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F22 Analysisv4

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Program history and military-industrial complex

F22 program is a prime example of bad management large developmental and production costsmeant reduction in number of planes procured; that, in turn, increased per-aircraft cost even more,and led to further cuts. Result was that original number of airframes was cut from 750 to 680 duringH. W. Bush' administration. In 1993-94, Clinton Administration cut number further, to 442 planes;

1997 Quadrennial Defense Review cut number to 339 aircraft about three wings worth, althoughtit did leave option of buying two more wings if air-to-ground capability was introduced into F22. In2002, there was another attempt to cut numbers further, but it did not pass, but in 2003, number wascut to 279, and in 2005 to 178 aircraft. Later, four aircraft were added to procurement plan.

In 1990s, Air Force cancelled program to develop multi-role replacement for F16, and, along withthe navy, begun a new effort Joint Advanced Strike Technology program, or JAST, which led todevelopment of F35 Joint Strike Fighter. Marine Corps also joined in.

In December 2010, Program Budget Directive, pushed by Rumsfeld, slashed 10 billion USD fromF22 procurement, leaving it at anemic levels of only 183 planes, number later raised to 187.

Here is how number of F22s to be procured changed over time:1986 750 F22s1991 6481993 4421997 3392003 2792005 - 178

Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell estimated that, by 2024, USAF will be short of its 2250 fightersrequirement by some 800 aircraft (it must be noted that US policy had its military ready for two

major theater wars however, it is unlikely that either Russia or India will join China in the even ofUS-China far; actually, opposite is far more likely, especially in case of India). Problem is evenworse since air superiority is crucial element of all US military plans.

Major problem was abandonment of competetive prototyping policy introduced with F16 program,where designers would build full-technology, combat-capable prototypes based on skeletonrequirements, test them, redesign and fix what needed, and then test them again, meaning that bugswere being discovered during production; same mistake is being repeated with F35. Prototype wastested, but it had little in common to finished plane it did not have stealth skin, and was lighterthan finished F22. Even shape was very different, and there was no demonstrative dogfight inPentagon, it was called "paint job with shape of F22". Also, low-level production made it difficult tocancel outright, problem increased by fact that main goal of F22 program was to get money tocontractors. Production also started in 1997, despite the fact that, by then, less than 4% of testinghad been complete.

Capabilities also changed in 2002, limited ground attack capacity was added, earning itdesignation of F/A-22, which was in 2005 changed to F-22A.

Whereas F15 entered service 5 years after development started, F22 waited full 24 years. One ofreasons for that is permanent war economy in the US, which caused a merger of previously separategovernment and corporate managements. That has caused a proliferation of useless projects, whose

only purpose is to make money for contractors, sub-contractors and sub-sub-contractors.However, military-industrial complex does have support in United States due to number of jobs itcreates. F22 project itself was divided among 1 150 subcontractors in 43 states and Puerto Rico,

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employing 15 000 people, for precisely that reason - to make it difficult to get rid of. Whenaccounted for local economies, 160 000 jobs were put at risk. Same trick was tried with Nike-Zeusmissile defense program, and failed.

From 1990 to 2000, US Government spent 2 956 billion USD on the Department of Defense. In2002, 35 million people do not have secure supply of food due to living in poverty, 1,4 million more

than in 2001, and 18 000 out of over 40 million people without health insurance died due to lack oftreatment. Two thirds of all public schools have troublesome environmental conditions.

Cost of Vietnam war was 676 billion USD. Current US military budget draws 10 % of US GNP.Actually, in 1952 which saw highest level of defense spending during Cold War US defense

budget was 589 billion in FY2008 USD. In 2008, it was 670 billion USD. And these figures arebased on Pentagon's own data, and therefore lowered, as you will see below. CIAs 2007 WorldFactbook estimated 400 billion USD defense spending for rest of the world combined. In 2008,China and Russia had defense budgets of 81 and 21 billion USD, respectively. In 2010, number was178 billion USD for China; however, as with US 500-billion-USD number, both numbers for 2008included "base" spending only.

Real US defense spending in 2010: 534 billion "base" spending 6 billion "mandatory" appropriations (mostly personell-related expenses) 130 billion for financing war in Iraq and Afghanistan 22 billion for nuclear weapons (to Department of Energy) 106 billion to Department of Veterans 43 billion to Department of Homeland Security 49 billion for UN peacekeeping operations, aid to Iraq and Afghanistan and gifts to Israel

plus other costs of State Department

28 billion to Department of Treasury, to help pay for military retirement 57 billion to pay for Pentagon's share of interest on debt

Additions to the flow of capital funds from the Pentagon are welcomed. One example is the pulleypuller for the F-16 fighter essentially a steel bar two inches in length with three screws tapped in.In 1984, this small item was sold to the DoD by General Dynamics for $8,832 each. If the sameequipment were custom ordered in a private shop it would cost only $25.

It is typical that weapons cost three times or more than initial cost estimates. F22s flyaway cost hasincreased from 35 million USD originally projected 60 million in FY 2009 USD - to 250 millionUSD, or 412% of initial estimated cost. One of causes are misrepresentations of costs as John

Hamre, Pentagon controller from 1993 to 1997 said, military-industrial complex knew that planewould cost more than projected, but costs were misrepresented at Capitol Hill in order to secure the

project. Policy of cost misrepresentations is still in effect more about it below.

Another telling fact is that, between 2001 and 2005, 16 out of 17 major weapons systems did notmeet required specifications not one was stopped, or delayed in production, as result.

US, with its permanent war economy, is basically a militarizedstate capitalism..

One part of it is administrative staff. French designed and built the Mirage III with a totalengineering staff of fifty design draftsmen. The Air Forces F-15 Program Office alone had a staffof over 240, just to monitor the people doing the work.

As a result, US budget is larger than that of rest of the world combined. Over 27 000 military

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contractors are evading taxes and still continue to win new business from Pentagon, owing anestimated 3 billion USD at end of 2002 fiscal year. It is made worse by fact that only things thatlimit cost increases are external US Congress, Government and taxpayers. Current US militaryspending per year is, as seen above, around 1 trillion USD.

During 2002, Boeing had received $19.6 billion in government contracts. In support of such results,

the Boeing management spent $3.8 million for lobbying of various sorts and made campaigncontributions to members of Congress amounting to $1.7 million.

Military itself is penalized by receiving unreliable equipment that is too complex, requiring hard-to-find skilled maintenance talent, and prone to malfunction. In 2010, there have been claims thatChinese shot down F22 with a laser; most likely in order to fund more research into exotic weapons(YF-1984?). Another possibility is that US is also pressurizing China into revaluing its currency, orsimple propaganda as a goal of racheting up Chinese fear factor, as it was doing in last decade or so.Reason it became popular is due to all the hype F22 received.

Moreover, US wants to sell F22 to other coutries, and does it with other weapons systems effect it

creates is that US is in constant arms race with itself. Meanwhile, money expended on hardwaremeans that US pilots' training is suffering.

One of main problems with US weapons manufacturers is that these corporations cannotconvert tocivilian production (as William Anders, General Dynamics' CEO said in 1991 - " most [weaponsmanufacturers] don't bring a competitive advantage to non-defense business," and "Frankly, swordmakers don't make good and affordable plowshares."), and are constantly and consistently eatingaway scarce resources that still remain avaliable to other sectors. Two relatively small wars in Iraqand Afghanistan had put a cosiderable pressure on US military budget, even more than Vietnamwar, while Military-industrial-Congressional complex grows in power and influence exactly whatPresident Eisenhower warned against in his farawell adress.

Cold War itself served as an excuse to keep money flowing into MICC. By 1991, it was so wellestablished that shutting it down became nigh impossible; still, it began creating a series of warsand false dangers - Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the first and second Gulf wars, Afghanistan, Yemen,Pakistan, the war on terror, etc. - to justify its continuing survival (going by some analyses, it isentirely probable that even 2001 attacks were orchestrated by elements inside US to justify acontinuing stream of wars and ever-increasing defense budget, as well as reductions in personalfreedoms. Even if that is not the case, however, attacks were still masterfully exploited in pushingfor those goals).

It also should be noted that unit number reductions, contrary to what DoD apologetics say, are not acause of a growing costs in either F22 or F35 or most other US programs. Rather, they are asymptom.

F22 costs

F22 is, as it is obvious to everyone who knows something about it, very costly airplane to bothproduce and use. But, what are real numbers?

F22 is perhaps more famous for its perpetual increase in costs than for its hyped abilities. There aremany resons for such increase, such as false cost estimates made by Lockheed Martin, reducedorders and problems with aircraft itself. Official numbers are 150 million USD as a flyaway cost,and 350 million USD as unit procurement cost. However, these numbers are outdated.

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Unit and modernization costs

In 2011, one F22 had a flyaway cost of 250 million USD and unit procurement cost of 411 millionUSD. Later, unit program cost has increased to 412 million USD per plane.

Developmental costs have increased due to many patch-ups (such as structural strenghtening of rearfuselage) and fixes.

Discrepancy between official and real costs are logical, considering that all DoD cost estimates arebased on Lockheed Martin's internal documentation cost control is utterly nonexistent.

F22s electronics components are not federated they are designed to work only with anothercomponent of same design, thus any electronics upgrade would see replacement of entireelectronics system. Computer chips are already outdated.

Total cost of all F22s modernization programs has been 12,7 billion USD in 2012 (values for firstquarter of 2012). It is unknown wether it included fixes, but it means that unit program cost has

increased from 412 million USD in 2011 to 480 million USD in 2012. With GAO releasing updatedper-fighter cost of 421 million USD, beforementioned programs increase per-unit cost to 489million USD per aircraft.

Maintenance and operating costs

F22 is supposed to replace F15 fleet, but operating costs of brand-new F22s are already greater thanF15s - namely, F22's operating cost was 61 000 USD per hour in 2011; compare that with operatingcost 30 000 USD per hour for F15C, and 44 000 USD per hour operating cost in 2009.

In short, F22 costs two times more to operate than aircraft it is supposed to replace, whilecomparing F22 with F16 and its twelve times lower operating cost of 4 900 USD per hour just doesnot seem fair.

When we compare that to promises of Lockheed Martin about F22s lower operating costs whencompared to F15, it becomes obvious, not only that Lockheed Martin cannot be trusted (that muchalready is obvious) but that military-industrial complex desperately wants to protect Cold War statusquo, which allows them to get richer by downplaying future consequences of current decisions,they can continue loading defense budget with even more costly and complex weapons.

Problems

Here, I will not put cost of most fixes until now beacouse I don't know it but rather a list of

technical problems F22 has encountered so far (some may have been fixed in meantime): leaky fuselage access panels, leading to corrosion problems

four largest aluminium panels replaced by titanium ones; each titanium panel costs atleast 50 000 USD

bad quality control fatigue problems

aft boom fixed by reinforcing it

structural quality problems titanium booms connecting wings have structural failures that could result in loss of

airplane; problem "solved" by increasing inspections over the life of the fleet, withexpenses mostly paid by Air Force 30 F22s were badly glued

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defective VLO coating Lockheed knowingly used defective coatings

cracks in airframe small parts require frequent reglueing and glue can take more than a day to dry

problems with life support systems oxygen problems limited planes to maximum altitude of 7 600 meters, as opposed to

official maximum altitude of 19 800 meters in 2011, OBOGS failure meant that pilots were breathing a mixture of oxygen, anti-

freeze, oil fumes and propane, and F22 fleet was grounded.All of that, especially given large number of potentially safety-threatening problems, points towardsconclusion that F22 was approved for production before it was ready for it, much like later F35.

So far, three F22s have been lost two in accidents, one due to faulty life support systems leavingUnited States with 185 aircraft.

Strategical analysis

Effects of numbers

Effects of numbers are various. First, fewer planes means that these same planes have to do moretasks and fly more often, therefore accumulating flight ours faster and reaching designed structurallife limit faster. Also, smaller force will attrite faster; more flight hours per plane will mean lesstime avaliable for proper maintenance as well as greater wear and tear put on planes, furtherreducing already limited numbers.

In combat, side capable of putting and sustaining greater number of planes in the air will be able toput a larger sustained pressure on the enemy. Until advent of F16 and F18, USAF and USN were

constantly worried about being outnumbered for a good reason. Yet, small numbers of F22 arenow, somehow, desireable.

F22, even assuming all promises made by USAF and Lockheed Martin are actually true, will nothave numbers to make impact. In that, it is similar to Me262 Sturmvogel, German jet fighter fromWorld War 2. Like F22, it was designed as a technological wonder; and unlike F22, it actually usedtechnology that was not used in any other fighter plane before it. Yet, it was defeated by superiornumbers of Allied technologically inferior fighter planes. While it did cause some alarm, itsultimate effect on course of war was negligible.

F22s shortcomings force size and quality

To stop aging of its fighter inventory, USAF should have had acquired 2500 fighter planes between1998 and 2013. In contrast, only 187 F22s were produced, and even fewer F35s. Only low costoption is to restart production of F16 for one F22, one can get four F16s; seven, if we go withF22s unit procurement cost.

Acquiring only 180 aircraft means that USAF will use 80 planes for training and home defense, 50for European and 50 for Pacific theater. When these numbers are combined with low maintenancereadiness, owing due to its complexity and stealth coating, it will reduce F22s operationalavaliability and strategic impact to insignificance - in 2009, its avaliability was 55 60 %. It alsohad serious maintenance problems, such as corrosion. It could also fly on average 1,7 hours

between critical (mission-endangering) failures, and from 2004 to 2008, its maintenance time perhour of flight increased from 20 to 34 hours, with stealth skin repairs accounting for more than halfthe maintenance time. In 2009, number was 30 hours of maintenance per hour of flight, while in

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2011, F22 required 45 hours of maintenance for every hour in the air. As is obvious from this, and"Maintenance and operating costs" section, all F22s maintenance trends have been negative foryears.

Moreover, only 130 of these planes are combat-coded.

187 F22s in inventory can, at best, generate 60 combat sorties per day, which is pathetic numberagainst any serious enemy whereas F16s bought for same cost would generate 1000 combatsorties per day, F22s presence likely will not even be noticed in strategic sense. Number of sortieswill also become even lower as combat attrition and increased maintenance take its tool. There isalso fact that per-unit maintenance costs for new F22s are, as seen previously, far larger than thosefor 30-year-old F15s, and will increase as time passes.

Also, while simulators may be good for cockpit procedures training, they misrepresent reality of aircombat; as such, F22s unreliability also harms pilots training.

(Note: Out of 187 F22s that have entered active service, 3 have crashed, bringing number down to

184. It is still not large enough change to cause major effect numbers noted above. It is unknown tome wether all of crashed F22s were combat-coded)

Effects of training

As US commander in Gulf War said: "Had we exchanged our planes with the enemy, result wouldhave been the same". Even best hardware on planet will not help if pilots are undertrained andF22 pilots are on way to become that, due to F22s high maintenance requirements. When Israeli AirForce swept Syrian MiGs from sky in invasion of Lebanon in 1982 with exchange ratio of 82-0,Israeli Chief of Staff made same comment.

Between 1970 and 1980, instructors at Navy Fighter Weapons School, who got 40 to 60 hours of aircombat manouvering per month, used F5s to whip students, who got only 14 to 20 hours per month,in their "more capable" F4s, F14s and F15s. US pilots in Vietnam complained that 20 25 hours oftraining per month is inadequate. Currenly, F22 pilots get only 12 to 14 hours of flight training permonth.

Israeli pilots in 1960s and 70s got 40 to 50 hours of flight training per month. US Congress,meanwhile, cut 400 million USD from pilot training in 2008, to help pay for F22s.

F22 shortcomings other

One of shortcomings of F22 is very simple it requires large, very visible runaways in order toeven get into air. Not only such runaways will be prime target and hardened shelters aren't

protection against new weapons, while concrete runaway can be easily disabled for a relatively longspan of time they are also in danger of "goal tending" enemy aircraft, with larger fuel fractionand lower wing loading, can simply go ahead of returning F22 force and shoot them down whileF22s are trying to land. And with low numbers of F22s, this danger is very real. In short, if airdefenses of base are disabled or destroyed, a pair of biplanes with air to air missiles could hovernear base and not let anyone take off.

Also, hardened shelters USAF uses can be penetrated by modern munitions designed specificallyfor that use.

In World War 2, last major war United States have fought, such airfield vandalism was always adanger even when US had air superiority. So, how US solved it? It didn't it simply produced

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airplanes at faster rate than enemy could destroy them one airplane per hour. F22s complexdesign, aside from making it very difficult to produce and maintain, also makes it very vulnerable.What on legacy fighters would be counted as cosmetic damage, can force costly repairs on F22 stealth skin is prime offender.

Tactical analysis

BVR combat

Since development of first BVR weapons, each new generation of fighters would make someonedeclare that "dogfighting is a thing of past". Invariably, they have been wrong. In 1960, F4 Phantomwas designed without gun and then Vietnam happened.

US went into Vietnam relying on a AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missile. Pre-war estimated Pk was0,7 Pk demonstrated in Vietnam was 0,08. Current AIM-120 has demnostrated Pk of 0,59 incombat do this date, with 17 missiles fired for 10 kills. However, that is misguiding.

Since advent of BVR missile until 2008, 588 air-to-air kills were claimed by BVR-equipped forces.24 of these kills were by BVR missile. Before "AMRAAM era", four out of 527 kills were by BVRmissile. Since 1991, 20 out of 61 kills may have been done by BVR missile, while US itself hasrecorded ten AIM-120 kills. However, four were NOT from beyond visual range; Iraqi MiGs werefleeing and non-manouvering, Serb J-21 had no radar, as was the case with Army UH-60 (no radar,did not expect attack), while Serb Mig-29's radars were inoperative; there was no ECM use by anyvictim, no victim had comparable BVR weapon, and fights involved numerical parity or USnumerical superiority. Also, 16 BVR missile kills in Desert Storm are far from sure it says thatsixteen involved missiles that were fired BVR, meaning that these could have WVR kills

prefaced with BVR shots that missed. Five BVR victories are confirmed, however - one at 16 nm(and at night), one at 8.5 nm (night) and three at 13 nm, which more than doubles number of BVRvictories.

In Vietnam, Pk was 28% for gun, 15% for Sidewinder, 11% for Falcon, 8% for Sparrow, andessentially zero for Phoenix. Cost of expendables per kill was few hundred dollars for gun, 15 000USD for Sidewinder, 90 000 USD for Falcon, 500 000 USD for Sparrow, and several millions forPhoenix costs here are given in 1970 dollars. Overall cost for destroying enemy with BVRmissiles including training, and required ground support has never been computed.

AMRAAM itself costs 500 000 USD per missile, and USAF was forced stop buyng Sidewinders inorder to afford AMRAAMs.

In Cold War era conflicts involving BVR missiles Vietnam, Yom Kipuur, Bekaa Valley 144(27%) of kills were guns, 308 (58%) heat-seeking missiles, and 73 (14%) radar-guided missiles.Vast majority of radar-guided missile kills (69 out of 73, or 95%) were initiated and scored withinvisual range. In true BVR shots, only four out of 61 were successful, for a Pk of 6,6 %, and all fourwere carefully staged outside of large engagements in order to prove BVR theory (two were inVietnam, and two by Israeli Air Force after US pressured Israel into establishing BVR doctrine).

In Desert Storm itself, F15s Pk for Sidewinders was 67% as compared to Pk for BVR Sparrow of34%. However, Iraqi planes did not take evasive actions or use ECM, while there was persistentAWACS avaliability on Coalition part none of which can be counted at in any serious war.

Post-Desert Storm, there were 6 BVR shots fired by US during operation Southern Watch allmissed.

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There are other examples of radar missile engagements being unreliable: USS Vincennes shot downwhat it thought was attacking enemy fighter, and downed Iranian airliner, while two F14s firedtwice at intruding Lybian fighters, missing them at BVR with radar-guided Sparrows and shootingthem down in visual range with a Sparrow and Sidewinder.

BVR combat cannot for obvious reason fulfill critical requirement of visual identification. IFF is

unreliable it can be copied by the enemy, and can be tracked; meaning that forces usually shut itdown. As such, fighter planes have to close to visual range to visually identify target which is,depending on weather conditions, 400 to 800 meters.

WVR combat

In Desert Storm, US forces fired 48 WVR missiles, achieving 11 kills, for Pk of 0,23. However,historically, Pk for IR missiles was 0,15, and 0,308 for cannon. While F16s fired 36 Sidewindersand scored zero kills, at least 20 of launches were accidental, due to bad joystick ergonomy, whichwas later modified.

Effects of numbersIn WVR, numbers are usually decisive. Thus, F22 relies on a (flawed, as shown above) concept ofdecisive BVR engagement to compensate for larger numbers of enemy fighter planes it can beexpected to engage.

However, even in BVR, numbers do matter. Lanchester square criteria, which holds that qualitativeadvantage of outnumbered force has to be square of outnumbering force's numerical advantage, iseven more applicable for BVR combat than for WVR, due to lack of space constrains. Thus, due toSu-27s costing 30 million USD, as opposed to F22s 250 million, F22s would have to enjoy 70:1qualitative advantage just to break even which is extremely unlikely. Historically, 3:1 was usuallya limit of when quality could no longer compensate for enemy's quantitative advantage, in both

BVR and WVR.

Superior numbers also saturate enemy with targets, and cause confusion. USAF itself has alwaysdepended on superior numbers to win air war.

In short, F22 supporters have to learn to count.

F22s shortcomings in air combat

For beginning, four major characteristics were not met one, 26 per cent increase in weight has ledto wing loading and thrust-to-weight ratio slightly inferior to those of F15C; meaning that, for

reasons of physics, there was no increase in manouverability from outstanding, F22smanouverability was reduced to ordinary, except when it comes to air show tricks, that invariably

bleed off energy. Weight increase also led to decrease in fuel fraction, from 0.36 to 0.28, which istoo low even for a supercruise fighter fuel fractions of 0.28 and below yield subcruisers, 0.33

provides quasi-supercruiser and 0.35 and above gives combat-useful supercruise performance.Simply put, supercruise characteristic has failed 50 year old F104 can match F22s supercruiseradius, and F15C, to which F22s supercruise rainge is usually compared, is one of worst fighters interms of supercruise range. This means that F22 has to rely on subsonic cruise in combat and thatdespite the fact it was designed for supersonic cruise, therefore worsening its already badaerodynamical performance. Stealth itself was not achieved because F22 is, due to its size, is veryvisible in visual, infrared and acoustic spectrum, and its radar can be sensed by advanced RWRs, as

demonstrated by Eurofighter Typhoons at China Lake or by anti-radiation missiles, whichRussians have, and aren't afraid to sell them. Avionics system itself is outdated. Moreover, whencruising supersonically, loud sonic boom betrays its location.

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Also, to fully exploit its stealth advantages, F22 has to remain passive, even with its LPI radar; dueto its lack of IRST or other passive sensors, it is limited to being fed data by friendly aircraft,usually AWACS (while other fighters may do it, it is questionable they will be able to penetrate

jamming). Such planes can be shot down, effectively forcing F22 to choose between radiating inEM spectrum or fighting blind when compared to IRST-equipped fighters. Moreover, stealthy

aircraft are only stealthy at night, whereas air superiority is primarly daylight mission and F22slarge size means that it will be spotted first. Large size is partly because of requirements for radarstealth shapes required for achieveing radar VLO are very volume-ineffective. It is also veryvisible to sensors not based on active radio emissions, such as IRST.

F22s shortcomings in WVR combat

In WVR combat, F22 is pretty much very observable fighter it is very large, which does not servepurpose of stealth. As noted above, its manouverability is comparable to that of F15C, and usage ofgun doors and weapons bays increase response time, making snapshots within brief optimal"windows" a wishful thinking. While it is superior to F15E and F35, it is inferior in manouverability

to F15A and F16A, and is inferior in physical size to all current US fighters; as TopGun sayinggoes: "Largest target in the sky is always first one to die" a fact proven by actual combat: mostplanes were shot down unaware, from the rear.

That fact has been proven in exercises whenever "Red" aircraft entered visual range, F22invariably died (so far, list of F22 "killers" contains F16, EA18 "Growler", Eurofighter Typhoonand Dassault Rafale). Even thought in one such instance, F22 managed to "destroy" three F16s outof four, fight in question started in BVR; when last F16 got to WVR, F22 died fact that it is thelargest fighter in US inventory certainly helped.

Also, missiles have minimum weapons engagement zone; usually around a mile or little less, as

missile's warhead takes time to arm, and depending on missile's g-capacity (AIM-9B has minimumrange of 930 meters when fired from straight behind at sea level at Mach 0,8). Thus, gun is oftenonly remaining option option which, in F22s case, is unsatisfactory, due to usage of Gattlingdesign in combination with gun doors; both of that mean that F22 is unable to perform crucial split-of-second shots, due to combination of gun spin-up time and requiring doors to open increase time

between press on a trigger and first bullet leaving barrel to around a second whereas, to score akill and survive during mass dogfight, pilots would have to launch missiles quickly at multipletargets and then leave tactic appropriately called "launch and leave".

While missiles can perform 30-g manouvers, they move far faster than fighters, which means bothincreased turn diameter as well as increasing possibility of missile to miss target for no clear reason,

even when target is not manouvering or using ECM. This, combined with probability of fightersimply running out of missiles which is, with F22s low numbers, very likely - means that guncombat is far from outdated; and in it, F22 is handicapped.

As for F22s assumed unparralelled manouverability - while F22 may have thrust vectoring, it bleedsoff energy, is only really useful in post-stall maneuvers (thought it may improve sustained turn ratesomewhat), and non-VLO plane with thrust vectoring, such as Su-37, will always be moremanouverable, as thrust vectoring cannot compensate for aerodynamical and weight deficienciescaused by its VLO design. Also, TVC is only used in certain flight regimes where classic controlsare not effective enough; a problem which can be solved by close-coupled canard design.

While post-stall manouvers look cool at exercises, they are dangerous in real combat as they leaveplane vulnerable to enemy due to energy loss; therefore, only things that TVC really adds are safety,by providing two more control surfaces, and engine efficiency, by allowing aircraft to position itself

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better relative to air flow, thus improving range. F22, having 2D and not 3D TVC nozzles, islacking in former when compared to 3D TVC-equipped aircraft.

In short, thrust vectoring is dangerous for plane using it if pilot doesn't know how to use it (requireslot of training) and does not entirely compensate for airplane's size and weight so you can forgetthe prospect of F22 outmaneuvering, say, Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale.

F22s shortcomings in BVR combat

First, short supercruise range due to small fuel fraction does not allow F22 to pursue enemy orreliably avoid being jumped and/or pusued itself. While F22s supercruise range is superior to F15C,which is easily the worst supercruiser in USAF, it will be inferior to, for example, EurofighterTyphoon.

Second, it is not stealthy at all. Stealth is measured against five signatures infrared, sound, visual,and radar footprint as well as electronic emissions. Visual, by definition, is not important for BVRcombat; but sound and infrared signature are impossible to lower enough for plane to be VLO,

especially when supersonic. While it is not a shortcoming by itself, legacy fighters not even makingany effort to lower it, it becomes one when coupled by its low numbers and maximum of four BVRmissiles carried in VLO configuration essentially necessitating use of 3 to 4 F22s to kill a singletarget. And even if it was, it is not equipped with IRST (although it can be mounted), thusnecessitating F22 to emit signals be it radar or uplink to another plane to detect enemy, whichdefeats entire purpose of stealth, and allows enemy anti-radiation missiles to home in on F22s

powerful radar.

That problem is worsened by the fact that all US fighters emit in area of 10 000 Mhz in order to getall-weather capability meaning that enemy only has not to emit in that area in order to solve IFF

problem. In combat, enemy equipped with ARMs can force everyone to shut down radars, returning

combat squarely into visual range.

Meanwhile, US did make effort to develop ARM in 1969, but it was cancelled due to possibility ofit threatening radar missile development as well as F15 and F14 programs. French are also sellingadvanced ARMs all over the Third World, meaning that US might find itself in a trouble in nextwar.

Moreover, as soon as F22 manouvers, it is going to blow its already limited radar stealth. It isonly VLO within 20 degrees off the nose, and its reported radar signatures only take frontal aspectversus high-frequency radars into consideration.

In IR spectrum, F22 simply cannot hide, especially when supercruising fighter moving atsupersonic speeds generates shock cones of hot air; a feature impossible to hide to IRST.

Comparasion with other fighters

Su27

Su-27 family of planes are large planes with even larger radomes Russian radar manufacturerPhazotron is developing a Flanker-sized powerful radar Zhuk ASE which will outclass everysingle radar in US inventory except for that of F22.

However, IRST carried by Flankers is far greater problem, as explained in "counter-stealth" section.Su27 family of planes are also very manouverable, despite their size.

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In 1992, Su27 could see F22 from 15 kilometers. In 2000-2008, Flanker family's radar performancehas doubled meaning that by 2016, Flankers should be able to detect F22 from distance of 45kilometers.

F15

As explained above, F15C is equal to slightly superior in regards to F22 in most basiccharacteristics: thrust-to-weight ratio, wing loading and fuel fraction. It is superior to F22 inrearward cockpit visibility, as well as fact that no gun doors and externally mounted missiles allowfor split-of-second snap-shots critical for dogfight. Its similarity to F22 in dogfight was alsoacknowledged1 by its pilots to Everest Riccioni, retired USAF Colonel and member of FighterMafia.

F15 is also faster (Mach 2,5 vs Mach 2,2) and carries 940 rounds for its cannon, as opposed to 480rounds for F22.

F16

F16 costs 60 million USD in plane, and has operating cost of 4 600 USD per hour. Whereas 180F22s can only generate 60 combat sorties per day, F16s bought for same cost can generate 1728combat sorties per day (number of combat sorties = aircraft for equal cost x sortie rate; latter is 1,2for F16 and 0,7 for F22) if we use unit procurement costs, or 900 combat sorties if we use unitflyaway costs.

Original version of F16 would cost 30 million USD per plane, when adjusted for inflation. It alsohad better manouverability while F22 weights almost 30 000 kg even more, when latest fixesare counted - F16 weights bit over 18 000 kg. Original versions were half that weight.

Eurofighter Typhoon

Eurofighter Typhoon is another plane famous for its cost overruns. Currently, Tranche 2 Typhoonhas unit procurement cost of 142 million USD per plane, and unit flyaway cost of 118 million USD

per plane. Tranche 3's costs are 199 million USD per plane unit procurement, and 122 million USDper plane flyaway cost.

Also, both F22 and Eurofighter Typhoon have same top speed of Mach 2; F22 also can achieveMach 1,5 while supercruising in AtA configuration, while Typhoon is limited to Mach 1,2 in AtAconfiguration. Clean-configured, numbers are Mach 1,7 for F22 and Mach 1,5 for EFT.

There are reports that Typhoons engaged and defeated F22s in a mock dogfights at Nellis AFB; with

Typhoon's DASS suite allowing it to close range to F22 and enter a dogfight in which Typhoon wassuperior, due to its better manouverability (as noted above, F22s manouverability is similar to F15s,except for ability of doing post-stall manouvers). Nellis AFB is also where EA18G "killed" F22.

Typhoon's thrust-to-weight ratio is 1,14, while its wing loading is 312 kg/m2. F22s thrust-to-weightratio is 1,09, while its wing loading is 375 kg/m2 (all figures for loaded aircraft).

Moreover, Typhoon's PIRATE IRST has shown ability to track stealth aircraft just by heat generatedby stealth airplane's skin friction (it tracked B2 stealth bomber at air shows (1) ).

Dassault Rafale

Dassault Rafale's blended wing-fuselage design, relatively small size and light weight result in

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2005/03/riccioni_respon.htmlhttp://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2005/03/riccioni_respon.html

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comparably low wing loading even smaller than it can be calculated by simply dividing weight bywing area. Latter method results in wing loading of 306 kg/m2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 1,1 atloaded weight. Its close-coupled canards also help it maintain lift at high angles of attack, as well asto create dynamic instability; as such, its sustained and instanteneous turn rates are superior to F22,while its instantaneous turn rate is most likely superior to Eurofighter Typhoon.

Rafale is also capable of supercruise, and its relatively high fuel fraction in most versions (0,33 forC, 0,32 for B and 0,32 for M) as opposed to low fuel fractions of F22 and Eurofighter Typhoon(0,29 both) allow for greater persistence and range.

Counter-stealth technologies

Stealth versus classical radar

Su-27s radar performance has doubled over past 8 years, and by 2020 Flanker family radars will beable to detect VLO targets at over 46 kilometers. Also, US stealth planes fly mission with sameradar jamming escorts that accompany legacy platforms.

During the Gulf War, the British Royal Navy infuriated the Pentagon by announcing that it haddetected F-117 stealth fighters from 40 miles away with 1960s-era radar. The Iraqis used antiquatedFrench groud radars during that conflict, and they, too, claimed to have detected F-117s. TheGeneral Accounting Office, Congress' watchdog agency, tried to verify the Iraqi claim, but thePentagon refused to turn over relevant data to GAO investigators.

Also, even modern VLO planes have to operate alongside jamming planes, such as EA-6B or EA-18, when performing ground attack, confirming that even legacy radars are far from useless againstVLO planes.

Main way to reduce plane's radar signature is shaping stealth coating simply deals with last fewpercetages. Which means that F22 is going to blow its radar stealth as soon as it maneuvers, and itis physically impossible for airplane to present its reduced nose-on or side-on RCS to all radars.

VHF radar

While VLO planes are optimized to defeat S- and X- -band radars, VHF radars offer a goodcounter-stealth characteristics.

Simply put, RCS varies with the wavelenght beacouse wavelength is one of inputs that determinesRCS area.

VHF radars have wavelengths in 1-3 meter range, meaning that key shapings of 19-meter-long,13,5-meter-wide F22 are in heart of either resonance or Rayleigh scattering region.

Rayleigh scattering regios is region where wavelength is larger than shaping features of target ortarget itself. In that region, only thing that matters for RCS is actual physical size of target itself.Resonance occurs where shaping features are comparable in wavelength to radar, resulting ininduced electrical charges over the skin of target, vastly increasing RCS.

However, their low resolution and resultant large size means they are limited to ground-basedsystems.

Russians and Chinese already have VHF radars, with resolution that may be good enough to sendmid-flight update to SAMs. Also, it is physically impossible to design fighters that will be VLO in

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regards to both low power, high-frequency fighter radars, and high-power, low-frequency ground-based radars. Such radars can, according to some claims, detect fighter-sized VLO targets fromdistance of up to 330 kilometers (against bombers like B2, their performance will be worse, butsuch planes have their own shortcomings namely, IR signature and sheer size). Manufacturers ofVostok E claim detection range against F117 as being 352 km in unjammed and 74 km in jammedenvironment.

Also, RAM coatings used in many stealth planes are physically limited in their ability to absorbelectromagnetic energy; one of ways RCS reduction is achieved is active cancellation as signalreaches surface of RAM, part of it is deflected back; other part will be refracted into airframe, andthen deflected from it in exact opposite phase of first half, and signals will cancel each other on way

back. However, thickness of RAM coating must be exactly half of radar's frequency, meaning that itdoes not work against VHF radar for obvious reasons no fighter plane in world can have skin overhalf a meter thick.

There is one detail that apparently confirms this: in 1991, there was a deep penetrating raid directedat destruction of VHF radar near Bagdad; radar, which may have alerted Saddam at first wave of

stealth bombers approaching capital. Before US stealth bombers started flying missions, radar wasdestroyed in a special mission by helicopters. Also, during fighting in Kosovo, Yugoslav anti-airgunners downed F117 with Russian anti-air missile whose technology dates back to 1964, simply

by operating radar at unusually long wavelengths, allowing it to guide missile close enough toaircraft so as to allow missile's IR targeting system to take over. Another F117 was hit and damagedsame way, never to fly again.

These radars, being agile frequency-hopping designs, are very hard to jam; however, bandwidthavaliable is still limited.

Also, while bombers like B2 may be able to accomodate complex absorbent structures, it is not sowith fighters, which are simply too small.

Another benefit is power while capacity of all radars for detecting VLO objects increases withgreater raw output, it is easier to increase output of VHF radars.

It is also possible for VHF radar to track vortexes, wake and engine exhaust created by stealthplanes.

Another advantage of low-frequency radars is the fact that they present poor target for anti-radiationweapons, making them harder to destory. Moreover, new VHF radars are mobile Nebo SVU can

stow or deploy in 45 minutes, while new Vostok-E can do it in eight minutes.IRST

All Su-27 variants, as well as most modern Western fighters, carry IRST as a part of their sensorysuite. Russian OLS-35 is capable of tracking typical fighter target from head-on distance of 50 km,90 km tail-on, with azimuth coverage of +-90 degrees, and +60/-15 degree elevation coverage.Fighter supercruising at Mach 1,7 generates shock cone with stagnation temperature of 87 degreesCelzius, which will increase detection range to 55 km head-on. Not only that, but AMRAAMlaunch has large, unique thermal signature, which should allow detection of F22 and missile launchwarning up to 93+ kilometers, while AMRAAM moving at Mach 4 could be detected at up to 83kilometers.

Integrating Quantum Well Infrared Photodetector technology greatly increases performance Eurofighter Typhoon already has one with unclassified detection range for subsonic head-on

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airborne targets of 90 kilometers (with real range being potentially far greater).

Infrared imaging systems (like Typhoon's or Rafale's) provide TV-like image of area being scanned,which translates into inherent ability to reject most false targets. Also, while older IRST systemshad to be guided by the radar, newer ones can do initial detection themselves. Given that stealth

planes themselves rely on passive detection in evading targets, using passive means in detecting

them is logical response for fighter aircraft. Missiles themselves can use infrared imagingtechnology, locking on targets of appropriate shape.

While there are materials that can supress IR signature of a plane, most of these are highly reflectivein regards to radar waves, thus making them unusable for stealth planes, and other ways of reducingIR signature are not very effective.

Passive radar

Passive radar does not send out signals, but only receive them. As such, it can use stealth plane'sown radar to detect it, as well as its IFF, uplink and/or any radio traffic sent out by the plane.

Also, it can (like Czech VERA-E) use radar, television, cellphone and other avaliable signals ofopportunity reflected off stealth craft to detect them. Since such signals are usually coming from alldirections (except from above), stealth plane cannot control its position to present smallest return.EM noise in such bands is extensive enough for plane to leave a "hole" in data.

However, simply analyzing and storing such amount of data would require extreme processingpower as well as memory size, and it is prone to false alarms. It is also very short-range system, dueto amount of noise patterns being required to detect, map and store.

Lidar

Infrared doppler LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging; doppler LIDAR senses doppler shift infrequency) may be able to detect high altitude wake vortices of stealth aircraft. While atmosphericaerosoils are not sufficient for technique to work, exhaust particles as well as contrail ice particlesimprove detectability to point that aircraft may be detected from range well beyond 100 km;exhaust particles themselves allow for detection of up to 80 km.

Wake vortices are byproduct of generating lift, and are, as such, impossible to eliminate aircraftwing uses more curved upper and less curved or straight lower surface to generate differences inspeed between two airflows. As result, upper airflow is faster and as such generates lower pressurewhen compared to airflow below the wing, generating lift. That, however, has result of creatingvortices behind the trailing edge of the wing.

Background scanning

In that mode, radar does not look for stealth plane itself; instead it looks for background behindstealth plane, in which case sensory return leaves a "hole" in data. However, that requires radar to

be space-based; or, if stealth plane is forced to fly at very low altitude due to defence net, radar canbe airborne too.

Another possibility is using surface-based radio installations to scan the sky at high apertures andwith high sensitivity, such as with radio telescopes.

As it is known to radio-astronomers, radio signals reach surface uninterrupted even in daytime orbad weather; and since map of stars is well known, it can be assumed that any star not radiating iseclipsed by an object, such as stealth plane. And as with very snsitive radio-astronomical

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equipment, every part of sky is observed as being covered with stars. It is also doable by lesssensitive detecting equipment, simply by serching for changes in intensity of stars.

Over-the-horizon radar

Over-the-horizon radars invariably operate in HF band, with frequencies around 10 Mhz andwavelengths of 30 meters, beacouse it is band in which atmospheric reflection is possible. Also, atthat point, target will create some kind of resonance and shaping will be largely irrelevant, as will

be RAM coating, as explained above.

However, lowering frequency of radar means that size of radar aperture has to grow in proportion toradar wavelength to maintain narrow beam and adequate resolution; other problem is that these

bands are already filled with communications traffic, meaning that such radars are usually found inearly-warning role over the sea.

Such systems are already in use by US, Australia (Jindalee), Russia and China.

Bistatic / multistatic radarSince VLO characteristics are achieved primarly by shaping airframe to deflect radar waves in otherdirection than one they came from, and thus make it useless to classic systems. However, suchsignal can be picked by receiver in another position, and location of plane can be triangulated.While every radar pulse must be uniquely identifiable, that feature is already present in modernDoppler pulse radars. What is more difficult is turning data into accurate position estimate, sinceradar return may arrive to transmitter from variety of directions, due to anomalous atmospheric

propagation, signal distortion due to interference etc.

Acoustic detection

Planes are noisy, engines in particular but also airflow over surface. In former case, bafflers areadded, while in latter, noise is reduced by shaping plane so as to be more streamlined. However,internal weapons bays, when opened, create a great amount of noise.

Ultra-wide band radar

UWB radar works by transmitting several wavelengths at once, in short pulses. However, there areproblems: 1) it is more effective to transmit power in one pulse, 2) UWB antenna must work overfactor of ten or more in wavelength, 3) it would offer numerous false clutter targets. In short, if, forexample, UH frequency and VH frequency were used, such radar would combine UHF's and VHF'sadvantages AND disadvantages.

Also, it is very hard to make RAM that would be effective against multiple frequencies.

Cell phone network

Telephone calls between mobile phone masts can detect stealth planes with ease; mobile telephonecalls bouncing between base stations produce a screen of radiation. When the aircraft fly throughthis screen they disrupt the phase pattern of the signals. The Roke Manor system uses receivers,shaped like television aerials, to detect distortions in the signals.

A network of aerials large enough to cover a battlefield can be packed in a Land Rover.

Using a laptop connected to the receiver network, soldiers on the ground can calculate the positionof stealth aircraft with an accuracy of 10 metres with the aid of the GPS satellite navigation system.

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IR illumination

IR illumination famed "black light" of World War 2, used in Do 17Z-10 and Bf 110D-1/U1 nightfighters works on exact same principles as radar, with only difference being EM radiation'swavelenght, which is in IR range.

Since it is active technique, it also betrays location of emitter, and thus cannot be relied on forregular use by combat aircraft althought it can be fitted instead of radar - but can be used by airdefense networks.

Detecting LPI radar

F22s radar uses frequency hopping to counter radar recievers. However, it can only use relativelylow spread of frequencies, and can be detected by using spread-spectrum technology in RWRs.

Another way to hide radar signal is to include spread-spectrum technology; it is intended to reducesignature of radar signal and blend it into background noise. However, such radar still emits a signal

that is 1 million to 10 million times greater than real-world background noise. It is relatively simpleto build spread-spectrum passive receiver that can detect such radar at distance four times greaterthan radar's own detection range.

There are other ways of making radar LPI: 1) make a signal so weak that RWR cannot detect it, andincrease processing power, 2) narrow the radar beam and 3) have radar with far higher processinggain than RWR. Option one is impractical, and is only viable for few years, until newer RWR's areavaliable, even assuming it is initially successfull. Option two does not affect target being "painted",and option 3, closely connected to option one, is only, again, viable for few years.

Exercises charade

F22 proponents use exercises in which numerically inferior F22 force swept skies clear of enemyfighters as a proof of its supposed effectiveness. However, exercises are preplanned, unrealisticaland designed to play at F22s strengths while ignoring its weaknesses as well as reality of aircombat.

What is missing from claims of F22s superiority could fill a Bible. First, exercises assume fighterscharging head-on at each other with identities clearly known, like medieval knights; then, F22s usetheir radars to detect adversary aircarft which are not equipped with modern radars or any radardetectors - and launch computerized missiles which rarely miss. Second, all kills were made from

beyond visual range, with positive identification of "enemy" aircraft.

Adversaries, meanwhile, were simulating very simple OPFOR tactics ("Damn the AMRAAM, fullspeed ahead!"), equal fleet costs and fleet readiness were not represented in fights. Forgotten is the

possibility of assymetric response such as IRST, anti-radiation missiles or radar warning devices,all of them very basic measures that most potential opponents F22 might be used against have.Forgotten is unreliability of BVR missile shots. Forgotten is unreliability of BVR identification -utterly impossible if forces shut down IFF (which they do, so as not to be tracked).

That was also shown by ATF predecessor of F22 whereas, at first, stealthy ATFs were very

successful, very soon adversary ("red") pilots created tactics which allowed them to use theirnumbers to unmask stealth planes. To supress Red Force's unanticipated and undesirable mountingsuccesses, Air Force altered exercises until tests lost all semblance to reality. Successful adversary

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tactics and undesirable results went unrecorded, and were not reported to superiors; by virtue of"script", ATF and therefore F22 survived.

Alternatives

There are many alternatives to procuring F22 until a replacement can be designed and put intoservice. One is restarting production of F15C. Other possibilities include buying Dassault Rafale orEurofighter Typhoon.

F22s maximum achieved production rate of 36 per year and high cost mean that it would take 7years and 63,5 billion USD to replace all F15s (254) in service (currently there are 195 F22s builtfor 80,145 billion USD, 187 operational; replacing F15s would bring number to 441, 60 more thanUSAF stated minimum requirement. Actual requirement of 762 planes would bring cost to 290million USD per plane, and total cost to 221,4 billion USD). USAF also has to acquire at leastadditional 1500 combat planes, which would, with F22, take 42 years and 375 billion USD.

F16 would give 1500 planes for 90 billion USD, within 9 years, and as such would be excellentstopgap measure until a new, non-stealthy, super-agile dogfighter could be designed.

While F35 is touted by USAF as good way to increase numbers, that is not true first, F35 is aground attack plane, not a fighter; second, with unit flyaway cost of 207 million USD and unit

procurement cost of 305 million USD, it simply cannot give sufficient numbers without dealingdeath blow to already fragile US economy.

Notes

When USAF chief of staff was aked wether he really believes claims he makes about F22, answerwas "I express opinions about F22 that I am told to express.".

Conclusion

All of the above means that:1) F22 cannot get a jump at enemy at WVR, it will get detected by IRST or visually; at BVR,

either plane or missile launch/missile itself will get detected by IRST; and since it has toradiate to find targets, it is at disadvantage in radar area of detection too. It is based at wrong

premises and cannot be relied on to secure air superiority, air supremacy, or even airdominance

2) When ambushing enemy fails, it will be forced into close-in, manouvering dogfight, andkilled

3) F22 is too costly to operate in numbers large enough to win air war. Thus, converting it tofighter-bomber and using it to attack advanced SAMs that are proliferating would be farsmarter move, until VHF radars become advanced and numerous enough to completely denyit aerospace

4) F22 can be easily countered by combining VHF radars and IRST-equipped fighters; withradars handling first detection and then guiding fighters close enough to VLO target for theirIRST to acquire it.

F22, is, therefore, literal silver bullet extremely expensive and less effective than ordinary leadbullet. As can be seen, loyalty to the F22 that some people show does not hold under scrunity most likely, it is simply emotional attachement to overly hyped and quite sexy airplane. But even

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Fallen Madonna with Big Boobies that Lt. Gruber obsessed about cannot win a battle, much lesswar.

Additions

RCS size vs detection range

Target RCS size in m2 relative detection rangeAircraft carrier 100 000 1778Cruiser 10 000 1000Large airliner or automobile 100 1000Medium airliner or bomber 40 251Large fighter 6 157Small fighter 2 119Man 1 100Conventional cruise missile 0,5 84

Large bird 0,05 47Large insect 0,001 18Small bird 0,00001 6Small insect 0,000001 3

Effective range is calculated by formula (RCS1/RCS2) = (R1/R2)^4, where RCS = radar crosssection, while R=range.

RAM coatings

RAM coatings can be dielectric or magnetic. Dielectric works by addition of carbon products whichchange electric properties, and is bulky and fragile, while magnetic one uses iron ferrites whichdissipate and absorb radar waves, and are good against UHF radars.One of most known RAM coatings is iron ball paint, which contains tiny spheres coated withcarbonyl iron or ferrite. Radar waves induce molecular oscillations from the alternating magneticfield in this paint, which leads to conversion of the radar energy into heat.

The heat is then transferred to the aircraft and dissipated.

A related type of RAM consists of neoprene polymer sheets with ferrite grains or carbon black

particles (containing about 30% of crystalline graphite) embedded in the polymer matrix. The tileswere used on early versions of the F-117A Nighthawk, although more recent models use paintedRAM. The painting of the F-117 is done by industrial robots with the plane covered in tiles glued tothe fuselage and the remaining gaps filled with iron ball paint. The United States Air Forceintroduced a radar absorbent paint made from both ferrofluidic and non-magnetic substances. Byreducing the reflection of electromagnetic waves, this material helps to reduce the visibility ofRAM painted aircraft on radar.

Foam absorber typically consists of fireproofed urethane foam loaded with carbon black, and cutinto long pyramids. The length from base to tip of the pyramid structure is chosen based on the

lowest expected frequency and the amount of absorption required. For low frequency damping, thisdistance is often 24 inches, while high frequency panels are as short as 3-4 inches. Panels of RAMare installed with the tips pointing inward to the chamber. Pyramidal RAM attenuates signal by two

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effects: scattering and absorption. Scattering can occur both coherently, when reflected waves arein-phase but directed away from the receiver, and incoherently where waves are picked up by thereceiver but are out of phase and thus have lower signal strength. This incoherent scattering alsooccurs within the foam structure, with the suspended carbon particles promoting destructiveinterference. Internal scattering can result in as much as 10dB of attenuation. Meanwhile, the

pyramid shapes are cut at angles that maximize the number of bounces a wave makes within the

structure. With each bounce, the wave loses energy to the foam material and thus exits with lowersignal strength. Other foam absorbers are available in flat sheets, using an increasing gradient ofcarbon loadings in different layers.A Jaumann absorber or Jaumann layer is a radar absorbent device. When first introduced in 1943,the Jaumann layer consisted of two equally-spaced reflective surfaces and a conductive ground

plane. One can think of it as a generalized, multi-layered Salisbury screen as the principles aresimilar.

Being a resonant absorber (i.e. it uses wave interfering to cancel the reflected wave), the Jaumannlayer is dependent upon the /4 spacing between the first reflective surface and the ground planeand between the two reflective surfaces (a total of /4 + /4).

Because the wave can resonate at two frequencies, the Jaumann layer produces two absorptionmaxima across a band of wavelengths (if using the two layers configuration). These absorbers musthave all of the layers parallel to each other and the ground plane that they conceal.More elaborate Jaumann absorbers use series of dielectric surfaces that separate conductive sheets.The conductivity of those sheets increases with proximity to the ground plane.Iron ball paint has been used in coating the SR-71 Blackbird and F-117 Nighthawk, its activemolecule is made up by an iron atom surrounded by five carbon monoxide molecules.Iron ball paint (paint based on iron carbonyl) a type of paint used for stealth surface coating.The paint absorbs RF energy in the particular wavelength used by primary RADAR.Chemical formula: C5FeO5 / Fe (CO)5Molecular mass: 195.9 g/molApparent density: 76.87 g/cmcMolecular structure: An Iron atom surrounded by 5 carbon monoxide structures (it takes a balllikeshape, hence the name)Melting point: 1536 CHardness: 82-100 HB

It is obtained by carbonyl decomposition process and may have traces of carbon, oxygen andnitrogen. The substance (iron carbonyl) is also used as a catalyst and in medicine as an ironsupplement however it is toxic. The painting of the F-117 is done by industrial robots however the

F-117 is covered in tiles glued to the fuselage and the remaining gaps filled with iron ball paint.This type of coating converts the radar wave energy into heat (by molecular oscillations), the heat isthen transferred to the aircraft and dissipated.

Ideal fighter plane

Ideal fighter plane should be a small, cheap, single-seat single-engine plane. It should have a limitedRCS reduction as much as can be achieved without sacrificing performance or increasing cost toomuch (no RAM), no active sensors, good visibility and excellent manouverability, and should relyon IR missiles as its main air-to-air weapon.

In real world we don't live in Lockheed Martin's fantasy world, after all raids at airfields arealways a danger even when you have air superiority. Now, with long-range cruise missiles, more

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than ever. This means that plane must be capable of flying from hastily-prepared and hastily-repaired airfields, as well as using underground bases and underground runaways.

Links

1. http://i39.tinypic.com/197es8.jpg

Toni unjar

http://i39.tinypic.com/197es8.jpghttp://i39.tinypic.com/197es8.jpg