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Factors Influencing the Emergence of Environmental Foreign Policy: The Case of Malaysia

By:

Dr. Roslina Ismail Universiti Malaysia Terengganu

Abstract

Since the 1990s, there has been greater attention to the environmental foreign policies of individual states as a research area in the analysis of international environmental politics. This is proven by the fact that case studies related to the research area have been increasing significantly during the decade. The developments, however, have precluded the case of Malaysia. Indeed, the case of Malaysia is also important to the understanding of environmental foreign policy in the analysis of international environmental politics. This paper argues that Malaysia’s environmental foreign policy exists. It examines factors influencing the emergence of the policy: how the factors come to play in deciding whether or not the policy exists. In so doing, it begins by discussing the significance of studying Malaysian environmental foreign policy. After that, it discusses six factors influencing the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Then, it discusses an alternative perspective that derives from explanations of three prominent scholars of international politics namely Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985) and Miller (1995) that support the effectiveness of the factors in influencing the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Finally, this paper concludes with findings and recommendations for further research stemming from the study's findings.

Key words: Malaysia, Environmental Foreign Policy, Krasner, Miller, Wriggins Introduction Environmental foreign policy may be referred to what Yoon (2006: 74) calls the “government’s attempts to advance its national interests on environmental matters through interactions with foreign actors”. Analysis on environmental foreign policies is important for the understanding of the more complex situation of international environmental political issues. For instance, according to Sprintz and Vaahtoranta (1994:77) such analysis may support explanations of the success or failure of international environmental regulations. Since the 1990s, there has been greater attention to what may be called environmental foreign policies of individual (idiosyncratic) states as a research area in the analysis of international environmental politics. The research area has been developed by writers, such as Hopgood (1998), Economy Elizabeth (1998), Harris (2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2005; and 2007), Yoon (2006), and Niederberger and Schwager (2011). This paper seeks to analyse and discuss factors influencing the emergence environmental foreign policy of an individual

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(idiosyncratic) state, Malaysia. It argues that Malaysian environmental foreign policy exists and there are factors that influence the emergence of the policy. In so doing, it starts with discussing the significance of studying Malaysian environmental foreign policy. After that, it discusses factors that may influence the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Then, it discusses an alternative perspective that derives from explanations of three prominent scholars of international politics namely Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985) and Miller (1995). It will be showing how the perspective supports the effectiveness of the factors in the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Finally, this paper concludes with findings and recommendations for further research stemming from the study's findings. Why Malaysian environmental foreign policy? Indeed, the case of Malaysia is also important to the understanding of environmental foreign policy in the analysis of international environmental politics. The importance of studying the case of Malaysian environmental foreign policy can be seen in four aspects as follows: 1. It may extend the research line of inquiry regarding the domestic characteristics that

influence environmental foreign policy. Harris (2005: 4) argues that environmental foreign policy “can reveal important national characteristics that shape state behaviour, both domestically and internationally”. However, previous case studies of environmental foreign policies of individual states have not provided sufficient insight into the domestic characteristics of the environmental foreign policies of developing states. This gap certainly suggests the need for another study critically examining the domestic characteristics of environmental foreign policies of developing states, which is sought to be done by this paper.

2. It may unveil the specific fields of the reader’s interest in Malaysia’s involvement in international environmental politics, for instance, the politics of environmental concerns in Malaysia, and the history of environmental policy and politics in Malaysia. This paper captures all these aspects of the reader’s interest and concern.

3. It may add another dimension in analysing the role and the objective of states in international environmental politics. For instance, it would highlight the aspects that relate to the conviction that the futures of both Planet Earth and of future generations still lie in the hands of individual states. The aspects are as follows.

a. Individual states hold legitimate authority over the execution of all governmental activities at local level, such as imposing local environmental policies and regulations on the people, and monitoring environmental protection and pollution within their territorial jurisdiction.

b. Individual states have their roles in intergovernmental relations; they hold a crucial position in international institutions and regimes (Dauvergne 2005) through which the performance of international environmental cooperation is evaluated (Vogler 1996).

c. Individual states undertake the responsibility expected by the public that looks for serious attention being given to the tasks pertaining to managing

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environmental crises and protection. Doyle and McEachern (2008: 4) stress that states have their stands concerning ‘the willingness to accept the existence of an environmental crisis’. At this point, the efforts individual states make to meet the responsibility the public in regard to their dealing with environmental crises and protection, though desirable, is questionable chiefly because – like other actors, which are dynamic in international environmental politics – they are also dynamic in politics. However, they are still responsible for the public’s needs and to its opinions. Thus, by uncovering actions of individual states in regard to these, this study has gone some way in highlighting environmental foreign policies of states, their roles and objectives in international environmental politics.

4. It can offer some general ideas of the environmental policies and politics in individual developing states. It can also fill the gap in the existing literature: Malaysia’s behaviour towards international environmental issues has received widespread attention among writers of international environmental politics, yet the issues they have focused on are strictly segmental, that is, separated from one another.1 On the contrary, this paper offers various issues associated with Malaysian environmental foreign policy which are related to one another. Above all, studying Malaysia’s environmental foreign policy is important for both the research area of environmental foreign policy, and the field of international environmental politics.

A brief review of literature Prior to discussing the factors mentioned above, it is essential to provide a brief review of literature on environmental foreign policy. In the search for previous research in the area of environmental foreign policy, one has to look into foreign policy literature. This is because the essential element of environmental foreign policy, which is about interactions between states and foreign actors, also reflects the basic definition of foreign policy. Foreign policy, according to the basic definition, is ‘the activity [a boundary activity or the straddle of activity between two environments: an internal or domestic environment and an external or global environment] whereby state actors act, react, and interact’ (Evans and Newnham 1998: 179). In the foreign policy literature, it has been revealed that studies on environmental foreign policy began to receive attention from writers since the Second World War. From then until this writing, there has been a range of research focuses related to the studies. For the sake of this paper, the research focus discussed here is merely about environmental foreign policies of individual (idiosyncratic) states. This is because it is within this dimension that the current study is situated. This research focus has been the most studied dimension in

1 This conviction is established based on several writings about Malaysia’s participation in the United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED; Taib 1997); in Antarctic affairs (Tepper and Haward 2005); in forest negotiations at the UN (Humphreys 2004); and in the politics of tropical timber (Dauvergne 1997).

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the research area of environmental foreign policy. Among writers, Hopgood’s PhD thesis (1995) has used the term ‘foreign environmental policy’ (that equally means ‘environmental foreign policy’) to capture the formulation of the US environmental foreign policy. His writing may be regarded as pioneering in the research on environmental foreign policy of individual states. He was the one who first considered environmental foreign policy of individual states in the analysis of international environmental politics. He argues that the foreign policy process at UN negotiation tables serves as a means for demonstrating involvement of states in international environmental politics (Hopgood 1995). Taib (1997) followed Hopgood’s method of analysis that utilized the data from negotiations at the UN environmental conferences. She examined Malaysia’s role at UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) and made use of data from negotiations and diplomacy at UNCED that involved Malaysia. Economy Elizabeth (1998) has studied the Chinese environmental foreign policy. She has highlighted a number of issues relating to it, which are of not concern to this paper, such as the evolution and objectives of the protection of the sovereignty of China, China’s access to foreign technology, funds and training, and the economic sustainability of China. Since the late 1990s, much more publications on environmental foreign policies of individual states has been produced (See for instance, Harris 2000; Harris 2001a; Harris 2001b; Harris 2005; and Harris 2007). Most of these publications focus on environmental politics of US foreign policy. One of them has offered a framework of analysis to use. In Harris (2005) he has made use of a framework of analysis to examine environmental foreign policies of China and Japan. However, the framework is incompatible with this paper. Amidst the developments in the research on environmental foreign policies of individual states resulting from the extensive work of Harris, Yoon (2006) came out with an analysis of South Korean environmental foreign policy. She argues that South Korean environmental foreign policy evolved from ‘a dual-track fashion’, that is environmental preservation and economic interests (Yoon 2006: 74–75). In a recent publication, Niederberger and Schwager (2011) offer a history of the Swiss environmental foreign policymaking process and subjects of sustainable development agenda in the new Swiss Federal Constitution. They made use of foreign policy and international relations theories and suggested that the sustainable development could be promoted through realigning government, economy and society on the new Federal Constitution. Overall, there is no research yet to explore factors that may influence the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Factors influencing the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy This paper suggests that there are six factors usefully used for explaining the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. The factors are developed from the books written by Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller. The books have been useful not only for understanding the behaviour of developing states in international politics, but also for

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guiding explanations of the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy.2 The factors include:

1) international demand for involvement in UNCHE (United Nations Conference on Human and Environment) put forward by UNGA (United Nations General Assembly);

2) legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia's position in the global economy;

3) domestic political structure; 4) a market-friendly approach; 5) a variety of environmental strategies; and 6) pragmatic relations with groups of developing states.

The ‘factor’ here is meant a driving force behind issues on environmental policy and politics. At the operational level of further research relating to the analysis on Malaysian environmental foreign policy, it is important to say that the application of the factors is quite complicated due to the complexity of the issues associated with Malaysia’s environmental policy and politics. Therefore, the factors are treated through two ideas: that issues are developed from the obtained evidence so that it would show the significance of the factors; and that the factors have functions that are based on the idea that each factor can either be idle or be combined to reflect each issue and that the factors may vary over time. The results of the issues would also give another advantage to the analysis of further research on Malaysian environmental foreign policy issues. Legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia’s position in the global economy The above-indicated ‘legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia’s position in the global economy’ is developed from the ‘historical process of colonialism’ which has been provided by Wriggins (1978) and Miller (1995). The positions of Wriggins and Miller on the ‘historical process of colonialism’ may be best understood from Miller’s emphasis (1995: 2–3) that has been discussed in earlier paragraphs. She stresses that the position of developing states in the global economy ‘is rooted in the colonial past’, and the legacy of colonialism and imperialism has been transmitted from the colonial predecessor to the former colonies of developing states (ibid.). The ‘legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia’s position in the global economy’ indicates that Malaysia has continued joining the global economy from which the British colonial ruler set up the exploitation of the natural environment and the natural resources as the basis of the involvement. Sani (1993: 7) argues that ‘it was the British who made the greatest changes to the country’s environmental resources [natural environment that then transformed into natural resources] through their colonial policies’. In the role, the British colonial ruler was also founding a political system in which the state governments were given the authority to exploit the natural resources. It is in the context of the state governments that the British

2 See subsequent section for discussions on how their books have been useful for guiding explanations of

Malaysian environmental foreign policy.

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colonial ruler established Malaysia as a federal state so that part of its institutions are state governments and all parts of the federal system are recognized through distribution of power among the three governmental systems: federal, state, and municipal (Jomo et al. 2004). After the era of British colonial rule, the Malaysian government has maintained involvement of Malaysia in the global economy according to the nature of attachment between Malaysia’s economy and natural resources utilization. Pragmatic relations with groups of developing states ‘Pragmatic relations with groups of developing states’ is developed from the contexts of ‘collective and individual characters’, ‘taking part in UN forums’, and ‘taking part in functions of NIEO’. It means that although popular belief maintains that Malaysia is a strong supporter of groups of developing states such as G77 and NAM, the relations are essentially guided by practical experience. It is argued that not all developing states’ actions that have been taken within the umbrella of developing states’ groups reflect full support from Malaysia. While in certain situations Malaysia may have shown its support to the collective character, in some other situations, Malaysia’s position may have gone against the collective character committed to by the groups of developing states. Throughout the administrations of all the prime ministers, Malaysia has had pragmatic relations with the groups of developing states. For instance, Malaysia had a consistent policy that supports G77 and UNCTAD since the administration of the first prime minister, but its policies according to each prime minister’s approach have not always been the same. Malaysia’s policy at the time of the first prime minister (Tunku Abdul Rahman, or ‘the Tunku’) was pro-British and anti-communist (Ahmad 1985), but at the time of the second prime minister (Tun Razak), the policy was neutrality (impartial or neutral relationships with the great powers) and pragmatic relations with NAM. Tun Razak dropped the pro-British and anti-communist policies of his predecessor. The third prime minister (Tun Hussein Onn) stuck to his predecessor Tun Razak’s approach, but built closer relations with the South-East Asian members in the context of ASEAN (Saravanamuttu 1983: 154). Moreover, in certain situations, Malaysia’s policies were represented by the position of the state governments towards foreign relations in the context of timber or forest matters, for instance, the relations between state governments in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) and the Council of South-East Asian Lumber Producers’ Association (SEALPA). Domestic political structure The above-mentioned domestic political structure is indicated by an economic structure that is rooted in the development programmes of the five-year development plans. It is developed from the context of the above-mentioned ideas of ‘collective and individual characters’, and ‘historical process of colonialism’. To describe specifically the domestic political structure in the context of the ‘collective and individual characters’, the term ‘domestic political structure’ borrows from the idea from Miller (1995) about domestic

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situations as a factor influencing the behaviour of developing states in international politics (see the idea discussed above concerning the individual aspect of the ‘collective and individual characters’). Whereas in the context of the ‘historical process of colonialism’, it also borrows from the idea of Miller about the legacies of colonialism and imperialism that have been transmitted from the colonial predecessor to the former colonies in developing states (see above for discussions concerning the ‘historical process of colonialism’). As an instance of Malaysia’s domestic political structure from the afore-mentioned perspective, one may look at the summary in the following paragraph. Between 1957 and 1970, most of the development programmes under the five-year development plans were adopted by the government according to procedures inherited from the British colonial ruler. After the period of policy implementation, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, the development programmes under the five-year development plans were developed in accordance with a combination of the New Economic Policy and the old policies related to natural resources or land use. The New Economic Policy was a long-term strategy to eradicate poverty and restructure the socio-economy of the society through economic development programmes. It was also set along with guidelines for Malaysia’s external economic relations, such as policies related to attracting foreign investment that provided a friendly approach to the global market, such as TNCs, and the prime minister’s approach to the economy on the international arena such as Tun Razak’s idiosyncratic policy that supported the creation of South-East Asia as a region of peace, freedom, neutral from nuclear weapon testing and great-power intervention, and as a region of economic growth and development. The old policies related to natural resources and land use were inherited from the British colonial ruler, such as the Federal Land and Development Authority (FELDA). These policies encouraged adoption of programmes that support Malaysia’s survival in the global economy and were treated by the government, through the New Economic Policy, as role models for economic development. Having said that the development programmes under the five-year development plans were developed in accordance with a combination of the New Economic Policy and the old policies related to natural resources or land use, analysis of issues of this paper in the context of the domestic political structure is straightforward. In the context of the factor, the issues are divided into: first, in which the focus was put on the idea of ‘collective and individual characters’; and second, in which the focus was put on the idea of ‘historical process of colonialism’. The first gives emphasis to the New Economic Policy instead of the old policies related to natural resources or land use, whereas the second gives more emphasis to the old policies related to natural resources or land use than the New Economic Policy. A market-friendly approach The market-friendly approach is developed from ideas about the individual aspects of the ‘collective and individual characters’, and ‘establishing relations with TNCs’. It means that Malaysia supports external economic influence and foreign investment that can bring gains to both its domestic economic development and its position in the global economy through a friendly approach. To describe specifically the market-friendly

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approach in the context of the above two ideas, the term market-friendly approach borrows the idea from Miller (1995) about domestic situations as a factor influencing the behaviour of developing states in international politics (see the idea discussed above concerning ‘the collective and individual characters’). It also borrows the idea from Miller (1995: 35–8) of relations between developing states and TNCs that has been built on the basis of TNCs’ position as controllers of both world trade and investment and as actors in the domestic political economy of countries they operate in. The market-friendly approach was established from the aspirations of the New Economic Policy, and from the situation when Malaysia was regarded as part of the group of states called the second tier of newly industrialized countries (NICs). The most clear indication that regards the rise of the group was the level of economic development of the states, within which they were associated with the second tier of NICs. The second tier of NICs was unique as compared to both the vast majority of the less disadvantaged developing states and the first-tier NICs of the 1970s such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Several writers of political economy of the 1980s, such as Kaplinsky (1991), and Broad and Cavanagh (1991) observed the position of Malaysia in the group at that time. An important indicator of Malaysia’s performance according to economic development was the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate when Malaysia’s GDP reached 8 per cent in the 1970s.3 With regard to how the market-friendly approach was regulated, it can be said that there are two things that indicate it: support from the export of primary commodities (Jomo 1993: 286), and the inward investment of TNCs. The former is to do with the external forces that can bring gains to both Malaysia’s domestic economic development and its position in the global economy. For instance, in the case of the marine fishery industry, the root cause that led it to join the global economy was because of trawling activities. The trawling activities developed in Malaysia, especially on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia from Thai fishermen’s trawling techniques which were adopted by local trawlers, mainly the Chinese (Vincent and Ali 1997). Malaysia’s marine fishery industry only started to become one of Malaysia’s important sectors in the global economy in the middle of the 1970s (ibid.). The latter is to do with the government’s approach to TNCs. Since the middle of the 1970s, the Malaysian government had implemented a policy of attracting inward investment of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In the FDI inflows, the government adopted policy incentives that encouraged both the location of TNCs in Malaysia and the involvement of TNCs in the manufacturing sector (Rasiah 1999). A variety of environmental strategies The factor ‘a variety of environmental strategies’ is developed from the contexts of ‘collective and individual characters’, ‘taking part in functions of UN forums’, ‘taking part in functions of UNEP’, recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs’, and ‘historical process of colonialism’. ‘A variety of environmental strategies’ means that Malaysia

3 See UNESCAP, 2009, ‘State of the Environment in Malaysia: Growth of Economic Activities’,

<http:www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/integra/volume3/Malaysia/3my01a.htm>, accessed on 18 January 2009.

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implements a variety of environmental strategies to confront environmental issues surrounding its development concerns. The environmental strategies are referred to as ‘a variety’ because there was a range of environmental protection policies and actions that Malaysia conducted between 1970 and 1982 and the variety derived from Malaysia’s domestic and international actions. The domestic actions are developed from the individual aspect of the ‘collective and individual characters’, ‘recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs’, and ‘historical process of colonialism’, whereas the international actions are developed from the collective aspect of ‘collective and individual characters’, ‘taking part in functions of UN forums’, and ‘taking part in functions of UNEP’. International demand for involvement in UNCHE put forward by UNGA The factor ‘international demand for involvement in UNCHE put forward by UNGA’ is developed from the context of ‘taking part in UN forums’ which has been provided by Miller (1995). The position of UNGA in policy-making processes within UN organs does work as a factor in the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. It puts forward international demands or international decisions for involvement of states in UNCHE. For some people, a demand that was put forward by the UNGA may be interpreted as an indication in which an external actor (that is to say, UNGA) is acting with forceful interference in a state’s internal affairs by putting forward the demand from developed states for urgent involvement of member states of the UN in UNCHE. However, in the context of this paper, the international demand is designed by a situation in which member states of the UN (including Malaysia) give consent to UNGA to convene a UNCHE meeting and the UNGA takes the power to officially endorse the involvement of states in UNCHE. The importance of UNGA’s demand in states’ relations may simply be understood through Cardwell’s assertion: ‘although individual persons have played important roles in shaping international environmental policies, the principal actors are organisations’ (Cardwell 1990: 94). Theoretical Perspectives and Arguments Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller have made a significant contribution to the analysis of international environmental politics. In the broader context of the analysis, Miller contributed to the issues surrounding the global south. This can be seen in much of her work, for instance: Tragedy for the Commons: The Enclosure and Commodification of Knowledge (2001: 111–134); Third World States and Fluid Sovereignty: Development Options and the Politics of Sustainable Ocean Management (2000); Protecting the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region: The Challenge of Institution-Building (1996); The Third World Agenda in Environmental Politics: From Stockholm to Rio (1995); The Third World in Global Environmental Politics (1995); and Balancing Development and Environment: The Third World in Global Environmental Politics (1992).

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Krasner has contributed to subjects pertaining to international political economy and the international regime,4 and Wriggins has contributed to issues pertaining to economy, politics, and security relationships.5 The books written by Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller those have been useful not only for understanding the behaviour of developing states in international politics, but also for guiding explanations of the emergence of Malaysia’s environmental foreign policy are Reducing Global Inequities (Wriggins 1978), Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Krasner 1985), and The Third World in Global Environmental Politics (Miller 1995). Critical Review of Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995) One must be able to explain the basic approach of Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995) before one can begin to understand any of the more complicated explanations that they may provide. It is strikingly clear that Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller have used different basic approaches in understanding the behaviour of developing states in international politics. Wriggins seems to follow the rational choice approach, particularly that of Graham Allison (1971) and Morton H. Kaplan (1960). He argues that the pattern and dynamic behaviour of developing states in international politics is determined by rational choice of the leaders. He stresses that it is the leaders of the states who can make strategic choices as to how best to promote the interest of the states (Wriggins 1978: 37). He says that leaders of developing states ‘are reasonably rational, goal-seeking individuals and that the goals they set affect the direction of the activities and their bargaining efforts’ (ibid.). On the contrary, Krasner (1985) stands among the structural realism thinkers whose assumptions of the groups reject the classical realists in terms of the struggle for power as a result of human nature as a factor shaping the pattern of international politics (Dunne and Schmidt 2008: 98). In Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Krasner endorses the structural realism thinking that, in the words of Dunne and Schmidt (ibid.) stresses that ‘international politics is essentially a struggle for power [as a result of] security competition and inter-state conflict to the lack of an overarching

4 Krasner’s article entitled ‘State Power and the Structure of International Trade’ (1976) has led to his

being recognized by Robert Keohane as a scholar who ‘defined the agenda of IPE [International Political Economy] in the United States for years of scholarship’ (Griffith 1999: 32, quoted in Keohane 1997: 151). Krasner’s work on the international regime includes: Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why (1981); Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables (1982); and Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables (1982). His other publications are: Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999); and Power, the State and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (2009), both of which are devoted to the development of state sovereignty. 5 The emphasis on economy, politics, and security relationships has been reflected in many of his

publications, that include: Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (1960); The Ruler's Imperative; Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa (1969); South and Southeast Asia in the Asian State System in the 1970s (1971); Population, Politics, and the Future of Southern Asia (1973); Reducing Global Inequities (1978); Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (1992); and Picking Up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine: Quaker Refugee Relief in World War II: A Memoir (2004).

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authority above states’. Structural realism is also concerned about ‘the relative distribution of power in the international system’ (ibid.). Contrary to Wriggins (1978) and Krasner (1985), Miller (1995) may be a proponent of the post-colonial approach. Her book The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, which has been regarded as one of the icons of international environmental politics analysis (Clapp 2004) constantly highlights the imposition of colonialism over environmental policy and politics in developing states. Miller (1995: 19 quoted in Tolba and Osama 1992: 34) says, ‘whatever political and economic approach these countries [developing states] adopt, it will have to address problems that have resulted from the distortation of their societies and economies by colonialism and imperialism’. The emphasis can appropriately be placed in the context of the post-colonial approach, i.e. one of the alternative approaches to international theory (Smith and Owens 2008: 188). In relation to Miller’s emphasis stated above, Smith and Owens (ibid.) regard that in the post-colonial approach, ‘there is no one satisfactory definition of post-colonialism...[but] much post-colonial scholarship highlights the important degree of continuity and persistence of colonial forms of power in contemporary world politics’. Miller’s view – that has been said to have association with the post-colonial thinking – can also be observed in most of her work other than The Third World in Global Environmental Politics.6 Wriggins (1978) argues that, first, developing states still act collectively, although the collective actions are diminished by individual actions which are shaped by the increasing diversities among individual states. The states still have solidarity, for instance, the pre-colonial history and cultures and the role of NIEO as among the main means of strengthening the collective actions, but individual actions from a range of new sources of diversities among developing states are posing challenges to the sustainability of the collective actions (ibid.). Among examples of the new diversities were the manoeuvres of the oil-producing states through the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the rapidly-growing industry of the newly industrializing states such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and Taiwan, and the rise of heavy external debt burdens of states such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Wriggins 1978: 28–29). Second, the pre-colonial history and cultures continue to affect the behaviour of developing states in international politics, though it is gradually being diminished by the presence of new diversities (Wriggins 1978). Third, national security threats as a result of interstate violence, such as the increasing availability of military establishments within states and persistent threats of violence or domestic protests among individuals or subgroups in developing states have been important concerns to developing states (Wriggins 1978).

6 See fnn. 2 above.

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Fourth, developing states’ actions or their strategies to achieve their objectives in international politics can be presented through various ways, mainly commodity coalitions, regional coalitions, universal coalitions, joining coalitions with major powers, creating threats through local wars, and igniting violence (Wriggins 1978). Wriggins (1978: 44–55) refers the commodity coalitions to OPEC. He says that one of the most important roles that the organization has played in sustaining the (economic, political, and strategic) strategies of developing states in international politics is providing solidarity in terms of improving earnings of the wealthy oil producers. The earnings would, in turn, bring ‘a new scope for policy choice, international influence, and accelerated development‘ (Wriggins 1978: 47). Wriggins (1978: 5) argues that the strategy concerning regional coalitions enables leaders of developing states to handle bargaining processes with developed states to powerful effect and make them better known to leaders of developed states. He also argues that regional coalitions, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) usually give attention to intraregional affairs (Wriggins 1978). Universal coalitions, such as NIEO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Group of 77 (G77), and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), indicate a strong coalition or solidarity among developing states (Wriggins 1978). It ‘makes Third World leaders more aware of the interests they hold in common’, and can serve as a source of fulfillment for every need of leaders from developing states, particularly in relation to three aspects: natural resources that are under control of developing states, security relations between developing and developed states, and global environmental matters (Wriggins 1978: 75). Building alliances with major powers is another important strategy that developing states have adopted in international politics (Wriggins 1978), which has several benefits, like enabling developing states to receive economic, political, and security assistance from them, for instance, by ‘linking their [developing states’] fate as closely as possible to one or another major power’ (Wriggins 1978: 77). The assistance is useful in helping to ameliorate the negative effects of economic, political, and security instability on developing states (ibid.). Creating local threats, for instance, through local wars, has been another strategy that developing states have adopted to achieve their objectives in international politics (Wriggins 1978). Local threats or local wars stem from local roots and are created in the hope of obtaining the interference of the superpowers in the wars so that the latter use their influence to support the ends of those who ignited the conflict (ibid.). Local threats are also created to show that the strategic and military capabilities of developing states have already developed (ibid.). ‘Irregular violence’ or ‘unconventional violence organised by action groups based in the Third World, is designed to alter local power arrangements and in part, to influence in and the policies of Northern states’ (Wriggins 1978: 103). There are at least two examples of the violence: ‘independence movements and terrorism’ (ibid.). The former means ‘[violence that] [is] depending on the mobilisation of substantial numbers of persons and extensive paramilitary activity’, whereas the latter means ‘[violence that] [is] relying upon the mobilisation of a few individuals’ (ibid.). Wriggins (1978: 101–103) argues that developing states want to commit themselves to the violence because they seek ‘to dramatise political grievance‘ to gain serious attention and sympathy not only from developed states, but also from

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other developing states so that the local power (the actor that holds power at the domestic level) can be changed according to their wish. Krasner Krasner’s book, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (1985), that has been of interest to many international political analysts (Griffith 1999; Little 2008: 310), reflects Krasner’s major interest in international regimes, which also became his central attention throughout the 1980s. More importantly, it was an outcome of Krasner’s criticism of a group of scholars, that he describes as ‘economistic perspective’, that has explained the goals, policies and politics of developing states merely by reference to the economic point of view (Krasner 1985: 19−27). Arguing against this view, he has provided arguments concerning the behaviour of developing states in international politics which has stressed the greater importance of the political dimension. Krasner (1985) argues that, first, the behaviour of developing states is homogeneous. He stresses that the states are collectively weak, and their ideological arguments are sustained by common features. He says that the national political regimes of developing states ‘are profoundly weak both internationally and domestically’ (Krasner 1985: 3–9). The regimes are weak domestically because their domestic politics and social structures are underdeveloped, inflexible, and insufficient in power ‘to make societal adjustments that could cushion external shocks’ (Krasner 1985: 3–4). The regimes are also weak internationally because ‘the national power capabilities of most Third World states are extremely limited, the national economic and military resources at the disposal of their leaders are unlikely to alter the behaviour of Northern actors or the nature of international regimes’ (ibid.). In terms of the ideological arguments, he stresses that they consistently develop:

a set of arguments that placed the major responsibility for underdevelopment on the workings of the international system rather than on the specific characteristics of developing countries and the policies adopted by their leaders...This line of argument was developed and propagated over time, drawing on Marxist as well as conventional economic analyses (Krasner 1985: 9).

Second, the relationship between developing and developed states is established by politics, implying, conflicts over getting more or less (Krasner 1985: 3). The conflicts happen ‘because most Southern countries cannot hope to cope with their international vulnerability except by challenging principles, norms, and rules preferred by industrialised countries’ (ibid.). Third, an authoritative international regime is a key determinant of developing states’ strategies or policies in international politics. The authoritative international regime is applied through the functions of NIEO (Krasner 1985). NIEO ‘covers a wide range of issue-areas, including trade, primary commodities, aid, debt, space, multinational corporations, journalism, and shipping’ (Krasner 1985: 7).

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Miller Miller (1995) wrote The Third World in Global Environmental Politics shortly after the end of the Cold War, or at the time when the environment began to gain greater prominence in international political agenda. Through the book, she argues that first both collective and individual characters of states can shape the behaviour of developing states in international politics (Miller 1995). The collective character may be found in circumstances where experience of colonialism and imperialism is shared among developing states (ibid.). Miller argues that although pre-colonial history and cultures in developing states accorded to the imperial power the length of colonial control within each state, the societies and the peoples of developing states ‘share a set of historically determined socio-economic characteristics’ (ibid.: 19–20). The shared value of colonialism and imperialism have not only made developing states politically and economically vulnerable or marginal against developed states, but also formed ‘the bases for their [developing states’] different experiences with regard to development’ (ibid.: 19). The collective character may also be found in circumstances where the economies of developing states still largely depend on agricultural yield and natural resources and where ‘many Third World countries are dependent on income earned from the exploitation of natural resources capital’ (Miller 1995: 20–23). The individual characters can be associated with Miller’s statement that has stressed that, ‘these countries [developing states] often work as a bloc in international politics [but] they have many political, cultural, economic, and social differences‘ (ibid.: 20). At the individual level, Miller argues that the internal arena of the state system can also shape their behaviour in international politics. It comes from domestic conditions, including ‘tax and subsidy instruments, distribution of wealth and income, population pressure, the status of women, and the political power structure’ (ibid.: 40–41, quoted in Warford 1991: 13). Besides, the income levels of developing states that are divided into the poorest, the high-income, and the newly industrializing countries (NICs; ibid.: 22–23) are also having connections with the individual level. Second, the historical process of colonialism, particularly in the economic aspect, may also induce the behaviour of developing states in international politics (Miller 1995). Miller (1995: 2–3) argues that the position of the developing states in the global economy ‘is rooted in the colonial past’. Moreover, the legacy of colonialism and imperialism has been transmitted from the colonial predecessor to the former colonies of developing states. For instance, Miller (ibid.) says:

the colonial power...accumulate[s] capital and assume[s] political hegemony over the subordinate colony, leading to a pattern in which the colony’s resources were used in a manner incongruent with local needs.... Developing countries became very dependent on both export and import trade and decolonialisation did not end this pattern.

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Third, the circumstances in the global economy have not only imposed constraints on developing states, but have also generated an economic atmosphere in which they are treated unfairly by developed states (Miller 1995). The circumstances in the global economy are so complex that they have made underdeveloped and vulnerable states become even more vulnerable (ibid.). On the other hand, developed states did not recognize the experience of developing states concerning the constraints from the nature of the global economy as part of their problem in their participation in the global economy (ibid.: 25). The developed states have treated developing states unequally in terms of trade and economic sanctions (ibid.). The circumstances in the global economy make developing states respond to changes in the global economy much more slowly than by developed states. All the aforesaid situations, therefore, not only add burdens to the existing position of developing states in the global economy, but also put the states at a disadvantage in the global economy as compared to that of the agile states (that is, the developed states). It also makes the global system become increasingly structured, with an increasing degree of impact of dependency and world-system structures on developing states (Miller 1995). As a result, their economic progression and economic development become constrained (ibid.: 22–23), and they have to continue to struggle to fulfil the interests of both developed states’ capital and themselves, for instance, by expanding or diversifying their economies and concentrating on using their domestic resources (ibid.). Fourth, the complex interdependence regarding natural, political, and economic interdependence of global environmental problems has made relations between developed and developing states directly dependent (Miller 1995). The interdependence makes developing states experience a different kind of ‘asymmetrical sensitivity and vulnerability’ based on a situation in which ‘an action by one state can have environmental implications for the rest of the global community’ (Miller 1995: 2). This situation gives developing states the opportunity to have economic and political leverages in environmental politics (ibid.: 57). Miller (1995: 58) says, ‘because of [by] the nature of the biosphere, the Third World countries have the power to deny the industrialised countries their environmental objectives, which potentially gives the Third World some bargaining leverage’. Fifth, developing states may adopt a number of policies to optimize their chances to achieve their objective in international politics (Miller 1995). The policies may be adopted when they are handling or dealing with international actors that are important in environmental matters such as economic intergovernmental organizations (for instance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), TNCs, environmental NGOs (ENGOs), and institutionalized environmental cooperation. Miller has provided that in the circumstances, the policies of developing states include establishing cooperation with economic intergovernmental organizations, with UNEP, and with the TNCs; recognizing the role of environmental interest groups in domestic

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affairs; and taking part in the bargaining process establishing an international environmental regime and international environmental governance. Sixth, the cooperation between developing states and economic intergovernmental organizations was established as an accidental by-product of the initial objective for establishment of the organizations (Miller 1995: 26–27). The organizations are tailor-made for the interests of the developed states, that is to facilitate credit transactions among themselves. They also adopt decision-making procedures that are in favour of interests of developed states. In such cooperation, the focus of developing states is not so much on the issues that serve the best interests of the developed states, but on many other issues, including ‘access to capital for development, access to the markets of developed states, and equitable prices for the commodities they were selling internationally’ (ibid.). Seventh, the cooperation between developing (and developed) states and UNEP began after the convening of UNCHE in 1972 (Miller 1995). While UNCHE ‘looked at the broader political, social and economic issue[s] [in which] Third World countries played a prominent role in pre-conference discussions and thus were able to modify the agenda’ (Miller 1995: 7–8), the cooperation has been built on the basis of UNEP’s functions as an international environmental agency for notifying states of appropriate environmental actions to be taken domestically and internationally, for ‘disseminat[ing] information, cultivat[ing] understanding, and collaborat[ing] with the environmental programs of other agencies’ (Miller 1995: 34). For developing states, the cooperation has provided a platform on which they can address areas of their common concern and common aversion that matter in their relations with developed states (Miller 1995). Eighth, the relations between developing states and TNCs has been built on the basis of TNCs’ position as a controller of world trade and investment (Miller 1995). As TNCs ‘play a central economic and political role in the countries in which they operate’, developing states can possibly have a tendency to make efforts to attract foreign investment from TNCs (Miller 1995: 35–38). Ninth, the role of ENGOs in environmental matters can affect the behaviour of developing states in international politics (Miller 1995 38–39). In governmental affairs, their role in environmental matters is to be an agent of epistemic community, as critics of the governments and as activists of both intergovernmental organizations and intergovernmental agreements (Miller 1995: 38). Tenth, international environmental politics have highlighted participation of states in bargaining processes associated with efforts to achieve institutionalized environmental cooperation at international level (Miller 1995: 56). The bargaining process has not only provided a platform on which both developed and developing states can leverage their power, but has also given more opportunity for developing states to show their ability to control ‘others or the circumstances of others’ (ibid.). She says it is through this platform that developing states ‘have the power [ability to control] to deny the developed world its environmental objectives’ (ibid.). In addition, the bargaining process also shows the

17

behaviour of developing states towards which environmental issues or institutionalized environmental cooperation are of interest to them. Miller’s observation on efforts of developing states to influence international environmental regimes of hazardous waste trade, biodiversity, technology transfer, and atmosphere and climate change implies that their concerns are greater when it comes to international regimes that they see can have effects on their economic interests (Miller 1995). The Ideas Provided by Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995) Figure 1 below shows seven ideas stemming from Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995), that guide explanations of factors influencing the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. Within all the ideas, those of Miller are the most extensively used in investigating the factors, therefore, she has offered the most compelling explanation for Malaysian environmental foreign policy. The function of the ideas under consideration is based on the idea that each idea can either be idle, or be combined to reflect each factor.

Figure 1

Summary of Ideas Derived from Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995) that Guide Explanations of Factors Influencing Malaysian Environmental Foreign Policy

Miller

Ideas: A = collective and individual characters B = historical process of colonialism C = taking part in functions of UN forums D = taking part in functions of NIEO E = establishing cooperation with UNEP F = establishing relations with TNCs G = recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs

Krasner C

E F G

A B

D

Wriggins

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Collective and individual characters Between Wriggins (1978), Miller (1995) and Krasner (1985), the first two writers provide an idea of the ‘collective and individual characters’ (indicated as ‘A’ in Figure 1) which is appropriate to use in the context of Malaysia. As has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, both writers imply that actions of developing states in international politics can bring the meaning of either joint (collective) characters among themselves, or idiosyncratic (individual) preference. Wriggins and Miller imply that the collective characters are a harmony in terms of ideological purpose, actions and promises between one state and the mainstream groups of developing states. The idiosyncratic preference may clearly be understood in Miller vis-à-vis in Wriggins from the context in which she argues that individual actions or diversities among individual developing states and domestic situations also become factors influencing the behaviour of developing states in international politics. At this point, she may have implied that in certain situations, the individual characters of the states may reflect their actions in international politics. In other words, the individual character implies a self-action of a state that directly diverges from the collective ideological purpose, actions and promises of the mainstream groups of developing states. Deriving from the point of view about the ‘collective and individual characters’, this paper has reason to reject Krasner’s view. The most obvious reason is because Krasner advocates the idea that only collective characters can shape the behaviour of developing states in international politics, instead of both collective and individual characters. For instance, as has been discussed above, Krasner views that behaviour of developing states is homogeneous in nature. He stresses that the states are collectively weak and their ideological arguments are identical. This paper holds that although actions of developing states under the umbrella of groups of developing states are usually seen from the collective point of view, there are cases where their actions that have been taken as such imply that individual states of the groups do not give full support towards them. In other words, while in certain situations one state may have shown its support to the collective character, in some other situations, the state’s position may have gone against the collective character committed by the groups of developing states. These positions can be regarded as a pragmatic relation to the plans collectively agreed upon at the level of the developing states’ groups. A pragmatic relation here is understood to mean a characteristic of pragmatism in which ‘pragmatists are interested in what works; their prime criterion of value is success. [It] turn[s] away from a belief in fixed principles toward the truth of concrete results’ (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996: 518, cited in Miroff 1976). The idea concerning the ‘collective and individual characters’, which is derived from Wriggins and Miller, is intrinsic to the factors ‘pragmatic relations with groups of developing states’, ‘domestic political structure’, ‘a market-friendly approach’, and ‘a variety of environmental strategies’. Between all these factors, the first factor tends to absorb either the collective or the individual aspect of the ‘collective and individual characters’, the second and third factors tend to absorb its individual aspect, and the fourth factor tends to absorb both its aspects.

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Historical process of colonialism The persons who have provided the idea of ‘historical process of colonialism’ (indicated as ‘B’ in Figure 1) are Miller (1995) and Wriggins (1978). As has been discussed earlier, Wriggins supports the view that colonial history and cultures have a place in the behaviour of developing states in international politics, though he feels that it might sometimes be belittled. His general view about the idea is compatible with the evidence of this paper, but Miller has provided a better explanation about the ‘historical process of colonialism’ than Wriggins did. As has been discussed in the previous paragraphs, she has stressed that the ‘historical process of colonialism’ that occurred in developing states, particularly in the economic aspect, may also influence the behaviour of developing states in international politics. Miller (1995: 2–3) argues that the position of the developing states in the global economy ‘is rooted in the colonial past’. Moreover, she argues that the legacy of colonialism and imperialism has been transmitted from the colonial predecessor to the former colonies of developing states. The legacy includes the landscapes of accumulation of capital, pattern of utilization of (natural) resources, and pattern of export and import trade. For instance, Miller (ibid.) says that:

the colonial power...accumulate[s] capital and assume[s] political hegemony over the subordinate colony, leading to a pattern in which the colony’s resources were used in a manner incongruent with local needs.... Developing countries became very dependent on both export and import trade and decolonialisation did not end this pattern.

The idea about the ‘historical process of colonialism’, which is derived from Wriggins and Miller, is intrinsic to the factors ‘legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia’s position in the global economy’, ‘domestic political structure’, and ‘a variety of environmental strategies’. Taking part in functions of UN forums Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995) come to an agreement with the above-indicated idea (indicated as ‘C’ in Figure 1) as one of the references to understand the behaviour of developing states in international politics. They come to an agreement that the UN conference becomes a dominant, usually effective, platform for developing states to participate in, for instance, in bargaining processes about establishing an authoritative international regime (Krasner 1985), in dealing with an international environmental regime (Miller 1995), and in establishing a universal coalition (Wriggins 1978). In the context of this paper, it can be seen that UNGA, UNCTAD and UNCHE serve as important references of the UN agenda or UN forums. In many situations – though not all – Malaysia treated the forums as intermediators for transmitting its domestic preferences through either developing states’ groups it involved, or the idiosyncratic movement of its leaders. The position of UNGA, UNCTAD and UNCHE in the behaviour of developing states is beyond doubt. Krasner has emphasized the fact that UNGA and UNCLOS have been important platforms used by developing states to be involved in international politics, whereas Miller (1995: 7) has

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emphasized the fact that UNCHE has become an important platform for developing states in negotiating not only environmental issues, but also the broader political, social and economic issues. Wriggins and Krasner have shared the emphasis of UNCTAD being one of the key players in the international politics of developing states until the 1980s. The idea about ‘taking part in UN forums’ is intrinsic to the factors ‘international demand for involvement in UNCHE put forward by UNGA’, ‘pragmatic relations with groups of developing states’, and ‘a variety of environmental strategies’. Taking part in functions of NIEO The functions of NIEO here mean that its agenda is relatively broad in terms of the geographical scope of developing states, but consisting only of issues which affect the states. As has been discussed above, Wriggins (1978) and Krasner (1985) agree with the functions of NIEO (indicated as ‘D’ in Figure 1.1) as one of the references to understand the behaviour of developing states in international politics. This aspect, however, is neglected in the analysis of Miller. Wriggins and Krasner basically come to an agreement with regard to NIEO as an important means in the design of universal objectives of developing states in international politics, but their emphasis is slightly different. Krasner has emphasized that the behaviour of developing states in international politics is devoted entirely to the functions of NIEO; therefore, understanding their policies and objectives in international politics needs to focus merely on their involvement in NIEO. On the other hand, Wriggins has emphasized that NIEO can be only one of the means for maintaining or regaining the objectives of developing states in international politics. In the general context of this paper, the functions of NIEO are applicable, but in a specific context, they tend to follow Wriggins’s emphasis. The idea of ‘taking part in functions of NIEO’, which is derived from Wriggins and Krasner, is intrinsic to the factor ‘pragmatic relations with groups of developing states’. Establishing cooperation with UNEP Between Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995), only Miller has given emphasis to the position of UNEP as an important aspect in understanding the behaviour of developing states in international politics. As has been mentioned in earlier, Miller views that all states began cooperation with UNEP since after the convening of UNCHE. In the context of this paper, establishing cooperation with UNEP (indicated as ‘E’ in Figure 1) means that Malaysia adopted a convergent position towards cooperation with UNEP. This is particularly effective in terms of the role of UNEP, which is related to notifying states of appropriate environmental actions to be taken domestically and internationally, ‘disseminat[ing] information, cultivat[ing] understanding, and collaborat[ing] with the environmental programs of other agencies’ that has been stressed by Miller (1995: 34). The idea of ‘establishing cooperation with UNEP’ is intrinsic to the factor ‘a variety of environmental strategies’.

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Establishing relations with TNCs The beginning of the involvement of TNCs in developing states occurred around the period of the UNCHE meeting. Its role impacted not only Malaysia, but also other developing states (Freeman 1991: 158). Between Wriggins (1978), Krasner (1985), and Miller (1995), only Miller gives emphasis to the establishment of good relations with the TNCs (indicated as ‘F’ in Figure 1) as an issue that influences the behaviour of developing states in international politics. Wriggins and Krasner have given views which are quite different from the ones explained by Miller. Their views are not applicable to this paper. As has been noted in the discussions above, Wriggins (1978: 38) and Krasner (1985: 66) view that developing states do not support good relations with TNCs. For instance, developing states establish rigid requirements to deal with foreign businesses to achieve economic growth (Wriggins ibid.). Moreover, the agency is part of market-based regimes that adopt policies that contrast with the policies of the regimes (that is the authoritative international regimes) preferred by developing states (Krasner ibid.). In the global context of developing states, Wriggins’s and Krasner’s views might be correct. This is because the presence of TNCs in developing states was rejected strongly by the vast majority of those states. In the Fourth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries that was held in Algiers in 1973, developing states denounced ‘the unacceptable practice of transnational companies which were [believed] to infringe the sovereignty of developing countries and violate the principles of non-interference and the right of people to self-determination…’ (Moss and Minton, Unitar Document Service No. 1: 418−419). However, in the context of Malaysia, Wriggins’s and Krasner’s views did not apply. Malaysia treated friendly TNCs as partners in supporting economic development programmes. This observation is consistent with Miller’s position. As has been stressed above, Miller views that the relations between developing states and TNCs have been built on the basis of TNCs’ positions as controllers of world trade and investment. As TNCs ‘play a central economic and political role in the countries in which they operate’, developing states can possibly have a tendency to make efforts to attract foreign investment from the TNCs (Miller 1995: 35–38). idea of ‘establishing relations with TNCs’ is intrinsic to the factor ‘a market-friendly approach’. Recognizing the Role of ENGOs in domestic affairs Like justifications for considering the above two ideas (establishing cooperation with UNEP and establishing relations with TNCs), Miller (1995) has provided another important idea, that is about recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs (indicated as ‘G’ in Figure 1) as an issue that influences the behaviour of developing states in international politics. As has been discussed earlier, her view in the above respect has been seen as impotent to Wriggins (1978) and Krasner (1985). Miller (1995: 38–39) views that the role of ENGOs in environmental matters can affect the behaviour of developing states in international politics. In governmental affairs at domestic level, the role of ENGOs in environmental matters is recognized as an agent of epistemic community, and as critics of the governments. In governmental affairs at international level ENGOs are recognized as activists of intergovernmental organizations or agreements (ibid.: 38). In the context of this paper, the Malaysian government has

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accepted the involvement of ENGOs in public affairs. It is argued that the idea of ‘recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs’ is intrinsic to the factor ‘a variety of environmental strategies’. Summary of connections

Table below shows the significant connection between the factors and the ideas provided by Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller discussed above. It gives a summary of how the factors may be applied in the analysis. It also indicates the previously discussed ideas.

Table 2

Summary of Connections between Factors Influencing the Emergence of Malaysian Environmental Foreign Policy, and the Ideas Provided by Wriggins (1978), Krasner

(1985), and Miller (1995)

Factors Ideas Sources

1. Legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia’s position in the global economy

Historical process of colonialism Wriggins (1978) and Miller (1995)

2. Pragmatic relations with groups of developing states

Collective and individual characters Wriggins and Miller Taking part in functions of UN forums

Wriggins, Krasner (1985), and Miller

Taking part in functions of NIEO Wriggins and Krasner 3. Domestic political structure

Collective and individual characters (individual aspect)

Wriggins and Miller

Historical process of colonialism Wriggins and Miller 4. A market-friendly approach

Collective and individual characters (individual aspect)

Wriggins and Miller

Establishing relations with TNCs Miller 5. A variety of environmental strategies

Collective and individual characters Wriggins and Miller Taking part in functions of UN forums

Wriggins, Krasner , and Miller

Establishing cooperation with UNEP Miller Recognizing the role of ENGOs in domestic affairs

Miller

Historical process of colonialism Wriggins and Miller 6. International demand for involvement in UNCHE put forward by UNGA

Taking part in functions of UN forums

Wriggins, Krasner, and Miller

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Conclusion and recommendations for future research This paper concludes that there are six factors that contribute to the emergence of Malaysian environmental foreign policy. The factors include: i) international demand for involvement in UNCHE (United Nations Conference on Human and Environment) put forward by UNGA (United Nations General Assembly); ii) legacies of British colonial policies and systems that support Malaysia's position in the global economy; iii) domestic political structure; iv) a market-friendly approach; v) a variety of environmental strategies; and vi) pragmatic relations with groups of developing states. This paper also concludes that effort to offer the utility of the factors is borne out from the extension of Vogler’s argument (1995) regarding Krasner’s explanation on the attempts made by the Global South to counter the North power in international politics through ocean regimes. This paper postulates that the factors may also useful to guide understanding of issues pertaining to Malaysia’s involvement in international environmental politics. This paper recommends that the research area of environmental foreign policies of individual (idiosyncratic) states may be extended to include issue-area around international environmental regimes, such as biodiversity, climate and ocean regimes. Currently a research work is in progress to explore the implementations of Malaysian environmental foreign policy towards international biodiversity regime since its signatory in 1992. Bibliography Barkdull, J and Harris, P.G. (2002) ‘Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: A

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