Facility Characterization & Target Identification … – Facility Characterization & Target...

3 – Facility Characterization & Target Identification

The Twenty-Sixth International Training Course

3 . Fac i l i t y Charac te r i zat ion & Target I dent i f i ca t ion

October 24 – November 11, 2016Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Mark Snell

Facility Characterization & Target Identification

Learn ing Object ives

After completing this module, you should be able to:• Describe information useful in characterizing a facility

and operations to support PPS design and evaluation • Identify targets to protect• Demonstrate the use of selected theft categorization

tables• Recognize the process for vital area identification

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INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

• Paragraph 3.44 – State categorization and unacceptable radiological consequence.

• Paragraphs 4.1 – 4.49 – Attractiveness (Cat 1, 2, 3), levels of protection for theft targets. Defines the facility, protected area, limited area, vital area, inner area.

• Paragraph 5.1 – 5.58 – Attractiveness (URC/HRC) levels of protection for sabotage targets (vital areas). Defines the facility.

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Fac i l i ty Charac ter i za t ion Areas o f Invest igat ion

• Investigate anything that impacts performance of the physical protection system Physical conditions Facility operations Facility policies and procedures Regulatory requirements Safety considerations Legal issues Corporate goals and objectives

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Phys ica l Condit ions

• Site boundaries, fencing, barriers, weather, and environment

• Buildings (construction materials for walls, ceilings and floors), rooms, and access points

• Heating, ventilation, air conditioning, communication paths and types, power distribution system, environmentally controlled areas, and locations of hazardous materials

• Consult drawings and then “Walk-Down” the facility

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Fac i l i ty Operat ions

• Operational activities Products and processes Operational hours Number of employees Visitors and vendors Senior executive location

• On-site location and movement of materials Shipping and receiving process Tracking mechanisms Material characteristics

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Fac i l i ty Po l ic ies and Procedures

• Written policies and procedures Facility and corporate documents

• Training policies and procedures• Other indications of corporate culture• Unwritten policies and practices

Interview staff Observe routine work

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Regulatory Requirements

• State and local requirements• Regulatory authority• Industry practice• Building codes

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Safety Considerat ions

• Safety regulations and requirements• Safety requirements sometimes conflict with security

requirements

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Legal Issues

• Most complex and difficult• Legal issues include:

Security liability (provide reasonable security) Failure to protect (negligence liability) Overreaction (excessive force, invasion of privacy, guard

instructions and training) Labor/employment issues

(labor unions, work practices)

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Corporate Goals and Object ives

• Management’s role in security• Is security identified as a goal or objective?

• Determination of security culture Underlying assumptions (attractive target?) Espoused values (intent of management?) Visible artifacts

(equipment and practices?)

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Other Informat ion

• Political environment• Surrounding community relations• Facility and local law enforcement liaison• Mutual aid agreements• Local threat information

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Targets—what are they?

Target: Nuclear material, equipment, systems, or devices that are subject to danger, risk of harm, or loss• Theft Targets

Nuclear or radioactive materials

• Sabotage Targets Nuclear or radioactive materials Process or support equipment needed to prevent unacceptable

radiological consequences

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Targets Addressed in This Course

• Focus for this course will be on theft and sabotage of: Nuclear materials Nuclear facilities

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IAEA Signi f icant Quant i t ies

Significant quantity (SQ): The approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded

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a All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.b Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 Gy/hrc Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium; depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in accordance with

prudent management practice.d Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a

different category of physical protection.e Other fuel which by virtue of its original material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category

level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/hr (100rad/hr) at one meter unshielded.


IAEA Categor izat ion of Nuclear Mater ia l

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Material Form Category I Category II Category IIIc

1. Plutoniuma Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but morethan 500 g

500 g or less but more than 15 g

2. Uranium‐235 Unirradiatedb

‐ Uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more

5 kg or more Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg

1 kg or less but more than 15 g

‐ Uranium enriched to 10% 235U but less than 20% 235 U

10 kg or more Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg

‐ Uranium enriched above natural but less than 10% 235 U

10 kg or more

3. Uranium‐233 Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g

500 g or less but more than 15 g

4. Irradiated Fuel (The categorization of irradiated fuel in the table is based on international transportconsiderations. The State may assign a different category for domestic use, storage, and transportation taking all relevant factors into account.)

Depleted or naturaluranium, thorium or low‐enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content)d/e

Note: See text pg.3-27




S ta te Phys ica l P rotec t ion Reg ime Objec t ives*

• Protect against theft of nuclear material in use, storage, and transport

• Ensure implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and recover lost or stolen material

• Protect nuclear material and facilities against sabotage• Mitigate or minimize the radiological consequences of

sabotage

* Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

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Target Types—Thef t o f Nuc lear Mater ia l (NM)

• Protect nuclear material from theft that could lead to the construction of a nuclear explosive device by a technically competent group or which could lead to subsequent dispersal

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Target Type—Sabotage

• Objective: Protect facilities from radiological sabotage • Chernobyl accident provides illustration of potential

sabotage consequences

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Radio logica l Sabotage

• No classification scheme has been adopted for sabotage targets

• INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 specifies that PPS should protect against unacceptable radiological consequences (URC)• Identification of what constitutes URC is the responsibility of the

State

• Possible basis for URC definition: Quantitative (safety criteria) Qualitative (relative risk)

• PPS should protect against any sabotage scenarios that exceed URC criterion

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Types of URC Cr i ter ia

• Release- or dose-based criteria Maximum allowable release or dose Could make use of existing safety limits Requires detailed dispersion modeling

• Design limit criteria Specifies an unacceptable plant state that must be prevented

(core damage for example) Requires less analytical effort Is generally more conservative

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Two Ways Sabotage May Lead to URC

• Directly Adversary applies energy directly to the nuclear/radioactive

material to cause dispersal Adversary must gain access to area in which material is located Example: Explosive or incendiary device used to disperse the

material• Indirectly

Adversary uses energy present in the material or process system to cause dispersal

Requires initiating a process upset condition and disabling the systems designed to mitigate the upset

Example: Disable primary cooling system (initiating event) and backup cooling capability (mitigating systems), and allow material to overheat

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Sabotage Prevent ion

• INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

Vital Area: An area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to high radiological consequences

• Protect vital areas that contain: Inventories of nuclear or radioactive material with potential to

exceed HRC if dispersed (direct scenarios) A minimum set of equipment needed to prevent indirect

sabotage scenarios

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V i ta l Area Ident i f icat ion Process

• Identify inventories capable of exceeding HRC if released• Protect locations of such inventories as vital areas• Determine whether there are scenarios that can lead

indirectly to HRC Initiating events Disablement of mitigation systems

• Protect as vital areas either: Locations from which initiating events can be causedor Locations of equipment needed to mitigate initiating events

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V i ta l Area Ident i f icat ion Resul ts

Target sets: Combinations of areas attacker must visit in order to cause HRC

Candidate vital area sets: Combinations of areas to which attacker must be denied access to prevent HRC

Optimal vital area set: Set of vital areas to be protected

• Consider: Impact on safety and emergency response Impact on operations Ease, effectiveness, and cost of protecting the set of vital areas

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V i ta l Area Example for Reactors

• Protect areas that ensure all critical safety functions can be performed Reactivity control

• Control rod SCRAM components and systems

Decay heat removal• Heat removal system components, including control and coolant

source

Process monitoring• Instrumentation for pressure, coolant level, etc.

Reactor coolant makeup Support functions

• Electrical power, switchgear, cooling, startup, and controls

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Summary (1 of 2)

• To design a PPS, we need Facility information on physical conditions; facility operations;

policies, procedures, requirements; safety issues; legal issues; and corporate goals and objectives

From sources such as design documents, layout drawings, procedures manuals, operational records, environmental reports, and safety analyses

• Two types of targets are considered in this course Theft targets (nuclear materials) Sabotage targets

• Nuclear materials• Equipment needed to prevent radiological release

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Summary (2 of 2)

• Theft targets are categorized using the table from INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 based on isotopic content and amount

• Vital area identification process steps Identify inventories capable of exceeding HRC if released Protect locations of such inventories as vital areas Determine whether there are scenarios that can lead indirectly to

HRC Protect as vital areas either:

• Locations from which initiating events can be caused• Locations of equipment needed to mitigate initiating events

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Facility Characterization & Target Identification … – Facility Characterization & Target...

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