Facilitating problem definition in teams

David SIMS, Colin EDEN and Sue JONES Centre for the Stud)' of Organizational Change and Develop. merit, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7,4 Y, United Kingdom

Received April 1979 Revised January 1980

The problems that a team comes to define as needing to be worked an depend upon idiosyncratically defined subjec- tive, qualitative and organizationally political factors affecting the individual members of the te.am. In this paper we shall argue that Operational Research tends to pay little attention to the process of problem def'mition and that when it does, the emphasis is towards determining an accurate or correct interpretation of the external situation that the team confronts and the organizational objectives which have been laid down for the team. We suggest, however, that Opera- tional Researchers are particularly well placed to act in a w/ty which pays attention to both these fields. This paper is addressed to those Operational Rese~chers who predomi- nantly work with complex policy problems belonging to a team of decision-makers. We shall demonstrate that group techniques, new computer simulation technology, and atten- tion to process can lead to a team negotiating a definition and redefinition of a problem so that solutions have a greater commitment from the team, and therefore a higher chance of being implemented.

1. Introduction

It is rare for an Operational Researcher to be called upon to act as a facilitator in problem defini- tion, that is, as one who attempts to assist in the pro- cesses of problem definition in teams. It is more usual for him to be called upon to use some particular form of skill or expertise he has so as to contribute to the solution of a problem. How, then, can such a person prosecute a role of facilitating problem definition in teams rather than offering expert definitions? We are not suggesting that an Operational Researcher should downrate the mathematical and technique oriented skills that are often seen as the legitimation for his place in the organization. Instead we are arguing that it is Operational Researchers who can, by applying some beha~oural science skills to their problem-

Some of the research on which this paper is based was sup- ported by gr~.nts from the SSRC and the Leverhulme Trust.

North-Holland Publishing Company European Journal of Operational Research 6 (1981 ) 360 - 366

solving situations, be more successful in their mathematical-technical problem-solving role, and so undertake a total task which is beyond that of the Organization Development or behavioural science consultant.

In this paper we shall be presenting methods which focus upon the process of effective consulting but nevertheless can be the basis for problem analysis and for problem solving in ways which are currently pre- dominznt within Operational Research. We shall argue that there is an activity which lies somewhere between Organization Development consultation and Operational Research which makes the process of problem-solving both more successful and more enjoyable for consultant and client.

Our focus in this paper is on the process of acting as a consultant to a team or project group. Often the Operational Researcher is, in the first instance, called upon to offer some expert help with problems the team is intending to solve, and he has a peripheral and usually short term involvement in the particular project the team is formed to work upon. Thus the Operational Researcher will be interested in trying to apply his skills in a way which mearls that the team will see them as relevant to their own multifarious views on their organizational world. In order to achieve this, the Operational Researcher will be inter- ested in trying to understand more about the partic- ulari_ties and differences that exist in the views each of the team members hold (Eden and Sims [12]).

2. Disincentives to acting as a facilitator

If, as we are suggesting in this paper, there are advantages to being able to use behavioural science skills alongside mathematical-technical ones, why should it be that not all Operational Researchers take such a role? We shall suggest six disincentives which may deter them.

Firstly, the Operational Researcher will lose the power of being a 'rational', objective outsider. The expectation is most commonly that the consultant will supply an objectivity and a capacity for rational analysis. This, after all, is what the consultant has been taught to do in whatever training he has had as an Operational Researcher, and if he has been trained

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D. Sims et al. / Facilitating problem definition in teams 361

to make rational analytic definitions of problems, there would need to be some good reason for him to become involved with irrational, subjective, political and seemingly inefficient attempts at problem-defini- tior,~ by the members of a team.

Secondly, there i~ the apparently inefficient use of time which characterizes facilitating. The process of collaborating with others is notoriously slow com- pared with working alone, and can usually only be justified in terms of an improvement in quality.

Thirdly, the Operational Researcher who ends the day feeling that he has employed significant tech- nical expertise may feel more satisfied than he would be if he felt he had facilitated others. If a consultant is to be able to persuade himself and others that his time is being well spent, he may feel the need to be doing something more active than is usually implied by 'facilitating'; whatever academics and runners of courses may preach about 'effectiveness', there still tend to be marks awarded for visible effort in profes- sions such as consultancy.

Fourthly, a particularly powerful disincentive to the facilitator role is that the consultant loses his right as an 'expert' to direct the situation. If he relinquishes power, he becomes just one influence among many on what goes on; it therefore follows that he might quite easily find himself facilitating the definition of a problem that he can play no part in solving. If the team does end up with a problem that he cannot solve, or at least play a part in solving, this can have serious implications for an Operational Researcher whose organizational position, or even whose livelihood, depends on people seeing them- selves as having problems of a type with which he can help.

Fifthly, the minute.by-minute activity of being a facilitator may be unattractive to some consultants because of the extent to which it entails reflecting back to people things that they and others in their team have said, to check the understanding and to build upon that understanding. To the person who is used to making prgnouncements from a position of expertise, this can be a most threatening and ala~'ming activity.

Sixthly, the facilitator may not get a great deal of thanks for his efforts. In taking a facilitative stance towards problem-definition, he is likely to lead the persons and teams involved into new learning about themselves and their ways of thinking and acting. Such learnings will not always be welcomed; as Morimoto [ 17, p. 257] says:

"Several times over the years I have been confronted, ahuost accused, by people who I have endeavoured to help. They have gained the perspective to be able to talk about their own concerns differently - which means they have expanded their capacity to perceive things from different positions. This complicates the process of decision-making and they become furious at me for robbing them in some way of the limited view of reality which has provided them with a kind of stability. I become ambivalent because I wonder if learning is worthy of that much anguish."

3. Incentives to acting as a facilitator

Let us consider the particular features of working with a team that are usually taken to be different from those that pertain between a consultant and his individual client. When meeting an individual client the consultant is attending to his understanding of the problem as the client sees it and is then concerned with negotiating a suitable role for himself with respect to this problem [12].

When working with a group we discover that we are not only likely to be confused by the social dynamics of several different political games, personal- ity differences, and styles of interaction, but also more significantly by several different understandings of the problem the team will be addressing, a variety of beliefs about what the group has been formed for, and a range of fantasies about the way in which the group might begin to work together. Being aware of these social dynamics can have important conse- quences for consultants. For example, it often happens when a consultant acting as an expert defines problems for a team, that some team members for some reason do not agree with the definition of the problem that the consultant has found, or they see that definition as being not in their particular inter- est, or they see the definition as making them look inadequate, or perhaps they would prefer a solution which favours them more than whatever solution they see as being likely to come out of the problem- definition the consultant has proposed. In these cases, such team members can subvert the process of defining and disposing of the problem. Thus even if the consultant is 'correct' in the definition that he arrives at, that definition may have no influence on subsequent events unless steps have been taken to gain the commitment of team members to it. If an expert problem solver resolves these in a way that is unacceptable to powerful members of a team, his resolution will be thrown out and he will have wasted

362 D. Sims et al. / Facilitating problem definition in teams

his time. Whether or not this should be so seems to us to be beside the point. As Bailey [2, p. xil] puts it:

Everyone claims to be acting for the general good, and I suppose many would not be able to act with such passionate intensity if they did not also sincerely believe that they were fuelled on altruism.

The complexity of this political side of problem definition in teams is very great, wlfich may be taken either as a reason for paying attention to it or as a reason for pretending it is not there (Sims [20] describes 95 categories, most of them political, used by team members about problem-construction in their teains.)

The chance that the consultant might t~= correct in an expert definition, however, would not seem very good. The consultant comes as an outsider to a team of people, each of whom is experienced in his own organizational world in the sense that he spends his whole working life in it, and each of whom has devel- oped his own wisdom, both as.~o what the issues and the context of the issues are k~ that orgamzation, and as to the likely successfulness of particular approaches to handling these issues in that context. Any problem which is of sufficient significance that anybody wishes to talk to a consultant about it is likely to be of sufficient complexity that there is a fair amount of data which members of a team believe they already have about it, even if that data is not organized in such a form that they can use it. A facilitating role may enable more o f the wisdom of the team members to be brought to explicit consciousness and to be communicated to other members of the team, than can be achieved without such assistance.

We suggest that an Operational Researcher will usually find it possible to be cognizant of the partic- ular wisdom that exists within a group. At the present time, however, we would suggest that the Operational Researcher normally chooses to ignore, formally or analytically, his uriderstandings of groups when these understandings take the above form; this is because there are currently few methods or techniques which can enable him to use routinely this intuitive knowl- edge about group behaviour in an analytic way. The expert problem-solver ignores political complexity and the clients' personal wisdom at the risk of, in his turn, being ignored by the clients. Such a disillu- sioning disappointment for the consultant can, we would suggest, only be avoided by taking a facilitative stance.

4. Ways of listening

Argyns and Sch6n [ 1 ] have argued for the need for the professional in any field to pay attention to both technical and interpersonal competence. We believe that operationalizing a facilitative stance for problem definition must involve paying attention to interpersonal aspects through a process by means of which people can listen to each other and them- selves. The notion of listening that we are pursuing here is inevitably a complicated one. We follow Morimoto who suggests that "when we speak of the importance of listening to one another, we sometimes overlook the complexity and the discipline involved; listening requires more than a warm and accepting attitude" [17, p. 247].

Most of us have experienced at some time those group meetings where for one particular reason or another, often to do with internal politics, some or all of the individuals concerned cannot or do not wish to say what it is they consider to be important in their own evaluation of the situation they are intendedly meeting to discuss. We are also familiar with the way in which individuals can variously interpret situations, 'misunderstand' each other, 'discover' by accident that in a previous conversation what each had thought he had heard bore no relation to the meaning of the other. Thus we believe that facilitating listening will mean paying careful attention to not assuming shared meanings among those involved. Thus we are suggesting that the Operational Researcher who wishes to undertake a facilitating role would be helped if he can combine the tech- nical skills of model building and explicit representa- tion which are the usual province of Operational Research with the social skills of process consulta- tion which are not usually taken to be his business.

There are two distinct ways in which the Opera- tional Researcher may set about doing this: he can create circumstances which allow him to talk with each member of the team individually, in the first instance; or he may gradually allocate himself a for- real and designated role of listener in the group theetings. The first of these strategies must commit the consultant to two phases of problem definition. The first phase involves a one-to-one working in which the aim is to create circ~.,mstances where the team member feels able to tell the consultant about his own perspective, objectives, and views of the problem associated with the team. After the con- sultant has constructed an explicit representation of

D. Sims et aL / Facilitating problem definition in teams 363

these views, which the team member has agreed to be a rough (and usually qualitative/subjective) impres- sion of "the position as it looks to me", then the sec- ond phase of facilitating a definition of ~ problem that all members wish to commit energy to solving can be started.

This second phase of negotiating from an 'inter- subjectivity' base (Eden et al. [ 11 ], Vickers [21 ]) involves the consideration of some difficult con- ceptual and theoretical issues, but, as we shall indi- cate later, can nevertheless be solved at the level of pragmatics. The second strategy of working directly with the groups as 'listener' involves the consultant in the process of interpreting what members say and immediately 'coding' it and adding it t c a flip-chart explication of the aggregated theories and ideas espoused, thus enabling negotiation to be directly aimed at a qualitative model of the 'world' of the project team as the model is constructed.

Both of the approaches to listening discussed above demand something more of the Operational Researcher than merely intuitive processing of what we hear and see going on around us. Clearly listening is something we suppose ourselves to be adept at doing and yet we know that as we watch other people we see them interpret and attribute meaning to what others say in such a way that they can treat it as wrong or misguided, or rapidly define it in the con- text of their own problems and views of the world, or alternatively take it as a cue for pres~nting another part of their own view. If we see others doing this, then it is likely that we do it ourselves.

As we have argued elsewhere (Eden et al. [ 10]) an important part of listening is attempting to identify formally the focus of interest of each member of a group, that is, to answer the questions, "Why is this person fussed about the problem he is describing? What is it about the situation he is describing that makes him focus on the particular features he has chosen to describe? Is there a mentally simulated future he is seeing that he is uncomforable with, if so why? Is there a fantasy of a possible future he would like?"

There must be a potentially enormous number of different ways of listening th rou~ constructing an explicit representation or model of an evolving prob- lem definition. The choice of method will be con- tingent upon the particular context of the facilitator and the client group and what they feel themselves to be most comfortable with. Thus a facilitator may choose and negotiate with the client group, a process

in wlfich he makes notes or tape records one session with the client group and feeds back at the beginning of the following session, for discussion and elabora- tion, a verbal scenario representing the unfolding problem definition. He may choose to feed back a tape recording itso!f. He may follow a process where- by he provides at intervals during a discussion a verbal summary which may or may not be recorded in writing. He may record such summaries, or lists of factors mutually agreed to be crucial, on a board or flip-chart for elaboration or amendment as discus- sion pro,reeds. He may use pictures or diagrams.

Rein and Schfn [181 suggest several different ways of 'problem.setting', through story telling, maps, theories and models. For some years Bowen [4] has been arguing for techniques of this sort, and has suggested his own Systems approach to the problem (see [5]). This approach, and many others exempli- fied within the Systems movement (see for example, Checkland [7]), depend upon forming categories of systems which are modelled as boxes or circles. The analysis which can take place is either implicitly directed by set theoretic considerations, or explicitly assumed to be concerned with reified or abstracted notions of unilateral objectives (Beishon and Peters [3], Bryer and Kistruck [6], Hoes [ 16], Silverman [19]). Bowen is fairly exceptional in emphasising the necessary involvement of the client in considering his problem within this framework, but it is more com- mon for Systems Analysis to be conducted away from the client and result in prescription from a presumed problem definition.

One method that we have developed for listening to, capturing and representing in a formal way the complicated definitions of an issue by a client group involves the coding on a board or flip.chart of the scenarios given to us by the members of the group to produce a cognitive map. While our cognitive mapping may appear similar to the influence diagrams used in Systems Dynamics modelling, it is intended to represent the particular situation as it is perceived and described by the members of a group rather than some objective reality. The coding methods used to construct the map are described in detail elsewhere [10]. They are intended to capture the structure and content of the theories and hypotheses the individ- uals concerned have developed to make sense of and explain their world - their concepts which describe states of affairs and the relationships between states of affairs explaining their occurrence and anticipating

their consequences.

364 D. Sims et al. / Facilitating problem definition in teams

We shall attempt, below, to describe some of the salient features and basic 'building blocks' for con- structing our cognitive map. It is not our intention here to give examples of cognitive maps, which can be found elsewhere (Eden et al. [9,10,14]). However it is our inteniion to provide a flavour of how listening can gradually lead to the construction of a network of beliefs which will become a cognitive map amena- ble to analysis. Let us first consider briefly the basic principles of mapping theories as they are expressed idiosyncratically by an individual. Concepts, descrip- tions, ideas and beliefs may be:

(i) Assertions or attributions: Such as "the world is round", "Brian is stupid", "got a bad report", "Paul did not apply for job". These are a part of a map if they offer an explanation for a circumstance or are believed to cause an event. They are attribu- tions made in an assertive manner as if ~hey were a matter of fact. Quite often they represent historical facts.

(ii) Increasing or decreasing concept ~alizations: Such as the presumption that a part of the situation in which the team finds itself is the possibility that there might be "an increase, or decrease, in the extent to which I am known in my own patch". A con- ceptualization of this sort normally implies the possibility of a monotonic change in a circumstance.

(iii) Alternative circumstances: Most descriptions which contribute to a problem definition tend to be statements about current circumstances with either an implicitly or explicitly stated alternative circum- stance. Thus "meetings last too long", or "1 ! hour

" 2 meetings"; or "less" or "old level of" "profes- sionalism in service"; "more" or "less" "bureaucracy".

(iv) Causality: Each of the coding circumstances set out above deliberately permit the map to capture the language of the client and depict cor.,cepts in his terms. Except for assertions the other concept coding deliberately sees the conceptualization of a problem through dichotomous descriptions where the alterna- tive circumstances are not necessarily strict opposites but psychological appreciations of the alternative. Each concept may be linked by a belief in causality. The link is by arrow, as with directed graphs (Harary et al. [ 15]) or influence diagrams in Systems Dynam- ics (Coyle [8]).

Thus, a statement such as "if a Probation Officer is a person in whom a client can confide rather than an extension of the police, then it is likely that a warmer relationship can exist, and it is this that gives more job satisfaction" earl become t:

/PO to confide in/PO as extension of police/ 1,

/warmer relationship between PO and client/

1+ job satisfaction

Later, another individual in the team stated that "it is the likelihood of increased bureaucracy that will make us look like the police and destroy our working relationship with our clients", thus adding an extra concept and filling a void pole:

bureaucracy l -

/PO to confide in/PO as extension of police/

1+ /warmer/destroy working/relationship between

PO and client/

t+ job satisfaction

As the facilitator continues to listen, the network will become increasingly complex, and begin to take on the form of a model of the problem as it is being constructed by the team. Typically a cognitive map can turn out between 30 and 500 concepts. During this time the facilitator is likely to be playing an active role, checking the validity of the coding for the members of the team, asking for explanations and consequences around concepts, requesting the articulation of opposite poles, exploring concepts that appear to be particularly crucial or central, putting in interrelationships between concepts men- tioned at different times in the discussion, picking up and exploring apparent contradictions, and so on - at each stage adding to or amending the existing map.

Coding on the spot is a skill which becomes easy with practice. What is more important is that the facilitator can capture concepts, relationships and theories as they are articulated. As the model unfolds then attention is focussed on debating the theories and the meaning of concepts in a way that would not otherwise be the case;it is this negotiative activity that we see as facilitating problem det~alition. The

I Slashes are used to separate opposite poles of a concept. If there are no slashes, then the positive (left-hand) pole is taken to be 'an increase' and the negative (right-hand) 'a decrease'. A positive ~elationship (+) follows the poles and a negative one (-) crosses the poles.

D. Sims et al. / Facilitating problem definition in teams 365

model is the very act o f the Operational Researcher listening to his client. The process will usually have the additional important outcome of giving the team confidence in their consultant because he listens to what they have to say.

In this way the model becomes a representation through which, as the coding proceeds, the team can begin to reflect and to conduct a dialogue with each other. The unfolding model enables the team to re.rain and interrelate many of the separate points which different members make which might other- wise have been lost because, at the time they are uttered, no one is sure hew to relate them to other points. It becomes a means of checking meanings and the focus for elaboration and modification and, above all, subjective, idiosyncratic and different knowledge comes to be seen as legitimate for a negotiated prob- lem definition. The construction of a model with a team in which qualitative, subjective and political ele- ments are coded as integral to the definitions of the problem facilitates the members of the team seeing these aspects as legitimate. The process also appears to reduce some of the stressful aspects of inter- personal dynamics that can accompany negotiation over an issue as it becomes increasingly difficult and irrelevant to try and remember to whom a particular idea or hypothesis belongs; this me~'ls that relevant parts of the model can be addressed, amended or deleted through discussion.

Constructing a model in this way can take place over several sessions as an increasingly complex prob- lem definition is constructed. In a recent consultancy project [9] lasting approximately nine months, over half the total time devoted to the project was spent in reaching the stage at which there was an owned prob- lem that everyone wished to work on.

While we have concentrated in this paper on the process of constructing a problem definition with a client group, the method used for listening to a prob- lem will be contingent upon the particular circum- stances and what the client team and the fac~itator feel most comfortable with - whether it be large total maps across a w ~ , separate bits of a map, small pieces of paper, use of the computer, con- structing maps for feedback using the tape recorder and notes of a meeting rather than with the client, and so on. To take one example, the analysis of a complicated map can be assisted by the use of the comput.¢r and we have developed a suite of computer programmes designed to take the coded maps and allow ourselves and our clients to access those parts

of the model of interest and explore the interrela- tionships between concepts and their ramifications [10, Chapter 5]. Some clients find this easier than attempting to analyse a complicated visual representa- :,on. Very often we ourselves have used the computer for analysis and tidying of maps between sessions devoted to constructing a model with a client group.

5. Qualitative models and an expert role

We have stated in this paper that it is our intention to persuade Operational Researchers to encompass a facilitator role within their expert problem-solving role rather than to become behavioural science con- sultants. We see this extended role as being relatively easy to attain because of the degree to which a negotiated problem definition in the form of a cogni- tive map can become the basis for help from technical and mathematical analyses.

As a cognitive map is developed, either from the gradual merging of individual maps or the aggregated direct construction of the map at team meetings, the map becomes complex in the sense of it being a reflection of alternative and often conflicting view- points. It is not uncommon for negotiation to pro- duce strategies for inquiry which the Operational Researcher would usually be anxious to help devise. Often the need for inquiry strategies to be devel- oped stems from the team realizing the centrality of a particular belief for the satisfactory evaluation of possible policy options, and yet uncertainty sur- rounds the validity of the belief, or there might be conflicting beliefs not compromised or resolved thi'ough negotiation. The need for inquiry has here been established not through an implicit, intuitive demand for knowledge but from the explicit context of its importance in policy evaluation. From this point on, the inquiry may proceed as usual, but by developing inquiry strategies naturally from a negotiated problem definition the researcher has a clearer idea of its context and thus a better under- standing of the level of accuracy required and of timing constraints.

The identification of problems, within an issue, often reveals opportunities for the Operational Researcher to use specific decision analysis tech- niques in order to help the team gradually to simplify the issue by gaining insight into some of the problems which contribute to the general issue. Our experience indicatzs that the most common, and useful, tech-

366 D. Sims et al. / Facilitating problem definition in te,:tms

nique that can be employed to help the team better understand the ramifications of policy options is that of computer simulation. Although cognitive maps are dominated by subjective and qualitative concepts and relationships, it can be helpful for the team to identify those concepts which can be opera- t~onalized and routes between them identified.

Probatqy the most important contribution that a cw~iti:~'e map can make during the stages of em- ploying quantitative techniques is that of being set alongside the output of these techniques. In this way qualitative and quantitative considerations can be made of possible po~,:y options (Eden and Smithin [13]) and a part of our current software development programme is aimed at automatically linking the cognitive map and simulation model so that output from b m h can be viewed on a graphics terminal.

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