand other Nile tributaries.

3 Policy narratives

Many o Ethiopias emerging policy narratives onagriculture and climate change crystallised in early 2012when a decision was taken to harmonise and mainstreamagriculture-related activities under the CRGE into theAgricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework(PIF). CRGE, launched in 2011, has been described as astrategic ramework or organising Ethiopias responseon climate change(DFID, 2011). The CRGE Strategy

contains a number o sectoral plans, which are in theprocess o elaboration. Sector ministries e.g. Agriculture will lead on implementation, though the CRGE Facilityis located within the Ministry o Finance and EconomicDevelopment (DFID, 2011).

The Climate Resilience process under the agriculturesector is receiving support rom the UK8. In 2011, DFIDnoted that challenges in agriculture include a basic lacko capacity to deliver core development services suchas agricultural extension, environmental managementand inrastructure planning (DFID, 2011, p.36). At the

level o establishing a more climate-sensitive agriculturalsector, many challenges remain, including a basic lack ocapacity to deliver core development services such as

agricultural extension, environmental management andinrastructure planning (DFID, 2011). In other words, thereare question marks over whether or not the sector hasreached a level o capacity development to implementa more nuanced sector policy.

The CRGE Vision policy document is explicit on theneed, however, arguing that there will be changes inproduction system viability; cropland area and croppingpatterns; pest and disease requency and distributionbrought about by changes in seasonality; timing and

distribution o rainall; higher evapotranspiration; droughtand ood damage. And relating to the livestock sector,yields will be impacted directly through temperatureefects on annual growth, milk and wool production andreproduction; and indirectly by changes in the quantity

Figure 1. Ethiopias agro-ecological mosaic

Source: http://www.as.usda.gov/pecad2/highlights/2002/10/ethiopia/baseline/Eth_Agroeco_Zones.htmWurch (Cold highlands): Areas above 3000 meters and annual rainall is above 2200-mm. Barley is the dominate crop and light rost otenorms at night.Dega (Cool, humid, highlands): Areas rom 2500-3000 meters where annual rainall ranges rom 1200 to 2200-mm. Barley and wheat arethe dominate crops.Weina Dega(Temperate, cool sub-humid, highlands): Areas between 1500 to 2500 meters, where annual rainall ranges rom 800-1200-mm.This is where most o the population lives and all regional types o crops are grown, especially tef.Kolla (Warm, semi-arid lowlands): Areas below 1500 meters with annual rainal l ranges rom 200-800 mm. Sorghum and corn are grown, withtef grown in the better areas. The kolla is warm year round and temperatures range rom 27 to 50 degrees Celsius.Bereha (Hot and hyper-arid): General term that reers to the extreme orm okolla, where annual rainall is less than 200-mm. The bereha hasdesert type vegetation where pastoralism is the main economic activity. This area encompasses the DenakilDepression, the Eritrean lowlands,

the eastern Ogaden, the deep tropical valleys o the Blue Nile and Tekez rivers, and the peripheral areas along the Sudanese and Kenyan borders.


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and quality o pasture, orage, grass and disease andincreases in parasites. Pastoralist communities may beparticularly negatively impacted by climate change.(FDRE, 2011a, p.8-9).

Based on the current analysis o policy documentation

and interviews with key inormants, the three ollowingcore climate and agriculture narratives were identied.

3.1 Climate-smarter agriculture?

Ethiopias economy is dependent on the successo smallholder arming to provide jobs and securemost o the countrys ood security. Government anddevelopment agencies are now emphasising that utureagriculture development should be climate smart,enabling systems that are more resilient and adaptiveto climate change. The basic concept is o a system that

maintains or increases production o oods or othercrops, supports livelihoods and sustains environmentalresources and ecosystems, adapts to existing anduture climate, sequesters carbon and/or reduces GHGemissions (Beddington et al, 2012). It is also a conceptheavily promoted by the World Bank, which describesit as a triple win, providing increased and greater yieldresilience, and making the arm a solution to climatechange rather than part o the problem (World Bank,2011).

Reecting this narrative, a key inormant rom theEPA9 emphasised that climate-smart agricultural

development involved establishing agricultural activitiesthat included existing techniques and knowledge that,or example, could increase the organic content o soilsthrough conservation tillage, increasing water holdingcapacity and establishing more resilient crops whilst alsoreducing erosion. Citing another example, she statedhow integrated soil ertility management could lowerertiliser costs, increase soil carbon and improve yields.These multiple wins are the centre o the concept.

However, one emerging policy network based inEthiopia states that a triple win approach requires

adjusting institutions, policies, nancing and marketsto strengthen capacities or transormational changeo agriculture systems at various scales (WageningenUR/ HoAREC, 2011). These changes are signicant andstructural in nature; such transormations can only bevery gradual.

Although the current pattern o vulnerability torainall uctuations is a central sub-narrative in supporto climate smart agriculture, there are signicant issuesthat such climate narratives do not address, including thechallenges o land tenure reorm and natural resourcegovernance at a local level. Narratives on vulnerability are

largely ramed in terms o the naturalistic environment;the process o naturalisation o vulnerability helps inmasking the impacts o policy and politics on armingsystems and localised livelihoods, including the verypolitical roots o policies on land reorm. Some argue that

there should be a stronger emphasis on ecosystem-basedadaptation, rather than agricultural intensication10.

Donors and the government have established thePSNP Climate Smart Initiative, which is being pilotedin a number o districts. Under criticism that PSNP

handouts are too small and inrequent to make mucho a dierence, the government has introduced theHousehold Asset Building Programme (HABP), which isimproving access to credit or poor households (DFID,2011). These approaches are mainstreaming climatesmart thinking in Ethiopia, albeit it at a slow pace giventhe many institutional challenges aced.

The CRGE initiative prioritises the ollowing initiativesto limit the soil-based emissions rom agriculture and thepressure on orests rom the expansion o land undercultivation. These are to intensiy cultivation throughimproved inputs and better residue management,

resulting in a decreased requirement or additionalagricultural land that would primarily be taken romorests; creating new agricultural land in degraded areasthrough small-, medium-, and large-scale irrigation toreduce the pressure on orests i expansion o thecultivated area becomes necessary; and to introducelower-emission agricultural techniques, ranging romthe use o carbon- and nitrogen-ecient crop cultivarsto the promotion o organic ertilisers. These measureswould reduce emissions rom already cultivated areas.

3.2 Intensication and

commercialisation

A second major narrative is broader in scope andsits within earlier policy concerns (i.e. pre-dating majorclimate concerns) and relates to generating growththrough more value-based orms o production. Thisis a narrative o intensication and commercialisation.Part o an earlier ADLI concept under the PASDEP, thenarrative emphasises extensication o agriculture in thelowlands through massive conversion o rangelands toirrigated systems and, in the highlands, intensicationand encouragement o a more commercial model under

an agricultural growth theme.

This is a narrative enshrined in the governmentsGrowth and Transormation Plan, the central tenets owhich seek to enhance productivity through scalingup model smallholder arming practices, expandingsmall and medium scale irrigation, strengthening andextending rural all-weather roads and access to markets,and promoting commercial arming. It is expectedthat anticipated increases in productivity will spurindustrialisation and support exports (ADB, 2011).

Irrigation is regarded as an important component o

commercialisation, through reducing arming risk romrainall uctuations as the World Bank made clear ina 2006 water resources study (World Bank, 2006: 49),stating that the unpredictability o rains in Ethiopiarepresent an overwhelming disincentive to invest in


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agricultural improvements. Current cropland irrigatedis just 3% o the total (ibid).

The ve year spurt o investment growth includescommercial agricultural opportunities or investorsin over eight million acres o land, much o which willbe in irrigable areas in Ethiopias lowlands. Whilst thissuggests a major extensication in some areas, the keyGES narratives include increasing the productivity oarmland and livestock rather than increasing the landarea cultivated or the numbers o livestock. The GreenEconomy Strategiy (FDRE, 2011b) speaks o improvingcrop and livestock production practices or higher oodsecurity and armer income while reducing emissions:...traditional economic development...could deliver therequired growth, but at the cost o signicant agricultureland expansion (inducing pursuing and acceleratingdeorestation), soil erosion, and higher emissionsas well as at the risk o reaching the limits to urther

development, e.g., by exceeding the carrying capacityor cattle o Ethiopia. (FDRE 2011b: 23).

3.3 Pastoralist transormation

Major changes are taking place in the predominantlypastoral periphery o Ethiopia. In these lowland kollaareas, lower annual rainall in the Belg season (Funk et al.2012) and changes to grazing areas are orcing changesin pastoral livelihoods.

The livestock sub-sector accounts or some 20% oEthiopias GDP, and the herd inhabits Ethiopias vast

lowland periphery covering some 60% o total land area.Some 10 million pastoralists rely on animal husbandry asa key source o wealth and subsistence. These groups ownhal the countrys cattle and a quarter o other livestockcontributing to a livestock trade worth at least $100million a year (UN-OCHA, 2007 and DFID, 2011).

In recent years, pastoralists have been the ocus ogovernment attempts at transorming productionsystems, including shiting to more commercial ormso production associated with greater sedentarisation opastoral communities. The core argument is that changesin livestock production patterns are, in part, rainall (andthereore grazing) related, and that because o utureuncertainty over rainall patterns pastoral communitiesare particularly vulnerable.

The northeast escarpment along the Awash Valley is acase in point where rainall ailure oten associated withENSO events can severely impede crop production andrangeland grazing. The lower slopes are ast becomingkey areas o competition over access to natural resources.In recent years poor rains have orced pastoralists torange urther and stay away longer rom their baseareas (Rahmato, 2009). The impacts o drought are one

guiding narrative or greater sedentarisation o pastoralcommunities. As Rahmato notes, Drought aggravatesthe risk o animal disease and the inadequate stateo veterinary services means pastoralist productioncontinues to deteriorate. Long years o drought has

meant pastoral groups have lost their hardy and resilientanimal breeds orcing some communities to switch toanimals purchased rom the highlands, which are lesswell adapted, less resilient and less adaptive (ibid).Recent years have seen pastoral groups like the Aarincreasingly move away rom cattle to camels andshoats11, according to a key inormant working on waterand pastoral livelihoods.

Widespread degradation o rangelands and theincrease in less palatable species, including invasivealien species12, has been a recent-onset phenomenonrom the early 1990s onwards. Other longer-termpressures include the impact o increased populationdensity in the highlands leading to settlement movingdown into pastoralist areas. A central narrative o thecurrent move to sedentarise pastoralists is driven by abelie that pastoralist systems are now so much morevulnerable and less resilient. The idea o sedentarisation

thereore becomes part o a wider narrative on disasterrisk reduction and preparedness.

The GTP includes policies aimed at commercialisingand adding value to pastoralism as well as voluntaryresettlement. In the coming ve years, it states, over 3million hectares o land will be identied, prepared and,ensuring it will be used or the desired developmentpurpose, will be transerred to investors and in so doingtangible support will also be given to enhance theirinvestment in commercial agriculture (MoFED, 2010).Counter-narratives include the argument that large-scaleland transer o this nature involve negating the rights

o current owners and users o these lands. Rahmatoargues that in the long run, the shits o agrarian systemrom small-scale to large-scale, oreign-dominatedproduction-which is what the investment program isnow doing-will marginalised small producers, and causeimmense damage to local systems, wildlie habitats andbiodiversity (Rahmato, 2011: vii).

One key pastoral-related strategy under the GESincludes a partial shit towards lower-emitting sources oprotein or support or the consumption o lower-emittingsources o protein, e.g., poultry. An increase o the shareo meat consumption rom poultry to up to 30% appearsrealistic and will help to reduce emissions rom domesticanimals...These initiatives ofer the combined beneto supporting economic growth, increasing armers/pastoralists income and limiting emissions and shouldbe integrated into the plan o activities or implementingthe transormation plan under development by theMinistry o Agriculture (FDRE, 2011b). This is anexample o a crossover rom climate smart thinking,and more specically the mitigation agenda, withouta clear understanding o the institutional and culturalcomplexities involved.

Alternative narratives suggest that the very resilienceo much o the population is compromised by trying toocus on mitigation and adaptation within agriculturaltransormation. A key inormant rom ACCRA argued thatadaptation should be the top priority and should also


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receive more donor ocus, rather than trying to meldtogether adaptation and mitigation agendas.

4 Key actors, institutions and

networks

In all three narratives, there are critically-embeddedassumptions about capacity or transormation withinexisting institutional and policy environments. Whilstagrarian reorm is a key plank in existing dynamiceconomic change in Ethiopia, at present the rigidityo land holdings, the poor access to nancial capitalor armers and the assumptions about capacity andwillingness to embark on transition e.g. in pastoralism question the overall approach being adopted.

There are ve clear lead institutions shaping Ethiopiascurrent climate response in agriculture: the EPA, the Prime

Ministers Oce, MoFED, MoA, and MoWE (DFID, 2011).The PMO is identied by many key inormants as themain political decision making body within Ethiopiasresponse to climate change, which included (underormer Prime Minister Meles Zenawi) very personalengagement by the Prime Minister and his adviser.The EPAs role has been more about coordinating andproviding strategic direction, including negotiatingstrategies at COP meetings. Within the MoA the NaturalResource Management Directorate is particularly strongin mainstreaming climate change in the PSNP and theagricultural investment ramework, and within the

Forestry Department, responding to REDD). MoFEDs roleis basically establishing the CRGE Facility in practice. Theinter-institutional politics involved are in part about therecipient organ or uture climate unding.

Prior to 2009, the NMA was at the oreront o policydevelopment, based on the agencys role in orecastingrainall and its widely-established presence in the country(though not at lower levels). The NAPA was completedunder its auspices and the NMA was responsible ornational engagement in the UNFCCC. Subsequently, therole o the Environmental Protection Agency emerged,in part due to the agencys existing though relatively

weak presence at regional level. In relation to this, onekey inormant (rom FSS) noted that Ethiopia signedinternational climate change instruments and initiallydelegated the EPA or the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and NMAor the UNFCCC, to ensure the integration o climatechange into sectoral policies and development eforts.However recently the later delegations were also shitedto the EPA by the PMO because o coordination problemsand institutional competition13. Formally, EPAs role asEthiopias lead agency on climate change is drawn romthe National Environmental Policy and the Environmental

Protection Organs Establishment Proclamation No.295/2002 (FDRE, 2011c).

The EPAs own lack o human and institutional capacityhas drawn criticism that it is insuiciently robust tolead on climate policy development. Concern over this

recently led to the EPA being accorded ministerial status.Its hitherto largely supervisory mandate insucientlyequipped it to deal with the complex issues o adaptation,which involve negotiating and bridging developmentchallenges across and within sectors.

The role o the Ministry o Agriculture is still emerging,hampered by its own lack o human resource capacity.Control over policy ormulation remains centralisedwithin the Prime Ministers Oice and its associated though nominally independent think tank, theEthiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI).

Ethiopias policy responses on climate and agricultureinclude a programme o institution-building. Thisinvolves new technical institutions shaping policy andnew vehicles or channelling uture climate nance. In2011 the GoE established the Agricultural TransormationAgency (ATA). The ATA aims to promote agriculture sectortransormations and is modelled on similar initiatives inKorea and Malaysia. Led by a CEO, it is governed by aninter-ministerial council chaired by the PM, and drivesorward an agenda o technological innovation andsystems change to enable increased productivity andimproved livelihoods or smallholder armers.

In spite o the governments Civil Society Law o 2009,which seeks to restrict the mandate and role o civil societyinstitutions, civil society is playing an important role inclimate policy dialogue within Ethiopia. This includesenabling access to greater scientic knowledge throughlinkages to global networks and experience-sharingwith other countries. Currently three major civil societynetworks work on climate change issues ECSNCC,CCF-E and CCRDA. Their capacity and strengths vary butcommon to all three is convening power. This strengthenscross-cutting approaches to climate knowledge andclimate change policy. Recent Ethiopian delegations toCOP have included representatives o these networks.Nevertheless, the extent o their advocacy and lobbyingwork on climate policy is limited, as the Law has led toincreasing reluctance among national NGOs to challengemainstream policy narratives.

Overall the private sector role is remains weak. DFIDis unding a new Climate Innovation Centre dedicatedto incubating businesses working in low carbon sectors(DFID, 2011). However, this has been slow to take of and,by its own admission, ...all these institutions will struggleto succeed without broader institutional and regulatory


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reorms (DFID, 2011). With support rom the World Bank,CIC has recently nalised its design o a ve-year BusinessPlan under its stated mission to provide a holistic seto early-stage nancing, business support and capacitybuilding services to the Ethiopia private sector, includingwomen and rurally based entrepreneurs and business

owners, working to develop, launch innovative climatetechnology ventures that promote Ethiopias climateresilience and green growth. (InoDev/World Bank,2011). There is no similarly-unded set o institutions onadaptation and a proposal to establish an agriculture-climate research centre was turned down under DFIDsSCIP initiative.

It is also apparent that to date much climate policyand planning remains institutionally top-down, althoughsome consultation took place during the ormulation othe NAPA ollow-on document, the EPACC. This is nowbeing transormed into the national Climate Resilient

Strategy as one component o CRGE (the other beingthe Green Economy Strategy) and is due to be releasedin 2013. The approach ollowed has been described asboth top-down (the initial 20 issues to be covered weredirectly provided by EPA), and bottom up (through otheractor engagement the issues increased to 29). An initialnational drat was based on seven sectoral adaptationplans, nine regional and two city plans, and an initialsample ocus o 64 woredas. The lessons learnt rom theseare to be gradually scaled up to the whole country (FDRE,2011c). CRGE initiatives are presented in Figure 2 below,rom the CRGE Vision document (FDRE 2011a).

One key inormant14 stated that this experience wasone o the rst involving real policy inuence rom below,including by CSOs. Nevertheless, there is a question markover whether or not the inputs rom civil society networkssuch as PANE, ECSNCC and FSS have been truly taken onboard, including issues like the introduction o a green

tax on polluters.

The Green Economy Strategy (GES), by contrast,was weak in terms o actor inclusion, according to aninormant at the EPA15. Most inormants amongst NGOsnoted that the GES development only consulted thoseNGOs involved under two sub-technical thematiccommittees (including SLUF, EWNRA and ISD under soiland livestock emissions, and the Orthodox Church andWorld Vision under the REDD sub-thematic group).

Other key actors in shaping agriculture-speciicelements o climate change policy include the Natural

Resources Directorate and the climate change task orcewithin the MoA. WFP, the Sustainable Land ManagementProgramme Coordination oce, the World Bank, GiZand FARM Arica are also identied, according to keyinormants, as important in shaping policy related toclimate change under the MoA. With specic reerenceto climate smart approaches, both the World Bank andFAO are key actors in advocating this approach.

The World Bank has pushed hard or soil carbon trading.However, some civil society organisations are reluctantto support carbon sequestration as a key agenda item,

arguing that it is inappropriate in the Ethiopia context

Source: FDRE, 2011a/ CRGE Vision.

Figure 2. Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) initiatives in Ethiopia.

Constitution of Ethiopia

Environment Policy

CRGE Vision, InvestmentPlan, Facility &Strategy

Regional CRGE

Programmes & Action Plans

Sectoral CRGE

Programmes & Action Plans

Ethiopias Programmeof Adaptation to

Climate Change (EPACC)

Green Economy

Initiatives (e.g.National Appropriate

Mitigation Actions)


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as part o climate smart agriculture not least because o

the realities that manure and other crop residues that

otherwise would be used as compost are tradable local

commodities at a local level or use as building materials

o as a uel source. Hence they are important to the local

livelihoods o the very poorest, in particular. The ECSNCC

also orwarded a message prior to the Conerence othe Parties (COP) to the Climate Convention in Durban,

December 2011, which requested the Arican head o

states and governments to understand the implications

o emerging issues entering into the climate agenda

such as climate smart agriculture, soil carbon trading

and green economy, prior to ull-scale implementation

(ECSNCC, 2011).

The ollowing table provides a summary o theinstitutional roles and strengths that shape the climate

change and agricultural policy landscape in Ethiopia. Itis ranked in descending order o control over decision-making processes based on centrality to the policy-making processes. This strength assessment is based

on interviews and document analysis.

5 Financing challenges

Specic inormation on how nancing is channelledand managed is weak in part because relativelylittle unding has been disbursed as yet. The majorcoordination organisation the EPA is reluctant toprovide details. At present, EPACC remains the main

Table 1. Institutional roles and strengths in Ethiopia

Institution RolePMO Provides political decisions and strategic policy directions, in negotiating; leads

on the national Environmental Council; plays a largely political andconstitutional role.

Environmental Council Approves environmental standards and directives, recommends laws,establishes the MSC and appoints its chair; composed o the PM plus leadingocials rom government, the private sector and civil society.

Ministerial SteeringCommittee

Oversees, monitors implementation and expenditure; chaired by the head oEDRI and composed o state ministers and senior ocials rom participatinginstitutions; responsible or direction setting and expected outcomes o theCRGE.

EPA Provides technical supervision and expertise as well as monitoring

implementation; composed o leading proessionals and an expert team.MoFED Secures and channels nance; hosts and administers the CRGE Facility, which

allocates resources according to priorities.

Technical Committee Technical committee chaired by the head o the EPA; composed o STC chairs,and responsible or coherence and approval o content; discusses output romSTCs; reviews, prioritises and approves projects and programme unding andcoordinates CRGE unctions o EUs; composed o chairs o environmental unitsand experts rom EPA and MoFED.

STCs There are seven Sub-sectoral Technical Committees chaired by senior expertsrom leading ministries; around 50 experts are involved rom 20 governmentinstitutions developing sectoral plans that will eed into a ederal plan; theseare largely responsible or context development.

Regional EnvironmentalAgencies

Coordinate regional implementation and are composed o experts; responsibleor coordinating environmental issues including climate change.

Environment (or CRGE) Unit Develops sectoral implementation plans or the CRGE, unding proposals andcoordinates, and drives implementation; composed o selected experts romeach involved institution; helps to rene policy and implement thearrangements identied in the vision; responsible or identiying the prioritiesor climate activities, including identiying research gaps and rening climateaction plans, establishing an M&E ramework and tracking national progresstowards a climate resilient green economy.

Climate Change Unit o MoA The unit ocuses on mainstreaming climate change issues in the diferentsub-sectors.

Woredas Some districts have developed local (woreda) adaptation plans (e.g. in Oromia

and Aar regions) according to interviewee at EPA.

Kebeles Unclear how much, i any, consultation has taken place below the woreda levelwith kebele leaders and/or communities.

Sources: DFID, 2011; FDRE, 2011 and interviews


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vehicle or adaptation unding in Ethiopia. South Koreaprovided inancing or the Green Economy Strategy.Japan Oicial Development Assistant and the UNDPare other major additional unders.

According to the CGRE Vision policy document, an

initial programme or the rst three-year phase o theEPACC (2011-14) has been budgeted at US$10 millionand will receive signicant support rom the Governmento Japan through the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (US$ 6.5 million), with a urther US$ 2.6 millionrom the United Nations Development Programme.

In addition, it is reported that the European Union willprovide 13.7 million Euros or implementing the EPACC.Other donors including the World Bank support thiswork through studies on the Economics o Adaptationto Climate Change in Ethiopia and DFIDs 15 millionStrategic Climate Institutions Programme, while not

directly supporting EPACC, will complement its activities(FDRE, 2011).

With support rom McKinsey and the NorwegianGovernment, the government has prepared around 80investment plans and a Green Economy Strategy. CRGEpreparation was supported by the UK, the Global GreenGrowth Institute (GGGI) and the UNDP. Its Vision (see box1 below) is accompanied by a strategy that breaks downcosts according to sectors and regions.

The NMA does not directly receive climate nance, butindirectly through broader support rom the WMO which

receives these unds through the Rockeeller Foundationand the World Bank/UN system.

Under Ethiopias Green Economy Strategy, it has beencalculated that under a carbon neutral growth trajectoryEthiopia could oset some 250 million tonnes eachyear. Even given the current carbon price o US$10-20a tonne, this could generate billions o dollars or thecountry (FDRE, 2011a). However, barriers to uture carbonnancing in Ethiopia include diculties in accessingcredits (skewed against activities such as reorestation)and because o the low value o CDM credits (DFID, 2011).

A key inormant at HoAREC also argued that a weaknesso the carbon nancing approach was the ocus on thenew tree planting, but lack o ocus on protection oexisting orests. Part o the rationale or expansion oirrigation is so-called degraded areas predominantlyin the lowlands that this will not afect existing orest

cover, though this is disputed. Moreover, what mayappear degraded can also be used seasonally or pasture.

The terms o reerence or the Facility has introducedtwo windows: a strategic window and a responsivewindow and two accounts (national account, at theNational Bank, which ollows the rules o MoFED, anda Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) account, or theearmarked, UNDP managed account). The two windowswill work as ollows:

Thestrategic windowconsiders proposals (investmentplans) and associated institution-building requirements,

accounting or more than 75% o total unds contributed.Investment plans would be submitted by line ministriesand regional governments (alongside ministries), jointlyor in parallel with the standard government budgetprocess. Funds invested in the strategic window would bepooled and would not be earmarked. Sectoral investmentproposals will eature both climate activities undertakenthrough mainstreaming into existing programs andthrough additional programs. Investment proposalsidentied under each sector investment plan shouldspeciy their nancing needs - broken down by source(public, private) and type (grant, guarantee, loan etc).

The responsive windowwill provide demand-drivensupport or implementation and institution-buildingactivities. This window would be open to proposalsdeveloped outside the sector reduction mechanism ona demand-driven basis and rom a range o stakeholders,but primarily accessed by Government institutions atederal, regional and local levels. The intention is thatunds could be accessed by communities, as well asacademic institutions, CSOs and private organisations,working in partnership with government institutions atdiferent levels.

Box 1. Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Facility Approach and VisionClosely linked to the EPA, the PMO and MoFED, the CRGE Facility established within MoFED will channelnance to activities prioritised in the CRGE Strategy and, later, Plan. The Facility will be responsible orattracting, allocating and channelling international climate nance, leveraging both public and privatenance, rom multilateral and bilateral sources. Finance will be provided or activities that have been identiedin the CRGE Strategy and Plan.

Ideally, climate nance will complement other orms o investment to bolster Ethiopias core climate-compatible development activities (in areas such as ood security, energy, inrastructure development andnatural resource management).

We are also looking at the possibility o having a results-based perormance mechanism or allocating nance.At least initially, the CRGE Facilitys duciary risk and nancial management unctions will be provided byUNDP. The CRGE Facility will administer a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) in anticipation o donors increasinglychannelling bilateral climate unds through the MPTF (FDRE, 2011a). Additional sources or the acility areanticipated to be UNFCCC nance, Fast Start Finance, Climate Investment Funds and, carbon nance (ibid).


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According to DFID key inormants, more than a millionpounds has been provided to civil society and the EPAas well as nancial support or CRGE development. SCIPinitially had some 15 million or institutional capacitydevelopment, with 8 million earmarked or governmentand civil society, including a Climate Innovation Centre

that will receive 5 million and M&E ( 750,000), accordingto a DFID Ethiopia key inormant in 2011. However, thisgure has been reduced considerably over time.

Development agencies have established an inormalgroup to share inormation and coordinate policy,particularly with respect to attempts at harmonisation.An optimal strategy would include donors investingmoney through the multi-donor CRGE Facility, avoidingurther ragmentation. So ar it is not clear that this isbeing achieved.

At present the climate inancing picture is one o

emerging policies and institutions that seek to captureuture nancing ows, both bilateral and multilateral.There is little sense o how climate unds will tricklethrough to practical agricultural solutions. Concerns wereraised by some interviewees that the CRGE was rushedthrough very quickly, and with limited stakeholderconsultation outsid16 , which meant that it was basedentirely on the knowledge o technical experts andmissing local knowledge and expertise. At present thereare many initiatives, but ew established real nancingor support routes to smallholder armers beyond PSNPs(which only target the poorest). Important no regretsapproaches, moreover, including huge soil and water

conservation programs are being nanced largely byarming households contributing 60 days o labour timein-kind per household a year.

Secondly, insoar as nancing is likely to drive a strongerCSA approach, this will be within the context o a landpolicy that is securing land access but not ownership.Fluidity in transerring land holdings into liquid assetshas yet to become policy, and at the present time seemsto be many years away.

Finally, pastoralism has little it within currentnancing rameworks. This suggests the uture onus will

be on pastoralism tting within a more commercial-agropastoral narrative raming in which rangelands are seenas high-risk (or degraded) areas and the settlement opastoralists a logical response to risk, mitigation andadaptation needs.

6 Conclusion: Wider political

economic drivers are

shaping responses

This paper has mapped the emerging policy process

on climate change and agriculture in Ethiopia. Overall,there are ew surprises in terms o interests and inuenceover the direction o Ethiopias agricultural policyresponse to climate change. Ethiopias economy is nota system o interest-groups lobbying to determine the

eventual shape o policy approaches. Rather, the rulingEPRDF and interest groups, such as there are, unctionwithin limited spaces and out o public scrutiny withinthe party s ruling apparatus.

The countrys ethnic regions are nominally

autonomous, but largely under the control o the partymachinery, either directly or indirectly. Any genuinelyoppositional voice to a policy is unlikely to exert inuenceeither at a regional or ederal level and is more likelyto be suppressed. In short, there is no genuine publicpolicy debate on the shape and direction o climate andagricultural policy in Ethiopia.

Drivers o change are rmly rooted in the economicsand political interests associated with the agriculturaleconomy and the exigencies o control over a vast ruralpopulation. The State as a development agent plays ahuge part in the lives o armers directing policies that

seek to achieve greater livelihood security, but in returnremain shy o truly transormational change.

Decision making surrounding climate policy servesthe interests o a greater agricultural stability, but alsoo an agricultural sector that is compliant and politicallyneutral. A persistent lack o major land prevents armersbecoming owners o their key resource and deters theirown decision making on disposal o this vital asset. Theresult is continued ragmentation o plots, which remainsat the core o vulnerability and risk in rural productionsystems. Rainall uncertainty merely adds to this risk.

It could thus be argued that there is a substantialcontradiction within climate and agricultural policy inas ar as it seeks to maintain and increase the productivityo smallholder arming through intensication but locksup real capacity or change. Greater land consolidationwith ewer separate arms and more people moving romarming into other non-arm occupations will have totake place in uture. Additionally, massive support orlarge-scale mechanised arming including irrigation in major lowland areas is directly afecting pastoralistrangelands as investors turn lowlands into sugarplantations and arms or other major cash crops. The

intent is agriculture-led industrialisation, and onwardeconomic linkages that can generate new industries.

The continued increase in population in Ethiopiashighlands in the absence o alternative livelihoodstrategies and land reorm is a substantial policychallenge that has yet to be tackled. At no point doclimate, agriculture and population policy intersect.When, in early 2012, it was agreed that the agriculturesector should be proactive in taking on board the CRGEagenda, real impetus began behind mainstreamingagricultural elements o the CRGE into the PIF.

Emerging core narratives include climate smartagriculture; transormations to a more commercialisedorm o arming; and pastoral transormations. AlthoughEthiopia has established strong policy directions in recent


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years, a major gap still exists in the capacity to efectchange through implementation locally.

Real challenges lie at the levels o political power anddecision making, and with an improved ideas-reality tboth in terms o uncertainty surrounding climate science

and in the response behaviour o the international system.Hitherto the latter has been somewhat led by a strongtop-down decision making environment in Ethiopia andhas not been willing to challenge the policy positions onland and other issues central to uture climate resilienceand, moreover, the adoption o a low-carbon economy.

Key risk actors including underlying trends inpopulation growth and environmental degradation,particularly related to soil ertility, are poorly addressed,particularly when considered in isolations rom widerenergy use trends in rural areas. A more consensus-basedpublic policy environment could strengthen emergingsolutions and cement the capacity o local armers tobecome agents o their own transormation ratherthan subjects o top-down adaptation and mitigationplanning.

At present narratives on vulnerability and change arelargely ramed in terms o the naturalistic environment;the process o naturalisation o vulnerability helps inmasking the impacts o policy and politics on armingsystems and localised livelihoods. Rainall variability andtemperature rise are taken as risk actors to be addressedthrough climate change policies. Other institutional and

social policies, such as on land tenure, demography, andemployment, are currently of limits in this debate, yet arecentral to wider debates on agricultural transormation.

END NOTES

1 Similar case studies have been carried out in Kenya,Ghana and Malawi (c. Maina et al., 2013; Chinsingaet al., 2012; Sarpong and Anyidoho, 2012).

2 Maplecrot CCVI 2012 (see http://maplecrot.com/about/news/ccvi_2013.html)

3 Sedentarisation here means the process o settling

nomadic pastoralists.4 See also Annex 2 or key relevant policies.

5 Improving armer skills, techniques and inputs atthe smallholder level, to improving soil managementand animal health services

6 See http://www.guardian.co.ukcommentisree/2012/nov/13/cofee-not-dead-wild-ethiopia

7 Personal communication with FSS.

8 Meeting note drat prepared by the UNDP Climate

Change, Environment and Disaster RiskManagement Team, May 2012.

9 Personal Communication with EPA, October 11,2011

10 Personal Communication with FSS, October 11,2011

11 Sheep and goats

12 Including Prosopis Juliora in the Awash Valley inparticular.



15 Prepared during 2011 or COP 17 in Durban, apromised two months o extensive consultation toensure alignment on priorities did not materialise.

16 The CRGE was initiated in February, 2011 andlaunched already during COP 17 in Durban,December 2011. The drat GES stated that ...thedocument will be used during two months oextensive stakeholder consultation to ensurenational alignment on priorities, conirm initialndings, create awareness, and join orces (FDRE2011b). According to interviewees, this two-monthconsultation did not happen, however.

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ADB (2011) Climate Change Action Plan, 2011-2015.

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Beddington, et al (2012) What Next or Agriculture aterDurban? Science, 335 (20).

Belay K. And Manig W. (2004) Access to rural land ineastern Ethiopia: mismatch between policy and reality.Journal o Agriculture and Rural Development in theTropics and Subtropics, 105 (2): 123-138

Bewket, W. (2007) Rainall variability and the need orwater security in Ethiopia. In the Nile Waters and Ethiopia:Mainstreaming the Nile Issue into the Media, Academiaand Research Institutions. Workshop Proceedings, AddisAbaba: Flamingo Printing Press PLC.

Conway, D. and Schipper, E.L.F. (2011). Adaptation toclimate change in Arica: Challenges and opportunitiesidentied rom Ethiopia. Global Environmental Change,21 (2011) 227237.

DFID (2011) Strategic Climate Institutions Programme,Design Paper, DFID Ethiopia.

ECSNCC (2011) Ethiopian Civil Society Network onClimate Change, Policy Brie No.2 Lessons rom theCopenhagen Accord or the implementation o theCancun Agreements and Beyond, Addis Ababa.


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FDRE (2010) Federal Democratic Republic o Ethiopia,Ministry O Agriculture And Rural Development Ethiopias

Agricultural Sector Policy And Investment Framework(Pi) 2010-2020 Drat Final Report 15 September 2010.

FDRE (2011a) Ethiopias vision or a climate resilient greeneconomy, CRGE: Vision, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

FDRE (2011b) Ethiopias Climate-Resilient GreenEconomy: Green economy strategy (Drat), Addis Ababa,Ethiopia

FDRE (2011c) Climate Resilient Green Economy: MissionStatement.

FDRE (2012) Ethiopias Climate Resilient Green Economy(CRGE) Facility: Terms o Reerence (Final Drat) FinalRevised Version, June, 2012, Addis Ababa.

FEPA (2011) Ethiopias Program o Adaptation to ClimateChange, Federal Environmental Protection Authority, 17July, Addis Ababa

Funk C, Rowland J, Eilerts G, Kebebe E, Biru N, White Land Galu G, 2012 A Climate Trend Analysis o Ethiopia.Climate change Adaptation Series. Famine Early WarningSystems Network, U.S. Geological Survey, USAID. FactSheet, 6p, April 2012.

Gebreselassie, S (2006) Food Aid and SmallholderAgriculture in Ethiopia, Future Agricultures DiscussionPaper 11. IDS, Brighton.

Gebreselassie, S., Teshome, A., Devereux, S., Scoones, I.and K. Sharp (2006) Pathways or Ethiopian Agriculture:Options and Scenarios, Future Agricultures Consortium(FAC) Policy Brie 02. IDS, Brighton.

Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (2003) UnderstandingEnvironmental Policy Processes: Cases rom Arica, Ch.2, London: Earthscan, pp. 21-39.

MoFED (2010) Federal Democratic Republic o Ethiopia Growth and Transormation Plan 2010/11-2014/15,Volume I: Main Text, Addis Ababa, Drat

NMA (2007) Climate Change National AdaptationProgramme o Action (NAPA) o Ethiopia, June, AddisAbaba, Ministry o Water Resources/NationalMeteorological Agency

Oromia National Regional State (2011) Program o Planon Adaptation to Climate Change, Team Members

Participated in this Document Preparation Regional Taskorce Members, Technical and Financial Support:Environmental Protection Authority o the FederalDemocratic Republic o Ethiopia, February, 2011, Finnne

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Annexes

Annex 1: List of interviewees

No. Organisation Date

1 PANE (Poverty Action Network in Ethiopia) October 5, 20112 ACCRA October 14, 2011

3 FSS October 11, 2011

4 HoAREC October 10, 2011

5 MoA, NRM Directorate October, 2011

6 EPA October 11, 2011

7 EPA October 11, 2011

8 Christian Aid October 21 , 2011

9 Christian Aid October 31, 2011

10 CCF-E October 19, 2011

11 HU October 19, 201112 AAE October 21 , 2011

13 ECSNCC October 17, 2011

14 MoA October 16, 2011

15 EIAR October 24, 2011

16 FE October 28, 2011

17 ENDA- Ethiopia November 3, 2011

18 Sustainable Land Use Forum (SLUF) November 3, 2011

19 AFD October 27, 2011

20 Population, Health & Education (PHE) Consortium - Ethiopia November 3, 2011

21 Addis Ababa University (AAU) , Science Faculty, Environmental ScienceProgram

October 18, 2011

22 Addis Ababa University (AAU), Collage o Development Studies (CDS) November, 2011

23 CC Programme Coordinator, Oxam America November 21, 2011

24 Director o Meteorological Research and Studies Directorate February 10, 2012

25 Senior expert on EIA February 7, 2012

26 DFID Ethiopia, 2 advisors February 14, 2012

28 FAO Ocer April 3, 2012

29 Environment Program Coordinator, Panos Ethiopia October, 2011

30 HoAREC October 10, 2011


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Annex 2: Key national policies

Policy Year Institutional owner

The Environmental Policy o Ethiopia 1997 EPA

Initial national communications (submitted to UNFCCC)

Environmental Impact Assessment

Proclamation 299 o 2002

Climate Change National Adaptation Programme o Action (NAPA) oEthiopiaGrowth and Transormation Plan

2001

2002

2007

2010

NMA/EPA

EPA

NMA/EPA

MoFED

Climate Resilient Green Economy Initiative: Vision 2011 EPA

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) plan, January 2010

Ethiopian Program o Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC) (currentlyclimate resilient strategy is under preparation)

2010

2011

EPA

EPA

Green economy strategy 2011 2011 EPA

Agriculture Development Led Industrialisation 1993

Rural Development Policy and Strategies 2003 MoFED

Pastoral Development Policy 2002

Productive Saety Nets Program 2004

Household Asset Building Program (HABP) 2009/10 MoARD

Sustainable Land Management Project (SLMP) 2008/09 MoARD

Agriculture Sector Programme o Adaptation to Climate Change 2011 Ministry o Agriculture (MoA)

Ethiopias Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF)

2010-2020

2010 MoARD

Others:

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) known as Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction (SDPRP)was implemented rom 2002-2005, MoFED

PASDEP (Plan or Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty), rom 2006-2010, MoFED National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM), 1993, DPPA/DPPC The Constitution o the Federal Democratic Republic o Ethiopia, 1995, FDRE/GoE Food Security Strategy, 2002, FDRE Food Security Programme, 2009, MoARD National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management /DRM (Drat), 2010, FDRE DRM Strategic Program and Investment Framework, 2011, DRMFSS


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Annex 3: Abbreviations

ACCRA Arica Climate Change Resilience Alliance

ACPC Arica Climate Policy Centre

ADLI Agriculture-Development Led Industrialisation

ADB Arican Development Bank

AAU Addis Ababa University

AMU Arba Minch University

ATA Agricultural Transormation Agency

CAADP Comprehensive Arica Agriculture Development Programme

CAHOSCC Conerence o Arican Heads o State on Climate Change

CC Climate Change

CCA Climate Change Adaptation

CCF-E Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia

CCRDA Consortium o Christian Relie and Development Association

CDM Clean Development Mechanism

CEO Chie Executive Ocer

CHIP Climate High-Level Programme

ClimDev Climate Inormation or Development in Arica

COP Conerence o the Parties, the annual summit o UNFCCC

CPWD Community based Participatory Watershed Development

CRGE Climate Resilient Green Economy

CRSCSOs

Climate Resilient StrategyCivil Society Organisations

DFID Department or International Development

DPPC Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission

DRM Disaster Risk Management

DRMFS Disaster Risk Management and Food Security

CSI Climate Smart Initiative

EC European Commission

ECSNCC Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate Chance

EDRI Ethiopian Development Research Institute

EIAR Ethiopian Institute o Agricultural Research

EPA-CC Ethiopias Programme o Adaptation to Climate Change

EPA Environment Protection Authority

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization o the UN

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic o Ethiopia

FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network,

FSS FSS: Forum or Social Studies

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoE Government o Ethiopia

GGGI Global Green Growth Institute

GTP Growth and Transormation Plan

HABP Household Asset Building Programme

HoARECN Horn o Arica Region Environment Centre and Network

HU Haramiya University


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ICF International Climate Fund

IDS Institute o Development Studies

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IWMI International Water Management Institute

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MoARD Ministry o Agriculture and Rural Development

MoFED Ministry o Finance and Economic Development

MoWE Ministry o Water and Energy

MPTFMSC

Multi-Partner Trust FundMinisterial Steering Committee

MU Mekele University

NAPA National Adaptation Program o Action

NPDPM National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

NMAE National Meteorological Agency o Ethiopia

OA Oxam America

PANE Poverty Action Network Ethiopia

PM Prime Minister

PMO Prime Minister Oce

PASDEP Plan or Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty

PIF Policy and Investment Framework

PSNP Productive Saety Nets Program

RDSP Rural Development Policy and Strategies

REDD Reducing Emission rom Deorestation and Forest Degradation

REDFS Rural Economic Development and Food Security

SCIP Strategic Climate Institutions Programme

SDPRP Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program

SLMP Sustainable Land Management Project

SLUF Sustainable Land Use Forum

SNNPR Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Region

SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights

STC Sub Technical Committees

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-OCHA United Nations Oce o the Coordinator o Humanitarian Afairs

USAID United States Agency or International Development

WB World Bank

WMO World Meteorological Organization


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